TORTS AND DAMAGES

10 Sep 2020

General Consideration

a. TORTS

Etymology

The word "tort" came to be adopted in our jurisprudence upon the implantation of American
sovereignty in the Philippines. But there are important differences between the common law on
torts obtaining in the United States and the law on torts in the Philippines. This is due to the fact
that the provisions of our codes governing legal wrongs which we call "torts" are sometimes
different from the common law on torts (see Nicolas, The Philippine Law on Torts and
Damages, p. 13).

History

The Philippines is a civil law country. Our private laws are found in codes mainly based on the
Spanish codes which were continued in force with certain modifications after the advent of the
American regime and in laws passed by our legislature from time to time. These latter laws were
based on, or greatly influenced by, American ideas and principles which are the product of the
common law. In the interpretation and application of our codes and legislation, our courts have
freely drawn upon American precedents and authorities. The result of all this is that many
common law principles have been engrafted in our legal system. Perhaps, in no branch of law in
the Philippines is the blending of the common law and the civil law systems better exemplified
that in the field of torts (Ibid., citing Jarencio, Philippine Legal History).

Definition

· A tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which the court will
provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages.

· TORTS in common law cover all wrongful acts, although sometimes viewed
to be limited only to a wrong independent of a contract.

· The term “Tort” is of Anglo-American law-common law which is broader in

scope than the Spanish-Phil concept which is limited to negligence while the
former includes international or criminal acts. Torts in Philippine law is the
blending of common-law and civil law system.

Under Philippine Law

 In the Philippines, our concept of torts leans towards its civil law equivalent of
culpa aquiliana.Thus, in Article 2176 of our Civil Code, the following definition appears:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict."

In the general plan of the Philippine legal system, intentional and malicious acts
that are constitutive also of torts in common law are governed by the Penal Code,
although certain exceptions are made (See Report of the Code Commission, pp. 161-162).
What are generally considered tortious acts in the Philippines are limited to acts committed by
negligence and without intent. "

In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the

Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with
certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

Elements

The elements of a valid tort are as follows:

1. There must be an act or omission

2. Damage or injury is caused to another

3. Fault or negligence is present

4. There is no pre-existing contractual relations between the parties

5. Causal connection between damage done and act/omission

Purpose of the Tort Law

The major purposes of tort law include the following: (1) to provide a peaceful means for
adjusting the rights of parties who might otherwise take the law into their own hands; (2) deter
wrongful conduct; (3) to encourage socially responsible behaviour; and (4) to restore injured
parties to their original condition, insofar as the law can do this, by compensating them for their
injury.

To compensate the victim for harm actually done, damages are usually
measured by the extent of the injury. Expressed in money terms, these include replacement of
property destroyed, compensation for lost wages, reimbursement for medical expenses, and
dollars that are supposed to approximate the pain that is suffered.

QUASI-DELICT (Art. 2176, NCC)

Historical Background
Quasi-delict was used by the Code Commission to designate negligence as a separate source
of obligation because it “more nearly corresponds to the Roman Law classification of obligations
and is in harmony with the nature of this kind of liability.” (Report of the Code Commission, p.
161; see also Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compania Transatlantica, 38 Phil. 875). It was called
culpa-aquiliana in Spanish law because it can be traced from the Roman law source of
obligation called Lex Aquilia.

Nature

Definition

Quasi Delict or tort refers to acts or omission causes damage to another, there is being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done. If there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, such fault or negligence is called quasi-delict – governed by Civil
Code.

Scope

Elements

1. Damages suffered by the plaintiff

2. Fault or negligence of the defendant

3. Casual connection between the fault or negligence of the defendant’s act

and the damages incurred by the plaintiff (Andamo vs IAC, 191 SCRA
426, ’96)

4. No pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. However, the

supreme court held that even if there is contractual relation, nevertheless
the act that break the contract may be also be tort, in cases of Air France
vs Carrascaso, 18 SCRA 155; Singson vs BPI, 23 SCRA 1117, ’63; and
Fabre Jr vs CA, 259 SCRA 426, ’96)

The requisites of quasi-delict are the following:

(a) there must be an act or omission;

(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;

(c) such act or omission is caused by fault or negligence; and

 (d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

Tort, Quasi Delict, and Delict – Distinctions

Culpa Aquiliana v. Culpa Contractual

Culpa Aquiliana

1. Only private concern.

2. Repairs the damage by indemnification.

3. Covers all acts that are faulty or negligent.

4. Preponderance of evidence.

5. No reservation – it’s independent from crime. (Andamo vs IAC, 191 SCRA 203)

6. Employer’s liability is solidary (Fabre Jr. vs CA, 259 SCRA 426, ‘ 96)

Culpa Contractual

1. Pre-existing obligation between the parties

2. Fault or negligence is incidental to the performance of the obligation

3. Defense of having exercised diligence of a good father of a family is not available, just
like in criminal action. Applied doctrine of Respondent Superior, or Master and Servant
Rule.

Cases

Rakes v. The Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company, 7 Phil. 359 (1907)

Facts: Plaintiff was one of a gang of eight laborers employed by the defendant to transport rails
from a barge in the harbor to the company’s yard near the Malecon in Manila. The rails were
being transported on two-hand cars immediately following one another. The rails lay upon two
cross pieces or sills secured to the cars but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from
slipping off. At a certain spot at or near the water’s edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car
either canted or upset the rails lid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg which was
afterwards amputated at about the knee. The sagging of the track and the breaking of the tie,
which was the immediate occasion of the accident, was due to the dislodging of the crosspiece
or piling under the stringer by the water of the bay raised by a recent typhoon. It appeared that a
day before the accident the attention of the defendant’s foreman was called by one of the
laborers to the defect in the track but the same was not repaired. Action was instituted by
plaintiff to recover damages from his employer the defendant.

Issue: One of the questions was whether under the facts the defendant was negligent or not.

Ruling: “… On the principles it was the duty of the defendant to build and to maintain its track in
reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its workingmen from unnecessary danger. It is
plain that in one respect or the other it failed in its duty, otherwise the accident could not have
occurred; consequently the negligence of the defendant is established.”

Defendant was held liable.

Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 29 Phil 542

Facts: Cuddy leased a cinematograph film “Zigomar” to Gilchrist who owned a theatre in Iloilo
for one week beginning May 26, 1913 at an agreed rental of P125. Defendants Espejo and
Zaldariaga induced their co-defendant Cuddy to break his contract of lease with plaintiff Gilchrist
by offering Cuddy a rental of P350.

Issue: One of the questions raised in the case was whether such acts of Espejo and Zaldariaga
were actionable and if so under what legal principle.

Ruling: “The liability of the appellants (Espejo and Zaldariaga) arises from unlawful acts and not
from contractual obligations, as they were under no such obligation to induce Cuddy to violate
his contract with Gilchrist.

So that if the action of Gilchrist had been one for damages, it would be governed by Chapter 2,
title 16, book 4 of the (Spanish) Civil Code. Article 1902 of that code provides that a person
who, by act or omission, causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a
condition precedent to the liability of a tortfeasor that he must know the identity of a person to
whom he causes damage. In fact, the chapter wherein this article is found clearly shows that no
such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered.”

Wright v. Manila Electric R.R. & Light Co., G.R. No. 7760, October 1, 1914

Facts: Defendant was operating an electric street railway in the City of Manila and its suburbs,
including the municipality of Caloocan. Plaintiff’s residence in Caloocan fronted the street along
which defendant’s tracks ran, so that to enter his premises from the street plaintiff was obliged
to cross defendant’s tracks. On the night of August 8, 1909 plaintiff drove home in a calesa and
in crossing the tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell,
causing the vehicle to strike one of the rails with great force. The fall of the horse and the
collision of the vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw plaintiff from the vehicle
and caused the injuries complained of. It was found that at the point where plaintiff crossed the
tracks on the night in question not only the rails were above-ground, but that the ties upon which
the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground, thus making
the tops of the rails rise some 5 to 6 inches or more above the level of the street.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant may be held liable for said act.

Ruling: “A street car company which maintains its tracks in the public highway, at a point where
they are crossed by travelers, in such condition that the rails and a considerable portion of the
ties are above the level of the street, is negligent and is responsible to a person who, having to
pass over said tracks at right angles with a vehicle in the nighttime, is injured by reason of the
condition of the tracks, he using ordinary care and prudence in making the crossing”.

Defendant was held liable.

Samson v. Dionisio, G.R. No. L-15326. October 25, 1960

Facts: The defendants constructed a dam closing the southern end of the Magos Creek which
empties into the Bocaue River. In consequence, the water rose during the rainy season for lack
of an outlet, and the neighboring lands, including the plaintiff’s fishpond, became flooded.

About two thousand fishes valued at P100 escaped and plaintiff filed an action for damages
against the defendants.

Ruling: “Hence, upon the theory already proven, that the creek in question was of public
ownership, and not the property of the defendants, it is clear that the latter had no right
whatever to construct the aid dam, closing its entrance into and communication with the Bocaue
River; and, inasmuch as they did it without any authority to the loss and prejudice of the plaintiff,
they are under obligation to indemnify the latter for the reasons alleged by him in his complaint,
in accordance with the provisions of Article 1902 of the Civil Code.”

Defendants were, therefore, condemned to pay the plaintiff P100.

Bernal v. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil. 327 (1930)

Facts: Plaintiff Enverso and her five-year old daughter were passing along a public street one
night. The little girl was allowed to go a short distance in advance of her mother. When in front
of the electric and ice plant of the defendant House, an automobile suddenly appeared from the
opposite direction. This frightened the little girl and she turned to run and fell into a street gutter
or ditch where hot water coming from the defendant’s electric and ice plant was allowed to flow.
The child died later as a result of the burns which she sustained from the hot water. This action
was instituted to recover damages for her death.

Ruling: “…The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban,
Leyte on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in
allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the
coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch
filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic
Gulf & Pacific Co., 7 Phil 359, still rules. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced.
The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to
recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in the reduction of the damages.”

Defendant House was held guilty of fault and negligence when he caused hot water from his ice
plant to flow to the public street which endangered the lives of passers-by who may fall into the
gutter.

Barredo v. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 (1942)

FACTS: May 3, 1936 on the road between malabon and Navotas, province of Rizal, there was a
head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers,
16 years old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal
action was filed against Fontanilla and he was convicted.

Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila Against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of
the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla.

Fausto Barredo is shown to be careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught for
several times for violation of the automobile law and speeding. The defense is that the liability is
only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person
criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not they can file for a separate civil action against Fausto Barredo making
him primarily and directly responsible.

RULING: Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus
making him primarily and directly, responsible under Article 1903 of the Civil Code as an
employer of Pedro Fontanilla. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangled that
has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes
under the Penal Code and Fault or negligence under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or “culpa aquiliana” is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individually that is entirely
apart and independent from delict or crime.

Calalas v. Court of Appeals, GR 122039, 31 May 2000

FACTS:

At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga,
then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled
to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a
wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger
off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger.
Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco
Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of
the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a
common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco
Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. RTC – Dumaguete – rendered judgment against Salva holding that the driver of the Isuzu
truck was responsible

It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and
Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena
jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.

2. CA – reversed the RTC, awarding damages instead to Sunga as plaintiff in an action for
breach of contract of carriage since the cause of action was based on such and not quasi delict.

Hence, current petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether (per ruling in Civil Case) negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the
accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an
insurer of the safety of its passengers

In relation thereto, does the principle of res judicata apply?

RULING:

No. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for
quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this
case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.

In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This
provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.\

Hence, Vicente Calalas (operator) is liable since he did not exercise utmost diligence.
1. Jeepney was not properly parked;

2. Overloading of passengers.

Virata v. Ochoa, G.R. No. L-46179 January 31, 1978

Facts: Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been bumped while walking along Taft Ave.,
Pasay City by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla and registered in the name of
Victorio Ochoa. Borilla was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence. At the
hearing of the criminal case the private prosecutor made a reservation to file a separate civil
action for damages against the driver. Later the private prosecutor withdrew the reservation and
actively took part in the prosecution of the criminal case. Still later the heirs of Virata reserved
their right to institute a separate civil action. On July 19, 1976 the heirs of Virata commenced a
civil action in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for damages based on quasi-delict against the
driver Borilla and the owner of the jeepney Ochoa. On Sept. 8, 1976 the Court of First Instance
of Rizal at Pasay City rendered a decision acquitting Borilla on the ground that he caused the
injury by mere accident. On Jan. 31, 1977 the Court of First Instance of Cavite, dismissed the
civil action for damages upon motion of the defendants.

Ruling: “it is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an
action under the Revised Penal Code or for quasidelict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to
recover twice for the same negligent act.

Lim v. Ping, G.R. No. 175256, August 23, 2012

Cerezo v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 141538, March 23, 2004

FACTS: Noontime, June 26, 1993 -- A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle
in Pampanga. The driver of the tricycle Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs.
Cerezo, the owner of the bus lines, her husband, Atty. Cerezo, and bus driver Foronda.

According to the facts alleged in the complaint, Tuazon was driving on the proper lane. There
was a "Slow Down" sign which Foronda ignored. After the complaint was filed, alias summons
was served upon the person of Atty. Cerezo, the Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor.

In their reply, Mrs. Cerezo contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction because
there was no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to
institute a separate civil action for damages in the criminal action.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Cerezo is liable for damages

RULING: Mrs. Cerezo's contention is wrong. Tuazon's case is not based on criminal law but on
quasi-delict under the Civil Code.

The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Art. 103, RPC, or
may give rise to an action for quasi-delict under Art. 2180, C.C. An aggrieved party may choose
between the two remedies. An action based on quasi-delict may proceed independently from
the criminal action. There is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict
and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy whether to sue for a delict or a
quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.

Tuazon's action is based on quasi-delict under Art. 2180: Employer's liability.