G.R. No.

127240             March 27, 2000

ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the
1 

Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting petitioner Ong Chia to
Philippine citizenship.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived
at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines
where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom
he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a
Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in §2, and lack of the disqualifications
enumerated in §3 of the law, stated —

17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of
Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor
General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon
owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted
after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by
administrative process was suspended;

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony
of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness
present any witness against him, he remarked:

Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in
the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the
Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really
deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish
to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the
petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.
3

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all
the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in
violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or
occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of
§2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. 4

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, in which petitioner
5 
stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as
"Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for
naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail. The state also annexed income tax
6 

returns allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly
7 

support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although
petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in
1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of
marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present
his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977
marriage contract and a Joint-Affidavit executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show
8  9 

that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been
required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had
been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according
to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been
married.

The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence,  petitioner
10 

resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition.

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted,
reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the
importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in
the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal.  The appellate court held:
11 

As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to
state in this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which
name appeared in his previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and
pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for naturalization and failure to include the same
militates against a decision in his favor. . . This is a mandatory requirement to allow those
persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come forward and inform the
authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his application for citizenship.

Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly
resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised
Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state in his petition "his present and former
places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply
with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision is to give
the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government, upon the publication of
the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their objections against the
petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the public and
said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .

Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he
lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the
consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of
clergy and begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper
and irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies
him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization . . .

Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of
bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income
 tax return "because he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It
is not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in
life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's
becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are in their old age,
petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their children.
The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his
income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said
pensions are contingent, speculative and precarious. . .

Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN

NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE
THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.

II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN
KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER

STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES
OF RESIDENCE.

IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO
CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which
had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the
reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence,
they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value,"  so it was argued, because under
12 

Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered.

The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143  of the Rules of Court which provides
13 

that —

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election

cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided
for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (Emphasis added).

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked
by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The
only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and
convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered
by the rule on res judicata.  Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State
14 
from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its
documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process.  We are
15 

not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not
been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility.  Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of
16 

the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections,
as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:

The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was
supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case
number of the alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the
petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and
should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal.  17

Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted
for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of
which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation
Sheet  of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No.
18 

031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the
documents presented by the State.

Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition in SCN Case No.
031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
petitioner's income tax returns — are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under
oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or
irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the
appellate court did not err in relying upon them.

One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle
all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address
"J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on
petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as
Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said
address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had
been fully published,  with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes
19 

substantial compliance with §7.  This is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the
20 

objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the

government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of
information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have
lived at one time or another.  It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly
21 

enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.  As noted by
22 

the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the
petition his present and former places of residence.  This provision and the rule of strict application
23 

of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the
requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought
to be denied.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

DIGEST

The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State,
however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, among others for having failed to state all his
former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7 and to support his petition with the
appropriate documentary evidence. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his
petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully
published, with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial
compliance with §7.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the documents annexed by the State to its appelant’s brief without having been
presented and formally offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence justified the reversal of of the Trial Court’s decision.

HELD:

YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Petition was denied.

RATIO:

It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant. [T]he rule of strict application of the law in naturalization
cases defeat petitioner’s argument of “substantial compliance” with the requirement under the
Revised Naturalization Law.
[T]he reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered
is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that
he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate
court by the State.

[G.R. NOS. 140538-39 : June 14, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. GODOFREDO B.

ADOR and DIOSDADO B. ADOR III, Appellants.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

The quiescence of the fading day was shattered by bursts of gunfire,

startling the otherwise tranquil but sanguine folks of Pacol, Naga
City.As the fusillade of shots ceased and the wisp of smoke cleared,
frolicking promenaders stumbled upon Ompong Chavez who was
gasping his last, clutching his intestines which had spewed out from
his bloodied stomach.He did not in fact reach the hospital alive.A
breath away, Abe Cuya lay lifeless on the pavement.He died on the
spot.For the twinned deaths, the Adors, six (6) of them, were haled
to court.

In two (2) separate informations,1 Diosdado Sr.,2 Diosdado Jr.,

Diosdado III, Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan, all surnamed Ador,
were charged with the murder of Absalon Abe S. Cuya III and
Rodolfo Ompong S. Chavez.The Informations in Crim. Cases
Nos.97-6815 and 97-6816 identically read: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ

That on or about March 10, 1997, in the City of Naga, Philippines,

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and the aid of
armed men, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot ABSALON ABE CUYA III (RODOLFO OMPO CHAVEZ y SAN
ANDRES3 for Crim. Case No. 97-6816) with firearms, inflicting upon
him multiple and mortal gunshot wounds which caused his death, to
the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
With the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and
nighttime.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

However, only four (4) of the six (6) Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr.,
Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan, were taken into custody.The two (2),
Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III, remained at large.Trial thus
proceeded only against Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan
who all pleaded not guilty.Diosdado Sr. is the father of Diosdado Jr.,
Diosdado III and Godofredo, while Rosalino is the father of
Allan.Diosdado Sr. and Rosalino are brothers.4 ςrνll

In its effort to secure the conviction of the accused, the prosecution

presented a total of sixteen (16) witnesses: Mercy Beria, Larry
Cado, Medico-Legal Officer of Naga City Dr. Joel S. Jurado, Police
Inspector Ma. Julieta Razonable, SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa, SPO3
Augusto Basagre, Major Ernesto Idian, Inspector Reynaldo F. Fulgar,
SPO1 Noli Reyes Sol, SPO3 Eduardo C. Bathan, Inspector Vicente C.
Lauta, Ernani Castillo, PO3 Augusto I. Nepomuceno, Absalon Cuya
Sr., Efren Chavez and Pablo Calsis.

From the evidence of the prosecution, it appears that on March 10,

1997, at around seven-thirty in the evening, while Mercy Beria,
Larry Cado and some eleven (11) others were leisurely walking
along Kilometer 11 on their way to Zone 1, Kilometer 10, Pacol,
Naga City, to attend a wedding anniversary, they heard several
gunshots.Shortly after, they met a certain Pablito Umali who told
them that Ompong Chavez had been shot.They ran to Chavez
straight off and saw him already lying on the ground, about 1
meters away from a lighted electric post, holding on to his intestines
which were starting to come out.Beria shook Chavez and asked him
what had happened.Chavez replied tinambangan kami na Ador (We
were ambushed by the Adors) and requested that he be brought to
the hospital as he was dying.About eight (8) meters from where
Chavez was, in a dark spot, lay Abe Cuya, dead.5  ςrνll

Upon learning of the shooting incident through their radio

communication, SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa, together with PO2
Alexander Diaz, immediately proceeded to the crime scene to
conduct an investigation.SPO3 Eduardo Bathan and SPO1 Wilfredo
Fernandez, among others, were already there.6 SPO1 Barbosa
collected some pieces of evidence, took some pictures and made
some sketches.7 SPO1 Fernandez on the other hand interviewed one
Cresenciana Mendoza in her house which was nearby, and when he
heard people shout that Chavez was still alive, he brought Chavez
to the hospital but the latter expired on the way.8 
ςrνll

That same evening, upon being informed that the Adors had a long-
standing grudge against the Cuyas, SPO1 Barbosa sought the help
of then Barangay Captain Josue Perez to accompany him to the
residence of the Adors.They arrived at the Adors at around ten
oclock that evening and spoke with their patriarch, Diosdado Ador
Sr. SPO1 Barbosa looked for the other male members of the Ador
family but was told by Diosdado Sr. that they were already
asleep.Diosdado Sr. nevertheless promised to present them the
following day.9 
ςrνll

The following morning, March 11, 1997, Barangay Captain Perez

accompanied the Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr., Diosdado III,
Godofredo, Rosalino, Allan and Reynaldo, to SPO1 Barbosa at the
PNP Central Police Headquarters.The Adors were informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to choose their own
counsel.They were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the
Provincial Headquarters and subjected to paraffin tests.10 On the
way to the crime laboratory, Godofredo told his police escort that he
had been entrusted with a handgun which he kept in his
residence.11 The information was relayed to Major Ernesto Idian,
then Deputy Chief of Police of Naga City, who ordered PO3 Augusto
I. Nepomuceno to accompany him in recovering the gun because
Godofredo said that he would turn in the gun only to PO3
Nepomuceno.Thus, Major Idian, PO3 Nepomuceno and some others
accompanied Godofredo to the latters residence.

Upon reaching the Ador residence, Godofredo, together with PO3

Nepomuceno, went to their backyard, retrieved the gun from under
a fallen coconut trunk and turned it in to the latter.Godofredo
allegedly told the police that he fired the said gun outside their
house on the night of March 10 after he heard several
gunshots.12 PO3 Nepomuceno identified the gun as a caliber .38
paltik handgun which had no serial number.13 PO3 Nepomuceno
then turned over the handgun to Major Idian14 who likewise
identified it as a .38 caliber revolver.Major Idian returned the
handgun to PO3 Nepomuceno for ballistic and paraffin
examination.15 Thereafter, PO3 Nepomuceno placed his initials on
the gun and put it in his private locker while preparing the
documents for the examinations and the possible filing of a case for
Illegal Possession of Firearm.16 
ςrνll

Also, on the same day, March 11, 1997, Dr. Joel S. Jurado, Medico-
Legal Officer of Naga City, conducted an autopsy on the bodies of
Chavez and Cuya.Based on the autopsy reports, Dr. Jurado testified
that Cuya sustained five (5) gunshot wounds and died from cardio-
pulmonary arrest, massive intra-thoracic, intra-abdominal, intra-
cranial hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds
penetrating the heart, brain, lungs and digestive tract.17 Chavez on
the other hand had three (3) gunshot wounds and died from
traumatic shock and massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage
secondary to multiple gunshot wounds penetrating the right kidney
and the internal abdominal organs.18 Dr. Jurado further testified that
that he recovered a slug from Cuyas head three (3) days after he
conducted the autopsy - after Cuyas relatives called his attention to
a protruding mass in Cuyas head.Thus, he had Cuyas cadaver sent
back to the funeral parlor, opened it and was able to extract a
deformed .38 caliber slug which he thereafter submitted to the City
Prosecutors Office.19 
ςrνll

Police Inspector Reynaldo Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm Identification

Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Ola, Legaspi City,
testified that based on the ballistic examination he conducted on the
bullets submitted to his office, the .38 caliber slug recovered from
Cuyas head matched the three (3) .38 caliber test bullets which
were test-fired from the suspected firearm surrendered by
Godofredo.He however averred that the .38 caliber bullets were
actually fired from a .357 Smith and Wesson Magnum homemade
revolver without serial number, and not from a .38 caliber
revolver.20 
ςrνll
The paraffin casts taken from the Adors were also transmitted to
the PNP Crime Laboratory Services for examination and yielded the
presence of gunpowder nitrates, thus

(1) Diosdado A. Ador both hands, positive;

(2) Diosdado B. Ador III right hand, positive; left hand, negative;

(3) Godofredo B. Ador right hand, positive; left hand, negative;

(4) Rosalino A. Ador both hands, positive;

(5) Reynaldo T. Ador both hands, negative;21

(6) Allan T. Ador both hands, positive.22 

ςrνll

Absalon Cuya Sr., father of deceased Cuya III, said that the killing
of his son was driven by the long-standing feud between the Adors
and his family.He said that Diosdado Jr. had earlier accused his
other son Liberato of frustrated homicide for allegedly stabbing him
(Diosdado Jr.). 23 Then, Adelina, a daughter of Diosdado Sr., filed a
case for abduction with multiple rape against him, Absalon III,
Rayne and Josephine, all surnamed Cuya, after the romantic
relationship between Adelina and his deceased son Absalon III
turned sour.24 He also presented official receipts of the funeral and
burial expenses which amounted to P10,230.00.25  ςrνll

Efren Chavez, brother of deceased Chavez, likewise spoke of the

animosity between the Chavez and the Ador families.He produced a
certification from the PNP Naga City Police Station that on February
17, 1997, a blotter was entered in the Daily Record of Events
showing that deceased Chavez reported a certain Ricardo Ador who
while under the influence of liquor caused him physical injury.26 The
witness likewise presented an official receipt showing that the family
spent P3,500.00 for the funeral of the deceased Chavez.27 After
presenting Chavez, the prosecution rested its case.

On April 7, 1998, the four (4) accused filed a demurrer to evidence

for utter lack of evidence.28 On May 13, 1998, the trial court
dismissed the cases against Diosdado Sr., Rosalino and Allan but
denied the demurrer to evidence against Godofredo

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the demurrer to evidence to be

justified for the accused Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and
Rosalino Ador, hence, the same is hereby granted insofar as these
accused are concerned.Said accused therefore, namely: Diosdado A.
Ador, Allan T. Ador and Rosalino Ador are ACQUITTED in Crim.
Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816.The bailbonds posted for their
provisional liberty are hereby cancelled.

Trial of the case insofar as Godofredo B. Ador is concerned shall

proceed.

SO ORDERED.29  ςrνll

Thus, trial proceeded against Godofredo.

For his defense, Godofredo denied any participation in the killings of

Cuya and Chavez.He said that on March 10, 1997, at aroundseven
oclock in the evening, he heard several gunshots while he was
having dinner with his wife and four (4) children in their house in
Pacol,NagaCity.Since his wife advised him not to go out anymore,
he slept after dinner.The following day, while he was gathering pili
nuts, his long-time friend Dominador Bautista arrived and asked
him to go down from the tree.Bautista wanted to borrow money and
on his way to see him, found a gun by the footpath.Bautista gave
the gun to him.It was his first time to hold a gun.He tried it out and
fired three (3) times.After firing the gun, he removed the empty
shells from its chambers and threw them away.He then wrapped the
gun with plastic and hid it under a coconut trunk.Bautista left when
he told him that he had no money.He then continued to gather pili
nuts until Major Idian and three (3) other policemen came.

Godofredos father told him that they were being suspected of killing
Chavez and Cuya the night before.Thus, they went to the provincial
headquarters, were subjected to paraffin testing and made to sign a
blank bond paper.After that, they went back to the central police
station.At the central police station, Godofredo narrated to a certain
Calabia that that morning, his friend Bautista found a gun along the
road and gave it to him.He hid the gun under a coconut
trunk.Calabia relayed the information to Major Idian who directed
PO3 Nepomuceno to go with Godofredo to get the gun.Godofredo
led PO3 Nepomuceno to where he hid the gun, retrieved it and
handed it to the latter.They then returned to the police
headquarters where he was jailed.He asserted that the gun
presented in court is different from the gun he surrendered to the
police.30 
ςrνll

Bautista corroborated Godofredos story.He testified that he found

the gun which Godofredo yielded to PO3 Nepomuceno.He said that
he was on his way to see Godofredo to borrow money when he
chanced upon the handgun on the pathway.He gave the gun to
Godofredo and the latter tested it by pulling its trigger.After firing
the gun, Godofredo removed the empty shells and threw
them.Godofredo then wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it under
a fallen coconut trunk.31 
ςrνll

Meanwhile, Diosdado Jr. was arrested on October 9, 1998, at

Barangay Doa, Orani,Bataan, and committed to the Naga City Jail
on November 17, 1998, while Diosdado III surrendered to the court
and was committed to the same city jail on November 22, 1998.On
November 23, 1998, both Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III were
arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.Hence, trial against them
commenced and proceeded jointly with the case of the remaining
accused, Godofredo.

The prosecution presented Pablo Calsis32 as a witness against

Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III.Calsis testified that on March 10,
1997, at around 7:30 in the evening, he dropped by the house of
Cresenciana Mendoza whom he fondly called Lola Kising at
Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga City, before going home from work.After
asking permission from her to go home and while about to urinate
outside her house, he heard several gunshots.He ducked by
a sineguelas tree at a nearby flower plantation.As he was about to
stand up, he saw Disodado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo and another
unidentified man run away.Godofredo was carrying a short firearm
while Diosdado Jr. had a long firearm.33 He saw Chavez and Cuya
lying on the road.Chavez was about five (5) meters away from
where he stood while Cuya was ten (10) meters away.The place was
illuminated by a bright light from an electric post.There were no
other people around.Calsis ran away for fear that he might be
identified by the assailants.He heard Chavez mumbling but shirked
nevertheless.34 
ςrνll

Calsis narrated to Absalon Cuya Sr. what he saw only after about
one (1) year and nine (9) months.Fear struck him.35 He maintained
that he knew the assailants because he and his wife lived in the
house of Lola Kising after they got married.36 Immense fear
prevented him from attending to Chavez, even while he heard him
murmuring, and from informing the families of the victims of the
incident that very same night.He was about to tell the Chavez
family the following morning but was counseled by his Lola Bading,
the sister of his Lola Kising, against getting involved in the
case.37 Calsis and his family left their residence in Pacol one (1)
month after the incident because he was afraid the assailants might
have identified him.38 Even Lola Kising left her residence two (2)
months after the incident.39 It was only after he learned from
Absalon Cuya Sr.that the trial court dismissed the cases for lack of
evidence insofar as some of the original accused were concerned
that he took pity on the respective families of the victims who have
failed to get justice for the death of their loved ones.40 
ςrνll

In defense, Diosdado Jr. testified that on March 10, 1997, he was in

Marikina City working as a warehouseman and timekeeper of the
Consuelo Builders Corporation.He was there the whole time from
February 15, 1997, until March 24, 1997.41 Pablo Aspe, a co-worker
of Diosdado Jr., corroborated the latters testimony.He said that on
February 15, 1997, he and Diosdado Jr. left Pacol, Naga City,
together to work in Consuelo Construction in Marikina City.They
were with each other in Marikina City the whole time from February
15, 1997, until he (Aspe) went home to Naga City on March 22,
1997.While in Marikina City, they resided and slept together in their
barracks at the construction site.42 
ςrνll

Diosdado III also took the witness stand.On March 10, 1997, at
around seven oclock in the evening, he was at their house at Zone
1, Pacol, Naga City, watching television with his parents and cousins
Reynaldo and Allan when they heard gunshots.They ignored the
gunshots, continued watching television and slept at eight
oclock.The following day, at around six oclock in the morning, while
he was fetching water, four (4) policemen arrived at their house and
talked to his father.Thereafter, his father called him, his brother
Godofredo, uncle Rosalino and cousins Allan and Reynaldo.The
policemen then requested all of them to go to the PNP Central Police
Headquarters for investigation regarding the killings of Chavez and
Cuya.Upon reaching the police headquarters, they were interviewed
by the media and afterwards brought to the provincial headquarters
where they were subjected to paraffin tests.They were then brought
back to the Central Police Headquarters and later allowed to go back
home to Pacol.

Then, sometime in October, 1997, his father was arrested by the

police.Diosdado III was at their residence when his father was
picked up.Only his father was taken by the police.He continued to
reside in their house until April, 1998, when he transferred to
Sagurong, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay, to work as a fisherman.On
November 21, 1998, he received a letter from his father telling him
to come home.Thus, he went home the following day.On November
23, 1998, he surrendered to the court.43 ςrνll

The defense also presented Barangay Captain Josue Perez and an

uncle of Diosdado Jr. and Disodado III, Jaime Bobiles.Perez testified
that he was the barangay captain of Pacol from 1982 until May,
1997.In 1996, Cresenciana Mendoza left their barangay
permanently to live with her children in Manila because she was
sickly and alone in her house.He said that Mendoza never came
back.He does not know any Pablo Calsis and the latter could not
have talked to Mendoza on March 10, 1997, because at that time,
Mendoza was not there and her house was already
abandoned.44 Similarly, Bobiles confirmed the testimony that
Diosdado III worked as a fisherman in Tabaco and stayed in his
residence from May 1, 1998, until November 1998 when Diosdado
III received a letter from his father and had to go home.45 
ςrνll

In rebuttal however, prosecution witness SPO1 Fernandez asserted

that he interviewed Cresenciana Mendoza that fateful night of March
10, 1997.46 After the rebuttal witness was presented, the cases
were finally submitted for decision.47 
ςrνll

On August 2, 1999, the trial court held that a chain of

circumstances x x x lead to a sound and logical conclusion that
indeed the accused (Diosdado III and Godofredo) committed the
offense charged48 and as such rendered judgment

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused

Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, defined and penalized
under the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 7659 in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-6815 and
97-6816, hereby sentences the said accused Godofredo B. Ador and
Diosdado B. Ador III to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
in Criminal Case No. 97-6815; RECLUSION PERPETUA in Criminal
Case No. 97-6816, to pay the heirs of Absalon Abe Cuya III P25,000
each by way of actual damages andP50,000 in each criminal case by
way of indemnity.To pay the heirs of Rodolfo Ompong Chavez the
sum of P50,000 in each criminal case by way of indemnity, such
accessory penalties as provided for by law and to pay the cost.For
insufficiency of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby
ACQUITTED in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816.

The Jail Warden of the Naga City District Jail is hereby ordered to
forthwith release from its custody the accused Diosdado B. Ador,
Jr., unless his further detention is warranted by any other legal
cause or causes.

SO ORDERED.49  ςrνll

Hence, this joint appeal interposed by Disodado III and

Godofredo.They maintain that the trial court gravely erred in
convicting them of murder based on circumstantial evidence.The
testimony of prosecution witness Pablo Calsis that he saw them
running away from the scene of the crime was concocted.The
handgun turned in by Godofredo was not the same gun presented
by the prosecution during the trial.The unusual discovery of a slug
from the head of the deceased - three (3) days after the autopsy
was conducted and after the cadaver was turned over to the family
of the victim - was quite doubtful.Even the supposed dying
declaration of the victim specifically pointed to neither Diosdado III
nor Godofredo.And, the trial court erred in admitting in evidence
those taken against them in violation of their constitutional rights to
counsel during custodial investigation.50 ςrνll

The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on circumstantial

evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.51 It may be the basis of a
conviction so long as the combination of all the circumstances
proven produces a logical conclusion which suffices to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.52 All the
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the theory that all the accused are guilty of the offense charged,
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that they are
innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis except
that of guilt.53 The evidence must exclude each and every
hypothesis which may be consistent with their innocence.54 Also, it
should be acted on and weighed with great caution.55 Circumstantial
evidence which has not been adequately established, much less
corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of conviction.56 
ςrνll

Thus, for circumstantial evidence to suffice, (1) there should be

more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.57 Like an ornate tapestry created out of
interwoven fibers which cannot be plucked out and assayed a strand
at a time apart from the others, the circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.58 The test to determine whether or not
the circumstantial evidence on record are sufficient to convict the
accused is that the series of the circumstances proved must be
consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his
innocence.59 Accordingly, we have set guidelines in appreciating
circumstantial evidence:(1) it should be acted upon with caution;
(2) all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of
guilt; (3) the facts must exclude every theory but that of guilt; and
(4) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused
as to convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused is the one who committed the offense.60  ςrνll

Measured against the guidelines set, we cannot uphold the

conviction of the accused based on the circumstantial evidence
presented.

The first circumstance which the prosecution sought to prove is that

the accused were supposedly seen fleeing from the locus
criminis, armed with their respective weapons.Thus, the trial court,
gleaning from the evidence presented, found that [w]hen about to
stand, Calsis saw Godofredo B. Ador, Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. and
Diosdado B. Ador III, and a person going to the direction of the
house of the Adors which is about 500 meters away.61 In fact,
prosecution witness Calsis allegedly even saw Diosdado Jr. carrying
a long firearm but x x x could not determine what kind of gun it
was.62 However, the trial court acquitted Diosdado Jr.But only
rightly so.For, Calsis had difficulty in identifying the Adors
notwithstanding his assertion that he knew and saw them
personally.We defer to his direct examination

ATTY. TERBIO (Private Prosecutor) : ςηαñrοblεš  νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ

Q.You said you recognized the persons running, could you tell us
their names? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

PABLO CALSIS: ςηαñrοblεš  νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ

A.Yes sir.

Q.Name them? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.Godofredo Ador, Jr., Sadang III.

Q.How about the others? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.I could not tell his name but if I see him I could identify him.

Q.The 4 persons whom you saw that night, if they are present in
court, please point them out? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes sir.

Q.Point particularly Godofredo Ador, Jr.? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.(Witness pointed or tapped the shoulder of a person inside the

courtroom who answered by the name Diosdado Ador, Jr.)

Q.How about this Sadang III? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.(Witness tapped the shoulder of a man who answered by the

name of Diosdado Ador III.)

Q.Likewise, point to the third person? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.(Witness pointed to a man)

COURT:

Delete that portion from the record, he is not on trial.

ATTY TERBIO: ςηαñrοblεš  νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ

Q.You said you saw 4 persons, is the fourth one inside the
courtroom? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.None sir.

Q.But if you saw that person, will you be able to recognize him? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.Yes sir.

Q.Why do you know these persons whom you just tapped the
shoulder?

x x xx x xx x x

A.I know these persons having lived in the house of Lola Kising.

Q.How far? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.Around 100 meters.

Q.On the said date and time and place, you said you saw them
running, how far were you from them? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.Around 10 meters. (Emphases supplied)63  ςrνll

The testimony of Calsis, if at all, could hardly be used against

Diosdado III whom he miserably failed to positively identify during
trial.In fact, the acquittal of Diosdado Jr. by the trial court renders
the entire testimony of Calsis in serious doubt.Calsis was presented
to positively identify the assailants who were supposedly personally
known to him and were just ten (10) meters away from him.It
puzzles us no end why he cannot even identify the Adors in open
court.

Thus, despite Calsis assertion that Diosdado Jr. was one of the
assailants, the trial court doubted him and gave credence to the
alibi of Diosdado Jr. that the latter was in Nangka, Marikina, when
the killings took place.The trial court favored the unbiased
testimony of Aspe who said that Diosdado Jr. worked as a
timekeeper and warehouseman with him at the Consuelo
Construction at Nangka, Marikina, from February 15, 1997, until
March 22, 1997, and went home to Pacol only on May 27, 1997.This
ruling is strengthened by the fact that on the morning following the
killings, all the male members of the Ador family were brought to
the police headquarters for paraffin examination and Diosdado Jr.
was not among them.64 We thus respect the finding of the trial court
that indeed Diosdado Jr. was not at the scene of the crime absent
any indication that the lower court overlooked some facts or
circumstances which if considered would alter the outcome of the
case.65 
ςrνll

While it is true that the courts are not bound to accept or reject an
entire testimony, and may believe one part and disbelieve
another,66 our Constitution and the law mandate that all doubts
must be resolved in favor of the accused.Calsis committed an
obvious blunder in identifying the supposed assailants which this
Court cannot simply let go.On the contrary, it creates reasonable
doubt in our minds if Calcis really saw the persons he allegedly saw
or if he was even where he said he was that evening.For, it is
elementary that the positive identification of the accused is crucial
in establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.That is wanting in
the instant case.

What is more, Calsis asseverations, at the outset, could no longer

be used against Godofredo since both the prosecution and the
defense have already rested and the case against Godofredo was
already submitted for decision when Calsis was presented.67 Neither
can they still be used against Diosdado Jr. who was already
acquitted by the trial court.

Both Diosdado III and Godofredo denied the charges hurled against
them.But, while it is true that alibi and denial are the weakest of the
defenses as they can easily be fabricated,68 absent such clear and
positive identification, the doctrine that the defense of denial cannot
prevail over positive identification of the accused must yield to the
constitutional presumption of innocence.69 Hence, while denial is
concededly fragile and unstable, the conviction of the accused
cannot be based thereon.70 The rule in criminal law is firmly
entrenched that verdicts of conviction must be predicated on the
strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.71  ςrνll

The second circumstance is the handgun turned in by Godofredo.But

this was bungled by the prosecution.Major Idian, Deputy Chief of
Police of the Naga City Police Station, to whom the handgun was
turned over after Godofredo surrendered it, identified it as a
caliber .38 revolver, thus

ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor) : ςηαñrοblεš  νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ

Q.What kind of firearm was it? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

MAJOR IDIAN: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ

A.Revolver handgun, caliber .38 with 6 rounds ammunition.

Q.What is the caliber? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A..38 caliber.72  ςrνll

Similarly, PO3 Nepomuceno who then had been with the PNP for
eight (8) years already and to whom Godofredo turned in the
handgun, likewise identified it as a caliber .38, thus

ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor) : ςηαñrοblεš  νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ

Q.What is the caliber of that gun? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

PO3 NEPOMUCENO: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ

A..38 caliber.73  ςrνll

However, Insp. Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of

the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that [t]he indorsement coming
from the City Prosecutors Office x x x alleged that the .38 caliber
live bullet was fired from a .38 caliber revolver.But our office found
out that the firearm was not a .38 caliber revolver but a .357 caliber
revolver.74 ςrνll

Could it be that the handgun was replaced before it was turned over
to the PNP Crime Laboratory?While the prosecution traced the trail
of police officers who at every stage held the gun supposedly
recovered from Godofredo, it never clarified this discrepancy which
is quite glaring to ignore.It is difficult to believe that a Deputy Chief
of Police and a police officer of eight (8) years will both mistake a .
357 caliber for a .38 caliber handgun.Likewise, a Chief of the
Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory cannot
be presumed not to know the difference between the two (2)
handguns.Suffice it to say that the prosecution failed to clear up the
variance and for this Court to suggest an explanation would be to
venture into the realm of pure speculation, conjecture and
guesswork.Thus, faced with the obvious disparity in the suspected
firearm used in the crime and that which was turned over by
Godofredo, his declaration that the handgun presented in court was
different from the gun he gave to the police deserves serious, if not
sole consideration.

Consequently, even the third circumstance, the .38 caliber slug

supposedly recovered from the head of the victim three (3) days
after the autopsy was conducted loses evidentiary value as its
source is now highly questionable.It has become uncertain whether
the deformed slug was fired from the .38 caliber revolver turned in
by Godofredo or from a .357 caliber handgun as attested to by the
Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime
Laboratory.

Neither can this Court rely on the dying declaration of the dying
Chavez nor on the results of the paraffin tests to convict either
Diosdado III or Godofredo or both.To refute these, we need not go
far and beyond the 13 May 1998 Order of the trial court partially
granting the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused

The only direct evidence introduced by the prosecution is the

testimony of Mercy Beria, that she heard Rodolfo Ompong Chavez
say tinambangan kami na Ador (We were ambushed by the
Adors) .Sad to say, no specific name was ever mentioned by the
witness.Neither was she able to tell how many (persons) Adors were
involved.This testimony if it will be given credence may inculpate
any person with the family name Ador as assailant.The prosecution
therefore was not able to establish with moral certainty as to who of
the Adors were perpetrators of the offense x x x x Paraffin tests are
not conclusive evidence that indeed a person has fired a gun.

The fact that the accused-appellants tested positive of gunpowder

nitrates does not conclusively show that they fired the murder
weapon, or a gun for that matter, for such forensic evidence should
be taken only as an indication of possibility or even of probability,
but not of infallibility, since nitrates are also admittedly found in
substances other than gunpowder. (People v. Abellarosa, G.R. No.
121195, 27 November 1996; People v. de Guzman, 250 SCRA 118;
People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283)75  ςrνll

Thus, while a dying declaration may be admissible in evidence, it

must identify with certainty the assailant.Otherwise, it loses its
significance.Also, while a paraffin test could establish the presence
or absence of nitrates on the hand, it cannot establish that the
source of the nitrates was the discharge of firearms a person who
tests positive may have handled one or more substances with the
same positive reaction for nitrates such as explosives, fireworks,
fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, tobacco and leguminous
plants.76 In People v. Melchor, 77 this Court acquitted the accused
despite the presence of gunpowder nitrates on his hands

[S]cientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin

test is not conclusive.While it can establish the presence of nitrates
or nitrites on the hand, it does not always indubitably show that
said nitrates or nitrites were caused by the discharge of firearm.The
person tested may have handled one or more of a number of
substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or
nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, pharmaceuticals and
leguminous plants such as peas, beans and alfalfa.A person who
uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands
since these substances are present in the products of combustion of
tobacco.The presence of nitrates or nitrites, therefore, should be
taken only as an indication of a possibility but not of infallibility that
the person tested has fired a gun.

In fine, the admissions made by Godofredo to Major Idian and PO3

Nepomuceno including the gun in question cannot be considered in
evidence against him without violating his constitutional right to
counsel.Godofredo was already under custodial investigation when
he made his admissions and surrendered the gun to the police
authorities.The police had already begun to focus on the Adors and
were carrying out a process of interrogations that was lending itself
to eliciting incriminating statements and evidence: the police went
to the Ador residence that same evening upon being informed that
the Adors had a long-standing grudge against the Cuyas; the
following day, all the male members of the Ador family were told to
go to the police station; the police was also informed of the dying
declaration of deceased Chavez pointing to the Adors as the
assailants; the Adors were all subjected to paraffin examination;
and, there were no other suspects as the police was not considering
any other person or group of persons.The investigation thus was no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime as the Adors were
already being held as suspects for the killings of Cuya and Chavez.

Consequently, the rights of a person under custodial investigation,

including the right to counsel, have already attached to the Adors,
and pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 12(1) and (3), 1987 Constitution, any
waiver of these rights should be in writing and undertaken with the
assistance of counsel.Admissions under custodial investigation made
without the assistance of counsel are barred as evidence.78 The
records are bare of any indication that the accused have waived
their right to counsel, hence, any of their admissions are
inadmissible in evidence against them.As we have held, a suspects
confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the
assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of such assistance
regardless of the absence of such coercion, or the fact that it had
been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if such
confession were gospel truth.79 Thus, in Aballe v. People,80 the death
weapon, a four-inch kitchen knife, which was found after the
accused brought the police to his house and pointed to them the pot
where he had concealed it, was barred from admission as it was
discovered as a consequence of an uncounseled extrajudicial
confession.

With hardly any substantial evidence left, the prosecution likewise

played up the feud between the Adors on one hand and the
Chavezes and the Cuyas on the other hand, and suggested that the
Adors had an axe to grind against the Chavezes and the Cuyas.For
sure, motive is not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no
other reliable evidence from which it may reasonably be adduced
that the accused was the malefactor.81 Motive alone cannot take the
place of proof beyond reasonable doubt sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of innocence.82  ςrνll

All told, contrary to the pronouncements of the trial court, we

cannot rest easy in convicting the two (2) accused based on
circumstantial evidence.For, the pieces of the said circumstantial
evidence presented do not inexorably lead to the conclusion that
they are guilty.83 The prosecution witness failed to identify the
accused in court.A cloud of doubt continues to hover over the gun
used and the slug recovered.The dying declaration and paraffin
examination remain unreliable. Godofredos uncounseled admissions
including the gun he turned in are barred as evidence.And, the
supposed motive of the accused is simply insufficient.Plainly, the
facts from which the inference that the accused committed the
crime were not proven.Accordingly, the guilt of the accused cannot
be established, more so to a moral certainty.It is when evidence is
purely circumstantial that the prosecution is much more obligated to
rely on the strength of its own case and not on the weakness of the
defense, and that conviction must rest on nothing less than moral
certainty.84 
ςrνll

Consequently, the case of the prosecution has been reduced to

nothing but mere suspicions and speculations.It is hornbook
doctrine that suspicions and speculations can never be the basis of
conviction in a criminal case.85 Courts must ensure that the
conviction of the accused rests firmly on sufficient and competent
evidence, and not the results of passion and prejudice.86 If the
alleged inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2)
or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence is not adequate to support conviction.87 The court must
acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is therefore insufficient to support a judgment
of conviction.88 Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral
certainty of the guilt of the accused.89 The overriding consideration
is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but
whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.90 It is thus
apropos to repeat the doctrine that an accusation is not, according
to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt the prosecution
must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.The prosecution has failed to discharge its
burden.Accordingly, we have to acquit.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Naga City, Br. 25, in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816 dated
August 2, 1999, finding accused-appellants Godofredo B. Ador and
Diosdado B. Ador III guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of murder and imposing on them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Accused-appellants
Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III are ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt and their IMMEDIATE RELEASE is hereby
ORDERED unless they are being held for some other legal cause.
People v. Ador

432 SCRA 1

June 14, 2004

Second Division: Puno, J.

Facts:

In convicting accused of murder, the trial court relied on the

circumstances, namely:

1. that he was seen fleeing from the crime scene,

2. that he allegedly surrendered a handgun,

3. that the slug taken from the head of the victim was fired from
the gun he surrendered,

4. that the victim made a dying declaration identifying him, and

5. that paraffin test showed that he was positive for gun powder.

Issue:

Is the conviction proper?

Held:

No. For circumstantial evidence to suffice,

1. there should be more than one circumstance;

2. the facts from which the inference are derived are proven and

3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a

conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, the following are the guidelines in appreciating

circumstantial evidence:
1. it should be acted upon with caution;

2. all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of

guilt;

3. the facts must exclude every theory but that of guilt; and

4. the facts must establish such certainty of guilt as to convince the

judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the one
who committed the offense.

Measured against these guidelines, the conviction cannot stand for

the following reasons:

1. the testimony of the prosecution witness that he saw accused

fleeing from the crime scene is doubtful;

2. the gun surrendered by the accused does not appear to be the

same gun presented during trial;

3. if the gun is not the same, it is uncertain where the slug taken
from the head of the victim came from;

4. the dying declaration which mentioned only the "Adors" can refer
to anyone with that family name; and

5. scientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin

test is not conclusive.

Plainly, the facts from which the inference that the accused
committed the crime were not proven. Accordingly, the guilt of the
accused was not established with moral certainty.

G.R. No. 140679             January 14, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MANNY A. DOMINGCIL, appellant.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

For the sale and delivery of one (1) kilo of marijuana to a poseur-buyer, the appellant Manny
Domingcil was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, for violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 in an Information, the accusatory portion of which
reads:

That on or about the 12th day of August, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, not authorized by law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver mixed dried marijuana leaves, tops
and seeds in brick form, wrapped with paper placed in a plastic bag, a prohibited drug,
weighing 800 grams, to a poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation conducted by Police Officers
of Laoag City, in violation of the aforesaid law.1

Upon arraignment on August 29, 1994, the appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.2 The case thereafter proceeded to trial.

The Case for the Prosecution

On August 12, 1994, at around 11:00 a.m., Belrey Oliver, an employee of Ferd’s Upholstery Shop
located in Barangay 2, Laoag City, arrived at the Laoag Police Station. He reported to Chief
Investigator SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura that the appellant went to their shop looking for a buyer of
marijuana. Oliver recounted telling the appellant that he knew of someone who was interested and
ready to buy marijuana, and instructing him to bring one (1) kilo of the substance to a store located
in front of the Divine Word College of Laoag at General Segundo Avenue, Laoag City at around 1:30
p.m. of that same day.3

Acting on the said report, SPO4 Ventura formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation against the
appellant. He assigned SPO1 Orlando Dalusong as the poseur-buyer, and SPO2 Marlin Ramos,
SPO2 Warlito Maruquin, SPO1 Rovimanuel Balolong, SPO1 Loreto Ancheta, and SPO2 Rosemarie
Agustin, all assigned at the Investigation Section of the Laoag Police Station as back-up. The
marked "buy-money" consisting of one P500-bill bearing Serial No. G-242745 was recorded in the
police blotter in accordance with standard operating procedure.4

Except for SPO1 Dalusong and Oliver, the rest of the team left the precinct on board two (2) owner-
type jeeps and posted themselves near the Macmac Store, across the gate of the Divine Word
College. Five minutes later, SPO1 Dalusong and Oliver arrived at General Segundo Avenue.5 Oliver
immediately approached the appellant, who was then standing between the Macmac Store and a
xerox center, and introduced poseur-buyer SPO1 Dalusong, who was sporting casual clothes and
slippers: "Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen" ("Friend, this is the buyer"). At this point, the appellant who
was carrying an orange plastic bag, brought out a brick-like item wrapped in newspaper. He handed
the item to SPO1 Dalusong, who forthwith checked the same by making a small hole through it.
Convinced that the brick-like item was indeed marijuana, SPO1 Dalusong handed the P500 bill to
the appellant. He thereupon scratched his head, a signal to the back-up men that the transaction
had been consummated.6 Momentarily, the back-up officers, who had earlier positioned themselves
separately in different strategic locations near the poseur-buyer, rushed to the scene and arrested
the appellant. SPO1 Dalusong then handed the orange plastic bag containing the suspected
marijuana to SPO4 Ventura. SPO2 Ramos frisked the appellant and recovered the buy-money from
the latter’s pocket. Thereafter, the appellant was brought to the headquarters where he was booked,
and the incident was recorded in the police blotter.7 The suspected marijuana was brought to and
initially examined by Dr. Joseph Adaya, an accredited physician of the Dangerous Drugs Board
(DDB), who certified that the item comprised of three genuine mixture of marijuana leaves with
seeds.8

On September 5, 1994, SPO4 Ventura sent a letter to the Commanding Officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service, Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando, La Union, requesting for the examination of
samples of the suspected marijuana taken from the appellant.9 On September 6, 1998, SPO1 Loreto
Ancheta, evidence custodian of the Laoag City, PNP, delivered the orange plastic bag containing the
suspected marijuana to the PNP provincial crime laboratory service in Camp Juan, Laoag City. The
bag, together with SPO4 Ventura’s letter-request, was received by SPO3 Diosdado Mamotos.10 On
September 8, 1994, SPO3 Mamotos forwarded the laboratory request and the confiscated item, and
were duly received by SPO4 Tampos.11 The latter, in turn, handed the item to Police Superintendent
Theresa Ann B. Cid, Forensic Chemist of the Crime Laboratory Center, Region I, Camp Diego
Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union, who conducted an examination of representative
samples extracted from the suspected marijuana confiscated from the appellant.12 On the basis of
her examination, Superintendent Cid issued Chemistry Report No. D-074-94 with the following
findings:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

One (1) block of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing eight hundred grams
(800) wrapped with newspaper pages contained in an orange plastic bag.

...

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of marijuana on the above-mentioned specimen.

F I N D I N G S:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen prove

POSITIVE result to the test for marijuana, a prohibited drug.13

The Case for the Appellant

The appellant interposed the twin defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that sometime in the first
week of August 1994, he and Ernesto Gamiao went to the City of Laoag to canvass the price for the
repair of the upholstery of a passenger jeepney. On that occasion, they befriended a certain Belrey
Oliver who was an employee of the Ferd’s Upholstery Shop. In the course of their conversation,
Oliver asked the appellant where he came from and what his occupation was. Upon being told that
he helped in harvesting mangoes in Cagayan, Oliver immediately offered refreshments to Gamiao
and the appellant. While taking their snacks, Oliver inquired whether they wanted to back up the
promotion of certain policemen who, in the future, might be able to return the favor to them. When
the appellant asked in what way they could extend help, Oliver suggested that they look for
somebody in Cagayan from whom they could buy one (1) kilo of marijuana. He agreed to Oliver’s
suggestion. The latter handed to him the amount of P700.00 to cover the purchase of the marijuana.
The appellant immediately went to the terminal bound for Cagayan to look for somebody from that
province who could be of help. When he could not find anyone, he decided to personally take the
trip. He then instructed Gamiao to just go home to Vintar and inform his mother that he was going to
Cagayan.
The appellant thereafter took a bus bound for Tuguegarao, Cagayan. After three (3) days, he was
able to buy one kilo of marijuana for P300.00. When he returned to Laoag City on August 12, 1994,
he went to Ferd’s Upholstery Shop at 11:30 a.m. to inform Oliver that he had procured the order.
After seeing the marijuana, Oliver instructed him to take it and meet him at about 12:30 p.m. of the
same day in front of the Divine Word College where they would hand over the marijuana to the
policemen they intended to help.

At about 12:00 noon, the appellant arrived at Macmac’s Store and took his merienda. Momentarily,
Oliver arrived alone on a tricycle. Oliver summoned him and they walked southward, away from the
Macmac’s Store, looking for the policemen to whom they would deliver the marijuana. They walked
back northward, at which point they encountered an owner-type jeep which suddenly stopped. He
was nonplussed when Oliver grabbed him by the neck, seized his knapsack containing the
marijuana, and pushed him inside the jeep. He was made to sit beside the driver with another
policeman, while Oliver seated himself at the back seat with another policeman. The jeep they were
riding was followed by a patrol car. Still dazed at the sudden turn of events, he asked Oliver four
times, "Why is it that this is now happening to me(?)," but Oliver did not respond. At the police
station, he was immediately locked up. That afternoon, SPO4 Ventura and SPO2 Ramos,
accompanied by Oliver, brought him to the City Fiscal’s Office. He was later brought to the provincial
hospital where he was subjected to a physical check-up. That was the last time he saw or heard of
Oliver.14

On July 9, 1999, the court a quo rendered judgment,15 the dispositive portion of which reads :

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court is morally convinced beyond reasonable

doubt that the accused Manny Domingcil is GUILTY under Sec. 4 of Art. II, RA No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The quantity of marijuana
involved is more than 750 grams; hence, in accordance with Sec. 20, the penalty provided
for in Sec. 4, shall be applied. The accused is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua with
all its accessory penalties and to pay the costs.

Hence, the present appeal.

The appellant submits the following assignment of errors:

1. The lower Court erred in finding that the accused was not instigated in looking for
marijuana and bringing it to Laoag.

2. The lower Court erred in finding that the accused received the FIVE HUNDRED PESO bill,
despite his denial that he received the same and that his denial cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of the police officers who are presumed to be regularly performing their
official duties, there being no improper motive attributed to them.

3. The lower Court erred in convicting the accused.16

The appellant contends that contrary to the collective testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
Oliver instigated him to buy marijuana. The trial court erred in not giving credence and probative
weight to his testimony and in considering the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution.

The appeal has no merit.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of
witnesses is entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless certain facts of
substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. The
reason for this rule is that the trial court is in a better position to decide thereon, having personally
heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.17 After a
thorough and careful review of the records of this case, we find that the guilt of the appellant was
sufficiently established by the evidence, and the trial court’s judgment is well-supported by law and
jurisprudence.

What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.18 In this
case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant sold one (1) kilo of
marijuana to poseur-buyer SPO1 Orlando Dalusong in the entrapment operation.

Q   How has the case involving drug or marijuana involving the accused brought to your
attention or to your office, for that matter?

A   Our informant by the name of Belrey Oliver tipped of (sic) to us that he met Manny
Domingcil at the Upholstery Shop along Ablan Avenue and he also informed us that he
ordered P500.00 worth of marijuana.

Q   Who ordered from whom?

A   Belrey Oliver from Manny Domingcil, sir.

Q   By the way, who was the chief of the Intelligence Section of Laoag City PNP, at that
time?

A   SPO4 Ventura, sir.

Q   Was he present when the informant Belrey Oliver tipped you of (sic) about this matter?

A   Yes, sir.

Q   And because of that information from Belrey Oliver, what did your Chief, SPO4 Ventura
do?

A   SPO4 Ventura made or designed a plan purposely to conduct a buy-bust operation, sir.

Q   Where will the operation take place?

A   In front of Macmac Store, particularly, in front of the Divine Word College of Laoag, sir.

Q   And did you have any participation in that operation?

A   Yes, sir, I acted as the poseur buy (sic).

Q   At what time was the operation scheduled to be executed?

A   1:30 P.M. of August 12, 1994, sir.

Q   For the said operation, what preparations, if any, did your group take?

A   Our Chief of Intelligence made a plan, sir.

Q   What was the plan?

A   To conduct the buy-bust operation, sir.

Q   And you said that you were to act as poseur buyer, anything was given to you in
connection with your specific participation?

A   I was given the buy-bust money in the amount of P500.00, sir.

Q   And what will you do with that P500.00?

A   The Chief of Intelligence, SPO4 Ventura directed me to reflect the serial number of the
money in the police blotter, the P500.00 to be used as marked money.

Q   And after the serial number was entered in the police blotter, what next did you do?

A   Before we went out of the station, the team or companions of SPO4 Ventura went ahead
to the place where the transaction will take place, sir.

Q   And who were the companions of SPO4 Ventura who went ahead?

A   Rosemarie Agustin, SPO2 Marlin Ramos and SPO4 Balolong, sir, while Oliver and myself
were the ones who went together.

Q   Who went ahead to the place where the sale will take place?

A   The team of SPO4 Ventura, sir.

Q   And did you reach the place where the transaction will take place?

A   Yes, sir.

Q   Before you started to the place where the transaction will take place in front of the Divine
Word College of Laoag, did you know then the face of Manny Domingcil?

A   No, sir.

Q   How did you know his face then?

A   Belrey Oliver, the informant, informed me that the person is Manny Domingcil.

Q   So, what you are saying is: when you arrived at the scene where the transaction would
take place, Manny Domingcil was already there and that Belrey Oliver pointed him to you?

A   Yes, sir.
Q   After that, what did you do with Belrey Oliver?

A   We went near Manny Domingcil, sir.

Q   And after or as soon as you were near him, what happened next?

A   Belrey Oliver introduced Manny Domingcil to me as the buyer, sir.

Q   What did Oliver say?

A   "Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen", (which when translated into english[sic] means): "Pare,
this is the buyer."

Q   And so, what was the reaction of Manny Domingcil?

A   Before that I asked Manny Domingcil if he has the stuff that was ordered.

Q   And what did he say?

A   Manny Domingcil said: "There is, Pare."

Q   By the way, who ordered the stuff from Manny Domingcil?

A   Belrey Oliver, sir.

Q   Did you ask Oliver where he ordered that from Manny Domingcil?

A   Yes, sir.

Q   Where?

A   At the Upholstery Shop at Ablan Avenue, sir.

Q   That was what Oliver told you when he ordered the stuff?

A   Yes, sir.

Q   When Manny Domingcil said: "There is, pare," what transpired next, if any?

A   I told him: "Can I look at it" and he brought out a wrapped brick-type form wrapped in a
newspaper inside an orange plastic bag.

Q   And after he had brought out the said thing, what did you do with it?

A   I checked the contents if it is real marijuana, sir.

Q   You said the thing was wrapped with newspaper and you said you checked its contents?

A   Yes, sir, I opened the wrapper, by making a small hole at the side.
Q   And what was the result of your inspection?

A   I found out that it was real marijuana, sir.

Q   And, so what did you do then?

A   After I found out that it was marijuana I handed to Manny Domingcil the P500 peso bill,
sir.

Q   And as soon as you have handed the P500.00 bill, what did you do next?

A   I gave the signal to my companions, sir.

Q   And what did your companions do when you gave the signal?

A   They apprehended Manny Domingcil, sir.

Q   What was your signal?

A   I scratched my head, sir.

Q   And, what was your attire at that time you bought the brick-type marijuana from Manny
Domingcil?

A   Ordinary clothes, sir, wearing slippers.

Q   And all the time during your transaction with Manny Domingcil, where was Belrey Oliver?

A   At my side, sir.

Q   And during the transaction, did Belrey Oliver say anything?

A   None, sir.

Q   And after giving your signal to your companion police officers who were nearby and they
rushed to your place where you were, what happened?

A   They apprehended Manny Domingcil, sir.

Q   And what about the marijuana which you said Manny Domingcil sold to you?

A   I handed it to SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura, sir.

Q   And what about the P500 peso bill, do you know what happened to it?

A   SPO2 Marlin Ramos recovered the P500 peso bill from the pocket of Manny Domingcil.

Q   And after arresting Manny Domingcil where did your group go?
 A   To the police station, sir.

Q   Do you know if any records were made to your police station when you returned or
arrived there?

A   Yes, sir.

Q   What for example?

A   They made a request ... we reflected in the police blotter the apprehension of Manny
Domingcil, the confiscation of the marijuana and the recovery of the marked money in the
amount of P500.00.

Q   Was the serial number of the P500 bill you recovered from the pocket of Manny
Domingcil recorded?

A   Yes, sir.

Q   And do you know what happened to the stuff later on after you returned to the police
station?

A   They made a request to Dr. Adaya to conduct an initial examination on the confiscated
marijuana, sir.19

The foregoing testimony of SPO1 Orlando Dalusong was corroborated on material points by SPO4
Rodrigo Ventura, then Chief of the Intelligence Section of the PNP of Laoag City who organized and
conducted the operation and was part of the buy-bust team itself.20 SPO4 Ventura remained
steadfast and unwavering on cross-examination despite intense grilling by the defense counsel.21

Police Superintendent Theresa Ann Cid, the Forensic Chemist assigned at the PNP Crime
Laboratory Center at San Fernando, La Union, confirmed22 Dr. Joseph Adaya’s initial finding23 that
the substance seized from the appellant was indeed marijuana, a prohibited drug.

It was also fairly established by SPO3 Diosdado Mamotos24 and SPO1 Loreto Ancheta25 that the
confiscated marijuana was the same substance examined by the forensic chemist and later
presented as evidence in court.

The testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses complement each other, giving a complete
picture of how the appellant’s illegal sale of the prohibited drug transpired, and how the sale led to
his apprehension in flagrante delicto. Their testimonies establish beyond doubt that dangerous drugs
were in the possession of the appellant who had no authority to possess or sell the same. More
importantly, all the persons who obtained and received the confiscated stuff did so in the
performance of their official duties. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members
of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their
duty, their testimonies on the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit.26

The appellant’s bare denial of the crime charged and his barefaced claim that he was merely
instigated by Oliver into procuring the marijuana cannot prevail over the straightforward and positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It is incredible that the appellant, who had just met Belrey
Oliver in the course of his canvass for the upholstery of his brother’s jeepney, would readily leave his
errand behind and allow a stranger to talk him into buying a prohibited drug, a known criminal activity
for which he could be prosecuted, and if convicted, sentenced to reclusion perpetua. All this he was
willing to risk, in exchange for an empty promise of alleged future favors from another who was also
unknown to the appellant. The appellant supposedly traveled to and spent almost three days in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, just to be able to accommodate a newly found acquaintance, who handed
the appellant the meager sum of P700.00 for the intended purpose. The Court cannot give credence
to such a preposterous stance as advanced by the appellant and confirmed by his supposed
corroborative witness, Ernesto Gamiao.

It is axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth
of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself such that common experience and
observation of mankind lead to the inference of its probability under the circumstances. In criminal
prosecution, the court is always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable and in harmony with
the usual course of human experience and not by mere conjecture or speculation. Testimonies that
do not adhere to this standard are necessarily accorded little weight or credence.27 Besides,
instigation, or the appellant’s claim of a frame-up, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by
this Court with disfavor because the same can easily be concocted and is a common standard
defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.28 Thus, in People vs.
Bongalon,29 the Court held:

As we have earlier stated, the appellant’s denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. We are not unaware of the perception that, in some instances,
law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even to
harass civilians. However, like alibi, frame-up is a defense that has been viewed by the Court
with disfavor as it can easily be, concocted, hence, commonly used as a standard line of
defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. We realize
the disastrous consequences on the enforcement of law and order, not to mention the well-
being of society, if the courts, solely on the basis of the policemen’s alleged rotten
reputation, accept in every instance this form of defense which can be so easily fabricated. It
is precisely for this reason that the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed exists.

The failure of the prosecution to present Oliver, the police informant, does not enfeeble the
case for the prosecution. Informants are almost always never presented in court because of
the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Their testimony or identity may be
dispensed with inasmuch as his or her narration would be merely corroborative, especially so
in this case, when the poseur-buyer himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug.30

The appellant’s claim that the prosecution offered in evidence a mere xerox copy of the P500.00 buy
money and did not account for its failure to adduce in evidence the original copy thereof is not
supported by the records. The records show that the original, and not merely a xerox copy of the
marked money, was in fact offered in evidence by the prosecution.31 The appellant would surely have
objected if the prosecution had offered in evidence a mere xerox copy of the bill. The appellant did
not do so. The only ground for his objection to the admission of the marked money was that it was
self-serving.

Even if the xerox copy of the P500.00 bill was erroneously admitted in evidence by the trial court, the
absence of the original of the marked money is inconsequential. The marked money used in the buy-
bust operation is not indispensable in drug cases;32 it is merely corroborative evidence. Moreover,
the appellant was charged not only for the sale of marijuana but also for the delivery thereof, which
is committed by the mere delivery or transfer of the prohibited drug. The consideration for the
transaction is of no moment.33
The law defines deliver as "a person’s act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another with or
without consideration."34 Considering that the appellant was charged with the sale and the delivery of
prohibited drugs, the consummation of the crime of delivery of marijuana may be sufficiently
established even in the absence of the marked money. The erasures and alterations in the Joint
Affidavit of the policemen involved in the buy-bust operation did not debilitate the case of the
prosecution. First. The Joint Affidavit of the policemen was not admitted in evidence for any
party. Second. The investigator who prepared the "Joint Affidavit" erroneously stated that the
two P500.00 bills were used by the policemen who conducted the buy-bust operation bearing Serial
Numbers AA823675 and G242745. As shown by the prosecution’s evidence the policemen used
only the P500.00 bill bearing Serial No. G242745 for the purchase of the drug. Hence, the "Joint
Affidavit" of the policemen had to be corrected to reflect the truth.

All told, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty is, in this case, uncontradicted by
evidence to the contrary and, therefore, stands. This is bolstered by the fact that the prosecution’s
evidence fully shows and confirms such regularity. Accordingly, there exists no cogent reason to
reverse or even modify the findings of the trial court giving credence to the evidence of the
prosecution.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 16, in Criminal Case No. 7079, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; Witnesses;The evaluation by the trial court of the
credibility of witnesses isentitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appealunless
certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which,if considered, might affect the result of
the case

.—Time and again,this Court has ruled that the evaluation by the trial court of thecredibility of
witnesses is entitled to the highest respect and willnot be disturbed on appeal unless certain facts of
substance andvalue were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the resultof the case. The
reason for this rule is that the trial court is in abetter position to decide thereon, having personally
heard thewitnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. After a
thorough and careful review of the records of this case, we find that the guilt of the appellant
wassufficiently established by the evidence, and the trial court’s judgment is well-supported by law
and jurisprudence.

G.R. Nos. 96027-28             March 08, 2005

BRIG. GEN. LUTHER A. CUSTODIO*, CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS D. CASTRO,
SGT. CLARO L. LAT, SGT. ARNULFO B. DE MESA, C1C ROGELIO B. MORENO, C1C MARIO
E. LAZAGA, SGT. FILOMENO D. MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO
M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, A1C CORDOVA G. ESTELO, MSGT. PABLO S.
MARTINEZ, SGT. RUBEN AQUINO, SGT. ARNULFO ARTATES, A1C FELIZARDO
TARAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:

Before us is a Motion To Re-Open Case With Leave Of Court filed by petitioners who were convicted
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and
10011 for the double murder of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman on August 21,
1983.1

Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator Aquino’s security detail upon his
arrival in Manila from his three-year sojourn in the United States. They were charged, together with
several other members of the military, before the Sandiganbayan for the killing of Senator Aquino
who was fatally shot as he was coming down from the aircraft of China Airlines at the Manila
International Airport. Petitioners were also indicted for the killing of Rolando Galman who was also
gunned down at the airport tarmac.

On December 2, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010-
10011 acquitting all the accused, which include the petitioners. However, the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan were later found by this Court to be a sham trial. The Court thus nullified said
proceedings, as well as the judgment of acquittal, and ordered a re-trial of the cases.2

A re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan.

In its decision dated September 28, 1990, the Sandiganbayan, while acquitting the other accused,
found the petitioners guilty as principals of the crime of murder in both Criminal Cases Nos. 10010
and 10011. It sentenced them to reclusion perpetua in each case.3 The judgment became final after
this Court denied petitioners’ petition for review of the Sandiganbayan decision for failure to show
reversible error in the questioned decision,4 as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.5

In August 2004, petitioners sought legal assistance from the Chief Public Attorney who, in turn,
requested the Independent Forensic Group of the University of the Philippines to make a thorough
review of the forensic evidence in the double murder case. The petitioners, assisted by the Public
Attorney’s Office, now want to present the findings of the forensic group to this Court and ask the
Court to allow the re-opening of the cases and the holding of a third trial to determine the
circumstances surrounding the death of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman.

Petitioners invoke the following grounds for the re-opening of the case:

Existence of newly discovered pieces of evidence that were not available during the second
trial of the above-entitled cases which could have altered the judgment of the
Sandiganbayan, specifically:

A) Independent forensic evidence uncovering the false forensic claims that led to the
unjust conviction of the petitioners-movants.
 B) A key defense eyewitness to the actual killing of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr.

II

There was a grave violation of due process by reason of:

A) Insufficient legal assistance of counsel;

B) Deprivation of right to counsel of choice;

C) Testimonies of defense witnesses were under duress;

D) Willful suppression of evidence;

E) Use of false forensic evidence that led to the unjust conviction of the petitioners-
movants.

III

There was serious misapprehension of facts on the part of the Sandiganbayan based on
false forensic evidence, which entitles petitioners-movants to a re-trial.6

Petitioners seek to present as new evidence the findings of the forensic group composed of Prof.
Jerome B. Bailen, a forensic anthropologist from the University of the Philippines, Atty. Erwin P. Erfe,
M.D., a medico-legal practitioner, Benito E. Molino, M.D., a forensic consultant and Human Rights
and Peace Advocate, and Anastacio N. Rosete, Jr., D.M.D., a forensic dentistry consultant. Their
report essentially concludes that it was not possible, based on the forensic study of the evidence in
the double murder case, that C1C Rogelio Moreno fired at Senator Aquino as they descended the
service stairway from the aircraft. They posit that Senator Aquino was shot while he was walking on
the airport tarmac toward the waiting AVSECOM van which was supposed to transport him from the
airport to Fort Bonifacio. This is contrary to the finding of the Sandiganbayan in the second trial that
it was C1C Moreno, the security escort positioned behind Senator Aquino, who shot the latter. The
report also suggests that the physical evidence in these cases may have been misinterpreted and
manipulated to mislead the court. Thus, petitioners assert that the September 28, 1990 decision of
the Sandiganbayan should be voided as it was based on false forensic evidence. Petitioners submit
that the review by the forensic group of the physical evidence in the double murder case
constitutes newly discovered evidence which would entitle them to a new trial under Rule 121 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. In addition to the report of the forensic group, petitioners seek
to present the testimony of an alleged eyewitness, the driver of the waiting AVSECOM van, SPO4
Ruben M. Cantimbuhan. In his affidavit submitted to this Court, SPO4 Cantimbuhan states that he
saw a man in blue uniform similar to that of the Philippine Airlines maintenance crew, suddenly fire
at Senator Aquino as the latter was about to board the van. The man in blue was later identified as
Rolando Galman.

Petitioners pray that the Court issue a resolution:

1. [a]nnulling and setting aside this Honorable Court’s Resolutions dated July 23, 1991 and
September 10, 1991;

2. [a]nnulling and setting aside the Decision of the Sandiganbayan (3rd Division) dated
September 28, 1990 in People vs. Custodio, et al., Case No. 10010-10011[;]
 3. [o]rdering the re-opening of this case; [and]

4. [o]rdering the Sandiganbayan to allow the reception of additional defense evidence/re-trial

in the above entitled cases.7

The issue now is whether petitioners are entitled to a third trial under Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

The pertinent sections of Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:

Section 1. New Trial or reconsideration. — At any time before a judgment of conviction

becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the
consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.

Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused have been committed during the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial
and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.

xxx

Sec. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. — The effects of granting a

new trial or reconsideration are the following:

(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities
committed during the trial, all the proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be
set aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the
introduction of additional evidence.

(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the
evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other
evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be
taken and considered together with the evidence already in the record.

(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original
judgment shall be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered
accordingly. (emphasis supplied)

In line with the objective of the Rules of Court to set guidelines in the dispensation of justice, but
without shackling the hands that dispense it, the remedy of new trial has been described as "a new
invention to temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice."8 Thus, the Rules
allow the courts to grant a new trial when there are errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused committed during the trial, or when there exists newly discovered
evidence. In the proceedings for new trial, the errors of law or irregularities are expunged from the
record or new evidence is introduced. Thereafter, the original judgment is vacated and a new one is
rendered.9
Under the Rules, a person convicted of a crime may avail of the remedy of new trial before the
judgment of conviction becomes final. Petitioners admit that the decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 became final and executory upon denial of their petition for
review filed before this Court and their motion for reconsideration. Entry of judgment has in fact been
made on September 30, 1991.10 Nonetheless, they maintain that equitable considerations exist in
this case to justify the relaxation of the Rules and re-open the case to accord petitioners the
opportunity to present evidence that will exonerate them from the charges against them. We do not
find merit in their submission.

Petitioners anchor their motion on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Courts are
generally reluctant in granting motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence for
it is presumed that the moving party has had ample opportunity to prepare his case carefully and to
secure all the necessary evidence before the trial. Such motions are treated with great caution due
to the danger of perjury and the manifest injustice of allowing a party to allege that which may be the
consequence of his own neglect to defeat an adverse judgment. Hence, the moving party is often
required to rebut a presumption that the judgment is correct and that there has been a lack of due
diligence, and to establish other facts essential to warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence.11 This Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted
on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was
discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change
the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly discovered evidence could have been very well
presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered
newly discovered.12

These standards, also known as the "Berry" rule, trace their origin to the 1851 case of Berry vs.
State of Georgia13 where the Supreme Court of Georgia held:

Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence, are not favored by the
Courts. x x x Upon the following points there seems to be a pretty general concurrence of
authority, viz; that it is incumbent on a party who asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, to satisfy the Court, 1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge
since the trial. 2d. That it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come
sooner. 3d. That it is so material that it would produce a different verdict, if the new trial were
granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative only — viz; speaking to facts, in relation to which there
was evidence on the trial. 5th. That the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced, or
its absence accounted for. And 6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the only object of the
testimony is to impeach the character or credit of a witness. (citations omitted)

These guidelines have since been followed by our courts in determining the propriety of motions for
new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of showing that the new
evidence he seeks to present has complied with the requisites to justify the holding of a new trial.

The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is
whether the proferred evidence is in fact a "newly discovered evidence which could not have been
discovered by due diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two
aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when
should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has
relevance.14 We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded
as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence
offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now
submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in
seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.15

The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised
due diligence depends upon the particular circumstances of each case.16 Nonetheless, it has been
observed that the phrase is often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the
defendant." In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good
faith component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering
evidence in support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence
contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of
the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.17

Applying the foregoing tests, we find that petitioners’ purported evidence does not qualify as newly
discovered evidence that would justify the re-opening of the case and the holding of a third trial.

The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly discovered evidence as petitioners
failed to show that it was impossible for them to secure an independent forensic study of the physical
evidence during the trial of the double murder case. It appears from their report that the forensic
group used the same physical and testimonial evidence proferred during the trial, but made
their own analysis and interpretation of said evidence. They cited the materials and methods
that they used for their study, viz:

MATERIALS AND METHODS

MATERIALS:

a. Court records of the case, especially photographs of: a) the stairway where the late Sen.
Aquino and his escorts descended; b) the part of the tarmac where the lifeless bodies of the
late Sen. Aquino and Galman fell; and c) the autopsy conducted by the NBI Medico-legal
team headed by Dr. Mu[ñ]oz; and the autopsy report of the late Sen. Benigno Aquino[,] Jr.
signed by Dr. Mu[ñ]oz and Dr. Solis;

b. The gun and live ammunitions collected at the crime scene;

c. A reference human skull photos and X-rays of the same to demonstrate wound location
and bullet trajectory;

d. The reports of interviews and statements by the convicted military escorts, and other
witnesses;

e. Re-enactment of the killing of Aquino based on the military escorts[’] version, by the
military escorts themselves in the Bilibid Prison and by volunteers at the NAIA Tarmac;

f. Various books and articles on forensic and the medico-legal field[;]

g. Results of Forensic experiments conducted in relation to the case.

METHODS:
 a. Review of the forensic exhibits presented in the court;

b. Review of TSNs relevant to the forensic review;

c. Study of and research on the guns, slugs and ammunitions allegedly involved in the crime;

d. Interviews/re-enactment of the crime based on the military’s accounts, both in the Bilibid
Prison where the convicts are confined and the MIA (now NAIA) stairway and tarmac;

e. Conduct of ocular inspection and measurements on the actual crime scene (stairway and
tarmac) at the old Manila International Airport (now NAIA);

f. Retracing the slug’s trajectory based on the autopsy reports and experts’ testimonies using
an actual human skull;

g. X-rays of the skull with the retraced trajectory based on the autopsy report and experts’
testimonies;

h. Evaluation of the presented facts and opinions of local experts in relation to accepted
forensic findings in international publications on forensic science, particularly on guns and
[gunshot] wound injuries;

i. Forensic experiments and simulations of events in relation to this case.18

These materials were available to the parties during the trial and there was nothing that prevented
the petitioners from using them at the time to support their theory that it was not the military, but
Rolando Galman, who killed Senator Aquino. Petitioners, in their present motion, failed to present
any new forensic evidence that could not have been obtained by the defense at the time of the trial
even with the exercise of due diligence. If they really wanted to seek and offer the opinion of other
forensic experts at the time regarding the physical evidence gathered at the scene of the crime,
there was ample opportunity for them to do so before the case was finally submitted and decided.19

A reading of the Sandiganbayan decision dated September 28, 1990 shows a thorough study by the
court of the forensic evidence presented during the trial, viz:

COURT FINDINGS

As to the physical
evidence

Great significance has to be accorded the trajectory of the single bullet that penetrated the
head and caused the death of Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. Basic to the question as to trajectory
ought to be the findings during the autopsy. The prosector in the autopsy, Dr. Bienvenido
Muñoz, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, reported in his Autopsy Report No. N-83-22-36, that the
trajectory of the gunshot, the wound of entrance having been located at the mastoid region,
left, below the external auditory meatus, and the exit wound having been at the anterior
portion of the mandible, was "forward, downward and medially." (Autopsy Report No. N-83-
22-36, Exhibit "NNNN-2-t-2")

A controversy as to this trajectory came about when, upon being cross-examined by counsel
for the defense, Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz made a significant turn-about by stating that the
correct trajectory of the fatal bullet was "upward, downward, and medially." The present
position of Dr. Muñoz is premised upon the alleged fact that he found the petrous bone
fractured, obviously hit by the fatal bullet. He concluded, in view of this finding, that the fatal
bullet must have gone upward from the wound of entrance. Since the fatal bullet exited at the
mandible, it is his belief that the petrous bone deflected the trajectory of the bullet and, thus,
the bullet proceeded downwards from the petrous bone to the mandible.

This opinion of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz in this regard notwithstanding, We hold that the
trajectory of the fatal bullet which killed Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. was, indeed, "forward,
downward and medially." For the reason that the wound of entrance was at a higher
elevation than the wound of exit, there can be no other conclusion but that the trajectory was
downward. The bullet when traveling at a fast rate of speed takes a straight path from the
wound of entrance to the wound of exit. It is unthinkable that the bullet, while projected
upwards, would, instead of exiting to the roof of the head, go down to the mandible because
it was allegedly deflected by a petrous bone which though hard is in fact a mere spongy
protuberance, akin to a cartilage.

Clear is proof of the downward trajectory of the fatal bullet; First, as Dr. Pedro Solis and Dr.
Ceferino Cunanan, the immediate superiors of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz, manifested before the
Court, that, since the wound of entrance appeared ovaloid and there is what is known as a
contusion collar which was widest at the superior portion, indicating an acute angle of
approach, a downward trajectory of the bullet is indicated. This phenomenon indicates that
the muzzle of the fatal gun was at a level higher than that of the point of entry of the fatal
bullet.

There was no showing as to whether a probe could have been made from the wound of
entrance to the petrous bone. Out of curiosity, Dr. Juanito Billote tried to insert a probe from
the wound of exit into the petrous bone. He was unsuccessful notwithstanding four or five
attempts. If at all, this disproves the theory of Dr. Muñoz that the trajectory was upward,
downward and medially. On the other hand, Dr. Juanito Billote and photographer Alexander
Loinaz witnessed the fact that Dr. Muñoz’[s] understudy, Alejandrino Javier, had successfully
made a probe from the wound of entrance directly towards the wound of exit. Alejandrino
Javier shouted with excitement upon his success and Alexander Loinaz promptly
photographed this event with Alejandrino Javier holding the protruding end of the probe at
the mandible. (Exhibit "XXXXX-39-A")

To be sure, had the main bullet hit the petrous bone, this spongy mash of cartilage would
have been decimated or obliterated. The fact that the main bullet was of such force, power
and speed that it was able to bore a hole into the mandible and crack it, is an indication that
it could not have been stopped or deflected by a mere petrous bone. By its power and force,
it must have been propelled by a powerful gun. It would have been impossible for the main
bullet to have been deflected form an upward course by a mere spongy protuberance.
Granting that it was so deflected, however, it could not have maintained the same power and
force as when it entered the skull at the mastoid region so as to crack the mandible and
make its exit there.

But what caused the fracture of the petrous bone? Was there a cause of the fracture, other
than that the bullet had hit it? Dr. Pedro Solis, maintaining the conclusion that the trajectory
of the bullet was downward, gave the following alternative explanations for the fracture of the
petrous bone:
First, the petrous bone could have been hit by a splinter of the main bullet, particularly, that
which was found at the temporal region; and,

Second, the fracture must have been caused by the kinetic force applied to the point of
entrance at the mastoid region which had the tendency of being radiated towards the petrous
bone.

Thus, the fracture in the occipital bone, of the temporal bone, and of the parietal bone, Dr.
Pedro Solis pointed out, had been caused by the aforesaid kinetic force. When a force is
applied to the mastoid region of the head, Dr. Pedro Solis emphasized, a radiation of forces
is distributed all over the cranial back, including, although not limited to, the parietal bone.
The skull, Dr. Solis explains, is a box-like structure. The moment you apply pressure on the
portion, a distortion, tension or some other mechanical defect is caused. This radiation of
forces produces what is known as the "spider web linear fracture" which goes to different
parts of the body. The so-called fracturing of the petrous portion of the left temporal bone is
one of the consequences of the kinetic force forcefully applied to the mastoid region.

The fact that there was found a fracture of the petrous bone is not necessarily indicative of
the theory that the main bullet passed through the petrous bone.

Doubt was expressed by Dr. Pedro Solis as to whether the metal fragments alleged by Dr.
Bienvenido Muñoz to have been found by him inside the skull or at the wound of exit were
really parts of the main bullet which killed the Senator. When Dr. Pedro Solis examined these
fragments, he found that two (2) of the fragments were larger in size, and were of such
shapes, that they could not have gone out of the wound of exit considering the size and
shape of the exit wound.

Finding of a downward
trajectory of the
fatal bullet fatal
to the credibility
of defense witnesses.

The finding that the fatal bullet which killed Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. was directed
downwards sustains the allegation of prosecution eyewitnesses to the effect that Sen.
Benigno Aquino, Jr. was shot by a military soldier at the bridge stairs while he was being
brought down from the plane. Rebecca Quijano saw that the senator was shot by the military
man who was directly behind the Senator while the Senator and he were descending the
stairs. Rebecca Quijano’s testimony in this regard is echoed by Jessie Barcelona, Ramon
Balang, Olivia Antimano, and Mario Laher, whose testimonies this Court finds likewise as
credible.

The downward trajectory of the bullet having been established, it stands to reason that the
gun used in shooting the Senator was fired from an elevation higher than that of the wound
of entrance at the back of the head of the Senator. This is consistent with the testimony of
prosecution witnesses to the effect that the actual killer of the Senator shot as he stood at
the upper step of the stairs, the second or third behind Senator Aquino, while Senator
Aquino and the military soldiers bringing him were at the bridge stairs. This is likewise
consistent with the statement of Sandra Jean Burton that the shooting of Senator Aquino
occurred while the Senator was still on the bridge stairs, a conclusion derived from the fact
that the fatal shot was fired ten (10) seconds after Senator Aquino crossed the service door
and was led down the bridge stairs.
 It was the expert finding of Dr. Matsumi Suzuki that, as was gauged from the sounds of the
footsteps of Senator Aquino, as the Senator went down the bridge stairs, the shooting of the
Senator occurred while the Senator had stepped on the 11th step from the top.

At the ocular inspection conducted by this Court, with the prosecution and the defense in
attendance, it should be noted that the following facts were established as regards the bridge
stairs:

"Observations:

The length of one block covering the tarmac – 19’6";

The width of one block covering the tarmac – 10’;

The distance from the base of the staircase leading to the emergency tube to the Ninoy
marker at the tarmac – 12’6";

There are 20 steps in the staircase including the landing;

The distance from the first rung of the stairway up to the 20th rung which is the landing of
stairs – 20’8";

Distance from the first rung of the stairway up to the 20th rung until the edge of the exit door –
23’11";

Distance from the 4th rung up to the exit door – 21’;

Distance from the 5th rung up to the exit door – 19’11";

Length of one rung including railpost – 3’4";

Space between two rungs of stairway – 9";

Width of each rung – 11-1/2";

Length of each rung (end to end) – 2’9":

Height of railpost from edge of rung to railing – 2’5".

(underlining supplied)20

The Sandiganbayan again exhaustively analyzed and discussed the forensic evidence in its
resolution dated November 15, 1990 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the convicted
accused. The court held:

The Autopsy Report No. N-83-2236, Exhibit "NNNN-2-t-2" indicated a downward trajectory of the
fatal bullet when it stated that the fatal bullet was "forward, downward, and medially . . ."

xxx
 II

The wound of entrance having been at a higher elevation than the wound of exit, there can
be no other conclusion but that the trajectory was downward. The fatal bullet, whether it be a
Smith and Wesson Caliber .357 magnum revolver or a .45 caliber, must have traveled at a
fast rate of speed and it stands to reason that it took a straight path from the wound of
entrance to the wound of exit. A hole indicating this straight path was proven to have existed.
If, as contended on cross-examination by Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz, that the bullet was
projected upwards, it ought to have exited at the roof of the head. The theory that the fatal
bullet was deflected by a mere petrous bone is inconceivable.

III

Since the wound of entrance appeared ovaloid and there is what is known as a contusion
collar which was widest at the superior portion, indicating an acute angle of approach, a
downward trajectory of the fatal bullet is conclusively indicated. This phenomenon indicates
that the muzzle of the fatal gun was at a level higher than that of the point of entry of the fatal
bullet.

IV

There was no hole from the petrous bone to the mandible where the fatal bullet had exited
and, thus, there is no support to the theory of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz that the fatal bullet had
hit the petrous bone on an upward trajectory and had been deflected by the petrous bone
towards the mandible. Dr. Juanito Billote’s testimony in this regard had amplified the matter
with clarity.

xxx

These physical facts, notwithstanding the arguments and protestations of counsel for the
defense as now and heretofore avowed, compel the Court to maintain the holding: (1) that
the trajectory of the fatal bullet which hit and killed Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. was
"forward, downward and medially"; (2) that the Senator was shot by a person who stood at a
higher elevation than he; and (3) that the Senator was shot and killed by CIC Rogelio
Moreno on the bridge stairs and not on the tarmac, in conspiracy with the rest of the accused
convicted herein.21

This Court affirmed said findings of the Sandiganbayan when it denied the petition for review in its
resolution of July 25, 1991. The Court ruled:

The Court has carefully considered and deliberated upon all the contentions of the
petitioners but finds no basis for the allegation that the respondent Sandiganbayan has
gravely erred in resolving the factual issues.

The attempt to place a constitutional dimension in the petition is a labor in vain. Basically,
only questions of fact are raised. Not only is it axiomatic that the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan are final unless they fall within specifically recognized exceptions to the rule
but from the petition and its annexes alone, it is readily apparent that the respondent Court
correctly resolved the factual issues.

xxx
 The trajectory of the fatal bullet, whether or not the victim was descending the stairway or
was on the tarmac when shot, the circumstances showing conspiracy, the participants in the
conspiracy, the individual roles of the accused and their respective parts in the conspiracy,
the absence of evidence against thirteen accused and their co-accused Col. Vicente B.
Tigas, Jr., the lack of credibility of the witnesses against former Minister Jose D. Aspiras,
Director Jesus Z. Singson, Col. Arturo A. Custodio, Hermilo Gosuico, Major General
Prospero Olivas, and the shooting of Rolando Galman are all factual matters w[h]ich the
respondent court discussed with fairness and at length. The petitioners’ insistence that a few
witnesses in their favor should be believed while that of some witnesses against them should
be discredited goes into the question of credibility of witnesses, a matter which under the
records of this petition is best left to the judgment of the Sandiganbayan.22

The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the defense
during the trial of the double murder case. Clearly, the report is not newly discovered, but rather
recently sought, which is not allowed by the Rules.23 If at all, it only serves to discredit the version of
the prosecution which had already been weighed and assessed, and thereafter upheld by the
Sandiganbayan.

The same is true with the statement of the alleged eyewitness, SPO4 Cantimbuhan. His narration
merely corroborates the testimonies of other defense witnesses during the trial that they saw
Senator Aquino already walking on the airport tarmac toward the AVSECOM van when a man in
blue-gray uniform darted from behind and fired at the back of the Senator’s head.24 The
Sandiganbayan, however, did not give weight to their account as it found the testimonies of
prosecution eyewitnesses Rebecca Quijano and Jessie Barcelona more credible. Quijano and
Barcelona testified that they saw the soldier behind Senator Aquino on the stairway aim and fire a
gun on the latter’s nape. As earlier quoted, the Sandiganbayan found their testimonies to be more
consistent with the physical evidence. SPO4 Cantimbuhan’s testimony will not in any way alter the
court’s decision in view of the eyewitness account of Quijano and Barcelona, taken together with the
physical evidence presented during the trial. Certainly, a new trial will only be allowed if the new
evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.25 Also,
new trial will not be granted if the new evidence is merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching.

As additional support to their motion for new trial, petitioners also claim that they were denied due
process because they were deprived of adequate legal assistance by counsel. We are not
persuaded. The records will bear out that petitioners were ably represented by Atty. Rodolfo U.
Jimenez during the trial and when the case was elevated to this Court. An experienced lawyer in
criminal cases, Atty. Jimenez vigorously defended the petitioners’ cause throughout the entire
proceedings. The records show that the defense presented a substantial number of witnesses and
exhibits during the trial. After the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision, Atty. Jimenez filed a petition
for review with this Court, invoking all conceivable grounds to acquit the petitioners. When the Court
denied the petition for review, he again filed a motion for reconsideration exhausting his deep
reservoir of legal talent. We therefore find petitioners’ claim to be unblushingly unsubstantiated. We
note that they did not allege any specific facts in their present motion to show that Atty. Jimenez had
been remiss in his duties as counsel. Petitioners are therefore bound by the acts and decisions of
their counsel as regards the conduct of the case. The general rule is that the client is bound by the
action of his counsel in the conduct of his case and cannot be heard to complain that the result of
the litigation might have been different had his counsel proceeded differently.26 We held in People
vs. Umali:27

In criminal as well as civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact that blunders and
mistakes may have been made in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court, as a result
 of the ignorance, inexperience, or incompetence of counsel, does not furnish a ground for a
new trial.

If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be
an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that
prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned.

So it has been held that mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the
sufficiency, relevancy, materiality, or immateriality of a certain evidence, the proper defense,
or the burden of proof are not proper grounds for a new trial; and in general the client is
bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of his case, and can not be heard to
complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had counsel proceeded
differently. (citations omitted)

Finally, we are not moved by petitioners’ assertion that the forensic evidence may have been
manipulated and misinterpreted during the trial of the case. Again, petitioners did not allege concrete
facts to support their crass claim. Hence, we find the same to be unfounded and purely speculative.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the motion is DENIED.

G.R. No. 174472              June 19, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- Appellee,

vs.
BENIGNO FETALINO y GABALDON, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For Review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 31 May 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 02162 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon," affirming, with
modification, the Judgment2 dated 29 July 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 213, in Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1445, MC- 99-1446, MC-99-1447-H, MC 99-1448-H, and
MC-99-1449-H.

Appellant stood charged with two counts of acts of lasciviousness and three counts of rape allegedly
committed against the person of his own daughter, AAA.3 The Informations, all signed by Assistant
City Prosecutor Carlos A. Valenzuela, state:

In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1445

That on or about the 21st day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by force and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness
upon the person of [his] daughter AAA, a girl sixteen (16) years of age, and subjected to sexual
abuse, by inserting his finger into her vagina against her will and consent.4

In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1446

That on or about the 22nd day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by force and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness
upon the person of [his] daughter, AAA, a girl sixteen (16) years of age, and subjected to sexual
abuse, by inserting his finger into her vagina against her will and consent.5

In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1447-H

That on or about the 23rd day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place [within] the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force
and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
[his] daughter AAA, a girl sixteen years of age, and subjected to sexual abuse, all against her will
and consent.6

In Criminal Case No. MC 99-1448-H

That on or about the 24th day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place [within] the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force
and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
[his] daughter AAA, a girl sixteen years of age, and subjected to sexual abuse, all against her will
and consent.7

In Criminal Case No. MC 99-1449-H

That on or about the 25th day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place [within] the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force
and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
[his] daughter AAA, a girl sixteen years of age and subjected to sexual abuse, all against her will and
consent.8

On 20 April 1999, the arraignment for Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1445 and MC-99 99-1446 was
held at which time appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges of acts of lasciviousness.9 On 10
February 2000, he entered a similar plea to the three counts of rape in Criminal Cases No. MC-99-
1447-H, MC-99-1448-H, and MC-99-1449-H.10 Joint trial of the five cases thereafter ensued with the
prosecution presenting five witnesses, namely: AAA, the private complainant; BBB, AAA’s mother
and appellant’s live-in partner; Dr. Winston S. Tan (Dr. Tan), Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City; SPO4 Julieta Espiritu (SPO4
Espiritu), Chief of the Women’s Desk of the PNP, XXX City; and POS Rolando Tejada (POS
Tejada).

AAA was called to the witness stand as a hostile witness by the prosecution. The reason behind this
unusual move was explained by the prosecutor during the offer of AAA’s testimony:

Before we proceed your honor, may we manifest that we are presenting this witness as our hostile
witness in view of her declaration before this representation that she is no longer interested in
prosecuting this case against the accused your honor, and in view likewise, of the manifestation
given before this honorable court by the counsel for the accused that the victim and the mother of
the victim came to see him to ask her (sic) to desist.11

AAA testified that appellant raped her on three separate instances in March 1999. She recalled that
the events transpired in their house which was then undergoing renovation.12 Appellant allegedly
undressed her and inserted his private organ into her vagina for which she felt pain and cried. She
claimed that she tried to resist appellant’s bestial attack and that she struggled with him by trying to
remove his hands. She could not shout for help as appellant threatened her with harm. After
satisfying his lust, appellant told her not to report the incident to anybody or else he would kill her
and her mother. She, however, finally revealed her sad experiences to her mother sometime in
1999. Thereafter, she was brought to the crime laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for a
medical examination. The physical examination was conducted by Dr. Tan whose test confirmed that
AAA was already in a non-virgin state physically. The pertinent portion of Dr. Tan’s medico-legal
report states:

GENITAL:

There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with the pinkish brown
labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen
with deep healed lacerations at 7 and 9 o’clock and shallow healed laceration at 6 o’clock positions.
External vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger.
Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugorsities. Cervix is firm and closed.13

Dr. Tan confirmed having performed the medical examination on the person of AAA. According to
him, their office received a request from the XXX Police Station for the conduct of a "medico-
legal/physical examination" on AAA who was a victim of an "alleged sexual abuse/molestation
perpetrated by her biological father."14 AAA and BBB were then subjected to a brief interview after
which they both signed the consent form for the said examination.15 Dr. Tan likewise explained that
the most common cause of a hymenal laceration is the insertion into the vagina of an erect male
genitalia or any other object of the same consistency.16

BBB, AAA’s mother, stated that she and appellant were engaged in a common law relationship and
together they begot five children17 including AAA. On the evening of 25 March 1999, BBB came
home from Divisoria where she earned a living as a vendor. When she reached their house, a
certain Paul Quiambao, a carpenter she hired to do some minor repairs in their abode, came to see
her and informed her that he saw appellant on top of AAA. In the vernacular, Paul allegedly told BBB
that AAA was "ginagalaw" by appellant. Immediately after Paul left, BBB talked to AAA to confirm the
harrowing news that she had just received. AAA finally had the courage to reveal to her mother that
her predicament in the hands of her own father started on 22 March 1999 and it occurred everyday
thereafter until 25 March 1999. She and AAA then proceeded to the barangay hall to report the
misdeeds of appellant. After this, their barangay captain and members of the police came to their
house to look for appellant who allegedly tried to flee after seeing the authorities. He was eventually
arrested and taken to the police station. The barangay officials then instructed her and AAA to go to
the police station in order for them to file a complaint against appellant.

In the police station, she and AAA gave their respective sworn statements to the investigating
officer.18

SPO4 Espiritu testified that she was the investigator assigned to the case. During her investigation,
AAA complained that in the afternoon of 21 March 1999, when the latter arrived home from school,
appellant entered her room and, at knife point, embraced and kissed her. Unsatisfied with these
initial condemnable acts, appellant thereafter inserted his finger into AAA’s vagina. This incident
would be repeated the following day, 22 March 1999.

Unfortunately for AAA, her ordeal would even take a turn for the worse for on 23 March 1999,
appellant apparently became more emboldened and could no longer contain his bestial desires;
thus, he proceeded to have carnal knowledge of AAA. AAA had to suffer such abuse on two more
separate instances which occurred on 24 and 25 March 1999.

The prosecution presented, as its last witness, POS Tejada, who was a member of the team which
responded to the complaint of AAA and BBB on 26 March 1999. His turn at the witness stand was
brief, as appellant’s counsel admitted the substance of POS Tejada’s would-be testimony which
pertained mainly to the circumstances surrounding the arrest of appellant.

For his part, appellant offered the hackneyed defense of denial to refute the charges brought against
him. Appellant narrated that he and BBB had been live-in lovers for almost 25 years. He admitted
that AAA was indeed one of their children.19 In 1977, he was imprisoned for murder and was ordered
released from detention on 23 February 1996. From the time he regained freedom, he allegedly
stayed in the house of one of his legitimate children located somewhere in Paco, Manila. During the
time material to the case, however, he was at the house he used to share with BBB and their
children located at No. XXX St., XXX Drive, XXX City. Said house was undergoing renovation at that
time.

Appellant claimed that the present criminal charges were brought against him in retaliation for the
physical injuries he inflicted upon BBB during one of their heated arguments which became frequent
as he wanted BBB and her new live-in partner to move out of their house in XXX St. In fact,
according to appellant, BBB even charged him with physical injuries which was raffled off to a
different branch of the court.

To bolster appellant’s claim of innocence, the defense presented CCC, another one of his children
with BBB. In CCC’s recollection, at the time the criminal acts complained of took place, she was in
their house together with AAA, their brother DDD, and appellant. She, however, insisted that nothing
unusual happened during those dates. She remembered that although appellant was in their house,
he spent most of his time inside his room fixing his belongings.

As for its last witness, the defense recalled BBB to the witness stand in order to prove that the only
reason she executed her sworn statement before the police was because she was angry with
appellant for having stabbed her during one of their fights.

After trial, the court a quo found appellant guilty as charged in all the cases filed against him. The
dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment states:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case Nos. MC-99-1445
and MC-99-1446, finding the accused BENIGNO FETALINO Y GABALDON, GUILTY, beyond
reasonable doubt of Acts of Lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article III, Section 5[b] of
Republic Act 7610, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer for each of the two (2) charges, the penalty
of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as minimum and
maximum, respectively.

Decision is also hereby rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. MC-99-1447-H, MC-99-1448-H and MC-
99-1449-H finding the accused, BENIGNO FETALINO Y GABALDON, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by the Republic Act 7659 and R.A. 8353. Finding the victim to be under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, and that the offender is the father, this court
imposes upon same BENIGNO FETALINO Y GABALDON, for EACH charge, the supreme penalty
of DEATH through lethal injection, as provided for in R.A. 8177, amending Section 24, of R.A. 7659
in the manner and procedure therein provided.
Moreover, pursuant to [A]rticle 100 in relation to Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, governing
civil indemnity, accused is furthermore ordered to indemnify the minor victim, AAA, the amount of
Php50,000.00, by way of moral damages in line with the reward made under the case of People vs.
Bonday (222 SCRA 216) and another Php25,000.00 for exemplary damages to deter other sexual
perverts or two legged-beast from sexually assaulting or molesting hapless and innocent girls.

As the penalty imposed is [TRIPLE] DEATH, the City Jail Warden is directed to immediately commit
the person of BENIGNO FETALINO Y GABALDON to the National Prisons at Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila.20

In view of the death penalty imposed by the trial court, the cases were automatically elevated to this
Court for review. However, in our Resolution dated 13 December 2005,21 we ordered the remand of
these cases to the Court of Appeals pursuant to our holding in People v. Mateo.22

In its assailed Decision, the appellate court modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting
appellant of the two charges of rape and by downgrading the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No.
MC-99-1447-H from death to reclusion perpetua –

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City
convicting accused-appellant Benigno Fetalino of the crime of two (2) counts of acts of
lasciviousness in Criminal Case Nos. MC-99-1445 and MC-99-1446 and for rape in Criminal Case
No. MC-99-1447-H is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of death imposed by the
trial court for the crime of rape should be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is
ordered to pay complainant AAA the following amounts:

1. the total amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

2. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and

3. ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

As regards Criminal Case Nos. MC-99-1448-H and MC-99-1449-H, accused is hereby ACQUITTED
for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.23

Once again, appellant’s case is before us for our consideration raising the following errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE [CRIMES] CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

III
 THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH AS THE AGE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAS NOT
BEEN SUFFICIENTYLY PROVED.24

The appeal is partly meritorious.

At the outset, we would like to impart our observation as regards the proper charge that should have
been filed against appellant for the incidents that transpired on 21 and 22 March 1999, during which
he inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA. For these acts, which spawned Criminal Cases No.
MC-99-1445 and MC-99-1446, appellant was indicted merely for two counts of acts of
lasciviousness when the appropriate charges should have been two separate counts of rape under
Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code. It must be remembered that Articles 266-A and 266-B
are the amendments introduced to the Revised Penal Code by Republic Act No. 8353 or the "The
Anti-Rape Law of 1997," which took effect on 22 October 1997. With these amendments, rape was
reclassified as a crime against person and not merely a crime against chastity. Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed:

1) By a man who [shall] have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

The first paragraph of Article 266-A refers to the traditional concept of rape; that is, having sexual
intercourse with a woman against her will. The second paragraph, on the other hand, is categorized
as rape by sexual assault.25

In the case of People v. Soriano,26 appellant therein was charged with 13 counts of rape by sexual
assault for having inserted his finger inside the private organ of his minor daughter. After reviewing
the records of said case, we adjudged appellant therein guilty of 12 counts rape by sexual assault,
bearing in mind the expanded definition of rape under Republic Act No. 8353.

Subsequently, in People v. Palma,27 appellant therein was charged with six counts of qualified rape
committed between the second week of October 1997 and the first week of November 1997. This
case was brought before us on automatic appeal in view of the death sentence imposed by the trial
court. It must be noted that two of the charges arose from appellant’s acts of inserting his finger into
the vagina of his victim. The first of such incidents happened during the second week of October
1997 when appellant inserted his thumb into the victim’s vaginal orifice. Then, sometime during the
first week of November 1997, appellant inserted his middle finger into the vagina of the private
complainant. In disposing said case, we declared –

x x x In Criminal Case No. 8177, the first incident of insertion of appellant’s finger into the victim’s
vagina during the second week of October 1997 could only render appellant guilty of an act of
lasciviousness. The second incident of the insertion of appellant’s middle finger, however, during the
first week of November 1997, constituted consummated rape through sexual assault under Republic
Act No. 8353 or the "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997," which took effect on 22 October 1997 x x x."28

With these precedents, it is clear that the insertion of one’s finger into the genital or anal orifice of
another person constitutes rape by sexual assault and not merely an act of lasciviousness like what
was erroneously charged in this case. Much as we want to punish appellant for his appalling acts
toward AAA in Criminal Cases Nos. MC-99-1445 and MC-99-1446, we are enjoined by our
primordial duty to observe appellant’s constitutionally guaranteed right to be informed of the charges
against him. Certainly, we cannot allow ourselves to be the ones to perpetrate the denial of
appellant’s right to due process. He cannot be punished for an offense graver than that with which
he was charged.29

In his Brief, appellant invokes the settled rule that under our jurisdiction, an accused is presumed
innocent until proven guilty and to overcome this presumption, the prosecution must establish the
guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. He contends that in this case, the fact that the
prosecution presented AAA as a hostile witness casts doubt as to the culpability of appellant. He
also insists that the testimony of AAA was unconvincing and vague and points to the following
portions of her statement in the witness stand:

Q. Who was raped by Benigno Fetalino?

A. Me, ma’am.

Q. When was (sic) you raped by Benigno Fetalino?

A. I cannot recall anymore, ma’am.

Q. Could it be in the year 1999?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. Could it be in the month of March?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. Where did the alleged raping incident took place?

A. In our house.

Q. Where is your house located?

A. XXX Street, XXX City.

Q. How many times were you raped in March 1999?

A. Three (3) times.

Q. Is it on the same date or on different dates of March 1999?

A. Same dates, ma’am.

Q. Are you sure of that?

A. Yes, ma’am.

PROS. SILAO:

I would like to remind you again Madam Witness that you are under oath and you can be held liable
for telling a lie.

Q. What time was the first rape committed?

A. It was then in the afternoon after my mother arrived.

Q. What time did your mother arrived on that afternoon?

A. 5:00 p.m.

Q. What about the second rape, what time was it?

A. I cannot recall the time anymore.

Q. What about the third rape?

A. I cannot recall anymore, ma’am.

Q. But all in the year 1999 of March?

A. Yes, ma’am.30

The seeming reluctance of AAA, as punctuated by appellant, is precisely one of the principal
motivations which propelled our legislature to reclassify the crime of rape as a crime against person.
As explained by Congresswoman Luz Reyes Bakunawa during her sponsorship speech of the
House Bill No. 6265 which eventually became Republic Act No. 8353 –

This reclassification is necessary because under the existing law, only the victim can file a
complaint, if she wishes, or her parents, or grandparents in that order, which is very restrictive. The
bill now prescribes that any citizen can file a complaint, even if the complainant may not be the
victim, or close relative of the victim. This is the significance of the change that intends to bring the
criminal to the bar of justice even if the victim may not decide to complain due to fear, shame, or for
other reasons. 31

Thus, despite the claimed disinterest of AAA in pursuing the charges against appellant, the choice of
whether the cases would prosper was no longer hers alone. Besides, at the time AAA was presented
as a witness, almost three years had already lapsed. Events must have taken place or influence
might have been exerted upon her that could have weakened her resolve to seek justice for what
was done to her. However, the fact remains that AAA never categorically denied in open court the
charges she hurled at appellant. On the contrary, when AAA was subjected to cross-examination,
she affirmed that appellant had indeed raped her, thus:

COURT:

Q. Do you know why you were (sic) here, Madam Witness?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why?

A. Because we have a hearing.

Q. Do you know for a fact that you filed a rape case against the accused in this case?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Tell us the reason why you filed this case?

A. Because he raped me.

Q. Did anyone forced (sic) you to file a case against the accused herein?

A. None, sir.

Q. In what part of your house were you raped?

A. Inside my father’s bedroom.

Q. How many bedrooms do you have in your house?

A. Two only, sir.

Q. So, at the time you were rape you were inside your father’s bedroom?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You will agree with me that the door of the room has a lock, Madam Witness?

A. None sir, it was open because our house was under renovation then.

Q. When the accused inserted his penis into your vagina, you did not resisted (sic)?

A. I resisted.

Q. How did you resisted (sic), Madam Witness?

A. I struggled.

Q. In what way?

A. I remove (sic) his hands.

Q. Did the accused likewise, undress himself?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. He was totally naked then?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you have a neighbor, Madam Witness?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It happened at about 1:00 to 2:00 in the afternoon, Madam Witness?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You did not shout for help, Madam Witness?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why?

A. I was afraid because he threatened me.

Q. How did he threaten you?

A. He told me not to report the matter to anybody.

Q. When did you finally decide to disclose what happened to you to anyone, Madam Witness?

A. It was on (sic) 1999, to my mother, but I cannot recall the date.

Q. Why did you disclose the same to your mother?

A. I was afraid of my father.

Q. When you stated in your statement that a certain Paul witnessed the incident, when was that?

A. March 1999.

Q. While your father was raping you?

A. He saw the incident because he was then working at our house.

Q. You stated in your affidavit that your father was on top of you when Paul see (sic) you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But at the time when Paul saw your father on top of you, his penis was not yet inserted in to your
vagina?

A. Not yet, sir.32

Complementary to AAA’s oral testimony, she confirmed the sworn statement which she executed
before SPO4 Espiritu on 26 March 1999 upon redirect examination by the prosecutor. As we had
elucidated in the case of People v. Servano,33 the evidence which should be considered by the court
in criminal cases need not be limited to the statements made in open court; rather, it should include
all documents, affidavits or sworn statements of the witnesses, and other supporting evidence. We
explained –

x x x [W]hen a sworn statement has been formally offered as evidence, it forms an integral part of
the prosecution evidence which should not be ignored for it complements and completes the
testimony on the witness stand. A sworn statement is a written declaration of facts to which the
declarant has sworn before an officer authorized to administer oaths. This oath vests credibility and
trustworthiness on the document. The fact that a witness fails to reiterate, during trial, the contents of
his sworn statement should not affect his credibility and render the sworn statement useless and
insignificant, as long as it is presented as evidence in open court. This is not to say, however, that
the sworn statement should be given more probative value than the actual testimony. Rather, the
sworn statement and the open court declarations must be evaluated and examined together in toto
so that a full and thorough determination of the merits of the case may be achieved. Giving weight to
a witness’ oral testimony during the trial should not mean being oblivious to the other pieces of
available evidence such as the sworn statement. In like manner, the court cannot give probative
value to the sworn statement to the exclusion of the oral testimony. In every case, the court should
review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by the parties. x x x.34

In this case, AAA’s sworn statement which forms part of the records of this case supplied the details
of the incidents she experienced during those fateful days in March 1999, thus:

T : Ano ang dahilan at narito ka ngayon sa aming tanggapan at nagbibigay ng isang malayang
salaysay?

S : Para po isumbong at ipakulong ang tatay ko na tatlong beses akong ni-rape at dalawang beses
na ipinasok and daliri niya sa ari ko.

T : Sino ba ang tatay mo na sinasabi mo na nag-rape sa iyo ng tatlong beses?

S : Siya po si Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon, 62 taong gulang, walang trabaho at nakatira din po sa
XXX St., XXX City.

T : Kailan, saan at anong oras nangyari ang sinasabi mong pangre-rape na ginawa sa iyo ng tatay
mo?

S : Noon pong March 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 1999, lahat po ay mga ala-una hanggang alas dos ng
hapon, sa mismo pong bahay namin sa XXX St., XXX City.
T : Tunay mo bang ama ang sinasasabi mong tatay mo na nag-rape sa iyo ng maraming beses?

S : Opo.

T : Maari mo bang ituro sa akin ang sinasabi mong tatay mo na nag-rape sa iyo?

S : Siya po. (Affiant pointing to ne Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon, 62 years old, jobless of XXX St.,
XXX City.)

T : Maari mo bang isalaysay ang buong pangyayari?

S : Noon nga pong March 21, 1999, pagdating ko po galing sa eskwela at nasa loob ako ng kwarto
at gumagawa po ako ng assignment ng bigla pong pumasok ang tatay ko at agad akong tinutukan
ng balisong at sinabing huwag akong maingay, niyakap po ako at hinalikan, tapos po ay ipinasok
ang kamay niya sa loob ng short ko at ipinasok ang daliri niya sa ari ko, umiiyak po ako at
nakikiusap ng huwag niyang gawin, pero ang sabi lang po niya "HUWAG KANG MAINGAY,
PAPATAYIN KITA" at pagkatapos po ay sinabihan din niya ako ng "HUWAG KANG
MAGSUSUMBONG, PAPATAYIN KITA, PATI NA ANG NANAY MO." Noon pong March 22, 1999,
pagdating ko po uli galing eskwela, ay ganon po ulit ang ginawa niya, ipinasok po uli ang daliri niya
sa ari ko, natatakot po ako kaya hindi po ako sumisigaw at hindi rin po ako nagsusumbong, kasi
baka nga patayin niya kaming lahat. Ng pangatlong araw po, March 23, 1999 ay ganon po uli ang
ginawa niya, pinasok po niya ako sa kwarto at tinutukan ng balisong, pero hinubad na po niya ang
short ko at inihiga ako sa papag at naghubad din po siya at pumatong sa akin at ipinasok ang ari
niya sa ari ko, hindi po ako pumapalag dahil natatakot po ako dahil may hawak siyang balisong
habang gumagalaw siya sa ibabaw ko. Wala po akong nagawa kundi ang umiyak, hindi po ako
makapagsumbong dahil sa pananakot niya na papatayin kami. Tapos po ng March 24, 1999 uli ng
hapon ay pinasok ulit niya ako at ganon po ulit, inalis niya ang short ko at pumatong sa akin, ng
nakapatong po siya ay biglang pumasok si Kuya Pol, iyon po yong karpintero na gumagawa ng
bahay naming at nakita kami, kaya po biglang tumigil ang tatay ko, at lumabas na siya pero
sinabihan ako ulit na huwag magsusumbong dahil papatayin kami. Hindi pa rin po ako nagsumbong,
kaya kahapon po, March 25, 1999 ay inulit na naman niya ang ginagawa niyang pangre-rape sa
akin. Tapos kagabi nga po ng wala ang tatay ko ay nagpunta sa amin si Kuya Pol at kinausap ang
nanay ko at narinig ko ng sabihin niya sa nanay ko na nakita niya ang tatay ko na nakapatong sa
akin sa kwarto. Pag-alis po ni Kuya Pol ay agad akong kinausap ng nanay ko at tinanong, kaya po
sinabi ko na sa kanya, pero ang sinabi ko po ay daliri lang ang ginagamit ng tatay ko, natatakot po
kasi ako na baka patayin kami ng tatay ko. Agad pong pumunta ang nanay ko sa Barangay at
nagsumbong, kaya po hinuli siya ng Barangay at dinala kami dito sa pulis.35

Against the categorical statements of AAA, appellant could only offer the defense of denial and point
to BBB as the brains behind the institution of these criminal charges against him. Such bare-faced
defense is obviously insufficient to overcome AAA’s categorical claim of being raped and sexually
molested by appellant. The rule is settled that against the positive identification by the private
complainant, the mere denials of an accused cannot prevail to overcome conviction by the trial
court.36

Indeed, appellant could not offer any plausible reason which could have impelled AAA to bring these
serious charges against him. All he could muster was to claim in the trial court that BBB was furious
at him and that the two of them engaged in frequent fights. To our mind, such contention is
unavailing. Although BBB admitted that she was mad at appellant for the physical injuries he inflicted
upon her, still, she stated that what drove her to issue her sworn statement on 26 March 1999 was
appellant’s rape of AAA. Furthermore, a mother like BBB certainly would not expose her own
daughter to the ignominy of a rape trial simply to retaliate against her husband for the
transgressions, knowing fully well the life-long stigma and scars that such a public trial could
bring.37 Such selfish motive on the part of a mother runs counter to her natural instinct to protect her
offspring from all kinds of harm and to safeguard the latter’s well-being.

We, however, sustain the appellate court’s acquittal of appellant in Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1448-
H and MC-99-1449-H. It must be remembered that each and every charge of rape is a separate and
distinct crime so that each of the other rape charges should be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.38 Thus, it is incumbent on the prosecution to present the quantum of proof necessary for the
conviction of an accused.

In this case, we have gone over the testimony of AAA and her sworn statement and cannot agree in
the trial court’s conclusion that appellant’s guilt had been sufficiently established. AAA’s testimony
pertaining to the second and third incidents of rape merely consists of the following:

Q. What about the second rape, what did he do to you?

A. The same.

Q. Meaning he undressed you and he inserted his private organ to your private organ?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. What about the third rape, how did he did (sic) it to you?

A. The same procedure, ma’am.39

Such laconic responses on the part of AAA to the prosecutor’s queries are grossly inadequate to
sustain appellant’s conviction. Her answers during the prosecutor’s examination are utterly lacking in
material details that would warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.40 As we have held in
the case of People v. Marahay –

When prodded to specify the acts done to her, she stated that her father "used her." No other detail
was evoked from her to show the attendant elements that constitute rape, the crime charged. Such
bare statements cannot suffice to establish accused-appellant’s guilt with the required quantum of
evidence.41

In this regard, we cannot overemphasize the need for the prosecution to ask the necessary probing
questions in order to elicit from a witness crucial details to establish the elements of the crime
charged.

Likewise, AAA’s sworn statement cannot be the basis for appellant’s conviction for the second and
third incidents of rape. To recall, AAA declared in said statement that the rape which allegedly
occurred on 24 March 1999 was the one witnessed by their carpenter Quiambao. However, on the
witness stand, she declared that when Quiambao saw appellant on top of her, appellant had not yet
inserted his penis into her vagina. In fact, her testimony does not even state whether appellant’s
penis even touched her vagina at all. In the absence of a statement that appellant’s penis touched
even just her labia majora, we have to acquit him for the 24 March 1999 incident.

As regards the rape purportedly committed on 25 March 1999, AAA’s sworn statement, like her
testimony, contained a mere conclusion that she was raped by appellant on that day which we find
insufficient to support a finding of appellant’s guilt.
We now turn to the appropriate penalties that should be imposed upon appellant for the two counts
of acts of lasciviousness and one count of rape. Appellant contends, and the Court of Appeals and
the Office of the Solicitor General agree with him, that the trial court erred in appreciating AAA’s
minority in determining the imposable penalties on him. We find merit in this contention.

While it is alleged in the Informations that AAA was only 16 years old at the time the crimes charged
were committed, nevertheless, the prosecution failed to substantiate said allegation. In establishing
the minority of the alleged victim, the courts are to be guided by our pronouncement in the case of
People v. Pruna,42 to wit:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s
mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that
it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. 43

In the case at bar, we cannot simply rely on BBB’s unsubstantiated claim with regard to AAA’s age,
particularly since the loss of her birth certificate was not sufficiently established. We cannot
overemphasize the importance of fixing with exactitude AAA’s age, for under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, rape by sexual intercourse is punishable by the supreme penalty of death in
case "the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim." The severity, permanence and irreversible nature of the penalty
prescribed by law makes the decision-making process in capital offenses, such as qualified rape,
subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.44

On the other hand, the alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code should be considered against appellant since in crimes against chastity, like acts of
lasciviousness, relationship is considered aggravating.45 In this case, as it was clearly mentioned in
the Informations and admitted by appellant that AAA is his daughter, their relationship aggravated
the two charges of acts of lasciviousness.

Acts of lasciviousness is punished under the Revised Penal Code by prision correccional. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance of
relationship, appellant should be made to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition,
appellant is to pay the amount of ₱30,000.00 as moral damages for each count of acts of
lasciviousness.46

With respect to Criminal Case No. M-99-1447-H, because of the prosecution’s failure to establish
with certainty that AAA was still a minor at the time the incestuous rape was committed by appellant,
the appropriate penalty should only be reclusion perpetua in accordance with the first sentence of
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code which states that rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A,
or rape by sexual intercourse, shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. In addition to this, and
consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence,47 appellant is also held liable to AAA in the amount of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 31 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:

A. Appellant Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon is hereby found GUILTY:

1. In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1445, of acts of lasciviousness and he is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional, as maximum and to pay AAA the amount of Thirty Thousand (₱30,000.00) Pesos as
moral damages;

2. In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1446, of acts of lasciviousness and he is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of
prision correccional, as maximum and to pay AAA the amount of Thirty Thousand (₱30,000.00)
pesos as moral damages;

3. In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1447-H, of rape through sexual intercourse, and he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of fifty thousand (₱50,000.00)
pesos as civil indemnity, fifty thousand (₱50,000.00) pesos as moral damages, and twenty-five
thousand (₱25,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.

B. Appellant is ACQUITTED of the charges in MC-99-1448-H and MC-99-1449-H on grounds of

reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

G.R. No. 150224             May 19, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch
25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the
amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages amounting
to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1

Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:

That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a
certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with
use of a bladed weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death
of the victim, and on the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and
 feloniously, and by means of force and violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D.
Uba against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

The facts are:

On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old
Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in
Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar,
to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn
handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning.3

At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their
farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn
told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave,
she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania.
Kathylyn was left alone in the house.4

Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of
Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the back
door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he
replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother.5

At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the
ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the
house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants,
pacing back and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his
wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7

At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was
wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting
the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were
"reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something important to
tell him. Judilyn’s husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of
the house of Isabel.8

In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house
were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was
open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still
empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She
found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the
dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.9

Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her
granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a
flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her
intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A
daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in
Isabel Dawang’s house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found
the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.

The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder
of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.

The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her
naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood
within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.

When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns’s
death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.

On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar
Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station.
They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). Police
Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running
away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan
recaptured him.12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21,
1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."

After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-
Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.

Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his
Brief, appellant assigns the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.

II

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.

The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against
appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility
of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.13 Well-entrenched
is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on
appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of
the same; the reason being that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the
witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial
judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would
affect the result of the case, the trial judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court’s
highest respect.15 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.16

The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which
provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused
committed the crime.17

Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5)
incised, were found on the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to
spill out of her body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitm’s body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the
victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be approximated from
between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other words, the
estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was
within the timeframe within which the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel
Dawang was testified to by witnesses.

It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej
Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the
victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his
testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done
through sexual intercourse with the victim.21 In addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by
the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling
in her right forearm indicating resistance to the appellant’s assault on her virtue.22

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.

DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms.23 A person’s DNA is
the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s
blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax,
mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms
in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of
identical twins.25

DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a
suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been
left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory
and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime
committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent,
and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.

DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from
suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would
leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the
victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could
also be transferred to the victim’s body during the assault.27 Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in
proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from
the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the
suspect at the scene of the crime.28
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case,
used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR)
analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially
within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became
possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the tests.29

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as
an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it
was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts
subject of examination.31 The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the
following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical
with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen
found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of
the trial.

Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the
Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted
waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed
in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of
new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief
in its existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence
obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a
quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human
genetics and molecular biology.

Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the
trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang
together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of
their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his
estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania
and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang,
acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going
down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30
p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a
was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the
ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the
second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay
naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the
house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the
periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J");
(11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood;
(12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical;
and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended,
such flight being indicative of guilt.35

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the
perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three
requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from
him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his
right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were
forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the
use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused
under duress.

Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and
DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately
after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel,
we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be
compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which
he is accused.

It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was
conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are
unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post
facto law.

This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA
typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of
Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a
factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.

Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and
bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang’s house
during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident.
Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two
places at the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the same
barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and
requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens
his alibi.

As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed reversible
error in convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on reasonable
doubt.

Appellant’s assertion cannot be sustained.

Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere
conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than a
minimum of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus
value."41 This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight
value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus
value" may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial
court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would result from
its admission.

The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the
court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is
that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and
judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable
doubt.42 This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else,
committed the offense charged.43 In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that
the present case passes the test of moral certainty.

However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the
culprit.44

Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw
the victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang.45 She witnessed the
appellant running down the stairs of Isabel’s house and proceeding to the back of the same
house.46 She also testified that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed
to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the school."47 The victim told
Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her naked and
violated body was found dead in her grandmother’s house on June 25, 1998.48 In addition, Judilyn
also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her
husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family."49 According to Judilyn, who was personally
present during an argument between her aunt and the appellant, the exact words uttered by
appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill all your family and your
relatives x x x."50 These statements were not contradicted by appellant.

Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a
rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses
on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense,
deeds or words that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be
inferred.51
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or
on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victim’s lips by
stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.

The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or
intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force,
threat or intimidation, appellant killed the woman.52 However, in rape committed by close kin, such as
the victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary
that actual force or intimidation be employed.53 Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of
violence and intimidation.54 The fact that the victim’s hymen is intact does not negate a finding that
rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, even
without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape.55 The strength and
dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during
intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the
victim is of tender age.56

In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than the
victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-
law, together with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his
parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-law’s house. Being a relative
by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral
ascendancy over the victim.

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by reason or
on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court
maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty,
they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that the
death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred by the family of

the victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00,58 and moral damages of
P75,000.0059 should be awarded in the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence. Exemplary
damages cannot be awarded as part of the civil liability since the crime was not committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances.60

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch
25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special
complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he
be ORDERED to pay the family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of
P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of
exemplary damages is DELETED.

Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.

G.R. No. 114776           February 2, 2000

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well as its
Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:

Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then Director of Flight
Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant company
[herein private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila.

On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to plaintiff,
offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of two
(2) years commencing on January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced
working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-month probation period, plaintiffs
appointment was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).

On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five (5)
years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set
forth in the contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.).

During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in command of a
flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff apologized.
(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).

Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of the aircraft
scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was suspended for a few days until he
was investigated by board headed by Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded.

On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion training at
Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's expense. Having successfully completed
and passed the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo duty as
captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet
commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp.
34-38, Rec.).

Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures. Seventeen

(17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant's
requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate
pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to take advance leaves. (Exh. "15",
p. 466, Rec.)

Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to terminate its
excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however, immediately terminate it's
A-300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among
 the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was
not one of the twelve.

On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1,

1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex
"I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff
requested a three-month notice to afford him time to exhaust all possible avenues for
reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1) month
salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).

Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor
Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion was
resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for
damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the court a quo (Complaint,
pp. 1-10, Rec.).

Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts
have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal
dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in the course of plaintiffs
employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant to
Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other
aspects of his employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus,
defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall have
jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).

In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the items demanded in
a complaint are the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation and not
labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is
beyond the field of specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on
the employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and the consequence
thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)

On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid).
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)

On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds relied upon in its
motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel
from instituting the complaint and that he has no cause of action . (pp. 102-115)1

On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano and

against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts
of —

SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at

the time of payment, as and for unearned compensation with legal interest from the filing of
the complaint until fully paid;
 SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at
the time of payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential damages with
legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;

P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;
and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.

Costs against defendant.

SO ORDERED.2

Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of jurisdiction,
validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.

On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,

. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-
appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.

Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:

1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN

YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING
FROM AN INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS
UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?

2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY HIS

EMPLOYER?

3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE

THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?

At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine
law, thus:

Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the
Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore
Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the
Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that
claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The
defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.4
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said
court.5 On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from
raising further the issue of jurisdiction.6

Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on Article 1146
of the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment effective November 1, 1982, was
based on an employment contract which is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10
years as provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based on Article
1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded that the
action for illegal dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was
withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed.

In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here pertinent. What is
applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:

Art. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employee-employer relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time
the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.

xxx     xxx     xxx

What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this Court.
In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil
Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the
prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW
applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations.9

More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim was based on a written
contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:

. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to "money
claims specifically recoverable under said Code" but covers all money claims arising from an
employee-employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764
[1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .

It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable to
money claims arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that
"where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
designed therefore should prevail." (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157
SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11

In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's
action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4)
years after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.

In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-
appelle only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which sets the prescription
period at three (3) years and which governs under this jurisdiction.

Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his complaint for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission. However, this
claim deserves scant consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International,
Inc., vs., Court of Appeals, we held that "although the commencement of a civil action stops the
running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the
plaintiff leaves in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all."12

Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was valid, the
appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of
employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said,

It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From the moment
the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their nature, may be in
keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer of
employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract, among
others, the right of mutual termination by giving three months written notice or by payment of
three months salary. Such provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no
room for interpretation.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions of the

Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be noted that when
plaintiff-appellee's employment was confirmed, he applied for membership with the
Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory to the aforementioned
Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from questioning the legality of the said
agreement or any proviso contained therein.13

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is amply
supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:

When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline industry
resulting in a slow down in the company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian
Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures,
such as cutting down services, number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number
of flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a result, defendant-
appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots, including plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in
excess of what is reasonably needed.14

All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's
termination from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice and
opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore,
could be attributed to respondent appellate court. 1âwphi1.nêt

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. CV
No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100901 July 16, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS @ "Commander Falcasantos," AWALON KAMLON

HASSAN @ "Commander Kamlon," MAJID SAMSON @ "Commander Bungi," JUMATIYA
AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y
MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y
SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @ "Ajid" and several JOHN and
JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in another case, also
pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and
documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to remind the bench and the bar that reclusion
perpetua is not synonymous with life imprisonment.

The Case

On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos. 10060, 10061,
10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping (Crim Case Nos. 10065, 10066 and
10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were filed   before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City
1

against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais,
Jalina Hassan de Kamming,   Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan,
2

Imam   Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid," and several John and Jane Does. The
3

Informations for kidnapping for ransom, which set forth identical allegations save for the
names of the victims, read as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, with threats to kill the
person of FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060]   and for the purpose
4

of extorting ransom from the said Felix Rosario or his families or employer, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, KIDNAP the person of said
Felix Rosario,   a male public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga,
5

who was then aboard a Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was
being ambushed by the herein accused at the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo,
Zamboanga City, and brought said Felix Rosario   to different mountainous
6
 places of Zamboanga City and Zamboanga del Sur, where he was detained,
held hostage and deprived of his liberty until February 2, 1989, the day when
he was released only after payment of the ransom was made to herein
accused, to the damage and prejudice of said victim; there being present an
aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with
the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.

The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating together, mutually
aiding and assisting one another, by means of threats and intimidation of
person, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously KIDNAP, take
and drag away and detain the person of MONICO SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN
[Criminal Case No. 10065]   a male public officer of the City Government of
7

Zamboanga, against his will, there being present an aggravating circumstance

in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed men or
persons who insure or afford impunity.

Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya Amlani,
Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk
Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel.  8

On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on
the merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the assailed 36-page
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration, this

Court renders its judgment, ordering and finding:

1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias "AJID" and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot

[g]uilty of the eight charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping,
their guilt not having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered, unless
detained for some other offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases Nos.
10060-10067).

2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y

MENDOZA and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as principals by conspiracy
in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping (Crim.
Cases Nos. 10060-10067).

Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of
armed men who insured impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on them
shall be at their maximum period.

WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and pursuant
to Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are imposed on
Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and
Kadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer and
pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life imprisonment is
imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y
Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No. 10066)

For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar, and
their kidnapping not having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art. 268,
Revised Penal Code, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same four
accused — Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y
Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih — are sentenced to serve two (2) jail terms
ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065 and 10067).

3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges of

[k]idnapping and she is acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065,
10066 and 10067).

But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five

charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom.

WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five (5)

imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to
EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos.
10060-1 0064).

4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN (charged

as Jalina Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges
for [k]idnapping and are, therefore, ACQUITTED of these three charges. (Crim.
Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067).

But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as
accomplices in the five charges for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being miners,
they are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which
lowers the penalty imposable on them by one degree.

WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced to

serve five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional as minimum to TEN YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF prision
mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders

"convicted of an offense punishable by death or life" by Presidential Decree
No. 1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of which [k]idnapping for [r]ansom
is such an offense) the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha
Hussin de Kamming are NOT suspended but must be served by them.

Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are
sentenced further to return the following personal effects taken on December
 12, 1988, the day of the kidnapping, or their value in money, their liability being
solidary.

To Jessica Calunod:
One (1) Seiko wrist watchP P 250.00
One Bracelet P 2,400.00
One Shoulder Bag P 200.00
Cash P 200.00
To Armado C. Bacarro:
One (1) wrist watch P 800.00
One Necklace P 300.00
One Calculator P 295.00
Eyeglasses P 500.00
One Steel Tape P 250.00
To Edilberto S. Perez:
One (1) Rayban P 1,000.00
One Wrist WatchP P 1,800.00
Cash P 300.00
To Virginia San Agustin-
Gara:
One (1)Wrist Watch P 850.00

The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall be
extended to those sentenced.

The cases against Majid Samson, alias "Commander Bungi" Awalon Kamlon

a.k.a. "Commander Kamlon" Carlos Falcasantos and several "John Does" and
Jane "Does" are ARCHIVED until their arrest.

Costs against the accused convicted.

SO ORDERED.  9

On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais
and Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal.   In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the
10

same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of their application for
"amnesty." In our March 19, 1997 Resolution, we granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal
of Kulais remains for the consideration of this Court.  11
 The Facts

The Version of the Prosecution

The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:

On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government

agencies, organized themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government
projects in Zamboanga City. The group was composed of Virginia Gara, as the
head of the team; Armando Bacarro, representing the Commission on Audit;
Felix del Rosario, representing the non-government: Edilberto Perez,
representing the City Assessor's Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa of the
City Budget Office and Monico Saavedra, the driver from the City Engineer's
Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22, 1990.)

On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School to
check on two of its classrooms. After inspecting the same, they proceeded to
the Talaga Footbridge. The group was not able to reach the place because on
their way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns at
them (p. 4, TSN, ibid.).

The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of their
personal belongings. They were then ordered to walk to the mountain by the
leader of the armed men who introduced himself as Commander Falcasantos
(p. 5, TSN, ibid.).

While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government
troops which caused their group to be divided. Finally, they were able to
regroup themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men joined the others. (pp.
7-8, TSN, ibid.).

The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. During
their captivity, the victims were able to recognize their captors who were at all
times armed with guns. The wives of the kidnappers performed the basic
chores like cooking. (pp. 9-10. TSN, ibid.)

Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes
which demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange for
twenty (20) sets of uniform. (p. 15, TSN, ibid.)

On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 o'clock noontime, the victims were

informed that they would be released. They started walking until around 7:00
o'clock in the evening of that day. At around 12:00 o'clock midnight, the
victims were released after Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received the
ransom money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.) The total amount paid was P122,000.00. The
same was reached after several negotiations between Mayor Vitaliano Agan of
Zamboanga City and the representatives of the kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov.
11, 1990)

. . . 
12
The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims
themselves: Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San Agustin-Gara,
Calixto Francisco, and Monico Saavedra.

The Version of the Defense

The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows: 

13

On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, while weeding their
farm in Sinaburan, Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani
was picked up by soldiers and brought to a place where one army battalion
was stationed. Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador Mamaril,
Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel were
already detained. In the afternoon of the same day, appellants spouses Jailon
Kulais and Norma Sahiddan were brought to the battalion station and likewise
detained thereat. On May 30, 1990, the eight (8) accused were transported to
Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City. Here on the same date, they were joined by
accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin.

At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from
the captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and company who in 1988 kidnapped and
brought her to the mountains. Against their will, she stayed with Falcasantos
and his two wives for two months, during which she slept with Falcasantos as
aide of the wives and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch water and
run other errands for everybody. An armed guard was assigned to watch her,
so that, for sometime, she had to bear the ill-treatment of Falcasantos' other
wives one of whom was armed. After about two months, while she was
cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives were bathing in the river, and while
her guard was not looking, she took her chance and made a successful dash
for freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992, pp. 2-15)

Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who was

thirteen years old at the time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of the
instant cases commenced). She was kidnapped by Daing Kamming and
brought to the mountains where he slept with her. She stayed with him for less
than a month sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing
housekeeping errands for Kamming and his men. She made good her escape
during an encounter between the group of Kamming and military troops. She
hid in the bushes and came out at Ligui-an where she took a "bachelor" bus in
going back to her mother's house at Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan, Zamboanga
del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while she was
harvesting palay at the neighboring village of Tigbalangao, military men picked
her up to Ticbanuang where there was an army battalion detachment. From
Ticbawuang, she was brought to Vitali, then to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City,
where on her arrival, she met all the other accused for the first time except
Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)

Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan,

Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of a day
in May, while she and her husband were in their farm, soldiers arrested them.
The soldiers did not tell them why they were being arrested, neither were they
shown any papers. The two of them were just made to board a six by six truck.
 There were no other civilians in the truck. The truck brought the spouses to the
army battalion and placed them inside the building where there were civilians
and soldiers. Among the civilians present were her six co-accused Hadjirul
Plasin, Salvador Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie
Manuel and Jumatiya Amlani. That night, the eight of them were brought to
Tictapul, Zamboanga City; then to Vitali; and, finally, to the Metrodiscom,
Zamboanga City where they stayed for six days and six nights. On the seventh
day, the accused were brought to the City Jail, Zamboanga City. (TSN, January
30, 1991, pp. 6-11)

The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore narrated,

was arrested with his wife the day the soldiers came to their farm on May 28,
1990. He has shared with his wife the ordeals that followed in the wake of their
arrest and in the duration of their confinement up to the present. (TSN, January
22, 1991 pp. 2-4).

The Trial Court's Ruling

The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one
count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six
terms of "life imprisonment." It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention
for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as
follows:

Principally, the issue here is one of credibility — both of the witnesses and
their version of what had happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989.
On this pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to [p]rosecution witnesses and
their testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing. No
taint of evil or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to [p]rosecution
witnesses. To this Court, who saw all the witnesses testify, [p]rosecution
witnesses testified only because they were impelled by [a] sense of justice, of
duty and of truth.

Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of

alibis. The individual testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on
what happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the
accused explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to
February 3, 1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of
the nine accused were keeping the five or six hostages named by
[p]rosecution evidence.

The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the
course of the captivity of the five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1)
Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais; (5)
Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.

The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid", and
Imam Taruk Alah. These two must, therefore, be declared acquitted based on
reasonable doubt.

The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty as
conspirators as charged in the eight Informations; or only as accomplices?
 Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping group to which the seven
accused belonged had formed themselves into an armed band for the purpose
of kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut themselves off from
established communities, lived in the mountains and forests, moved from
place to place in order to hide their hostages. The wives of these armed band
moved along with their husbands, attending to their needs, giving them
material and moral support. These wives also attended to the needs of the
kidnap victims, sleeping with them or comforting them.

x x x           x x x          x x x

II The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul
Plasin. The Court holds these four men guilty as conspirators in the 8 cases of
kidnapping. Unlike the three women-accused, these male accused were armed.
They actively participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off the military
and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from place to place, and in
guarding the kidnap hostages. Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais were
positively identified as among the nine armed men who had kidnapped the
eight kidnap victims on December 12, 1988.

The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is
supported by the rulings of our Supreme Court quoted below.

(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to prove
conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions and
circumstances which may vary according to the purposes to be accomplished
and from which may logically be inferred that there was a common design,
understanding or agreement among the conspirators to commit the offense
charged. (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil 64; People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)

(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent
which existed between the sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the band
or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible for the murder in
question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)

(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively,
each individual whose evil will actively contribute to the wrongdoing is in law
responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone.
(People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759, 772 (1968).)  14

The Assigned Errors

The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:

The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in
another case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team leader of
the government troops which allegedly captured the accused-appellants in an
 encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their right to cross-
examine him.

II

On the assumption that Lt. Feliciano's testimony could be validly taken judicial
notice of, the trial court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the same for
being highly improbable and contradictory.

III

The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha
Hussin and Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al., with material
and moral comfort, hence, are guilty as accomplices in all the kidnapping for
ransom cases.

IV

The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and Norma
Sahiddan the benefits of suspension of sentence given to youth offenders
considering that they were minors at the time of the commission of the
offense. 15

As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn their
appeal, and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them only, will no
longer be dealt with. Only the following issues pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be
discussed: (1) judicial notice of other pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence, and (3) denial as a defense. In addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of
the penalty imposed by the trial court.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

First Issue:

Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process

Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial
notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the
team leader of the government troops that captured him and his purported
cohorts.   Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross-examine a material witness
16

in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the latter's testimony should not be
used against him.  17

True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in
other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have
been heard and are actually pending before the same judge.   This is especially true in
18

criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the
testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against
the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based
mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica
Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to
meticulous cross-examinations conducted by appellant's counsel. At best, then, the trial
court's mention of Lieutenant Feliciano's testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither
affected the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.

Second Issue:

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latter's testimony:

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?

A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.

Q And during those days did you come to know any of the
persons who were with the group?

A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed

there for fifty-four days.

Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you

know them?

A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and

Commander Kamlon we came to know first our foster parents,
those who were assigned to give us some food.

Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men
who will take care of you?

A Yes.

Q And to whom were you assigned?

A To Ila Abdurasa.

Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you
are assigned to, who else did you come to know?

A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2)
wives of Commander Falcasantos — Mating and Janira —
another brother in-law of Commander Kamlon, Usman, the wife
of Kamlon, Tira.
 x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days
and you really came to know them. Will you still be able to
recognize these persons if you will see the[m] again?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any
of those you mentioned are here?

A Yes, they are here.

Q Some of them are here?

A Some of them are here.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?

A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was

one of those nine armed men who took us from the highway.

RTC INTERPRETER:

Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his

name, he gave his name as JAILON KULAIS.

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle
and made you alight, what else was he doing while you were in
their captivity?

A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband

of Nana.

COURT:

Q Who?

A Tangkong.

xxx xxx xxx  19

Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarro's testimony pointing to appellant as one of
the culprits:

FISCAL CAJAYON:
 x x x           x x x          x x x

Q And what happened then?

A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who
will be the one [to] g[i]ve food to us.

Q [To] whom were you assigned?

A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife.
[D]o you remember how he looks like?

A Yes.

Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that
said Tangkong and his wife are here?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us?

A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name

he identified [himself] as Jailon Kulais.

Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get
that name?

A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the
camp.

x x x           x x x          x x x

ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)

Q When did you first meet Tangkong?

A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the

one who took us.

Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you

stated that Mr. Mamaril was one of those who stopped the bus
and took you to the hill and you did not mention Tangkong?

A I did not mention but I can remember his face.

x x x           x x x          x x x
 Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host
even if he did not tell you that he [was] one of those who
stopped you, you would not recognize him?

A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my
shoes.

COURT:

Q Who?

A Tangkong, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx  20

Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez' candid narration:

FISCAL CAJAYON:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Who else?

A The last man.

Q Did you come to know his name?

A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in

Court who identified himself as Jailon Kulais.)

Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?

A The same, guarding us.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK.

Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine

armed men on your way from [the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot
Bridge. [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?

A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.

Q They did not fire any shots?

A But they were pointing their guns at us.

Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to
[the] Talaga Footbridge, you stated [that] one of them [was]
Commander Falcasantos?
 A Yes.

Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that

group?

A Yes.

Q Will you please identify?

A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in

court who identified himself as Jailon Kulais.)

x x x           x x x          x x x

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN.

Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the
camp?

FISCAL CAJAYON:

Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he

used the word Tangkong.

ATTY. FABIAN

Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?

A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have

their time two hours another will be on duty guarding us.

Q Where did you meet Tangkong?

A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.

xxx xxx xxx  21

It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping or
detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their will, for fifty-three days from
December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that Appellant Kulais was a member
of the group of armed men who staged the kidnapping, and that he was one of those who
guarded the victims during the entire period of their captivity. His participation gives
credence to the conclusion of the trial court that he was a conspirator.

Kidnapping

for Ransom
That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is also
apparent from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the accused
and narrating the circumstances surrounding the writing of the ransom letters.

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there
were these meetings for possible negotiation with the City
Government. What do you mean by this? What were you
supposed to negotiate?

A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after

the terms.  22

Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?

A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by
Commander Falcasantos to write the letter, the ransom letter.

Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were

you asked to write for your ransom?

A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them.

Q Why will you able to identify the same?

A Because I was the one who wrote it.

Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?

A Yes.

Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us

by the Honorable City Mayor Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 — there
are five letters all handwritten.

COURT:

Original?

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Original, your Honor.

Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any
of these were the ones you were asked to write.

A (Witness going over [letters])

This one — 2 pages. This one — 2 pages. No more.

Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in
these letters, what else will make you remember that these are
really the ones you wrote while there?

A The signature is there.

Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.

A And over it is a signature.

Q That is your signature?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?

A Yes, there is the other signature.

Q There are names — other names here — Eddie Perez, Allan

Basa, Armando Bacarro, Felix Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there
are signatures above the same. Did you come up to know who
signed this one?

A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons.

[sic].

Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan,

and there is the signature above the same. Did you come to
know who signed it?

A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Jessica, I am going over this letter . . . Could you please read

to us the portion here which says the terms? . . .

A (Witness reading) "Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo

ang kantidad nga P100,000 ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga
uniforms sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989).  23

x x x           x x x          x x x

INTERPRETER (Translation):

This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of

P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform
on Friday, February 3, 1989.

x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is
dated January 21, 1988.   Now, could you please explain to us
24

why it is dated January 21, 1988 and the other one Enero 31,
1989 or January 31, 1989?

A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.

Q January 21, 1989?

A Yes.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned?

Please go over this.

A (Going over the letter)

Yes, ma'am.

Q Could you please read it aloud to us?

A (Witness reading)

Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga

completong uniformer (7 colors marine type wala nay labot ang
sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large size.  25

x x x           x x x          x x x

INTERPRETER:

They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete

uniform (7 colors, marine-type not including the shoes), one half
medium, one half large.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after
[they were] signed by your companions and all of you, do you
know if these letters were sent? If you know only.

A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me

by Falcasantos to inform the City Mayor that initial as
P500,000.00, and when we were already — I was asked again to
write, we were ordered to affix our signature to serve as proof
that all of us are alive.   [sic]
26
Calunod's testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro   and 27

Edilberto Perez.   The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver the
28

ransom, and the release of the hostages upon payment of the money were testified to by
Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano Agan   and Teddy Mejia. 
29 30

The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code,   having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having been
31

clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial court's finding of
appellant's guilt on five counts of kidnapping for ransom.

Kidnapping of

Public Officers

Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members of
the government monitoring team abducted by appellant's group. The three testified to the
fact of kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the appellant. Even so, appellant's
identity as one of the kidnappers was sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez,
who were with Gara, Saavedra and Francisco when the abduction occurred.

That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours   does nor matter.
32

In People vs. Domasian,   the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released
33

even before his parents received the ransom note. The accused therein argued that they
could not be held guilty of kidnapping as no enclosure was involved, and that only grave
coercion was committed, if at all.   Convicting appellants of kidnapping or serious illegal
34

detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an
eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty when he was restrained from going home. The
Court justified the conviction by holding that the offense consisted not only in placing a
person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in any manner, of his
liberty.   Likewise, in People vs. Santos,   the Court held that since the appellant was charged
35 36

and convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4, it was not the duration of the deprivation of
liberty which was important, but the fact that the victim, a minor, was locked up.

Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a few hours
is immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers   — Gara was a fiscal
37

analyst for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City Engineer's Office, and
Francisco was a barangay councilman at the time the kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais
should be punished, therefore, under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and
not Art, 268, as the trial court held.

The present case is different from People vs. Astorga,   which held that the crime committed
38

was not kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave coercion. The appellant in
that case had tricked his seven-year-old victim into going with him to a place he alone knew.
His plans, however, were foiled when a group of people became suspicious and rescued the
girl from him. The Court noted that the victim's testimony and the other pieces of evidence
did not indicate that the appellant wanted to detain her, or that he actually detained her.

In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably established that
the victims were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof beyond reasonable doubt
that kidnapping took place, and that appellant was a member of the armed group which
abducted the victims.
 Third Issue:

Denial and Alibi

The appellant's bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the
prosecution witnesses' positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to
the positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the
defense.   Between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the
39

one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails.   Jessica Calunod,
40

Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified in a clear, straightforward and frank manner;
and their testimonies were compatible on material points. Moreover, no ill motive was
attributed to the kidnap victims and none was found by this Court.

We agree with the trial court's observation that the appellant did not meet the charges
against him head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the day he was
arrested and on subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain where he was during
the questioned dates (December 12, 1988 to February 3, 1989); neither did he rebut Calunod,
Bacarro and Perez, when they identified him as one of their kidnappers.

Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment

The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The
penalty for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the crimes happened in 1988, when the capital penalty was proscribed by the
Constitution, the maximum penalty that could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua.
Life imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life
imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it accessory penalties provided in the Revised
Penal Code and has a definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment is invariably imposed for
serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in
accordance with the Revised Penal Code.  41

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of

kidnapping for ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty
imposed is hereby MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five terms of reclusion
perpetua, one for each of his five convictions for kidnapping for ransom; and to three terms
of reclusion perpetua, one each for the kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico
Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the other accused who withdrew their appeals, he is
REQUIRED to return the personal effects, or their monetary value, taken from the kidnap
victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the amount of P122,000 representing the ransom
money paid to the kidnappers. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 74336. April 7, 1997.]

J. ANTONIO AGUENZA, Petitioner, v. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO.,

VITALIADO P. ARRIETA, LILIA PEREZ, PATRICIO PEREZ and THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, Respondents.
 Quasha Asperilia Angela Penal & Nolasco for Petitioner.

Perez & Calma Law Offices for respondent Metrobank.

Delfin A. Manuel, Jr. for private respondents Lilia and Patricio Reyes.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS; MAY BE CONTRADICTED BY

SHOWING THAT IT WAS MADE BY IMPROVIDENCE OR MISTAKE OR THAT NO SUCH
ADMISSION WAS MADE. — The general rule that "the allegations, statements, or
admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader" is not an
absolute and inflexible rule and is subject to exceptions. Rule 129, Section 4, of the
Rules of Evidence, provides: "Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made." In other words, an
admission in a pleading on which a party goes to trial may be contradicted by showing
that it was made by improvidence or mistake or that no such admission was made, i.e.,
"not in the sense in which the admission was made to appear or the admission was
taken out of context."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. COMMERCIAL LAWS; CORPORATION CODE; RATIFICATION OF AN UNAUTHORIZED

CONTRACT; MUST BE MADE BY THE OFFICER AS GOVERNING BODY HAVING
AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH CONTRACT. — As we elucidated in the case of Vicente v.
Geraldez, "ratification can never be made on the part of the corporation by the same
persons who wrongfully assume the power to make the contract, but the ratification
must be by the officer as governing body having authority to make such contract." In
other words, the unauthorized act of respondent Arrieta can only be ratified by the
action of the Board of Directors and/or petitioner Aguenza jointly with private
respondent Arrieta. We must emphasize that Intertrade has a distinct personality
separate from its members. The corporation transacts its business only through its
officers or agents. Whatever authority these officers or agents may have is derived
from the Board of Directors or other governing body unless conferred by. the charter of
the corporation. An officer’s power as an agent of the corporation must be sought from
the statute, charter, the by-laws, as in a delegation of authority to such officer, or the
acts of the Board of Directors formally expressed or implied from a habit or custom of
doing business.

3. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; AGENCY; SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY; REQUIRED

WHEN THE POWER TO BORROW MONEY IS INVOLVED; CASE AT BAR.. — The power to
borrow money is one of those cases where even special power of attorney is required.
In the instant case, there is invariably a need of an enabling act of the corporation to be
approved by its Board of Directors. As found by the trial court, the records of this case
is bereft of any evidence that Intertrade through its Board of Directors, conferred upon
Arrieta and Lilia Perez the authority to contract a loan with Metrobank and execute the
promissory note as a security therefor. Neither a board resolution nor a stockholder’s
resolution was presented by Metrobank to show that Arrieta and Lilia Perez were
empowered by Intertrade to execute the promissory note.

4. ID.; ID.; SURETYSHIP; MUST BE EXPRESS AND NEVER PRESUMED; CANNOT

EXTEND TO MORE THAN WHAT IS STIPULATED; CASE AT BAR. — The subject loan was
not the responsibility of Intertrade, it follows that the undertaking of Arrieta and the
bookkeeper was not an undertaking covered by the Continuing Suretyship Agreement.
The rule is that a contract of surety is never presumed., it must be express and cannot
extend to more than what is stipulated. It is strictly construed against the creditor,
every doubt being resolved against enlarging the liability of the surety.

DECISION

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of

the Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals) 2 finding petitioner J.
Antonio Aguenza liable under a continuing surety agreement to pay private respondent
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (hereafter, Metrobank) a loan jointly obtained by
the General Manager and a bookkeeper of Intertrade, a corporation of which petitioner
is President and in whose behalf petitioner had, in the past, obtained credit lines. chanrobles law library : red

The following facts are not disputed: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On February 28, 1977, the Board of Directors of Intertrade, through a Board

Resolution, authorized and empowered petitioner and private respondent Vitaliado
Arrieta, Intertrade’s President and Executive Vice-President, respectively, to jointly
apply for and open credit lines with private respondent Metrobank. Pursuant to such
authority, petitioner and private respondent Arrieta executed several trust receipts from
May to June, 1977, the aggregate value of which amounted to P562,443.46, with
Intertrade as the entrustee and private respondent Metrobank as the entruster.

On March 14, 1977, petitioner and private respondent Arrieta executed a Continuing
Suretyship Agreement whereby both bound themselves jointly and severally with
Intertrade to pay private respondent Metrobank whatever obligation Intertrade incurs,
but not exceeding the amount of P750,000.00.

In this connection, private respondent Metrobank’s Debit Memo to Intertrade dated

March 22, 1978 showed full settlement of the letters of credit covered by said trust
receipts in the total amount of P562,443.46.

On March 21, 1978, private respondents Arrieta and Lilia P. Perez, a bookkeeper in the
employ of Intertrade, obtained a P500,000.00 loan from private respondent Metrobank.
Both executed a Promissory Note in favor of said bank in the amount of P500,000.00.
Under said note, private respondents Arrieta and Perez promised to pay said amount,
jointly and severally, in twenty five (25) equal installments of P20,000.00 each starting
on April 20, 1979 with interest of 18.704% per annum, and in case of default, a further
8% per annum.
Private respondents Arrieta and Perez defaulted in the payment of several installments,
thus resulting in the entire obligation becoming due and demandable. In 1979, private
respondent Metrobank instituted suit against Intertrade, Vitaliado Arrieta, Lilia Perez
and her husband, Patricio Perez, to collect not only the unpaid principal obligation, but
also interests, fees and penalties, exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and
costs of suit.

More than a year after private respondent Metrobank filed its original complaint, it filed
an Amended Complaint dated August 30, 1980 for the sole purpose of impleading
petitioner as liable for the loan made by private respondents Arrieta and Perez on
March 21, 1978, notwithstanding the fact that such liability is being claimed on account
of a Continuing Suretyship Agreement dated March 14, 1977 executed by petitioner and
private respondent Arrieta specifically to guarantee the credit line applied for by and
granted to, Intertrade, through petitioner and private respondent Arrieta who were
specially given authority by Intertrade on February 28, 1977 to open credit lines with
private respondent Metrobank. The obligations incurred by Intertrade under such credit
lines were completely paid as evidenced by private respondent Metrobank’s debit memo
in the full amount of P562,443.46.

After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision absolving petitioner
from liability and dismissing private respondent Metrobank’s complaint against him, the
dispositive portion of which reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1) Declaring that the Promissory Note dated March 21, 1978, marked as Exhibit A, is
the responsibility only of defendant Vitaliado P. Arrieta and Lilia P. Perez, in their
personal capacity and to the exclusion of defendant Intertrade and Marketing Co. Inc.;

2) Ordering defendants Vitaliado P. Arrieta and Lilia P. Perez to pay, jointly and
severally, the plaintiff the sum of P1,062,898.92, due as of September 15, 1982, plus
interest, fees and penalties due from that date pursuant to the stipulations in the
promissory note until the whole obligations shall have been paid and finally settled;

3) Ordering defendants Vitaliado P. Arrieta and Lilia Perez to pay, jointly and severally,
the plaintiff the sum of P44,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees and other litigation
expenses, albeit there is no award for exemplary damages; chanrobles.com : virtual law library

4) Declaring defendant Patricio Perez, as conjugal partner of defendant Lilia Perez, as

jointly and severally liable with her for what the latter is ordered to pay per this
Decision;

5) Dismissing this case insofar as defendants Intertrade and Marketing Co., Inc. and J.
Antonio Aguenza are concerned, although their respective counterclaims against the
plaintiff are also ordered dismissed.

Costs of suit shall be paid, jointly and severally, by defendant Vitaliado Arrieta and Lilia
Perez.
SO ORDERED." 3

Private respondents Arrieta and spouses Perez appealed the foregoing decision to the
respondent Court of Appeals.

On February 11, 1986, respondent appellate court promulgated the herein assailed
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering
Intertrade & Marketing Co., Inc., and J. Antonio Aguenza, jointly and severally: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1) to pay the Bank the principal of P440,000.00 plus its interest of 18.704% per annum
computed from April 15, 1979 until full payment;

2) to pay the Bank the sum equivalent to 8% of P440,000.00 as penalty, computed

from July 19, 1978 until full payment;

3) to pay the Bank the sum of P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

The complaint is dismissed as against Lilia Perez, Patricio Perez and Vitaliado P. Arrieta
who are absolved from liability.

All counterclaims are dismissed.

Costs against Intertrade and Aguenza, jointly and severally.

SO ORDERED." cralaw virtua1aw library

In setting aside the decision of the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals ratiocinated
such reversal in this wise: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"No dispute exists as to the promissory note and the suretyship agreement. The
controversy centers on whether the note was a corporate undertaking and whether the
suretyship agreement covered the obligation in the note.

As far as Intertrade is concerned, it seems clear from its answer that the loan
evidenced by the note was a corporate liability. Paragraph 1.3 of the answer admits
‘. . . defendant’s obtention of the loan from the plaintiff . . .’; the affirmative defenses
admit default, and invoking the defense of usury, plead adjustment of excessive
interest which Intertrade refused to make.

On the basis of this admission, it is no longer in point to discuss, as the appealed

decision does, the question of the capacity in which Arrieta and Perez signed the
promissory note, Intertrade’s admission of its corporate liability being admission also
that the signatories signed the note in a representative capacity. The Bank itself gave
corroboration with its insistence on Intertrade’s liability under the note. . . .

The stated purpose of the note is ‘operating capital.’ It cannot be contended that the
words ‘operating capital’ refer to the capital requirements of Perez and Arrieta. In the
first place, it was not shown that they were in business for themselves. Besides, Perez
was only a bookkeeper of Intertrade with a salary of P800.00 a month . . . Their
combined resources would not have been sufficient to justify a business loan of the
note’s magnitude. From these follows the only logical conclusion: that Arrieta and the
Perez spouses are not liable on the note.

The surety agreement presents a different problem.

There is no question that Aguenza signed the agreement . . . Its second paragraph
shows, typewritten in bold capitals, that the agreement was executed ‘for and in
consideration of any existing indebtedness to the Bank of INTERTRADE & MARKETING
COMPANY, INC.’ Nowhere in its entire text is it shown that its execution was for the
benefit of Perez or Arrieta.

Aguenza feigns ignorance of the promissory note and claims his knowledge of it came
only when he received summons. This is difficult to believe. As Intertrade’s first letter
to the Bank . . . shows, the Board of Directors and principal stockholders met to discuss
the obligation. Aguenza was at the time president of Intertrade and acting chairman of
its board . . .

Aguenza also argues that the suretyship was executed to enable Intertrade to avail of
letters of credit to finance importations, which had all been paid in full, and therefore
the agreement was thereby terminated. Again, the agreement shows up the fallacy of
this argument. The document is boldly denominated ‘CONTINUING SURETYSHIP,’ and
paragraph VI thereof stipulates it to be a continuing one, ‘to remain in force until
written notice shall have been received by the Bank that it has been revoked by the
surety . . .’ In other words, the option to cancel, in writing, was given to the sureties;
the evidence does not show any written notice of such cancellation. . . .

And, the argument that the agreement was executed as security for letters of credit
that had already been paid is in itself confirmation that the suretyship was meant to
benefit Intertrade. The trust receipts . . . and the bills of exchange . . . are all in the
name of Intertrade.

The suretyship is both retrospective and prospective in its operation. Its wording covers
all obligations of Intertrade existing as of its date as well as those that may exist
thereafter. Hence, its coverage extends to the promissory note as well." 4

Understandably, petitioner lost no time in bringing this case before us via a petition for
review on certiorari on the following grounds: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN REVERSING AND [SETTING] ASIDE THE FINDING
OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE LOAN OF P500,000.00 PROCURED 21 MARCH 1978 BY
RESPONDENTS VITALIADO ARRIETA AND LILIA PEREZ IS NOT A CORPORATE LIABILITY
OF RESPONDENT INTERTRADE AND THAT PETITIONER IS NOT LIABLE THEREON
UNDER THE ‘CONTINUING SURETYSHIP AGREEMENT’ DATED 4 MARCH 1977.

THE CONCLUSION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT THAT THE LOAN OF P500,000.00

PROCURED 21 MARCH 1978 BY RESPONDENT VITALIADO ARRIETA AND LILIA PEREZ IS
A CORPORATE LIABILITY OF RESPONDENT INTERTRADE AND CONSEQUENTLY
RENDERING PETITIONER LIABLE IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AS A SURETY UNDER
THE ‘CONTINUING SURETYSHIP’ OF 4 MARCH 1977, IS GROSSLY ERRONEOUS AND
PREMISED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.

THE CONCLUSIONS AND CONSTRUCTION REACHED BY RESPONDENT COURT FROM

THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE OF RECORD, ARE INCORRECT RESULTING IN AN
ERRONEOUS DECISION GRAVELY PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF
PETITIONER." 5

The petition has merit.

The principal reason for respondent appellate court’s reversal of the trial court’s
absolution of petitioner is its finding that the loan made by private respondent Arrieta
and Lilia Perez were admitted by Intertrade to be its own obligation. cdti

After a careful scrutiny of the records, however, we find and we so rule that there is
neither factual nor legal basis for such a finding by respondent Appellate Court.

First, the general rule that "the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a
pleading are conclusive as against the pleader" 6 is not an absolute and inflexible rule 7
and is subject to exceptions. Rule 129, Section 4, of the Rules of Evidence, provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in

the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made." (Emphasis supplied)

In other words, an admission in a pleading on which a party goes to trial may be

contradicted by showing that it was made by improvidence or mistake or that no such
admission was made, i.e., "not in the sense in which the admission was made to appear
or the admission was taken out of context." 8

In the case at bench, we find that the respondent Court of Appeals committed an error
in appreciating the "Answer" filed by the lawyer of Intertrade as an admission of
corporate liability for the subject loan. A careful study of the responsive pleading filed
by Atty. Francisco Pangilinan, counsel for Intertrade, would reveal that there was
neither express nor implied admission of corporate liability warranting the application of
the general rule. Thus, the alleged judicial admission may be contradicted and
controverted because it was taken out of context and no admission was made at all.

In any event, assuming arguendo that the responsive pleading did contain the aforesaid
admission of corporate liability, the same may not still be given effect at all. As
correctly found by the trial court, the alleged admission made in the answer by the
counsel for Intertrade was "without any enabling act or attendant ratification of
corporate act," 9 as would authorize or even ratify such admission. In the absence of
such ratification or authority, such admission does not bind the corporation.

Second, the respondent appellate court likewise adjudged Intertrade liable because of
the two letters emanating from the office of Mr. Arrieta which the respondent court
considered "as indicating the corporate liability of the corporation." 10 These
documents and admissions cannot have the effect of a ratification of an unauthorized
act. As we elucidated in the case of Vicente v. Geraldez, 11 "ratification can never be
made on the part of the corporation by the same persons who wrongfully assume the
power to make the contract, but the ratification must be by the officer as governing
body having authority to make such contract." In other words, the unauthorized act of
respondent Arrieta can only be ratified by the action of the Board of Directors and/or
petitioner Aguenza jointly with private respondent Arrieta.

We must emphasize that Intertrade has a distinct personality separate from its
members. The corporation transacts its business only through its officers or agents.
Whatever authority these officers or agents may have is derived from the Board of
Directors or other governing body unless conferred by the charter of the corporation.
An officer’s power as an agent of the corporation must be sought from the statute,
charter, the by-laws, as in a delegation of authority to such officer, or the acts of the
Board of Directors formally expressed or implied from a habit or custom of doing
business. 12

Thirdly, we note that the only document to evidence the subject transaction was the
promissory note dated March 21, 1978 signed by private respondents Arrieta and Lilia
Perez. There is no indication in said document as to what capacity the two signatories
had in affixing their signatures thereon.

It is noted that the subject transaction is a loan contract for P500,000.00 under terms
and conditions which are stringent, if not onerous. The power to borrow money is one
of those cases where even a special power of attorney is required. 13 In the instant
case, there is invariably a need of an enabling act of the corporation to be approved by
its Board of Directors. As found by the trial court, the records of this case is bereft of
any evidence that Intertrade through its Board of Directors, conferred upon Arrieta and
Lilia Perez the authority to contract a loan with Metrobank and execute the promissory
note as a security therefor. Neither a board resolution nor a stockholder’s resolution
was presented by Metrobank to show that Arrieta and Lilia Perez were empowered by
Intertrade to execute the promissory note. 14

The respondents may argue that the actuation of Arrieta and Lilia Perez was in
accordance with the ordinary course of business usages and practices of Intertrade.
However, this contention is devoid of merit because the prevailing practice in Intertrade
was to explicitly authorize an officer to contract loans in behalf of the corporation. This
is evidenced by the fact that previous to the controversy, the Intertrade Board of
Directors, through a board resolution, jointly empowered and authorized petitioner and
respondent Arrieta to negotiate, apply for, and open credit lines with Metrobank. 15 The
participation of these two was mandated to be joint and not separate and individual. chanrobles.com : virtual law library

In the case at bench, only respondent Arrieta, together with a bookkeeper of the
corporation, signed the promissory notes, without the participation and approval of
petitioner Aguenza. Moreover, the enabling corporate act on this particular transaction
has not been obtained. Neither has it been shown that any provision of the charter or
any other act of the Board of Directors exists to confer power on the Executive Vice
President acting alone and without the concurrence of its President, to execute the
disputed document. 16

Thus, proceeding from the premise that the subject loan was not the responsibility of
Intertrade, it follows that the undertaking of Arrieta and the bookkeeper was not an
undertaking covered by the Continuing Suretyship Agreement. The rule is that a
contract of surety is never presumed; it must be express and cannot extend to more
than what is stipulated. 17 It is strictly construed against the creditor, every doubt
being resolved against enlarging the liability of the surety.

The present obligation incurred in subject contract of loan, as secured by the Arrieta
and Perez promissory note, is not the obligation of the corporation and petitioner
Aguenza, but the individual and personal obligation of private respondents Arrieta and
Lilia Perez.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals 18 dated February 11, 1986 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the
trial court dated February 29, 1984 is hereby REINSTATED.

G.R. No. 87434 August 5, 1992

PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. and TAGUM PLASTICS,

INC., petitioners,
vs.
SWEET LINES, INC., DAVAO VETERANS ARRASTRE AND PORT SERVICES, INC. and HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners.

Carlo L. Aquino for Sweet Lines, Inc.

REGALADO, J.:

A maritime suit   was commenced on May 12, 1978 by herein Petitioner Philippine American General
1

Insurance Co., Inc. (Philamgen) and Tagum Plastics, Inc. (TPI) against private respondents Sweet
Lines, Inc. (SLI) and Davao Veterans Arrastre and Port Services, Inc. (DVAPSI), along with S.C.I.
Line (The Shipping Corporation of India Limited) and F.E. Zuellig, Inc., as co-defendants in the
court a quo, seeking recovery of the cost of lost or damaged shipment plus exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and costs allegedly due to defendants' negligence, with the following factual
backdrop yielded by the findings of the court below and adopted by respondent court:

It would appear that in or about March 1977, the vessel SS "VISHVA YASH"
belonging to or operated by the foreign common carrier, took on board at Baton
Rouge, LA, two (2) consignments of cargoes for shipment to Manila and later for
transhipment to Davao City, consisting of 600 bags Low Density Polyethylene 631
and another 6,400 bags Low Density Polyethylene 647, both consigned to the order
of Far East Bank and Trust Company of Manila, with arrival notice to Tagum Plastics,
Inc., Madaum, Tagum, Davao City. Said cargoes were covered, respectively, by Bills
of Lading Nos. 6 and 7 issued by the foreign common carrier (Exhs. E and F). The
necessary packing or Weight List (Exhs. A and B), as well as the Commercial
Invoices (Exhs. C and D) accompanied the shipment. The cargoes were likewise
insured by the Tagum Plastics Inc. with plaintiff Philippine American General
Insurance Co., Inc., (Exh. G).

In the course of time, the said vessel arrived at Manila and discharged its cargoes in
the Port of Manila for transhipment to Davao City. For this purpose, the foreign
carrier awaited and made use of the services of the vessel called M/V "Sweet Love"
owned and operated by defendant interisland carrier.

Subject cargoes were loaded in Holds Nos. 2 and 3 of the interisland carrier. These
were commingled with similar cargoes belonging to Evergreen Plantation and also
Standfilco.

On May 15, 1977, the shipment(s) were discharged from the interisland carrier into
the custody of the consignee. A later survey conducted on July 8, 1977, upon the
instance of the plaintiff, shows the following:

Of the cargo covered by Bill of Lading No. 25 or (2)6, supposed to contain 6,400
bags of Low Density Polyethylene 647 originally inside 160 pallets, there were
delivered to the consignee 5,413 bags in good order condition. The survey shows
shortages, damages and losses to be as follows:

Undelivered/Damaged bags as tallied during discharge from vessel-

173 bags; undelivered and damaged as noted and observed whilst
stored at the pier-699 bags; and shortlanded-110 bags (Exhs. P and
P-1).

Of the 600 bags of Low Density Polyethylene 631, the survey conducted on the
same day shows an actual delivery to the consignee of only 507 bags in good order
condition. Likewise noted were the following losses, damages and shortages, to wit:

Undelivered/damaged bags and tally sheets during discharge from

vessel-17 bags.

Undelivered and damaged as noted and observed whilst stored at the

pier-66 bags; Shortlanded-10 bags.

Therefore, of said shipment totalling 7,000 bags, originally contained in 175 pallets,
only a total of 5,820 bags were delivered to the consignee in good order condition,
leaving a balance of 1,080 bags. Such loss from this particular shipment is what any
or all defendants may be answerable to (sic).

As already stated, some bags were either shortlanded or were missing, and some of
the 1,080 bags were torn, the contents thereof partly spilled or were fully/partially
emptied, but, worse, the contents thereof contaminated with foreign matters and
therefore could no longer serve their intended purpose. The position taken by the
consignee was that even those bags which still had some contents were considered
as total losses as the remaining contents were contaminated with foreign matters
and therefore did not (sic) longer serve the intended purpose of the material. Each
bag was valued, taking into account the customs duties and other taxes paid as well
 as charges and the conversion value then of a dollar to the peso, at P110.28 per bag
(see Exhs. L and L-1 M and O).  2

Before trial, a compromise agreement was entered into between petitioners, as plaintiffs, and
defendants S.C.I. Line and F.E. Zuellig, upon the latter's payment of P532.65 in settlement of the
claim against them. Whereupon, the trial court in its order of August 12, 1981   granted plaintiffs' 3

motion to dismiss grounded on said amicable settlement and the case as to S.C.I. Line and F.E.
Zuellig was consequently "dismissed with prejudice and without pronouncement as to costs."

The trial court thereafter rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners on this dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Philippine

General American Insurance Company Inc. and against the remaining defendants,
Sweet Lines Inc. and Davao Veterans Arrastre Inc. as follows:

Defendant Sweet Lines, Inc. is ordered to pay said plaintiff the sum of P34,902.00,
with legal interest thereon from date of extrajudicial demand on April 28, 1978 (Exh.
M) until fully paid;

Defendant Sweet Lines Inc. and Davao Veterans Arrastre and (Port) Services Inc.
are directed to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of P49,747.55, with
legal interest thereon from April 28, 1978 until fully paid;

Each of said defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiffs the additional sum of
P5,000 is reimbursable attorney's fees and other litigation expenses;

Each of said defendants shall pay one-fourth (1/4) costs.  4

Due to the reversal on appeal by respondent court of the trial court's decision on the ground of
prescription,   in effect dismissing the complaint of herein petitioners, and the denial of their motion
5

for reconsideration,   petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, faulting respondent
6

appellate court with the following errors: (1) in upholding, without proof, the existence of the so-
called prescriptive period; (2) granting arguendo that the said prescriptive period does exist, in not
finding the same to be null and void; and (3) assuming arguendo that the said prescriptive period is
valid and legal, in failing to conclude that petitioners substantially complied therewith.  7

Parenthetically, we observe that herein petitioners are jointly pursuing this case, considering their
common interest in the shipment subject of the present controversy, to obviate any question as to
who the real party in interest is and to protect their respective rights as insurer and insured. In any
case, there is no impediment to the legal standing of Petitioner Philamgen, even if it alone were to
sue herein private respondents in its own capacity as insurer, it having been subrogated to all rights
of recovery for loss of or damage to the shipment insured under its Marine Risk Note No. 438734
dated March 31, 1977 8 in view of the full settlement of the claim thereunder as evidenced by the subrogation receipt   issued in its
9

favor by Far East Bank and Trust Co., Davao Branch, for the account of petitioner TPI.

Upon payment of the loss covered by the policy, the insurer's entitlement to subrogation pro tanto,
being of the highest equity, equips it with a cause of action against a third party in case of
contractual breach.   Further, the insurer's subrogatory right to sue for recovery under the bill of
10

lading in case of loss of or damage to the cargo is jurisprudentially upheld.   However, if an insurer,
11

in the exercise of its subrogatory right, may proceed against the erring carrier and for all intents and
purposes stands in the place and in substitution of the consignee, a fortiori such insurer is presumed
to know and is just as bound by the contractual terms under the bill of lading as the insured.
On the first issue, petitioners contend that it was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse the
appealed decision on the supposed ground of prescription when SLI failed to adduce any evidence
in support thereof and that the bills of lading said to contain the shortened periods for filing a claim
and for instituting a court action against the carrier were never offered in evidence. Considering that
the existence and tenor of this stipulation on the aforesaid periods have allegedly not been
established, petitioners maintain that it is inconceivable how they can possibly comply therewith.   In 12

refutation, SLI avers that it is standard practice in its operations to issue bills of lading for shipments
entrusted to it for carriage and that it in fact issued bills of lading numbered MD-25 and MD-26
therefor with proof of their existence manifest in the records of the case.   For its part, DVAPSI
13

insists on the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint as to it due to petitioners' failure to prove its
direct responsibility for the loss of and/or damage to the cargo.  14

On this point, in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals resolved that
although the bills of lading were not offered in evidence, the litigation obviously revolves on such bills
of lading which are practically the documents or contracts sued upon, hence, they are inevitably
involved and their provisions cannot be disregarded in the determination of the relative rights of the
parties thereto. 15

Respondent court correctly passed upon the matter of prescription, since that defense was so
considered and controverted by the parties. This issue may accordingly be taken cognizance of by
the court even if not inceptively raised as a defense so long as its existence is plainly apparent on
the face of relevant pleadings.   In the case at bar, prescription as an affirmative defense was
16

seasonably raised by SLI in its answer,   except that the bills of lading embodying the same were not
17

formally offered in evidence, thus reducing the bone of contention to whether or not prescription can
be maintained as such defense and, as in this case, consequently upheld on the strength of mere
references thereto.

As petitioners are suing upon SLI's contractual obligation under the contract of carriage as contained
in the bills of lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as actionable documents which under
the Rules must be properly pleaded either as causes of action or defenses,   and the genuineness
18

and due execution of which are deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath by the
adverse party.   The rules on actionable documents cover and apply to both a cause of action or
19

defense based on said documents.  20

In the present case and under the aforestated assumption that the time limit involved is a
prescriptive period, respondent carrier duly raised prescription as an affirmative defense in its
answer setting forth paragraph 5 of the pertinent bills of lading which comprised the stipulation
thereon by parties, to wit:

5. Claims for shortage, damage, must be made at the time of delivery to consignee
or agent, if container shows exterior signs of damage or shortage. Claims for non-
delivery, misdelivery, loss or damage must be filed within 30 days from accrual. Suits
arising from shortage, damage or loss, non-delivery or misdelivery shall be instituted
within 60 days from date of accrual of right of action. Failure to file claims or institute
judicial proceedings as herein provided constitutes waiver of claim or right of action.
In no case shall carrier be liable for any delay, non-delivery, misdelivery, loss of
damage to cargo while cargo is not in actual custody of carrier.  21

In their reply thereto, herein petitioners, by their own assertions that —

2. In connection with Pars. 14 and 15 of defendant Sweet Lines, Inc.'s Answer,

plaintiffs state that such agreements are what the Supreme Court considers as
 contracts of adhesion (see Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Hon. Bernardo Teves, et al., G.R.
No. L-37750, May 19, 1978) and, consequently, the provisions therein which are
contrary to law and public policy cannot be availed of by answering defendant as
valid defenses.  22

thereby failed to controvert the existence of the bills of lading and the aforequoted provisions therein,
hence they impliedly admitted the same when they merely assailed the validity of subject
stipulations.

Petitioners' failure to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution,
of the instruments in question amounts to an admission. Judicial admissions, verbal or written, made
by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are
conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same, and cannot be contradicted unless shown
to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.   Moreover,
23

when the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the
adverse party's failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be
presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.  24

Even granting that petitioners' averment in their reply amounts to a denial, it has the procedural
earmarks of what in the law on pleadings is called a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant
with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely
denied. It is in effect an admission of the averment it is directed to.   Thus, while petitioners objected
25

to the validity of such agreement for being contrary to public policy, the existence of the bills of
lading and said stipulations were nevertheless impliedly admitted by them.

We find merit in respondent court's comments that petitioners failed to touch on the matter of the
non-presentation of the bills of lading in their brief and earlier on in the appellate proceedings in this
case, hence it is too late in the day to now allow the litigation to be overturned on that score, for to
do so would mean an over-indulgence in technicalities. Hence, for the reasons already advanced,
the non-inclusion of the controverted bills of lading in the formal offer of evidence cannot, under the
facts of this particular case, be considered a fatal procedural lapse as would bar respondent carrier
from raising the defense of prescription. Petitioners' feigned ignorance of the provisions of the bills of
lading, particularly on the time limitations for filing a claim and for commencing a suit in court, as
their excuse for non-compliance therewith does not deserve serious attention.

It is to be noted that the carriage of the cargo involved was effected pursuant to an "Application for
Delivery of Cargoes without Original Bill of Lading" issued on May 20, 1977 in Davao City   with the
26

notation therein that said application corresponds to and is subject to the terms of bills of lading MD-
25 and MD-26. It would be a safe assessment to interpret this to mean that, sight unseen, petitioners
acknowledged the existence of said bills of lading. By having the cargo shipped on respondent
carrier's vessel and later making a claim for loss on the basis of the bills of lading, petitioners for all
intents and purposes accepted said bills. Having done so they are bound by all stipulations
contained therein.   Verily, as petitioners are suing for recovery on the contract, and in fact even
27

went as far as assailing its validity by categorizing it as a contract of adhesion, then they necessarily
admit that there is such a contract, their knowledge of the existence of which with its attendant
stipulations they cannot now be allowed to deny.

On the issue of the validity of the controverted paragraph 5 of the bills of lading above quoted which
unequivocally prescribes a time frame of thirty (30) days for filing a claim with the carrier in case of
loss of or damage to the cargo and sixty (60) days from accrual of the right of action for instituting an
action in court, which periods must concur, petitioners posit that the alleged shorter prescriptive
period which is in the nature of a limitation on petitioners' right of recovery is unreasonable and that
SLI has the burden of proving otherwise, citing the earlier case of Southern Lines, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.   They postulate this on the theory that the bills of lading containing the same
28

constitute contracts of adhesion and are, therefore, void for being contrary to public policy,
supposedly pursuant to the dictum in Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Teves, et al.  29

Furthermore, they contend, since the liability of private respondents has been clearly established, to
bar petitioners' right of recovery on a mere technicality will pave the way for unjust
enrichment.   Contrarily, SLI asserts and defends the reasonableness of the time limitation within
30

which claims should be filed with the carrier; the necessity for the same, as this condition for the
carrier's liability is uniformly adopted by nearly all shipping companies if they are to survive the
concomitant rigors and risks of the shipping industry; and the countervailing balance afforded by
such stipulation to the legal presumption of negligence under which the carrier labors in the event of
loss of or damage to the cargo.  31

It has long been held that Article 366 of the Code of Commerce applies not only to overland and
river transportation but also to maritime
transportation.   Moreover, we agree that in this jurisdiction, as viewed from another angle, it is more
32

accurate to state that the filing of a claim with the carrier within the time limitation therefor under
Article 366 actually constitutes a condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against a
carrier for damages caused to the merchandise. The shipper or the consignee must allege and
prove the fulfillment of the condition and if he omits such allegations and proof, no right of action
against the carrier can accrue in his favor. As the requirements in Article 366, restated with a slight
modification in the assailed paragraph 5 of the bills of lading, are reasonable conditions precedent,
they are not limitations of action.   Being conditions precedent, their performance must precede a
33

suit for enforcement   and the vesting of the right to file spit does not take place until the happening
34

of these conditions.  35

Now, before an action can properly be commenced all the essential elements of the cause of action
must be in existence, that is, the cause of action must be complete. All valid conditions precedent to
the institution of the particular action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed by agreement of the
parties or implied by law must be performed or complied with before commencing the action, unless
the conduct of the adverse party has been such as to prevent or waive performance or excuse non-
performance of the condition.  36

It bears restating that a right of action is the right to presently enforce a cause of action, while a
cause of action consists of the operative facts which give rise to such right of action. The right of
action does not arise until the performance of all conditions precedent to the action and may be
taken away by the running of the statute of limitations, through estoppel, or by other circumstances
which do not affect the cause of action.   Performance or fulfillment of all conditions precedent upon
37

which a right of action depends must be sufficiently alleged,   considering that the burden of proof to
38

show that a party has a right of action is upon the person initiating the suit.  39

More particularly, where the contract of shipment contains a reasonable requirement of giving notice
of loss of or injury to the goods, the giving of such notice is a condition precedent to the action for
loss or injury or the right to enforce the carrier's liability. Such requirement is not an empty formalism.
The fundamental reason or purpose of such a stipulation is not to relieve the carrier from just liability,
but reasonably to inform it that the shipment has been damaged and that it is charged with liability
therefor, and to give it an opportunity to examine the nature and extent of the injury. This protects
the carrier by affording it an opportunity to make an investigation of a claim while the matter is fresh
and easily investigated so as to safeguard itself from false and fraudulent claims.  40
Stipulations in bills of lading or other contracts of shipment which require notice of claim for loss of or
damage to goods shipped in order to impose liability on the carrier operate to prevent the
enforcement of the contract when not complied with, that is, notice is a condition precedent and the
carrier is not liable if notice is not given in accordance with the stipulation,   as the failure to comply
41

with such a stipulation in a contract of carriage with respect to notice of loss or claim for damage
bars recovery for the loss or damage suffered.  42

On the other hand, the validity of a contractual limitation of time for filing the suit itself against a
carrier shorter than the statutory period therefor has generally been upheld as such stipulation
merely affects the shipper's remedy and does not affect the liability of the carrier. In the absence of
any statutory limitation and subject only to the requirement on the reasonableness of the stipulated
limitation period, the parties to a contract of carriage may fix by agreement a shorter time for the
bringing of suit on a claim for the loss of or damage to the shipment than that provided by the statute
of limitations. Such limitation is not contrary to public policy for it does not in any way defeat the
complete vestiture of the right to recover, but merely requires the assertion of that right by action at
an earlier period than would be necessary to defeat it through the operation of the ordinary statute of
limitations. 
43

In the case at bar, there is neither any showing of compliance by petitioners with the requirement for
the filing of a notice of claim within the prescribed period nor any allegation to that effect. It may then
be said that while petitioners may possibly have a cause of action, for failure to comply with the
above condition precedent they lost whatever right of action they may have in their favor or, token in
another sense, that remedial right or right to relief had prescribed. 44

The shipment in question was discharged into the custody of the consignee on May 15, 1977, and it
was from this date that petitioners' cause of action accrued, with thirty (30) days therefrom within
which to file a claim with the carrier for any loss or damage which may have been suffered by the
cargo and thereby perfect their right of action. The findings of respondent court as supported by
petitioners' formal offer of evidence in the court below show that the claim was filed with SLI only on
April 28, 1978, way beyond the period provided in the bills of lading   and violative of the contractual
45

provision, the inevitable consequence of which is the loss of petitioners' remedy or right to sue. Even
the filing of the complaint on May 12, 1978 is of no remedial or practical consequence, since the time
limits for the filing thereof, whether viewed as a condition precedent or as a prescriptive period,
would in this case be productive of the same result, that is, that petitioners had no right of action to
begin with or, at any rate, their claim was time-barred.

What the court finds rather odd is the fact that petitioner TPI filed a provisional claim with DVAPSI as
early as June 14, 1977   and, as found by the trial court, a survey fixing the extent of loss of and/or
46

damage to the cargo was conducted on July 8, 1977 at the instance of petitioners.   If petitioners
47

had the opportunity and awareness to file such provisional claim and to cause a survey to be
conducted soon after the discharge of the cargo, then they could very easily have filed the
necessary formal, or even a provisional, claim with SLI itself   within the stipulated period therefor,
48

instead of doing so only on April 28, 1978 despite the vessel's arrival at the port of destination on
May 15, 1977. Their failure to timely act brings us to no inference other than the fact that petitioners
slept on their rights and they must now face the consequences of such inaction.

The ratiocination of the Court of Appeals on this aspect is worth reproducing:

xxx xxx xxx

 It must be noted, at this juncture, that the aforestated time limitation in the
presentation of claim for loss or damage, is but a restatement of the rule prescribed
under Art. 366 of the Code of Commerce which reads as follows:

Art. 366. Within the twenty-four hours following the receipt of the
merchandise, the claim against the carrier for damage or average
which may be found therein upon opening the packages, may be
made, provided that the indications of the damage or average which
gives rise to the claim cannot be ascertained from the outside part of
the packages, in which case the claims shall be admitted only at the
time of the receipt.

After the periods mentioned have elapsed, or the transportation

charges have been paid, no claim shall be admitted against the
carrier with regard to the condition in which the goods transported
were delivered.

Gleanable therefrom is the fact that subject stipulation even lengthened the period for
presentation of claims thereunder. Such modification has been sanctioned by the
Supreme Court. In the case of Ong Yet (M)ua Hardware Co., Inc. vs. Mitsui
Steamship Co., Ltd., et al., 59 O.G. No. 17, p. 2764, it ruled that Art. 366 of the Code
of Commerce can be modified by a bill of lading prescribing the period of 90 days
after arrival of the ship, for filing of written claim with the carrier or agent, instead of
the 24-hour time limit after delivery provided in the aforecited legal provision.

Tested, too, under paragraph 5 of said Bill of Lading, it is crystal clear that the
commencement of the instant suit on May 12, 1978 was indeed fatally late. In view of
the express provision that "suits arising from
. . . damage or loss shall be instituted within 60 days from date of accrual of right of
action," the present action necessarily fails on ground of prescription.

In the absence of constitutional or statutory prohibition, it is usually

held or recognized that it is competent for the parties to a contract of
shipment to agree on a limitation of time shorter than the statutory
period, within which action for breach of the contract shall be brought,
and such limitation will be enforced if reasonable . . . (13 C.J.S. 496-
497)

A perusal of the pertinent provisions of law on the matter would disclose that there is
no constitutional or statutory prohibition infirming paragraph 5 of subject Bill of
Lading. The stipulated period of 60 days is reasonable enough for appellees to
ascertain the facts and thereafter to sue, if need be, and the 60-day period agreed
upon by the parties which shortened the statutory period within which to bring action
for breach of contract is valid and binding. . . . (Emphasis in the original text.) 
49

As explained above, the shortened period for filing suit is not unreasonable and has in fact been
generally recognized to be a valid business practice in the shipping industry. Petitioners' advertence
to the Court's holding in the Southern Lines case, supra, is futile as what was involved was a claim
for refund of excess payment. We ruled therein that non-compliance with the requirement of filing a
notice of claim under Article 366 of the Code of Commerce does not affect the consignee's right of
action against the carrier because said requirement applies only to cases for recovery of damages
on account of loss of or damage to cargo, not to an action for refund of overpayment, and on the
further consideration that neither the Code of Commerce nor the bills of lading therein provided any
time limitation for suing for refund of money paid in excess, except only that it be filed within a
reasonable time.

The ruling in Sweet Lines categorizing the stipulated limitation on venue of action provided in the
subject bill of lading as a contract of adhesion and, under the circumstances therein, void for being
contrary to public policy is evidently likewise unavailing in view of the discrete environmental facts
involved and the fact that the restriction therein was unreasonable. In any case, Ong Yiu vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.,   instructs us that "contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready-made
50

form of contract on the other . . . are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the
contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres he gives his consent." In the present case,
not even an allegation of ignorance of a party excuses non-compliance with the contractual
stipulations since the responsibility for ensuring full comprehension of the provisions of a contract of
carriage devolves not on the carrier but on the owner, shipper, or consignee as the case may be.

While it is true that substantial compliance with provisions on filing of claim for loss of or damage to
cargo may sometimes suffice, the invocation of such an assumption must be viewed vis-a-vis the
object or purpose which such a provision seeks to attain and that is to afford the carrier a reasonable
opportunity to determine the merits and validity of the claim and to protect itself against unfounded
impositions.   Petitioners' would nevertheless adopt an adamant posture hinged on the issuance by
51

SLI of a "Report on Losses and Damages," dated May 15, 1977,   from which petitioners theorize
52

that this charges private respondents with actual knowledge of the loss and damage involved in the
present case as would obviate the need for or render superfluous the filing of a claim within the
stipulated period.

Withal, it has merely to be pointed out that the aforementioned report bears this notation at the lower
part thereof: "Damaged by Mla. labor upon unloading; B/L noted at port of origin," as an explanation
for the cause of loss of and/or damage to the cargo, together with an iterative note stating that "(t)his
Copy should be submitted together with your claim invoice or receipt within 30 days from date of
issue otherwise your claim will not be honored."

Moreover, knowledge on the part of the carrier of the loss of or damage to the goods deducible from
the issuance of said report is not equivalent to nor does it approximate the legal purpose served by
the filing of the requisite claim, that is, to promptly apprise the carrier about a consignee's intention to
file a claim and thus cause the prompt investigation of the veracity and merit thereof for its
protection. It would be an unfair imposition to require the carrier, upon discovery in the process of
preparing the report on losses or damages of any and all such loss or damage, to presume the
existence of a claim against it when at that time the carrier is expectedly concerned merely with
accounting for each and every shipment and assessing its condition. Unless and until a notice of
claim is therewith timely filed, the carrier cannot be expected to presume that for every loss or
damage tallied, a corresponding claim therefor has been filed or is already in existence as would
alert it to the urgency for an immediate investigation of the soundness of the claim. The report on
losses and damages is not the claim referred to and required by the bills of lading for it does not fix
responsibility for the loss or damage, but merely states the condition of the goods shipped. The
claim contemplated herein, in whatever form, must be something more than a notice that the goods
have been lost or damaged; it must contain a claim for compensation or indicate an intent to claim.  53

Thus, to put the legal effect of respondent carrier's report on losses or damages, the preparation of
which is standard procedure upon unloading of cargo at the port of destination, on the same level as
that of a notice of claim by imploring substantial compliance is definitely farfetched. Besides, the
cited notation on the carrier's report itself makes it clear that the filing of a notice of claim in any case
is imperative if carrier is to be held liable at all for the loss of or damage to cargo.
Turning now to respondent DVAPSI and considering that whatever right of action petitioners may
have against respondent carrier was lost due to their failure to seasonably file the requisite claim, it
would be awkward, to say the least, that by some convenient process of elimination DVAPSI should
proverbially be left holding the bag, and it would be pure speculation to assume that DVAPSI is
probably responsible for the loss of or damage to cargo. Unlike a common carrier, an arrastre
operator does not labor under a presumption of negligence in case of loss, destruction or
deterioration of goods discharged into its custody. In other words, to hold an arrastre operator liable
for loss of and/or damage to goods entrusted to it there must be preponderant evidence that it did
not exercise due diligence in the handling and care of the goods.

Petitioners failed to pinpoint liability on any of the original defendants and in this seemingly wild
goose-chase, they cannot quite put their finger down on when, where, how and under whose
responsibility the loss or damage probably occurred, or as stated in paragraph 8 of their basic
complaint filed in the court below, whether "(u)pon discharge of the cargoes from the original
carrying vessel, the SS VISHVA YASH," and/or upon discharge of the cargoes from the interisland
vessel the MV "SWEET LOVE," in Davao City and later while in the custody of defendant arrastre
operator. 54

The testimony of petitioners' own witness, Roberto Cabato, Jr., Marine and Aviation Claims Manager
of petitioner Philamgen, was definitely inconclusive and the responsibility for the loss or damage
could still not be ascertained therefrom:

Q In other words, Mr. Cabato, you only computed the loss on the
basis of the figures submitted to you and based on the documents
like the survey certificate and the certificate of the arrastre?

A Yes, sir.

Q Therefore, Mr. Cabato, you have no idea how or where these

losses were incurred?

A No, sir.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Mr. Witness, you said that you processed and investigated the
claim involving the shipment in question. Is it not a fact that in your
processing and investigation you considered how the shipment was
transported? Where the losses could have occurred and what is the
extent of the respective responsibilities of the bailees and/or carriers
involved?

x x x           x x x          x x x

A With respect to the shipment being transported, we have of course

to get into it in order to check whether the shipment coming in to this
port is in accordance with the policy condition, like in this particular
case, the shipment was transported to Manila and transhipped
through an interisland vessel in accordance with the policy. With
respect to the losses, we have a general view where losses could
have occurred. Of course we will have to consider the different
 bailees wherein the shipment must have passed through, like the
ocean vessel, the interisland vessel and the arrastre, but definitely at
that point and time we cannot determine the extent of each liability.
We are only interested at that point and time in the liability as regards
the underwriter in accordance with the policy that we issued.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Mr. Witness, from the documents, namely, the survey of Manila

Adjusters and Surveyors Company, the survey of Davao Arrastre
contractor and the bills of lading issued by the defendant Sweet
Lines, will you be able to tell the respective liabilities of the bailees
and/or carriers concerned?

A No, sir. (Emphasis ours.)  55

Neither did nor could the trial court, much less the Court of Appeals, precisely establish the stage in
the course of the shipment when the goods were lost, destroyed or damaged. What can only be
inferred from the factual findings of the trial court is that by the time the cargo was discharged to
DVAPSI, loss or damage had already occurred and that the same could not have possibly occurred
while the same was in the custody of DVAPSI, as demonstrated by the observations of the trial court
quoted at the start of this opinion.

ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the dismissal of the
complaint in the court a quo as decreed by respondent Court of Appeals in its challenged judgment
is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 116111 January 21, 1999

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the Acting Commissioner of Land

Registration), petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses CATALINO SANTOS and THELMA BARRERO SANTOS, ST.
JUDE'S ENTERPRISES, INC., Spouses DOMINGO CALAGUIAN and FELICIDAD CALAGUIAN,
VIRGINIA DELA FUENTE and LUCY MADAYA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is the immunity of the government from laches and estoppel absolute? May it still recover the
ownership of lots sold in good faith by a private developer to innocent purchaser for value,
notwithstanding its approval of the subdivision plan issuance of seperate individual certificates of the
title thereto?

The Case

These are the main questions raised in the Petition for Review before us, seeking to set aside the
November 29, 1993 Decision   of the Court of Appeals   in CA-G.R CV No. 34647. The assailed
1 2

Decision affirmed the ruling   of the Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City, Branch 125, in Civil Case
3

No. C-111708, which dismissed petitioner's Complaint for the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs) to several lots in Caloocan City, issued in the name of private respondents.

In a Resolution   dated July 7, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the Republic's motion for
4

reconsideration.

The Fact

The facts of the case are not disputed. The trial court's summary, which was adopted by the Court of
Appeals, is reproduced below:

Defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. is the registered owner of a parcel of land
known as Lot 865-B-1 of the subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-52368, being a portion of
Lot 865-B located in Caloocan City containing an area of 40,623 square meters. For
Lot 865-B-1 defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. was issued TCT No. 22660 on
July 25, 1995.

Sometime in March 1966. defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. subdivided Lot No.
865-B-1 under subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-55643 and as a result thereof the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City cancelled TCT No. 22660 and in lieu thereof
issued Certificates of Title Nos. 23967 up to 24068 inclusive, all in the name of
defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. The subdivision of lot 865-B-1 [which was]
covered [by] TCT No. 22660 was later found to have expanded and enlarged from its
original area of 40,523 square meters to 42,044 square meters or an increase of
1,421 square meters. This expansion or increase in area was confirmed by the Land
Registration Commission [to have been made] on the northern portion of Lot 865-B-
1.

Subsequently, defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. sold the lots covered by TCT
Nos. 24013 and 24014 to defendant Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma Barreto
Santos[;] TCT No. 24019 to defendant Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Felicidad de
Jesus[;] TCT No. 24022 to defendant Virginia dela Fuente[;] and TCT No. 2402[3] to
defendant Lucy Madaya. Accordingly, these titles were cancelled and said
defendants were issued the following: TCT No. C-43319 issued in the name of Sps.
Santos containing an area of 344 square meters[;] TCT No. 55513 issued in the
name of defendants Sps. Calaguian containing an area of 344 square meters[;] TCT
13309 issued in the name of Sps. Santos[;] TCT No. 24069 issued in the name of
Virginia dela Fuente containing an area of 350 square meters[;] and TCT No. C-
46648 issued in the name of defendant Lucy Madaya with an area of 350 square
meters. 5

[On January 29, 1985, then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed] an action
seeking . . . the annulment and cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. 24015, 24017, 24018, 24020, 24021, 24024, 24025 and 24068 issued in the
 name of defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc.[;] Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
13309 and C-43319 both registered in the name of Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma
B. Santos[;] and TCT No. 55513 registered in the name of Sps. Domingo Calaguian
and Felicidad de Jesus[;] TCT No. 24069 registered in the name of Virginia dela
Fuente[;] and TCT No. C-46648 registered in the name of Lucy Madaya, principally
on the ground that said Certificates of Title were issued on the strength of [a] null and
void subdivision plan (LRC) PSD-55643 which expanded the original area of TCT
No. 22660 in the name of St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. from 40,623 square meters to
42,044 square meters upon its subdivision.

Defendants Virginia dela Fuente and Lucy Mandaya were declared in default for
failure to file their respective answer within the reglementary period.

Defendants Sps. Catalino Santos and Thelma Barreto Santos, St. Jude's
Enterprises, Inc. and Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Felicidad Calaguian filed
separate answers to the complaint. Defendants Sps. Domingo Calaguian and Sps.
Catalino Santos interposed defenses, among others, that they acquired the lots in
question in good faith from their former owner, defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc.
and for value and that the titles issued to the said defendants were rendered
incontrovertible, conclusive and indefeasible after one year from the date of the
issuance of the titles by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.

On the other hand, defendant St. Jude's Enterprises, Inc. interposed defenses,
among others, that the cause of action of plaintiff is barred by prior judgement; that
the subdivision plan submitted having been approved by the LRC, the government is
now in estoppel to question the approved subdivision plan; and the plaintiff's
allegation that the area of the subdivision increased by 1,421 square meters is
without any basis in fact and in law.6

Ruling of the Trial Court

On April 30, 1991, the trial court dismissed the Complaint. While the plaintiff sufficiently proved the
enlargement or expansion of the area of the disputed property, it presented no proof that
Respondent St. Jude Enterprises, Inc. ("St. Jude") had committed fraud when it submitted the
subdivision plan to the Land Registration Commission (LRC) for approval. Because the plan was
presumed to have been subjected to investigation, study and verification by the LRC, there was no
one to blame for the increase in the area "but the plaintiff[,] for having allowed and approved the
subdivision plan." Thus, the court concluded, the government was already "in estoppel to question
the approved subdivision plan."

The trial court also took into account the "absence of complaints from adjoining owners whose
supposed lots [were] encroached upon by the defendants," as well as the fact that an adjoining
owner had categorically stated that there was no such encroachment. Finding that Spouses Santos,
Spouses Calaguian, Dela Fuente and Madaya had bought their respective lots from St. Jude for
value and good faith, the court held that their titles could no longer be questioned, because under
the Torrens system, such titles had become absolute and irrevocable. As regards the Republic's
allegation that it had filed the case to protect the integrity of the said system, the court said:

. . . [S]ustaining the position taken by the government would certainly lead to

disastrous consequences. Buyers in good faith would lose their titles. Adjoining
owners who were deprived of a portion of their lot would be forced to accept the
portion of the property allegedly encroached upon. Actions for recovery will be filed
 right and left[;] thus instead of preserving the integrity of the Torrens System it would
certainly cause chaos rather than stability. Finally, if only to strengthen the Torrens
System and in the interest of justice, the boundaries of the affected properties of the
defendants should not be disturbed and the status quo should be
maintained. 8

The solicitor general appealed the trial court's Decision to the Court of Appeals.

Ruling of the Appelate Court

Citing several cases   upholding the indefeasibility of the titles issued under the Torrens system, the
9

appelate court affirmed the trial court. It berated petitioner for bringing the suit only after nineteen
(19) years had passed since the issuance of St. Jude's title and the approval of the subdivision plan.
The pertinent portion of the assailed Decision reads: 10

. . . Rather than make the Torrens system reliable and stable, [its] act of filing the
instant suit rocks the system, as it gives the impression to Torrens title holders, like
appellees, that their titles to properties can be questioned by the same authority who
had approved the same even after a long period of time. In that case, no Torrens title
holder shall be at peace with the ownership and possession of his land, for the
Commission of Land Registration can question his title anytime it makes a finding
unfavorable to said Torrens title holder.

Undauted, petitioner seeks a review by this Court.  11

The Issues

In this petition, the Republic raises the following issues for our resolution: 12

1. Whether or not the government is estopped from questioning the approved

subdivision plan which expanded the areas covered by the transfer certificates of title
in question;

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it did not consider the Torrens
System as merely a means of registering title to land;

3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider that
petitioner's complaint before the lower court was filed to preserve the integrity of the
Torrens System.

We shall discuss the second and third questions together. Hence, the issues shall be (1) the
applicability of estoppel against the State and (2) the Torrens system.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

First Issue:

Estoppel Against the Government

The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or
agents.  However, like all general rules, this is also subject to exception, viz.:
13 14

Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in
a rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would
operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public.
They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those
special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the
government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens,
and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . .,
the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well
as against private individuals.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,  the government, in its effort to recover ill-gotten wealth, tried to skirt
15

the application of estoppel against it by invoking a specific constitutional provision.  The Court
16

countered:  17

We agree with the statement that the State is immune from estoppel, but this concept
is understood to refer to acts and mistakes of its officials especially those which are
irregular (Sharp International Marketing vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 299; 306
[1991]; Republic v. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186 [1983]), which peculiar circumstances are
absent in this case at bar. Although the State's right of action to recover ill-gotten
wealth is not vulnerable to estoppel[;] it is non sequitur to suggest that a contract,
freely and in good faith executed between the parties thereto is susceptible to
disturbance ad infinitum. A different interpretation will lead to the absurd scenario of
permitting a party to unilaterally jettison a compromise agreement which is supposed
to have the authority of res judicata (Article 2037, New Civil Code), and like any
other contract, has the force of law between parties thereto (Article 1159, New Civil
Code; Hernaez vs. Kao, 17 SCRA 296 [1996]; 6 Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 7th
ed., 1987, p. 711; 3 Aquino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 463). . . .

The Court further declared that "(t)he real office of the equitable norm of estoppel is limited to
supply[ing] deficiency in the law, but it should not supplant positive law." 
18

In the case at bar, for nearly twenty years (starting from the issuance of St. Jude's titles in 1996 up to
the filing of the Complaint in 1985), petitioner failed to correct and recover the alleged increase in the
land area of St. Jude. Its prolonged inaction strongly militates against its cause, as it is tantamount to
laches, which means "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do what which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
19

The Court notes private repondents' argument that, prior to the subdivision, the surveyors erred in
the original survey of the whole tract of land covered by TCT No. 22660, so that less than
the actual land area was indicated on the title. Otherwise, the adjoining owners would have
complained upon the partition of the land in accordance with the LRC-approved subdivision plan. As
it is, Florenci Quintos, the owner of the 9,146 square-meter Quintos Village adjoining the northern
potion of St. Jude's property (the portion allegedly "expanded"), even attested on August 16, 1973
that "there [was] no everlapping of boundaries as per my approved plan (LRC) PSD 147766 dated
September 8, 1971."   None of the other neighboring owners ever complained against St. Jude or
20

the purchaser of its property. It is clear, therefore, that there was no actual damage to third persons
caused by the resurvey and the subdivision.
Significantly, the other private respondents — Spouses Santos, Spouses Calaguian, Dela Fuente
and Madaya — bought such "expanded" lots in good faith, relying on the clean certificates of St.
Jude, which had no notice of any flaw in them either. It is only fair and reasonable to apply the
equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an injustice   to the
21

innocent purchasers for value.

Likewise time-settled is the doctrine that where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of
the certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts cannot disregard such rights and order
the cancellation of the certificate. Such cancellation would impair public confidence in the certificate
of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire
in very instance whether the title has been regularly issued or not. This would be contrary to the very
purpose of the law, which is to stabilize land titles. Verily, all persons dealing with registered land
may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law or the courts
do not oblige them to go behind the certificate in order to investigate again the true condition of the
property. They are only charged with notice of the liens and encumbrances on the property that are
noted on the certificate.22

When private respondent-purchasers bought their lots from St. Jude, they did not have to go behind
the titles thereto to verify their contents or search for hidden defects or inchoate rights that could
defeat their rights to said lots. Although they were bound by liens and encumbrances annonated on
the titles, private respondents-purchasers could not have had notice of defects that only an inquiry
beyond the face of the titles could have satisfied.   The rationale for this presumption has been
23

stated thus:24

The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real
estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to
rely upon the face of a Torrens Certificate of the Title and to dispense with the need
of inquiring further, except when the party concerned had actual knowledge of facts
and circumtances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further
inquiry (Pascua v. Capuyoc, 77 SCRA 78). Thus, where innocent third persons
relying on the correctness of the certificate thus issued, acquire rights over the
property, the court cannot disregard such rights (Director of Land v. Abache, et al.,
73 Phil. 606).

In another case,   this Court further said:

25

The Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person
purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he
should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all.
This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if there were permitted,
public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have
to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and
proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be
even more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy
purposes of the Torrens System, should be the first to accept the validity of the titles
issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied [Emphasis
supplied.]

Petitioner never presented proof that the private respondents who had bought their lots from St.
Jude were buyers in bad faith. Consequently, their claim of good faith prevails. A purchaser in good
faith and for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person
has right to or an interest in such property; and who pays a full and fair price for the same at the time
of such purchase or before he or she has notice of the claims or interest of some other
person.  Good faith is the honest intention to abstain from taking any unconsientious advantage of
26

another. 27

Furthermore, it should be stressed that the total area of forty thousand six hundred twenty-three
(40,623) square meters indicated on St. Jude's original title (TCT No, 22660) was not an exact area.
Such figure was followed by the phrase "more or less." This plainly means that the land area
indicated was not precise. Atty. Antonio H. Noblejas, who became the counsel of St. Jude
subsequent to his tenure as0 Land Registration Commissioner, offers a sensible explanation. In his
letter   to the LRC dated November 8, 1982, he gave the following information:
28

a. Records show that our client owned a large tract of land situated in an area cutting
the boundary of Quezon City and Caloocan City, then known as Lot 865-B, Psd
60608, and described in T.C.T. No. 100412, containing an area of 96.931 sq. meters,
more or less.

b. It will be noted that on the northern portion of this lot 865-B, Psd-60608, is . . . Lot
865-A, Psd-60608, which means that at previous point of time, these 2 lots
composed one whole tract of land.

c. On December 23, 1995, Lot 865-B, Psd-60608, was subdivided into 2 lots,
denominated as Lot 865-B-1, with an area of 40,622 sq. meters, more or less, on the
Caloocan side, and Lot 865-B-2, with an area of 56,308 sq. meters, more or less,
Quezon City side, under plan (LRC) Psd-52368.

d. On March 1-10, 1966, Lot 865-B-1, Psd-52368, then covered by T.C.T. No. N-
22660, was subdivided into residential lots under Plan (LRC)Psd-55643, with a total
area of 42,044 sq. meters, more or less.

e. It will be noted that Lot 865-B, Psd-60608, covered by T.C.T. No. 100412,
contained an area of 96,931 sq. meters, more or less, but when subdivided under
Plan (LRC) Psd-52368, into 2 lots its total area shrank by 1 sq. meter, to wit:

Lot 865-B-1, Psd-52368 = 40,622 sq. meters

Lot 865-B-2, Psd-52368 = 56,308 sq. meters

———

96,930 sq. meters

———

f. There is no allegation whatever in the Perez report that there was no error in laying
out the metes and bound of Lot 865-B-1 in Plan (LRC) Psd-55643 as specified in
Technical Description of the said lot set forth in T.C.T. No. N-22660 covering the
same. There is likewise no allegation, on the contrary there is no confirmation from
the boundary owner on the northern side. Mr. Florencio Quintos, that there is no
overlapping of boundaries on the northern side of Lot 865-B-1, Psd-55643.
 g. We respectfully submit that the area of 42, 044 sq. meters stated in Plan (LRC)
Psd-55643 as the size of Lot 865-B-a, is the more accurate area, confirmed by the
Perez report 'as per surveyor[']s findings on the ground, which
rectifies previous surveyor's error in computing its area as 40,622 sq. meters in Plan
(LRC) Psd-52368, which is about 3.5% tolerable error (1,422 divided by 40,622 =
035).

[h.] It is well settled that in the identification of a parcel of land covered by certificate
of title, what is controlling are the metes and bounds as set forth in its Technical
Description and not the area stated therein, which is merely an approximation as
indicated in the more or less phrase placed after the number of square meters.

i. There is thus no unauthorized expansion of the survey occasioned by the

subdivision of Lot 865-B-1 under Plan (LRC) Psd-55643; consequently, LRC Circular
No. 167, Series of 1967, finds no application thereto, as to bar the processing and
registration in due course of transactions involving the subdivision lots of our client,
subject hereof. This is apart from the fact that LRC Circular No. 167 has not been
implemented by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City or any proper government
authority since its issuance in 1967, and that, in the interest of justice and equity, its
restrictive and oppressive effect on transactions over certificates of titles of
subdivisions that allegedly expanded on re-surveys, cannot be allowed to continue
indefinitely. (Emphasis supplied.)

The discrepancy in the figures could have been caused by the inadvertence or the negligence of the
surveyors. There is no proof, though, that the land area indicated was intentionally and fraudulently
increased. The property originally registered was the same property that was subdivided. It is well-
settled that what defines a piece of titled property is not the numerical data indicated as the area of
the land, but the boundaries or "metes and bounds" of the property specified in its technical
description as enclosing it and showing its limits. 29

Petitioner miserably failed to prove any fraud, either on the part of Private Respondent St. Jude or
on the part of land registration officials who had approved the subdivision plan and issued the
questioned TCTs. Other than its peremptory statement in the Complaint that the "expansion" of the
area was "motivated by bad faith with intent to defraud, to the damage and prejudice of the
government and public interest," petitioner did not allege specifically how fraud was perpetrated to
cause an increase in the actual land size indicated. Nor was any evidence proffered to substantiate
the allegation. That the land registration authorities supposedly erred or committed an irregularity
was merely a conclusion drawn from the "table survey" showing that the aggregate area of the
subdivision lots exceeded the area indicated on the title of the property before its subdivision. Fraud
cannot be presumed, and the failure of petitioner to prove it defeats its own cause.

Second Issue:

The Torrens System

True, the Torrens system is not a means of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of
registration of titles to lands.   Consequently, land erroneously included in a Torrens certificate of
30

title is not necessarily acquired by the holder of such certificate. 31

But in the interest of justice and equity, neither may the title holder be made to bear the unfavorable
effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a
fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. First, the real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet
title to land to put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were
noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto.  Second, 32

as we discussed earlier, estoppel by laches now bars petitioner from questioning private
respondent's titles to the subdivision lots. Third, it was never proven that Private Respondent St.
Jude was a party to the fraud that led to the increase in the area of the property after its subdivision.
Finally, because petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any error that might have been
committed by its agent who had surveyed the property, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their functions must be respected. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system,
which petitioner purportedly aims to protect by filing this case, shall forever be sullied by the
ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly
performed their duties. 33

We cannot, therefore, adhere to petitioner's submission that, in filing this suit, it seeks to preserve
the integrity of the Torrens system. To the contrary, it is rather evident from our foregoing discussion
that petitioner's action derogates the very integrity of the system. Time and again, we have said that
a Torrens certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person whose
name appears thereon.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 111244. December 15, 1997.]

ARTURO ALANO, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

ENRICO A. LANZANAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Manila, Branch 37, and ROBERTO CARLOS, Respondents.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioner Arturo Alano has filed this petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28150 which affirmed in toto the order of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 37 2 denying petitioner’s motion for the suspension of
proceeding of Criminal Case No. 90-84933, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Arturo
Alano" as well as his motion for reconsideration. chanrobles law library : red

Criminal Case No. 90-84933 is a prosecution for the crime of estafa. The information 3
alleges: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about June 10, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Roberto S. Carlos in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused, pretending to be still the owner of a parcel
of land with an area of 1,172 square meters, more or less, located at Bicutan, Taguig,
Metro Manila, covered by Tax Declaration No. 120-004-00398, well knowing that he
had previously sold the same to the said Roberto S. Carlos for P30,000.00, sold the
aforesaid property for the second time to one Erlinda B. Dandoy for P87,900.00,
thereby depriving the said Roberto S. Carlos of his rightful ownership/possession of the
said parcel of land, to the damage and prejudice of the said Roberto S. Carlos in the
aforesaid amount of P30,000.00, Philippine currency.

Contrary to law." cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that there was a
prejudicial question pending resolution in another case being tried in the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Region, Pasig, Branch 68. The case, docketed as Civil Case No.
55103 and entitled "Roberto Carlos and Trinidad M. Carlos v. Arturo Alano, Et Al.,"
concerns the nullity of the sale and recovery of possession and damages. In the
aforementioned Civil Case, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner
seeking the annulment of the second sale of said parcel of land made by the petitioner
to a certain Erlinda Dandoy on the premise that the said land was previously sold to
them. In his answer, petitioner contends that he never sold the property to the private
respondents and that his signature appearing in the deed of absolute sale in favor of
the latter was a forgery, hence, the alleged sale was fictitious and inexistent. At this
juncture, it is worth mentioning that the civil case was filed on March 1, 1985, five
years before June 19, 1990 when the criminal case for estafa was instituted.

On October 3, 1991, the trial court denied the petitioner’s motion as well as a
subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of

Appeals seeking the nullification of the assailed order.

On July 26, 1993, 4 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, the
decretal portion of which reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, finding no merit to the petition, the same is hereby DISMISSED, with
cost against petitioner." cralaw virtua1aw library

Hence, this petition.

The only issue in this petition is whether the pendency of Civil Case No. 55103, is a
prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
90-84933 filed against the petitioner.

Petitioner alleges that his signature appearing in the first deed of absolute sale in favor
of private respondent was a forgery, such that there was no second sale covering the
said parcel of land. Otherwise stated, if the Court in the said Civil Case rules that the
first sale to herein private respondent was null and void, due to the forgery of
petitioner’s signature in the first deed of sale, it follows that the criminal case for estafa
would not prosper.

While at first blush there seems to be merit in petitioner’s claim, we are compelled to
affirm the Court of Appeals’ findings.

The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action
and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which
must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action. 5 In other words, if both civil
and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the
issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the
other element or characteristic is satisfied. 6

On the basis of the foregoing and a perusal of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, the
disposition of the issue raised need not unduly detain us. We have already ruled that a
criminal action for estafa (for alleged double sale of property) is a prejudicial question
to a civil action for nullity of the alleged deed of sale and the defense of the alleged
vendor is the forgery of his signature in the deed. 7

Notwithstanding the apparent prejudicial question involved, the Court of Appeals still
affirmed the Order of the trial court denying petitioner’s motion for the suspension of
the proceeding on the ground that petitioner, in the stipulation of facts, had already
admitted during the pre-trial order dated October 5, 1990 of the criminal case the
validity of his signature in the first deed of sale between him and the private
respondent, as well as his subsequent acknowledgment of his signature in twenty-three
(23) cash vouchers evidencing the payments made by the private Respondent. 8
Moreover, it was also noted by the Court of Appeals that petitioner even wrote to the
private respondent offering to refund whatever sum the latter had paid. 9

In this regard, the pre-trial provision on criminal procedure found in Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court provides: chanrobles law library : red

"Sec. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. — . . . The pre-trial conference shall consider

the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Plea bargaining

(b) Stipulation of facts"

From the foregoing, there is no question that a stipulation of facts by the parties in a
criminal case is recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence,
binding upon the parties 10 and by virtue of which the prosecution dispensed with the
introduction of additional evidence and the defense waived the right to contest or
dispute the veracity of the statement contained in the exhibit. 11

Accordingly, the stipulation of facts stated in the pre-trial order amounts to an

admission by the petitioner resulting in the waiver of his right to present evidence on
his behalf. While it is true that the right to present evidence is guaranteed under the
Constitution, 12 this right may be waived expressly or impliedly. 13

Since the suspension of the criminal case due to a prejudicial question is only a
procedural matter, the same is subject to a waiver by virtue of the prior acts of the
accused. After all, the doctrine of waiver is made solely for the benefit and protection of
the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished
without infringing on any public right and without detriment to the community at large.
14

Accordingly, petitioner’s admission in the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial of the
criminal amounts to a waiver of his defense of forgery in the civil case. Hence, we have
no reason to nullify such waiver, it being not contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
15 Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the pre-trial order was signed by the
petitioner himself. As such, the rule that no proof need be offered as to any facts
admitted at a pre-trial hearing applies. 16

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 26, 1993 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 119220 September 20, 1996

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NILO SOLAYAO, accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Naval,
Biliran, Branch 16, with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition   defined
1

and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866.

The lone prosecution witness, SPO3 Jose Niño, narrated that at about 9:00 o'clock in the
evening of July 9, 1992, with CAFGU members Teofilo Llorad, Jr. and Cecilio Cenining, he
went to Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran. They were to conduct an intelligence
patrol as required of them by their intelligence officer to verify reports on the presence of
armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran.  2

From Barangay Caulangohan, the team of Police Officer Niño proceeded to Barangay Onion
where they met the group of accused-appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The former
became suspicious when they observed that the latter were drunk and that accused-
appellant himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. Accused-appellant's
companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled.  3
Police Officer Niño told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself as "PC,"
after which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found
wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally know as "latong." When he asked
accused-appellant who issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether he was
connected with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no
permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm and turned
him over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and
charged him with illegal possession of firearm.  4

Accused-appellant, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but
averred that this was only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes Cenining,
when it was still wrapped in coconut leaves. He claimed that he was not aware that there
was a shotgun concealed inside the coconut leaves since they were using the coconut
leaves as a torch. He further claimed that this was the third torch handed to him after the
others had been used up.   Accused-appellant's claim was corroborated by one Pedro
5

Balano that he indeed received a torch from Hermogenes Cenining which turned out to be a
shotgun wrapped in coconut leaves.  6

On August 25, 1994, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of
firearm under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and imposed upon him the penalty
of imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. The trial
court, having found no mitigating but one aggravating circumstance of nighttime, sentenced
accused-appellant to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided by law.   It found that accused-appellant did not contest the fact that
7

SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm from him and that he had no permit or license to possess
the same. It hardly found credible accused-appellant's submission that he was in possession
of the firearm only by accident and that upon reaching Barangay Onion, he followed four
persons, namely, Hermogenes Cenining, Antonio Sevillano, Willie Regir and Jovenito Jaro
when he earlier claimed that he did not know his companions.  8

Accused-appellant comes to this Court on appeal and assigns the following errors:

I. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm.

II. The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nighttime in
the imposition of the maximum penalty against the accused-appellant.  9

This court, in the case of People v. Lualhati  ruled that in crimes involving illegal possession
10

of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: (a) the
existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it
does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same.

In assigning the first error, accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the
subject firearm in evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search. He
maintained that the search made on his person violated his constitutional right to be secure
in his person and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Not only was the
search made without a warrant but it did not fall under any of the circumstances enumerated
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides, inter
alia:
 A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.

Hence, the search being unlawful, the homemade firearm confiscated from him is
inadmissible in evidence for being "the fruit of the poisonous
tree."   As such, the prosecution's case must necessarily fail and the accused-appellant
11

acquitted.

Accused-appellant's arguments follow the line of reasoning in People v. Cuizon, et

al.   where this Court declared: ". . . emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires
12

that the search be incident to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be
considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of
a person and his belongings. Were a search first undertaken, then an arrest effected based
on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for
being contrary to law."

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, however, accused-appellant's arguments are
hardy tenable. He and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the suspicion of SPO3
Niño's group, as well as the fact that he himself was attired in a camouflage uniform or a
jungle suit   and that upon espying the peace officers, his companions fled. It should be
13

noted that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that
armed persons were roaming around the barangays of Caibiran.  14

The circumstances in this case are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals   where this Court held that "at the time the peace officers identified themselves and
15

apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not know that he had
committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunitions. They just suspended that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did
not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a
warrant."

This Court, nevertheless, ruled that the search and seizure in the Posadas case brought
about by the suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk"
situation. There was probable cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be
made.

In the present case, after SPO3 Niño told accused-appellant not to run away, the former
identified himself as a government agents.   The peace officers did not know that he had
16

committed, or was actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked
with verifying the report that there were armed men roaming in the barangays surrounding
Caibiran, their attention was understandably drawn to the group that had aroused their
suspicion. They could not have known that the object wrapped in coconut leaves which
accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.

As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be
effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk"
accused-appellant when his companions filed upon seeing the government agents. Under
the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a search
warrant first.
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the
homemade firearm as evidence.

As to the question of whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the second element,
that is, the absence of a license or permit to possess the subject firearm, this Court agrees
with the Office of the Solicitor General which pointed out that the prosecution failed to prove
that accused-appellant lacked the necessary permit or license to possess the subject
firearm.  17

Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon
the prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority constitutes an essential
ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm, and every ingredient or essential
element of an offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. 18

In People v. Tiozon,   this Court said:

19

It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758
could be invoked to support the view that it is incumbent upon a person charged with
illegal possession of a firearm to prove the issuance to him of a license to possess
the firearm, but we are of the considered opinion that under the provisions of Section
2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provide that in criminal cases the burden of
proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact
alleged by the prosecution must be proven if "it is an essential ingredient of the
offense charged," the burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove
that the firearm used by appellant in committing the offense charged was not
properly licensed.

It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of

the offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information filed against appellant
in Criminal Case No. 3558 of the lower court (now G.R. No. 27681) specifically
alleged that he had no "license or permit to possess" the .45 caliber pistol mentioned
therein. Thus it seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not merely to allege
that negative fact but to prove it. This view is supported by similar adjudicated cases.
In U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, the accused was charged with "having criminally
inscribed himself as a voter knowing that he had none of the qualifications required
to be a voter. It was there held that the negative fact of lack of qualification to be a
voter was an essential element of the crime charged and should be proved by the
prosecution. In another case (People vs. Quebral. 68 Phil. 564) where the accused
was charged with illegal practice of medicine because he had diagnosed, treated and
prescribed for certain diseases suffered by certain patients from whom he received
monetary compensation, without having previously obtained the proper certificate of
registration from the Board of Medical Examiners, as provided in Section 770 of the
Administrative Code, this Court held that if the subject of the negative averment like,
for instance, the act of voting without the qualifications provided by law is an
essential ingredient of the offense charged, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the same, although in view of the difficulty of proving a negative allegation,
the prosecution, under such circumstance, need only establish a prima facie case
from the best evidence obtainable. In the case before Us, both appellant and the
Solicitor General agree that there was not even a prima facie case upon which to
 hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm. Former Chief Justice Moral
upholds this view as follows:

The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of proof of
the fact alleged, should not relieve the party making the averment of the burden of
proving it. This is so, because a party who alleges a fact must be assumed to have
acquired some knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not have alleged it. Familiar
instance of this is the case of a person prosecuted for doing an act or carrying on a
business, such as, the sale of liquor without a license. How could the prosecution
aver the want of a license if it had acquired no knowledge of that fact? Accordingly,
although proof of the existence or non-existence of such license can, with more
facility, be adduced by the defendant, it is nevertheless, encumber upon the party
alleging the want of the license to prove the allegation. Naturally, as the subject
matter of the averment is one which lies peculiarly within the control or knowledge of
the accused prima facie evidence thereof on the part of the prosecution shall suffice
to cast the onus upon him." (6 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963
edition, p. 8).

Finally, the precedents cited above have been crystallized as the present governing case law
on this question. As this Court summed up the doctrine in People v. Macagaling:  20

We cannot see how the rule can be otherwise since it is the inescapable duty of the
prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the offense as alleged against the accused
in an information, which allegations must perforce include any negative element
provided by the law to integrate that offense. We have reiterated quite recently the
fundamental mandate that since the prosecution must allege all the elements of the
offense charged, then it must prove by the requisite quantum of evidence all the
elements it has thus alleged.

In the case at bar, the prosecution was only able to prove by testimonial evidence that
accused-appellant admitted before Police Officer Niño at the time that he was accosted that
he did not have any authority or license to carry the subject firearm when he was asked if he
had one.   In other words, the prosecution relied on accused-appellant's admission to prove
21

the second element.

Is this admission sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal
possession of firearm which is that accused-appellant does not have the corresponding
license? Corollary to the above question is whether an admission by the accused-appellant
can take the place of any evidentiary means establishing beyond reasonable doubt the fact
averred in the negative in the pleading and which forms an essential ingredient of the crime
charged.

This Court answers both questions in the negative. By its very nature, an "admission is the
mere acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstance from which guilt may be inferred, tending
to incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish his guilt."   In other words, it
22

is a "statement by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection with

proof of other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to
authorize conviction."   From the above principles, this Court can infer that an admission in
23

criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime
charged.
 Moreover, said admission is extra-judicial in nature. As such, it does not fall under Section 4
of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court which states:

An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the trial or other
proceedings in the same case does not require proof.

Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not prove beyond
reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. It does not even
establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not
stand as proof of the fact of absence or lack of a license.

This Court agrees with the argument of the Solicitor General that "while the prosecution was
able to establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police from the
possession of appellant, without the latter being able to present any license or permit to
possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized
to carry such firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty
to establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing
evidence, like a certification from the government agency concerned."  24

Putting it differently, "when a negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiff's case depends

upon the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact are equally within
the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the negative."  25

In this case, a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National
Police that accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any kind or caliber would
have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
the crime of illegal possession of firearm.

In view of the foregoing, this Court sees no need to discuss the second assigned error.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence and
ordered immediately released unless there are other legal grounds for his continued
detention, with cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119288 August 18, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA GACOT, respondents.

RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, prays in the instant petition for
review on certiorari for the annulment of the decision, dated 22 February 1995, of the Court of
Appeals affirming the 12th August 1993 judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan (Branch
50-Puerto Princesa) which has adjudicated Lot No. 5367 in Cadastral Case No. 13, GLRO Cadastral
Record No. 1133, to herein private respondent, now deceased Josefa Gacot, the claimant in the
cadastral case.

The antecedents are amply summarized in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals, viz:

The entire lot 5367 is being claimed by Josefa Gacot as per answer she filed on June 7,
1971. It appears from the record that the lot is located in Barangay Los Angeles, Magsaysay,
Palawan but the area was not indicated. It also appeared that Ceferino Sabenacio is her co-
owner.

This case was set for hearing on August 9, 1990 and the petitioner was represented by
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Reynaldo Guayco and Rogelio Paglinawan, Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Puerto Princesa City while the
claimant appeared without counsel. In view thereof, the hearing was reset to August 13,
1990. Before the scheduled hearing on August 13, 1990, the Court received a report from
the Land Registration Authority calling the Court's attention of the decision rendered by
Judge Lorenzo Garlitos on October 20, 1950 declaring this lot as property of the Republic of
the Philippines. Despite this declaration however, the petitioner nor the government did not
bar the claimant from filing her answer, possessing and occupying the lot and in fact
accepted her tax payments and issuing her tax declaration on the same.

The claimant presented herself as witness as well as her son, Vicente Dantic, Jr. The
witnesses testified that Josefa Gacot was married to Vicente Dantic, Sr. in 1940 and were in
actual possession of the property for more than 30 years, having bought the same from
Cipriana Dantic-Llanera as per deed of sale dated April 22, 1955 in Cuyono dialect (Exhibit 1
and 1-A). Since she acquired the property from Cipriana Llanera, she continued her
occupation and introduced improvements thereon as well as declared Lot 5367 for taxation
purposes in her name (Exhibit 2) and paid the corresponding taxes thereon up to the present
time (Exhibit 3). That claimant is now a widow and has 5 children namely, Hernando Dantic,
Antero Dantic, Felipe Dantic, Fe Dantic and Vicente Dantic, Jr.

Cipriano Sabenacio, the alleged co-owner of claimant Josefa Gacot appeared in Court and
manifested that he is waiving his claim over Lot 5367 in favor of Josefa Gacot who is in
actual possession of the property as he is only a boundary owner.

After the presentation of claimant and her son, they offered their exhibits and rested their
case. Thereafter, the petitioner thru counsel manifested that it is not presenting controverting
evidence and is submitting the case for resolution. 1

On 05 September 1990, the trial court rendered judgment adjudicating Lot No. 5367 to Josefa
Gacot, thus —

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the claim of Josefa Gacot Dantic to be in order. Accordingly,
Lot 5367 is hereby adjudicated to Josefa Gacot-Dantic, widow and a resident of Barangay
Los Angeles, Magsaysay, Palawan with all the improvements the, eon, subject to the estate
tax as provided by law.
 SO ORDERED. 2

The Republic, through the Solicitor General, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

During the pendency of the appeal, the Office of the Solicitor General was able to verify that Lot
5367 was earlier declared to be the property of the Republic in a decision rendered by Judge
Lorenzo Garlitos on 20 October 1950 following an order of general default. The Solicitor General
thus filed a motion with the appellate court to have the case reopened and remanded to the court a
quo to allow the Republic of the Philippines to present the decision of Judge Garlitos. In its
resolution, dated 26 December 1991, the Court of Appeals granted the motion.

What transpired thereafter was narrated by the trial court in its 12th August 1993 decision; viz:

This case was set for hearing several times for the government to present its evidence and
for the parties to submit their respective memorandum in support of their respective stand on
the matter. The claimant submitted her memorandum while the government represented by
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor assigned to this sala has not presented any witness to
support the government's claim, neither has he submitted any memorandum to support the
government's stand on this matter.

With the foregoing development, the Court is of the opinion that the subsequent application
or claim of Josefa Gacot-Dantic on Lot 5367 which became part of the public domain where
her occupation thereto having been open to the whole world, public and notorious in the
concept of an owner since 38 years ago was well taken and therefore entitled to the lawful
adjudication of Lot 5367 in her name. Besides, the government represented by the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor and the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(CENRO) for Puerto Princesa City and Cuyo, Palawan have not made any protest nor
interposed any objection on the claim of Josefa Gacot during the hearings. Neither was there
a manifestation of protest or claim of government use coming from the municipal officials of
Magsaysay, Palawan despite notice sent to them of the cadastral hearing. And the sad part
was that the government had accepted without any protest all the taxes due the property
paid by the claimant religiously. This is not to say that this order has been considered in the
previous decision of this Court which is hereunder quoted as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

With this finding of the Court, it is its considered opinion and so holds, that there is no reason
to disturb its previous decision aforequoted. 3

An appeal was taken by the Republic from the decision of the trial court. In its now assailed decision
of 22 February 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court. The
appellate court ratiocinated:

In its brief, the Office of the Solicitor General claims that "records of the re-hearing show that
on October 20, 1950, an order was, indeed, issued by Judge Lorenzo C. Garlitos of the
Court of First Instance of Palawan, 7th Judicial District, declaring that Lot No. 5367 was
among lots declared as property of the Republic of the Philippines." (p. 3, Appellant's Brief,
p. 19, Rec.) It now invokes Republic Act No. 931, approved on June 30, 1953 and Republic
Act No. 2061, which took effect on June 30, 1958, both laws setting the time limits for the
filing of applications, among other things, for the reopening of judicial proceedings on certain
lands which were declared public land. Under R.A. 2061, the time for filing an application
shall not extend beyond December 31, 1968. Thus, petitioner-appellant argues that since
claimant-appellee Josefa Gacot filed her answer only on 07 June 1971, the court a quo did
not acquire jurisdiction over the instant claim since she did not file her answer within the
period fixed by R.A. No. 2061.

This would be true, if the Order dated 20 October 1950 of Judge Lorenzo Garlitos declaring
Lot No. 5367 as property of the Republic of the Philippines, was presented as evidence in
the rehearing of this case. Unfortunately, the Republic of the Philippines failed to offer as its
exhibit the said order. There is no basis for the appellant, therefore, to invoke R.A. 2061, to
support its claim that claimant-appellee Josefa Gacot filed her answer beyond the period
fixed by said law and therefore the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Precisely, the purpose of the rehearing was to enable the Republic of the Philippines, thru
the Office of the Solicitor General, to present in evidence the said order. The Solicitor
General, in its Motion dated 21 May 1991, prayed that with regards to Lot No. 5367 "the
proceedings therein be ordered reopened and the same be remanded to the court a quo to
enable the Republic of the Philippines to present the judgment dated October 20, 1950 of
Judge Lorenzo Garlitos declaring Lot No. 5367 as government property." (pp. 30-31, Rollo)
[Emphasis Ours]

This Court granted the motion and ordered the records of the case remanded to the court a
quo for further proceedings "to enable the government to present in evidence the judgment
dated October 20, 1950, declaring Lot No. 5367 as government property . . ." (p. 42, Rollo)
[Emphasis Ours]

During the rehearing, however, the Government failed to present the said order of Judge
Garlitos in evidence. Thus, the court a quo said in its appealed decision:

This case was set for hearing several times for the government to present its
evidence and for the parties to submit their respective memoranda in support
of their respective stand on the matter. The claimant submitted her
memorandum while the government represented by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor has not presented any witness to present the government's claim
neither has he submitted any memorandum to support the government's
stand on this matter." (see p. 92, Rollo) [Emphasis Ours]

It is the rule that "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered."
(Rule 132, Sec. 34) It is true that the Order of 20 October 1950 has been appended to the
records of this case (see p. 19, Rec.). But it is misleading on the part of the Solicitor General
to state that "Records of the rehearing show that on October 20, 1950, an order was, indeed,
issued by Judge Lorenzo C. Garlitos . . . ." For, during the rehearing, as reflected in the
appealed decision, the government did not present any evidence nor any memorandum
despite having been ordered by the court a quo.

"Neither can We take judicial notice of the Order of Judge Garlitos. As a general rule, courts
are not authorized to take judicial knowledge of the contents of the record of other cases, in
the adjudication of cases pending before them, even though the trial judge in fact knows or
remembers the contents thereof, or even when said other cases have been heard or are
pending in the same court and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
heard or are really pending before the same judge. (Municipal Council vs. Colegio de San
Jose, et al., G.R. No. L-45460; 31 C.J.S. 623-624; cited in p. 25, Evidence, Second Ed.; R.J.
Francisco) Indeed, the Government missed its opportunity to have the claim of Josefa Gacot,
 the herein appellee, declared as a nullity, considering that no evidence was presented by it
in opposition thereto.4

In the instant petition, the Republic, assigning a sole error, contends

that —

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (HAS) ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO

BASIS FOR PETITIONER TO INVOKE R.A. No. 2061 TO SUPPORT ITS CLAIM THAT
JOSEFA GACOT FILED HER ANSWER BEYOND THE PERIOD FIXED BY THE SAID LAW
AND THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE, SINCE IT (HAS) FAILED TO OFFER AS ITS EXHIBIT THE ORDER, DATED
OCTOBER 20, 1950 OF JUDGE LORENZO GARLITOS. 5

The Solicitor General explains that the records of the reopened case would show that a certified
copy of the decision, dated 20 October 1950, of Judge Garlitos has been appended to page 19
thereof. It is not evident, however, why the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer ("CENRO") for Puerto Princesa, representing the
government during the rehearing, did not present it. The Solicitor General, nevertheless, invokes the
rule that the Republic is not estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.

In the meantime, Josefa Gacot passed away. The Solicitor General thereupon moved that the heirs
of Josefa Gacot be impleaded party respondents in substitution for the deceased. The motion was
granted, and the heirs were directed to comment on the government's petition.

To this day, private respondents have not submitted their comment. The Court, however, cannot
allow the case to remain pending and unresolved indefinitely. It must now dispense, as it hereby
dispenses, with such comment in order not to unduly delay the remand of the case to the trial court
for further proceedings.

Let it initially be said that, indeed, the Court realizes the points observed by the appellate court over
which there should be no quarrel. Firstly, that the rules of procedure  and jurisprudence,  do not
6 7

sanction the grant of evidentiary value,  in ordinary trials,  of evidence which is not formally offered,
8 9

and secondly, that adjective law is not to be taken lightly for, without it, the enforcement of
substantive law may not remain assured. The Court must add, nevertheless, that technical rules of
procedure are not ends in themselves but primarily devised and designed to help in the proper and
expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may have to be so
construed  liberally as to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice.
10

Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras  opined:

11

A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts
established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of
 another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and
of public records on file in the same court. In addition judicial notice will be taken of the
record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or
involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another case between different
parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be taken of court personnel.
12

The remand of the case would likewise seem to be unavoidable. The area of Lot No. 5367 claimed
and awarded to the late Josefa Gacot had not been specified in the records. Indeed, on the basis of
the Certification of the Forest Management Services of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Lot No. 5367, per Land Classification (LC) No. 1246 of 15 January 1936, would appear
to contain an area of 394,043 square meters, 300,000 square meters of which were classified as
Alienable and Disposable land and 94,043 square meters as Timberland, which under Proclamation
No. 2152, dated 29 December 1981, had been included to form part of the Mangrove Swamp Forest
Reserve, closed for entry, exploitation and settlement.13

It behooves all concerned that the above matters be carefully looked into, albeit with reasonable
dispatch, for the final resolution of this case.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings for it to ascertain
and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties conformably with the foregoing opinion of the Court.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100901 July 16, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS @ "Commander Falcasantos," AWALON KAMLON

HASSAN @ "Commander Kamlon," MAJID SAMSON @ "Commander Bungi," JUMATIYA
AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y
MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y
SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @ "Ajid" and several JOHN and
JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in another case, also
pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and
documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to remind the bench and the bar that reclusion
perpetua is not synonymous with life imprisonment.
 The Case

On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos. 10060, 10061,
10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping (Crim Case Nos. 10065, 10066 and
10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were filed   before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City
1

against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais,
Jalina Hassan de Kamming,   Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan,
2

Imam   Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid," and several John and Jane Does. The
3

Informations for kidnapping for ransom, which set forth identical allegations save for the
names of the victims, read as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, with threats to kill the
person of FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060]   and for the purpose
4

of extorting ransom from the said Felix Rosario or his families or employer, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, KIDNAP the person of said
Felix Rosario,   a male public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga,
5

who was then aboard a Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was
being ambushed by the herein accused at the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo,
Zamboanga City, and brought said Felix Rosario   to different mountainous
6

places of Zamboanga City and Zamboanga del Sur, where he was detained,
held hostage and deprived of his liberty until February 2, 1989, the day when
he was released only after payment of the ransom was made to herein
accused, to the damage and prejudice of said victim; there being present an
aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with
the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.

The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating together, mutually
aiding and assisting one another, by means of threats and intimidation of
person, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously KIDNAP, take
and drag away and detain the person of MONICO SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN
[Criminal Case No. 10065]   a male public officer of the City Government of
7

Zamboanga, against his will, there being present an aggravating circumstance

in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed men or
persons who insure or afford impunity.

Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya Amlani,
Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk
Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel.  8

On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on
the merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the assailed 36-page
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration, this
Court renders its judgment, ordering and finding:

1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias "AJID" and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot

[g]uilty of the eight charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping,
their guilt not having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered, unless
detained for some other offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases Nos.
10060-10067).

2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y

MENDOZA and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as principals by conspiracy
in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping (Crim.
Cases Nos. 10060-10067).

Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of
armed men who insured impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on them
shall be at their maximum period.

WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and pursuant
to Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are imposed on
Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and
Kadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer and
pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life imprisonment is
imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y
Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No. 10066)

For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar, and
their kidnapping not having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art. 268,
Revised Penal Code, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same four
accused — Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y
Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih — are sentenced to serve two (2) jail terms
ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065 and 10067).

3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges of

[k]idnapping and she is acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065,
10066 and 10067).

But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five

charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom.

WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five (5)

imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to
EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos.
10060-1 0064).
 4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN (charged
as Jalina Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges
for [k]idnapping and are, therefore, ACQUITTED of these three charges. (Crim.
Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067).

But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as
accomplices in the five charges for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being miners,
they are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which
lowers the penalty imposable on them by one degree.

WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced to

serve five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional as minimum to TEN YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF prision
mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders

"convicted of an offense punishable by death or life" by Presidential Decree
No. 1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of which [k]idnapping for [r]ansom
is such an offense) the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha
Hussin de Kamming are NOT suspended but must be served by them.

Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are
sentenced further to return the following personal effects taken on December
12, 1988, the day of the kidnapping, or their value in money, their liability being
solidary.

To Jessica Calunod:
One (1) Seiko wrist watchP P 250.00
One Bracelet P 2,400.00
One Shoulder Bag P 200.00
Cash P 200.00
To Armado C. Bacarro:
One (1) wrist watch P 800.00
One Necklace P 300.00
One Calculator P 295.00
Eyeglasses P 500.00
One Steel Tape P 250.00
To Edilberto S. Perez:
One (1) Rayban P 1,000.00
One Wrist WatchP P 1,800.00
Cash P 300.00
To Virginia San Agustin-
Gara:
One (1)Wrist Watch P 850.00

The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall be
extended to those sentenced.

The cases against Majid Samson, alias "Commander Bungi" Awalon Kamlon

a.k.a. "Commander Kamlon" Carlos Falcasantos and several "John Does" and
Jane "Does" are ARCHIVED until their arrest.

Costs against the accused convicted.

SO ORDERED.  9

On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais
and Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal.   In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the
10

same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of their application for
"amnesty." In our March 19, 1997 Resolution, we granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal
of Kulais remains for the consideration of this Court.  11

The Facts

The Version of the Prosecution

The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:

On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government

agencies, organized themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government
projects in Zamboanga City. The group was composed of Virginia Gara, as the
head of the team; Armando Bacarro, representing the Commission on Audit;
Felix del Rosario, representing the non-government: Edilberto Perez,
representing the City Assessor's Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa of the
City Budget Office and Monico Saavedra, the driver from the City Engineer's
Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22, 1990.)

On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School to
check on two of its classrooms. After inspecting the same, they proceeded to
the Talaga Footbridge. The group was not able to reach the place because on
their way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns at
them (p. 4, TSN, ibid.).

The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of their
personal belongings. They were then ordered to walk to the mountain by the
leader of the armed men who introduced himself as Commander Falcasantos
(p. 5, TSN, ibid.).

While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government
troops which caused their group to be divided. Finally, they were able to
 regroup themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men joined the others. (pp.
7-8, TSN, ibid.).

The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. During
their captivity, the victims were able to recognize their captors who were at all
times armed with guns. The wives of the kidnappers performed the basic
chores like cooking. (pp. 9-10. TSN, ibid.)

Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes
which demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange for
twenty (20) sets of uniform. (p. 15, TSN, ibid.)

On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 o'clock noontime, the victims were

informed that they would be released. They started walking until around 7:00
o'clock in the evening of that day. At around 12:00 o'clock midnight, the
victims were released after Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received the
ransom money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.) The total amount paid was P122,000.00. The
same was reached after several negotiations between Mayor Vitaliano Agan of
Zamboanga City and the representatives of the kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov.
11, 1990)

. . . 
12

The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims
themselves: Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San Agustin-Gara,
Calixto Francisco, and Monico Saavedra.

The Version of the Defense

The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows: 

13

On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, while weeding their
farm in Sinaburan, Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani
was picked up by soldiers and brought to a place where one army battalion
was stationed. Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador Mamaril,
Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel were
already detained. In the afternoon of the same day, appellants spouses Jailon
Kulais and Norma Sahiddan were brought to the battalion station and likewise
detained thereat. On May 30, 1990, the eight (8) accused were transported to
Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City. Here on the same date, they were joined by
accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin.

At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from
the captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and company who in 1988 kidnapped and
brought her to the mountains. Against their will, she stayed with Falcasantos
and his two wives for two months, during which she slept with Falcasantos as
aide of the wives and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch water and
run other errands for everybody. An armed guard was assigned to watch her,
so that, for sometime, she had to bear the ill-treatment of Falcasantos' other
wives one of whom was armed. After about two months, while she was
cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives were bathing in the river, and while
 her guard was not looking, she took her chance and made a successful dash
for freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992, pp. 2-15)

Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who was

thirteen years old at the time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of the
instant cases commenced). She was kidnapped by Daing Kamming and
brought to the mountains where he slept with her. She stayed with him for less
than a month sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing
housekeeping errands for Kamming and his men. She made good her escape
during an encounter between the group of Kamming and military troops. She
hid in the bushes and came out at Ligui-an where she took a "bachelor" bus in
going back to her mother's house at Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan, Zamboanga
del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while she was
harvesting palay at the neighboring village of Tigbalangao, military men picked
her up to Ticbanuang where there was an army battalion detachment. From
Ticbawuang, she was brought to Vitali, then to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City,
where on her arrival, she met all the other accused for the first time except
Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)

Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan,

Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of a day
in May, while she and her husband were in their farm, soldiers arrested them.
The soldiers did not tell them why they were being arrested, neither were they
shown any papers. The two of them were just made to board a six by six truck.
There were no other civilians in the truck. The truck brought the spouses to the
army battalion and placed them inside the building where there were civilians
and soldiers. Among the civilians present were her six co-accused Hadjirul
Plasin, Salvador Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie
Manuel and Jumatiya Amlani. That night, the eight of them were brought to
Tictapul, Zamboanga City; then to Vitali; and, finally, to the Metrodiscom,
Zamboanga City where they stayed for six days and six nights. On the seventh
day, the accused were brought to the City Jail, Zamboanga City. (TSN, January
30, 1991, pp. 6-11)

The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore narrated,

was arrested with his wife the day the soldiers came to their farm on May 28,
1990. He has shared with his wife the ordeals that followed in the wake of their
arrest and in the duration of their confinement up to the present. (TSN, January
22, 1991 pp. 2-4).

The Trial Court's Ruling

The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one
count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six
terms of "life imprisonment." It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention
for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as
follows:

Principally, the issue here is one of credibility — both of the witnesses and
their version of what had happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989.
On this pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to [p]rosecution witnesses and
their testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing. No
taint of evil or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to [p]rosecution
witnesses. To this Court, who saw all the witnesses testify, [p]rosecution
witnesses testified only because they were impelled by [a] sense of justice, of
duty and of truth.

Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of

alibis. The individual testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on
what happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the
accused explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to
February 3, 1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of
the nine accused were keeping the five or six hostages named by
[p]rosecution evidence.

The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the
course of the captivity of the five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1)
Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais; (5)
Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.

The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid", and
Imam Taruk Alah. These two must, therefore, be declared acquitted based on
reasonable doubt.

The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty as
conspirators as charged in the eight Informations; or only as accomplices?
Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping group to which the seven
accused belonged had formed themselves into an armed band for the purpose
of kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut themselves off from
established communities, lived in the mountains and forests, moved from
place to place in order to hide their hostages. The wives of these armed band
moved along with their husbands, attending to their needs, giving them
material and moral support. These wives also attended to the needs of the
kidnap victims, sleeping with them or comforting them.

x x x           x x x          x x x

II The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul
Plasin. The Court holds these four men guilty as conspirators in the 8 cases of
kidnapping. Unlike the three women-accused, these male accused were armed.
They actively participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off the military
and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from place to place, and in
guarding the kidnap hostages. Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais were
positively identified as among the nine armed men who had kidnapped the
eight kidnap victims on December 12, 1988.

The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is
supported by the rulings of our Supreme Court quoted below.

(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to prove
conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions and
circumstances which may vary according to the purposes to be accomplished
and from which may logically be inferred that there was a common design,
 understanding or agreement among the conspirators to commit the offense
charged. (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil 64; People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)

(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent
which existed between the sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the band
or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible for the murder in
question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)

(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively,
each individual whose evil will actively contribute to the wrongdoing is in law
responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone.
(People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759, 772 (1968).) 
14

The Assigned Errors

The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:

The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in
another case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team leader of
the government troops which allegedly captured the accused-appellants in an
encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their right to cross-
examine him.

II

On the assumption that Lt. Feliciano's testimony could be validly taken judicial
notice of, the trial court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the same for
being highly improbable and contradictory.

III

The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha
Hussin and Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al., with material
and moral comfort, hence, are guilty as accomplices in all the kidnapping for
ransom cases.

IV

The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and Norma
Sahiddan the benefits of suspension of sentence given to youth offenders
considering that they were minors at the time of the commission of the
offense. 15

As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn their
appeal, and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them only, will no
longer be dealt with. Only the following issues pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be
discussed: (1) judicial notice of other pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence, and (3) denial as a defense. In addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of
the penalty imposed by the trial court.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

First Issue:

Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process

Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial
notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the
team leader of the government troops that captured him and his purported
cohorts.   Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross-examine a material witness
16

in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the latter's testimony should not be
used against him.  17

True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in
other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have
been heard and are actually pending before the same judge.   This is especially true in
18

criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against him.

Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the
testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against
the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based
mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica
Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to
meticulous cross-examinations conducted by appellant's counsel. At best, then, the trial
court's mention of Lieutenant Feliciano's testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither
affected the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.

Second Issue:

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latter's testimony:

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?

A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.

Q And during those days did you come to know any of the
persons who were with the group?

A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed

there for fifty-four days.
Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you
know them?

A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and

Commander Kamlon we came to know first our foster parents,
those who were assigned to give us some food.

Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men
who will take care of you?

A Yes.

Q And to whom were you assigned?

A To Ila Abdurasa.

Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you
are assigned to, who else did you come to know?

A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2)
wives of Commander Falcasantos — Mating and Janira —
another brother in-law of Commander Kamlon, Usman, the wife
of Kamlon, Tira.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days
and you really came to know them. Will you still be able to
recognize these persons if you will see the[m] again?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any
of those you mentioned are here?

A Yes, they are here.

Q Some of them are here?

A Some of them are here.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?

A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was

one of those nine armed men who took us from the highway.

RTC INTERPRETER:
 Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his
name, he gave his name as JAILON KULAIS.

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle
and made you alight, what else was he doing while you were in
their captivity?

A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband

of Nana.

COURT:

Q Who?

A Tangkong.

xxx xxx xxx  19

Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarro's testimony pointing to appellant as one of
the culprits:

FISCAL CAJAYON:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q And what happened then?

A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who
will be the one [to] g[i]ve food to us.

Q [To] whom were you assigned?

A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife.
[D]o you remember how he looks like?

A Yes.

Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that
said Tangkong and his wife are here?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us?

 A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name
he identified [himself] as Jailon Kulais.

Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get
that name?

A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the
camp.

x x x           x x x          x x x

ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)

Q When did you first meet Tangkong?

A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the

one who took us.

Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you

stated that Mr. Mamaril was one of those who stopped the bus
and took you to the hill and you did not mention Tangkong?

A I did not mention but I can remember his face.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host

even if he did not tell you that he [was] one of those who
stopped you, you would not recognize him?

A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my
shoes.

COURT:

Q Who?

A Tangkong, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx  20

Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez' candid narration:

FISCAL CAJAYON:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Who else?

A The last man.

Q Did you come to know his name?

A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in

Court who identified himself as Jailon Kulais.)

Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?

A The same, guarding us.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK.

Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine

armed men on your way from [the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot
Bridge. [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?

A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.

Q They did not fire any shots?

A But they were pointing their guns at us.

Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to
[the] Talaga Footbridge, you stated [that] one of them [was]
Commander Falcasantos?

A Yes.

Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that

group?

A Yes.

Q Will you please identify?

A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in

court who identified himself as Jailon Kulais.)

x x x           x x x          x x x

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN.

Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the
camp?

FISCAL CAJAYON:

Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he

used the word Tangkong.

ATTY. FABIAN
 Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?

A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have

their time two hours another will be on duty guarding us.

Q Where did you meet Tangkong?

A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.

xxx xxx xxx  21

It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping or
detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their will, for fifty-three days from
December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that Appellant Kulais was a member
of the group of armed men who staged the kidnapping, and that he was one of those who
guarded the victims during the entire period of their captivity. His participation gives
credence to the conclusion of the trial court that he was a conspirator.

Kidnapping

for Ransom

That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is also
apparent from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the accused
and narrating the circumstances surrounding the writing of the ransom letters.

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there
were these meetings for possible negotiation with the City
Government. What do you mean by this? What were you
supposed to negotiate?

A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after

the terms. 22

Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?

A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by
Commander Falcasantos to write the letter, the ransom letter.

Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were

you asked to write for your ransom?

A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them.

Q Why will you able to identify the same?

A Because I was the one who wrote it.

Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?

A Yes.

Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us

by the Honorable City Mayor Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 — there
are five letters all handwritten.

COURT:

Original?

CP CAJAYON D MS:

Original, your Honor.

Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any
of these were the ones you were asked to write.

A (Witness going over [letters])

This one — 2 pages. This one — 2 pages. No more.

Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in

these letters, what else will make you remember that these are
really the ones you wrote while there?

A The signature is there.

Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.

A And over it is a signature.

Q That is your signature?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?

A Yes, there is the other signature.

Q There are names — other names here — Eddie Perez, Allan

Basa, Armando Bacarro, Felix Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there
are signatures above the same. Did you come up to know who
signed this one?

A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons.

[sic].
Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan,
and there is the signature above the same. Did you come to
know who signed it?

A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Jessica, I am going over this letter . . . Could you please read

to us the portion here which says the terms? . . .

A (Witness reading) "Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo

ang kantidad nga P100,000 ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga
uniforms sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989).  23

x x x           x x x          x x x

INTERPRETER (Translation):

This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of

P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform
on Friday, February 3, 1989.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is
dated January 21, 1988.   Now, could you please explain to us
24

why it is dated January 21, 1988 and the other one Enero 31,
1989 or January 31, 1989?

A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.

Q January 21, 1989?

A Yes.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned?

Please go over this.

A (Going over the letter)

Yes, ma'am.

Q Could you please read it aloud to us?

A (Witness reading)
 Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga
completong uniformer (7 colors marine type wala nay labot ang
sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large size.  25

x x x           x x x          x x x

INTERPRETER:

They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete

uniform (7 colors, marine-type not including the shoes), one half
medium, one half large.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after
[they were] signed by your companions and all of you, do you
know if these letters were sent? If you know only.

A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me

by Falcasantos to inform the City Mayor that initial as
P500,000.00, and when we were already — I was asked again to
write, we were ordered to affix our signature to serve as proof
that all of us are alive.   [sic]
26

Calunod's testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro   and 27

Edilberto Perez.   The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver the
28

ransom, and the release of the hostages upon payment of the money were testified to by
Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano Agan   and Teddy Mejia. 
29 30

The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code,   having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having been
31

clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial court's finding of
appellant's guilt on five counts of kidnapping for ransom.

Kidnapping of

Public Officers

Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members of
the government monitoring team abducted by appellant's group. The three testified to the
fact of kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the appellant. Even so, appellant's
identity as one of the kidnappers was sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez,
who were with Gara, Saavedra and Francisco when the abduction occurred.

That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours   does nor matter.
32

In People vs. Domasian,   the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released
33

even before his parents received the ransom note. The accused therein argued that they
could not be held guilty of kidnapping as no enclosure was involved, and that only grave
coercion was committed, if at all.   Convicting appellants of kidnapping or serious illegal
34

detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an
eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty when he was restrained from going home. The
Court justified the conviction by holding that the offense consisted not only in placing a
person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in any manner, of his
liberty.   Likewise, in People vs. Santos,   the Court held that since the appellant was charged
35 36

and convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4, it was not the duration of the deprivation of
liberty which was important, but the fact that the victim, a minor, was locked up.

Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a few hours
is immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers   — Gara was a fiscal
37

analyst for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City Engineer's Office, and
Francisco was a barangay councilman at the time the kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais
should be punished, therefore, under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and
not Art, 268, as the trial court held.

The present case is different from People vs. Astorga,   which held that the crime committed
38

was not kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave coercion. The appellant in
that case had tricked his seven-year-old victim into going with him to a place he alone knew.
His plans, however, were foiled when a group of people became suspicious and rescued the
girl from him. The Court noted that the victim's testimony and the other pieces of evidence
did not indicate that the appellant wanted to detain her, or that he actually detained her.

In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably established that
the victims were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof beyond reasonable doubt
that kidnapping took place, and that appellant was a member of the armed group which
abducted the victims.

Third Issue:

Denial and Alibi

The appellant's bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the
prosecution witnesses' positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to
the positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the
defense.   Between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the
39

one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails.   Jessica Calunod,
40

Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified in a clear, straightforward and frank manner;
and their testimonies were compatible on material points. Moreover, no ill motive was
attributed to the kidnap victims and none was found by this Court.

We agree with the trial court's observation that the appellant did not meet the charges
against him head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the day he was
arrested and on subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain where he was during
the questioned dates (December 12, 1988 to February 3, 1989); neither did he rebut Calunod,
Bacarro and Perez, when they identified him as one of their kidnappers.

Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment

The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The
penalty for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the crimes happened in 1988, when the capital penalty was proscribed by the
Constitution, the maximum penalty that could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua.
Life imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life
imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it accessory penalties provided in the Revised
Penal Code and has a definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment is invariably imposed for
serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in
accordance with the Revised Penal Code.  41

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of

kidnapping for ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty
imposed is hereby MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five terms of reclusion
perpetua, one for each of his five convictions for kidnapping for ransom; and to three terms
of reclusion perpetua, one each for the kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico
Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the other accused who withdrew their appeals, he is
REQUIRED to return the personal effects, or their monetary value, taken from the kidnap
victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the amount of P122,000 representing the ransom
money paid to the kidnappers. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 114776           February 2, 2000

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well as its
Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:

Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then Director of Flight
Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant company
[herein private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila.

On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to plaintiff,
offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of two
(2) years commencing on January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced
working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-month probation period, plaintiffs
appointment was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).

On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five (5)
years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set
forth in the contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.).

During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in command of a
flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff apologized.
(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of the aircraft
scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was suspended for a few days until he
was investigated by board headed by Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded.

On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion training at
Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's expense. Having successfully completed
and passed the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo duty as
captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet
commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp.
34-38, Rec.).

Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures. Seventeen

(17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant's
requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate
pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to take advance leaves. (Exh. "15",
p. 466, Rec.)

Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to terminate its
excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however, immediately terminate it's
A-300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among
the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was
not one of the twelve.

On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1,

1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex
"I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff
requested a three-month notice to afford him time to exhaust all possible avenues for
reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1) month
salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).

Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor
Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion was
resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for
damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the court a quo (Complaint,
pp. 1-10, Rec.).

Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts
have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal
dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in the course of plaintiffs
employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant to
Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other
aspects of his employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus,
defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall have
jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).

In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the items demanded in
a complaint are the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation and not
labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is
beyond the field of specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on
the employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and the consequence
thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)
 On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid).
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)

On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds relied upon in its
motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel
from instituting the complaint and that he has no cause of action . (pp. 102-115)1

On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano and

against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts
of —

SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at

the time of payment, as and for unearned compensation with legal interest from the filing of
the complaint until fully paid;

SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at

the time of payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential damages with
legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;

P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;
and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.

Costs against defendant.

SO ORDERED.2

Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of jurisdiction,
validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.

On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,

. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-
appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.

Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:

1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN

YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING
FROM AN INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS
UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?
2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY HIS
EMPLOYER?

3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE

THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?

At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine
law, thus:

Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the
Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore
Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the
Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that
claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The
defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.4

Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said
court.5 On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from
raising further the issue of jurisdiction.6

Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on Article 1146
of the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment effective November 1, 1982, was
based on an employment contract which is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10
years as provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based on Article
1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded that the
action for illegal dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was
withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed.

In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here pertinent. What is
applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:

Art. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employee-employer relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time
the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.

xxx     xxx     xxx

What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this Court.
In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil
Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the
prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW
applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations.9

More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim was based on a written
contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:

. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to "money
claims specifically recoverable under said Code" but covers all money claims arising from an
employee-employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764
[1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .
 It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable to
money claims arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that
"where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
designed therefore should prevail." (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157
SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11

In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's
action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4)
years after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.

In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-
appelle only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.

We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which sets the prescription
period at three (3) years and which governs under this jurisdiction.

Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his complaint for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission. However, this
claim deserves scant consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International,
Inc., vs., Court of Appeals, we held that "although the commencement of a civil action stops the
running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the
plaintiff leaves in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all."12

Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was valid, the
appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of
employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said,

It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From the moment
the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their nature, may be in
keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer of
employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract, among
others, the right of mutual termination by giving three months written notice or by payment of
three months salary. Such provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no
room for interpretation.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions of the

Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be noted that when
plaintiff-appellee's employment was confirmed, he applied for membership with the
Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory to the aforementioned
Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from questioning the legality of the said
agreement or any proviso contained therein.13

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is amply
supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:
 When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline industry
resulting in a slow down in the company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian
Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures,
such as cutting down services, number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number
of flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a result, defendant-
appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots, including plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in
excess of what is reasonably needed.14

All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's
termination from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice and
opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore,
could be attributed to respondent appellate court.
1âwphi1.nêt

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. CV
No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 177404 : June 25, 2009]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. KUMASSIE PLANTATION

COMPANY INCORPORATED, Respondent.

[G.R. NO. 178097 : June 25, 2009]

KUMASSIE PLANTATION COMPANY INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. LAND BANK

OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court,1 docketed as G.R. No. 177404 and G.R. No. 178097, assailing the
Decision,2 dated 24 November 2005, and Resolution,3 dated 30 March 2007, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65923.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated (KPCI) is the registered owner of 802.2906

hectares of agricultural land situated in Basiawan, Santa Maria, Davao del Sur, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 646.4 In 1982, KPCI and Philippine
Cocoa Corporation (PCC) entered into a contract of lease whereby the former agreed to
lease the said land together with the improvements thereon to the latter for a period of
25 years beginning 15 May 1982.5 Subsequently, PCC executed a deed of assignment
transferring all its rights as lessee under the said contract of lease to Philippine Cocoa
Estates Corporation (PCEC) effective 31 December 1983.6

On 18 February 1992, a portion of the aforementioned land, measuring 457.9952

hectares, planted with coconuts and cocoa (subject land), was compulsorily acquired by
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Region XI, Davao City, for distribution to
farmer-beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.7 The DAR then requested the Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP) to determine the value of the subject land.8 LBP pegged the
value of the subject land at P19,140,965.00 or equivalent to P41,792.94 per
hectare.9 DAR offered to KPCI said amount as compensation for the subject land,10 but
it was rejected by KPCI for being "unreasonably low."11 Despite the rejection by KPCI of
the valuation of the subject land by LBP, the amount of P19,140,965.00 was deposited
by LBP, upon the instructions of DAR, in the name and for the account of KPCI.12 KPCI
withdrew from LBP the entire amount in cash and bonds.13

DAR then advised the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), on
27 July 1994, to conduct a summary administrative proceeding for the determination of
the just compensation due KPCI for the subject land.14 The proceeding was docketed as
DARAB Case No. JC-R-XI-DAV-OR-0017-CO. LBP and KPCI later submitted their
respective position papers with the DARAB.15

DAR next directed the Register of Deeds of Digos, Davao del Sur, on 26 September
1994, to cancel TCT No. 646 covering the subject land in the name of KPCI and to issue
a new TCT in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.16 After the issuance of a new
TCT in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and again upon the request of the
DAR, the Register of Deeds of Digos, Davao del Sur, issued Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.17

On 20 January 1997, KPCI filed with the Davao City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
15 (acting as a Special Agrarian Court), a Complaint against LBP and the DAR for
determination and payment of just compensation, docketed as Civil Case No. 25,045-
97.18 KPCI implored the RTC to render judgment fixing the just compensation for the
subject land at P160,000.00 per hectare, or equivalent to a total amount
of P73,279,232.00, less the amount of P19,140,965.00 which KPCI had previously
withdrawn from LBP.19

Subsequently, LBP and the DAR filed with the RTC their respective Answers contending
that the Complaint was prematurely filed as KPCI failed to exhaust administrative
remedies; that KPCI was already paid just compensation for the subject land,
determined to be P41,792.94 per hectare, for a total amount of P19,140,965.91; and
that KPCI admitted in the Complaint having received such amount from LBP. LBP
asserted that it correctly calculated the value of the subject land to be P19,140,965.91,
applying the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 6, Series of
1992, as amended by DAO No. 11, Series of 1994. At the end of their respective
Answers, both LBP and DAR sought the dismissal of the Complaint of KPCI.20
The RTC thereafter directed the parties to submit the names of their respective
nominees for commissioners in Civil Case No. 25,045-97.21 KPCI nominated Oliver A.
Morales (Morales), President of Cuervo Appraisers Incorporated,22 while LBP submitted
the name of a certain Engineer Romeo Cabanial.23 For its part, the DAR endorsed
Tomasa L. Miranda (Miranda), a DAR employee.24 The RTC appointed Morales and
Miranda as commissioners. The two subsequently took their oaths of office as court-
appointed commissioners.25

Meanwhile, the DARAB issued, on 19 May 1997, a Resolution in JC-R-XI-DAV-OR-0017-

CO, affirming the valuation of the subject land by the LBP.26 The DARAB found the LBP
valuation of the subject land to be "accurate and just," as it was in harmony with the
pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 6657 and DAO No. 6, Series of 1992, as
amended.27

After trial in Civil Case No. 25,045-97, the RTC rendered its Decision on 18 February
1999, fixing the fair and reasonable value of the subject land at P100,000.00 per
hectare. In arriving at said valuation, the RTC considered the location of the subject
land, the nature of the trees planted thereon, and the reasons stated in Morales'
appraisal report. The RTC then ordered LBP and DAR to pay KPCI an amount equivalent
to P100,000.00 per hectare as just compensation for the subject land, plus legal
interest computed from 23 March 1994 until fully paid.28

LBP filed with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision;29 while
DAR filed a Notice of Appeal, manifesting that it would appeal said RTC Decision to the
Court of Appeals.30

On 23 July 1999, the RTC issued an Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration of
LBP.31 Aggrieved, LBP filed its appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R CV
No. 65923.32 LBP filed, on 27 September 2000, its Appellant's Brief in CA-G.R CV No.
65923.33 DAR joined the appeal of LBP by filing, on 18 January 2001, in CA-G.R CV No.
65923, a Manifestation adopting in toto the Appellant's Brief of LBP.34

On 24 November 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R CV No.
65923, affirming with modification the appealed RTC Decision. The appellate court
sustained the finding of the RTC that the fair and reasonable value of the subject land
was P100,000.00 per hectare. Nevertheless, it ruled that the imposition of legal interest
should be deleted, as there was no delay on the part of LBP in depositing the amount
of P19,140,965.91 in the account of KPCI, which amount was admittedly withdrawn by
KPCI. The fallo of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 11th
Judicial Region, Br. 15, Davao City is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, as
none should be awarded, the award of interest is deleted. No costs.35

LBP and KPCI each filed its own Motion for Reconsideration of the 24 November 2005
Decision of the Court of Appeals,36 but both Motions were denied by the appellate court
in its Resolution dated 30 March 2007.

Hence, LBP and KPCI separately sought recourse from this Court by virtue of the
Petitions for Review presently before us, docketed as G.R. No. 177404 and G.R. No.
178097, respectively. The two Petitions were consolidated since they arose from the
same set of facts.37

The procedure for the determination of compensation cases under Republic Act No.
6657, as devised by this Court,38 commences with the valuation by the LBP of the lands
taken by the State from private owners under the land reform program. Based on the
valuation of the land by the LBP, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner through a
written notice. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative
proceeding is held and, afterwards, depending on the value of the land, the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD), or the DARAB, fixes the price to be paid for the said land. If the landowner
still does not agree with the price so fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC, acting
as Special Agrarian Court.

In the process of determining the just compensation due to landowners, it is a

necessity that the RTC takes into account several factors enumerated in Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, to wit:

Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. - In determining just compensation, the

cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use
and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation.

Being the government agency primarily charged with the implementation of the
agrarian reform program, DAR issued DAO No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended, filling
out the details necessary for the implementation of Section 17 of Republic Act No.
6657. DAR translated the factors specified in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, into
a basic formula, presented as follows in DAO No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended:

LV = (CNI x 0.6) + ( CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

Where: LV = Land Value

CNI = Capitalized Net Income

CS = Comparable Sales

MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant, and
applicable.

A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall
be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall
be:

LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula
shall be:

LV = MV x 2

In its Petition docketed as G.R. No. 177404, LBP maintains that the RTC and the Court
of Appeals erred in their valuation of the subject land at P100,000.00 per hectare
because both courts did not consider the factors enumerated in Section 17 of Republic
Act No. 6657 and the formula for valuation of lands under DAO No. 6, Series of 1992,
as amended.39

While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function which is

vested in the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court, we, nonetheless, disregarded the
determination of just compensation made by the RTC in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Banal,40 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,41 and in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Lim,42 when, as in this case, the judge gravely abused his discretion by not taking into
full consideration the factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules.

In several cases, we have reminded the special agrarian courts to resolve just
determination cases judiciously and with utmost observance of Section 17 of Republic
Act No. 6657 and the administrative orders issued by the DAR to implement said
statutory provision.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Banal,43 we emphasized that the factors laid down in
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and the formula stated in DAO No. 6, Series of
1992, as amended, must be adhered to by the RTC in fixing the valuation of lands
subjected to agrarian reform, thus:

In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several factors

enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, thus:

xxx

These factors have been translated into a basic formula in [DAO 6-92], as amended by
[DAO 11-94], issued pursuant to the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object
and purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended.

xxx

While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial

discretion, however, such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the law.
Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing
rules and regulations. ([DAO 6-92], as amended by [DAO 11-94]).

xxx

WHEREFORE, x x x. The trial judge is directed to observe strictly the procedures

specified above in determining the proper valuation of the subject property. (Emphasis
ours.)

Again, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,44 we stressed that the special agrarian
court cannot ignore, without violating Republic Act No. 6657, the formula provided by
the DAR for the determination of just compensation. We rejected the valuation fixed by
the RTC because it failed to follow the DAR formula:

While [Special Agrarian Court] is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land,
the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn
valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments made by the
government assessors to determine just compensation, it is equally true that these
factors have been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-
making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. As the government agency principally
tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR's duty to issue rules
and regulations to carry out the object of the law. [DAO] No. 5, s. of 1998 precisely
"filled in the details" of Section 17, RA No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which
the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account. The [Special Agrarian Court]
was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to implement the said
provision.

It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret

the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to
great respect. Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in
their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore administrative
issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an
administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same.
(Emphasis ours.)

Instead, we sustained the valuation made by the LBP, which was patterned after the
applicable administrative order issued by the DAR, viz:

[LBP] arrived at its valuation by using available factors culled from the Department of
Agriculture and Philippine Coconut Authority, and by computing the same in accordance
with the formula provided, thus'

COMPUTATION (Applicable Formula): LV = 0.90 CNI + 0.10 MV

Comparable Land Transactions (P x x x x ____ ) = P x-x-x

Capitalized Net Income: Cassava 16,666.67 x 0.90 = 15,000.00
Corn/Coco 26,571.70 = 23,914.53
Market Value Cassava 8,963.78 x 0.10 = 896.38
 per Tax Declaration: Corn/Coco 10,053.93 = 1,005.39
Computed Value per
Hectare: Cassava 15,896.38; Corn/Coco - 24,919.92
xxxx
Value per hectare used: Cassava 15,896.38 x 6.0000 has. = 95,378.28
Corn/Coco 24,919.92 x 8.1939 has. = 204,191.33
Payment due to LO : P299, 569.61

The above computation was explained by Antero M. Gablines, Chief of the Claims,
Processing, Valuation and Payment Division of the Agrarian Operations Center of the
Land Bank, to wit:

ATTY. CABANGBANG: (On direct):

xxx

Q. What are the items needed for the Land Bank to compute? cralawred

A. In accordance with Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998, the value of the land
should be computed using the capitalized net income plus the market value. We need
the gross production of the land and its output and the net income of the property.

Q. You said "gross production." How would you fix the gross production of the property?
cralawred

A. In that Administrative Order No. 5, if the owner of the land is cooperative, he is

required to submit the net income. Without submitting all his sworn statements, we will
get the data from the DA (Agriculture) or from the coconut authorities.

xxx

Q. In this recommended amount which you approved, how did you arrive at this figure?
cralawred

A. We used the data from the Philippine (Coconut) Authority and the Agriculture and
the data stated that Cassava production was only 10,000 kilos per hectare; corn, 2,000
kilos; and coconuts, 15.38 kilos per hectare. The data stated that in the first cropping
of 1986, the price of cassava was P1.00 per kilo; corn was sold at P7.75 per kilo; and
the Philippine Coconut Authority stated that during that time, the selling price of
coconuts was P8.23 per kilo.

Q. After these Production data and selling price, there is here a "cost of operation,"
what is this?cralawred

A. It is the expenses of the land owner or farmer. From day one of the cultivation until
production. Without the land owner's submission of the sworn statement of the income,
production and the cost, x x x Administrative Order No. 5 states that x x x we will use
20% as the net income, meaning 80% of the production in peso. This is the cost of
valuation.
Q. 80 % for what crops? cralawred

A. All crops except for coconuts where the cost of expenses is only 20%.

Q. Summing all these data, what is the value per hectare of the cassava? cralawred

A. The cassava is P15,896.38.

Q. How about the corn x x x intercropped with coconuts? cralawred

A. P24,919.92.

Under the circumstances, we find the explanation and computation of [LBP] to be

sufficient and in accordance with applicable laws. [LBP's] valuation must thus be
upheld.45 (Emphases ours.)

In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals,46 we once more gave paramount

importance to the criteria inscribed in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and the
pertinent DAOs. In sustaining therein the valuation of the special agrarian court, we
ratiocinated:

[T]he Court affirmed the due consideration given by the RTC of the factors specified in
Section 17, Republic Act No. 6657. Again, the proper valuation of the subject premises
was reached with clear regard for the acquisition cost of the land, current market value
of the properties, its nature, actual use and income, inter alia - factors that are material
and relevant in determining just compensation. These are the very same factors laid
down in a formula by DAR A.O. No. 5. Due regard was thus given by the RTC to
Republic Act No. 6657, DAR A.O. No. 5 and prevailing jurisprudence when it arrived at
the value of just compensation due to AFC and HPI in this case.

The Court En Banc in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lim47 was confronted with the
question of whether the RTC can resort to any other means of determining just
compensation aside from Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and DAO No. 6, Series of
1992, as amended. The Court resolved the issue in the negative and pronounced that
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and DAO No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended, are
mandatory and are not mere guides that the RTC may disregard. Citing Banal and
Celada, we held in Lim  that:

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Banal [434 SCRA 543], this Court
underscored the mandatory nature of Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92, as
amended by DAR AO 11-94, x x x.

xxx

And in LBP v. Celada [479 SCRA 495], this Court set aside the valuation fixed by the
RTC of Tagbilaran, which was based solely on the valuation of neighboring properties,
because it did not apply the DAR valuation formula. x x x.

xxx
Consequently, as the amount of P2,232,868 adopted by the RTC in its December 21,
2001 Order was not based on any of the mandatory formulas prescribed in DAR
AO 6-92, as amended by DAR AO 11-94, the Court of Appeals erred when it
affirmed the valuation adopted by the RTC. (Emphases ours.)

In the instant case, the RTC did not pay particular attention to Section 17 of Republic
Act No. 6657 and DAO No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended. It merely cited the location
of the subject land, nature of the trees planted thereon, and Morales' appraisal report,
as bases for fixing the value of the subject land at P100,000.00 per hectare; which are
not among the factors mentioned in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657. Also, the RTC
did not apply the formula stated under DAO No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended, in
fixing the value of the subject land. This undoubtedly constitutes an obvious departure
from the settled doctrine previously discussed herein regarding the mandatory nature
of Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and DAO No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended.

Further, Morales, in his appraisal report, used the market data approach (a method
which based the value of the subject land on sales and listings of similar properties
situated within the area), and the income approach (a procedure which based the value
of the subject land on the potential net benefit that may be derived from its ownership)
in determining the value of the subject land.48 Morales did not explicitly state or even
impliedly use Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and DAO No. 6, Series of 1992, as
amended, in his appraisal report for the subject land. Neither was there any foundation
for concluding that the market data approach and income approach conformed to
statutory and regulatory requirements. More importantly, Morales himself admitted
during the trial that he did not consider Republic Act No. 6657 and DAO No. 6, Series of
1992, as amended, in his appraisal report for the subject land, despite being aware of
the said law and rules for a long time.49 This being the case, the valuation of the subject
land, as contained in the appraisal report adopted by the RTC, cannot be deemed to be
in compliance with the requirements under Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and
DAO No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended.

In contrast, LBP arrived at its valuation of the subject land by considering the factors
identified under Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, and by computing the same in
accordance with the formula in DAO No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended. The meticulous
calculations of LBP are reproduced below:

FORMULA USED IN THE VALUATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY

The records show that Acquisition Cost (CA), Market Value based on Mortgage (MVM)
and Comparable Sales (CS) are not applicable. Hence, pursuant to paragraph A.2 of
DAR Adm. Order No. 6, Series of 1992, the applicable formula in arriving at the land
Value is: LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV [x] 0.1).

Considering that the subject property is covered by an existing lease contract, the
Lease Rental Income was also considered in the computation of the Capitalized Net
Income (CNI) by following the formula prescribed under paragraph B.7 of Dar Adm.
Order No. 6, Series of 1992, thus:

CNI = LRI
 .12

DISCUSSION OF THE FORMULAE

The pertinent provisions of DAR Adm. Order No. 6, Series of 1992, reads:

B. Capitalized Net Income (CNI) - This shall refer to the difference between the gross
sales (AGP x SP) and total cost of operations (CO) capitalized at 12%.

Expressed in equation form:

(AGP x SP) - CO
CNI =
.12

Where: CNI = Capitalized Net Income

AGP = One year's Average Gross Production immediately preceding the date of offer in
case of VOS or date of notice of coverage in case of CA.

SP = Selling price shall refer to average prices for the immediately preceding calendar
year from the date of receipt of the claimfolder by LBP from DAR for processing secured
from the Department of Agriculture (DA) other appropriate regulatory bodies or in their
absence, from Bureau of Agricultural Statistics. If possible, SP data shall be gathered
from the barangay or municipality where the property is located. In the absence
thereof, SP may be secured within the province or region.

CO = Cost of Operations

Whenever the cost of operations could not be obtained or not be obtained or verified,
and assumed net income rate (NIR) of 20% shall be used. Landholdings planted to
coconut which are productive at the time of offer/coverage shall continue to use the
70% NIR x x x

12 = Capitalized Rate

B.1 Industry data on production, cost of operation, and selling price shall be obtained
from government/private entities. Such entities shall include, but not limited to the
Department of Agriculture (DA), the Sugar Regulatory Authority (SRA), the Philippine
Coconut Authority (PCA) and other private persons/entities knowledgeable to the
concerned industry.

B.2 The landowner shall submit a statement of net income derived from the land
subject of acquisition. This shall include among others, total production and cost of
operations on a per crop basis, selling price/s (farm gate) and such other data as may
be required.
 xxx

In case of failure by the landowner to submit the statement x x x or the data stated
therein cannot be verified/validated from the farmers, LBP may adopt any available
industry data or in the absence thereof may conduct an industry study on the specific
crop which will be used in determining the production, cost and net income of the
subject landholding.

xxx

B.7 For landholdings planted to permanent crops which are covered by existing lease
contract, the following formula shall be used in the computation of the CNI:

LRI
CNI/Ha. =
.12

Where: LRI = Lease Rental Income per Hectare/Year as stipulated under the contract.

xxx

c. In case the lease rental is a variable amount (e.g., progressively increasing during
the term of the lease), LRI is computed as follows:

Sum of Annual lease Rental per Hectare over

the remaining Term of the Lease Contract
LRI =
Remaining Term of Lease, Years

xxx

D. Market Value per Tax Declaration (MV) shall refer to the market value per Tax
Declaration (TD) issued before August 29, 1987 (effectivity of EO 229). The most
recent set of values indicated in the latest schedule of unit value (SMV) grossed-up for
inflation rate from the date of effectivity up to the date of receipt of claimfolder by LBP
from DAR for processing.

CAPITALIZED NET INCOME

Re: AGP

LANDBANK adopted as AGP the average production indicated in the Contract of Lease
which is 44 metric tons of copra per month (net) or 528 metric tons a year. Converted
into kilos, the AGP per hectare is 658.12 kilos.

Re: Selling Price

As Selling Price, LANDBANK used the 1992 Philippine Coconut Authority Data which
is P6.87 per kilo as the same is the average price for the immediately preceding
calendar year from the date of receipt by LANDBANK of the claimfolder from DAR for
processing in 1993 pursuant to paragraph 5, Item B of DAR Adm. Order No. 6, Series of
1992, above quoted.

Re: Capitalization Rate

A 12% capitalization rate was used in accordance with paragraph 8, Item B of DAR
Adm. Order No. 6, Series of 1992.

Using the foregoing as input, the CNI for copra is P37,677.37 per hectare (658.12 kilos
x P6.87 per kilo / .12).

Cocoa was not included in the computation of the CNI because there is no production
data available. Further, the same was introduced by the lessee.

Re: LRI

Pursuant to Item B, paragraph B.7, sub-paragraph c of DAR Adm. Order No. 6, Series
of 1992, LANDBANK computed the total lease rentals for the remaining period of the
lease contract (1994 to 2007 or 14 years). Thus, LRI = (690 x 4) + (P680 x 5) +
(P1,120 x 5) divided by 14 or P904.29 per hectare. Following the formula: 12% over
LRI (P904.29), the CNI per hectare (Lease Contract) is P7,535.75.

MARKET VALUE PER TAX DECLARATION

In the computation of the market Value per Tax Declaration (MV), the unit market
values of both the land and the coconut trees were determined based on the 1991
Schedule of Market Values for agricultural properties in Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur. Per
the said Schedule of Market Values, the subject property is classified as third class
cocoland and has a unit market value of P6,240.00 per hectare while the cocotrees
have a unit market value of P62.40 per tree.

The unit market values of both the land and the cocotrees were multiplied with the
location adjustment factor of 98% and the results were in turn multiplied with the
Consumer Price Index (1.1254). Thus, the total market value as adjusted for the land
is P6,882.05 per hectare and P4,129.23 for the cocotrees or a total of P11,011.28 per
hectare.

In summation:

CNI (copra) - P37,677.37 per ha.

CNI (Lease contract) - P 7,535.75 per ha.
Total CNI - P45,213.12 per ha.
MV (Land) - P 6,882.05 per ha.
MV (cocotree) - P 4,129.23 per ha.
Total MV - P11,011.28 per ha.

Following the formula: LV = CNI x 0.9 (P45,213.12 x 0.9) P40,691.81 + MV 0.1

(11,011.28 x 0.1) P1,101.13 x 457.9952 hectares, the total value of the area subject to
acquisition is P19,140,965.91.50 (Emphases supplied).

We find the foregoing exhaustive explanation and thorough computations of LBP to be

sufficient and in accordance with Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and DAO No. 6,
Series of 1992, as amended. Hence, the Court affirms the valuation by LBP
of P41,792.94 per hectare, or a total of P19,140,965.91, for the subject land.

Since we have already resolved the issue in G.R No. 177404, we shall now discuss and
determine the matters brought up in G.R. No. 178097.

In its Petition docketed as G.R. No. 178097, KPCI argues that the imposition of legal
interest as damages is warranted because LBP has delayed in paying just compensation
for the subject land. KPCI alleges that the act of LBP in appealing the decisions of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals reveals the intent of the LBP to delay the payment of just
compensation to KPCI.51  ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Given our finding that it is the valuation of the subject land by the LBP that is correct
and in compliance with the requirements of the law and administrative rules and
regulations, then the issue of interest, raised by KPCI in its Petition, has actually
become irrelevant. The amount of P19,140,965.91, representing the valuation of LBP
for the entire subject land, was deposited for the account of and in the name of KPCI,
which the latter had admittedly already withdrawn. The just compensation for the
subject land is, thus, already fully paid.

Even if we were still to address the issue of interest, we shall decide against KPCI.

In expropriation cases, interest is due the landowner if there was delay in payment. The
imposition of interest was in the nature of damages for the delay in payment, which in
effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance. It follows
that the interest in the form of damages cannot be applied where there was prompt and
valid payment of just compensation.52 In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,53 we stressed that interest on just compensation is imposed only in case of
delay in the payment thereof, which must be sufficiently established. ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

There is nothing in the records to show that LBP was delayed in the payment of just
compensation to KPCI. In fact, contrary to the claim of KPCI, it was paid just
compensation by LBP with dispatch.

The mere fact that LBP appealed the decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
does not mean that it deliberately delayed the payment of just compensation to KPCI.
LBP is an agency created primarily to provide financial support in all phases of agrarian
reform pursuant to Section 74 of Republic Act No. 3844 and Section 64 of Republic Act
No. 6657. It is vested with the primary responsibility and authority in the valuation and
compensation of covered landholdings to carry out the full implementation of the
Agrarian Reform Program. It may agree with the DAR and the landowner as to the
amount of just compensation to be paid to the latter and may also disagree with them
and bring the matter to court for judicial determination.54 This makes the LBP an
indispensable party in cases involving just compensation for lands taken under the
Agrarian Reform Program, with a right to appeal decisions in such cases that are
unfavorable to it. Having only exercised its right to appeal in this case, LBP cannot be
penalized by making it pay for interest.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing:

1) The Petition of Land Bank of the Philippines in G.R. No. 177404 is GRANTED. The
Decision, dated 24 November 2005, and Resolution, dated 30 March 2007, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65923, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The valuation of
the subject land at P41,792.94 per hectare, for a total of P19,140,965.91, by the Land
Bank of the Philippines is APPROVED, and such amount is DECLARED PAID IN FULL;
andcralawlibrary

2) The Petition of Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC GLASS CORPORATION and GERVEL,

INC, Petitioners, v.  LAWRENCE C. QUA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 assailing the 6 March

2000 Decision2 and the 26 July 2000 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54737. The Court of Appeals set aside
the Order3 of 3 May 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 63 ("RTC-Branch 63"), in Civil Case No. 88-2643 and
reinstated the Decision4 of 12 January 1996 in respondent's favor.
 The Facts

Petitioners Republic Glass Corporation ("RGC") and Gervel, Inc.

("Gervel") together with respondent Lawrence C. Qua ("Qua") were
stockholders of Ladtek, Inc. ("Ladtek"). Ladtek obtained loans from
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company ("Metrobank")5 and Private
Development Corporation of the Philippines6 ("PDCP") with RGC,
Gervel and Qua as sureties. Among themselves, RGC, Gervel and
Qua executed Agreements for Contribution, Indemnity and Pledge of
Shares of Stocks ("Agreements").7

The Agreements all state that in case of default in the payment of

Ladtek's loans, the parties would reimburse each other the
proportionate share of any sum that any might pay to the
creditors.8 Thus, a common provision appears in the Agreements:

RGC, GERVEL and QUA each covenant that each will respectively
reimburse the party made to pay the Lenders to the extent and
subject to the limitations set forth herein, all sums of money which
the party made to pay the Lenders shall pay or become liable to pay
by reason of any of the foregoing, and will make such payments
within five (5) days from the date that the party made to pay the
Lenders gives written notice to the parties hereto that it shall have
become liable therefor and has advised the Lenders of its
willingness to pay whether or not it shall have already paid out such
sum or any part thereof to the Lenders or to the persons entitled
thereto. (Emphasis supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

Under the same Agreements, Qua pledged 1,892,360 common

shares of stock of General Milling Corporation ("GMC") in favor of
RGC and Gervel. The pledged shares of stock served as security for
the payment of any sum which RGC and Gervel may be held liable
under the Agreements.

Ladtek defaulted on its loan obligations to Metrobank and PDCP.

Hence, Metrobank filed a collection case against Ladtek, RGC,
Gervel and Qua docketed as Civil Case No. 8364 ("Collection Case
No. 8364") which was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 149 ("RTC-Branch 149"). During the pendency of Collection
Case No. 8364, RGC and Gervel paid Metrobank P7 million. Later,
Metrobank executed a waiver and quitclaim dated 7 September
1988 in favor of RGC and Gervel. Based on this waiver and
quitclaim,9 Metrobank, RGC and Gervel filed on 16 September 1988
a joint motion to dismiss Collection Case No. 8364 against RGC and
Gervel. Accordingly, RTC-Branch 149 dismissed the case against
RGC and Gervel, leaving Ladtek and Qua as defendants.10

In a letter dated 7 November 1988, RGC and Gervel's counsel, Atty.

Antonio C. Pastelero, demanded that Qua pay P3,860,646, or
42.22% of P8,730,543.55,11 as reimbursement of the total amount
RGC and Gervel paid to Metrobank and PDCP. Qua refused to
reimburse the amount to RGC and Gervel. Subsequently, RGC and
Gervel furnished Qua with notices of foreclosure of Qua's pledged
shares.

Qua filed a complaint for injunction and damages with application

for a temporary restraining order, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-
2643 ("Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643"), with RTC-Branch 63 to
prevent RGC and Gervel from foreclosing the pledged shares.
Although it issued a temporary restraining order on 9 December
1988, RTC-Branch 63 denied on 2 January 1989 Qua's "Urgent
Petition to Suspend Foreclosure Sale." RGC and Gervel eventually
foreclosed all the pledged shares of stock at public auction. Thus,
Qua's application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
became moot.12

Trial in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 ensued. RGC and Gervel

offered Qua's Motion to Dismiss13 in Collection Case No. 8364 as
basis for the foreclosure of Qua's pledged shares. Qua's Motion to
Dismiss states:

8. The foregoing facts show that the payment of defendants

Republic Glass Corporation and Gervel, Inc. was for the
entire obligation covered by the Continuing Surety Agreements
which were Annexes "B" and "C" of the Complaint, and that the
same naturally redound[ed] to the benefit of defendant Qua herein,
as provided for by law, specifically Article 1217 of the Civil Code,
which states that:

xxx
10. It is very clear that the payment of defendants Republic Glass
Corporation and Gervel, Inc. was much more than the amount
stipulated in the Continuing Surety Agreement which is the basis for
the action against them and defendant Qua, which was just SIX
MILLION TWO HUNDRED [THOUSAND] PESOS (P6,200,000.00),
hence, logically the said alleged obligation must now be considered
as fully paid and extinguished.

RGC and Gervel likewise offered as evidence in Foreclosure Case

No. 88-2643 the Order dismissing Collection Case No. 8364,14 which
RTC-Branch 149 subsequently reversed on Metrobank's motion for
reconsideration. Thus, RTC-Branch 149 reinstated Collection Case
No. 8364 against Qua.

On 12 January 1996, RTC-Branch 63 rendered a Decision in

Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 ("12 January 1996 Decision")
ordering RGC and Gervel to return the foreclosed shares of stock to
Qua. The dispositive portion of the 12 January 1996 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby renders

judgment ordering defendants jointly and severally liable to return
to plaintiff the 1,892,360 shares of common stock of General Milling
Corporation which they foreclosed on December 9, 1988, or should
the return of these shares be no longer possible then to pay to
plaintiff the amount of P3,860,646.00 with interest at 6% per
annum from December 9, 1988 until fully paid and to pay plaintiff
P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees. The costs will be for
defendants' account.

SO ORDERED.15

However, on RGC and Gervel's Motion for Reconsideration, RTC-

Branch 63 issued its Order of 3 May 1996 ("3 May 1996 Order")
reconsidering and setting aside the 12 January 1996 Decision. The 3
May 1996 Order states:

After a thorough review of the records of the case, and an

evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties as well as their
contentions, the issues to be resolved boil down to the following:
1. Whether or not the parties' obligation to reimburse, under the
Indemnity Agreements was premised on the payment by any of
them of the entire obligation;

2. Whether or not there is basis to plaintiff's apprehension that he

would be made to pay twice for the single obligation; and cralawlibrary

3. Whether or not plaintiff was benefited by the payments made by

defendants.

Regarding the first issue, a closer scrutiny of the pertinent

provisions of the Indemnity Agreements executed by the parties
would not reveal any significant indication that the parties' liabilities
are indeed premised on the payment by any of them of the entire
obligation. These agreements clearly provide that the parties'
obligation to reimburse accrues upon mere advice that one of them
has paid or will so pay the obligation. It is not specified whether the
payment is for the entire obligation or not.

Accordingly, the Court stands corrected in this regard. The obvious

conclusion that can be seen now is that payment of the
entire obligation is not a condition sine qua non for the
paying party to demand reimbursement. The parties have
expressly contracted that each will reimburse whoever is made to
pay the obligation whether entirely or just a portion thereof.

On the second issue, plaintiff's apprehension that he would be made

to pay twice for the single obligation is unfounded. Under the
above-mentioned Indemnity Agreements, in the event that the
creditors are able to collect from him, he has the right to ask
defendants to pay their proportionate share, in the same way
defendants had collected from the plaintiff, by foreclosing his
pledged shares of stock, his proportionate share, after they had
made payments. From all indications, the provisions of the
Indemnity Agreements have remained binding between the parties.

On the third issue, there is merit to defendants' assertion that

plaintiff has benefited from the payments made by defendants. As
alleged by defendants, and this has not been denied by
plaintiff, in Civil Case No. 8364 filed before Branch 149 of
this Court, where the creditors were enforcing the parties'
liabilities as sureties, plaintiff succeeded in having the case
dismissed by arguing that defendants' payments [were] for
the entire obligation, hence, the obligation should be
considered fully paid and extinguished. With the dismissal of
the case, the indications are that the creditors are no longer running
after plaintiff to enforce his liabilities as surety of Ladtek.

Whether or not the surety agreements signed by the parties and the
creditors were novated is not material in this controversy. The fact
is that there was payment of the obligation. Hence, the Indemnity
Agreements govern.

In the final analysis, defendants' payments gave rise to plaintiff's

obligation to reimburse the former. Having failed to do so, upon
demand, defendants were justified in foreclosing the pledged shares
of stocks.

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated January 12,

1996 is reconsidered and set aside. The above-entitled complaint
against defendants is DISMISSED.

Likewise, defendants' counterclaim is also dismissed.

SO ORDERED.16 (Emphasis supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

Qua filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 May 1996 Order

which RTC-Branch 63 denied.

Aggrieved, Qua appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the

pendency of the appeal, Qua filed a Manifestation17 with the Court of
Appeals attaching the Decision18 of 21 November 1996 rendered in
Collection Case No. 8364. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

ordering defendants Ladtek, Inc. and Lawrence C. Qua:
1. To pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the amount of
P44,552,738.34 as of October 31, 1987 plus the stipulated interest
of 30.73% per annum and penalty charges of 12% per annum from
November 1, 1987 until the whole amount is fully paid, less
P7,000,000.00 paid by defendants Republic Glass Corporation and
Gervel, Inc., but the liability of defendant Lawrence C. Qua
should be limited only to P5,000,000.00 and P1,200,000.00,
the amount stated in the Continuing Suretyship dated June
15, 1983, Exh. "D" and Continuing Suretyship dated
December 14, 1981, Exh. "D-1", respectively, plus the
stipulated interest and expenses incurred by the plaintiff.

2. To pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff an amount equivalent

to ten (10%) percent of the total amount due as and by way of
attorney's fees;

3. To pay the cost of suit.

The Counterclaims of the defendants Ladtek, Inc. and Lawrence C.

Qua against the plaintiff are hereby dismissed.

Likewise, the cross-claims of the defendants are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.19 (Emphasis supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

On 6 March 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered the questioned

Decision setting aside the 3 May 1996 Order of RTC-Branch 63 and
reinstating the 12 January 1996 Decision ordering RGC and Gervel
to return the foreclosed shares of stock to Qua.20

Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In reversing the 3 May 1996 Order and reinstating the 12 January

1996 Decision, the appellate court quoted the RTC-Branch 63's 12
January 1996 Decision:

The liability of each party under the indemnity agreements therefore

is premised on the payment by any of them of the entire obligation.
Without such payment, there would be no corresponding share to
reimburse. Payment of the entire obligation naturally redounds to
the benefit of the other solidary debtors who must then reimburse
the paying co-debtors to the extent of his corresponding share.

In the case at bar, Republic Glass and Gervel made partial

payments only, and so they did not extinguish the entire obligation.
But Republic Glass and Gervel nevertheless obtained quitclaims in
their favor and so they ceased to be solidarily liable with plaintiff for
the balance of the debt (Exhs. "D", "E", and "I"). Plaintiff thus
became solely liable for the unpaid portion of the debt even as he is
being held liable for reimbursement on the said portion.

What happened therefore, was that Metrobank and PDCP in effect

enforced the Suretyship Agreements jointly as against plaintiff and
defendants. Consequently, the solidary obligation under the
Suretyship Agreements was novated by the substantial modification
of its principal conditions. xxx The resulting change was from one
with three solidary debtors to one in which Lawrence Qua became
the sole solidary co-debtor of Ladtek.

Defendants cannot simply pay off a portion of the debt and then
absolve themselves from any further liability when the obligation
has not been totally extinguished.

xxx

In the final reckoning, this Court finds that the foreclosure and sale
of the shares pledged by plaintiff was totally unjustified and without
basis because the obligation secured by the underlying pledge had
been extinguished by novation. xxx21

The Court of Appeals further held that there was an implied

novation or substantial incompatibility in the surety's mode or
manner of payment from one for the entire obligation to one merely
of proportionate share. The appellate court ruled that RGC and
Gervel's payment to the creditors only amounted to their
proportionate shares of the obligation, considering the following
evidence:
The letter of the Republic to the appellant, Exhibit "G", dated June
25, 1987, which mentioned the letter from PDCP confirming its
willingness to release the joint and solidary obligation of the
Republic and Gervel subject to some terms and conditions, one of
which is the appellant's acceptable repayment plan of his "pro-rata
share"; and the letter of PDCP to the Republic, Exhibit "H",
mentioning full payment of the "pro rata share" of the Republic and
Gervel, and the need of the appellant to submit an acceptable
repayment plan covering his "pro-rata share"', the release from
solidary liability by PDCP, Exhibit "J", mentioning full payment by
the Republic and Gervel of their "pro rata share" in the loan, as
solidary obligors, subject however to the terms and conditions of
the hold out agreement; and the non-payment in full of the loan,
subject of the May 10, 1984 Promissory Note, except the 7 million
payment by both Republic and Gervel, as mentioned in the Decision
(Case No. 8364, Metrobank v. Ladtek, et al). Precisely, Ladtek and
the appellant, in said Decision were directed to pay Metrobank the
balance of P9,560,798, supposedly due and unpaid.

Thus, the payment did not extinguish the entire obligation and did
not benefit Qua. Accordingly, RGC and Gervel cannot demand
reimbursement. The Court of Appeals also held that Qua even
became solely answerable for the unpaid balance of the obligations
by virtue of the quitclaims executed by Metrobank and PDCP in
favor of RGC and Gervel. RGC and Gervel ceased to be solidarily
liable for Ladtek's loan obligations.22

The Issues

RGC and Gervel raise the following issues for resolution:

I.

WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL APPLIES TO QUA'S

JUDICIAL STATEMENTS THAT RGC AND GERVEL PAID THE ENTIRE
OBLIGATION.

II.
WHETHER PAYMENT OF THE ENTIRE OBLIGATION IS A
CONDITION SINE QUA NON FOR RGC AND GERVEL TO DEMAND
REIMBURSEMENT FROM QUA UNDER THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS
EXECUTED BY THEM AFTER RGC AND GERVEL PAID METROBANK
UNDER THE SURETY AGREEMENT.

III.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS NOVATION OF THE

SURETY AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY THE PARTIES AND THE
CREDITORS, WHETHER THE NOVATION IS MATERIAL IN THIS
CASE.23

The Court's Ruling

We deny the petition.

Whether Qua was in estoppel

RGC and Gervel contend that Qua is in estoppel for making

conflicting statements in two different and separate cases. Qua
cannot now claim that the payment made to Metrobank was not for
the entire obligation because of his Motion to Dismiss Collection
Case No. 8364 where he stated that RGC and Gervel's payment was
for the entire obligation.

The essential elements of estoppel in pais are considered in relation

to the party to be estopped, and to the party invoking the estoppel
in his favor. On the party to be estopped, such party (1) commits
conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of
material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that
the facts are inconsistent with those which the party subsequently
attempts to assert; (2) has the intent, or at least expectation that
his conduct shall at least influence the other party; and (3) has
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. On the party
claiming the estoppel, such party (1) has lack of knowledge and
of the means of knowledge of the truth on the facts in question; (2)
has relied, in good faith, on the conduct or statements of the party
to be estopped; (3) has acted or refrained from acting based on
such conduct or statements as to change the position or status of
the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment or
prejudice.24

In this case, the essential elements of estoppel are inexistent.

While Qua's statements in Collection Case No. 8364 conflict with his
statements in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643, RGC and Gervel
miserably failed to show that Qua, in making those statements,
intended to falsely represent or conceal the material facts. Both
parties undeniably know the real facts.

Nothing in the records shows that RGC and Gervel relied on Qua's
statements in Collection Case No. 8364 such that they changed
their position or status, to their injury, detriment or prejudice. RGC
and Gervel repeatedly point out that it was the presiding judge25 in
Collection Case No. 8364 who relied on Qua's statements in
Collection Case No. 8364. RGC and Gervel claim that Qua
"deliberately led the Presiding Judge to believe" that their payment
to Metrobank was for the entire obligation. As a result, the presiding
judge ordered the dismissal of Collection Case No. 8364 against
Qua.26

RGC and Gervel further invoke Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court to support their stance:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made

by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does
not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.

A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings filed by

the parties, (b) during the trial either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial
proceeding.27

The elements of judicial admissions are absent in this case. Qua

made conflicting statements in Collection Case No. 8364 and in
Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643, and not in the "same case" as
required in Section 4 of Rule 129. To constitute judicial admission,
the admission must be made in the same case in which it is
offered. If made in another case or in another court, the fact of such
admission must be proved as in the case of any other fact, although
if made in a judicial proceeding it is entitled to greater weight.28

RGC and Gervel introduced Qua's Motion to Dismiss and the Order
dismissing Collection Case No. 8364 to prove Qua's claim that the
payment was for the entire obligation. Qua does not deny making
such statement but explained that he "honestly believed and
pleaded in the lower court and in CA-G.R. CV No. 58550 that the
entire debt was fully extinguished when the petitioners paid P7
million to Metrobank."29

We find Qua's explanation substantiated by the evidence on record.

As stated in the Agreements, Ladtek's original loan from Metrobank
was only P6.2 million. Therefore, Qua reasonably believed that RGC
and Gervel's P7 million payment to Metrobank pertained to the
entire obligation. However, subsequent facts indisputably show that
RGC and Gervel's payment was not for the entire obligation. RTC-
Branch 149 reinstated Collection Case No. 8364 against Qua and
ruled in Metrobank's favor, ordering Qua to pay P6.2 million.

Whether payment of the entire obligation is an essential

condition for reimbursement

RGC and Gervel assail the Court of Appeals' ruling that the parties'
liabilities under the Agreements depend on the full payment of the
obligation. RGC and Gervel insist that it is not an essential condition
that the entire obligation must first be paid before they can seek
reimbursement from Qua. RGC and Gervel contend that Qua should
pay 42.22% of any amount which they paid or would pay
Metrobank and PDCP.

RGC and Gervels' contention is partly meritorious.

Payment of the entire obligation by one or some of the solidary

debtors results in a corresponding obligation of the other debtors to
reimburse the paying debtor.30 However, we agree with RGC and
Gervel's contention that in this case payment of the entire
obligation is not an essential condition before they can seek
reimbursement from Qua. The words of the Agreements are clear.

RGC, GERVEL and QUA each covenant that each will respectively
reimburse the party made to pay the Lenders to the extent and
subject to the limitations set forth herein, all sums of money
which the party made to pay the Lenders shall pay or become
liable to pay by reason of any of the foregoing, and will make such
payments within five (5) days from the date that the party made to
pay the Lenders gives written notice to the parties hereto that it
shall have become liable therefor and has advised the Lenders of its
willingness to pay whether or not it shall have already paid out such
sum or any part thereof to the Lenders or to the persons entitled
thereto. (Emphasis supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

The Agreements are contracts of indemnity not only against actual

loss but against liability as well. In Associated Insurance &
Surety Co., Inc. v. Chua,31 we distinguished between a contract of
indemnity against loss and a contract of indemnity against liability,
thus:32

The agreement here sued upon is not only one of indemnity against
loss but of indemnity against liability. While the first does not render
the indemnitor liable until the person to be indemnified makes
payment or sustains loss, the second becomes operative as
soon as the liability of the person indemnified arises
irrespective of whether or not he has suffered actual loss.
(Emphasis supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

Therefore, whether the solidary debtor has paid the creditor, the
other solidary debtors should indemnify the former once his liability
becomes absolute. However, in this case, the liability of RGC, Gervel
and Qua became absolute simultaneously when Ladtek defaulted in
its loan payment. As a result, RGC, Gervel and Qua all became
directly liable at the same time to Metrobank and PDCP. Thus, RGC
and Gervel cannot automatically claim for indemnity from Qua
because Qua himself is liable directly to Metrobank and PDCP.

If we allow RGC and Gervel to collect from Qua his proportionate

share, then Qua would pay much more than his stipulated liability
under the Agreements. In addition to the P3,860,646 claimed by
RGC and Gervel, Qua would have to pay his liability of P6.2 million
to Metrobank and more than P1 million to PDCP. Since Qua would
surely exceed his proportionate share, he would then recover from
RGC and Gervel the excess payment. This situation is absurd and
circuitous.

Contrary to RGC and Gervel's claim, payment of any amount will

not automatically result in reimbursement. If a solidary debtor pays
the obligation in part, he can recover reimbursement from the co-
debtors only in so far as his payment exceeded his share in the
obligation.33 This is precisely because if a solidary debtor pays an
amount equal to his proportionate share in the obligation, then he in
effect pays only what is due from him. If the debtor pays less than
his share in the obligation, he cannot demand reimbursement
because his payment is less than his actual debt.

To determine whether RGC and Gervel have a right to

reimbursement, it is indispensable to ascertain the total obligation
of the parties. At this point, it becomes necessary to consider the
decision in Collection Case No. 8364 on the parties' obligation to
Metrobank. To repeat, Metrobank filed Collection Case No. 8364
against Ladtek, RGC, Gervel and Qua to collect Ladtek's unpaid
loan.

RGC and Gervel assail the Court of Appeals' consideration of the

decision in Collection Case No. 836434 because Qua did not offer the
decision in evidence during the trial in Foreclosure Case No. 88-
2643 subject of this petition. RTC-Branch 6235 rendered the decision
in Collection Case No. 8364 on 21 November 1996 while Qua filed
his Notice of Appeal of the 3 May 1996 Order on 19 June 1996. Qua
could not have possibly offered in evidence the decision in Collection
Case No. 8364 because RTC-Branch 62 rendered the decision only
after Qua elevated the present case to the Court of Appeals. Hence,
Qua submitted the decision in Collection Case No. 8364 during the
pendency of the appeal of Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 in the
Court of Appeals.

As found by RTC-Branch 62, RGC, Gervel and Qua's total obligation

was P14,200,854.37 as of 31 October 1987.36 During the pendency
of Collection Case No. 8364, RGC and Gervel paid Metrobank P7
million. Because of the payment, Metrobank executed a
quitclaim37 in favor of RGC and Gervel. By virtue of Metrobank's
quitclaim, RTC-Branch 62 dismissed Collection Case No. 8364
against RGC and Gervel, leaving Ladtek and Qua as defendants.
Considering that RGC and Gervel paid only P7 million out of the
total obligation of P14,200,854.37, which payment was less than
RGC and Gervel's combined shares in the obligation,38 it was clearly
partial payment. Moreover, if it were full payment, then the
obligation would have been extinguished. Metrobank would have
also released Qua from his obligation.

RGC and Gervel also made partial payment to PDCP. Proof of this is
the Release from Solidary Liability that PDCP executed in RGC and
Gervel's favor which stated that their payment of P1,730,543.55
served as "full payment of their corresponding proportionate share"
in Ladtek's foreign currency loan.39 Moreover, PDCP filed a collection
case against Qua alone, docketed as Civil Case No. 2259, in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 150.40

Since they only made partial payments, RGC and Gervel should
clearly and convincingly show that their payments to Metrobank and
PDCP exceeded their proportionate shares in the obligations before
they can seek reimbursement from Qua. This RGC and Gervel failed
to do. RGC and Gervel, in fact, never claimed that their payments
exceeded their shares in the obligations. Consequently, RGC and
Gervel cannot validly seek reimbursement from Qua.

Whether there was novation of the Agreements

RGC and Gervel contend that there was no novation of the

Agreements. RGC and Gervel further contend that any novation of
the Agreements is immaterial to this case. RGC and Gervel
disagreed with the Court of Appeals on the effect of the "implied
novation" which supposedly transpired in this case. The Court of
Appeals found that "there was an implied novation or substantial
incompatibility in the mode or manner of payment by the surety
from the entire obligation, to one merely of proportionate share."
RGC and Gervel claim that if it is true that an implied novation
occurred, then the effect "would be to release respondent (Qua) as
the entire obligation is considered extinguished by operation of
law." Thus, Qua should now reimburse RGC and Gervel his
proportionate share under the surety agreements.

Novation extinguishes an obligation by (1) changing its object or

principal conditions; (2) substituting the person of the debtor; and
(3) subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. Article
1292 of the Civil Code clearly provides that in order that an
obligation may be extinguished by another which substitutes the
same, it should be declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old
and new obligations be on every point incompatible with each
other.41 Novation may either be extinctive or modificatory. Novation
is extinctive when an old obligation is terminated by the creation of
a new obligation that takes the place of the former. Novation is
merely modificatory when the old obligation subsists to the extent it
remains compatible with the amendatory agreement.42

We find that there was no novation of the Agreements. The parties

did not constitute a new obligation to substitute the Agreements.
The terms and conditions of the Agreements remain the same.
There was also no showing of complete incompatibility in the
manner of payment of the parties' obligations. Contrary to the Court
of Appeals' ruling, the mode or manner of payment by the parties
did not change from one for the entire obligation to one merely of
proportionate share. The creditors, namely Metrobank and PDCP,
merely proceeded against RGC and Gervel for their proportionate
shares only.43 This preference is within the creditors' discretion
which did not necessarily affect the nature of the obligations as well
as the terms and conditions of the Agreements. A creditor may
choose to proceed only against some and not all of the solidary
debtors. The creditor may also choose to collect part of the debt
from some of the solidary debtors, and the remaining debt from the
other solidary debtors.

In sum, RGC and Gervel have no legal basis to seek reimbursement

from Qua. Consequently, RGC and Gervel cannot validly foreclose
the pledge of Qua's GMC shares of stock which secured his
obligation to reimburse.44 Therefore, the foreclosure of the pledged
shares of stock has no leg to stand on.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision dated 6 March
2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54737
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

HABAGAT GRILL Through LOUIE BIRAOGO, Proprietor/Manager, Petitioners, v. DMC-URBAN

PROPERTY DEVELOPER, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Entitlement to physical or material possession of the premises is the issue in an ejectment suit. The
two forms of ejectment suits - - forcible entry and unlawful detainer - - may be distinguished from
each other mainly by the fact that in forcible entry, the plaintiffs must prove that they were in prior
possession of the premises until they were deprived thereof by the defendants; in unlawful detainer,
the plaintiffs need not have been in prior physical possession.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the April 12, 2002
Decision2 and the August 19, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53524.
The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, the Court REVERSES the appealed Decision and renders
judgment:

1. Commanding [Petitioner] Louie Biraogo and all persons acting for and in his behalf or by his
authority to remove the Habagat Grill and all improvements he has introduced into the lot in question
and to vacate said lot; andcralawlibrary

2. Ordering said [petitioner] to pay the [respondent] P10,000.00 monthly compensation for the
occupation of the land in question until the possession from December 1, 1993 of said property shall
have been completely restored to the [respondent]; and cralawlibrary

3. Ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] P10,000.00 as attorney's fees."4

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The antecedents were ably summarized by the CA as follows:

"On June 11, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. acquired and became the owner of a residential lot
situated in Matina, Davao City and covered by TCT No. T-82338. This lot shall henceforth be called the
lot in question. On June 13, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. transferred said lot to its sister company,
the DMC Urban Property Developers, Inc. (DMC) in whose favor TCT No. T-279042 was issued.
Alleging that Louie Biraogo forcibly entered said lot and built thereon the Habagat Grill in December,
1993, DMC filed on March 28, 1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry against Habagat Grill and/or Louie
Biraogo. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1233-D-94 in the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 4, in Davao City. The Complaint alleged that as owner DMC possessed the lot in
question from June 11, 1981 until December 1, 1993; that on that day, December 1, 1993, Louie
Biraogo, by means of strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered into the lot in question and constructed
the Habagat Grill thereon, thus illegally depriving DMC of the possession of said lot since then up to
the present; that the reasonable rental value of said lot is P10,000.00 a month.
"Louie Biraogo in his Answer denied illegally entering the lot in question. He averred that Habagat Grill
was built in 1992 inside Municipal Reservation No. 1050 (Presidential Proclamation No. 20) and so
DMC has no cause of action against him. Since one of the vital issues in the case was the location of
Habagat Grill, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities constituted a team composed of three members, one
a Geodetic Engineer representing the DMC, another Geodetic Engineer representing Biraogo and the
third from the DENR which was tasked with the duty of determining where precisely was Habagat Grill
located, on the lot in question or on Municipal Reservation No. 1050. Biraogo was directed by the
court to furnish the team with a copy of Municipal Reservation No. 20. Biraogo never complied. Worse,
his designated Geodetic Engineer Panfilo Jayme never took oath as such and did not participate in the
Relocation survey. The ones who conducted the survey were Engr. Edmindo Dida of the DENR and
Engr. Jose Cordero, DMC's representative. After conducting the relocation survey on March 30, 1998,
engineers Dida and Cordero submitted their report to the Court specifically stating that the Habagat
Grill Restaurant was occupying 934 square meters of the lot in question.

"After necessary proceedings, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered a Decision on August 6,
1998 dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. DMC
appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court and the same was docketed in Branch 12, in
Davao City as Civil Case No. x x x 26,860.98. On February 16, 1999, said court rendered judgment
affirming the appealed Decision. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was denied in the court's
Order dated April 21, 1999."5

Consequently, respondent interposed an appeal to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Granting respondent's appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the court of origin had jurisdiction over
the Complaint for Forcible Entry.6 The CA gave greater weight to the testimony of respondent's real
property manager, Bienamer Garcia, that Habagat Grill had been built on December 1, 1993.7 The
appellate court opined that his testimony was credible, because he had personal knowledge of the
facts he had testified to - - it was his task to know such matters. On the other hand, it was not clear in
what capacity petitioner's witness, Samuel Ruiz, came to know of the facts he had testified to.8 The CA
further held that the minutes of the Urban Planning and Economic Development hearings - - submitted
by petitioner to prove the construction of Habagat Grill in 1992 - - were immaterial, as these referred
to another establishment.9

The CA faulted petitioner for not presenting any other documentary evidence to establish the date of
Habagat Grill's construction.10 It added that the court of origin had improperly adjudged the subject
property as part of the public domain. The appellate court explained that the lower court could take
cognizance of Presidential Proclamation No. 20, but not of the situational relation between the
property covered by the Proclamation and the land in question. The CA further criticized petitioner for
not presenting any evidence to show the basis of the latter's alleged authority to build Habagat Grill
on the property.11

Hence, this Petition.12

The Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

"1. That, with due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Honorable
Court of First Level has no jurisdiction over this case as petitioner's possession and occupation of the
lot where Habagat Grill was constructed on the subject premises was yet in 1992 or for more than one
(1) year prior to the filing of this case on April 7, 1994 and that respondent's predecessor (David M.
Consunji, Inc.) had not been in prior and physical possession of the subject premises, as a matter of
fact, it failed to allege the same in its Complaint in this case; and
cralawlibrary

"2. That, with due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Complaint of
respondent's predecessor (David M. Consunji, Inc.) in this case failed to state a valid cause of action
as the lot referred to therein is not particularly described and is different from the lot on which the
Habagat Grill was constructed."13

Simplified, the issues are (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the case, and (2) whether
respondent alleged a sufficient cause of action in its Complaint.

This Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:

Jurisdiction

Petitioner argues that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, because mere
allegation of ownership did not, by itself, show that respondent had prior possession of the property.14

We disagree. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the

complaint.15 As long as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible entry or for
unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle holds, even if
the facts proved during the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the
court - - after acquiring jurisdiction - - may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence.

The necessary allegations in a Complaint for ejectment are set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, which reads thus:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession
of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of
any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

In the present case, the Complaint filed before the trial court on March 28, 1994, stated:

"2. That [respondent] had been in lawful and peaceful possession of a residential lot at Tulip Drive,
Ecoland and Subdivision covered by TCT T-82338 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City being owner
thereof, since June 11, 1981, until the day and incident in the following paragraph hereof.

"3. That on or about December 1, 1993, [petitioner] by means of strategy and stealth, unlawfully
entered and occupied a portion of said residential lot and constructed what is now known as the
'Habagat Grill', thereby illegally depriving [respondent] of the possession of the premises."16

Notably, petitioner alleged (1) prior possession, (2) deprivation thereof by strategy and stealth, and
(3) the date such unlawful deprivation started, which was less than one year from the filing of the
Complaint. Considering the presence in the Complaint of all the necessary allegations,17 the trial court
evidently acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

Date of Entry

Petitioner further contends that, as determined by the court of origin and the regional trial court,
respondent has not adduced preponderance of evidence to prove that this case was filed within the
one-year prescriptive period.18 Petitioner presented the testimony of a certain Samuel Ruiz and offered
the minutes of the hearings conducted by the Urban Planning and Economic Development (UPED) to
prove that the construction of the Habagat Grill began in 1992.19

Respondent counters that the CA properly relied on the testimony of the former's real property
manager, Bienamer Garcia, as he had personal knowledge of the facts.20 On the other hand, the two
trial courts allegedly relied on the hearings conducted by the UPED in resolving that petitioner had
been in possession of the property since 1992. Respondent avers that those hearings referred to a
restaurant located 330 meters away, not to Habagat Grill.21

The determination of the date of entry into the subject lot is a question of fact. This Court has held in
a long line of cases that the review of cases brought before it via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
limited to errors of law. Findings of fact by the CA are conclusive except in a number of instances, one
of which is when its factual findings are contrary to those of the courts below, as in the present case.22

The appellate court held that the minutes of the UPED hearing pertained to matters relating to a
different establishment, the Kawayan Restaurant.23 Thus, the UPED minutes did not have any material
bearing on the resolution of the present case. Consequently, the determination of the date of entry
into the subject lot boils down to the appreciation of the testimonies of Garcia and Ruiz.

"Preponderance of evidence" means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to
or has greater weight than that of the other.24 Where the evidence presented by one side is insufficient
to ascertain the claim, there is no preponderance of evidence.25 In criminal cases in which the
quantum of evidence required is greater than in civil cases, the testimony of only one witness - - if
credible, straightforward, and worthy of belief - - is sufficient to convict.26 With more reason then,
Garcia's testimony, if clear and positive, may be sufficient to establish respondent's claim.

Under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, among the facts and circumstances to be
considered by the court in determining which of the presented evidence has superior weight is the
witnesses' means and opportunity to know the facts to which they testify.27

The extent of such means and opportunity are determined by the following considerations:

"First, the 'Actor Rule. 'This rule maintains that a person's recollection of his own acts and of the
attendant circumstances is more definite and trustworthy than another person's recollection of it,
especially if it was an act done in the performance of a duty, or if the other person's testimony is little
more than an expression of opinion or judgment. Apart from comparative tenacity of memory, the
actor usually knows better than any one else what he did or did not do, and his testimony is generally,
but not always, entitled to superior weight on that account. Thus, the execution and attestation of a
will or other legal document may be so far regarded as the act of the lawyer who superintends the
transactions and knows the formalities required by law, and his testimony to the circumstances will
generally outweigh that of a non-professional witness.

"The 'Actor Rule' has been applied in a multitude of admiralty cases and any other cases where a
person's testimony concerning his own conduct conflicts with the testimony of a non-participating
observer or with inconclusive inferences from facts proved, especially where the 'actor' witness
testifies to an act which the duties of his employment required him to perform. But it said that the
testimony of one who evidently speaks rather to his custom than to his acts on the particular occasion
will hardly suffice to put him in the category of those who are specially favored by the Actor Rule.

"Second, the witness who had the greater interest in noticing and remembering the facts is to be
believed in preference to the one that had a slighter interest to observe or was wholly indifferent.
Interest has effect on the power of observation of witness. Thus, it has been held that it was not
remarkable that witnesses would not have observed traces of blood along the route through which the
deceased was taken because said witnesses had no reason to suspect that the crime was not
committed in the place where the dead body was found. Similarly, the failure of witnesses to notice
whether or not there were houses at the place where they say the accused maltreat the offended
party was attributed as due to the fact that their attention was concentrated to what they say, and
they had no interest in knowing whether or not there were houses in or around the place.
"Third, the witness who gives reasons for the accuracy of his observations is preferred to him who
merely states the fact to be so, without adverting to any circumstances showing that his attention was
particularly called to it. Thus, the testimony of the crew of a vessel that their light on the night of a
collision was red, and nothing more, was easily overcome by testimony of witnesses on the other
vessel that the light was white, not red, and that fact was a matter of remark among them when the
light was observed.

"Fourth, the witness in a state of excitement, fear, or terror is generally incapable of observing
accurately. This is so because, if men perceive the most insignificant facts in the most diverse ways,
even when it is impossible that these facts should produce on the observer any emotion preventing
him from observing with absolute calm, even much more will their impressions be diversified under
circumstances calculated to produce in the onlookers excitement, fear or terror.

"Fifth, intoxication tends to impair accuracy both of observation and memory of a witness."28 (Citations
omitted) chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Based on the foregoing criteria, the testimony of Garcia must be given greater weight, considering
that it was his task - - as the real property manager of respondent - - to know about matters involving
the latter's properties. In contrast, it was not explained how Ruiz could be deemed competent and
credible in his testimony as to those matters.

The lower courts dismissed the testimony of Garcia - - regardless of how clear, positive and
straightforward it was - - solely on the ground that he was not a disinterested witness. True, he was
an employee of respondent; relationship, however, will not by itself determine the true worth of one's
testimony.29 The essential test is whether such testimony is disencumbered, credible, and in accord
with human experience.30 It cannot easily be dismissed by the mere invocation of the witness'
relationship with respondent. In sum, we have no reason to disagree with the CA's evaluation that,
being credible, Garcia's direct testimony was sufficient to establish respondent's claim that petitioner
had entered the premises on December 1, 1993.

Second Issue:

Cause of Action

Petitioner avers that no cause of action was alleged by respondent, as shown by the following
circumstances: (1) the latter's property was not encroached upon by Habagat Grill, which had
allegedly been constructed on a portion of land owned by the City Government of Davao;31 and (2)
respondent failed to prove that its predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of the property.32

On the other hand, respondent argues that the trial court indiscriminately ignored the Report of the
survey team that had been constituted to determine the exact location of Habagat Grill. Respondent
further contends that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the metes and bounds of the
property covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 20.33 Although the lower court may take judicial
notice of PD No. 20, it may not do so in regard to the metes and bounds of Times Beach. Neither, may
it claim knowledge of the situational relation between the land in question and Times Beach.

Location of the Property

We agree with respondent. "Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may
properly take and act on without proof because they already know them."34 Its object is to save time,
labor and expense in securing and introducing evidence on matters that are not ordinarily capable of
dispute or actually bona fide disputed, and the tenor of which can safely be assumed from the
tribunal's general knowledge or from a slight search on its part.

Indeed, municipal courts may take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the
municipality in which they sit.35 Such notice, however, is limited to what the law is and what it
states.36 As can be gleaned from its discussions, the trial court took judicial notice of the existence of
Presidential Proclamation No. 20, which declared Times Beach a recreation center. The MTC also took
judicial notice of the location of the beach, which was from the shoreline to the "road towards the
shoreline." On the basis of these premises, the trial court resolved that the lot on which petitioner's
restaurant was located should necessarily be inside Times Beach, which was owned by the City of
Davao. Hence, it was the City - - not respondent - - that had a cause of action against petitioner. To
arrive at this conclusion, the MTC made its own estimate of the location of the metes and bounds of
the property mentioned by the law.37

The location of Habagat Grill cannot be resolved by merely taking judicial notice of Presidential
Proclamation No. 20; such location is precisely at the core of the dispute in this case. Moreover,
considering respondent's allegation that the supposed lot covered by the Ordinance has been lost due
to inundation by the sea, we cannot fathom how the trial court could have known of the actual
location of the metes and bounds of the subject lot.

Neither may the MTC take discretionary judicial notice under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, because the exact boundaries of the lot covered by that law are not a matter of public
knowledge capable of unquestionable demonstration. Neither may these be known to judges because
of their judicial functions.

Hence, the CA was correct in disregarding the findings of the trial courts, because they had erred in
taking judicial notice of the exact metes and bounds of the property. The appellate court aptly relied
on the Report submitted by the survey team that had been constituted by the trial court, precisely for
the purpose of determining the location of Habagat Grill in relation to respondent's lot.

Prior Possession

Finally, petitioner avers that respondent failed to prove that the latter's predecessor-in-interest had
prior possession of the property.38 Conversely, respondent alleges that its predecessor was in prior
physical possession of the property as the registered owner thereof since June 11, 1981.39 Again, we
rule for respondent.

There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or material possession of
the premises; that is, to possession de facto, not possession de jure? Issues as to the right of
possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except
only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.40

The two forms of ejectment suits - - forcible entry or unlawful detainer - - may be distinguished from
each other mainly by the fact that in forcible entry, the plaintiffs must prove that they were in prior
possession of the premises until they were deprived thereof by the defendant; in unlawful detainer,
the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession.41

Spouses Benitez v. CA42 has held that possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but
also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right.

Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. "These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of
possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, x x x execution and registration of public
instruments, and the inscription of possessory information titles."43 For one to be considered in
possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation44 of every square inch of the property at
all times. In the present case, prior possession of the lot by respondent's predecessor was sufficiently
proven by evidence of the execution and registration of public instruments and by the fact that the lot
was subject to its will from then until December 1, 1993, when petitioner unlawfully entered the
premises and deprived the former of possession thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

[G.R. NO. 148372 : June 27, 2005]

CLARION PRINTING HOUSE, INC., and EULOGIO YUTINGCO, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division) and MICHELLE
MICLAT, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES,  J.:

Respondent Michelle Miclat (Miclat) was employed on April 21, 1997 on a probationary basis as
marketing assistant with a monthly salary of P6,500.00 by petitioner Clarion Printing House
(CLARION) owned by its co-petitioner Eulogio Yutingco. At the time of her employment, she was not
informed of the standards that would qualify her as a regular employee.

On September 16, 1997, the EYCO Group of Companies of which CLARION formed part filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a "Petition for the Declaration of Suspension of Payment,
Formation and Appointment of Rehabilitation Receiver/ Committee, Approval of Rehabilitation Plan
with Alternative Prayer for Liquidation and Dissolution of Corporation"1 the pertinent allegations of
which read:

xxx

5. The situation was that since all these companies were sister companies and were operating under a

unified and centralized management team, the financial requirements of one company would normally

be backed up or supported by one of the available fundings from the other companies.

6. The expansion exhausted the cash availability of Nikon, NKI, and 2000 because those fundings

were absorbed by the requirements of NPI and EYCO Properties, Inc. which were placed on real estate

investments. However, at the time that those investments and expansions were made, there was no

cause for alarm because the market situation was very bright and very promising, hence, the decision

of the management to implement the expansion.

7. The situation resulted in the cash position being spread thin. However, despite the thin cash

positioning, the management still was very positive and saw a very viable proposition since the

expansion and the additional investments would result in a bigger real estate base which would be

very credible collateral for further expansions. It was envisioned that in the end, there would be bigger

cash procurement which would result in greater volume of production, profitability and other good

results based on the expectations and projections of the team itself.

8. Unfortunately, factors beyond the control and anticipation of the management came into play which

caught the petitioners flat-footed, such as:

a) The glut in the real estate marketwhich has resulted in the bubble economy for the real estate

demand which right now has resulted in a severe slow down in the sales of properties;

b) The economic interplay consisting of the inflation and the erratic changes in the peso-

dollar exchange ratewhich precipitated a soaring banking interest.

c) Labor problemsthat has precipitated adverse company effect on the media and in the financial

circuit.

d) Liberalization of the industry(GATT) which has resulted in flooding the market with imported

goods;

e) Other related adverse matters.

9. The inability of the EYCO Group of Companies to meet the obligations as they fall due on the

schedule agreed with the bank has now become a stark reality. The situation therefore is that since

the obligations would not be met within the scheduled due date, complications and problems would

definitely arise that would impair and affect the operations of the entire conglomerate comprising

the EYCO Group of Companies.

xxx

12. By virtue of this development, there is a need for suspension of all accounts o[r] obligations

incurred by the petitioners in their separate and combined capacities in the meantime that they are

working for the rehabilitation of the companies that would eventually redound to the benefit of these

creditors.

13. The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the present combined financial condition of the

petitioners clearly indicates that their assets are more than enough to pay off the credits.

x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)2

On September 19, 1997, the SEC issued an Order3 the pertinent portions of which read:

xxx

It appearing that the petition is sufficient in form and

substance, the corporate petitioners' prayer for the creation of management or receivership committee 
and creditors' approval of the proposed Rehabilitation Plan is hereby set for hearing on October 22, 19
97 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon at the SICD, SEC Bldg., EDSA, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City.

xxx

Finally, the petitioners are hereby enjoined from disposing any and all of their properties in any
manner, whatsoever, except in the ordinary course of business and from making any payment outside
of the legitimate business expenses during the pendency of the proceedings and as a consequence of
the filing of the Petition, all actions, claims and proceedings against herein petitioners pending before
any court, tribunal, office board and/or commission are deemed SUSPENDED until further orders from
this Hearing Panel pursuant to the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of RCBC v. IAC et al.,
213 SCRA 830 and BPI v. CA, 229 SCRA 223. (Underscoring supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

And on September 30, 1997, the SEC issued an Order4 approving the creation of an interim receiver
for the EYCO Group of Companies.

On October 10, 1997, the EYCO Group of Companies issued to its employees the following
Memorandum:5

This is to formally announce the entry of the Interim Receiver Group represented by SGV from today
until October 22, 1997 or until further formal notice from the SEC.

This interim receiver group's function is to make sure that all assets of the company are secured and
accounted for both for the protection of us and our creditors.

Their function will involve familiarization with the different processes and controls in our organization
& keeping physical track of our assets like inventories and machineries.

Anything that would be required from you would need to be in writing and duly approved by the top
management in order for us to maintain a clear line.

We trust that this temporary inconvenience will benefit all of us in the spirit of goodwill. Let's extend
our full cooperation to them.

Thank you. (Underscoring supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

On October 22, 1997, the Assistant Personnel Manager of CLARION informed Miclat by telephone that
her employment contract had been terminated effective October 23, 1997. No reason was given for
the termination.

The following day or on October 23, 1997, on reporting for work, Miclat was informed by the General
Sales Manager that her termination was part of CLARION's cost-cutting measures.

On November 17, 1997, Miclat filed a complaint6 for illegal dismissal against CLARION and Yutingco
(petitioners) before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

In the meantime, or on January 7, 1998, the EYCO Group of Companies issued a

Memorandum7 addressed to company managers advising them of "a temporary partial shutdown of
some operations of the Company" commencing on January 12, 1998 up to February 28, 1998:

In view of the numerous external factors such as slowdown in business and consumer demand and
consistent with Art. 286 of the Revised Labor Code of the Philippines, we are constrained to go on a
temporary partial shutdown of some operations of the Company.

To implement this measure, please submit to my office through your local HRAD the list of those
whom you will require to report for work and their specific schedules. Upon revalidation and approval
of this list, all those not in the list will not receive any pay nor will it be credited against their VL.
Please submit the listing no later than the morning of Friday, January 09, 1998.

Shutdown shall commence on January 12, 1998 up to February 28, 1998, unless otherwise recalled at
an earlier date.

Implementation of th[ese] directives will be done through your HRAD departments. (Underscoring
supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

In her Position Paper8 dated March 3, 1998 filed before the labor arbiter, Miclat claimed that she was
never informed of the standards which would qualify her as a regular employee. She asserted,
however, that she qualified as a regular employee since her immediate supervisor even submitted a
written recommendation in her favor before she was terminated without just or authorized cause.

Respecting the alleged financial losses cited by petitioners as basis for her termination, Miclat disputed
the same, she contending that as marketing assistant tasked to receive sales calls, produce sales
reports and conduct market surveys, a credible assessment on production and sales showed
otherwise.

In any event, Miclat claimed that assuming that her termination was necessary, the manner in which it
was carried out was illegal, no written notice thereof having been served on her, and she merely
learned of it only a day before it became effective.

Additionally, Miclat claimed that she did not receive separation pay, 13th month pay and salaries for
October 21, 22 and 23, 1997.

On the other hand, petitioners claimed that they could not be faulted for retrenching some of its
employees including Miclat, they drawing attention to the EYCO Group of Companies' being placed
under receivership, notice of which was sent to its supervisors and rank and file employees via a
Memorandum of July 21, 1997; that in the same memorandum, the EYCO Group of Companies
advised them of a scheme for voluntary separation from employment with payment of severance pay;
and that CLARION was only adopting the "LAST IN, FIRST OUT PRINCIPLE" when it terminated Miclat
who was relatively new in the company.

Contending that Miclat's termination was made with due process, petitioners referred to the EYCO
Group of Companies' abovesaid July 21, 1997 Memorandum which, so they claimed, substantially
complied with the notice requirement, it having been issued more than one month before Miclat was
terminated on October 23, 1997.

By Decision9 of November 23, 1998, the labor arbiter found that Miclat was illegally
dismissed and directed her reinstatement.The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent
to reinstate complainant to her former or equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and
benefits and to pay her backwages, from the time of dismissal to actual reinstatement,
proportionate 13th month pay and two (2) days salary computed as follows:

a.1) Backwages - 10/23/97 to 11/30/98

P6,500.00 x 13.25 months = P86,125.00

a.2) Proportionate 13th month pay

1/12 of P86,125 = 7,177.08

b) 13th month pay - 1997

=P6,500 x 9.75 months/12 = 5,281.25

c) Two days salary

=P6,500/26 x 2 days = 500.00

TOTAL P 99,083.33

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to which petitioners appealed, they argued
that:10

1. [CLARION] was placed under receivership thereby evidencing the fact that it sustained business

losses to warrant the termination of [Miclat] from her employment.

2. The dismissal of [Miclat] from her employment having been effected in accordance with the law and

in good faith, [Miclat] does not deserve to be reinstated and paid backwages, 13th month pay and two

(2) days salary.

And petitioners pointed out that CLARION had expressed its decision to shutdown its operations by
Memorandum11 of January 7, 1998 to its company managers.

Appended to petitioners' appeal before the NLRC were photocopies of their balance sheets from 1997
to November 1998 which they claimed to "unanimously show that x x x [petitioner] company
experienced business reverses which were made the basis x x x in retrenching x x x."12

By Resolution13 of June 17, 1999, the NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter's decision. The pertinent portion
of the NLRC Resolution reads:

There are three (3) valid requisites for valid retrenchment: (1) the retrenchment is necessary to
prevent losses and such losses are proven; (2) written notices to the employees and to the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month prior to the intended date of
retrenchment; and (3) payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least - month
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. The two notices are mandatory. If the notice to the
workers is later than the notices sent to DOLE, the date of termination should be at least one month
from the date of notice to the workers.

In Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers Philippine Labor Union Association (PLUA-
NACUSIP) and National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court had the occasion to set
forth four standards which would justify retrenchment, being, firstly, - the losses expected should be
substantial and not merely de minimis in extent. If the loss purportedly sought to be forestalled by
retrenchment is clearly shown to be insubstantial and inconsequential in character, the bona fide
nature of the retrenchment would appear to be seriously in question; secondly, - the substantial loss
apprehended must be reasonably imminent, as such imminence can be perceived objectively and in
good faith by the employer. There should, in other words, be a certain degree of urgency for the
retrenchment, which is after all a drastic course with serious consequences for the livelihood of the
employees retired or otherwise laid-off; thirdly, - because of the consequential nature of
retrenchment, it must be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses.
The employer should have taken other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment to forestall losses,
i.e., cut other cost than labor costs; and lastly, - the alleged losses if already realized and the
expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, must be proven by sufficient and convincing
evidence.

The records show that these requirements were not substantially complied with. And proofs presented
by respondents-appellants were short of being sufficient and convincing to justify valid retrenchment.
Their position must therefore fail. The reason is simple. Evidences on record presented fall short of the
requirement of substantial, sufficient and convincing evidence to persuade this Commission to declare
the validity of retrenchment espoused by respondents-appellants. The petition before the Securit[ies]
and Exchange Commission for suspension of payment does not prove anything to come within the
bounds of justifying retrenchment. In fact, the petition itself lends credence to the fact that
retrenchment was not actually reinstated under the circumstances prevailing when it stated, "The
foregoing notwithstanding, however, the present combined financial condition of the petitioners clearly
indicates that their assets are more than enough to pay off the credits." Verily, reading further into
the petition, We are not ready to disregard the fact that the petition merely seeks to suspend
payments of their obligation from creditor banks and other financing institutions, and not because of
imminent substantial financial loss. On this account, We take note of paragraph 7 of the petition which
stated: "The situation resulted in cash position being spread thin. However, despite the thin cash
positioning, the management was very positive and saw a very viable proposition since the expansion
and the additional investments would result in a bigger real estate base which would be a very
credible collateral for further expansions. It was envisioned that in the end, there would a bigger cash
procurement which would result in greater volume of production, profitability and other good results
based on the expectations and projections of the team itself." Admittedly, this does not create a
picture of retrenchable business atmosphere pursuant to Article 283 of the Labor Code.

We cannot disregard the fact that respondent-appellants failed in almost all of the criteria set by law
and jurisprudence in justifying valid retrenchment. The two (2) mandatory notices were violated. The
supposed notice to the DOLE (Annex "4," List of Employees on Shutdown) is of no moment, the same
having no bearing in this case. Herein complainant-appellee was not even listed therein and the date
of receipt by DOLE, that is, January 18, 1999, was way out of time in relation to this case. And no
proof was adduced to evidence cost cutting measures, to say the least. Nor was there proof shown
that separation pay had been awarded to complainant-appellee.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding no grave abuse of discretion on the findings of Labor
Arbiter Nieves V. De Castro, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit.

The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)

Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC resolution having been denied by Resolution14 of
July 29, 1999, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari15 before the Court of Appeals (CA) raising the
following arguments:

1. PETITIONER CLARION WAS PLACED UNDER RECEIVERSHIP THEREBY EVIDENCING THE FACT THAT

IT SUSTAINED BUSINESS LOSSES TO WARRANT THE TERMINATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT

MICLAT FROM HER EMPLOYMENT.

2. THE DISMISSAL OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICLAT FROM HER EMPLOYMENT HAVING

BEEN EFFECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW AND IN GOOD FAITH, PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOES
NOT DESERVE TO BE REINSTATED AND PAID BACKWAGES, 13th MONTH PAY AND TWO (2) DAYS

SALARY. (Underscoring supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

By Decision16 of November 24, 2000, the CA sustained the resolutions of the NLRC in this wise:

In the instant case, Clarion failed to prove its ground for retrenchment as well as compliance with

the mandated procedure of furnishing the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment
(hereafter, DOLE) with one (1) month written notice and payment of separation pay to the
employee. Clarion's failure to discharge its burden of proof is evident from the following instances:

First, Clarion presented no evidence whatsoever before the Labor Arbiter. To prove serious business

losses, Clarion presented its 1997 and 1998 financial statements and the SEC Order for the Creation

of an Interim Receiver, for the first time on appeal before the NLRC. The Supreme Court has

consistently disallowed such practice unless the party making the belated submission of evidence had

satisfactorily explained the delay. In the instant case, said financial statements are not admissible in

evidence due to Clarion's failure to explain the delay.

Second, even if such financial statements were admitted in evidence, they would not alter the

outcome of the case as statements have weak probative value. The required method of proof in such

case is the presentation of financial statements prepared by independent auditors and not merely by

company accountants. Again, petitioner failed in this regard.

Third, even audited financial statements are not enough. The employer must present the statement

for the year immediately preceding the year the employee was retrenched, which Clarion failed to do

in the instant case, to prove not only the fact of business losses but more importantly, the fact that

such losses were substantial, continuing and without immediate prospect of abatement. Hence,

neither the NLRC nor the courts must blindly accept such audited financial statements. They must

examine and make inferences from the data presented to establish business losses. Furthermore, they

must be cautioned by the fact that "sliding incomes" or decreasing gross revenues alone are not

necessarily business losses within the meaning of Art. 283 since in the nature of things, the possibility

of incurring losses is constantly present in business operations.

Last, even if business losses were indeed sufficiently proven, the employer must still prove that

retrenchment was resorted to only after less drastic measures such as the reduction of both

management and rank-and-file bonuses and salaries, going on reduced time, improving manufacturing

efficiency, reduction of marketing and advertising costs, faster collection of customer accounts,

reduction of raw materials investment and others, have been tried and found wanting.
Again, petitioner failed to prove the exhaustion of less drastic measures short of retrenchment as it

had failed with the other requisites.

It is interesting to note that Miclat started as a probationary employee on 21 April 1997. There being

no stipulation to the contrary, her probation period had a duration of six (6) months from her date of
employment. Thus, after the end of the probation period on 22 October 1997, she became a regular
employee as of 23 October 1997 since she was allowed to work after the end of said period. It is also
clear that her probationary employment was not terminated at the end of the probation period on the
ground that the employee failed to qualify in accordance with reasonable standards made known to
her at the time of engagement.

However, 23 October 1997 was also the day of Miclat's termination from employment on the ground of
retrenchment. Thus, we have a bizarre situation when the first day of an employee's regular
employment was also the day of her termination. However, this is entirely possible, as had in fact
happened in the instant case, where the employer's basis for termination is Art. 288, instead of Art.
281 of the Labor Code. If petitioner terminated Miclat with Art. 281 in mind, it would have been too
late to present such theory at this stage and it would have been equally devastating for petitioner had
it done so because no evidence exists to show that Miclat failed to qualify with petitioner's standards
for regularization. Failure to discharge its burden of proof would still be petitioner's undoing.

Whichever way We examine the case, the conclusion is the same - Miclat was illegally dismissed.
Consequently, reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and full backwages from date of dismissal
on 23 October 1997 until actual reinstatement is in order.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the 29 July 1999 and 7 June 1999
resolutions of the NLRC are SUSTAINED. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

By Resolution17 of May 23, 2001, the CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners contending that:

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE

ASSAILED DECISIONS OF HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION:

A. HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICLAT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED; and cralawlibrary

B. ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICLAT TO HER FORMER OR

EQUIVALENT POSITION WITHOUT LOSS OF SENIORITY RIGHTS AND BENEFITS AND PAYMENT OF

BACKWAGES, 1[3]th MONTH PAY AND TWO (2) DAYS SALARY.18

Petitioners argue that the conclusion of the CA that no sufficient proof of financial losses on the part of
CLARION was adduced is patently erroneous, given the serious business reverses it had gravely
suffered as reflected in its financial statements/balance sheets, thereby leaving as its only option the
retrenchment of its employees including Miclat.19

Petitioners further argue that when a company is under receivership and a receiver is appointed to
take control of its management and corporate affairs, one of the evident reasons is to prevent further
losses of said company and protect its remaining assets from being dissipated; and that the
submission of financial reports/statements prepared by independent auditors had been rendered moot
and academic, the company having shutdown its operations and having been placed under
receivership by the SEC due to its inability to pay or comply with its obligations.20
Respecting the CA's holding that the financial statements CLARION submitted for the first time on
appeal before the NLRC are inadmissible in evidence due to its failure to explain the delay in the
submission thereof, petitioners lament the CA's failure to consider that technical rules on evidence
prevailing in the courts are not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC which may consider
evidence such as documents and affidavits submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal.21

As to the CA's holding that CLARION failed to prove the exhaustion of less drastic measures short of
retrenching, petitioners advance that prior to the termination of Miclat, CLARION, together with the
other companies under the EYCO Group of Companies, was placed under receivership during which
drastic measures to continue business operations of the company and eventually rehabilitate itself
were implemented.22

Denying Miclat's entitlement to backwages, petitioners proffer that her dismissal rested upon a valid
and authorized cause. And petitioners assail as grossly erroneous the award of 13th month pay to
Miclat, she not having sought it and, therefore, there was no jurisdiction to award the same.23

The petition is partly meritorious.

Contrary to the CA's ruling, petitioners could present evidence for the first time on appeal to the
NLRC. It is well-settled that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time
on appeal, because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.

The settled rule is that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal as technical rules
of evidence are not binding in labor cases. In fact, labor officials are mandated by the Labor Code to
use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively,
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. Thus, in Lawin
Security Services v. NLRC, and Bristol Laboratories Employees' Association-DFA v. NLRC, we held that
even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was duly introduced on
appeal to the NLRC is enough basis for the latter to be more judicious in admitting the same, instead
of falling back on the mere technicality that said evidence can no longer be considered on appeal.
Certainly, the first course of action would be more consistent with equity and the basic notions of
fairness. (Italics in the original; citations omitted)24

It is likewise well-settled that for retrenchment to be justified, any claim of actual or potential
business losses must satisfy the following standards: (1) the losses are substantial and not de
minimis; (2) the losses are actual or reasonably imminent; (3) the retrenchment is reasonably
necessary and is likely to be effective in preventing expected losses; and (4) the alleged losses, if
already incurred, or the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, are proven by sufficient
and convincing evidence.25 And it is the employer who has the onus of proving the presence of these
standards.

Sections 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A (P.D. 902-A) ("reorganization of the securities and
exchange commission with additional powers and placing said agency under the administrative
supervision of the office of the president"),26 as amended, read:

SEC. 5 In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as
expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases involving:

xxx

(d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations declared in the state of

suspension of payments in cases where the corporation, partnership or association
possesses sufficient property to cover all debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting
them when they respectively fall due or in cases where the corporation, partnership,
association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the management of a
Rehabilitation Receiver or Management Committee created pursuant to this Decree.
SEC. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following
powers:

xxx

(c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real and personal, which is the subject of the
action pending before the Commission in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court in such
other cases whenever necessary in order to preserve the rights of the parties-litigants and/or protect
the interest of the investing public and creditors: Provided, however, That the Commission
may in appropriate cases, appoint a rehabilitation receiver  of corporations, partnerships or
other associations not supervised or regulated by other government agencies who shall
have, in addition to powers of the regular receiver under the provisions of the Rules of
Court, such functions and powers as are provided for in the succeeding paragraph (d)
hereof: x x x

(d) To create and appoint a management committee, board or body upon petition or motu propio to
undertake the management of corporations, partnership or other associations not supervised or
regulated by other government agencies in appropriate cases when there is imminent danger of
dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of assets or other properties or paralization of
business operations of such corporations or entities which may be prejudicial to the interest
of minority stockholders, parties-litigants of the general public: x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).

From the above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, the appointment of a receiver or
management committee by the SEC presupposes a finding that, inter alia, a company possesses
sufficient property to cover all its debts but "foresees the impossibility of meeting them when they
respectively fall due" and "there is imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of
assets of other properties or paralization of business operations."

That the SEC, mandated by law to have regulatory functions over corporations, partnerships or
associations,27 appointed an interim receiver for the EYCO Group of Companies on its petition in light
of, as quoted above, the therein enumerated "factors beyond the control and anticipation of the
management" rendering it unable to meet its obligation as they fall due, and thus resulting to
"complications and problems . . . to arise that would impair and affect [its] operations . . ." shows that
CLARION, together with the other member-companies of the EYCO Group of Companies, was suffering
business reverses justifying, among other things, the retrenchment of its employees.

This Court in fact takes judicial notice of the Decision28 of the Court of Appeals dated June 11, 2000 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 55208, "Nikon Industrial Corp., Nikolite Industrial Corp.,  et al. [including
CLARION],  otherwise known as the EYCO Group of Companies v. Philippine National Bank, Solidbank
Corporation, et al., collectively known and referred as the 'Consortium of Creditor Banks,' " which was
elevated to this Court via Petition for Certiorari and docketed as G.R. No. 145977, but which petition
this Court dismissed by Resolution dated May 3, 2005:

Considering the joint manifestation and motion to dismiss of petitioners and respondents dated

February 24, 2003, stating that the parties have reached a final and comprehensive settlement of all
the claims and counterclaims subject matter of the case and accordingly, agreed to the dismissal of
the Petition for Certiorari, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari (Underscoring
supplied).

The parties in G.R. No. 145977 having sought, and this Court having granted, the dismissal of the
appeal of the therein petitioners including CLARION, the CA decision which affirmed in toto the
September 14, 1999 Order of the SEC, the dispositive portion of which SEC Order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is as it is hereby, granted and the Order dated 18
December 1998 is set aside. The Petition to be Declared in State of Suspension of payments is
hereby disapprovedand the SAC Plan terminated. Consequently, all committee, conservator/
receivers created pursuant to said Order are dissolved and discharged and all acts and orders issued
therein are vacated.

The Commission, likewise, orders the liquidation and dissolution of the appellee

corporations. The case is hereby remanded to the hearing panel below for that purpose.

x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

has now become final and executory. Ergo, the SEC's disapproval of the EYCO Group of Companies'
"Petition for the Declaration of Suspension of Payment . . ." and the order for the liquidation and
dissolution of these companies including CLARION, must be deemed to have been unassailed.

That judicial notice can be taken of the above-said case of Nikon Industrial Corp. et al. v. PNB et
al., there should be no doubt.

As provided in Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms
of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the
world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of
thelegislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure
of time, and the geographical divisions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

which Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras interpreted as follows:

A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established
in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between
the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in
the same court. In addition judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a
case in another court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the
record of another case between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be taken of
court personnel. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)29

In fine, CLARION's claim that at the time it terminated Miclat it was experiencing business reverses
gains more light from the SEC's disapproval of the EYCO Group of Companies' petition to be declared
in state of suspension of payment, filed before Miclat's termination, and of the SEC's
consequent order for the group of companies' dissolution and liquidation.

This Court's finding that Miclat's termination was justified notwithstanding, since at the time she was
hired on probationary basis she was not informed of the standards that would qualify her as a regular
employee, under Section 6, Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code which
reads:

SEC. 6. Probationary employment. There is probationary employment where the employee, upon his
engagement, is made to undergo a trial period during which the employer determines his fitness to
qualify for regular employment, based on reasonable standards made known to him at the time of
engagement.

"Probationary employment shall be governed by the following rules:

xxx

(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the
employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his
engagement. Where no standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed
a regular employee" (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
she was deemed to have been hired from day one as a regular employee.30

CLARION, however, failed to comply with the notice requirement provided for in Article 283 of the
Labor Code, to wit:

ART. 283. CLOSURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND REDUCTION OF PERSONNEL. 'The employer may also
terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices,
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of
this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the Ministry of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

This Court thus deems it proper to award the amount equivalent to Miclat's one (1) month salary
of P6,500.00 as nominal damages to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due
process rights of employees.31

Since Article 283 of the Labor Code also provides that "[i]n case of retrenchment to prevent
losses, . . . the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2)
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. . ., [a] fraction of at least six (6) months
[being] considered one (1) whole year," this Court holds that Miclat is entitled to separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month salary.

As to Miclat's entitlement to 13th month pay, paragraph 6 of the Revised Guidelines on the 13th
Month Pay Law provides:

6. 13th Month Pay of Resigned or Separated Employee

An employee x x x whose services were terminated any time before the time for payment of the 13th
month pay is entitled to this monetary benefit in proportion to the length of time he worked during the
calendar year up to the time of his resignation or termination from the service. Thus if he worked only
from January up to September his proportionate 13th month pay shall be equivalent to 1/12 of his
total basic salary he earned during that period.

xxx

Having worked at CLARION for six months, Miclat's 13th month pay should be computed as follows:

(Monthly Salary x 6) / 12 = Proportionate 13th month pay

(P6,500.00 x 6) / 12 = P3,250.00

With the appointment of a management receiver in September 1997, however, all claims and
proceedings against CLARION, including labor claims,32 were deemed suspended during the existence
of the receivership.33 The labor arbiter, the NLRC, as well as the CA should not have proceeded to
resolve respondent's complaint for illegal dismissal and should instead have directed respondent to
lodge her claim before the then duly-appointed receiver of CLARION. To still require respondent,
however, at this time to refile her labor claim against CLARION under the peculiar circumstances of
the case - that 8 years have lapsed since her termination and that all the arguments and defenses of
both parties were already ventilated before the labor arbiter, NLRC and the CA; and that CLARION is
already in the course of liquidation - this Court deems it most expedient and advantageous for both
parties that CLARION's liability be determined with finality, instead of still requiring respondent to
lodge her claim at this time before the liquidators of CLARION which would just entail a mere
reiteration of what has been already argued and pleaded. Furthermore, it would be in the best interest
of the other creditors of CLARION that claims against the company be finally settled and determined
so as to further expedite the liquidation proceedings. For the lesser number of claims to be proved,
the sooner the claims of all creditors of CLARION are processed and settled.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals November 24, 2000 Decision, together with its May 23, 2001
Resolution, is SET ASIDE and another rendered declaring the legality of the dismissal of respondent,
Michelle Miclat. Petitioners are ORDERED, however, to PAY her the following in accordance with the
foregoing discussions:

1) P6,500.00 as nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process;

2) P6,500.00 as separation pay; and

3) P3,250.00 as 13th month pay.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the SEC Hearing Panel charged with the liquidation and
dissolution of petitioner corporation for inclusion, in the list of claims of its creditors, respondent
Michelle Miclat's claims, to be satisfied in accordance with Article 110 of the Labor Code in relation to
the Civil Code provisions on Concurrence and Preference of Credits.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.