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TORTS AND DAMAGES

||Prepared by: GR No. 082791||
QUASI-DELICT || Nature, Scope, and Coverage
Case Elcano v. Hill
Issue Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
Ruling The extinction of civil liability referred to in paragraph (e) of section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the RPC, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Case Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA, G.R. No. 97336, 19 Feb. 1993
Issue WON damages may be recovered for breach of promise to marry based on Article 21 of the CC
Ruling YES. Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.

Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an
Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes
not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission
responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to
be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article
2176 of the Civil Code.

In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have
been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19
and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has
become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.

As to the purpose of Article 21: “Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it
and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.”

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise,
and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to
their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private
respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of
lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier
adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article
337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the seduction.

Case Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 110295, 18 Oct. 1993
Issue WON the petitioner's cause of action is not under Article 2176 of the CC on quasi-delict
Ruling The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action
based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between
the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be
deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus,
in Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 17 this Court stated:

We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the parties
does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of
damages therefor. 18 Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent
case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, 19 involving an airplane passenger who, despite hi first-
class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a
seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon
the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation between the passenger and a
carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature . . . the act that breaks the contract may also be

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a tort.

Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations. 20

Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on
negligence, 21 breach of warranty, 22 tort, 23 or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation. 24 Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish
legal treaties as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) 25 is homologous but not identical
to tort under the common law, 26 which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts,
such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. 2

Case Navida et al. v. Dizon et al., G.R. No. 125078, 30 May 2011
Issue Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter
Ruling YES. The injuries and illnesses, which petitiones allegedly suffered resulted from their exposure to DBCP
while they were employed in the banana plantations located in the Philippines or while they were
residing within the agricultural areas also located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the
Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines.
The RTC has reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases.

It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by petitioners took place
abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., "the
manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other
disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce," and, hence, outside the
jurisdiction of the RTCs.

Certainly, the cases are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would
be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal civil actions, such as claims for
payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and tried in the appropriate
court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides.

Most of the evidence required to prove the claims of petitioners are available only in the Philippines. First,
plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines (General Santos City). Second, the specific areas
where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the
courts a quo wherein petitioners initially filed their claims for damages. Third, the testimonial and
documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers etc. would be easier to
gather in the Philippines. Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that the alleged cause of
action of petitioners against the defendant companies for damages occurred in the Philippines,
demonstrate that, apart from the RTC having jurisdiction over the subject matter in the instant civil cases,
they are, indeed, the convenient fora for trying these cases.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petitions for review on certiorari. We REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the Order of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, and REMAND the records of this case
to the respective Regional Trial Courts of origin for further and appropriate proceedings.

REQUISITES
Case Child Learning v. Tagario, G.R. No. 150920, 25 Nov. 2005
Issue Whether or not the school was negligent for the boy’s accidental fall.
Ruling YES. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.

In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed to provide precautionary measures to avoid harm
and injury to its students in two instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite having been
notified of the problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills on the window where Timothy fell from.
During trial, it was found that the lock was defective. The architect witness testified that he did not verify
if the doorknob at the comfort room was actually put in place. Further, the fact that Timothy fell out
through the window shows that the door could not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently points to
the fact that something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa
loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to
warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the
accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or
control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Petitioners are clearly
answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in working

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condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window, instead of the door, shows that
something was wrong with the door. As to the absence of grills on the window, petitioners contend that
there was no such requirement under the Building Code. Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as
petitioners themselves point out, was approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it was within reach
of a student who finds the regular exit, the door, not functioning.

Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good father of the family, should have anticipated that a student,
locked in the toilet by a non-working door, would attempt to use the window to call for help or even to get
out. Considering all the circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of liability on
petitioners’ part.

Petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is
applicable where the employer is being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the
fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained. The Court’s
pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out using the door,
negates petitioners’ other contention that the proximate cause of the accident was Timothy’s own
negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall were the product of a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any intervening cause, that originated from CLC’s own negligence.

QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM: Culpa Criminal

Case Casupanan v. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, 26 Aug. 2002
Issue Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case.
Ruling YES. Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the
prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime if such civil action is
reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case
where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for
quasi-delict–without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously
and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not
suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have
no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case
against his employer or guardians.
Case Cerezo v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 141538, 23 March 2004
Issue WON the contention of Tuazon a quasi-delict under the CC or under the RPC?
Ruling The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed
independently from the criminal action. There is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising
36

from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy, whether to sue for a delict
or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.
Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict. In his complaint, Tuazon alleged that
Mrs. Cerezo, "without exercising due care and diligence in the supervision and management of her
employees and buses," hired Foronda as her driver. Tuazon became disabled because of Foronda’s
"recklessness, gross negligence and imprudence," aggravated by Mrs. Cerezo’s "lack of due care and
diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly Foronda."
The trial court thus found Mrs. Cerezo liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
CASE Sps. Santos, et al. v. Pizardo et al., G.R. No. 151452, 29 July 2005
ISSUE WON the petition constitute or based on quasi-delict which petitioners have been brought within 4 years
from the time the cause of action accrued?
RULING NO. A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioner’s claim
that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of
negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were
pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint,
the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended
party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal
Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had

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already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their
reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex
quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime
especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the
crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its
decision convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latter’s civil liability.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the
subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer
becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the
employees. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to
obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a
final judgment convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits,
considering petitioners’ allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising from
crime.
CASE Manliclic v. Calaunan, G.R. No. 150157, 25 Jan. 2007
ISSUE What is the effect of Manliclic’s acquittal to the civil case
RULING ACQUITTAL DOES NOT AFFECT THE CASE. MANLICLIC AND PRBLI ARE STILL LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity
all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime – a distinction
exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.
It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability
arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is
acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal
closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no
crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil
action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by
an acquittal, whether it be on grounds of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. An
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana.
CASE Lumantas, MD v. Calapiz, G.R. No. 163753, 15 Jan. 2014
ISSUE Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioner's civil liability despite his acquittal of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.
RULING
The petition for review lacks merit.
The acquittal of an accused does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability.
There are two kinds of acquittal recognized by law: one where the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of, and one based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
In this case, the petitioner was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence, but his civil liability can still be
adjudged based on preponderance of evidence.
The failure to prove criminal negligence does not prevent a finding of civil liability.
The RTC and the CA both found that Hanz sustained the injurious trauma from the petitioner's
circumcision, and that the trauma could have been avoided.
The Court must accord the highest respect to the factual findings of the trial court and the CA, unless there
is a clear showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error.
Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of their body, and civil damages should be assessed once
that integrity has been violated.
In Hanz's case, his physical and moral sufferings warranted the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Interest of 6% per annum should be imposed on the award from the filing of the criminal information on
April 17, 1997.

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Ratio:
The acquittal of an accused does not necessarily absolve him from civil liability.
There are two kinds of acquittal recognized by law: one where the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of, and one based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
In this case, the petitioner was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence, but his civil liability can still be
adjudged based on preponderance of evidence.
The failure to prove criminal negligence does not prevent a finding of civil liability.
The Court must accord the highest respect to the factual findings of the trial court and the CA, unless there
is a clear showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error.
Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of their body, and civil damages should be assessed once
that integrity has been violated.
In Hanz's case, his physical and moral sufferings warranted the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Interest of 6% per annum should be imposed on the award from the filing of the criminal information on
April 17, 1997.

QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM: Culpa Criminal

CASE Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155
ISSUE Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.
RULING Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa aquiliana.

Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish
Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France failed to
furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s
employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was already,
seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of a first class ticket to a
passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.

Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there is
also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They
have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air France’s
contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed
upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France – a case of quasi-delict.
Damages are proper.

CASE Phil. School of Business Administration, et al v. CA, G.R. No. 84698, 4 January 1992
ISSUE Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.
RULING Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and
Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression
has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis.
Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the
educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants
of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable. But it does not
necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to comply with . For its
part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to
equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. This includes
ensuring the safety of the students while in the school premises. On the other hand, the student covenants
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to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test
of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other
words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the
school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances
set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

CASE Calalas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122039, 31 May 2000

ISSUE Whether or not respondent passenger is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the
driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict.
RULING NO. The principle of res judicata does not apply where a party in a pending case was never a party in a
previous one. And besides, the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case are not the same. The
issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the
damage caused to petitioner’s jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is
liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.

CASE Regino v Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, G.R. No. 156109, 18 Nov.
2004
ISSUE WON the complaint stated sufficient cause/s of action—YES, there were two causes of action,
first, breach of contract, second, liability for tort
RULING 1. The first cause of action was for breach of contract
a. It was already ruled in Alcuaz v. PSBA and Non v. Danes II, that a contractual relationship subsists
between the school and the student. This relationship gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights
and obligations
b. Thus, students expect that upon their payment of tuition fees, satisfaction of the set academic
standards, completion of academic requirements, and observance of school rules and regulations,
the school would reward them by recognizing their “completion” of the course enrolled in.
c. In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly, in the middle
of the semester. It exacted the dance party fee as a condition for the students’ taking the final
examinations, and ultimately for its recognition of their ability to finish a course. The fee,
however, was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the start of the school year.
Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.
2. Second cause of action is based on liability for tort
a. An academic institution may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its
students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort
b. The acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony, and
“demoralization of unimaginable proportions” in violation of Articles 19, 21, and 26 of the Civil
Code
c. In the case at the bar, she was made to sit out her logic class while her classmates took the exam,
and in her statistics class, Baladad announced to the whole class that she wasn’t allowing the
petitioner and another student to take their exams, and then ejected them from the classroom.

CASE Loadmasters Customs Services v. Glodel Brokerage, G.R. No. 179446, 10 January
2011
ISSUE Whether Loadmasters and Glodel are solidarily liable.
RULING Loadmasters’ claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee
Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. It may not have a direct contractual
relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts which expressly provide:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides:

ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters whose employees
(truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As employer,

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Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted within the
scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse.

Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection
(culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict
committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof
that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee. In this regard, Loadmasters failed.

CASE G & S Transport v. Ochoa, G.R. No.170125, 9 March 2011

ISSUE The acquittal of Padilla in the criminal case is immaterial to the instant case for breach of contract
RULING In the instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action,
which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being
deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the
offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause
of action, i.e., culpa contractual." (Emphasis supplied; Citations omitted.)

In this case, the action filed by the heirs is primarily for the recovery of damages arising from breach of
contract of carriage allegedly committed by G & S. Clearly, it is an independent civil action arising from
contract which is separate and distinct from the criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide filed by the heirs against Padilla by reason of the same incident. Hence, regardless of Padilla’s
acquittal or conviction in said criminal case, same has no bearing in the resolution of the present case.
There was therefore no error on the part of the CA when it resolved this case without regard to the fact
that Padilla has already been acquitted by the RTC in the criminal case. Moreover, while the CA quoted
some portions of the MTC Decision in said criminal case, we however find that those quoted portions
were only meant to belie G & S’ claim that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the
driver of the delivery van which allegedly hit the Avis taxicab. Even without those quoted portions, the
appellate court’s ultimate finding that it was Padilla’s negligence which was the proximate cause of the
mishap would still be the same. This is because the CA has, in fact, already made this declaration in the
earlier part of its assailed Decision. The fact that the MTC Decision from which the subject quoted portions
were lifted has already been reversed by the RTC is therefore immaterial.

In view of the foregoing, we deny G & S’ petition for lack of merit.

CASE Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 56 Phil 177

ISSUE Whether or not, Manuel Gutierrez may be held liable for damages as head of house for acts of his
minor child Bonifacio Gutierrez.
RULING The head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for the general use of his family is
liable for its negligent operation by one of his children, whom he designates or permits to run it, where
the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the
owner’s family than the child driving it.

CASE Torres-Madrid Brokerage v. FEB Mitsui, G.R. No. 194121, 11 July 2016
ISSUE 1. TMBI and BMT are not solidarily liable to Mitsui.
2. A third party may recover from a common carrier for quasi-delict but must prove actual
negligence.
RULING 1. We disagree with the lower courts’ ruling that TMBI and BMT are solidarily liable to Mitsui for the
loss as joint tortfeasors. TMBI’s liability to Mitsui does not stem from a quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana)
but from its breach of contract (culpa contractual). The tie that binds TMBI with Mitsui is contractual,
albeit one that passed on to Mitsui as a result of TMBI’s contract of carriage with Sony to which Mitsui
had been subrogated as an insurer who had paid Sony’s insurance claim. The legal reality that results
from this contractual tie precludes the application of quasi-delict.

2. While it is undisputed that the cargo was lost under the actual custody of BMT (whose employee is
the primary suspect in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment), no direct contractual relationship
existed between Sony/Mitsui and BMT. If at all, Sony/Mitsui’s cause of action against BMT could only
arise from quasi-delict, as a third party suffering damage from the action of another due to the
latter’s fault or negligence, pursuant to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In the present case, Mitsui’s
action is solely premised on TMBI’s breach of contract. Mitsui did not even sue BMT, much less prove
any negligence on its part.

ACTS OR OMISSIONS
CASE Picart v Smith, 37 Phil 809 **Landmark Case**
ISSUE Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence that gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage
done to Picart and his pony.

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RULING Yes, the court ruled that Smith that he is liable to pay Picart the amount of P200. The sum is computed to
include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles
of his apparel.

 In the nature of things, this change in situation occurred while the automobile was still some distance
away. From this moment it was no longer possible for Picart to escape being run down by going to a
place for greater safety.
 The control of the situation had then passed entirely to Smith, and it was his duty to bring his car to
an immediate stop or seeing no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass
sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid collision. There was an appreciable risk that a horse not
acquainted with vehicles would react that way.
 The Test to Determine the Existence of Negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used the same situation? If not then he is guilty of negligence.
 The law in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman Law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.
 A prudent man, placed in the position of Smith in the Court’s opinion would have recognized that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk and would therefore have foreseen harm to the
horse and the rider as a reasonable consequence of that course.

CASE Gaid v People. GR No. 171636, 7 April 2009

ISSUE WON petitioner was negligent?
RULING Petitioner must be acquitted at least on reasonable doubt. The award of damages must also be deleted
pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code which states that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
1ST STAGE: began when Dayata flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the road and
ended when he was run over by the jeepney
2nd STAGE: covered the span between the moment immediately after the victim was run over and the point
when petitioner put the jeepney to a halt

During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent.

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act.

In the instant case, petitioner was driving slowly at the time of the accident. Petitioner stated that he was
driving at no more than 15 kilometers per hour. It appears from the evidence Dayata came from the left
side of the street. Petitioner, who was driving the jeepney on the right lane, did not see the victim flag him
down. He also failed to see him go near the jeepney at the left side. Understandably, petitioner was
focused on the road ahead. In Dayata’s haste to board the jeep which was then running, his feet somehow
got pinned to the left rear tire, as narrated by Bongolto. Actub only saw Dayata after he heard a strong
impact coming from the jeep.

With the foregoing facts, petitioner can not be held liable during the first stage. Specifically, he cannot be
held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, as found by the trial court. The proximate cause
of the accident and the death of the victim was definitely his own negligence in trying to catch up with the
moving jeepney to get a ride.

CASE Dyteban v Jose Ching, GR No. 161803, 4 February 2008

ISSUE Whether or not prime mover driver Limbaga was negligent in parking the vehicle
RULING
Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national highway; he failed to prevent or minimize
the risk to oncoming motorists.

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.17 The Supreme Court stated the test of negligence in the landmark case Picart v.
Smith18 as follows:
The test by which to determine the existence or negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by

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reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would
be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that.

The test of negligence is objective. We measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with that of an
ordinary reasonable person in the same situation. The test, as applied to this case, is whether Limbaga, in
parking the prime mover, used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary reasonable person
would have used in the same situation.

We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover askew on the right side of the
national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of the national road on the lane of the
passenger bus. It was parked at the shoulder of the road with its left wheels still on the cemented highway
and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway. It is common sense that the skewed
parking of the prime mover on the national road posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. It was
incumbent upon Limbaga to take some measures to prevent that risk, or at least minimize it.

We are unable to agree with the CA conclusion "it would have been dangerous and quite impossible to
further park the prime mover on the graveled shoulder of the road because the prime mover may tilt and
the bulldozer may fall off." The photographs taken after the incident show that it could have been possible
for Limbaga to park the prime mover completely on the shoulder of the national road without risk to
oncoming motorists. We agree with the RTC observation on this point, thus:

x x x The statement of Limbaga that he could not park the prime mover and trailer deeper into the sand
and gravel shoulder of the highway to his right because there were banana plants is contradicted by the
picture marked Exhibit "F." The picture shows that there was ample space on the shoulder. If defendant
Limbaga was careful and prudent enough, he should have the prime mover and trailer traveled more
distance forward so that the bodies of the prime mover and trailer would be far more on the shoulder
rather than on the cemented highway when they were parked. Although at the time of the incident, it was
about 4:45 in the morning and it was drizzling but there is showing that it was pitch dark that whoever
travels along the highway must be extra careful. If the Joana Paula bus swerved to the lane on which the
"Nissan" ice van was properly traveling, as prescribed by Traffic Rules and Regulations, it is because the
driver of the bus did not see at a distance the parked prime mover and trailer on the bus' proper lane
because there was no warning signs of danger of any kind that can be seen from a distance. 19
Limbaga also failed to take proper steps to minimize the risk posed by the improperly parked prime
mover. He did not immediately inform his employer, private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc., that the
prime mover suffered two tire blowouts and that he could not have them fixed because he had only one
spare tire. Instead of calling for help, Limbaga took it upon himself to simply place banana leaves on the
front and rear of the prime mover to serve as warning to oncoming motorists. Worse, Limbaga slept on
the prime mover instead of standing guard beside the vehicle. By his own account, Limbaga was sleeping
on the prime mover at the time of the collision and that he was only awakened by the impact of the Nissan
van and the passenger bus on the prime mover.20

Limbaga also admitted on cross-examination that it was his first time to drive the prime mover with
trailer loaded with a D-8 caterpillar bulldozer. 21 We find that private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was
utterly negligent in allowing a novice driver, like Limbaga, to operate a vehicle, such as a truck loaded
with a bulldozer, which required highly specialized driving skills. Respondent employer clearly failed to
properly supervise Limbaga in driving the prime mover.
The RTC noted that private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. also failed to keep the prime mover in proper
condition at the time of the collision. The prime mover had worn out tires. It was only equipped with one
spare tire. It was for this reason that Limbaga was unable to change the two blown out tires because he
had only one spare. The bulldozer was not even loaded properly on the prime mover, which caused the
tire blowouts.
All told, We agree with the RTC that private respondent Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime
mover on the national highway. Private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was also negligent in failing to
supervise Limbaga and in ensuring that the prime mover was in proper condition.

CASE R Transport vs. Yu, GR No. 174161, 18 February 2015

ISSUE Whether Gimena and the petitioner are liable
RULING Yes. Both the trial and appellate courts found driver Gimena negligent in hitting and running over the
victim and ruled that his negligence was the proximate cause of her death. Negligence has been defined as
"the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." Verily,
foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. It is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. In this case, the records show
that driver Gimena was clearly running at a reckless speed. As testified by the police officer on duty at the
time of the incident16 and indicated in the Autopsy Report,17 not only were the deceased’s clothes ripped
off from her body, her brain even spewed out from her skull and spilled over the road. Indeed, this Court
is not prepared to believe petitioner’s contention that its bus was traveling at a "normal speed" in

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preparation for a full stop in view of the fatal injuries sustained by the deceased. Moreover, the location
wherein the deceased was hit and run over further indicates Gimena’s negligence. As borne by the
records, the bus driven by Gimena bumped the deceased in a loading and unloading area of a commercial
center. The fact that he was approaching such a busy part of EDSA should have already cautioned the
driver of the bus. In fact, upon seeing that a bus has stopped beside his lane should have signalled him to
step on his brakes to slowdown for the possibility that said bus was unloading its passengers in the area.
Unfortunately, he did not take the necessary precaution and instead, drove on and bumped the deceased
despite being aware that he was traversing a commercial center where pedestrians were crossing the
street. Ultimately, Gimena should have observed due diligence of a reasonably prudent man by slackening
his speed and proceeding cautiously while passing the area. Under Article 2180of the New Civil Code,
employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks. Once negligence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the
employer was remiss in the selection and/or supervision of the negligent employee. To avoid liability for
the quasi-delict committed by its employee, it is incumbent upon the employer to rebut this presumption
by presenting adequate and convincing proof that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Unfortunately, however, the records of this case
are bereft of any proof showing the exercise by petitioner of the required diligence.

CASE Umali v. Bacani, G.R. No. L-40570, 30 January 1976

ISSUE (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event- storm;
(2) WON boy’s parents’ negligence exempts petitioner from liability.
RULING Decision affirmed.
(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on the part of
defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. With ordinary
foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the
electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down.

(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' (petitioners’) lack of
due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This
law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for
injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

CASE Civil Aeronautics Administration v. CA, et al., G.R. No. L-51806, 8 November 1988
ISSUE WON CAA is liable for the construction of the elevation which was done negligently?
RULING YES. Here, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing deck, a facility open to the public, requires
that CAA insure the safety of the viewers using it. As these people come to the viewing deck to watch the
planes and passengers, their tendency would be to look to where the planes and the incoming passengers
are and not to look down on the floor or pavement of the viewing deck. The CAA should have thus made
sure that no dangerous obstructions or elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent any undue
harm to the public.

The legal foundation of CAA's liability for quasi-delict can be found in Article 2176 of the Civil Code which
provides that "(w)hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done... As the CAA knew of the existence of the dangerous elevation which it
claims though, was made precisely in accordance with the plans and specifications of the building for
proper drainage of the open terrace [See Record on Appeal, pp. 13 and 57; Rollo, p. 391, its failure to have
it repaired or altered in order to eliminate the existing hazard constitutes such negligence as to warrant a
finding of liability based on quasi-delict upon CAA.

The Court finds the contention that private respondent was, at the very least, guilty of contributory
negligence, thus reducing the damages that plaintiff may recover, unmeritorious. Contributory negligence
under Article 2179 of the Civil Code contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff,
which although not the proximate cause of his injury, contributed to his own damage, the proximate cause
of the plaintiffs own injury being the defendant's lack of due care. In the instant case, no contributory
negligence can be imputed to the private respondent.

CASE Associated Bank v. Tan, G.R. No. 156940, 14 December 2004

ISSUE Whether or not the petitioner has the right to debit the amount of the dishonored check from
the account of respondent on the ground that the check was withdrawn by respondent prior to
its clearing
RULING The Petition has no merit. The real issue here is not so much the right of petitioner to debit
respondent’s account but, rather, the manner in which it exercised such right. Banks are granted by law
the right to debit the value of a dishonored check from a depositor’s account but they must do so with the
highest degree of care, so as not to prejudice the depositor unduly. The degree of diligence required of
banks is more than that of a good father of a family where the fiduciary nature of their relationship with
their depositors is concerned. In this case, petitioner did not treat respondent’s account with the highest
degree of care. Respondent withdrew his money upon the advice of petitioner that his money was already

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cleared. It is petitioner’s premature authorization of the withdrawal that caused the respondent’s account
balance to fall to insufficient levels, and the subsequent dishonor of his own checks for lack of funds.

CASE Pacis v Morales, GR No. 169467, 25 February 2010

ISSUE Was Morales negligent?
RULING As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should
have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to
others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be
stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access
defensive use.16 With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely
because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case.
Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer
without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored
in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not
loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another
person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely
unloaded.17 For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent.
Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes
him to repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms. 18

Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family,
much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him
from liability in this case

CAUSAL CONNECTION || Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

CASE Africa v. Caltex Phil., G.R. No. L-12986, 31 March 1966
ISSUE W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
should apply as to presume negligence on the part of the appellees.
RULING Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that “where the thing which caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation of defendant, that the incident happened because
of want of care.

The aforesaid principle enunciated in Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. is applicable in
this case. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of
appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The person who
knew or could have known how the fire started were the appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of
want of care. The report by the police officer regarding the fire, as well as the statement of the driver of
the gasoline tank wagon who was transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage when
the fire broke out, strengthen the presumption of negligence. Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy
district and pedestrians often pass through or mill around the premises; (2) the area is used as a car barn
for around 10 taxicabs owned by Boquiren; (3) a store where people hang out and possibly smoke
cigarettes is located one meter from the hole of the underground tank; and (4) the concrete walls
adjoining the neighborhood are only 2.2 meters high at most and cannot prevent the flames from leaping
over it in case of fire.

CASE Rosit v. Davao Doctors Hospital, G.R. No. 210445, 7 Dec. 2015

ISSUE Whether or not res ipsa loquitur principle is not applicable and that the testimony of an expert witness is
necessary for a finding of negligence Dr. Gestuvo from liability.
NO. An expert witness is not necessary as the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is applicable
RULING
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician
has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with
because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the
necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science,
and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by
anyone familiar with the facts.

Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving of a
foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body
which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body when another
part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a patient's jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his

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tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under the influence of anesthetic, during or
following an operation for appendicitis, among others.

We have further held that resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as an exception to the requirement of
an expert testimony in medical negligence cases may be availed of if the following essential requisites are
satisfied: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged;
and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person
injured.[12]

After careful consideration, this Court cannot accede to the CA's findings as it is at once apparent from the
records that the essential requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present.

- The first element was sufficiently established when Rosit proved that one of the screws
installed by Dr. Gestuvo struck his molar. It was for this issue that Dr. Gestuvo himself referred Rosit
to Dr. Pangan. Clearly, had Dr. Gestuvo used the proper size and length of screws and placed the same
in the proper locations, these would not have struck Rosit's teeth causing him pain and requiring him
to undergo a corrective surgery. Dr. Gestuvo knew that the screws he used on Rosit were too large as,
in fact, he cut the same with a saw. He also stated during trial that common sense dictated that the
smallest screws available should be used. More importantly, he also knew that these screws were
available locally at the time of the operation. Yet, he did not avail of such items and went ahead with
the larger screws and merely sawed them off. Even assuming that the screws were already at the
proper length after Dr. Gestuvo cut the same, it is apparent that he negligently placed one of the
screws in the wrong area thereby striking one of Rosit's teeth.

In any event, whether the screw hit Rosit's molar because it was too long or improperly placed, both
facts are the product of Dr. Gestuvo's negligence. An average man of common intelligence would
know that striking a tooth with any foreign object much less a screw would cause severe pain. Thus,
the first essential requisite is present in this case.

- second element for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine application, it is sufficient that the
operation which resulted in the screw hitting Rosit's molar was, indeed, performed by Dr. Gestuvo. No
other doctor caused such fact. The CA finds that Rosit is guilty of contributory negligence in having Dr.
Pangan operate on him during the healing period of his fractured mandible. What the CA overlooked
is that it was Dr. Gestuvo himself who referred Rosit to Dr. Pangan. Nevertheless, Dr. Pangan's
participation could not have contributed to the reality that the screw that Dr. Gestuvo installed hit
Rosit's molar.

- Lastly, the third element that the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution of the person injured was satisfied in this case. It was not shown that
Rosit's lung disease could have contributed to the pain. What is clear is that he suffered because one
of the screws that Dr. Gestuvo installed hit Rosit's molar.

Clearly then, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine finds application in the instant case and no expert
testimony is required to establish the negligence of defendant Dr. Gestuvo.
CASE Borromeo v. Family Care Hospital, G.R. No. 191018, 25 January 2016
ISSUE WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to this case
RULING Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable when the failure to observe due care is not immediately apparent to
the layman.

The petitioner cannot invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to shift the burden of evidence onto the
respondent. Res ipsa loquitur, literally, "the thing speaks for itself;" is a rule of evidence that presumes
negligence from the very nature of the accident itself using common human knowledge or experience.

The application of this rule requires: (1) that the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive: control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) that the injury suffered must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution from the injured person. The concurrence of these
elements creates a presumption of negligence that, if unrebutted, overcomes the plaintiffs burden of
proof.

This doctrine is used in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge. We have applied this
doctrine in the following cases involving medical practitioners:

a) Where a patient who was scheduled for a cholecystectomy (removal of gall stones) but was otherwise
healthy suffered irreparable brain damage after being administered anesthesia prior to the operation.

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b) Where after giving birth, a woman woke up with a gaping burn wound close to her left armpit;

c) The removal of the wrong body part during the operation; and

d) Where an operating surgeon left a foreign object (i.e., rubber gloves) inside the body of the patient.

The rule is not applicable in cases such as the present one where the defendant's alleged failure to
observe due care is not immediately apparent to a layman. These instances require expert opinion to
establish the culpability of the defendant doctor. It is also not applicable to cases where the actual cause of
the injury had been identified or established.

BURDEN OF PROOF
CASE BJDC Construction v. Lanuzo, G.R. No. 161151, 24 March 2014
ISSUE Whether or not heirs of Balbino were able to establish by preponderance of evidence the
negligence of BJDC.
RULING The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.

NO. The party alleging the negligence of the other as the cause of injury has the burden to establish the
allegation with competent evidence. If the action based on negligence is civil in nature, the proof required
is preponderance of evidence.

In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on
either side. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the
complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court, but it may rest on the defendant if he admits
expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises affirmative defense or defenses, which if proved,
will exculpate him from liability.

The Court affirmed the findings of the RTC, and rules that the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying
the burden of proof, did not establish by preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the part of the
company was the proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino.

During the trial, the Lanuzo heirs attempted to prove inadequacy of illumination instead of the
total omission of illumination. In contrast, the company credibly refuted the allegation of inadequate
illumination. The Court observes, too, that SPO1 Corporal, a veteran police officer detailed for more than
17 years at the Pili Police Station, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official
duties. In his report, it was mentioned that “upon arrival at the scene of the incident it was noted that road
sign/barricade installed on the road has a light.”

COMPLETE DEFENSES || Plaintiff’s Own Negligence

CASE Fe Cayab-Lasan v. Ramolete, G.R. No. 159132, Dec. 18, 2008
ISSUE WON there was medical malpractice in the case?
RULING
There was no medical malpractice in the case.

Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or
surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by
the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. In order to
successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or
action caused injury to the patient.

There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate
causation.

From the testimony of the expert witness and the reasons given by him, it is evident that the D&C
procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Editha’s uterus. Further in the testimony, it is
clear that the D&C procedure was conducted in accordance with the standard practice, with the same
level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances, and that there was nothing irregular in the way the petitioner dealt with Editha.

Medical malpractice is often brought as a civil action for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The

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defenses in an action for damages, provided for under Article 2179 of the Civil Code are:

Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded.

It is also undisputed that Editha did not return for a follow-up evaluation, in defiance of the petitioners
advise. Editha omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which could have avoided the injury.
The omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation played a substantial part in bringing about
Editha’s own injury. Had Editha returned, petitioner could have conducted the proper medical tests and
procedure necessary to determine Editha’s health condition and applied the corresponding treatment
which could have prevented the rupture of Editha’s uterus. The D&C procedure having been conducted in
accordance with the standard medical practice, it is clear that Editha’s omission was the proximate cause
of her own injury and not merely a contributory negligence on her part.

CASE BJDC Construction v. Lanuzo, G.R. No. 161151, 24 March 2014

RULING The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had no application. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase that literally means “the thing
or the transaction speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with
the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a
plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.

For the doctrine to apply, the following requirements must be shown to exist, namely:
(a) the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;
(b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
(c) the possibility of contributing conduct that would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.

Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence cannot be fairly ascribed to the company considering
that it has shown its installation of the necessary warning signs and lights in the project site. In that context, the fatal
accident was not caused by any instrumentality within the exclusive control of the company. In contrast, Balbino had
the exclusive control of how he operated and managed his motorcycle. The records disclose that he overtook another
motorcycle rider at a fast speed. Moreover, by the time of the accident, the project had been going on for more than a
month. Balbino, who had passed there on a daily basis in going to and from his residence and the school where he
then worked as the principal, was thus very familiar with the risks at the project site. Nor could the Lanuzo heirs
justly posit that the illumination was not adequate, for it cannot be denied that Balbino’s motorcycle was equipped
with headlights. Balbino was also not wearing a helmet during such time.

EXCEPTION: DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE

CASE Taylor v. Manila Electric, G.R. No. 4977, Mar. 22, 2014
RULING In order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence: (1) Damages to the
plaintiff. (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts
it must respond, was guilty. (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the
damage.

But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express
invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there
by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the
defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant
in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the
plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant,"
and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and
putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries
inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus
incurred.

CASE Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan, 91 Phil 488

ISSUE Whether or not petitioner is negligent and therefore liable for damages
RULING Under the doctrine of attractive nuisance, one who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or
appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children
from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is
technically a trespasser in the premises. However, this doctrine is generally not applicable to bodies of water,
artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and
its location.
No, petitioner is not negligent and therefore not liable for damages.

Under the doctrine of attractive nuisance, one who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise
ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender
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years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.

However, the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as
well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and
its location. Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is
always the danger of drowning. Against this danger, children are early instructed so that they are
sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool
on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, . . . (he) is not
liable because of having created an ’attractive nuisance."
In the case at bar, as petitioner’s tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether
the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the other issue submitted by
petitioner
- that the parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery, because they left
for Manila on that unlucky day leaving their son under the care of no responsible individual — needs no
further discussion.

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