Perspectives on Behavior Science

https://doi.org/10.1007/s40614-020-00249-9
ORIGINAL RESEARCH

Who Has the Last Word? Radical Behaviorism, Science,

and Verbal Behavior about Verbal Behavior

Alexandre Dittrich 1

# Association for Behavior Analysis International 2020

Abstract
A radical behaviorist epistemology recognizes the recursivity inherent in behavior
analysis: as behaving organisms, we not only take behavior as our subject matter but
we are also part of it. Such a naturalization of epistemology, however, is not without its
critics. In this article, my aim is to assess some of the arguments that were directed
against this approach by the American philosopher Thomas Nagel in his book The Last
Word (1997). In particular, I address Nagel's arguments regarding (1) the shortcomings
of naturalistic explanations of scientific knowledge and (2) the impossibility of
circumventing a realistic, representational epistemology. Regarding (1), I argue that
although Nagel is right in arguing that there is no neutral or external viewpoint from
which we can understand scientific knowledge, the naturalistic explanation of such
knowledge proposed by radical behaviorists is not only possible, but have important
practical advantages, insofar as it allows the identification of the variables that control
scientific behavior. Regarding (2), I argue that although behavior scientists will fre-
quently talk and write in descriptive ways, the function of descriptive verbal behavior in
science is not to represent reality but to coordinate our collective behavior in dealing
with the environment. I conclude that instead of avoiding an evolutionary account of
rationality, as Nagel suggests, we have every reason to further pursue it.

Keywords Thomas Nagel . radical behaviorism . naturalized epistemology . pragmatism

There is a recursivity that is characteristic of all behavioral sciences, including behavior

analysis: we take behavior as our subject matter and we are also, as behaving organ-
isms, part of this subject matter. Anything that applies to human behavior must also

I thank Hank Schlinger for the opportunity to discuss some of the topics I argue about here. However, all
arguments and shortcomings are my own.

* Alexandre Dittrich
alexandredittrich@gmail.com

1
Departamento de Psicologia, Universidade Federal do Paraná, Praça Santos Andrade, 50 – sala
2015 –, Curitiba, PR CEP 80020-300, Brazil
 Perspectives on Behavior Science

apply to the behavior of scientists. Behavior scientists, in particular, are inclined to

understand scientific behavior (verbal or nonverbal), including their own, as the
product of the same variables that affect any behavior (Normand, 2019; Skinner,
1956/1972a, 1945/1972b, 1957, 1963/1969, 1974; Smith, 1986; Zuriff, 1980).
From Skinner's point of view, this recursivity is a natural and desirable development
of a science of behavior. If logical, mathematical and scientific verbal behavior could
themselves be understood with the methods and concepts of behavior analysis, this
could ultimately provide us with an "empirical epistemology" (Skinner, 1963/1969, p.
228), including an "empirical logic" (Skinner, 1945/Skinner, 1972b, p. 380; Skinner,
1957, pp. 430–431). This new, empirically based approach, with methods better suited
for its subject matter, would enable significant advances in our understanding of the
behavior involved in the production of scientific knowledge, then overcoming the
traditional approaches offered by the philosophical disciplines of epistemology and
logic.
The possibility of taking scientific behavior as a scientific subject matter in its own
right has a long history, which can be traced at least to Hume (1777/Hume, 1996). The
resulting approach is frequently called, after Quine (1969), a naturalization of episte-
mology, in the sense that scientific methods would be applied to the understanding of
scientific knowledge itself. However, the very possibility of such recursivity and the
status of its possible outcomes are not without its critics.
In this article, my aim is to assess some of the arguments that were directed against
this approach by the American philosopher Thomas Nagel in his book The Last Word
(Nagel, 1997). The book is entirely devoted to a critique of attempts to naturalize
epistemology, which would try to undermine what the author regards as the authority of
reason as the basis of scientific knowledge. In what follows, I will address Nagel's
arguments regarding (1) the shortcomings of naturalistic explanations of scientific
knowledge and (2) the impossibility of circumventing a realistic, representational
epistemology. Although Nagel's arguments were not directly aimed towards behavior
analysis, they are potentially applicable to it as a version of naturalized epistemology,
and its consequences to radical behaviorism as a philosophy are worthy of proper
assessment. What emerges from such an analysis is a sharp opposition between Nagel’s
views on the nature and functions of the scientific enterprise and a radical behaviorist
one. I will argue that the naturalistic explanation of scientific knowledge proposed by
radical behaviorists is not only possible, but have important practical advantages,
insofar as it allows for the identification of the variables that control scientific behavior;
and that the function of descriptive verbal behavior in science is not to represent reality
but to coordinate our collective behavior in dealing with the environment.
In spite of the fact that I use The Last Word as the source for my analysis of Nagel’s
(1997) arguments, my aim goes beyond just reviewing the book. I try to present an in-
depth analysis of the author’s arguments regarding logic, mathematics, and science. It
must be noted that Nagel’s book also has a section on ethics, and although its content is
also of interest to behavior scientists a proper assessment of it would require a different
line of inquiry. Here I concentrate on the implications of Nagel’s arguments for radical
behaviorism as a philosophy of science.
As in most nonbehavior analytic literature (most notably when it comes from a
rationalist tradition such as Nagel’s), the arguments of the book are couched in
mentalistic jargon, but this does not preclude its potential interest to behavior scientists.
Perspectives on Behavior Science

Moreover, I assume, with Burgos and Killeen (2019), that mentalism (or rationalism for
that matter) is not a single, monolithic and easily definable view, but “a family of
positions” (p. 244)—and thus I try to identify the arguments I am examining as
precisely as possible.

Nagel's Objections to the Naturalization of Scientific Knowledge

Can We Have a Naturalistic Explanation of Science?

Nagel’s arguments in The Last Word (Nagel, 1997) are a contemporary stance of a
rationalist tradition in the philosophy of science that dates back to Descartes and even
Plato. This is recognized by Nagel himself. He states that “the conception of the
authority of human reason that I want to defend is very like that of Descartes” (p.
18), and argues that “basically . . . Descartes’s cogito is correct” (p. 92).1
Nagel (1997) draws inspiration from the famous Cartesian insight that thinking
cannot get outside of itself: when we think about thinking we are thinking. That being
the case, for Nagel any attempt to understand thinking "from the outside" (e.g., in
biological, psychological, sociological or anthropological terms) will necessarily be
limited by the fact that this understanding itself must be carried out by rational means.
By "thinking" or "reason" Nagel means mathematics and basic logic, including "the
reasoning that goes into the generation and elimination of scientific hypotheses sug-
gested by the available evidence" (p. 23). Nagel dubs himself a rationalist and a realist,
and calls into question epistemological positions which he attributes to "subjectivists"
and "relativists," most notably what he sees as their attempts to undermine reason as the
final basis of epistemological judgment.
Nagel submits that an argument must be faced with another argument, following the
commonly accepted rules of reason (logic and mathematics) —not with the observation
that, after all, any argument is just an historical, behavioral, social, or contingent
phenomenon. That doesn't mean, for Nagel, that reason has any inherent infallibility,
for arguments can be refuted or displaced. But the limits of any rational discussion are
to be found within the arguments themselves, including the data that support them—not
in their explanation as natural and social phenomena:

Everything depends on the outcome of this peculiar contest over the last word.
The subjectivist wants to give it to the recognition that justifications come to an
end within our language and our practices. I want to give it to the justifications
themselves, including some that are involved or implicated in that recognition,
which is subordinate to them, just as the recognition that a notation is essential for
thinking about arithmetic is subordinate to arithmetic itself. (p. 34)

If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere
psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. ...
One cannot embed all one's reasoning in a psychological theory, including the

1
I will often quote Nagel directly in order to be as close as possible to the author's arguments. All references to
the author, with or without page indications, are from Nagel (1997) unless otherwise noted.
 Perspectives on Behavior Science

reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck
must stop somewhere. (p. 137; emphasis in original)

Thus, scientific statements are to be evaluated within the limits of reason, and any
attempt to evaluate them "from the outside" would necessarily employ reason again.
The attempt to explain or otherwise evaluate logic as just a behavioral, social practice
would amount to "explain the more fundamental in terms of the less fundamental" (p.
39). Reason, in this sense, is considered by Nagel to be a basic type of procedure from
which all other forms of knowledge depend, and these forms could not displace reason
from its foundational role. Thus, Nagel takes issue with any suggestion that the
"universal claims of reason" (p. 99) could be merely "relative," "subjective," "local,"
or "contingent." The universality of such claims would be beyond any possible doubt:
"Nothing would permit us to attribute to anyone a disbelief in modus ponens, or in the
proposition that 2 + 2 = 4" (p. 77). Deciding rationally if any statement is true would
amount to "thinking about the evidence and the arguments and being open to consid-
eration of whatever anyone brings up as relevant" (p. 89), and this would be an
inescapable and fundamental scientific procedure, not subject to any further analysis
that doesn't employ rationality itself.
Nagel suggests a hierarchy in which the rules of reason dominate any other
propositions and are dominated by none, especially not by those that can be made
regarding the rules of reason themselves as just historical, psychological or sociological
facts. Thus, “simple logical thoughts" are "exempt from skepticism," for "there is no
intellectual position we can occupy from which it is possible to scrutinize those
thoughts without presupposing them" (p. 64). Any skepticism about basic logic would
then be contradictory, because it would necessarily rely on logic itself. Again, it would
also follow from this dominance of the rules of reason "the impossibility of any sort of
relativistic, anthropological, or 'pragmatist' interpretation" which would try to get
outside of these rules, and thus "the last word, with respect to such beliefs, belongs
to the content of the thought itself rather than to anything that can be said about it" (p.
64).
Nagel concludes that what he calls "subjectivism" about human reason would be
self-defeating, because its proposals would amount to nothing more than an alternative
description of the world, including us and any relations we may have with it. Attempts
to naturalize epistemology "from the outside" with the aid of historical, biological,
psychological, or sociological data would not elevate us to a neutral meta-level of
analysis; they would be only more empirical and rational hypotheses in competition
with other descriptions trying to explain human knowledge. Confronted with alterna-
tive descriptions of the world, we would have no alternative other than to ask ourselves
which one is more probably true, and to that end we would have to employ reason
again.

Can we Avoid a "Representation of Reality" in Science?

From the previous arguments Nagel also draws the conclusion that a naturalistic
conception of knowledge cannot encompass and explain a rival realistic conception
from an "outside" point of view; rather, they are competing views of the world,
Perspectives on Behavior Science

including humans and their relations with other parts of it. These or any other
epistemological conceptions would aspire to be impersonal and universal: "Reflection
about anything leads us inexorably to certain thoughts in which "I" plays no part—
thoughts that are completely free of first-person content" (p. 67; emphasis in original).
These impersonal thoughts or statements would be our various attempts to construct
shared descriptions of reality, with the general aim of "make sense of the world in
which we find ourselves and of how it appears to us and others" (p. 81). The
comparison and choice among different descriptions of the world would presuppose
that there is a reality independent from our observations and from the language that
tries to describe it:

We begin from the idea that there is some way the world is, and this, I believe, is
an idea to which there is no intelligible alternative and which cannot be subor-
dinated to or derived from anything else. . . . What we cannot avoid is the idea
that something is the case, even if we don't know what it is. Doubts about the
reliability or objectivity of our perceptions and judgments have to be based on
revisions of our view of the world; they cannot escape it completely. (p. 81)

Thus, the idea of an objective reality would be inescapable. For example, for Nagel the
very possibility of regularities described by scientific laws suggest that order is a
characteristic of most natural phenomena, revealed to us in spite of our partial and
localized experiences. These regularities would be "manifestations of something else,
something which includes us but on which none of us has a privileged perspective" (p.
84). Nagel calls this something else a "mind-independent natural order," the existence
of which would be disputed by subjectivists, for whom any attempts at scientific
descriptions would be only "general features of our perspective or linguistic practice
or point of view" (p. 86). Nagel, however, objects that this is in itself an "alternative
world picture," which is "in direct competition with the objective judgments it is meant
to displace" (p. 86). The existence of these alternative world views would imply, for
example, a competition between

the hypothesis that objects attract one another with a force directly proportional to
the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the
distance between them, versus the hypothesis that it is a property of objects only
as they appear to us (or in our language-game) that they attract each other with a
force . . . and so on. (p. 86)

Nagel does not suppose as a necessary truth that all aspects of the world are orderly, but
he submits that "anything we can know about must be at least related in an orderly way
to us, and an amazing amount has proved to be within our reach; given our achieve-
ments so far, it is reasonable to try to continue" (p. 92). The hypothesis that the world is
orderly would be always open to refinement—but according to Nagel, "however we
divide up the contributions of the external world and of our own perspective, the result
is a conception of how the world is, ourselves included" (p. 97).
Nagel extends this line of argument to any explanations we may have about
knowledge, science, logic, and mathematics: they would be attempts to represent
how these processes actually work, even if always revisable. What Nagel calls the
 Perspectives on Behavior Science

subjectivist account of knowledge would then be just an alternative attempt at such

representation. However, Nagel considers this account as self-defeating, because it
would always bring us back to the idea of an objective reality (described by the
account) and to the need to rationally assess the account as more or less true,
considering the available data. Whatever our explanations about anything are, we
would be always confronted with the question, "What reason do we have to think the
world is really like that?" (p. 95).

A Radical Behaviorist Perspective on Nagel's Critiques

The Possibility and Relevance of a Naturalistic Account of Science

As we have seen, Nagel fiercely criticizes naturalistic attempts to understand scientific

knowledge, including behavioral and evolutionary approaches. In his book, however,
he seems to oscillate between the recognition that such approaches are feasible and the
sheer denial of its possibility. For example, although at one point he states that it is
"natural" to pursue such understanding (p. 72), subsequently he regards it as "impos-
sible" and observes that maybe there is "something wrong" with such an attempt (p.
76).
Naturalistic approaches of knowledge are of course possible in the simple sense
that they exist, in behavior analysis and beyond (e.g., Daniels, Cole, & Wertsch,
2007; Geber, 1977/Geber, 2006; Schlinger, 1995). Since Skinner (e.g., 1945/Skin-
ner, 1972b, Skinner, 1957, Skinner, 1974), our perspective on human knowledge is
an evolutionary one. Living organisms had to "know" the world since they became
a part of it if they were to survive and reproduce. An evolutionary history of
knowledge has to begin with this kind of nonverbal knowledge and track the
complex selective contingencies that lead to current scientific knowledge.2 As
Skinner (1957, 1945/1972b, 1974, 1953/2014) repeatedly pointed out, scientific
knowledge developed as a function of its practical consequences, not because
humans previously decided about the best rational means for the achievement of
truth. A complex set of phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and cultural variables have led us
to our present state of scientific knowledge, including all its various criteria for
precision, confirmation, justification, verification, theorizing, and truth. Behavior-
analytic approaches of logic and mathematics seize and improve upon Skinner's
pioneering analyses, showing that they are part of the evolution of our ability to
collectively deal with the world in increasingly complex and productive ways
(Fantino & Stolarz-Fantino, 2013; Marr, 2015; Moore, 2015; Palmer, 2013; Terrell
& Johnston, 1989). The evolution of such practices was greatly accelerated by the
fact that we turned ourselves to the investigation of what we do when we think. It
would be hard to imagine, for example, the systematization of Aristotelian logic and
the subsequent developments in this field emerging in any other way. Thinking
about thinking can improve it, with important practical consequences.

2
As Araiba (2019) suggests, concepts from evolutionary biology may help us understand the philosophical
diversification of behaviorism itself that has occurred over the last few decades.
Perspectives on Behavior Science

As Skinner (1957, Ch. 18) notes, the process of acquisition of a logic and scientific
verbal repertoire is long and complex, for the individual as well as for scientific
communities, and this emphasizes the social and behavioral nature of the process.
Although Skinner (1974) regards the behavior of those who deal with logic, mathe-
matics, and science as "the most difficult part of the field of human behavior and
possibly the most subtle and complex phenomenon ever submitted to a logical,
mathematical, or scientific analysis" (p. 234), he also states that there is simply no
reason to prevent any attempts to understand these types of behavior from a behavior-
analytic point of view. Skinner (1974) further observes that "traditional theories of
knowledge run into trouble because they assume that one must think before behaving,"
and that the rational reconstruction of scientific behavior by scientific methodologists
"seldom represents the behavior of the scientist at work" (p. 236). Such observations
are especially apt considering Nagel's analysis of science as a purely rational enterprise.
Nagel argues that any "external" explanation of knowledge has to stop somewhere,
because "that external view does not itself admit of a still more external view, and so on
ad infinitum" (p. 20). The possibility that a behavioral epistemology may lead to an
"infinite regress" (Zuriff, 1980), or an "infinite tail chasing" (Hayes, 1997, p. 43) is
frequently recognized by behavior scientists (see also Barnes & Roche, 1997; Gifford
& Hayes, 1999; Hayes, 1997; Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). The analysis of behavior is
also behavior, subject to further analysis, and so on. Where Nagel finds his stopping
point in reason, behavior scientists, following Skinner, tend to find it in the pragmatic
goals of understanding, prediction, and control of natural and social processes. An
evolutionary approach to knowledge would suggest that reason itself, whatever de-
fined, has evolved as part of human efforts to solve everyday problems. As aptly
summarized by Hackenberg (2013), Skinner's approach suggests that "scientific and
logical behavior is continuous with other aspects of experience," and thus "does not
take place in some logical-theoretical realm that transcends everyday life, but is instead
part of everyday human contexts, messy and variable as they may be" (p. 279).
Nagel's claim that there is no neutral epistemic standpoint from which to analyze
knowledge must be familiar to radical behaviorists, for it was repeatedly made by
Skinner (e.g., Skinner, 1957, 1945/Skinner, 1972b, Skinner, 1974) himself. Behavior-
ists, Skinner (1974) remarked, cannot "step out of the causal stream and observe
behavior from some special point of vantage, 'perched on the epicycle of Mercury'"
(p. 234). In fact, the whole metaphor of an "external" or "outside" view is probably not
adequate to deal with the issue. As Skinner's account suggests, humans simply evolved
to the point at which they can analyze their own actions, and the implied circularity is
no reason to prevent us from furthering our scientific self-knowledge:

The philosopher will call this circular. He will argue that we must adopt the rules
of logic in order to make and interpret the experiments required in an empirical
science of verbal behavior. But talking about talking is no more circular than
thinking about thinking or knowing about knowing. Whether or not we are lifting
ourselves by our own bootstraps, the simple fact is that we can make progress in a
scientific analysis of verbal behavior. Eventually we shall be able to include, and
perhaps to understand, our own verbal behavior as scientists. If it turns out that
our final view of verbal behavior invalidates our scientific structure from the
point of view of logic and truth-value, then so much the worse for logic, which
 Perspectives on Behavior Science

will also have been embraced by our analysis. (Skinner, 1945/Skinner, 1972b, p.
379)

Thus we have that any epistemology is circular in this sense, as the very etymology of
the word suggests: we aim to know what knowing is. The relevant point, as suggested
by Skinner, is to "make progress": can we improve our understanding, prediction, and
control of scientific behavior by means of our analyses?
However, in spite of the fact that we can analyze science and logic as behavioral
processes, one can barely claim that we have reached the point of "invalidating" logic
and truth-value, as Skinner rather boldly suggested could happen—and here Nagel has
a point. Once we agree on a set of shared standards for the evaluation of scientific data
(including logic and mathematics) the evaluation must proceed within these standards,
and any attempt to "get outside" of them an evaluate them as "just" behavior would be
pointless, albeit possible. We attribute generality to logic and mathematics in the sense
that we expect to have the assent of other people whenever we present sound arguments
or calculations supported by relevant data, and this is especially so in science—
including, of course, behavior analysis. Although conceding that any language is a
system of social conventions, with rules of correctness established by linguistic com-
munities, Nagel draws a distinction between the content of thought and the meaning of
words:

The fact that contingencies of use make "and" the English word for conjunction
implies absolutely nothing about the status of the truth that p and q implies p.
What is meant by a set of sentences is a matter of convention. What follows from
a set of premises is not. (p. 40)

Here Nagel is only reasserting that the validity of a logical argument is a matter of logic,
and there is no reason to quarrel with this. But again, this doesn't prevent a behavioral
analysis of arguments and of logic in general, even if its goals would be different: in the
first case, we want to know if a logical argument is valid (or a calculation correct, in the
case of mathematics); in the second, we want to understand what behavioral processes
lead a person or a verbal community to consider an argument valid or invalid (or a
calculation correct or incorrect), and more broadly to emit logical and mathematical
verbal responses at all. Nagel is justified in arguing that it would be irrational to
abandon mathematics and logic "on historical or anthropological grounds alone" (p.
105), and behavior scientists have no reason to disagree. But the suggestion that we
have to abandon an "external" view in order to preserve an "internal" one seems to have
no grounding. The usefulness of logic and mathematics remains untouched by a
behavioral analysis.
As another example of his point, Nagel states that there is a difference between a
question like "How can human beings add?" and the question "How can electronic
calculators add?," because "in ascribing that capacity to a person, I interpret what he
does in terms of my own capacity," of which I cannot get outside, or about which I
cannot have a neutral perspective. In face of that, how would one expect to "get
outside" addition and explain it in anyone else? "To follow a rule is not to obey a
natural law," concludes Nagel (p. 76). Attempts to explain addition in naturalistic terms
would then be "impossible," or a "fallacy" (p. 42). But again, an analysis of
Perspectives on Behavior Science

mathematical behavior is no more circular than an analysis of, for example, philosoph-
ical behavior. Behavior analysis empirically demonstrates that the following of rules
can be understood as a natural process. Why should one then refrain from applying this
knowledge to understand how children can learn to add? Nothing seems to be taken
from the validity and usefulness of addition by this procedure, and the fact that those
who study addition must also know how to add doesn't seem to seriously preclude the
analysis, for in general those who analyze verbal behavior must also behave verbally.
Part of the problem with Nagel's denial of an evolutionary account of reason seems
to be that he regards language as a "vehicle" for reason, or as "displaying" principles of
reason. In the author's words, "grammar obeys logic," and not the opposite (pp. 38–39).
Moreover, to "have" a concept means more than to abide with the use of the concept by
linguistic communities. For Nagel, the meaning of arithmetical concepts like "plus" and
"two" is not based only in its use by communities, and although we may infer the
possession of the concept from linguistic practice, it does not consist in this practice (p.
41). One is left to wonder, however, how to find the meaning of these concepts beyond
their use in certain contexts, and how are we supposed to explain logic apart from
verbal behavior. Nagel argues that "no 'language' in which modus ponens was not a
valid inference or identity was not transitive could be used to express thoughts at all"
(p. 39), but again, the problem is to suppose that language "expresses thoughts" that
came before it. As suggested by Terrell and Johnston (1989), a rule of inference like
modus ponens can only be understood as a product of behavioral contingencies. The
rule is not a vehicle for a principle of reasoning, but a convenient way to control useful
behavior with respect to the physical and social environment. Cruder forms of verbal
behavior certainly came before logic as a set of rules, and this renders an evolutionary
account of logic all the more necessary for its understanding. The fact that any
newcomer to a scientific community will have to learn concepts and autoclitic rules
with functions already established by the community doesn't imply that the evolution of
the concepts and rules themselves must be left untouched by a scientific analysis. One
wonders what would happen to etymology, a science to which Skinner frequently
appealed in order to examine the historical function of words, if such an evolutionary
approach was to be halted.
Palmer (2013) shows how the autoclitic frames provided by mathematical and
logical rules "filter out" the variability of natural processes, generating "essentialistic
models" that in turn control the scientific behavior of listeners in many useful ways.
Truth and validity may thus be applied to these rules and to scientific model building in
general, but we are dealing again with the selection of behavior by its consequences,
not with essential principles of reason. In Nagel's terms, the difference between these
approaches must be treated as one between alternative world views, but the implication
that one of them better represents reality may itself be questioned by a selectionist
approach. Even so-called "representations of reality" have useful functions under this
form of explanation.
Nagel submits that mathematics and logic, given their universality, cannot be
analyzed just as "language," but even if we allow for such universality this does not
imply that a behavioral understanding isn't feasible. In fact, one would barely expect the
development of mathematical and logical behavior in individuals not exposed to social
contingencies arranged by verbal communities. Moreover, as Skinner (1988/Skinner,
1989) suggested, the universality of certain features of verbal behavior may be just a
 Perspectives on Behavior Science

product of common environmental features. But even if we are uncertain about the
relative participation of variables at different levels of selection in the explanation of
mathematics and logic, the possibility of a behavioral treatment obviously remains
open.
At some points in his book Nagel suggests a "conflict" (p. 87) or a "clash" (p. 139)
between rationality and an evolutionary account of its development, but one wonders
why this must be so. The author objects to the possibility of a behavioral explanation of
rational procedures by stating that maybe "some things can't be explained because they
have to enter into every explanation" (p. 76). Reason must then be "self-justifying" and
"independently valid" (p. 136), in the sense that it must be considered a precondition of
the acceptance of an evolutionary account, whereas the account itself cannot be used to
justify or validate reason. But how is one to decide what is to be taken as a precondition
of what? The fact that one could barely avoid scientific verbal practices when doing
science should not prevent the functional investigation of its evolution. Nor should one
refrain from proposing possible improvements in logical and mathematical verbal
behavior just because one has to use them when doing so (after all, there would be
no other way to do it). Logical and mathematical methods are useful rules that humans
have developed to deal with the world in increasingly complex ways, and we have
every reason to employ them to understand their own evolution.
Moreover, we need an evolutionary approach if we are to have any hope of
understanding why humans—including scientists—do not always behave “rationally.”
This is made clear, for example, by empirical research in the field of behavioral
economics. The traditional “homo economicus” model, according to which humans
are consistently expected to behave rationally to maximize their gains, in full awareness
of the costs and benefits of their decisions, is now long outdated (Francisco, Madden, &
Borrero, 2009; Furrebøe & Sandaker, 2017; Hursh & Roma, 2013; Reed, Niileksela, &
Kaplan, 2013; Todorov, 2010). Most of our choices seem to be “irrational,” and we
have to turn to selective contingencies to understand why. As Furrebøe and Sandaker
(2017) suggest, we would be better off in dispensing altogether with the normative
rational/irrational dichotomy, because it “carries the risk of substituting one mentalistic
explanation for another” (p. 315) and may thus divert us from the analysis of behavioral
contingencies.

Empirical Epistemology and the "Representation of Reality" in Science

As we have seen, one of Nagel's main arguments is that we cannot escape the notion
that the aim of scientific language is to describe, in an impersonal and accurate way, an
objective reality that is independent of our descriptions. The available data would then
lead us to deem more likely that "to a considerable extent, the order that we find in our
experience is the product of an order that is there independent of our minds" rather than
"a framework we impose on experience" (p. 95). Science would then try to describe
these orderly processes in the real world, although never in a final and absolute way. A
competing subjectivist and relativist epistemological account, in trying to naturalize
scientific knowledge, would amount to an alternative world view in direct competition
with a rationalist and realist one. Such an account would, however, be self-defeating,
because it could not avoid the idea of an objective reality.
Perspectives on Behavior Science

Would all this apply to the "empirical epistemology" proposed by radical behavior-
ists? Selection by consequences constitutes a general framework from which behavior
scientists talk about all behavior. It is an empirically based framework, and one that
allow us to understand, predict, and control behavior with considerable success. As all
scientists, behavior scientists will frequently talk and write in descriptive ways, which
may be regarded as "representations" from a traditional point of view. Precise defini-
tions (in the form of tacts and intraverbals) are an important part of empirical science
exactly because they allow scientists to agree about the "truth" of their statements. As
long as we have precise and shared definitions about our subject matters, we may agree
about the number of planets in our galaxy, the types of organelles in a cell or the
reinforcing effect of a consequence over a response class.
However, a behavioral analysis of the development of this kind of scientific verbal
behavior (e.g., Normand, 2019; Skinner, 1957, Ch. 18) suggests that the only way to
understand its emergence is through its practical, reinforcing consequences. A "precise"
or "true" description of nature is not an end in itself; it is an important but intermediate
step in order to coordinate our collective behavior in dealing with different aspects of
the world. For most sciences the final test of empirical adequacy lies in their capacity to
demonstrate experimental control over the processes they study—and, in some cases, to
generate reliable technology derived from this control. As they get more sophisticated,
however, sciences will frequently engage in the production of "true" statements before
(or even without) achieving experimental and technological control. Scientists may
then talk as "realists" because they have to coordinate their behavior towards the world
in some way. This is a predictable consequence of the development of scientifically
precise definitions. Logic and mathematics emerge as valuable tools in dealing with the
world, but they are themselves only formalized descriptions of some of our relations
with the world, not self-justifiable rational powers.
This is a rough synthesis of an epistemological "world view" supported by radical
behaviorism and behavior analysis. In Nagel's terms, it can be treated as one of many
possible descriptions of our epistemological interactions with the world, and is in fact in
direct competition with other views, as it most certainly is with Nagel's. But if our
epistemological approach doesn't have the benefit of a special "outside" view—if it's
not "perched on the epicycle of Mercury"—why would it be preferable? Skinner (e.g.,
Skinner, 1957, 1945/Skinner, 1972b, Skinner, 1974) had repeatedly suggested that the
answer lies in its practical consequences. This is, of course, the promise of an empirical
epistemology: the functional analysis of the behavior of scientists would allow us to
improve it, as it has allowed to improve behavior in many other settings. This
improvement could well include our practices regarding ordinary uses of precision,
objectivity, and truth. Against the charge of circularity posed by Nagel one can only
say, with Skinner (1945/Skinner, 1972b), that progress is possible in such an analysis,
and the very achievement of practical results would interrupt the infinite regress. The
realist, on the other hand, has to face an old and ever-present caveat: he has no way to
compare reality with what it states about it in order to judge the relative truth of his
statements. He can only seek for agreement with its peers about the ordinary meanings
of precision, confirmation, justification, verification, theorizing, truth, and so on, and in
this he is side by side with any other scientist.
A radical behaviorist epistemological approach fully recognizes the historical, social,
and cultural nature of human knowledge. To know is to behave, producing
 Perspectives on Behavior Science

consequences in certain contexts—it is not to represent reality. However, in spite of

holding a nonrepresentational epistemological position based on a behavioral account
of knowledge, radical behaviorists feel free to go on talking "about the world" (or
"reality," "natural phenomena," etc.) —as every person does, scientist or not. For
example, we may assert many facts as truth: the world is not flat, the human species
evolved from other species, some "news" are fake, and a host of other things, from
trivial to complex, that we talk or write about with ordinary referential language. By the
same token, we assert that some things are false, or we classify statements with
different degrees of truth or certainty. It may seem, then, that even if we refuse to talk
about "reality," we talk about it nonetheless (Barnes & Roche, 1997; Leigland, 2015).
The apparent contradiction is a product of the very process of dealing with the world
through verbal behavior. Behavior scientists deal with behavioral processes with the
general language of truth and facts simply because this is part of the verbal practices
that were selected with respect to empirical evidence. But in doing so we are not talking
about the world, or representing it; we are talking under the control of the world
(including other people), and producing effects on it. This is a better picture of the
scientific enterprise not because it's closer to truth, but because it permits us to identify
and manipulate the variables that control the behavior of scientists, and to get rid of the
impossible task of deciding when our descriptions better represent what the world
really is. In the context of scientific verbal behavior a tact or intraverbal can be said to
be more or less true, precise, accurate, or objective (Skinner, 1957, Ch. 5), but the
criteria for these classifications are bound to their consequences in specific physical and
social contexts.
But what about the regularities we observe and describe in natural phenomena?
What about the fact that the results of our experimental procedures do not seem to
depend on our verbal practices? Does this not suggest that, after all, our scientific verbal
behavior must be in some way constrained by reality in order to be useful in dealing
with it (as suggested by Marr, 2003; see also Laudan, 1990)? Science is a social
enterprise, but the enterprise itself arose from our need to survive in a world that was
here before humans came to be. The contingencies that shape scientific verbal behavior
must include not only our social environment, but also the nonsocial, physical one.
Presumably our descriptions of the world owe something to the world itself, not only to
our social learning history. One may suppose that our descriptions of the world would
be very different should the world itself be different than what it is.
Once again, however, our descriptions must be functionally explained. All verbal
behavior, scientific or not, is part of contingencies that include physical and social
relations—but the marks and signs that are the product of our verbal behavior can ever
only affect the behavior of other people (or of ourselves as listeners), never the physical
environment (Skinner, 1957; Guerin, 1997). This is the common function of all
instances of verbal behavior, including our "descriptions of the world." To "describe,"
"specify," "refer," or "represent" are simply ways to produce consequences in certain
contexts. As part of our ordinary language, these verbs are nonbehavior analytic ways
to describe some functions of verbal behavior; a tact, as a verbal operant, never
specifies, refers, or denotes—it only affects the behavior of other people in certain
contexts. The nonsocial world is part of the contingencies that select different ways of
talking or writing, but these contingencies are only put to effect by a verbal community.
A solitary human on Earth (assuming he could survive) would have no need to behave
Perspectives on Behavior Science

verbally in order to change his environment. The emission of "representational" or

"referential" words (tacts) is useful in many social contexts in which they are the
standard way to produce certain consequences, but a radical behaviorist epistemology
cannot employ "reference" as its basis for the explanation of knowledge, for it doesn't
properly describe the relevant variables in action when someone "refers" someone to
something.
In Nagel's terms this would be just another way of describing what happens when
we "know" in competition with other possible descriptions. But it precludes an ultimate
judgment of truth in terms of reference or representation. The explanation of knowledge
in these terms is not false; it is simply not the best way to describe scientific verbal
behavior if we are to identify its controlling variables. However, referential language is
useful and may be more economical in much of ordinary scientific practice. The key to
understand the apparent conflict between our epistemology and our ordinary use of
referential language lies, therefore, in their usefulness in different contexts. Social
agreement over our "descriptions of reality" is a necessary intermediate process so that
we can coordinate our collective behavior in dealing with nature. Things and processes
in the nonphysical world certainly take part in the control of scientific talk—but again,
they remain unaffected by our words. The only function of verbal behavior is to alter
the behavior of others. It allows us to coordinate our behavior in dealing with nature in
many complex ways, thus achieving the impressive results displayed by science and
technology.
If verbal behavior never describes, specifies, refers, or represents, what can radical
behaviorists say about Nagel's argument that there is no escape from the idea of an
objective reality, or "the idea that there is some way the world is" (p. 81)? Science is a
verbal enterprise, and as soon as we begin to behave verbally, philosophical problems
of this sort arise. But no matter how basic, universal, or "ontological" we deem our
categories, their only general function is to affect the behavior of listeners in certain
contexts (Skinner, 1957; Guerin, 1997). None of these categories can better represent
what reality is. They can, however, affect listeners in many different ways, and that's
their only relevance.
The fact that a word like "ontology" itself can be used with different meanings in
philosophical discussions may be relevant. As Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Wilson
(2012) point out, one may use the word either to refer "merely to explicit specification
of conceptualizations" or to "the more traditional philosophical definition of what
categories exist or can be said to exist in the world and the correspondence between
analyses and these categories" (p. 4). Ontology in the first sense is, of course, necessary
to any science. The second sense, however, is problematic in radical behaviorism: we
can only create "categories" by interacting with the world and talking about it, but then
our "ontology" (our conceptual divisions of the world) will be only a practical way of
coordinating our collective behavior with respect to it. If one further assumes that
ontological truth "by definition, is immutable, absolute, and final" (Barnes & Roche,
1997, p. 547), it's even harder to see how a behavior scientist could have any interest in
discussing it.
As scientists we can barely avoid "talking about reality," however defined, and
looking for some form of truth, precision, confirmation, justification, verification, and
so on while investigating it. This should not contradict a behavior-analytic empirical
epistemology, for in this approach any scientific verbal practice is analyzed in a
 Perspectives on Behavior Science

functional way. As we suggested earlier, the mere use of representational language does
not imply a subscription to realism. On the other hand, the recognition that verbal
behavior does not represent reality does not imply that a behavior scientist cannot emit
tacts or intraverbals that suggest the "representation" of ordinary language.3 Behavior
scientists must feel free to talk "about reality" in any way that favors the achievement of
their goals, without the burden of looking for the extent in which their words "corre-
spond" to, for example, a Kantian noumenon. If the aim of science is to produce
reinforcing consequences, Skinner (1974) is right in pointing out that the verbal
behavior of the scientist is not closer to "what is really there" than any other behavior
(p. 127). Thus, behavior scientists have no need to pursue scientific truth as verbal
correspondence to an independent reality.
Finally, it must be noted that a naturalistic approach to scientific knowledge may
also be criticized from the point of view of social constructionism: because science is a
social process, there would be no way to distinguish scientific claims from any other
kind of verbal practice, especially regarding its objectivity (e.g., Gergen, 1985, 1989;
Howard, 1991).4 As Zuriff (1998) notes, however, it doesn’t follow from the rejection
of a rationalist, representational epistemological approach that we must also reject any
notion of objectivity in scientific practice. Scientific goals are of course human goals,
and scientists may pursue them “while recognizing the role of human activity in the
construction of descriptions of reality and criteria of objectivity” (p. 24). The fact that
these criteria are socially constructed doesn’t make them arbitrary, as long as the goals
they serve are clearly stated. It follows that these goals must be clearly stated, for only
then we’ll be able to judge the adequacy of our objectivity criteria—and, more broadly,
of all “precurrent activities (methods of observation, measurement, experimentation)”
that are gradually selected in scientific practice (Zuriff, 1998, p. 19; see also Hayes,
1993). As we already suggested, these goals may be generally described as the
understanding, prediction, and control of natural and social processes.

Conclusion

I have addressed Nagel's arguments regarding (1) the shortcomings of naturalistic

explanations of scientific knowledge and (2) the impossibility of circumventing a
realistic, representational epistemology.
Regarding (1), I argue that a naturalistic explanation of scientific knowledge is not
only possible, but have important practical advantages, insofar as it allows the identi-
fication of the variables that control scientific behavior. The process of acquisition of a
logic and scientific verbal repertoire is long and complex, and if we are to have any
hope of improving it we must investigate it as a behavioral process. Nagel is right in
arguing that there is no neutral or external viewpoint from which we can understand
scientific knowledge, but this does not preclude progress in the understanding, predic-
tion, and control of this process. There is no more circularity in this than in the behavior
3
See Schoneberger (2016) for a Rortian version of what seems to me a similar argument. However, a full
appraisal of Schoneberger's proposals about the problems of reality and truth is beyond the scope of this
article.
4
Although Nagel doesn’t approach social constructionism directly, he clearly takes issue with “the idea that
everything is ‘constructed’” (p. 4).
Perspectives on Behavior Science

of analyzing behavior in any field. Logic and mathematics, as well as shared standards
for the evaluation of scientific data (e.g., precision, confirmation, justification, verifi-
cation, truth), are useful scientific tools. The fact that they may be analyzed as behavior
does not preclude its ordinary use by behavior scientists. Verbal behavior is not a
"vehicle" for reason, as Nagel suggests; it is reason in action. Instead of avoiding an
evolutionary account of rationality, we have every reason to further pursue it.
Regarding (2), I argue that behavior scientists will frequently talk and write in
descriptive ways, that may be regarded as "representations" from a traditional stand-
point. However, a behavioral analysis of the development of this kind of scientific
verbal behavior suggests that the only way to understand its emergence is through its
practical consequences. A "precise" or "true" description of nature is not an end in
itself; it is an important but intermediate step in order to coordinate our collective
behavior in dealing with different aspects of the world. Scientists may then behave as
"realists" because they have to coordinate their behavior towards the world in some
way. However, verbal behavior never refers or represents in the traditional sense; it only
affects the behavior of other people. The nonsocial world is part of the contingencies
that select different ways of talking or writing, but these contingencies are only put to
effect by a verbal community. The key to understand the apparent conflict between our
epistemology and our ordinary use of referential language lies in their usefulness in
different contexts. Behavior scientists must feel free to talk "about the world" in any
way that favors the achievement of their goals, without the burden of looking for a
fundamental "correspondence" between their words and other events.
At the end of his book Nagel states that mind or rationality may be "a fundamental
feature of the universe" (p. 132) and advocates for "a more mind-friendly cosmology"
(p. 133). In the terms favored by Nagel this suggests that we end up with two different
pictures or views of the world, ourselves included: a mentalistic one, which supposes
that humans have a mind or reason capable of reflecting reality, and a radical behav-
iorist one, which supposes that an evolutionary history of interaction with the environ-
ment lead humans to deal with it in a number of increasingly complex ways. Only the
first picture actually aims to reflect reality. The second aims to increase our effective-
ness in dealing with it. So, the metaphor of an epistemological "picture" or "view" may
itself be misleading. Description of parts of the world and their relationships is an
integral part of science, but it's not an end in itself. The ways we describe the world can
only affect other listeners, allowing us to coordinate our interactions with it. Even if we
insist in sorting out which among our "pictures" or "views" better reflect reality, in the
end we'll still have to do this by comparing which ones better produce the goals we
collectively pursue.

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of Interest I declare that I have no conflict of interest.

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