PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, Dayan and Dr.
Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and
vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
GR. No. 135981, January 15, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa,
appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived
happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always
quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that
every time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and
sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical
doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and
the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However,
appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed
the victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide against
appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by beating
through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of
her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating
circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation
of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the
examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to
determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3)
the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes
of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a
quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme
Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It
remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert psychological
and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea.
Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra.
subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman
syndrome” as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
RULING:
1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is
afflicted with the “battered woman syndrome”.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected
to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce
her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights.
Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship
with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the
couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find
herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time,
and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-
called “cycle of violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension-building
phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least,
nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising
from the battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of
violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes
between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute
battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in
the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her
life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable --
not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on
the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken
altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense.
Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements
were duly established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence”
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No
doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in
at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar
pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third
phase of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence
must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our
jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a
real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent
and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that
the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression;
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3)
Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It
presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger
thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however,
according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him.
She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to
their children’s bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and
went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had
ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual
threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation
were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two
circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation --
did not arise from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the
battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated
beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which
was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without
depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been
held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of
an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts
or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate
this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act,
both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this
act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved
as conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that
when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to
have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the
aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific
purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that
might be put up by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally
produced passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal
night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight
(8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the
aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled
her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide.
However, considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and
without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained
for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of
the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon
due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for
some other lawful cause.
NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise
known as Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was
enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found
by the courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur any
criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements
for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HONORIO TIBON y DEISO, accused-appellant.
GR. No. 188320, June 29, 2010
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Honorio Tibon (accused-appellant) and his common-law wife Gina Sumingot
(Gina) lived together as husband and wife. They had two children, Keen Gist
(KenKen) and Reguel Albert (Reguel). They lived together with Tibon’s parents
and siblings on the third floor of a rented house. Gina went to Hongkong to
work as a domestic helper, leaving their children to Tibon’s custody. After
some time, Tibon heard from her sister who was also working abroad that Gina
was having an affair with another man. After the revelation, he was spotted
drinking a lot and was seen hitting his two children.
On the night of December 12, 1998, at around 11:30 p.m., accused-appellant’s
mother and his siblings (Zernan and Leilani), went to Tibon’s room. They saw
him with the two children who appeared to be lifeless and bore wounds on
their bodies. When Tibon realized that his mother and siblings had seen the
children lying on the floor he stabbed himself on the chest with a kitchen knife
and jumped out of the window of their house. At the hospital, accused-
appellant survived and was treated however, the children could no longer be
revived.
When Gina heard about the incident, she went home immediately and
confronted Tibon at the hospital where he was confined. He confessed to
stabbing their children and begged her for forgiveness.
In court, Tibon denied the charges against him and raised insanity as defense.
He said that he could not recall what happened on the night he allegedly
stabbed his two children. He also could not remember being taken to the
hospital. He said that he was only informed by his siblings that he had killed his
two children, causing him to jump off the window of their house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the exempting circumstance of insanity applies to the accused-
appellant’s case?
RULING:
NO.  Under Article 12 of the RPC “An imbecile or an insane person, unless the
latter has acted during a lucid interval” is exempted from criminal liability.
Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden
of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Testimony or proof of insanity
must relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense.
The medical records of Tibon with the National Center for Mental Health
(NCMH) is inapplicable for such refers to his condition to stand trial and not to
his mental state immediately before or during the commission of the crimes.

Tibon’s behavior was triggered by jealousy because of the revelation that his
wife was having an affair overseas. Uncontrolled jealousy and anger are not
equivalent to insanity.
The court considered Parricide as the applicable law in this case. Under Article
264 Parricide is committed when: (i) a person is killed; (ii) the deceased is
killed by the accused; (iii) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant,
or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Tibon was found guilty by this Court
with the punishment of reclusion perpetua.
ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
GR. No. 182941, July 3, 2009
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA was playing with her friend BBB in the
second floor of her family’s house in Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner who was
fifteen years old at that time, arrived holding a knife and told AAA and BBB that
he wanted to play with them. The petitioner then undressed BBB and had
sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA, undressed her, and
also had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his male organ into hers.
He was convicted of rape and was imposed a penalty of imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua and a fine. He elevated the case to CA and during the
pendency of the case, RA 9344 took effect. CA affirmed the conviction and
denied the defense of minority since the age was not established by presenting
the birth certificate but only alleged in the testimonial of the petitioner and
his mother. According to them the burden of proof of age is upon the
prosecution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law be given retroactive application.
RULING/RATIO:
YES. The duty to establish the age of the accused is not on the prosecution but
on the accused. Age can be established by birth certificate. Sec. 7 provides that
in the absence of such document, age may be based from the information of the
child, testimonies of other persons, physical appearance and other
relevant evidence.
Also in case of doubt, minority should be in favor of the child. In the case at
bar, minority was established by the testimonies of the petitioner and his
mother. This was not objected by the prosecution and did not even
presented contrary evidence. Thus, minority is established. The law
should be given retroactive application since this favors the accused as
provided for in the Revised Penal Code – penal laws favoring the accused
should be given retroactive effect. Hence the accused is considered a minor
with an age of not above 15 years old. The case is dismissed and the petitioner
is referred to the appropriate local social welfare.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NILO DE JESUS and WILFREDO YALONG, defendants-appellants.
GR. No. L-58506 November 19, 1982
DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS: Court of First Instance (CFI) convicted Nilo De Jesus and Wilfredo
Yalong of murder qualified by treachery and conspired in killing Feliciano de
los Santos. Fernando de los Santos, son of the victim has testified for the
prosecution. According to him, he was awakened by a shout of the small boy
informing him that his father was engaged in a quarrel. He stated in his
testimony that he saw Yalong aiming a gun at his father and when he shouted
at him to run the latter had already fired before he could do so, afterwards de
Jesus grabbed the gun and also shot his father which felled him and caused his
death. Petitioners interposed self-defense. Yalong admitted to shot Feliciano
twice after the victim almost stab him with a knife.

ISSUE: Whether or not the claim of self-defense be consider or conviction of

conspiracy be sustained?

HELD: Fernando's testimony that it was De Jesus who shot the victim was
found to be fabricated. Based on the record, Yalong admitted the shooting,
corroborated by De Jesus and another witness, Mrs. Anita Bernales' testimony.
It was likewise found that Fernando was the one who had a previous quarrel
with the deceased, thus the former was with motive to harm the latter. And if
conspiracy existed, accused-appellants would not have to do it at the place
where they can be seen conspicuously. The qualifying circumstance of
treachery by the lower court cannot be sustained as Yalong's decision to shoot
the deceased appeared to be sudden, brought about by the latter's unlawful
aggression to stab the former by a dagger.Yalong is entitled to the benefit of the
special mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense inasmuch as there
was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased without any provocation
coming from Yalong, but it was not proven that the means employed by the
latter was reasonably necessary.

De Jesus ACQUITTED; Yalong's conviction was MODIFIED to homicide