TORTS Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of
the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
Sagrada Orden De Predicadores Del Santisimo Rosario De
Filipinas vs. National Coconut Corporation
If defendant- appellant is liable at all, its obligations must arise
from any of the four sources of obligations (Spanish Code),
namely, law, contract or quasi-contract, crime, or negligence.
Defendant-appellant is not guilty of any offense at all, because it
entered the premises and occupied it with the permission of the
entity which had the legal control and administration thereof, the
Alien Property Administration. Neither was there any negligence
on its part. There was also no privity (of contract or obligation)
between the Alien Property Custodian and the Taiwan Tekkosho,
which had secured the possession of the property from the
plaintiff-appellee by the use of duress, such that the Alien Property
Custodian or its permittee (defendant-appellant) may be held
responsible for the supposed illega ity of the occupation of the
property by the said Taiwan Tekkosho.
There was no express agreement between the Alien Property
Custodian and the defendant-appellant for the latter to pay rentals
on the property.
We have also tried in vain to find a law or provision thereof, or
any principle in quasi contracts or equity, upon which the claim
can be supported. On the contrary, as defendant-appellant entered
into possession without any expectation of liability for such use
and occupation, it is only fair and just that it may not be held
liable therefor.
CONCEPT OF TORTS
Naguiat v. NLRC
Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of “corporate
tort.”
Section 100, paragraph 5, of the Corporation Code, states:
“(5) To the extent that the stockholders are actively engage(d) in
the management or operation of the business and affairs of a close
corporation, the stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary duties
to each other and among themselves. Said stockholders shall be
personally liable for corporate torts unless the corporation has
obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance.”
Essentially, “tort” consists in the violation of a right given or the
omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated, tort is a breach
of a legal duty. Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates the
employer to grant separation pay to employees in case of closure or
cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, which is the condition
obtaining at bar.
CFTI failed to comply with this law-imposed duty or obligation.
Consequently, its stockholder who was actively engaged in the
management or operation of the business should be held
personally liable.
Baksh v. CA
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is
not an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the
draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it
so.
Article 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict
in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the
giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had,
in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was
only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her
to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of
such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it
and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. v. First Farmers
“The doing of an act which is in itself is perfectly lawful will not
render one liable as for a tort, simply because the unintended effect
of such act is to enable or assist another person to do or accomplish
a wrong”, assuming, of course, that there was such a wrong.
QUASI-DELICT
CONCEPT AND REQUISITES
Cinco v. Canonoy
Liability being predicated on quasi delict, the civil case may
proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as specifically
provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
The concept of quasi-delict, as enunciated in Article 2176 of the
Civil Code supra, is so broad that it includes not only injuries to
persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction
between “damage to persons” on the one hand and “damage to
property” on the other. Indeed, the word “damage” is used in two
concepts: the “harm” done and “reparation” for the harm done.
And with respect to “harm” it is plain that it includes both injuries
to person and property since “harm” is not limited to personal but
also to property injuries.
In fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to
property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which
holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive
smoke which may be harmful “to persons or property.”
Elcano v. Hill
A reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia
(penned by Justice Bocobo)—that the concurrence of the Penal
Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplates only acts
of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts—deeper reflection
would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so
limited, but that in fact is actually extends to fault or culpa.
“(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full- grown development as culpa aquiliana or causi-delito. And so,
because Justice Bocobo was Chairman of the Code Commission
that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted
that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no
longer uses the term, “not punishable by law,” thereby making it
clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether
voluntary or negligent.
A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the victim do not recover damages on both
scores.
The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is
not a bar to the instant action against him.
TORTS AND DAMAGES, CASE DOCTRINES 1

The vicarious liability of the parents on account of a delict
committed by their minor child is not extinguished by the fact that
said, child who is living with and dependent upon said parents is
married.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason
behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them
from causing damage to third persons.
Safeguard Security v. Tangco
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender:
(1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code; and
(2) independent civil liabilities, such as those:
(a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as
a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising
from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional
torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or
(b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an
action independent and distinct from the criminal action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission or under both causes.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions
resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but
also acts which are voluntary and intentional.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary.
In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e)
of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as
a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part of the master or the
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
the supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the
employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it
is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily
liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former. Safeguard is
presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his
employee by operation of law. This presumption may be overcome
only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care
and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
the supervision of its employee.
Chan, Jr. v. Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc.
The requisites of quasi-delict are the following:
(a) there must be an act or omission;
(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;
(c) such act/omission is caused by fault/negligence; and
(d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
The tortious act was the excavation which caused damage to the
respondent because it was done surreptitiously within its premises
and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel. The
excavation on respondent’s premises was caused by fault. Finally,
there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the
petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on the
other.
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve
of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. Verily, the
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-
delict is solidary.
For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are
jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors.
“The basis of their solidarity is not the Memorandum of Agreement
but the fact that they have become joint tortfeasors. There is
solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or
when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort.
They even had provisions in their MOA as to how they would
divide the treasure if any is found within or outside petitioner’s
property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner
from liability, is the very noose that insures that he be so declared
as liable.
FGU Insurance Corp. v. CA
The requisites of quasi-delict are the following:
(a) there must be an act or omission;
(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;
(c) such act/omission is caused by fault/negligence;
We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the
existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of
defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-
Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR.
Gregorio v. CA
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the
plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the
damages suffered by him;
(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person to
whose act he must respond;
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence and the damages incurred; and
(4) that there must be no preexisting contractual relation between
the parties.
On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of
action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach,
though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the
following rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal
security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse;
(5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.
A scrutiny of Gregorio’s civil complaint reveals that the averments
thereof, taken together, fulfill the elements of Article 2176, in
relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code. It appears that Gregorio’s
rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of
mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to
exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the
person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently
funded checks. This fault was compounded when they failed to
ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of
the opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not
given proper notice. Gregorio’s action against Sansio is based
under Art. 2180, being the employer of Datuin. ***Gregorio’s
complaint is NOT based on Malicious Prosecution, not having
alleged bad faith in her complaint.
Vergara v. CA
*Requisites of Quasi-Delict
A mishap caused by defective brakes cannot be considered as
fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the
accident preventable.
The petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome the
disputable presumption of negligence on his part in the selection
and supervision of his driver.
American Express International Inc. v. Cordero
In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there
must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
But there are exceptions. There may be an action for quasi-delict
notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract between the
parties.
A liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is
that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act
which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted
the source of a quasi-delictual liability, the contract can be said to
have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to
apply.
Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must
be the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by the
plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case
upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent.
AS DISTINGUISHED FROM CRIME
LG Foods Corp. v. Hon. Pagapong
Victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an
action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for
quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the
Civil Code.
If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may
hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee,
subject to the employer’s defense of exercise of the diligence of a
good father of the family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is
for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily
liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee.
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil
action for damages was made when the criminal case was filed is
of no moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was
dismissed without any pronouncement having been made therein.
In reality, therefor, it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of
in the first place. And for the petitioners to insist for the conviction
of their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable for
damages is to ask for the impossible.
Mendoza v. Arrieta
The owner of a car which was bumped by a jeep after the latter was
bumped from behind by a truck may still file a civil action for
damages against the truck driver and its owner even after the truck
driver was adjudged guilty in the criminal case filed by the jeepney
driver against said truck driver and the jeepney driver, in the case
filed by the car owner was acquitted in the criminal case for
negligence filed by the car owner against the jeepney driver.
Reason: There is no identity of cause of action between the civil
case in question and the criminal case against the truck driver for
damage to the jeep.
Failure to make a reservation in the criminal action for negligence
of the right to file an independent civil action does not bar the
filing of the latter. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court cannot amend
the substantive provision of Art. 31 of the Civil Code on quasi
delict.
Under the facts of the case, jeep-owner- driver Salazar cannot be
held liable for the damages sustained by petitioner’s car. In other
words, “the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.”
Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner’s cause of action as against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex-delictu, founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been
extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court.
And even if petitioner’s cause of action as against jeep-owner-
driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the
same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that
Salazar’s acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt,
consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be
instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil
Code.
Philippine Rabbit v. People
The civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code shall remain “separate, distinct and independent” of any
criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct
consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code
need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not
deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil
action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right
to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
more than once for the same act or omission.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil
liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civilliability ex
delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi- delicts,
contracts or quasi-contracts.
In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil
liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party
may— subject to the control of the prosecutor—still intervene in
the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest
therein.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal
case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final
judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same token, to
allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their
employees without the latter’s consent would also result in
improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. The
decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s
civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an
employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.
Manliclic v. Calaunan
Quasi-Delicts; Extinction of Civil Liability; The extinction of civil
liability referred to Section 2(b) of Rule 111, refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a
TORTS AND DAMAGES, CASE DOCTRINES 3
quasidelict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused.—From
the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that
petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on
the ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which
is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure which reads: (b) Extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable
for the mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to a civil
action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action
arising from quasi- delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section
2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime—a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a
crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual.
The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra- contractual under the Civil Code.
It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a
finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil liability based on quasi delict.
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable
doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only.
However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the
author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil
liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance,
there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based
thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if
any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict
complained of.
AS DISTINGUISHED FROM BREACH OF CONTRACT
FGU Insurance v. GP Sarmiento
In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the
contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief.
A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid
cause for recovering that which may have been lost or suffered.
The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promisee that
may include his:
 “expectation interest,” which is his interest in having
the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a
position as he would have been in had the contract been
performed, or
 his “reliance interest,” which is his interest in being
reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by
being put in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract not been made; or
 his “restitution interest,” which is his interest in having
restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the
other party.
Petitioner’s civil action against the driver can only be based on
culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would require
the claimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the part
of the defendant. This is because the respondent’s driver, without
concrete proof of his negligence or fault, may not himself be
ordered to pay petitioner. The driver, not being a party to the
contract of carriage between petitioner’s principal and defendant,
may not be held liable under the agreement.
For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur) to apply, should be understood
as being confined only to cases of pure (non-contractual) tort
since obviously the presumption of negligence in culpa contractual,
as previously so pointed out, immediately attaches by a failure of
the covenant or its tenor.
In the case of the truck driver, whose liability in a civil action is
predicated on culpa acquiliana, while he admittedly can be said to
have been in control and management of the vehicle which figured
in the accident, it is not equally shown, however, that the accident
could have been exclusively due to his negligence, a matter that
can allow, forthwith, res ipsa loquitur to work against him.
Calalas v. CA
Quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor.
Breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi- delict, the negligence or fault should be
clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving
the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this
case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to
his destination.
In the case at bar (breach of contract of carriage), upon the
happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once
arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he
observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga “safely as far as human
care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances” as
required by Art. 1755? We do not think so.
Syquia v. CA
Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties
does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana.
Saludaga v. FEU
Where a student is enrolled in an educational institution, there is
created a contractual obligation between the two parties—the
student is obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of the
school while the latter, as a learning institution, is mandated to
impart knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills
to pursue higher education or a profession, as well as to ensure and
take adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the campus.
A learning institution should not be allowed to completely
relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the
security agency it hired—to do so would result to contracting away
its inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its
students.
An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed
to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such
a loss.

Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are
negligent in the performance of their obligations are liable for
damages.
Accordingly, for breach of contract due to negligence in providing
a safe learning environment, respondent FEU is liable to petitioner
for damages. It is essential in the award of damages that the
claimant must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the
existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal
connection to defendant’s acts.
Spouses Batal v. Spouses San Pedro
Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses:
either as culpa aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an
obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other
obligation, or as culpa contractual, which is the fault or
negligence incident in the performance of an obligation which
already existed, and which increases the liability from such already
existing obligation.
Culpa aquiliana is governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code and
the immediately following Articles; while culpa contractual is
governed by Articles 1170 to 1174 of the same Code.
Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc.
negligence is direct, substantive negligence is merely incidental
and independent to the performance of the
contractual obligation; there is a
pre-existing contract or
obligation
the defense of “good father of a such is not a complete and
family” is a complete and proper defense in the selection
proper defense insofar as and supervision of employees.
parents, guardians and
employers are concerned
there is no presumption of negligence is presumed so long
negligence and it is incumbent as it can be proved that there
upon the injured party to prove was breach of the contract and
the negligence of the defendant, the burden is on the defendant
otherwise, the former’s to prove that there was no
complaint will be dismissed negligence in the carrying out
of the terms of the contract; the
rule of respondeat superior is
followed.
As petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is
incumbent upon her to prove the presence of the following
requisites before respondents PHI and DTPCI can be held liable,
to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence
of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by
the plaintiff. Further, since petitioner’s case is for quasi- delict, the
negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis
of her action. The burden of proof is upon petitioner.
Radio Communications v. Verchez
In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract
and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides: Those who in the
performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages.
It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa contractual or
breach of contract with regard to Grace, and on tort with regard
to her co-plaintiffs-herein-co-respondents.
For the defense of force majeure to prosper, x x x it is necessary
that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have
occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a
person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse
consequences of such a loss.
When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person’s
participation —whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to
act—the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the
rules applicable to acts of God.
Considering the public utility of RCPI’s business and its
contractual obligation to transmit messages, it should exercise due
diligence to ascertain that messages are delivered to the persons at
the given address and should provide a system whereby in cases of
undelivered messages the sender is given notice of non-delivery.
The negligence of RCPI lies upon its failure to at least notify Grace
of the non-delivery of its telegram.
RCPI’s defense of force majeure cannot prosper.
For it is its breach of contract upon which its liability is, it bears
repeating, anchored. Since RCPI breached its contract, the
presumption is that it was at fault or negligent. It, however, failed
to rebut this presumption.
For breach of contract then, RCPI is liable to Grace for damages.
And for quasi-delict, RCPI is liable to Grace’s co-respondents
following Art. 2176 and Art. 26.
Nonchalance in performing urgent obligation indicates gross
negligence amounting to bad faith; A telegraph company’s
negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly
disturbed the peace of mind not only of the sender but also of her
other relatives as well.
The tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in this case are,
therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil
Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict when courts
may award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Air France v. Carrascoso
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner,
his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept;
and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil
Code, moral damages are recoverable.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and
degree from any other contractual relation. And this, because of the
relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is
mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect
or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give
ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a
right to be treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
TORTS AND DAMAGES, CASE DOCTRINES 5
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier.
SPECIFIC CASES OF LIABILITY
POSSESSOR OF ANIMALS
Vestil v. IAC
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same
is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the
damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who has suffered damage.
Petitioner’s contention that they could not be expected to exercise
remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of
the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should
“escape or be lost” and so be removed from his control. And it does
not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was
tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The
law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame
ones as long as they cause injury.
The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not
based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the
possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on
natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who
possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer
for the damage which such animal may cause.
PRODUCT LIABLITY
Coca-Cola Bottlers v. CA
The vendee’s remedies against a vendor with respect to the
warranties against hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the
thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the
Civil Code.
The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon
proof of error or fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on
obligations shall be applicable.
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be
brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing
contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the
applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be
deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the act which breaks the
contract may also be a quasi-delict.
NEGLIGENCE
CONCEPT
Tison v. Spouses Pomasin
To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites
must concur:
(a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) fault or negligence of defendant; and
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like
any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a
contributing cause of the injury.
The negligence of Gregorio’s daughter, Laarni was the proximate
cause of the accident. Going downward, the jitney had the
tendency to accelerate. The fall into the shoulder of the road can
result in the loss of control of the jitney, which explains why it was
running in a zigzag manner before it hit the tractor-trailer. There
was no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding. There is a
preponderance of evidence that the tractor-trailer was in fact
ascending. Considering its size and the weight of the tractor-
trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a fully loaded
jitney which was running downhill in a zigzagging manner.
Art. 2185. “The rule on negligence per se must admit
qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the
facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that
matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging
liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure
of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat.
But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny
relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory
violation and the injury sustained.
In the instant case, no causal connection was established between
the tractor-trailer driver’s restrictions on his license to the
vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently
explain that the Land Transportation Office merely erred in not
including restriction code 8 in his license.
Gaid v. People
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.
The elements of simple negligence: are
(1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and
(2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the
danger is not clearly manifest.
The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in
doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or
property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of
the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually
pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from
that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous
results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable
foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born
of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held
to exist.
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent
operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct
causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial
contributing factor in the causation of the accident is not the
proximate cause of an injury.
The prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate cause
of the victim’s death was petitioner’s alleged negligence, if at all,
even during the second stage of the incident. If at all again,
petitioner’s failure to render assistance to the victim would
constitute abandonment of one’s victim punishable under Article
275 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the omission is not
covered by the information.
Gan v. Court of Appeals
*Test in determining negligence similar to Gaid v. People.
Emergency Rule. “Under that rule, one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.
Thus, under the circumstances narrated by petitioner, we find that
the appellate court is asking too much from a mere mortal like the
petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best
judgment to extricate herself from a difficult and dangerous
situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner
certainly could not be expected to act with all the coolness of a
person under normal conditions. The danger confronting petitioner
was real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She had no
opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to heed the
very powerfull instinct of self-preservation.
Layugan v. IAC
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
As Judge Cooley defines it, "The failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury."
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in
effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman Law.
Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the happening of an injury
permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces
substantial evidence that injury was caused by an agency or
instrumentality under exclusive control and management of
defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary
course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been
used.
Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code.
In the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in
the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after selection, or both. Such presumption is juris tantum and not
juris et de jure and consequently, may be rebutted.
STANDARD OF CONDUCT
ORDINARY PRUDENT PERSON
PNR v. Vizcara
*Definition of negligence similar to Layugan v. IAC
A reliable signaling device in good condition, not just a dilapidated
“Stop, Look and Listen” signage, is needed to give notice to the
public. It is the responsibility of the railroad company to use
reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order. Failure
to do so would be an indication of negligence. Having established
the fact of negligence on the part of the petitioners, they were
rightfully held liable for damages.
As an institution established to alleviate public transportation, it is
the duty of the PNR to promote the safety and security of the
general riding public and provide for their convenience, which to a
considerable degree may be accomplished by the installation of
precautionary warning devices.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for
his own protection.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance provides that the antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages
caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last
fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence.
The proximate cause of the collision was the petitioners’
negligence in ensuring that motorists and pedestrians alike may
safely cross the railroad track. The unsuspecting driver and
passengers of the jeepney did not have any participation in the
occurrence of the unfortunate incident which befell them. Likewise,
they did not exhibit any overt act manifesting disregard for their
own safety. Thus, absent preceding negligence on the part of the
respondents, the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied.
McKee v. IAC
*Definition of negligence similar to Layugan v. IAC; Emergency
Rule, Proximate Cause, Art. 2185
The truck driver’s negligence is apparent in the records. He
himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers)
per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by
law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185
of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent
if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is a doctrine in the law of torts
which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured
will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence,
have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured
party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to
avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof.
Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule that it was
the truck driver’s negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to
avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the
collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents
are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily
liable for the resulting damages.
CHILDREN
Ylarde v. Aquino
It is only the teachers and not the principal or head of an academic
school who should be answerable for torts committed by their
students. In a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the
school who can be held liable. Under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code,
the teacher-in-charge of school children should be held liable for
negligence in his supervision over them and his failure to take the
necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons.
A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils should make
sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company.
The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the
capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor
should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his
conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of
persons of his age and experience.
The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his
own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by
children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and
experience under the same or similar circumstances.
TORTS AND DAMAGES, CASE DOCTRINES 7
Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde with
reckless imprudence.
Jarco Marketing v. CA
Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance. One who maintains on his
premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character
likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary
care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto,
is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if
the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. The principal
reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question
although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or
alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach,
get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to
such children.
Accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or
negligence attaches to the defendant. It is “a fortuitous
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any
human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human
agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or
unexpected by the person to whom it happens.”
Negligence is “the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.”
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot
exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is
exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person
and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested
by common prudence.
Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required
discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a
child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively
presumed to be incapable of negligence ; and that the presumption
of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a
child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one,
under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years
of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory
negligence as a matter of law
PROFESSIONALS
Li v. Spouses Soliman
Medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has
available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical
professional which has caused bodily harm.
In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove
that a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed
to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider
would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably
prudent provider would not have done; and that that failure or
action caused injury to the patient.
This Court has recognized that medical negligence cases are best
proved by opinions of expert witnesses belonging in the same
general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as
defendant physician or surgeon.
Tort of “battery” (i.e., an unauthorized physical contact with a
patient) if they had not gained the consent of their patients prior to
performing a surgery or procedure.
Doctrine of Informed Consent is a general principle of law that a
physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent
physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable
care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of
injury might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so
that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and
faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or
alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his
judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the
probable benefits.
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a
malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed consent:
(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks;
(2) he failed to disclose/inadequately disclosed those risks;
(3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the
patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have
consented to; and
(4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment.
The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to
“point to significant undisclosed information relating to the
treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it.
Cruz v. CA
For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite
degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the
generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion.
The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified
physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual
technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of
intelligently evaluating.
Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the
circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct
falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in
good standing when performing the same operation.
It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician
are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable
presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution
and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his
clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. This
presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly
lacking in the case at bench.
DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE
GSIS v. Pacific Airways
For disregarding PAL’s right of way, PAC’s pilots were grossly
negligent. Gross negligence is one that is characterized by the
want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar
as other persons may be affected.
*also cited in Bano v. Bachelor Express
The immediate and proximate case of the collision is the gross
negligence of PAC’s pilots. The fact that PAC’s pilots disregarded
PAL’s right of way and did not ask for updated clearance right
before crossing an active runway was the proximate cause of the
collision. Were it not for such gross negligence on the part of
PAC’s pilots, the collision would not have happened.
PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE
Anonuevo v. CA
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
the personal judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it
is the law which determines what would be reckless or negligent.
To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be
shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health
and body. To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to
establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the
negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense,
negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to
the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.
Anonuevo (driver of the car) was still liable for being negligent in
speeding before making his turn, and thus causing Villagracia’s
injury (cyclist). This is despite Villagracia not having installed
safety precautions in his bicycle as such was not the proximate
cause of the injury. Neither was there any contributory negligence
from Villagracia.
Standard Insurance Co. v. Cuaresma
For the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible as
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the following
requisites must be present: x x x (a) that the entry was made by a
public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of
his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other
person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which
must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
While the Traffic Accident Investigation Report was exhibited as
evidence, the investigating officer who prepared the same was not
presented in court to testify that he had sufficient knowledge of the
facts therein stated, and that he acquired them personally or
through official information. Neither was there any explanation as
to why such officer was not presented.
Josefa v. Manila Electric Co.
In some cases where negligence is difficult to prove, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence.
This doctrine postulates that, as a matter of common knowledge
and experience and in the absence of some explanation by the
defendant who is charged with negligence, the very nature of
occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of
the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury. In
other words, res ipsa loquitur is grounded on the superior logic of
ordinary human experience that negligence may be deduced from
the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
For this doctrine to apply, the complainant must show that: (1) the
accident is of such character as to warrant an inference that it
would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence;
(2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the
person charged with the negligence complained of;
(3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
Meralco has sufficiently established the direct causal link between
the truck and the electricity post. The present case satisfies all the
elements of res ipsa loquitur. It is very unusual and extraordinary
for the truck to hit an electricity post, an immovable and stationary
object, unless Bautista, who had the exclusive management and
control of the truck, acted with fault or negligence. We cannot also
conclude that Meralco contributed to the injury since it safely and
permanently installed the electricity post beside the street.
BDJC Construction v. Lanuzo
*Preponderance of evidence
Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence
cannot be fairly ascribed to the company considering that it has
shown its installation of the necessary warning signs and lights in
the project site. In that context, the fatal accident was not caused
by any instrumentality within the exclusive control of the company.
Res ipsa loquitur did not apply. The cause of death of Balbino was
the fatal depressed fracture at the back of his head, an injury that
Dr. Abilay opined to be attributable to his head landing on the
cemented road after being thrown off his motorcycle. Considering
that it was shown that Balbino was not wearing any protective
head gear or helmet at the time of the accident, he was guilty of
negligence in that respect. Had he worn the protective head gear
or helmet, his untimely death would not have occurred.
Filipinas Synthetic v. De Los Santos
It was well established that Mejia was driving at a speed beyond
the rate of speed required by law, specifically Sec. 35 of RA 4136.
Given the circumstances, the allowed rate of speed for Mejia's
vehicle was 50 kilometers per hour, while the records show that he
was driving at the speed of 70 kilometers per hour. Second
sentence of Sec. 42 provides that the driver of any vehicle traveling
at any unlawful speed shall forfeit any right of way which he might
otherwise have. Under the New Civil Code, unless there is proof to
the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating
any traffic regulation.
From those evidence, borne out by the records, there was proof
more than preponderant to conclude that Mejia was traveling at an
unlawful speed, hence, the negligent driver. The excessive speed
employed by Mejia was the proximate cause of the collision that
led to the sudden death of Teresa Elena and Armando.
Mendoza v. Soriano
Both circumstances support the conclusion that the FX vehicle
driven by Macasasa was overspeeding. Macasasa, the vehicle
driver, did not aid Soriano, the accident victim, in violation of Sec.
55, Art. V of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. While
Macasasa at first agreed to bring Soriano to the hospital, he fled the
scene in a hurry. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, there is no
showing of any factual basis that Macasasa fled for fear of the
people’s wrath. What remains undisputed is that he did not report
the accident to a police officer, nor did he summon a doctor.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a motor
vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating traffic regulations
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the
damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks. The liability arises due to the presumed negligence
of the employers in supervising their employees unless they prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage.
Respondents could recover directly from petitioner since petitioner
failed to prove that she exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in supervising Macasasa. Soriano was guilty of
contributory negligence for not using the pedestrian overpass
while crossing Commonwealth Avenue.
Del Carmen v. Bacoy
Res ipsa loquitur is merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a
mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for,
and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof
of negligence. It recognizes that parties may establish prima facie
negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to
substitute for specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to
present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending
circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or
presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the
burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part.
The doctrine is based partly on the theory that the defendant in
charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows
the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining
it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore
compelled to allege negligence in general terms.
TORTS AND DAMAGES, CASE DOCTRINES 9
The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a
presumption of negligence against Oscar Jr. which he could have
overcome by evidence that he exercised due care and diligence in
preventing strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately, he failed
to do so.
Macalinao v. Ong
The issue of negligence is factual and, in quasi-delicts, crucial in
the award of damages. In the case at bar, the crux of the
controversy is the sufficiency of the evidence presented to support
a finding of negligence against Ong. The evidence on record
coupled with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur sufficiently
establishes Ong’s negligence. (Photographs, police report)
An examination of said photographs clearly shows that the road
where the mishap occurred is marked by a line at the center
separating the right from the left lane. While ending up at the
opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile
collisions, the position of the two vehicles gives rise to the
conclusion that it was the Isuzu truck which hit the private jeepney
rather than the other way around/
No two motor vehicles traversing opposite lanes will collide as a
matter of course unless someone is negligent, thus, the first
requisite for the application of res ipsa loquitur is present. 2 nd and
3rd requisites are also present.
- There exists a fourth requisite under American
jurisprudence, that is, that the defendant fails to
offer any explanation tending to show that the
injury was caused by his or her want of due care.
As a consequence, the prima facie finding of negligence against
Ong, remaining unexplained and/or uncontradicted, is deemed
established. This in turn warrants a finding that Ong is liable for
damages to petitioners.
Batiquin v. CA
*Res ipsa loquitur
The entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the
exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin, private respondents were bereft
of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the
foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas'
body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless through the
intervention of negligence.
DEFENSES
PLAINTIFFS’ DEFENSES
Ramos v. COL Realty
Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by
the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or
agent, the latter's negligence is imputed to his superior and will
defeat the superior's action against the third person, assuming of
course that the contributory negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury of which complaint is made.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case,
Aquilino's (responent’s driver) act of crossing Katipunan Avenue
via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was
prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the
accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages
suffered by respondent from the accident. If Aquilino heeded the
MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from
Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This
specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was
intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides
within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had
reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a
natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue
since such crossing is considered dangerous.
Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo
"A prior and remote' cause cannot be made the basis of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if
there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury
a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act
or condition is the proximate cause.
To hold the defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno,
such supposed negligence of the company (in not properly
insulating the wires; although according to the unrefuted claim of
said company it was impossible to make the insulation of that kind
of wire) must have been the proximate and principal cause of the
accident, because if the act of Magno in turning around and
swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the
proximate and principal cause of the electrocution, then his heirs
may not recover.
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the
electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause,
but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning
around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any
precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire
to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the lattery
length of 6 feet.
PLDT v. CA
As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such
as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation,
constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said
omitted act would have prevented the injury.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the
burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence
causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies
on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first
instance of proving the existence of the same if contested,
otherwise his action must fail.
Antonio Esteban’s negligence was proven to be not only
contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the
very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its
determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover
damages. It was not the lack of knowledge of the excavations
which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but
the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane
towards the accident mound. – Court found through evidence
presented that the sudden swerving was due to Esteban’s lack of
due care by driving so fast during a drizzle and that he knew of
the excavations being a resident of the same street where the
excavations were made.
Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon
Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act
of Reynaldo (petitioner’s driver) for, as the trial court correctly
held, without that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap
in all probability would not have happened.
Article 2179. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is
that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should
not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the
consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be
held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.
The determination of the mitigation of the defendant’s liability
varies depending on the circumstances of each case.
Proximate cause was the sudden left turn of the jeepney without
care of petitioner’s driver, which caused the motorcycle to slice
through the side of the jeepney and causing the death of the
motorcycle driver. However, the Court found the decease with
contributory negligence for tailgating, speeding, having drunk
beer before driving and for not wearing a protective helmet.
Damages were mitigated and only 50% of the damages was
awarded to respondent’s.
Phil. Bank of Commerce v. CA
Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred”.
Under the doctrine of "last clear chance," that an antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages
for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability
sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could
have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
Assuming that RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity
to defraud the company, as advanced by PBC, yet it cannot be
denied that the bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity
to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully
observing their self-imposed validation procedure. RMC was
likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of
account.The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such
an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised
even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by
RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the
damages that may be awarded to RMC. Both liable.
FORTUITOUS EVENT
Real v. Belo
Jurisprudence defines the elements of a "fortuitous event" as
follows:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence must be
independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the
caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to
avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner;
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be
responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must
be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or
loss.
In this case, petitioner not only failed to show that she submitted
proof that the LPG stove and tank in her fastfood stall were
maintained in good condition and periodically checked for defects
but she also failed to submit proof that she exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her
employees. For failing to prove care and diligence in the
maintenance of her cooking equipment and in the selection and
supervision of her employees, the necessary inference was that
petitioner had been negligent.
Southeastern College, Inc. v. CA
In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability,
it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or
misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned.
An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person
who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its
possible adverse consequences. When a person’s negligence
concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to
another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that
the immediate or proximate cause of the damages or injury was a
fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the result of
the participation of man — whether it be from active intervention,
or neglect, or failure to act — the whole occurrence is hereby
humanized, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse
consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no
human participation amounting to a negligent act. In other words;
the person seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of
negligence.
Perla Compania v. Sarangaya III
A prudent man should have known that a 14-year-old car,
constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage
and other defects. For failing to prove care and diligence in the
maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was that
Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the car. The
circumstances on record do not support the defense of Pascual.
Clearly, there was no caso fortuito because of his want of care
and prudence in maintaining the car.
The fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit
any proof that he had it periodically checked (as its year-model
and condition required) revealed his negligence
*Res ipsa loquitor applied; petitioner-employer, vicariously liable.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Ilocos Norte Electric Co. v. CA
While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of
God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said
eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through
the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place.
Electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care
required of electric companies must be commensurate with or
proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree
of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a
right to be.
"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care
requires prompt efforts to discover and repair broken lines” The
fact is that when Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power
TORTS AND DAMAGES, CASE DOCTRINES 1
1
Corporation set out in the early morning of June 29, 1967 on an
inspection tour, he saw grounded and disconnected lines hanging
from posts to the ground but did not see any INELCO lineman
either in the streets or at the INELCO office. The foregoing shows
that petitioner's duty to exercise extraordinary diligence under the
circumstance was not observed.
The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" (To a willing person, injury is
not done) relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case
at bar.
It has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule,
that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide
by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life
or property of another is in peril;
or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property.
As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong the
deceased, accompanied by the former two, were on their way to
the latter's grocery store "to see to it that the goods were not
flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to
protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the
unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal
injury? Definitely not
EMERGENCY RULE
Valenzuela v. CA
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform
for his own protection. We agree with the respondent court that
Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence.
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs
Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without much time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be
a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective
thought, or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening
situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an individual in
such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the
event which absolutely negates thoughtful care, but by the over-all
nature of the circumstances.
A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a
rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both
convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other
motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search
for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or alley where she would
likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to
stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of
Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling
vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists.
In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of
Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat
tire. To avoid putting herself and other motorists in danger, she did
what was best under the situation.
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the
standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be
considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances
which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower
extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a
sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it
was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.
"Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which
creates an undue risk of harm to others." It is the failure to observe
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was
the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. The
circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court
below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving
his Mitsubishi Lancer
DUE DILIGENCE
Ramos v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.
“In order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised
all diligence of a good father of a family, he should not be satisfied
with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he
should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to
his qualifications, his experience and record of service."
Art. 2180, NCC. The responsibility treated of in this Article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
From this article two things are apparent:
(1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after the selection, or both; and (2) that the presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently may be rebutted.
It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction
of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability.
Company’s uncontested testimony providing that the “defendant
driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the
production department; that when he was hired as a driver, 'we
had size [sic] him by looking into his background, asking him to
submit clearances, previous experience, physical examination and
later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's
examination, consisting of: first, theoretical examination and
second, the practical driving examination, all of which he had
undergone, and that the defendant company was a member of the
Safety Council.
PRESCRIPTION
Spouses Santos v. Hon. Pizardo
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are
consistent with petitioners’ claim that the action was brought to
recover civil liability arising from crime.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case,
the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed.
Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened
for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex
delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi
delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been
expressly reserved.