On Representational Music

Author(s): V. A. Howard
Source: Noûs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Mar., 1972), pp. 41-53
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2214512
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 SEVENTH SYMPOSIUM

On Representational Music

V. A. HOWARD

HARVARD PROJECT ZERO, and

THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO

Commentators: ANNETTE BARNES AMHERST COLLEGE

LEE BROWN OHIO STATE
UNIVERSITY

1. The Visual and the Musical'

Often the question whether music can be representational is

broached as implying that music as an auditory event could become
visual by synesthesis or substitute for a visual symbol. If, as
Goodman argues, "Nothing is intrinsically a representation"; but
rather, "status as a representation is relative to a symbol system."
([2], p. 226), then it is misleading to ask whether music can usurp
the function of pictures or even whether it is "by nature" non-
representational. The appropriate question is whether music can
belong to a representational system as pictures more typically do.
However, being a picture is neither necessary nor sufficient to
being a representation as amply attested by non-representational
styles of painting. "Objects and events, visual and nonvisual, can
be represented by either visual or nonvisual symbols." ([2], p. 231)
So it seems there is more to representation than meets the eye and
may include what meets the ear in some musical contexts. It is
the primary purpose of this paper to sketch the special conditions

1 This paper was improved by the comments of Messrs. Nelson Goodman

and T. Graham Roupas. I am grateful to the Canada Council for a grant in support
of the research.

41

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 42 NOUS

of auditory representation in so-called "pictorial" music while

distinguishing musical representation from other programmatic
symbol relations, particularly expression, description, and naming
with which it is easily confused. One source of confusion is an
ambiguous, common use of the word 'represents' roughly synon-
ymous with 'symbolizes', 'stands for', or 'refers to' where the
latter encompass many different symbol relations including pictorial
representation. We shall be limited to consideration of the musical
analogues of pictorial representation or depiction. The relative
musical merits of attempts to use music to represent objects and
events are not at issue.
The technical notion of a representational system is Good-
man's as described in Languages of Art and covers visual and
auditory as well as other kinds of symbols. While this restricted
sense of representation is suggested and in part controlled by
ordinary uses of the word in aesthetic contexts, it does not corre-
spond to all its aesthetic or derivative meanings anymore than
such meanings correspond to each other. Pictorial representation,
for instance, has little to do with parliamentary representation but
more with musical or gestural representation. The terms 'expres-
sion', 'representation', and 'description' identify specific symbol
relations found in both the visual and musical arts. I will argue
that music can and often does meet the necessary and sufficient
conditions of representation as well as of description and ex-
pression.

2. Onomatopoeia and Representation

A natural place to begin an inquiry into musical representa-

tion is onomatopoeic sounds such as bird twitters, canon shots,
water swirlings, drum rolls, wind howls, and the like. Examples
such as these might tempt one to conclude that only those parts
of music which are imitative replicas of "natural" sounds are
representational. This would be a mistake; for, as I hope to show,
onomatopoeia, though imitative, is often non-representational,
while musical representation can be either imitative or not. There
may be good reasons for avoiding or at least qualifying talk of
imitation, but they can wait. In the meantime, let me strike a
comparison with Goodman's analysis of our ordinary use of the
verb 'represents' as applied to pictures. (See [2], pp. 21-31)
Goodman holds that to say something "represents" or is a
"picture of" something else is ambiguous between saying what, if

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 ON REPRESENTATIONAL MUSIC 43

anything, the picture denotes

is, between

(1) X is a picture of (i.e., denotes) Y; and

(2) X is a Y-picture (or representation).

In sense (1), 'represents' or 'picture of' behaves as a dyadic

predicate indicating what things are labelled by the picture. In
sense (2), 'represents' becomes a monadic predicate referring not
to objects or events denoted by the picture but rather to how the
picture itself is to be classified regardless of whether there is or
ever was anything in the world corresponding to it. The difference
is between the pictorial labelling of things and the labelling of
pictorial things. Implicitly, we mark this distinction every time we
notice a departure from the standard case where (1) and (2) hold
simultaneously: where X is a picture of (denotes) Y, and X is a
Y-picture (e.g., a Churchill-picture denoting Churchill). Picture
X may well denote Y without being a Y-picture as in caricature or
abstract symbolism (e.g., Christ represented by a fish), or, in the
case of fictional beings, X may be a Y-picture without denoting
anything.
Onomatopoeia in musical works is the analogue of the standard
case in pictorial representation. Roughly put,

(3) Passage S denotes R, and S is an R-sound (e.g., canon

shots, church bells, etc.).

This simply means that the work-sound exemplifies some of

the same literal properties as some other sound which it denotes.
Provisionally, this is all that is intended by saying that onoma-
topoeic work-sounds represent imitatively. All other instances of
musical representation fall into the category of non-imitative work-
sounds where

(4) Passage S denotes R, and S is not an R-sound.

Eventually, we shall have to distinguish other sorts of de-

noting but non-imitative passages-what I call musical names and
descriptions-from representational ones. Just now, I should like
to say a bit more about onomatopoeia and imitation.

3. Onomatopoeia and Imitation

An important difference between onomatopoeia and the

standard case of pictorial representation is in the kind and degree

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 44 NOUS

of imitation. Onomatopoeic sounds in musical compositions are

frequently thought to be replicas of other sounds, whereas a man-
picture could hardly be a man-replica even if we are able to attach
some significance to "looks exactly like a man". Further, a sound
in onomatopoeia, if used denotatively, is a self-denoting label; that
is, it denotes all sounds having the properties it exemplifies in-
cluding itself. (See [2], pp. 61n and 81) In this way, a bang-sound
may become a surrogate for the predicate 'bang' by labelling
other bang-sounds. By contrast, a man-picture of Trudeau de-
notes him but not itself.
While I have spoken of onomatopoeia as imitative sound,
imitation is no reliable criterion either of a sound being onomato-
poeic or representational. Goodman observes that "The variability
of exemplification is amusingly attested . . . by some linguistic
curiosities: it seems that French dogs bark 'gnaf-gnaf' rather than
'bow-bow'; [one might add 'woof-woof' in English] that German
cats purr 'schnurr-schnurr,' French cats 'ron-ron'; and in France
a drip-drip is a plouf-plouf." ([2], p. 61n) Certainly there is as
much variability among church bell sounds and bird twitter sounds
as among onomatopoeic words in language. The fact that a sound
is treated as onomatopoeic is at least as likely an explanation of its
resemblance to other sounds which it denotes as its being a sound-
replica of them. Furthermore, we do not usually think of successive
toots of a train whistle or gull screeches as symbolizing, signifying,
or denoting each other anymore than do exact replicas of coins or
pieces of furniture. Similarity between two things in some or every
respect does not imply that one denotes the other. (See [2], pp. 3-6;
also [3], p. 19.) On the one hand, sounds dissimilar in many
respects are treated as onomatopoeic, and on the other, there are
sound-replicas which are not onomatopoeic. So even if onomato-
poeic sounds were not as variable as they are, similarity or imitation
would not explain the onomatopoeic labelling of one sound by
another. Accordingly, neither can imitation explain any subset of
musical denotation including representation. It is noteworthy too
that Goodman's examples of onomatopoeia above are all linguistic
and therefore by definition non-representational; that is, they
consist of verbal inscriptions belonging to systems that are syntac-
tically disjoint and articulate. I hasten to add that I am not arguing
that onomatopoeia is non-imitative, but rather that imitation is no
explanation of onomatopoeic reference in representational or
linguistic systems. Instead, it seems that the resemblances we
discover between sounds can often be attributed to their being

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 ON REPRESENTATIONAL MUSIC 45

used onomatopoeically as much as to similarities antecedently

perceived.

4. Scoring and Representing

Towards the end of Languages of Art, Goodman caps his
rejection of imitation as the basis of pictorial representation with
these condensed remarks on musical denoting.

One quite incidental consequence [of the analysis of pictorial re-

presentation] concerns representation in music. Here no more than in
painting does representation require imitation. But if a performance
of a work defined by a standard score denotes at all, it still does not
represent; for as a performance of such a work it belongs to an articu-
late set. The same sound-event, taken as belonging to a dense set of
auditory symbols, may represent. Thus electronic music without
any notation or language properly so-called may be representational,
while music under standard notation, if denotative at all, is descrip-
tive. This is a minor curiosity, especially since denotation plays so
small a role in music. ([2], p. 232)

I am inclined to believe that denotation plays a larger role in

programme music and especially opera than Goodman's last
sentence might suggest, but that is incidental. Two kinds of
musical denoting are distinguished here: representation in a system
that is syntactically dense, and description in one that is syntac-
tically disjoint and articulate. For the moment, it is sufficient to
mark the difference by whether the durations of pitches and
silences of a performance are assignable to and identified by a
score in standard notation. If pitches and durations are so notated,
then score and performance are mutually recoverable: score from
performance and conversely. ([2], p. 178) In neither representation
nor description is the music uniquely recoverable from the objects
or events denoted (e.g., a waterfall, battle, etc.), so that both are
semantically non-disjoint, dense, or inarticulate. Thus, while
musical representation shares certain symbol features in common
with pictorial systems, musical description shares others in com-
mon with linguistic systems. Usually, pictorial systems are both
syntactically and semantically dense, whereas linguistic systems are
syntactically disjoint, articulate, and tend to be semantically dense.
It might appear from this that the mere existence of an
appropriate score could mark the difference among denoting
passages between those which represent and those which describe.
However, that would be an arbitrary and nominal difference at
best. It is not just the presence or absence of a score that marks

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 46 NOUS

the difference between the representational and the descriptive

but rather scoreability. It must be clear what are the characters
and inscriptions of a notational scheme that make for duplication
of the performance sounds. Performances which can be duplicated
via such a scheme would also be said to belong to an articulate set
whether or not they have ever been actually scored. But saying
this is not enough either; for it is precisely in the context of dis-
cussions of conventionally scored programme music that one most
frequently encounters talk of "musical painting", "representation",
or "pictorial music". To exclude these cases would be to eliminate
the paradigms of musical representation, at least as reflected in
the parlance of music theory and criticism. In other words, an
analysis of representational music should allow for it being so
under standard notation. This appears to contradict Goodman's
claims above, but I believe the contradiction can be eliminated by
marshalling a distinction and eliciting an assumption.
The distinction is one Goodman carefully draws earlier be-
tween a score and a notation. Notationality refers to the conjunction
of five properties of a system: syntactic disjointness and articulate-
ness, unambiguity, and semantic disjointness and articulateness.
([2], pp. 130-141 and 148-157) Any system lacking even one of
these features thus far fails of notationality. Theoretically and
practically, it is these five characteristics of a notational system
that make possible the mutual recoverability of score and per-
formance. In fact, many modern scoring methods fall short of
strict notationality (usually through violation of syntactic or
semantic articulateness), and not even standard music notation is
entirely "notational" inasmuch as it incorporates ambiguous
symbols, some linguistic and some not. ([2], pp. 183-185) Various
expression marks and verbal instructions regarding tempo, attack,
and dynamics are ambiguous. It is by virtue of just these non-
notational features of the music that a given passage may represent
something. This is because the sound-compliants of these am-
biguous elements of the score, when themselves taken as symbols,
turn out to be both syntactically and semantically undifferentiated.
Suppose, for instance, a few bars of stereotypical "galloping
music" of the deedle-dum, deedle-dum, deedle-dum-dum-dum
variety, duly written out in standard notation. Suppose further
that the music indicates the approach or recession of a rider,2

2 A rider? Of what? A horse, camel, or ostrich? Though ancillary clues as to

what specific objects are denoted can be gleaned from context or accompanying
titles, it may be thought that such questions constitute a peculiar threat to the

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 ON REPRESENTATIONAL MUSIC 47

each instant of sound indicating a relative location by an increase

or decrease of volume. Depending upon the dynamics, the rider
could be represented either as approaching and then receding or
receding and approaching again, e.g., '< >' or '> <'. Thus,
within the same work-class as defined by the score, there are
performances which may represent quite different events. That is,
we may have ambiguity within the same work-class-precisely
what Goodman does not assume in the quoted passage above.
Rather he assumes no ambiguity between score and compliant
performance and no ambiguity between the music as sound event
and what it denotes. So, given both that a passage denotes and
that it belongs to an articulate scheme, it is descriptive.
Wagner's system of leitmotifs contain convenient examples
of musical description. Description with motifs is commonly a
matter of class membership or predication as in natural languages.
For instance, if a love motif be combined with a naming motif,
the result is non-disjoint class inclusion or a musical description
equivalent to saying so-and-so is in love. A motif may also be
projected over a number of different characters or situations thereby
achieving generality through having multiple compliants, and
hence, descriptive status. The "Sturm-und-Drang Motiv" in Die
Meistersinger appears to operate in this way as do group naming
motifs like the "Meistersinger Motiv" which, among other things,
can be construed as indicating class membership.
It might be objected that the scores of these examples contain
ambiguous characters contrary to Goodman's assumption and
should, therefore, qualify as representational rather than descrip-
tive. This objection presupposes that music under a partially
notational score is always representational if denotational. However,
just as the mere presence or absence of a score does not mark the
difference between the descriptive and the representational, neither
does the mere presence of ambiguous parts of scores. Whether a
denoting passage is representational depends upon whether the
music denotes in respect of those aspects of the music which
belong to an inarticulate scheme. That is not the case with the
preceding examples from Wagner in which the non-notational
aspects of the music contribute exclusively to its expressive

denotative uses of music. However, this objection overlooks the fact that there is
nothing intrinsic about the linguistic symbol "horse and rider" binding it in-
extricably to what in fact the phrase denotes. Nor are pictures (pictorial represen-
tations) any less subject to ambiguity and vagueness regarding what they denote,
even, as we have seen, to the point of denoting things not pictured.

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 48 NOUS

qualities. In the example of the rider, however, the passage shows

relative position-nearness or remoteness, approach or recession-
by fluctuations in volume which are densely indicated in the score.
Being therefore both syntactically and semantically dense with
respect to the denoted event, the passage meets the requirements
of a representational system. Besides this familiar device of silent
film accompanists, there are less obvious examples of the use of
music to construct a representational "sliding scale" in respect of
some property or quality. As G. B. Shaw once observed, "It is a
favorite trick of Wagner's, when one of his characters is killed on
stage, to make the theme attached to that character weaken, fail,
and fade away with a broken echo into silence." ([6], p. 106)
Thus may a musical name be transformed to represent an event
involving the character named.

5. System and Scheme

Putting aside exceptions to notationality, a score in standard

notation is a character in a notational system, the system con-
sisting of scores and compliant performances. Where musical
sounds are thought to have semantic (denotational) content, this
''normal" situation is altered in at least two noteworthy respects:
first, the sounds themselves acquire the syntactic features of a
notational scheme, namely, syntactic disjointness and finite differ-
entiation; but, secondly, scores and compliant performances be-
come characters in different notational schemes. Allow me to
explain this a bit further.
Where a score S denoting sound events M constitutes a
notational system, M as compliants of S must constitute a nota-
tional scheme when M is taken to denote something else X. This
is because M retains the characteristics of disjointness and finite
differentiation through the shift. as it were, from sound-compliant
to sound-symbol. However, M must belong to a different nota-
tional scheme from S for the reason that X, the compliants of M,
may not meet the semantic requirements of notationality. One is
tempted to think of S and M under these circumstances on the
analogy of written and verbal inscriptions in language where the
printed or spoken word, say, 'cat' have a common compliant. But
if it is assumed that S and M belong to the same notational scheme
with respect to a common compliant X, then the notationality of
the system S-M would be sacrificed in the event that X did not
satisfy the semantic conditions of notationality. In fact, the system
M-X, as contrasted with the system S-M, may be either descriptive

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 ON REPRESENTATIONAL MUSIC 49

or notational depending upon whether the compliance classes of

M are disjoint and articulate. In language, both phonological
elements and written inscriptions can be coextensive. In music,
scores clearly denote sounds, but taking scores or parts of them as
denoting the compliants of the sounds would render scores non-
notational. In other words, when used descriptively, musical sounds
do not ascend (or descend, whichever one prefers) to the status of
coordinate verbal utterances of written inscriptions as in language.
However, as with language, a notational sound-scheme M is merely
a necessary condition of description as well as of notationality,
which leaves it open whether X will meet the semantic conditions
of notationality or description.
Nevertheless, there are practical circumstances where we
might consolidate the characters of the score and sound schemes
as belonging to one system. In literary discussions of programme
music and opera, for instance, one frequently encounters excerpted
portions of a score labelled "The Siegfried Motif" or "The Sword
Motif" being treated as if these score segments were coextensive
with the musical sounds they denote. However, at most a score
segment indirectly denotes a compliant of the music. In the context
of performance, it is a musical passage, not a score segment that
denotes Siegfried. Temporarily, we may adopt the linguistic analogy
for convenient reference; but only by ellipsis do a score S and
compliant sounds M become coextensive inscriptions of the same
characters.

6. Three Kinds of Musical Denoting

Musical naming and description are two kinds of musical
denoting in which the sounds of music acquire syntactic charac-
teristics relative to their denotata. The same applies also to musical
representation as a third species of musical denoting. However, as
I have argued, a distinguishing feature of representational music is
that it denotes in respect of those musical aspects which are non-
notational, that is, do not belong to a notational scheme. The
remainder of this paper will try to sharpen the differences between
the three kinds of musical denoting and finally contrast them with
musical expression as another kind of musical reference.
Assume a notational scheme consisting of Figure 1 plus
specific pitches and their durations-sounds-organized to satisfy
the syntactic and semantic conditions of notationality. These
sounds as characters, if taken to refer to something else so organ-
ized (say, different line lengths in inches) would then belong to a

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 50 NOUS

notational scheme. The whole consisting of the notational scheme

and the line intervals would constitute a notational system, in
which particular pitches and lengths of line are mutually re-
coverable: F and 1 inch, G and 2 inches, and so on. At first glance,
this manufactured example may seem remote from anything
musically real. But consider that, among other things, it is the
purpose of characters in a notational system such as a standard
score to identify a work from one performance to another. ([2],
p. 128) Similarly, a function of naming motifs in opera, so far as
they are denotational, is to signal the identity of their compliants.

V I I I

E denotes lines one inch long

F denotes lines two inches long
G denotes lines three inches long

FIGURE 1

Naming motifs are parts of a work denoting extra-musical things

and however else they may function in the work, denotatively they
serve mainly to identify and signalize their compliants whether
particular objects, a character, group, or even as naming an event
or feeling. As such, naming motifs constitute a redundant3 nota-
tional subsystem of a larger descriptive system of motifs. The only
significant difference between Figure 1 and actual naming motifs
from the standpoint of the symbol relations involved is that instead
of individual pitches being correlated with different lengths of line,
a whole musical passage is correlated with some item in a music-
drama. The passage may also be distinctive in its auditory appeal
and expressive of qualities of its compliant, but these features
should not be confused with its denotative use as a musical name.
From the fact that musical sounds may be so organized as to
satisfy the syntactic requirements of a notational scheme, it does
not follow that they satisfy the semantic requirements of a nota-
tional system. As in Figure 2 (a) the sounds may denote over-

3Since there may be different variations of the same motif.

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 ON REPRESENTATIONAL MUSIC 51

lapping compliance classes thus sacrificing semantic disjointness

and the mutual recoverability of sounds and compliants. Or they
may denote ambiguously as in 2 (b). Either way, the sounds, while
continuing to be parts of a notational scheme, belong to a descrip-

(a) E denotes lines between one and three inches long

F denotes lines between two and four inches long
G denotes lines between three and five inches long

(b) E denotes lines one or two inches long

F denotes lines two or three inches long
G denotes lines three or four inches long

FIGURE 2

tive rather than notational system with respect to the extra-musical

things they denote. If we introduce a slur (Figure 3) without finite
differentiation between distinct pitches, and further stipulate that
any difference in pitch denotes a difference in line length, the

FIGURE 3

system becomes both syntactically and semantically dense-a non-

notational scheme correlated with an undifferentiated field of
reference-in short, a representational system not unlike the
examples of the horseman and death motifs above.

7. Expression

The topic of expression is introduced here more as an appendix

than an extension of the preceding discussion. The three kinds of

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 52 NOUS

musical denoting analysed above are thrown into some relief by

comparing them to expression understood as a species of non-
denoting musical reference.
According to Goodman, what a work of art in this instance
a musical work-expresses are certain metaphorical labels denoting
and exemplified by the music ([2], pp. 85-95; see also [4]). Naming,
description, and representation depend upon what music under
certain syntactic and semantic conditions is taken to denote. One
difference, then, between expression as contrasted with naming,
description, and representation is the difference between being
denoted and denoting-denoting of versus denoting by music.
Given that difference, expression is a matter of the metaphorical
exemplification of properties belonging to the music solely as
music. Since expression is not conditional upon the music's ful-
filling certain syntactic requirements or its denoting anything,
expression may characterize denoting and non-denoting music
either as an additional nuance of musical names, descriptions, and
representations, or as the sole extra-musical reference. Many a
musical "programme" so-called is purely expressive. Beethoven,
for instance, described his Pastoral Symphony as "expression of
feeling rather than painting" ([1], p. 649) the point being that
it was in no way intended to denote any actual or generalized scene.
Much the same thing could be said of the greater portion of
Romantic music, namely that it is metaphorically exemplificational
(expressive) rather than denotational, i.e., descriptive or represen-
tational. As I have argued elsewhere:

. . . (M)usic may metaphorically exemplify many of the labels literally

applicable to, say, a love scene (e.g., tender, pleading, yielding, pas-
sionate) and thereby expressively underscore a dramatic action with-
out necessarily denoting anything. Much programme music which
seems prima facie descriptive, actually belongs in the . . . category of
expressive music; which is to say that the music exemplifies literally
or metaphorically many of the same labels as denote the dramatic
action or whatever is mentioned in the title. Of course, descriptive
music is usually also expressive, but the reverse generalization is less
likely to hold.... (F)requently we are at a loss to decide whether a
piece is denotational. A proper performance of Debussy's La Mer,
for instance, may not so much describe the sea as express qualities of
it, many of which belong literally to the sea and metaphorically to the
music, e.g., shimmering, swirling, heaving, swelling, ebbing, flowing,
gurgling. However, any number of other things might exhibit the
same or similar properties. Had the title of Debussy's work been
Mal de Mer, most of the same labels would continue to apply, in-

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ON REPRESENTATIONAL MUSIC 53

eluding even the titles of the subsections (e.g., "De L'Aube a midi
sur la mer") transformed thereby into hideous jokes! There are of
course as many similarities between the sea, Debussy's music, and
nausea as there are labels applicable to all three; but it requires no
attention to what, if anything, the music denotes to discover any of
them. On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent anyone from
taking Debussy's piece as descriptive of the sea, and there are charac-
teristics of the work which encourage that interpretation. The sub-
titles of each symphonic poem not only set an expressive mood but
delimit specific aspects of the sea: "jeux de vagues", "Dialogue du
vent et de la mer". Moreover, that the music expresses qualities of
the sea in no way prohibits its also describing the sea provided certain
syntactic and semantic conditions are met. The point is that the
music can be so construed, and if La Mer denotes, it does so descrip-
tively. [5].

In conclusion, I have tried to show how music can be represen-

tational by comparison to the ways in which it may also be descrip-
tive or expressive. Beyond a few hints limited to particular instances,
no general criteria or tests for detecting what a piece represents,
names, describes, or expresses have been suggested. Rather, it was
argued that if music represents or describes, it must satisfy certain
syntactic and semantic conditions which are the analogues of
conditions more typical of pictorial and linguistic systems. Neither
were any suggestions made for deciding the relative merits of the
referential uses of music. The preceding analyses are compatible
with all artistic attitudes from reverence to revulsion for pro-
gramme devices. Instead, focus has been on certain symbol re-
lations, however one prefers to name them, which are characteristic
of some music and have their counterparts in other symbol systems.

REFERENCES

[1] Apel, Willi. Harvard Dictionary of Music, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Mass., 1969.
[2] Goodman, Nelson. Languages of Art, Indianapolis, 1968.
[3] . "Seven Strictures on Similarity," in Experience and Theory, ed. by
Lawrence Foster and J. W. Swanson, Amherst, 1970, 19-29.
[4] Howard, V. A. "On Musical Expression," The British Journal of Aesthetics,
11, 268-280.
[5] . "On Musical Denoting," unpublished paper.
[6] Shaw, G. B. The Perfect Wagnerite, New York, 1967.

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