indemnification, merely repairs the
TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Go
*compilation of codal, concepts from cases, classroom discussions
E.L.C. 11.17.17
NOTE: Unless otherwise mentioned, codal references
will always pertain to the Civil Code.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Concept: Cupla Aquiliana, Quasi-Delict, Torts
1. Torts include not only negligence, but
intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and
battery, false imprisonment and deceit. (Gashem
Shookat Baksh v. CA)
2. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict. (Art. 2176) [quasi-
delict = culpa aquiliana] As currently worded, Art. 2176
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes
the notion of willfulness or intent. (Gashem Shookat
Baksh v. CA)
B. Distinctions: Culpa Aquiliana, Culpa
Contractual, and Culpa Criminal
1. Quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. Breach of contract or
culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in
the performance of a contractual obligation. (Calalas v.
CA)
2. In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should
be clearly established because it is the basis of the
action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can
be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the
contract and the fact that the obligor failed to perform
his obligation. (Calalas v. CA)
3. Some of the differences between crimes under
the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito
under the Civil Code are:
a. That crimes affect the public interest,
while cuasi-delitos are only of private
concern.
b. That, consequently, the Penal Code
punishes or corrects the criminal act,
while the Civil Code, by means of
1
c.
damage.
That delicts are not as broad as quasi-
delicts, because the former are punished
only if there is a penal law clearly covering
them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos,
include all acts in which “any kind of fault
or negligence intervenes.” However, it
should be noted that not all violations of
the penal law produce civil responsibility,
such as begging in contravention of
ordinances, violation of the game laws,
infraction of the rules of traffic when
nobody is hurt. (Barredo v. Garcia)
4. Every legal obligation must of necessity be
extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual
obligation has its source in the breach or omission of
those mutual duties which civilized society imposes
upon it members, or which arise from these relations,
other than contractual, of certain members of society
to others, generally embraced in the concept of status.
The legal rights of each member of society constitute
the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly
negative in character, which the existence of those
rights imposes upon all other members of society. The
breach of these general duties whether due to willful
intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury,
give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party.
The fundamental distinction between obligations of
this character and those which arise from contract,
rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual
obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris,
whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists
independently of the breach of the voluntary duty
assumed by the parties when entering into the
contractual relation. (Cangco v. PNR)
II. QUASI-DELICT
A. Concept
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
1. Elements:
a. Culpable act or negligence
b. Damage to another
c. Causal relation between the culpable act
or negligence and the damage to another

2. Although the relation of passenger and carrier
is contractual both in origin and nature nevertheless
the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Air
France Carrascoso) Simply put, the existence of a
contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the order and
the consequent recovery of damages therefor. (Singson
v. Bank of Philippine Islands)
3. In order that an obligation based on quasi-
delict may arise, there must be no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties. But there are
exceptions. There may be an action for quasi-delict
notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract
between the parties. A liability for tort may arise even
under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract. Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort,
thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. (American
Express v. Cordero)
4. Damnum Absque Injuria
a. The principle of damnum absque injuria,
or damage without injury means that
although there was physical damage,
there was no legal injury, as there was no
violation of a legal right. (NPC v. CA)
b. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right
while damage is the hurt, loss or harm
which results from the injury. (Lagon v.
CA)
c. Conjunction of damage and wrong is here
absent. There cannot be an actionable
wrong if either one or the other is wanting.
(Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw)
d. As applied to government officials,
“Mistakes concededly committed by
public officers are not actionable absent
any clear showing that they were
motivated by malice or gross negligence
amounting to bad faith.” (Farolan v.
Solmac)
5. Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of wrong; it means breach of a known duty thru some
motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature
of fraud. (Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw)
6. Good faith refers to a state of the mind which
is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned.
It consists of the honest intention to abstain from
2
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous
advantage of another. It is the opposite of fraud, and
its absence should be established by convincing
evidence. (Farolan v. Solmac)
7. Art. 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character; whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently,
a separate civil action against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only
to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused. Culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law. (Dulay v. CA)
B. No Double Recovery Rule
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
1. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has
the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability
arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi
delict under Art. 2176 of the Philippines. Once the
choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself
of any other remedy because he may not recover
damages twice for the same negligent act or omission
of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery.
(Rafael Reyes Trucking v. People)
2. The rationale behind the prohibition on double
recovery is the rule against unjust enrichment.
(Joseph v. Bautista)
3. The enforcement of the judgment against the
employer in an action based on Art. 2176 does not
require the employee to be insolvent since the nature
of the liability of the employer with that of the employee,
the two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors,
is solidary. On the other hand, an action predicated on
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an
employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a
felony committed by his employee in the discharge of
his duty. This liability attaches when the employee is
convicted of a crime done in the performance of his
work and is found to be insolvent that renders him
unable to properly respond to the civil liability
adjudged. (Rafael Reyes Trucking v. People)
4. The prohibition on double recovery does not
bar filing of multiple actions (subject to compliance
with the Rules of Court). He plaintiff will be entitled to
the bigger award. (Gula v. Dianala)
III. NEGLIGENCE
A. Concept
1. Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct
of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not
do. (Jarco Marketing v. CA)
2. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the
protection of the interest of another person, that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. (Jarco Marketing v. CA)
3. Negligence is want of the care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the
situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.
Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is
necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of
ordinary care under the circumstances. (McKee v. IAC)
4. An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in
which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant.
Accident and negligence are intrinsically
contradictory; one cannot exist with the
other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is
exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault
of any person and which could not have been
prevented by any means suggested by common
prudence. (Jarco Marketing v. CA)
5. The test in determining the existence of
negligence is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
3
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. (Picart v. Smith)
6. The existence of negligence in a given case is
not determined by reference to the personal judgment
of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that. (Picart v.
Smith)
7. In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years
of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without
discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from
criminal liability. The same presumption and a like
exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a
person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless
it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since
negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and
required discernment as a condition of liability, either
criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by
analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of
negligence; and that the presumption of lack of
discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of
a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a
rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is
that a child under nine years of age must be
conclusively presumed incapable of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. (Jarco Marketing v. CA)
8. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case
is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent
man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the conduct
or guarding against its consequences. (Fernando v. CA)
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in
the performance of every kind of obligation is also
demandable, but such liability may be regulated by
the courts, according to the circumstances.
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2, shall apply.
 If the law or contract does not state the diligence
which is to be observed in the performance, that
which is expected of a good father of a family shall
be required.
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by
the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
9. Obligations arising from contracts have the
force of law between the contracting parties. Corollarily,
those who in the performance of their obligations are
guilty of fraud, negligence or delay and those who in
any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages. The fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
the time and of the place. (Sarmiento v. Sun-Cabrido)
B. As Proximate Cause
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
1. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
(Bataclan v. Medina)
2. More comprehensively, the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom. (Bataclan v.
Medina)
3. Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding
which acts of the injured party shall be considered
4
immediate causes of the accident. The test is
simple. Distinction must be made between the
accident and the injury, between the event itself,
without which there could have been no accident, and
those acts of the victim not entering into it,
independent of it, but contributing to his own proper
hurt. (Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf; Fernando v. CA)
4. The rule is that the death of the victim must
be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (Urbano v.
IAC)
*As discussed in class, always be specific in
declaring which act is the proximate cause. In the case
of Taylor v. Manila Electric, the proximate cause is not
that for a 15-year old boy he has an advance
knowledge but rather his knowledge that the yellow
substance is explosive when ignited which he did and
later was injured for it.
C. Proof of Negligence
1. In an action for damages founded on culpable
negligence, the principle to be observed is that the
person claiming damages has the burden of proving
that the damage is caused by the fault or negligence of
the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one
of his employees. (Ong v. Metropolitan Water District)
D. Presumption of Negligence
Respondeat Superior
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
1. Respondeat superior means “let the master
answer.” In respondeat superior, it is not necessary to
prove that the employer is negligent (unlike in
vicarious liability). Establishing that the employee is
liable, that there is an employer-employee relationship,
and that the employee acted for the benefit of the
employer is enough.
2. Operation of Employer’s Motor Vehicle in Going
to or from Meals. It has been held that an employee who
uses his employers vehicle in going from his work to a
place where he intends to eat or in returning to work
from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of
his employment in the absence of evidence of some
special business benefit to the employer. Evidence that
by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals,
an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so
devote more time to the performance of his duties
supports the finding that an employee is acting within
the scope of his employment while so driving the
vehicle. (Castilex v. Vasquez)
3. Operation of Employer’s Vehicle in Going to or
from Work. In the same vein, traveling to and from the
place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or
concern of the employee, and not a part of his services
to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special
benefit to the employer other than the mere
performance of the services available at the place
where he is needed, the employee is not acting within
the scope of his employment even though he uses his
employers motor vehicle. (Castilex v. Vasquez)
The employer may, however, be liable where he
derives some special benefit from having the employee
drive home in the employers vehicle as when the
employer benefits from having the employee at work
earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his
actual duties. Where the employees duties require him
to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or
hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various
outside places of work, and his employer furnishes
him with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have
frequently applied what has been called the special
errand or roving commission rule, under which it can
be found that the employee continues in the service of
his employer until he actually reaches home. However,
even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the
scope of his employment in going to or from work in
his employers vehicle, the employer is not liable for his
negligence where at the time of the accident, the
employee has left the direct route to his work or back
home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
(Castilex v. Vasquez)
4. Use of Employer’s Vehicle Outside Regular
Working Hours. An employer who loans his motor
vehicle to an employee for the latter’s personal use
outside of regular working hours is generally not liable
for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle
during the period of permissive use, even where the
employer contemplates that a regularly assigned
motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal
as well as business purposes and there is some
incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the
employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has
been accomplished and he has started the return trip
5
to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has
been held that he has not resumed his employment,
and the employer is not liable for the employees
negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip.
(Castilex v. Vasquez)
Violation of Rules and Statutes
a. Traffic Rules
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who
was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding
two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the
provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it
is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation.
5. Under Art. 2185, unless there is proof to the
contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap
he was violating a traffic regulation. (Mallari v. CA)
b. Statutes and Ordinances or
Administrative Rules
6. Violation of a rule promulgated by a company
is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence of
negligence. (Marinduque Iron v. Workmen’s
Compensation)
7. Violation of a statutory duty is negligence per
se. In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the
owner of a furniture shop was held to be liable for the
destruction of the plaintiffs house in a fire which
started in his establishment in view of his failure to
comply with an ordinance which required the
construction of a firewall. In Teague v. Fernandez, we
stated that where the very injury which was intended
to be prevented by the ordinance has happened, non-
compliance with the ordinance was not only an act
negligence, but also the proximate cause of the death.
(Cipriano v. CA)
*As explained in class, violation of an internal
policy cannot give rise to a presumption of negligence,
such as in the Marinduque case, while violation of an
administrative rule, statute, or ordinance gives rise to
a presumption of negligence or “negligence per se.”
However, in the latter case, it must be shown that the
violation of the statute was the proximate or legal
cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed
thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of
violation of law, like any other negligence, is without
legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of
the injury. (Sanitary Steam Laundry v. CA)
Dangerous Weapons and Substances
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of
negligence on the part of the defendant if the death
or injury results from his possession of dangerous
weapons or substances, such as firearms and
poison, except when the possession or use thereof
is indispensable in his occupation or business.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
8. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which
literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for
itself. The phrase res ipsa loquitur is a maxim for the
rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken
with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or
make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an
explanation. Where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management
of the defendant or his servants and the accident is
such as in ordinary course of things does not happen
if those who have its management or control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from or was caused by the defendants
want of care. (Ramos v. CA; Africa v. Caltex)
9. It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out
an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the
plaintiffs prima facie case. The doctrine rests on
inference and not on presumption. The facts of the
occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and
they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence
when direct evidence is lacking. (Perla Compania v. Sps.
Sarangaya)
10. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a
recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of
common knowledge and experience, the very nature of
certain types of occurrences may justify an inference
of negligence on the part of the person who controls
the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence
of some explanation by the defendant who is charged
with negligence. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in
6
conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
(Ramos v. CA)
11. However, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of
substantive law and does not create or constitute an
independent or separate ground of liability. Instead, it
is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of
a procedural rule. It is regarded as a mode of proof, or
a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a
substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of
producing specific proof of negligence. In other words,
mere invocation and application of the doctrine does
not dispense with the requirement of proof of
negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such
proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the
proof of the accident, enough of the attending
circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an
inference or presumption of negligence, and to thereby
place on the defendant the burden of going forward
with the proof. (Ramos v. CA)
12. Requisites:
a. the accident is of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent;
b. the cause of the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person in charge
and
c. the injury suffered must not have been
due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person
injured. (Perla Compania v. Sps.
Sarangaya)
E. Defenses
1. Possible defenses against negligence:
a. Plaintiff’s negligence is proximate cause of
injury
b. Comparative or contributory negligence
c. Assumption of risk
d. Doctrine of last clear chance
e. Prescription
f. Force majeure/fortuitous event
g. Diligence
h. Mistake and waiver
i. Emergency or sudden peril
Plaintiff’s Negligence is Proximate Cause of Injury
2. As an example, in the case of PLDT v. CA, the
Supreme Court held that “the findings clearly show
that the negligence of respondent was not only
contributory to his injuries but goes to the very cause
of the occurrence of the accident and thereby
precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of
the road were known to, hence appreciated and
assumed by, private respondent. By exercising
reasonable care and prudence, respondent could have
avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even
assuming arguendo that there was some alleged
negligence on the part of petitioner.” (see also Kim v.
Phil. Aerial Taxi and American Express v. Cordero)
Comparative v. Contributory Negligence
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
3. The doctrine of comparative negligence allows
a recovery by a plaintiff whose own act contributed to
his injury, provided his negligence was slight as
compared with that of the defendant, and reducing the
award to a plaintiff in proportion to his responsibility
for the accident. (Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf)
4. The underlying precept on contributory
negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible
for his own injury should not be entitled to recover
damages in full but must bear the consequences of his
own negligence. The defendant must thus be held
liable only for the damages actually caused by his
negligence. (Estacion v. Bernardo) The determination
of the mitigation of the defendants liability varies
depending on the circumstances of each
case. (Lambert v. Heirs of Castillion)
*The way Art. 2179 is worded, mitigation of
damages is also possible in case of contributory
negligence. Hence, the distinction between
comparative and contributory negligence is really not
necessary.
5. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part
of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to
the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard to which he is required to conform for his
own protection. To hold a person as having
contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger
to health and body. To prove contributory negligence,
it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although
not proximate, between the negligence of the party and
the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is
contributory only when it contributes proximately to
the injury, and not simply a condition for its
occurrence. (PNR v. Brunty)
7
6. Since a master may be held for his servant's
wrongful act, the law imputes to the master the act of
the servant, and if that act is negligent or wrongful and
proximately results in injury to a third person, the
negligence or wrongful conduct is the negligence or
wrongful conduct of the master, for which he is
liable. The general rule is that if the master is injured
by the negligence of a third person and by the
concurring contributory negligence of his own servant
or agent, the latter's negligence is imputed to his
superior and will defeat the superior's action against
the third person, assuming, of course that the
contributory negligence was the proximate cause of
the injury of which complaint is made. (PCI Bank v. CA)
Assumption of Risk
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by
the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
7. The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria means
that to which a person assents is not esteemed, in law,
an injury, the facts and circumstances being as such
to warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff, freely and
voluntarily, with full knowledge of the nature and
extent of the risk he ran, impliedly agreed to incur it.
When a person, knowing and appreciating the danger
and the risk, elects voluntarily to encounter them, he
can no more maintain an action founded upon the
statute than he can in cases to which the statute has
no application. (Transporto v. Mijares)
8. Assumption of risk means that one who
voluntarily assumed the risk of injury from a known
danger is debarred from a recovery is recognized in
negligence cases. One who knows, appreciates, and
deliberately exposes himself to a danger assumes risk
thereof. One cannot deliberately incur an obvious risk
of personal injury, especially when preventive
measures are at hand, and then hold the author of the
danger for the ensuing injury. (Transporto v. Mijares)
9. The job of taking care of animals includes the
assumption of risk of being hurt by those animals.
(Afialda v. Hisole)
10. Carnapping is a normal business risk for
those engaged in the repair of motor vehicles. For just
as the owner is exposed to that risk so is the repair
shop since the car was entrusted to it. That is why,
repair shops are required to first register with the
DTI and to secure an insurance policy for the shop
covering the property entrusted by its customer for
repair, service or maintenance as a pre-requisite for
such registration/accreditation. Violation of this
statutory duty constitutes negligence per se. (Co v. CA)
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
11. The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery
for the negligence of the defendant where it appears
that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences
to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's
negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear
chance means that even though a person's own acts
may have placed him in a position of peril, and an
injury results, the injured person is entitled to recover.
As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the
last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent or that of a third person imputed to the
opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident. (McKee v. IAC)
12. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means
that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of defendant where it
appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care
and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence. (Ong v. Metropolitan Water District)
13. The doctrine applies only in a situation where
the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do
so, is made liable for all the consequences of the
accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the
plaintiff. The subsequent negligence of the defendant
in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to
plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate cause of
the accident which intervenes between the accident
and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus
making the defendant liable to the plaintiff. (McKee v.
IAC)
14. The last clear chance doctrine can never apply
where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided
by the application of all means at hand after the peril
is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in
which any previous negligence of the party charged
cannot be said to have contributed to the injury. (Ong
v. Metropolitan Water District)
Prescription
8
Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted
within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;
However, when the action arises from or out of any
act, activity, or conduct of any public officer
involving the exercise of powers or authority arising
from Martial Law including the arrest, detention
and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be
brought within one (1) year.
15. The prescriptive period begins from the day
the quasi-delict is committed. For example, in the case
of Kramer v. CA, it was an error for the plaintiff to
consider the date of issuance of the regulatory board
regarding the collision of the ships as the reckoning
date of the prescriptive period. The plaintiff should
have filed his claim with the court within 4 years from
the date of the collision because that is when the cause
of action arose.
16. It is also important to consider the cause of
action in determining the proper prescriptive period to
apply. In Sps. Santos v. Pizarro, the Supreme Court
ruled that since the cause of action is the civil liability
arising from the crime, then Art. 1146 is not applicable
since it relates only to quasi-delicts and not to civil
liability arising ex delicto. Similarly, in De Guzman v.
Toyota, it was held that since the action is for
collection of damages arising from a breach of implied
warranty, the six months prescriptive period should be
applied and not the two year prescriptive period in R.A.
7394.
Force Majeur/Fortuitous Event
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by
the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
17. Force majeure or fortuitous event is an
inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced
by any physical cause which is irresistible; such as
lightning. tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or
earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person;
any accident due to natural cause, directly exclusively
without human intervention, such as could not have
been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and
care reasonably to have been expected. (Gotesco v.
Chatto)
18. Elements:
a. the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of
the debtor to comply with his obligation,
must be independent of the human will;
b. it must be impossible to foresee the event
which constitutes the ‘caso fortuito’, or if it
can be foreseen, it must be impossible to
avoid;
c. the occurrence must be such as to render
it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and
d. the obligor must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the
injury resulting to the creditor. (Servando
v. Phil. Steam)
19. Where fortuitous event or force majeure is the
immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor
is exempt from liability for non-performance.
(Servando v. Phil. Steam) However, when an act of God
combines or concurs with the negligence of the
defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable
if the injury would not have resulted but for his own
negligent conduct or omission. (Ilocos Norte Electric v.
CA) There must be an entire exclusion of human
agency from the cause of injury or loss. (Yobido v. CA)
20. Claiming that one is ignorant as to the real
cause of the damage does not equate with force
majeure. (Gotesco v. Chatto)
21. Carnapping per se cannot be considered as a
fortuitous event. The fact that a thing was unlawfully
and forcefully taken from another’s rightful possession,
as in cases of carnapping, does not automatically give
rise to a fortuitous event. To be considered as such,
carnapping entails more than the mere forceful taking
of another’s property. It must be proved and
established that the event was an act of God or was
done solely by third parties and that neither the
claimant nor the person alleged to be negligent has any
participation. (Co v. CA)
Diligence
Art. 2180. x x x
The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.
9
22. Under Article 2180, employers are directly and
primarily liable for the resulting damages of the
negligence of their employee. The presumption that
they are negligent flows from the negligence of their
employee. Their only possible defense is that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage. (McKee v. IAC)
23. The diligence of a good father referred to
means the diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees. (McKee v. IAC; Umali v. Bacani) Thus, when
an employee, while performing his duties, causes
damage to persons or property due to his own
negligence, there arises the juris tantum presumption
that the employer is negligent, either in the selection
of the employee or in the supervision over him after the
selection. For the employer to avoid the solidary
liability for a tort committed by his employee, an
employer must rebut the presumption by presenting
adequate and convincing proof that in the selection
and supervision of his employee, he or she exercises
the care and diligence of a good father of a family.
(Estacion v. Bernardo)
24. In the selection of prospective employees,
employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. On the
other hand, due diligence in the supervision of
employees includes the formulation of suitable rules
and regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions intended for the
protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his or its employees
and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures
upon employees in case of breach or as may be
warranted to ensure the performance of acts
indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their
employer. To this, we add that actual implementation
and monitoring of consistent compliance with said
rules should be the constant concern of the employer,
acting through dependable supervisors who should
regularly report on their supervisory functions. To
establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of
vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence. (Safeguard
Security v. Tangco)
25. In the selection of prospective employees,
employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the
supervision of employees, the employer must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor
their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious
liability, employers must submit concrete proof,
including documentary evidence, that they complied
with everything that was incumbent on them.
(Manliclic v. Calaunan)
26. Due diligence in the supervision of employees
on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable
rules and regulations for the guidance of employees
and the issuance of proper instructions intended for
the protection of the public and persons with whom
the employer has relations through his or its
employees and the imposition of necessary
disciplinary measures upon employees in case of
breach or as may be warranted to ensure the
performance of acts indispensable to the business of
and beneficial to their employer. The actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent
compliance with said rules should be the constant
concern of the employer, acting through dependable
supervisors who should regularly report on their
supervisory functions. (Manliclic v. Calaunan)
27. In order that the defense of due diligence in
the selection and supervision of employees may be
deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to
emptily invoke the existence of said company
guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As
the negligence of the employee gives rise to the
presumption of negligence on the part of the employer,
the latter has the burden of proving that it has been
diligent not only in the selection of employees but also
in the actual supervision of their work. The mere
allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and
supervisory policies, without anything more, is
decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
(Manliclic v. Calaunan)
28. In the case of banks, however, the degree of
diligence required is more than that of a good father of
a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their
relationship with their depositors, banks are duty
bound to treat the accounts of their clients with
the highest degree of care. (PBCom v. CA)
29. A common carrier is bound to carry its
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard to all the
circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is
presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was
negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless
the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the
part of the common carrier. This statutory
presumption may only be overcome by evidence that
the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence. (Victory
Liner v. Gammad)
10
30. A duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in
protecting the safety of its passengers is imposed upon
a common carrier. In case of death or injuries to
passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the
common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently
unless it proves that it [had] observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755. In
fact, because of this statutory presumption, it has
been held that a court need not even make an express
finding of fault or negligence on the part of the
common carrier in order to hold it liable. To overcome
this presumption, the common carrier must show that
it had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the
injuries which is considerably more demanding than
the standard of ordinary diligence. A common carrier
is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard to
all the circumstances. (Gatchalian v. Delim)
Mistake and Waiver
31. A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the
first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms
which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to
give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to
him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a
person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and
clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in
such person. Also, it must not be contrary to law,
morals, public policy or good customs. (Gatchalian v.
Delim)
32. The hotel business like the common carriers
business is imbued with public interest. Catering to
the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only
lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons
and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence
of the business. The law in turn does not allow such
duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any
contrary stipulation in so-called undertakings that
ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel
keepers on guests for their signature. (YHT v. CA)
Art. 1331. In order that mistake may invalidate
consent, it should refer to the substance of the thing
which is the object of the contract, or to those
conditions which have principally moved one or
both parties to enter into the contract.
Mistake as to the identity or qualifications of one of
the parties will vitiate consent only when such
identity or qualifications have been the principal
cause of the contract.
 A simple mistake of account shall give rise to its
correction.
33. The concept of error in Art. 1331 must include
both ignorance, which is the absence of knowledge
with respect to a thing, and mistake properly speaking,
which is a wrong conception about said thing, or a
belief in the existence of some circumstance, fact, or
event, which in reality does not exist. In both cases,
there is a lack of full and correct knowledge about the
thing. (Theis v. CA)
Emergency or Sudden Peril
29. Emergency rule – one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act
without time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt a what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds
himself is brought about by his own negligence.
(McKee v. IAC)
F. Criminal Negligence
1. As discussed in class, reservation is only
necessary in pursuing the civil liability ex delicto. If the
cause of action is based on quasi-delict, reservation is
not necessary. However, the prohibition on double
recovery still remains.
2. Art. 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character; whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently,
a separate civil action against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only
to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused. Culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law. (Dulay v. CA)
11
3. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, subject to three notable
exceptions:
a. when the injured party expressly waives
the right to recover damages from the
accused;
b. when the offended party reserves his right
to have the civil damages determined in a
separate action in order to take full
control and direction of the prosecution of
his cause; and
c. when the injured party actually exercises
the right to maintain a private suit against
the offender by instituting a civil action
prior to the filing of the criminal case. (Sps.
Santos v. Pizarro)
4. An act or omission causing damage to another
may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part
of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not
arising from an act or omission complained of as a
felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising
from law under Art. 31, intentional torts under Art. 32
and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Art. 2176; or (b)
where the injured party is granted a right to file an
action independent and distinct from the criminal
action under Article 33. Either of these liabilities may
be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat
under Art. 2177 that the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant and the similar proscription against double
recovery. (Sps. Santos v. Pizarro)
5. The extinction of the civil action by reason of
acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil
liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code. In other words, the civil liability which is
also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the
civil liability arising from the act as a crime. (Padilla v.
CA)
6. The same punishable act or omission can
create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused
and, where provided by law, his employer. There is the
civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the
liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict.
Either one of these two types of civil liability may be
enforced against the accused, However, the offended
party cannot recover damages under both types of
liability. (Padilla v. CA)
7. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the
liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the
civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is
not extinguished by acquittal where
a. the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
as only preponderance of evidence is
required in civil cases;
b. the court expressly declares that the
liability of the accused is not criminal but
only civil in nature as, for instance, in the
felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious
mischief committed by certain relatives
who thereby incur only civil liability; and,
c. the civil liability does not arise from or is
not based upon the criminal act of which
the accused was acquitted. (Padilla v. CA)
8. Victims of negligence or their heirs have a
choice between an action to enforce the civil liability
arising from culpa criminal under Art. 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict
(culpa aquiliana) under Art. 2176 to 2194. If the action
chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the
employer liable for the negligent act of its employee,
subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the
diligence of a good father of the family. On the other
hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the
plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only
upon proof of prior conviction of its employee. (L.G.
Foods v. Pagapong-Agraviador)
IV. VICARIOUS/PRIMARY/SOLIDAY LIABILITY
A. Vicarious Liability
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176
is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible for the damages caused
by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the
minors or incapacitated persons who are under
their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
12
though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage
has been caused by the official to whom the task
done properly pertains, in which case what is
provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by
his dependents or employees may recover from the
latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction
of the claim.
Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing
damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or
insane person shall be answerable with his own
property in an action against him where a guardian
ad litem shall be appointed.
Parents and guardians
Owners and Managers of Enterprises
1. Under Art. 2180 and 2176, owners and
managers are responsible for damages caused by their
employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence
of a servant or an employee, the master or employer is
presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in
the supervision of that employee. This presumption
may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that
the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and the
supervision of its employee. (Pestano v. Sumayang)
Employers
2. Requisites in order to hold the employer liable
a. There is an employer-employee
relationship
b. The employee was working within the
scope of his assigned task when the tort
was committed
c. The employer did not exercise diligence in
the selection and supervision of the
employee

3. A distinction must be made between the
fourth and fifth paragraphs of Art. 2180 to determine
what is applicable. Both provisions apply to employers:
the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph,
to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers
negligent acts of employees committed either in the
service of the branches or on the occasion of their
functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses
negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of
their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the
former in both employer coverage and acts included.
Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the
employer is engaged in a business or industry, are
covered so long as they were acting within the scope of
their assigned task, even though committed neither in
the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their
functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear
different hats. They perform functions which are
beyond their office, title or designation but which,
nevertheless, are still within the call of duty. Under the
fifth paragraph of Art. 2180, whether or not engaged
in any business or industry, an employer is liable for
the torts committed by employees within the scope of
his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the
employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that
the employee was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the tort complained of was
committed. It is only then that the employer may find
it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence
in the selection and supervision of the employee.
(Castilex v. CA)
4. Once a driver is proven negligent in causing
damages, the law presumes the vehicle owner equally
negligent and imposes upon the latter the burden of
proving proper selection of employee as a defense.
(Carticiano v. Nuval)
5. Under Art. 2180, the liability of the employer
is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of insolvency of such employee. (L.G. Foods v.
Pagapong-Agraviador)
6. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for damages
caused by his employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former is not engaged in any business or industry.
(L.G. Foods v. Pagapong-Agraviador)
13
7. An employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict
is primary and direct, while the employers liability
based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words
primary and direct, as contrasted with subsidiary,
refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the
obligation rather than to the character and limits of
the obligation. Although liability under Art. 2180
originates from the negligent act of the employee, the
aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When
an employee causes damage, the law presumes that
the employer has himself committed an act of
negligence in not preventing or avoiding the
damage. This is the fault that the law
condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a
subsidiary capacity for the employee’s criminal
negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly
and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to
exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his
employee. (Cerezo v. Tuazon)
Medical Negligence/Malpractice
8. Medical malpractice cases do not escape the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Thus, it has been
applied when the circumstances attendant upon the
harm are themselves of such a character as to justify
an inference of negligence as the cause of that
harm. The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical
negligence cases presents a question of law since it is
a judicial function to determine whether a certain set
of circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit a
given inference. (Ramos v. CA, 1999)
9. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope
of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably enlarged, it
does not automatically apply to all cases of medical
negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof
to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the
ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or
ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to
be cautiously applied, depending upon the
circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to
situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able
to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequences of professional
care were not as such as would ordinarily have
followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction
must be made between the failure to secure results,
and the occurrence of something more unusual and
not ordinarily found if the service or treatment
rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled
in that particular practice. It must be conceded that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no
application in a suit against a physician or surgeon
which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a
scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not
required at his peril to explain why any particular
diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular
scientific treatment did not produce the desired
result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a
malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired
result of an operation or treatment was not
accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether
or not in the process of the operation any
extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the
routine performance occurred which is beyond the
regular scope of customary professional activity in
such operations, which, if unexplained would
themselves reasonably speak to the average man as
the negligent cause or causes of the untoward
consequence. If there was such extraneous
interventions, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be
utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the
matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could. (Ramos
v. CA, 1999)
10. As the so-called captain of the ship, it is the
surgeon’s responsibility to see to it that those under
him perform their task in the proper manner. (Ramos
v. CA, 1999)
11. In the case of Ramos v. CA, the surgeon was
held liable under the caption-of-the-ship principle
because (1) he was the one who recommended the
services of the anesthesiologist, (2) he was the
attending physician of the victim, and (3) he and the
anesthesiologist worked as a team in operating on the
victim.
12. Liability of hospitals
Why should the hospital be liable?
a. In the first place, hospitals exercise
significant control in the hiring and firing
of consultants and in the conduct of their
work within the hospital premises.
Doctors who apply for consultant slots,
visiting or attending, are required to
submit proof of completion of residency,
their educational qualifications; generally,
evidence of accreditation by the
appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of
fellowship in most cases, and references.
These requirements are carefully
scrutinized by members of the hospital
administration or by a review committee
set up by the hospital who either accept or
reject the application. This is particularly
true with respondent hospital. (Ramos v.
CA, 1999)
b. After a physician is accepted, either as a
visiting or attending consultant, he is
normally required to attend clinico-
14
pathological conferences, conduct bedside
rounds for clerks, interns and residents,
moderate grand rounds and patient
audits and perform other tasks and
responsibilities, for the privilege of being
able to maintain a clinic in the hospital,
and/or for the privilege of admitting
patients into the hospital. In addition to
these, the physicians performance as a
specialist is generally evaluated by a peer
review committee on the basis of mortality
and morbidity statistics, and feedback
from patients, nurses, interns and
residents. A consultant remiss in his
duties, or a consultant who regularly falls
short of the minimum standards
acceptable to the hospital or its peer
review committee, is normally politely
terminated. (Ramos v. CA, 1999)
c. In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire
and exercise real control over their
attending and visiting consultant staff.
While consultants are not, technically
employees, the control exercised, the
hiring, and the right to terminate
consultants all fulfill the important
hallmarks of an employer-employee
relationship, with the exception of the
payment of wages. In assessing whether
such a relationship in fact exists, the
control test is determining. Accordingly,
on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that
for the purpose of allocating responsibility
in medical negligence cases, an employer-
employee relationship in effect exists
between hospitals and their attending and
visiting physicians. (Ramos v. CA, 1999)
d. Established medical procedures and
practices, though in constant flux are
devised for the purpose of preventing
complications. A physicians experience
with his patients would sometimes tempt
him to deviate from established
community practices, and he may end a
distinguished career using unorthodox
methods without incident. However, when
failure to follow established procedure
results in the evil precisely sought to be
averted by observance of the procedure
and a nexus is made between the
deviation and the injury or damage, the
physician would necessarily be called to
account for it. In the case at bar, the
failure to observe pre-operative
assessment protocol which would have
influenced the intubation in a salutary
 way was fatal to private respondents case.
(Ramos v. CA, 1999)
Employer-Employee Relationship
e. Although the abovementioned statements
seem to establish the liability of the
hospital in case the patient was not
treated properly, in Ramos v. CA, 2002,
the hospital was absolved because the
employer-employee relationship between
the doctor and hospital was not
established using the four-fold test. As
reiterated in Professional Services v.
Natividad, for purposes of apportioning
responsibility in medical negligence cases,
an employer-employee relationship in
effect exists between hospitals and their
attending and visiting physicians.
f. In determining whether an employer-
employee relationship exists between the
parties, the following elements must be
present: (1) selection and engagement of
services; (2) payment of wages; (3) the
power to hire and fire; and (4) the power
to control not only the end to be achieved,
but the means to be used in reaching such
an end. (Ramos v. CA, 2002)
g. The control test (from the four-fold test)
determines whether an employment
relationship exists between a physician
and a hospital based on the exercise of
control over the physician as to details.
Specifically, the employer (or the hospital)
must have the right to control both the
means and the details of the process by
which the employee (or the physician) is to
accomplish his task. (Nogales v. Capitol
Medical)
Doctrine of Apparent Authority
h. In general, a hospital is not liable for the
negligence of an independent contractor-
physician. There is, however, an exception
to this principle. The hospital may be
liable if the physician is the ”ostensible”
agent of the hospital. This exception is
also known as the doctrine of apparent
authority. (Nogales v. Capitol Medical)
i. Under the doctrine of apparent authority
a hospital can be held vicariously liable for
the negligent acts of a physician providing
care at the hospital, regardless of whether
the physician is an independent
contractor, unless the patient knows, or
should have known, that the physician is
15
an independent contractor. (Nogales v.
Capitol Medical)
j. For a hospital to be liable under the
doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) the hospital, or its
agent, acted in a manner that would lead
a reasonable person to conclude that the
individual who was alleged to be negligent
was an employee or agent of the hospital;
(2) where the acts of the agent create the
appearance of authority, the plaintiff must
also prove that the hospital had
knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and
(3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the
conduct of the hospital or its agent,
consistent with ordinary care and
prudence. (Nogales v. Capitol Medical)
k. The element of “holding out” on the part of
the hospital does not require an express
representation by the hospital that the
person alleged to be negligent is an
employee. Rather, the element is satisfied
if the hospital holds itself out as a provider
of emergency room care without informing
the patient that the care is provided by
independent contractors. (Nogales v.
Capitol Medical)
l. The element of justifiable reliance on the
part of the plaintiff is satisfied if the
plaintiff relies upon the hospital to provide
complete emergency room care, rather
than upon a specific physician. (Nogales v.
Capitol Medical)
m. The doctrine of apparent authority
essentially involves two factors to
determine the liability of an independent-
contractor physician. The first factor
focuses on the hospital's manifestations
and is sometimes described as an inquiry
whether the hospital acted in a manner
which would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the individual who was
alleged to be negligent was an employee or
agent of the hospital. In this regard, the
hospital need not make express
representations to the patient that the
treating physician is an employee of the
hospital; rather a representation may be
general and implied. The second factor
focuses on the patient's reliance. It is
sometimes characterized as an inquiry on
whether the plaintiff acted in reliance
upon the conduct of the hospital or its
agent, consistent with ordinary care and
prudence. (Nogales v. Capitol Medical)
n. Apparent authority, or what is sometimes
referred to as the holding out theory, or
 doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by
estoppel, imposes liability, not as the
result of the reality of a contractual
relationship, but rather because of the
actions of a principal or an employer in
somehow misleading the public into
believing that the relationship or the
authority exists. The principal is bound by
the acts of his agent with the apparent
authority which he knowingly permits the
agent to assume, or which he holds the
agent out to the public as possessing. The
question in every case is whether the
principal has by his voluntary act placed
the agent in such a situation that a person
of ordinary prudence, conversant with
business usages and the nature of the
particular business, is justified in
presuming that such agent has authority
to perform the particular act in question.
(Professional Services v. Natividad, 2007)
o. Under the doctrine of apparent authority,
the question in every case is whether the
principal has by his voluntary act placed
the agent in such a situation that a person
of ordinary prudence, conversant with
business usages and the nature of the
particular business, is justified in
presuming that such agent has authority
to perform the particular act in question.
(Professional Services v. Natividad, 2008)
p. On using release forms, the Supreme
Court in Nogales v. Capitol Medical stated
that release forms, being in the nature of
contracts of adhesion, are construed
strictly against hospitals. Besides, a
blanket release in favor of hospitals “from
any and all claims,” which includes claims
due to bad faith or gross negligence, would
be contrary to public policy and thus void.
Even simple negligence is not subject to
blanket release in favor of establishments
like hospitals but may only mitigate
liability depending on the circumstances.
When a person needing urgent medical
attention rushes to a hospital, he cannot
bargain on equal footing with the hospital
on the terms of admission and operation.
Such a person is literally at the mercy of
the hospital. There can be no clearer
example of a contract of adhesion than
one arising from such a dire situation.
Doctrine of Corporate Negligence
q. As shown in Professional Services v.
Natividad, the hospital may be liable not
16
only on the basis of an employer-employee
relationship but also through the
principles of apparent authority (or
agency by estoppel) and corporate
negligence.
r. The doctrine of corporate negligence was
explained by the Supreme Court in
Professional Services v. Natividad (2007)
as follows: With the passage of time, more
duties were expected from hospitals,
among them: (1) the use of reasonable
care in the maintenance of safe and
adequate facilities and
equipment; (2) the selection and retention
of competent physicians; (3) the
overseeing or supervision of all persons
who practice medicine within its walls;
and (4) the formulation, adoption and
enforcement of adequate rules and
policies that ensure quality care for its
patients. Thus, in Tucson Medical Center,
Inc. v. Misevich, it was held that a hospital,
following the doctrine of corporate
responsibility, has the duty to see that it
meets the standards of responsibilities for
the care of patients. Such duty includes
the proper supervision of the members of
its medical staff. And in Bost v. Riley, the
court concluded that a patient who enters
a hospital does so with the reasonable
expectation that it will attempt to cure
him. The hospital accordingly has the
duty to make a reasonable effort to
monitor and oversee the treatment
prescribed and administered by the
physicians practicing in its premises.
s. The duty of providing quality medical
service is no longer the sole prerogative
and responsibility of the physician. This is
because the modern hospital now tends to
organize a highly-professional medical
staff whose competence and performance
need also to be monitored by the hospital
commensurate with its inherent
responsibility to provide quality medical
care. Such responsibility includes the
proper supervision of the members of its
medical staff. Accordingly, the hospital
has the duty to make a reasonable effort
to monitor and oversee the treatment
prescribed and administered by the
physicians practicing in its premises.
t. A corporation is bound by the knowledge
acquired by or notice given to its agents or
officers within the scope of their authority
and in reference to a matter to which their
authority extends. As such, in
 Professional Services v. Natividad (2007),
when the records of the nurse showed that
the number of gauzes did not tally and the
hospital failed to conduct an investigation
and inform the patient of such situation
made the hospital not only vicariously
liable for the negligence of the doctor but
directly liable to the patient for its own
negligence.
Summary
u. Where an employment relationship exists,
the hospital may be held vicariously liable
under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180 or
the principle of respondeat superior. Even
when no employment relationship exists
but it is shown that the hospital holds out
to the patient that the doctor is its agent,
the hospital may still be vicariously liable
under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 1431
and Art. 1869 or the principle of apparent
authority. Moreover, regardless of its
relationship with the doctor, the hospital
may be held directly liable to the patient
for its own negligence or failure to follow
established standard of conduct to which
it should conform as a corporation.
(Professional Services v. Natividad, 2010)
State
Teachers/Heads of Establishments
R.A. 10586: An Act Penalizing Persons Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol, Dangerous
Drugs, and Other Similar Substances.
Sec. 13. Direct Liability of Operator and/or Owner
of the Offending Vehicle. – The owner and/or
operator of the vehicle driven by the offender shall
be directly and principally held liable together with
the offender for the fine and the award against the
offender for civil damages unless he or she is able to
convincingly prove that he or she has exercised
extraordinary diligence in the selection and
supervision of his or her drivers in general and the
offending driver in particular.
This section shall principally apply to the owners
and/or operators of public utility vehicles and
commercial vehicles such as delivery vans, cargo
trucks, container trucks, school and company
buses, hotel transports, cars or vans for rent, taxi
cabs, and the like.
17
B. Primary Liability
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever
may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape
or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in
case the damage should come from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who
was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding
two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the
provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it
is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation.
Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file
with the proper government office a bond executed
by a government-controlled corporation or office, to
answer for damages to third persons. The amount
of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the
competent public official.
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of
foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods
shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any
noxious or harmful substances used, although no
contractual relation exists between them and the
consumers.
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of
negligence on the part of the defendant if the death
or injury results from his possession of dangerous
weapons or substances, such as firearms and
poison, except when the possession or use thereof
is indispensable in his occupation or business.
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall
be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision.
 Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure
is responsible for the damages resulting from its
total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the
lack of necessary repairs.
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for
damages caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not
been taken care of with due diligence, and the
inflammation of explosive substances which have
not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to
persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near
highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or
deposits of infectious matter, constructed without
precautions suitable to the place.
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two
preceding articles should be the result of any defect
in the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the
third person suffering damages may proceed only
against the engineer or architect or contractor in
accordance with said article, within the period
therein fixed.
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a
building or a part thereof, is responsible for
damages caused by things thrown or falling from the
same.
Possessors/Users of Animals
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever
may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape
or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in
case the damage should come from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.
Owners of Motor Vehicles
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who
was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding
two months.
18
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the
provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.
Manufacturers and Processors
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of
foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods
shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any
noxious or harmful substances used, although no
contractual relation exists between them and the
consumers.
1. The vendee's remedies against a vendor with
respect to the warranties against hidden defects of or
encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to
those prescribed in Art. 1567. (Coca-Cola Bottlers v.
CA)
2. Art. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561, 1562,
1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee may elect between
withdrawing from the contract (redhibitory action) and
demanding a proportionate reduction of the price
(accion quanti minoris), with damages either case.
(Coca-Cola Bottlers v. CA)
3. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of
the contract upon proof of error or fraud, in which case
the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable.
Under the law on obligations, responsibility arising
from fraud is demandable in all obligations and any
waiver of an action for future fraud is void.
Responsibility arising from negligence is also
demandable in any obligation, but such liability may
be regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances. Those guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay in the performance of their obligations and those
who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are
liable for damages. (Coca-Cola Bottlers v. CA)
4. The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-
delict under Art. 2176, and an action based thereon
may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true
that the pre-existing contract between the parties may,
as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on
quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise
from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the
contract may also be a quasi-delict. (Coca-Cola Bottlers
v. CA)
Municipal Corporations
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall
be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
 buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision.
5. Under Art. 2189, it is not necessary for the
liability therein established to attach that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted.
What said article requires is that the province, city or
municipality have either “control or supervision” over
said street or road. (City of Manila v. Teotico; Jimenez
v. City of Manila; Guilatco v. City of Dagupan)
*In City of Manila v. Teotico and Jimenez v. City of
Manila, it was argued that under the charter of the City
of Manila, the local government will be liable for any
damage or injury to persons or property arising from
the failure of the city officers to enforce the charter.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that Art. 2189
prevails over the charter because it is a specific
provision regarding liability for “defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other
public works under their control or supervision” unlike
the general liability clause of the charter.
R.A. 7160: Local Government Code
Section 24. Liability for Damages. - Local
government units and their officials are not exempt
from liability for death or injury to persons or
damage to property.
Building Proprietors
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure
is responsible for the damages resulting from its
total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the
lack of necessary repairs.
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for
damages caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not
been taken care of with due diligence, and the
inflammation of explosive substances which have
not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to
persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near
highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or
deposits of infectious matter, constructed without
precautions suitable to the place.
19
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a
building or a part thereof, is responsible for
damages caused by things thrown or falling from the
same.
1. In De Roy v. CA, giving a prior warning to the
injured party without repairing the damaged wall was
not considered as a defense against the liability under
Art. 2190.
Engineers/Architects/Contractors
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two
preceding articles should be the result of any defect
in the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the
third person suffering damages may proceed only
against the engineer or architect or contractor in
accordance with said article, within the period
therein fixed.
Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up
the plans and specifications for a building is liable
for damages if within fifteen years from the
completion of the structure, the same should
collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and
specifications, or due to the defects in the ground.
The contractor is likewise responsible for the
damages if the edifice falls, within the same period,
on account of defects in the construction or the use
of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or
due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If
the engineer or architect supervises the
construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the
contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does
not imply waiver of any of the cause of action by
reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding
paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years
following the collapse of the building.
C. Solidary Liability
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.
1. The responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is
a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this
case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation.
Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire
obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation
of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the
obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties
is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary
party because complete relief is available from either.
(Cerezo v. Tuazon)
2. Although the employer is solidarity liable with
the employee for damages, the employer may demand
reimbursement from his employee for whatever
amount the employer will have to pay the offended
party to satisfy the latter's claim. (Lanuzo v. Ping)
3. Where the concurrent or successive negligent
acts or omission of two or more persons, although
acting independently of each other, are, in
combination, the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person and it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even
though his act alone might not have caused the entire
injury, or the same damage might have resulted from
the acts of the other tortfeasor. (PNCC v. CA)
4. Where several causes producing an injury are
concurrent and each is an efficient cause without
which the injury would not have happened, the injury
may be attributed to all or any of the causes and
recovery may be had against any or all of the
responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of
them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by
them to the injured person was not the same. No
actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause
merely because it does not exceed the negligence of
other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the
sole cause of the injury. (PNCC v. CA)
5. There is no contribution between joint
tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of
them are liable for the total damage. Where the
concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions
of two or more persons, although acting independently,
are in combination with the direct and proximate
cause of a single injury to a third person, it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where their
concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to
a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage. (PNCC v. CA)
6. Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission
of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done
for their benefit. (Chan v. Iglesia ni Cristo)
20
7. The registered owner/operator of a public
service vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the
driver for damages incurred by passengers or third
persons as a consequence of injuries sustained in the
operation of said vehicles. (Gelisan v. Alday)
8. However, in Philippine Rabbit v. IAC, the
Supreme Court absolved the driver from any liability
and ruled that only the owner of the vehicle was liable.
The main difference of this case with the other cases
where the driver is solidarily liable with the owner is
that the cause of action in this case is based on breach
of contract of carriage. The Supreme Court reasoned
that “[t]he driver cannot be held jointly and severally
liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract
of carriage. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between
the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of
contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively
responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such
breach be due to the negligence of his driver. In other
words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the
contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his
driver's negligence is his. Secondly, if We make the
driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that
would make the carrier's liability personal instead of
merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover
only the share which corresponds to the
driver, contradictory to the explicit provision of Article
2181 of the New Civil Code.”
*Illustration:
A car collided with a jeep which resulted to Y’s death.
What are the causes of action which can be acted upon
by Y’s heirs?
Jeep Random Car
Passenger (Y)
Owner (X1) Owner (Z1)
Driver (X2) Driver (Z2)
1. As to X1, it can be breach of contract, Art.
2180, or Art. 2176. In light of Philippine Rabbit v. IAC,
if the cause of action is breach of contract, only X1 will
be liable while under Art. 2180, both X1 and X2 are
solidarily liable.
2. As to X2, Z1, and Z2, it is quasi-delict under
Art. 2176.
*As discussed in class, solidary liability should be
seen under the context of a third person and the
tortfeasor (who can the third person go after) while
vicarious liability should be seen under the context of
an employer-employee relationship (why the employer
should be liable). Also, the employer can be held
directly liable under vicarious liability such that the
plaintiff can run after the employer in the first instance.
In criminal cases, the employer will be solidarily liable
only when the accused is insolvent.
D. Strict Liability Torts
Exceptionally, liability is created even when there
may have been no fault or negligence.
Possessors/Users of Animals
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever
may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause, although it may escape
or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in
case the damage should come from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.
1. The obligation imposed by Art. 2183 is not
based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of
vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing
the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the
principle of social interest that he who possesses
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer
for the damage which such animal may cause. (Vestil
v. IAC)
Manufacturers and Processors
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of
foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods
shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any
noxious or harmful substances used, although no
contractual relation exists between them and the
consumers.
Head of Family
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a
building or a part thereof, is responsible for
damages caused by things thrown or falling from the
same.
V. SPECIAL TORTS (HUMAN RELATIONS)
A. Abuse of Right
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
21
1. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not
constitute a violation of a statute law, should be
compensated by damages. (Velayo v. Shell)
2. Elements of Art. 19
a. the existence of a legal right or duty,
b. which is exercised in bad faith,
c. for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another. (ABS-CBN v. CA)
3. Art. 19 sets standards which must be
observed in the exercise of ones rights as well as in the
performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice;
give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good
faith. When a right is exercised in a manner which
discards these norms resulting in damage to another,
a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be
held accountable. (PEA v. Ganac-Chu)
*As discussed in class, Art. 19, 20, and 21 give rise
to a cause of action. These fill the gap for acts or
omissions not specifically supported by any law.
B. Contrary to Law and Morals
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully
or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
1. Art. 20 speaks of the general sanction for all
provisions of law which do not especially provide for
their own sanction. (ABS-CBN v. CA)
2. Art. 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores,
and has the following elements
a. there is an act which is legal,
b. but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order, or public policy, and
c. and it is done with intent to injure. (ABS-
CBN v. CA)
3. Malice or bad faith is at the core of Art. 19, 20,
and 21. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity. Such must be
substantiated by evidence. (ABS-CBN v. CA)
4. In the light of the clear and manifest intent of
our law making body not to sanction actions for breach
of promise to marry, the award of moral damages in
such cases is untenable. (Hermosissima v. CA)

5. However, in the case of Gashem Shookat v. CA,
the Supreme Court ruled that “where a man's promise
to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device
to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain
her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award
of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
however, that such injury should have been committed
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. Arti. 21 may be applied in a breach of
promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral
seduction.”
6. While generally, malicious prosecution refers
to unfounded criminal actions and has been expanded
to include unfounded civil suits just to vex and
humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause
of action or probable cause, the foundation of an
action for malicious prosecution is an original
proceeding, judicial in character. A disbarment
proceeding is, without doubt, judicial in character and
therefore may be the basis for a subsequent action for
malicious prosecution. (Ponce v. Legaspi)
7. Elements of malicious prosecution
a. the fact of the prosecution and the
further fact that the defendant was
himself the prosecutor, and that the
action finally terminated with an
acquittal;
b. that in bringing the action, the
prosecutor acted without probable cause;
and
c. that the prosecutor was actuated or
impelled by legal malice, that is by
improper or sinister motive. (Ponce v.
Legaspi)
8. The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not
the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision
of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with
the knowledge that the charges were false and
groundless. (Magbanua v. Junsay)
9. Malice is essential to the maintenance of an
action for malicious prosecution and not merely to the
recovery of exemplary damages. But malice alone does
not make one liable for malicious prosecution, where
22
probable cause is shown, even where it appears that
the suit was brought for the mere purpose of vexing,
harassing and injuring his adversary. In other words,
malice and want of probable cause must both exist in
order to justify the action. (Ponce v. Legaspi)
10. Probable cause is the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime (or in this case, the wrongdoing)
for which he was prosecuted. (Ponce v. Legaspi) It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus,
a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry
into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. (Magbanua v. Junsay)
11. To constitute malicious prosecution, however,
there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the
defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a
case to the authorities for prosecution does not make
one liable for malicious prosecution. (Magbanua v.
Junsay)
C. Unjust Enrichment
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.
Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing damage
to another’s property was not due to the fault or
negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable
for indemnity if through the act or event he was
benefited.
1. Art. 22 which embodies the maxim, Nemo ex
alterius incommodo debet lecupletari (no man ought to
be made rich out of another's injury). (Security Bank v.
CA)
2. Hence, in Pecson v. CA, the respondent was
ordered to reimburse the petitioner the value of the
property based on the current market value and not
1956 value and in Security Bank v. CA, Security Bank
should pay the additional cost of construction because
it undoubtedly benefited from it.
D. Judicial Vigilance
 Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other
relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age
or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for
his protection.
1. In the case of Cruz v. NLRC, the Supreme
Court stated that “[t]his decision demonstrates once
again the tenderness of the Court toward the worker
subjected to the lawless exploitation and impositions
of his employer. The protection of our overseas workers
is especially necessary because of the inconveniences
and even risks they have to undergo in their quest for
a better life in a foreign land away from their loved ones
and their own government.”
E. Thoughtless Extravagance
Art. 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for
pleasure or display during a period of acute public
want or emergency may be stopped by order of the
courts at the instance of any government or private
charitable institution.
F. Disrespect for Person
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence:
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or
family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from
his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his
religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition.
G. Dereliction of Duty
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss
because a public servant or employee refuses or
neglects, without just cause, to perform his official
duty may file an action for damages and other relief
against he latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be
taken.
23
H. Unfair Competition
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural,
commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor
through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or
highhanded method shall give rise to a right of
action by the person who thereby suffers damage.
1. Any conduct may be said to constitute unfair
competition if the effect is to pass off on the public the
goods of one man as the goods of another. It is not
necessary that any particular means should be used
to this end. The most usual devices are the simulation
of labels and the reproduction of the form, color and
general appearance of the package used by the pioneer
manufacturer or dealer. But unfair competition is not
limited to these forms. The general principle
underlying the law of unfair competition is that a
competitor in business cannot be permitted to do acts
which have deceived, or are reasonably designed to
deceive, the public into buying his goods as those of
another. (Spinner v. Hesslein)
2. It makes no difference that dealers in the
article are not deceived. They are informed and usually
know what they are buying. The law concerns itself
with the casual purchaser who knows the commodity
only by its name. In obtaining what he asks for he is
entitled to protection against unfair dealing. (Spinner
v. Hesslein)
3. In the action to enjoin unfair competition, the
fraudulent intention on the part of the defendant may
be inferred from the similarity of the goods offered for
sale by him to the goods of the plaintiff. (Spinner v.
Hesslein)
I. Violation of Civil/Political Right
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a
periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without
due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private
property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and
correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations
or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly
to petition the government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude
in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness
against one’s self, or from being forced to confess
guilt, or from being induced by a promise of
immunity or reward to make such confession,
except when the person confessing becomes a State
witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and
unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed
or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has
not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether
or not the defendant’s act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
24
action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and mat be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not
demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other
penal statute.
1. To be liable under Art. 32, it is enough that
there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the
plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should
have acted with malice or bad faith. (Lim v. Ponce de
Leon)
2. Art. 32 speaks of an officer or employee or
person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of
another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one
directly responsible) who must answer for damages
under Art. 32; the person indirectly responsible has
also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party. (MHP Garments v. CA; Silahis
International Hotel v. Soluta)
3. For a search warrant to be valid: (1) it must be
issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause
must be determined by the judge himself and not by
the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant
and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4)
the warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
(Lim v. Ponce de Leon)
4. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential
that the victim be identifiable although it is not
necessary that he be named. Where the defamation is
alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is
essential that the statement must be so sweeping or
all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that
group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each
individual in the class or group can prove that the
defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so
that he can bring the action separately, if need be.
(Newsweek v. IAC; MVRS Publication v. Islamic Da’wah)
VI. INTERFERENCE IN CONTRACTUAL RELATION
 Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another
to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to
the other contracting party.
1. Elements:
a. existence of a valid contract;
b. knowledge on the part of the third person
of the existence of contract; and
c. interference of the third person is
without legal justification or excuse. (So
Ping Bun v. CA)
2. As regards the first element, the existence of a
valid contract must be duly established. While the
contract appeared as duly notarized, the notarization
thereof, however, only proved its due execution and
delivery but not the veracity of its contents. Settled is
the rule that until overcome by clear, strong and
convincing evidence, a notarized document continues
to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to
its execution and delivery. (Lagon v. CA)
3. The second element, on the other hand,
requires that there be knowledge on the part of the
interferer that the contract exists. Knowledge of the
subsistence of the contract is an essential element to
state a cause of action for tortuous interference. A
defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for
interfering with a contract he is unaware of. While it is
not necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must
nonetheless be aware of the facts which, if followed by
a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure
of the contractual relations and rights of the parties in
the contract. (Lagon v. CA)
4. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the
defendant must have acted with malice or must have
been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the
plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference cannot
be justified. As a general rule, justification for
interfering with the business relations of another
exists where the actor’s motive is to benefit himself.
Such justification does not exist where the actors
motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this,
some authorities believe that it is not necessary that
the interferer’s interest outweigh that of the party
whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts
under an economic interest that is substantial, not
merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious
motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection.
Moreover, justification for protecting ones financial
position should not be made to depend on a
comparison of his economic interest in the subject
matter with that of the others. It is sufficient if the
impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business
interest rather than in wrongful motives. (Lagon v. CA)
25
5. Where there was no malice in the interference
of a contract, and the impulse behind one's conduct
lies in a proper business interest rather than in
wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious
interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially
interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it
cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious
intermeddler. In other words, a financial or profit
motivation will not necessarily make a person an
officious interferer liable for damages as long as there
is no malice or bad faith involved. (Gilchrist v. Cuddy;
So Ping Bun v. CA; Lagon v. CA)
*Although it would seem malice is an element of
contractual interference, in So Ping Bun v. CA, while
the Supreme Court found that there was no malice, it
still declared the act committed as contractual
interference, stating “[w]hile we do not encourage tort
interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude
into existing contracts at the expense of others,
however, we find that the conduct herein complained
of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory
award for damages in the absence of any malice. The
business desire is there to make some gain to the
detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice,
however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve
petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts
and causing breach of existing ones.” In Daywalt v.
Corporacion, it was argued that “Malice in some form
is generally supposed to be an essential ingredient in
cases of interference with contract relations. But upon
the authorities it is enough if the wrong-doer, having
knowledge of the existence of the contract relations, in
bad faith sets about to break it up. Whether his motive
is to benefit himself or gratify his spite by working
mischief to the employer is immaterial. Malice in the
sense of ill-will or spite is not essential.”
VII. CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIME
A. Remedies
Civil Action With Criminal Action
Rule 111, Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
 The reservation of the right to institute separately
the civil action shall be made before the prosecution
starts presenting its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil
liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without
specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or
information, the filing fees thereof shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is
specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no
filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which could
have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil
actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing
fees based on the amount of the check involved,
which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the offended
party shall pay additional filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so
alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the
amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and
trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the latter case. If
the application is granted, the trial of both actions
shall proceed in accordance with Section 2 of this
Rule governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal actions.
Separate Civil Action
26
Rule 111, Section 2. When separate civil action is
suspended. — After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising
therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment
has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil
action has already been instituted, the latter shall
be suspended in whatever stage it may be found
before judgment on the merits. The suspension
shall last until final judgment is rendered in the
criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on
the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same
may, upon motion of the offended party, be
consolidated with the criminal action in the court
trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation,
the evidence already adduced in the civil action
shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal case
and of the parties to present additional evidence.
The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be
tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the
running of the period of prescription of the civil
action which cannot be instituted separately or
whose proceeding has been suspended shall be
tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil action. However, the
civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Independent Civil Action
Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to
demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense,
and no criminal proceedings are instituted during
the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of
evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act
complained of.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
Rule 111, Section 3. When civil action may
proceeded independently. — In the cases provided
 for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the independent civil action may
be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged
in the criminal action.
1. Only the civil liability arising from the offense
charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action. (DMPI
Employees v. Velez)
2. Under Section 1 of Rule 111, what is deemed
instituted with the criminal action is only the action to
recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-
delicto. All the other civil actions under Art. 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed
instituted, and may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in the
criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in
the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a
separate and independent civil action based on these
articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on
the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil
Code continues to run even with the filing of the
criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these
articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and
independent of the civil action deemed instituted in the
criminal action. (Casupanan v. Laroya)
3. The offended party is still given the option to
file a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action
before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the
offended party is deemed to make such reservation if
he files a separate civil action before filing the criminal
action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet
commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with
the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule
does not apply to separate civil actions arising from
the same act or omission filed under Art. 32, 33, 34
and 2176. (Casupanan v. Laroya)
4. The accused is barred from filing a
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in
the criminal case. However, the same provision states
that any cause of action which could have been the
subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action.
Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall
27
proceed independently of the criminal action, even as
the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the
criminal action. (Casupanan v. Laroya)
5. The independent civil action in Art. 32, 33, 34
and 2176 is not deemed instituted with the criminal
action but may be filed separately by the offended
party even without reservation. The commencement of
the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution
of the independent civil action under these articles of
the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the
present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising
from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed
before the commencement of the criminal action.
(Casupanan v. Laroya)
6. Thus, the offended party can file two separate
suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal
case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case
for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-
forum shopping. The two cases can proceed
simultaneously and independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the criminal action
will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The
only limitation is that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will
have no reason to file a second civil action since he
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused. In some instances, the
accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of
another case against his employer or guardians.
(Casupanan v. Laroya)
7. Similarly, the accused can file a civil action
for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is
accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly
allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of Rule 111 which
states that the counterclaim of the accused may be
litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for
two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from
setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is
deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is
therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim
against the offended party. If the accused does not file
a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive
period may set in since the period continues to run
until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed. Second,
the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to
invoke Art. 2177, in the same way that the offended
party can avail of this remedy which is independent of
the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing
a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to
recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to
deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and
equal protection of the law. (Casupanan v. Laroya)

8. An employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict
is primary and direct. The action can be brought
directly against the person responsible (for another),
without including the author of the act. The action
against the principal is accessory in the sense that it
implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by
the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that
it cannot be instituted till after the judgment against
the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to
the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the
employer) is in itself a principal action. Thus, in Cerezo
v. Tuazon, the employee is not considered an
indispensable party in a case filed directly against the
employer for quasi-delict.
9. Each of the overt acts in these instances may
give rise to two criminal liabilities -- one for estafa and
another for violation of BP 22. But every such act of
issuing a bouncing check involves only one civil
liability for the offended party, who has sustained only
a single injury. Thus, the possible single civil liability
arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can
be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted
with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation
prosecution. In the crimes of both estafa and violation
of BP 22, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly
allows, even automatically in the present case, the
institution of a civil action without need of election by
the offended party. As both remedies are
simultaneously available to this party, there can be no
forum shopping. Hence, in Rodriguex v. Ponferrada,
the Supreme Court allowed the intervention of the
private prosecutor in the civil aspect of both the estafa
case and the BP 22 case subject to the prohibition on
double recovery.
10. Election of remedies refers to the choice by a
party to an action of one of two or more coexisting
remedial rights, where several such rights arise out of
the same facts, but the term has been generally limited
to a choice by a party between inconsistent remedial
rights, the assertion of one being necessarily
repugnant to, or a repudiation of, the other. However,
when a certain state of facts under the law entitles a
party to alternative remedies, both founded upon the
identical state of facts, these remedies are not
considered inconsistent remedies. In such case, the
invocation of one remedy is not an election which will
bar the other, unless the suit upon the remedy first
invoked shall reach the stage of final adjudication or
unless by the invocation of the remedy first sought to
be enforced, the plaintiff shall have gained an
advantage thereby or caused detriment or change of
situation to the other. (Rodriguez v. Ponferrada)
28
11. It is important to determine the nature of the
cause of action in order to differentiate whether the
action is for the civil liability ex delicto or for quasi-
delict. The nature of a cause of action is determined by
the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the
cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and
the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim
of the party filing the action, made in his argument or
brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations
and prayer for relief. (Safeguard Security v. Tangco)
12. When the accused-employee absconds or
jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and
executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of
the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own
behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its
subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability
of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil
liability of the employer are carried in one single
decision that has become final and executory. To allow
employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a
criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or
defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.
By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final
criminal conviction of their employees without the
latter’s consent would also result in improperly
amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
(Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People)
13. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated
civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the
latter’s insolvency. The provisions of Art. 102 and 103
of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability are
deemed written into the judgments in the cases to
which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive
portion of its decision, the trial court need not
expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the
employer. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People)
14. The decision convicting an employee in a
criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the
employer not only with regard to the formers civil
liability, but also with regard to its amount. The
liability of an employer cannot be separated from that
of the employee. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People)
15. Before the employers subsidiary liability is
exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence
establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of
the convicted employees; (2) that the former are
engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime
was committed by the employees in the discharge of
their duties; and (4) that the execution against the
latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency. The
resolution of these issues need not be done in a
separate civil action. But the determination must be
based on the evidence that the offended party and the
employer may fully and freely present. Such
determination may be done in the same criminal
action in which the employees liability, criminal and
civil, has been pronounced; and in a hearing set for
that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer,
as part of the proceedings for the execution of the
judgment. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People)
16. Just because the employer participated in the
defense of its accused-employee does not mean that its
liability has transformed its nature; its liability
remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase
its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the
accused-employees conviction has attained finality,
then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto
attaches. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People)
B. Effects
Acquittal/Dismissal
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action for damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file
a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is
based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Rule 111, Section 2. When separate civil action is
suspended. — x x x
The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil action. However, the
civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Rule 120, Section 2. Contents of the judgment. —
If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the
legal qualification of the offense constituted by the
acts committed by the accused and the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances which attended its
commission; (2) the participation of the accused in
the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed
29
upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or
damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to
be recovered from the accused by the offended
party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the
civil liability by a separate civil action has been
reserved or waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state
whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
either case, the judgment shall determine if the act
or omission from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.
Extinction of Civil Liability
Rule 111, Section 2. When separate civil action is
suspended. — x x x
The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil action. However, the
civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
1. When a person is charged with an offense and
the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction
or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the
same or identical offense. This is double jeopardy.
(Manantan v. CA) (1) a first jeopardy has attached
before the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the
same offense as in the first. In turn, a first jeopardy
attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid
plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has
been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
(People v. Jugueta)
2. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the
accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil
liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission. There
being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than
the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111. The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Art. 29, where the civil action for
damages is for the same act or omission. (Manantan v.
CA)
3. The acquittal of the accused does not prevent
a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case
where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b)
where the court declared that the liability of the
accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused was acquitted. (Sanchez v.
FEBTC)
4. The civil action based on the delict is
extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where
the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him. (Sanchez v. FEBTC)
5. If the accused is acquitted on reasonable
doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil
aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot
appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place
the accused in double jeopardy. However, the
aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or
both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect
of the case within the period therefor. (Sanchez v.
FEBTC)
6. In other words, if an accused is acquitted
based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil
liability arising from the crime may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. However, if an
accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the
author of the act or omission complained of (or that
there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist), said
acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the
crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being
no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based
thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil
action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than
the delict complained of. (Manliclic v. Calaunan)
7. As regards civil liability arising from quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished
by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable
doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in
a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
30
liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility
arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code. An
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely
irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana. (Manliclic v. Calaunan)
C. Prejudicial Question
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be
decided before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by
rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with
the provisions of this Code.
Rule 111, Section 6. Suspension by reason of
prejudicial question. — A petition for suspension of
the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in
the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting
the preliminary investigation. When the criminal
action has been filed in court for trial, the petition
to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action
at any time before the prosecution rests.
Rule 111, Section 7. Elements of prejudicial
question. — The elements of a prejudicial question
are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
1. A prejudicial question is understood in law to
be that which arises in a case the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case
and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes
into play generally in a situation where civil and
criminal actions are pending and the issues involved
in both cases are similar or so closely related that an
issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case
before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the
existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is
alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of
the latter pending final determination of the former.
(Quiambao v. Osorio)
2. A prejudicial question is one that arises in a
case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into
play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former
an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale
behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions. (Spouses Lee-Yu v. PCIB)
3. A prejudicial question is one which arises in a
case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not
only that the civil case involves facts upon which the
criminal action is based, but also that the resolution
of the issues raised in the civil action would
necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.
Consequently, the defense must involve an issue
similar or intimately related to the same issue raised
in the criminal action and its resolution determinative
of whether or not the latter action may proceed.
(Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis)
4. Elements:
a. the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and
b. the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may
proceed (Quiambao v. Osorio; Marbella-
Bobis v. Bobis)
5. A prejudicial question does not conclusively
resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but
simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution
of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial
question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted
that all the essential elements of a crime have been
adequately alleged in the information, considering that
the prosecution has not yet presented a single
evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested
its case. A challenge of the allegations in the
information on the ground of prejudicial question is in
effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge
through a non-criminal suit. (Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis)
6. It is the issue in the civil action that is
prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal action,
not the criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil
action. (Yap v. Paras)
7. In Quiambao v. Osorio, the Supreme Court
applied analogously the concept of prejudicial question
to cases involving a civil case and an administrative
case. “If a pending civil case may be considered to be
31
in the nature of a prejudicial question to an
administrative case, We see no reason why the reverse
may not be so considered in the proper case, such as
in the petition at bar.” In Tamin v. CA, it was also
applied in a situation which involves two civil actions
(one of which is a cadastral proceeding).
8. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the defense of
prejudicial question in a criminal case for bigamy was
not accepted because “respondent was for all legal
intents and purposes regarded as a married man at
the time he contracted his second marriage with
petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in
the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the
civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question. As stated above, respondent cannot be
permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the
criminal action against him.”
D. Subsidiary Liability
Revised Penal Code, Article 102. Subsidiary civil
liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors
of establishments. - In default of the persons
criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and
any other persons or corporations shall be civilly
liable for crimes committed in their establishments,
in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special police
regulation shall have been committed by them or
their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the
restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within
their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the
payment of the value thereof, provided that such
guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper
himself, or the person representing him, of the
deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which
such innkeeper or his representative may have given
them with respect to the care and vigilance over
such goods. No liability shall attach in case of
robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons unless committed by the innkeeper's
employees.
Revised Penal Code, Article 103. Subsidiary civil
liability of other persons. - The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also
apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
Labor Code, Art. 106. Contractor or
subcontractor. Whenever an employer enters into
a contract with another person for the performance
of the former’s work, the employees of the contractor
and of the latter’s subcontractor, if any, shall be
paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor
fails to pay the wages of his employees in
accordance with this Code, the employer shall be
jointly and severally liable with his contractor or
subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the
work performed under the contract, in the same
manner and extent that he is liable to employees
directly employed by him.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, by
appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the
contracting-out of labor to protect the rights of
workers established under this Code. In so
prohibiting or restricting, he may make appropriate
distinctions between labor-only contracting and job
contracting as well as differentiations within these
types of contracting and determine who among the
parties involved shall be considered the employer for
purposes of this Code, to prevent any violation or
circumvention of any provision of this Code.
There is "labor-only" contracting where the person
supplying workers to an employer does not have
substantial capital or investment in the form of
tools, equipment, machineries, work premises,
among others, and the workers recruited and placed
by such person are performing activities which are
directly related to the principal business of such
employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary
shall be considered merely as an agent of the
employer who shall be responsible to the workers in
the same manner and extent as if the latter were
directly employed by him.
Art. 107. Indirect employer. The provisions of the
immediately preceding article shall likewise apply to
any person, partnership, association or corporation
which, not being an employer, contracts with an
independent contractor for the performance of any
work, task, job or project.
Art. 108. Posting of bond. An employer or indirect
employer may require the contractor or
subcontractor to furnish a bond equal to the cost of
labor under contract, on condition that the bond will
answer for the wages due the employees should the
32
contractor or subcontractor, as the case may be, fail
to pay the same.
Art. 109. Solidary liability. The provisions of
existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, every
employer or indirect employer shall be held
responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for
any violation of any provision of this Code. For
purposes of determining the extent of their civil
liability under this Chapter, they shall be
considered as direct employers.
Concept and Requisites
1. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a
delict. On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180
is founded on culpa-aquiliana. (Carpio v. Doroja)
2. In order that an employer may be held
subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in
the criminal action, it should be shown
a. that the employer is engaged in any kind
of industry,
b. that the employee committed the offense
in the discharge of his duties and
c. that the employee is insolvent. (Carpio v.
Doroja)
3. The subsidiary liability of the employer,
however, arises only after conviction of the employee
in the criminal action. If all the requisites are present,
the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable
upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of the
latter's insolvency. (Carpio v. Doroja)
4. Considering the subsidiary liability imposed
upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in
effect a party to the criminal case. Ergo, the employer's
subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in
the criminal case as part of the execution proceedings
against the employee. The proceeding for the
enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be
considered as part of the proceeding for the execution
of the judgment. A case in which an execution has
been issued is regarded as still pending so that all
proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the
suit. There is no question that the court which
rendered the judgment has a general supervisory
control over its process of execution, and this power
carries with it the right to determine every question of
fact and law which may be involved in the execution.
(Carpio v. Doroja)
5. The argument that the employer cannot be
held subsidiarily liable because the matter of
subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in like
manner, the appellate court's decision made no
mention of such subsidiary liability is of no moment.
As already discussed, the filing of a separate complaint
against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability
is not necessary since his liability is clear from the
decision against the accused. Such being the case, it
is not indispensable for the question of subsidiary
liability to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such
subsidiary liability is already implied from the
appellate court's decision. (Carpio v. Doroja)
6. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the
basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute an
amendment of the judgment because in an action
under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the
requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer
becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of
a separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary
liability can be enforced in the same case where the
award was given, and this does not constitute an act
of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon
the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of
execution (but only after the employer has been heard),
upon conviction of the employee and after execution is
returned unsatisfied due to the employee's insolvency.
(Carpio v. Doroja)
7. Insolvency is required only when the liability
of the master is being made effective by execution levy,
but not for the rendition of judgment against the
master. The subsidiary character of the employer's
responsibility merely imports that the latter's property
is not be seized without first exhausting that of the
servant. (Bantoto v. Bobis)
8. The master may not demand prior exhaustion
of the servant’s (principal obligor’s) properties if he
cannot point out to the creditor available property of
the debtor within Philippine territory, sufficient to
cover the amount of the debt. (Bantoto v. Bobis)
9. The master, as person subsidiarily liable,
cannot incur greater civil liability than his convicted
employee. (Bantoto v. Bobis)
10. The statutory basis for an employer’s
subsidiary liability is found in Art. 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. This Court has since sanctioned the
enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the same
criminal proceedings in which the employee is
adjudged guilty, on the thesis that it really is a part of,
and merely an incident in, the execution process of the
judgment. But, execution against the employer must
not issue as just a matter of course, and it behooves the
court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to
determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the
purpose, the legal applicability and propriety of the
33
employers liability. The requirement is mandatory even
when it appears prima facie that execution against the
convicted employee cannot be satisfied. The court
must convince itself that the convicted employee is in
truth in the employ of the employer; that the latter is
engaged in an industry of some kind; that the
employee has committed the crime to which civil
liability attaches while in the performance of his duties
as such; and that execution against the employee is
unsuccessful by reason of insolvency. (Yonaha v. CA)
11. The judgment of conviction of the employee, of
course, concludes the employer and the subsidiary
liability may be enforced in the same criminal case, but
to afford the employer due process, the court should
hear and decide that liability on the basis of the
conditions required therefor by law. (Yonaha v. CA)
Diligence Not A Defense
12. Victims of negligence or their heirs have a
choice between an action to enforce the civil liability
arising from culpa criminal under Art. 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict
(culpa aquiliana) under the Civil Code. If, as here, the
action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold
the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee,
subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the
diligence of a good father of the family. On the other
hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the
plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only
upon proof of prior conviction of its employee. (L.G.
Foods v. Pagapong-Agraviador)
VIII. DAMAGES
A. Concept/Kinds of Damages
Art. 2197. Damages may be:
(1) Actual or compensatory;
(2) Moral;
(3) Nominal;
(4) Temperate or moderate;
(5) Liquidated; or
(6) Exemplary or corrective.
1. The fundamental principle of the law on
damages is that one injured by a breach of contract or
by a wrongful or negligent act or omission shall have a
fair and just compensation, commensurate with the
loss sustained as a consequence of the defendants
acts. Hence, actual pecuniary compensation is the
general rule, except where the circumstances warrant
the allowance of other kinds of damages. (Spouses Ong
v. CA)
2. Damages, after all, are not intended to enrich
the complainant at the expense of the defendant.
(Spouses Ong v. CA)
B. General Principles of Recovery
1. Civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity
authorized in our criminal law for the offended party,
in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial
policy and apart from other proven actual damages,
which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory
damages in civil law. This award stems from Article
100 of the RPC which states, "Every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable." (People v.
Jugueta)
2. Civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or
a fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when
appropriate. (People v. Jugueta)
3. In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded
to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution
or compensation to the victim for the damage or
infraction that was done to the latter by the accused,
which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely,
it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person
dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment
imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to
pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Also, it
is apparent from Art. 2206 that the law only imposes
a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity,
which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a
ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the
award cannot be changed, increasing the amount
awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and
increased when the present circumstance warrants it.
(People v. Jugueta)
*NOTE: People v. Jugueta is a long case that
discussed the imposition of civil indemnity awarded in
criminal cases. You may check the Appendix for a
summary of the amount of indemnity awarded.
4. As a result of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the death
penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have
to impose reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the
principal consideration for the award of damages is the
penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense
because of its heinousness, not the public penalty
actually imposed on the offender. When the
circumstances surrounding the crime would justify
the imposition of the death penalty were it not for RA
9346, the Supreme Court has ruled that the award of
34
civil indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable
by death should be ₱75,000.00. “This is not only a
reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the
penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but
also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over
the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity.” Such reasoning also applies to all heinous
crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was later
increased to ₱100,000.00. (People v. Jugueta)
5. For crimes where the imposable penalty is
death in view of the attendance of an ordinary
aggravating circumstance but due to the prohibition to
impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence pegs the
amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱100,0000.00 as moral damages. For the qualifying
aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary
aggravating circumstances present, the amount of
₱100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside
from civil indemnity and moral damages. Regardless of
the attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance,
the exemplary damages shall be fixed at ₱100,000.00.
(People v. Jugueta)
6. When the circumstances surrounding the
crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only,
there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the
Court rules that the proper amounts should be
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱75,000.00 exemplary damages,
regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating
circumstances present. (People v. Jugueta)
7. When it comes to compound and complex
crimes, although the single act done by the offender
caused several crimes, the fact that those were the
result of a single design, the amount of civil indemnity
and moral damages will depend on the penalty and the
number of victims. For each of the victims, the heirs
should be properly compensated. If it is multiple
murder without any ordinary aggravating
circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating
circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death
because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the maximum
penalty shall be imposed, then, for every victim who
dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with ₱100,000.00
as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages. (People v.
Jugueta)
8. In case of a special complex crime, which is
different from a complex crime under Article 48 of the
RPC, if the penalty is death but it cannot be imposed
due to RA 9346 and what is actually imposed is the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and
moral damages will be ₱100,000.00 each, and another
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the
heinousness of the crime and to set an example. If
there is another composite crime included in a special
complex crime and the penalty imposed is death, an
additional ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱100,000.00 moral damages and ₱100,000.00
exemplary damages shall be awarded for each
composite crime committed. (People v. Jugueta)
*For example, in case of Robbery with
Homicide wherein three (3) people died as a
consequence of the crime, the heirs of the victims shall
be entitled to the award of damages as discussed [in
paragraph 8]. This is true, however, only if those who
were killed were the victims of the robbery or mere
bystanders and not when those who died were the
perpetrators or robbers themselves because the crime
of robbery with homicide may still be committed even
if one of the robbers dies. This is also applicable in
robbery with rape where there is more than one victim
of rape. (People v. Jugueta)
9. In awarding civil indemnity and moral
damages, it is also important to determine the stage in
which the crime was committed and proven during the
trial. when the crime proven is consummated and the
penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity
and moral damages that should be awarded will each
be ₱100,000.00 and another ₱100,000.00 for
exemplary damages or when the circumstances of the
crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only,
the civil indemnity and moral damages should be
₱75,000.00 each, as well as exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven is
in its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral
damages that should be awarded will each be
₱50,000.00, and an award of ₱25,000.00 civil
indemnity and ₱25,000.00 moral damages when the
crime proven is in its attempted stage. The difference
in the amounts awarded for the stages is mainly due
to the disparity in the outcome of the crime committed,
in the same way that the imposable penalty varies for
each stage of the crime. The said amounts of civil
indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of
felonies in their frustrated or attempted stages shall be
the bases when the crimes committed constitute
complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC. For
example, in a crime of murder with attempted murder,
the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and
exemplary damages is ₱100,000.00 each, while in the
attempted murder, the civil indemnity, moral damages
and exemplary damages is ₱25,000.00 each. (People v.
Jugueta)
10. In a special complex crime, like robbery with
homicide, if, aside from homicide, several victims
35
(except the robbers) sustained injuries, they shall
likewise be indemnified. It must be remembered that
in a special complex crime, unlike in a complex crime,
the component crimes have no attempted or frustrated
stages because the intention of the offender/s is to
commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the
process of committing the said crime, another crime is
committed. (People v. Jugueta)
*For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with
homicide, other victims sustained injuries, regardless
of the severity, the crime committed is still robbery
with homicide as the injuries become part of the crime,
"Homicide", in the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and
now forms part of the essential element of
robbery, which is the use of violence or the use of force
upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity of the
injuries sustained by the victims must still be
determined for the purpose of awarding civil indemnity
and damages. If a victim suffered mortal wounds and
could have died if not for a timely medical intervention,
the victim should be awarded civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages equivalent to the
damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim
suffered injuries that are not fatal, an award of civil
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages
should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages
awarded in an attempted stage. (People v. Jugueta)
11. In other crimes that resulted in the death of a
victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties,
like homicide, death under tumultuous affray,
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil
indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be
₱50,000.00 and ₱50,000.00 moral damages without
exemplary damages being awarded. However, an
award of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of
homicide shall be added if there is an aggravating
circumstance present that has been proven but not
alleged in the information.
12. In contracts or quasi-contracts, the obligor is
liable for all the damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation if
he is guilty of fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton
attitude. (Trans-Asia v. CA)
13. To be recoverable, actual damages must be
pleaded and proven in Court. In no instance may the
trial judge award more than those so pleaded and
proven. Damages cannot be presumed. The award
thereof must be based on the evidence presented, not
on the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly
not on flimsy, remote, speculative and non-substantial
proof. (Spouses Ong v. CA)
 14. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of
his or her body, and if that integrity is violated,
damages are due and assessable. However, physical
injury, like loss or diminution of use of an arm or a
limb, is not a pecuniary loss. Indeed, it is not
susceptible of exact monetary estimation. Thus, the
usual practice is to award moral damages for physical
injuries sustained. (Spouses Ong v. CA)
15. In Air France v. CA, the Supreme Court ruled
that “[o]missions by ordinary passengers may be
condoned but more is expected of members of the bar
who cannot feign ignorance of such limitations and
restrictions. An award of moral and exemplary
damages cannot be sustained under the
circumstances, but petitioner has to refund the
unused coupons in the Air France ticket to the private
respondent.”
16. Bad faith under the law cannot be presumed;
it must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. Again, the unbroken jurisprudence is that in
breach of contract cases where the defendant is not
shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith,
liability for damages is limited to the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation
which the parties had foreseen or could reasonably
have foreseen. The damages, however, will not include
liability far moral damages. (PAL v. Miano)
17. Decisions of Labor Arbiter
a. The decision of a labor arbiter is composed
of two parts. The first is that part of the
decision that cannot now be disputed
because it has been confirmed with
finality. This is the finding of the illegality
of the dismissal and the awards of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement,
backwages, attorney's fees, and legal
interests. The second part is the
computation of the awards made. On its
face, the computation the labor arbiter
made shows that it was time-bound as
can be seen from the figures used in the
computation. This part, being merely a
computation of what the first part of the
decision established and declared, can, by
its nature, be re-computed. (Nacar v.
Gallery Frames)
b. No essential change is made by a
recomputation as this step is a necessary
consequence that flows from the nature of
the illegality of dismissal declared by the
Labor Arbiter in that decision.29 A
recomputation (or an original
computation, if no previous computation
36
has been made) is a part of the law –
specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code
and the established jurisprudence on this
provision – that is read into the decision.
By the nature of an illegal dismissal case,
the reliefs continue to add up until full
satisfaction, as expressed under Article
279 of the Labor Code. The recomputation
of the consequences of illegal dismissal
upon execution of the decision does not
constitute an alteration or amendment of
the final decision being implemented. The
illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the
computation of monetary consequences of
this dismissal is affected, and this is not a
violation of the principle of immutability of
final judgments. (Nacar v. Gallery Frames)
C. Actual Damages
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by
stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered
by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation
is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Art. 2200. Indemnification for damages shall
comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered,
but also that of the profits which the obligee failed
to obtain.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the
damages for which the obligor who acted in good
faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or
could have reasonably foreseen at the time the
obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton
attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
non-performance of the obligation.
Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the
defendant shall be liable for all damages which are
the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. It is not necessary that
such damages have been foreseen or could have
reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
Art. 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to
minimize the damages resulting from the act or
omission in question.
 Art. 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been
insured, and he has received indemnity from the
insurance company for the injury or loss arising out
of the wrong or breach of contract complained of,
the insurance company shall be subrogated to the
rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the
person who has violated the contract. If the amount
paid by the insurance company does not fully cover
the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be
entitled to recover the deficiency from the person
causing the loss or injury.
Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment
of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay,
the indemnity for damages, there being no
stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of
the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of
stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent
per annum.
1. Actual or compensatory damages are those
awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss
or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of
natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong
that has been done, to compensate for the injury
inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions based
on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all
the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. (PNOC Shipping v. CA)
2. Actual damages are such compensation or
damages for an injury that will put the injured party
in the position in which he had been before he was
injured. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are
actually sustained and susceptible of measurement.
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is
entitled to adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss as he has duly proven. (Spouses Ong v.
CA)
3. To enable an injured party to recover actual or
compensatory damages, he is required to prove the
actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of
certainty premised upon competent proof and on the
best evidence available. The burden of proof is on the
party who would be defeated if no evidence would be
presented on either side. (PNOC Shipping v. CA) The
burden is to establish one’s case by a preponderance
of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole,
adduced by one side, is superior to that of the other.
Actual damages are not presumed. The claimant must
prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable
degree of certainty premised upon competent proof
and on the best evidence obtainable. Specific facts that
could afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual damages are borne must be
37
pointed out. Actual damages cannot be anchored on
mere surmises, speculations or conjectures. (Marikina
Autoline v. People)
4. In PNOC Shipping v. CA, the Supreme Court
ruled that “The price quotations presented as exhibits
partake of the nature of hearsay evidence considering
that the persons who issued them were not presented
as witnesses. x x x a letter may be offered in evidence
and admitted as such but its evidentiary weight
depends upon the observance of the rules on
evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter should
be presented as witness to provide the other party to
the litigation the opportunity to question him on the
contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence,
failure to present the author of the letter renders its
contents suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence,
whether objected to or not, has no probative value.”
5. Actual or compensatory damages cannot be
presumed, but must be duly proved, and proved with
reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and
amount of damages, but must depend upon competent
proof that they have suffered and on evidence of the
actual amount thereof. (Dichoso v. CA) It must point
out specific facts which could afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages
are borne. (DBP v. CA)
6. Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act
of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their value
at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum
of money which he would have to pay in the market for
identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper
case damages for the loss of use during the period
before replacement. In other words, in the case of
profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the
value of the chattel to its owner as a going concern at
the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least
in the case of ships, that regard must be had to
existing and pending engagements. (PNOC Shipping v.
CA)
Damnum Emergens/Lucrum Cessans
7. There are two kinds of actual or compensatory
damages: one is the loss of what a person already
possesses (daño emergente or damnum emergens
[actual loss]), and the other is the failure to receive as
a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro
cesante or lucrum cessans [amount of profit lost]).
(PNOC Shipping v. CA; Lim v. CA)
Disability
 8. Actual damages may likewise be recovered for
loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of
temporary or permanent personal injury, or for injury
to the plaintiffs business standing or commercial
credit. (ABS-CBN v. CA)
9. In some instances, the Supreme Court awards
the cost of medical procedures to restore the injured
person to his or her former condition. However, this
award necessitates expert testimony on the cost of
possible restorative medical procedure. In Spouses
Ong v. CA, “petitioner failed to present evidence
regarding the feasibility or practicability and the cost
of a restorative medical operation on her arm. Thus,
there is no basis to grant her P48,000 for such
expense.”
Indemnity for Death
10. The indemnity for death caused by a quasi-
delict used to be pegged at P3,000, based on Art.
2206. However, the amount has been gradually
increased through the years because of the declining
value of our currency. At present, prevailing
jurisprudence fixes the amount at P50,000. (Pestaño v.
Spouses Sumayang)
11. In considering the earning capacity of the
victim as an element of damages, the following factors
are considered in determining the compensable
amount of lost earnings:
a. the number of years for which the victim
would otherwise have lived; and
b. the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of
the deceased. (Lambert v. Heirs of
Castillion)
12. The first factor refers to the life expectancy,
which takes into consideration the nature of the
victims work, lifestyle, age and state of health prior to
the accident. The second refers to the victims earning
capacity minus the necessary living
expenses. (Pestaño v. Spouses Sumayang)
13. Jurisprudence provides that the first
factor, i.e., life expectancy, is computed by applying
the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the
American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the
Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality. As
to the second factor, it is computed by multiplying the
life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e.,
the total earnings less expenses necessary in the
creation of such earnings or income and less living and
other incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily
computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings.
(Lambert v. Heirs of Castillion)
38
14. Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 – age at time
of death) x (gross annual income – reasonable and
necessary living expenses)]. (Lambert v. Heirs of
Castillion)
15. As a rule, documentary evidence should be
presented to substantiate the claim for damages for
loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages
for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence when (1) the
deceased is self-employed earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial
notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s
line of work no documentary evidence is available; or
(2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker
earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws. (Victory Liner v. Gammad)
Interest
16. Guidelines on Interest Rates provided in
Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA as modified by BSP-MB
Circular No. 799:
a. When an obligation, regardless of its
source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-
contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is
breached, the contravenor can be held
liable for damages. The provisions under
Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code
govern in determining the measure of
recoverable damages.
b. With regard particularly to an award of
interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of
interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
i. When the obligation is breached,
and it consists in the payment of
a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest
due should be that which may
have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due
shall itself earn legal interest from
the time it is judicially demanded.
In the absence of stipulation, the
rate of interest shall be 6% per
annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and
subject to the provisions of Art.
1169.
ii. When an obligation, not
constituting a loan or forbearance
of money, is breached, an interest
on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the
 discretion of the court at the rate
of 6% per annum. No interest,
however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages,
except when or until the demand
can be established with
reasonable certainty. Accordingly,
where the demand is established
with reasonable certainty, the
interest shall begin to run from
the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art.
1169, Civil Code), but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the
demand is made, the interest
shall begin to run only from the
date the judgment of the court is
made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for
the computation of legal interest
shall, in any case, be on the
amount finally adjudged.
iii. When the judgment of the court
awarding a sum of money
becomes final and executory, the
rate of legal interest, whether the
case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 6%
per annum from such finality
until its satisfaction, this interim
period being deemed to be by then
an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.
c. And, in addition to the above, judgments
that have become final and executory
prior to July 1, 2013, shall not be
disturbed and shall continue to be
implemented applying the rate of interest
fixed therein. (Nacar v. Gallery Frames)
BSP Circular No. 799 series of 2013
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods, or credits, and the
rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an
express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be
6% per annum.
xxx
This circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.
39
17. Upon the provisions of Art. 2213, interest
“cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or
damages, except when the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty.” It is axiomatic that if the
suit were for damages, unliquidated and not known
until definitely ascertained, assessed and determined
by the courts after proof, interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum should be from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to be
reasonably ascertained). (Lim v. CA)
Attorney’s Fees
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons
or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution
against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or
proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident
bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly
valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household
helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's
compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability
arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are
awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just
and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation must be reasonable.
 18. An award of attorney’s fees is an indemnity for
damages ordered by a court to be paid by the losing
party to the prevailing party, based on any of the cases
authorized by law. It is payable not to the lawyer but
to the client, unless the two have agreed that the
award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof. (Spouses Ong v. CA)
19. Under Art. 2208, attorney’s fees are
recoverable only in the concept of actual damages, not
as moral damages nor judicial costs. Hence, to merit
such an award, it is settled that the amount thereof
must be proven. Moreover, such must be specifically
prayed for and may not be deemed incorporated within
a general prayer for such other relief and remedy as
this court may deem just and equitable. (Trans-Asia v.
CA)
20. The Supreme Court has established a set of
standards in fixing the amount of attorney’s fees:
a. The amount and character of the services
rendered;
b. labor, time and trouble involved;
c. the nature and importance of the litigation
or business in which the services were
rendered;
d. the responsibility imposed;
e. the amount of money or the value of the
property affected by the controversy or
involved in the employment;
f. the skill and experience called for in the
performance of the services;
g. the professional character and social
standing of the attorney;
h. the results secured, it being a recognized
rule that an attorney may properly charge
a much larger fee when it is contingent
than when it is not. (Spouses Ong v. CA)
21. An award of attorney’s fees is addressed to
sound judicial discretion and subject to judicial
control. Thus, in Spouses Ong v. CA, the Supreme
Court reduced the 25% attorney’s fees because
“considering that the nature of the case was not
exceptionally difficult, and he was not required to exert
Herculean efforts, his handling of the case was sorely
inadequate, as shown by his failure to follow
elementary norms of civil procedure and evidence.”
22. The mere fact that petitioners were
constrained to litigate in order to protect and assert
their rights does not ipso facto entitle them to
attorney's fees. What the Civil Code provides, in order
that attorney's fees may be awarded, is that “the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff
to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest.” It is settled that the fact that the
40
party was "compelled to litigate and incur expenses to
protect and enforce their claim does not justify the
award of attorney's fees. The general rule is that
attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages
because of the public policy that no premium should
be placed on the right to litigate. The award of
attorney's fees must be deleted where the award of
moral and exemplary damages are eliminated.
(Francisco v. Co)
23. The general rule is that attorney’s fees cannot
be recovered as part of damages because of the policy
that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party
wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s
fees under Art. 2208 demands factual, legal and
equitable justification. Even when a claimant is
compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may
not be awarded where there is no sufficient showing of
bad faith in the parties persistence of a case other than
an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his
cause. (City Trust v. Villanueva)
24. No person should be penalized for the exercise
of the right to litigate. This right, however, must be
exercised in good faith. Absence of good faith in the
present case is shown by the fact that petitioner clearly
has no cause of action against respondents but it
recklessly filed suit anyway and wantonly pursued
pointless appeals, thereby causing the latter to spend
valuable time, money and effort in unnecessarily
defending themselves, incurring damages in the
process. Attorney’s fees may be awarded by a court if
one who claims it is compelled to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect ones interests
by reason of an unjustified act or omission on the part
of the party from whom it is sought. (Industrial
Insurance Co. v. Bondad)
25. Attorney’s fees, as part of damages, are
assessed only in the instances specified in Art. 2208.
And it is necessary for the trial court to make express
findings of fact and law that would bring the case
within the exception. In short, the factual, legal or
equitable justification for the award must be set forth
in the text of the decision. The matter of attorney’s fees
cannot be touched only in the fallo of the decision, else
the award should be thrown out for being speculative
and conjectural. (Villanueva v. Salvador)
26. The award of attorney’s fees as an item of
damages is the exception rather than the rule, and
counsel’s fees are not to be awarded every time a party
wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s
fees under Art. 2208 demands factual, legal and
equitable justification, without which the award is a
conclusion without a premise, its basis being
improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In all
events, the court must explicitly state in the text of the
decision, and not only in the decretal portion thereof,
the legal reason for the award of attorney’s fees.
(Filipinas Broadcasting v. Ago Medical)
27. Award of attorney’s fees must be based on
findings of fact and law, stated in the decision of the
trial court. (Sanitary Steam Laundry v. CA)
28. When there is no basis to award moral and
exemplary damages, there is also no basis to award
attorney’s fees. (China Airlines v. CA)
D. Moral Damages
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.
Art. 2218. In the adjudication of moral damages,
the sentimental value of property, real or personal,
may be considered.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious
acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; (Art. 309. Any
person who shows disrespect to the dead, or
wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable to
the family of the deceased for damages, material and
moral.)
41
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26,
27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped,
or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may
also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers
and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9
of this article, in the order named.
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal
ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.
1. Moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. (City Trust v.
Villanueva) Although incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages, nevertheless, must
somehow be proportional to and in approximation of
the suffering inflicted. Such damages, to be
recoverable, must be the proximate result of a
wrongful act or omission the factual basis for which is
satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party.
(Expertravel & Tours v. CA)
2. Moral damages are treated as “compensatory
damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or
mental anguish resulting from a wrong.” They may
also be considered and allowed “for resulting pain and
suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation
suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her
assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of
provocation, the reasonableness of the force used, the
attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the
victim, [and] mental distress.” (People v. Jugueta)
3. Requisites for the award of moral damages:
a. there must be an injury, whether physical,
mental or psychological, clearly sustained
by the claimant;
b. there must be a culpable act or omission
factually established;
c. the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the
injury sustained by the claimant; and
d. the award of damages is predicated on any
of the cases stated in Art. 2219. (City Trust
v. Villanueva)
 4. In City Trust v. Villanueva, the Supreme Court
disallowed the award of moral damages because “it is
clear from the records that the BANK was able to
remedy the caveat of Kingly Commodities to
VILLANUEVA that his trading account would be closed
at 5:30 p.m. on 26 June 1986. The BANK was able to
issue a managers check in favor of Kingly Commodities
before the deadline. It was able to likewise explain to
Kingly Commodities the circumstances surrounding
the unfortunate situation. Verily, the alleged
embarrassment or inconvenience caused to
VILLANUEVA as a result of the incident was timely and
adequately contained, corrected, mitigated, if not
entirely eradicated.”
5. Art. 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages
to be recovered for quasi-delicts, provided that the act
or omission caused physical injuries. There can be no
recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict
resulted in physical injury. (Q.C. Government v.
Dacara)
6. While proof of pecuniary loss is unnecessary
to justify an award of moral damages, the amount of
indemnity being left to the sound discretion of the
court, it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant
satisfactorily proves the existence of the factual basis
of the damages and its causal connection to
defendants wrongful act or omission. This is so
because moral damages, albeit incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are designed to compensate the claimant
for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty
on the wrongdoer. (Villanueva v. Salvador)
7. For the court to arrive upon a judicious
approximation of emotional or moral injury, competent
and substantial proof of the suffering experienced
must be laid before it. Essential to this approximation
are definite findings as to what the supposed moral
damages suffered consisted of; otherwise, such
damages would become a penalty rather than a
compensation for actual injury suffered. The award of
moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite
showing that respondent actually experienced
emotional and mental sufferings. Mere allegations do
not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and
convincing proof. (Q.C. Government v. Dacara)
8. To recover moral damages in an action for
breach of contract, the breach must be palpably
wanton, reckless, malicious, in bad faith, oppressive
or abusive. (Francisco v. Ferrer, Jr.) There must be
proof of fraudulent action or bad faith for a claim for
moral damages to succeed. Moral damages are
generally not recoverable in culpa contractual except
when bad faith supervenes and is proven. (Villanueva
v. Salvador)
42
9. Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence, but it imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of a wrong. It should be established by clear and
convincing evidence since the law always presumes
good faith. In ascertaining the intention of the person
accused of acting in bad faith, the courts must
carefully examine the evidence as to the conduct and
outward acts from which the inward motive may be
determined. (Francisco v. Co)
10. It may be that gross negligence may
sometimes amount to bad faith. (Villanueva v.
Salvador) Mere negligence, even if it causes the
plaintiff to suffer mental anguish or serious fright, is
not a ground for awarding moral damages. (China
Airlines v. CA)
11. Before moral damages may be assessed, the
defendants act must be vitiated by bad faith or that
there is willful intent to injure. Simply put, moral
damages cannot arise from simple negligence.
(Villanueva v. Salvador)
12. Absent fraud or bad faith on defendant’s part
in breaching his contract, his liability for damages is
limited to the natural and probable consequences of
the breach of the obligation, which the parties had
foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In such a
case, the liability would not include moral damages.
For this reason, not every case of mental anguish,
fright or serious anxiety calls for the award of moral
damages. (China Airlines v. CA)
13. Moral damages are recoverable in a damage
suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage
only where (a) the mishap results in the death of a
passenger and (b) it is proved that the carrier was
guilty of fraud and bad faith even if death does not
result. (Morris v. CA)
14. Moral damages are generally not recoverable
in culpa contractual except when bad faith had been
proven. However, the same damages may be recovered
when breach of contract of carriage results in the
death of a passenger. (Morris v. CA) In culpa
contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may
be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or
was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith)
or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation
and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract
itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical
injuries. By special rule in Art. 1764, in relation to Art.
2206, moral damages may also be awarded in case the
death of a passenger results from a breach of
carriage. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when
an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b)
where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral
damages may aptly be recovered. This rule also applies
to contracts when breached by tort. In culpa criminal,
moral damages could be lawfully due when the
accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious
acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary
detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or
defamation. Malicious prosecution can also give rise
to a claim of for moral damages. (Expertravel & Tours
v. CA)
15. Although the institution of a clearly
unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal
justification for an award of attorney's fees, such filing,
however, has almost invariably been held not to be a
ground for an award of moral
damages. The rationale for the rule is that the law
could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right
to litigate. The anguish suffered by a person for having
been made a defendant in a civil suit would be no
different from the usual worry and anxiety suffered by
anyone who is haled to court, a situation that cannot
by itself be a cogent reason for the award of moral
damages. If the rule were otherwise, then moral
damages must every time be awarded in favor of the
prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff.
(Expertravel & Tours v. CA)
*Under Art. 2219, malicious prosecution is a
ground for moral damages. Thus, to be entitled to
moral damages, the threshold question is whether the
elements of a malicious prosecution is present or not
based on the facts (facts-dependent). Just because an
action is labelled as “unfounded civil action” does not
mean that the offended party is not entitled to moral
damages. If the facts show the presence of all the
elements, then it is a case of malicious prosecution
and moral damages may be awarded.
**Illustration:
A filed a case against B, an employee of C. The trial
court found that the act or omission complained of by
A is not B’s fault. Thus, the trial court absolved B (A
lost) which became final. If A pursues the case against
C, the employer, knowing that B is not liable, then this
is a case of malicious prosecution. C is now entitled to
moral damages.
16. An award of moral damages cannot be
justified solely upon the premise that the employer
fired his employee without just cause or due
process. Additional facts must be pleaded and proven
to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil
Code, these being, to repeat, that the act of dismissal
was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive
43
to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy; and of course, that social
humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc.,
resulted therefrom. (Cocoland Development v. NLRC)
17. Art. 1764 in relation to Art. 2206 holds the
common carrier in breach of its contract of carriage
that results in the death of a passenger liable to pay
the following: (1) indemnity for death, (2) indemnity for
loss of earning capacity, and (3) moral damages.
(Victory Liner v. Gammad)
18. A juridical person is generally not entitled to
moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it
cannot experience physical suffering or such
sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety,
mental anguish or moral shock. However, since Art.
2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a
natural or juridical person, a juridical person such as
a corporation can validly complain for libel or any
other form of defamation and claim for moral damages.
(Filipinas Broadcasting v. Ago Medical)
19. Moral damages under Art. 2220 does not fix
the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is
discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental
anguish or the suffering of the private offended party.
The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil
indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed
the award of civil indemnity. (People v. Jugeuta)
20. In rape cases, it is recognized that the victim's
injury is concomitant with and necessarily results
from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the
award of moral damages. (People v. Jugueta)
21. When awarded, moral damages must not be
palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate
that it was the result of passion, prejudice or
corruption on the part of the trial court judge or
appellate court justices. (Francisco v. Ferrer, Jr.)
22. The award of moral damages cannot be
lumped with exemplary damages because they are
based on different jural foundations. These damages
are different in nature and require separate
determination. (Victory Liner v. Gammad)
23. It must be emphasized that moral damages
are not intended to enrich the complainant at the
expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to
enable the injured parties to obtain means, diversions
or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
sufferings the injured parties have undergone by
reason of defendant's culpable action. In other words,
the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration
within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status
quo ante; and therefore it must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted. (Makabali v. CA)
E. Nominal Damages
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him.
Art. 2222. The court may award nominal damages
in every obligation arising from any source
enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case where
any property right has been invaded.
Art. 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages
shall preclude further contest upon the right
involved and all accessory questions, as between the
parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and
assigns.
1. In the absence of competent proof on the
actual damage suffered, private respondent is entitled
to nominal damages. (PNOC Shipping v. CA)
2. When plaintiff suffers some species of injury
not enough to warrant an award of actual damages,
the court may award nominal damages. The court may
award nominal damages purely to vindicate a right of
a plaintiff which defendant has violated and not to
indemnify any loss the plaintiff has suffered (China
Airlines v. CA)
3. Nominal damages are recoverable where a
legal right is technically violated and must be
vindicated against an invasion that has produced no
actual present loss of any kind or where there has been
a breach of contract and no substantial injury or
actual damages whatsoever have been or can be
shown. Nominal damages may be awarded to a
plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by
the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or
recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered. (Francisco v. Ferrer, Jr.)
4. Nominal damages are awarded in every
obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts,
or in every case where property right has been invaded.
Under Art. 2223, the adjudication of nominal damages
shall preclude further contest upon the right involved
and all accessory questions, as between the parties to
the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns. (PNOC
Shipping v. CA)
44
5. The amount of nominal damages is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court, with the relevant
circumstances taken into account. (Conjuangco v. CA)
6. Actually, nominal damages are damages in
name only and not in fact. Where these are allowed,
they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong
inflicted but simply in recognition of the existence of a
technical injury. However, the amount to be awarded
as nominal damages shall be equal or at least
commensurate to the injury sustained by private
respondent considering the concept and purpose of
such damages. The amount of nominal damages to be
awarded may also depend on certain special reasons
extant in the case. (PNOC Shipping v. CA)
7. If the dismissal was for cause, the lack of
statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal,
or render it illegal or ineffectual. However, violation of
an employee’s right to statutory due process (two-
notice rule) warrants the payment of indemnity in the
form of nominal damages. (Mercury Drug v. Serrano;
Industrial Timber v. Ababon)
*In Cocoland v. NLRC, failure to comply with the
two-notice rule, despite being a case of justified
dismissal of an employee under the Labor Code,
entitles the employee to moral damages and exemplary
damages. In Mercury Drug v. Serrano, the employee is
also entitled to nominal damages.
8. The extant rule is that a public officer shall not
be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for
acts done in the performance of official duties, unless
there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross
negligence. Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation
cannot be imposed either, in the absence of a clear
showing of any of the grounds provided therefor under
the Civil Code. Nevertheless, the public officer may still
be held liable under Art. 32. Under the aforecited
article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted
with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that
there was a violation of the constitutional rights of
petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or
good faith in the performance of ones duties.
(Conjuangco v. CA) In this case, nominal damages may
be awarded.
F. Temperate Damages
Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which
are more than nominal but less than compensatory
damages, may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
 amount can not, from the nature of the case, be
provided with certainty.
Art. 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable
under the circumstances.
1. Even if not recoverable as compensatory
damages, damages may still be awarded in the concept
of temperate or moderate damages. When the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but
the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty, temperate damages may be
recovered. Temperate damages may be allowed in
cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof
of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the
court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered
some pecuniary loss. (Primiere Development Bank v.
CA)
2. Normally, an award for actual damages
precludes an award for temperate damages. However,
in Ramos v. CA, the Supreme Court ruled that
“temperate damages can and should be awarded on
top of actual or compensatory damages in instances
where the injury is chronic and continuing. x x x In the
instant case, petitioners were able to provide only
home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who
has remained in that condition for over a decade.
Having premised our award for compensatory
damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the
onset of litigation, it would be now much more in step
with the interests of justice if the value awarded for
temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide
optimal care for their loved one in a facility which
generally specializes in such care. They should not be
compelled by dire circumstances to provide
substandard care at home without the aid of
professionals, for anything less would be grossly
inadequate.”
3. The award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when
no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is
presented in the trial court. Under Art. 2224,
temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be
denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary
loss although the exact amount was not proved. In
People v. Jugueta, the Supreme Court increased the
amount to be awarded as temperate damages to
₱50,000.00.
*As discussed in class, actual damages, nominal
damages, and temperate damages generally exclude
each other. Actual damages are awarded if the fact of
loss and the amount thereof are ascertained. If the fact
of loss cannot be ascertained, then nominal damages
45
will be awarded. If the amount of such loss cannot be
ascertained, then temperate damages will be awarded.
The only exception to this is the case of Ramos v. CA,
where temperate damages can and should be awarded
on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances
where the injury is chronic and continuing.
G. Liquidated Damages
Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed
upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case
of breach thereof.
Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended
as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably
reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
Art. 2228. When the breach of the contract
committed by the defendant is not the one
contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon the
liquidated damages, the law shall determine the
measure of damages, and not the stipulation.
1. The damages that may be recovered in actions
for ejectment are those equivalent to a reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the
premises by defendant. Nonetheless, if the damage
sought to be recovered had previously been agreed to
by lessee (in the contract of lease) and imposed by
lessor by way of damages, such damage may be
recovered in the same action for ejectment. (Azcuna, Jr.
v. CA)
H. Exemplary Damages
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are
imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages
as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are
separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to
the offended party.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages
may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the
court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner.
 Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered
as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or
not they should be adjudicated.
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary
damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must
show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded. In case liquidated
damages have been agreed upon, although no proof
of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated
damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the
court may consider the question of granting
exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages,
the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it
not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.
Art. 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary
damages are renounced in advance shall be null and
void.
1. Also known as punitive or vindictive damages,
exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve
as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a
vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion
of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those
guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are
generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In
common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for
injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and
humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an
injury that has been maliciously and wantonly
inflicted, the theory being that there should be
compensation for the hurt caused by the highly
reprehensible conduct of the defendant - associated
with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness,
malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression,
insult or fraud or gross fraud - that intensifies the
injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are
often used to refer to those species of damages that
may be awarded against a person to punish him for
his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages
are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer
and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
(People v. Catubig; People v. Jugueta)
2. Art. 2231 mandates that in cases of quasi-
delicts, exemplary damages may be recovered if the
defendant acted with gross negligence. Gross
negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a
presumption that the persons at fault must have been
conscious of the probable consequences of their
carelessness, and that they must have nevertheless
46
been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to
the person or property of others. The negligence must
amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of
persons or property. (Q.C. Government v. Dacara)
3. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition
to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. (Industrial Insurance Co. v. Bondad) The
award of these damages is meant to be a deterrent to
socially deleterious actions. Public policy requires
such imposition to suppress wanton acts of an
offender. It must be emphasized that local
governments and their employees should be
responsible not only for the maintenance of roads and
streets, but also for the safety of the public. Thus, they
must secure construction areas with adequate
precautionary measures. (Q.C. Government v. Dacara)
4. Exemplary damages may be recovered in
contractual obligations if the defendant acted in
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner. (Victory Liner v. Gammad)
5. The requirements of an award of exemplary
damages are:
a. they may be imposed by way of example in
addition to compensatory damages, and
only after the claimants right to them has
been established;
b. that they cannot be recovered as a matter
of right, their determination depending
upon the amount of compensatory
damages that may be awarded to the
claimant;
c. the act must be accompanied by bad faith
or done in a wanton, fraudulent,
oppressive or malevolent manner.
(Francisco v. Ferrer, Jr.)
6. The plaintiff must show that he is entitled to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the
court may consider the question of whether exemplary
damages should be awarded. If the court has no proof
or evidence upon which the claim for moral damages
could be based, such indemnity could not be outrightly
awarded. The same holds true with respect to the
award of exemplary damages where it must be shown
that the party acted in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner. Furthermore, this specie of
damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages
such that no exemplary damages can be awarded
unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to
moral damages. (Francisco v. Co)
7. Exemplary damages may be imposed by way
of example or correction for the public good. While
exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of
right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff must
show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider
the question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded. (Makabali v. CA)
8. The attendance of aggravating circumstances
in the perpetration of the crime serves to increase the
penalty (the criminal liability aspect), as well as to
justify an award of exemplary or corrective damages
(the civil liability aspect), moored on the greater
perversity of the offender manifested in the
commission of the felony such as may be shown by (1)
the motivating power itself, (2) the place of commission,
(3) the means and ways employed, (4) the time, or
(5) the personal circumstances of the offender or the
offended party or both. There are various types of
aggravating circumstances, among them, the ordinary
and the qualifying. (People v. Catubig)
9. Relative to the civil aspect of the case, an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an
award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Art. 2230. (People v. Catubig)
10. In People v. Jugueta, the Supreme Court ruled
that exemplary damages may be awarded even if the
aggravating circumstance is not stated in the
information but was proven to exist during trial.
11. The term aggravating circumstances used by
the Civil Code is to be understood in its broad or
generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-
pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the
social order and the other upon the private victim as it
causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed
by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the
penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal
liability which is basically a State concern, the award
of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It
would make little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be
withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the
offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case,
an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
47
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an
award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Art. 2230. (People v. Jugueta)
12. The reason is fairly obvious as to why the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure57 requires
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information.
It is in order not to trample on the constitutional right
of an accused to be informed of the nature of the
alleged offense that he or she has committed. A
criminal complaint or information should basically
contain the elements of the crime, as well as its
qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for
the court to effectively determine the proper penalty it
should impose. This, however, is not similar in the
recovery of civil liability. In the civil aspect, the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, even if not
alleged in the information but proven during trial
would entitle the victim to an award of exemplary
damages. (People v. Jugueta)
13. Being corrective in nature, exemplary
damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to
the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also
where the circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender
(i.e. fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant
sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own
daughters; moral corruption, perversity and
wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a
pregnant married woman; elders who abuse and
corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual
abuse). In much the same way as Art. 2230 prescribes
an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded,
Art. 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis
of the award. (People v. Jugueta)
14. If, however, the penalty for the crime
committed is death, which cannot be imposed because
of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing
jurisprudence sets the amount of ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages. (People v. Jugueta)
15. In contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary
damages may be awarded if the defendant acted in a
wanton fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner. It cannot, however, be considered as a matter
of right; the court having to decide whether or not they
should be adjudicated. Before the court may consider
an award for exemplary damages, the plaintiff must
first show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages; but it is not necessary that he
prove the monetary value thereof. (Trans-Asia v. CA)
16. Exemplary damages may be awarded only if
the dismissal of an employee was shown to have been
effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.
(Cocoland Development v. CA)
17. Awards for moral and exemplary damages
should be separate. This is because the nature and
purposes of said damages are different. While moral
damages have to do with injury personal to the
awardee, such as physical suffering and the like,
exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good. (Makabali v. CA)
I. Mitigation of Damages
Art. 1192. In case both parties have committed a
breach of the obligation, the liability of the first
infractor shall be equitably tempered by the courts.
If it cannot be determined which of the parties first
violated the contract, the same shall be deemed
extinguished, and each shall bear his own
damages.
Art. 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to
minimize the damages resulting from the act or
omission in question.
Art. 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated
may be respectively increased or lessened according
to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages
that he may recover.
Art. 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-
delicts, the court may equitably mitigate the
damages under circumstances other than the case
referred to in the preceding article, as in the
following instances:
(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the
terms of the contract;
(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a
result of the contract;
(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be
awarded, that the defendant acted upon the advice
of counsel;
(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;
(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant
has done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or
injury.
48
1. A grace period is a right, not an obligation, of
the debtor. When unconditionally conferred, the grace
period is effective without further need of demand
either calling for the payment of the obligation or for
honoring the right. The grace period must not be
likened to an obligation, the non-payment of which,
under Art. 1169, would generally still require judicial
or extrajudicial demand before “default” can be said to
arise. (Bricktown v. Amor Tierra)
2. In awarding damages for tortuous injury, it
becomes the sole design of the courts to provide for
adequate compensation by putting the plaintiff in the
same financial position he was in prior to the tort. It is
a fundamental principle in the law on damages that a
defendant cannot be held liable in damages for more
than the actual loss which he has inflicted and that a
plaintiff is entitled to no more than the just and
adequate compensation for the injury suffered. His
recovery is, in the absence of circumstances giving rise
to an allowance of punitive damages, limited to a fair
compensation for the harm done. The law will not put
him in a position better than where he should be in
had not the wrong happened. (Lim v. CA)
3. One who is injured by the wrongful or
negligent act of another should exercise reasonable
care and diligence to minimize the resulting damage.
Anyway, he can recover from the wrongdoer money lost
in reasonable efforts to preserve the property injured
and for injuries incurred in attempting to prevent
damage to it. (Lim v. CA)
4. Awards for moral and exemplary damages
cannot be the subject of execution pending appeal. The
execution of any award for moral and exemplary
damages is dependent on the outcome of the main case.
Unlike the actual damages for which the petitioners
may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific
contract and the amounts of which are fixed and
certain, liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary
damages as well as the exact amounts remain
uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by the
Court of Appeals and eventually the Supreme Court.
The existence of the factual bases of these types of
damages and their causal relation to the petitioners
act will have to be determined in the light of errors on
appeal. It is possible that the petitioners, after all,
while liable for actual damages may not be liable for
moral and exemplary damages. Or as in some cases
elevated to the Supreme Court, the awards may be
reduced. (IS v. CA)
IX. PROCEDURAL RULES ON DAMAGES
 A. Specification on Amount of Damages
1. Guidelines with regard to filing fees:
a. It is not simply the filing of the complaint
or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that
vests a trial court with jurisdiction over
the subject matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading
is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment
of the fee within a reasonable time but in
no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.
b. The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing
fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court
may also allow payment of said fee within
a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
c. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed
filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been
left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court
or his duly authorized deputy to enforce
said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee. (Sun Insurance v. Asuncion)
2. Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts
are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of
a sum of money for the damages suffered because of
the defendant’s alleged tortious acts. The damages
claimed in such actions represent the monetary
equivalent of the injury caused to the plaintiff by the
defendant, which are thus sought to be recovered by
the plaintiff. This money claim is the principal relief
sought, and is not merely incidental thereto or a
consequence thereof. The subject matter of actions for
damages based on quasi-delict is capable of pecuniary
estimation. (Iniego v. Guillermo)
3. All claims for damages should be considered
in determining the jurisdiction of the court regardless
of whether they arose from a single cause of action or
several causes of action. (Iniego v. Guillermo)
B. Filing Fees for Claim for Damages
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1. In Manchester v. CA, the Supreme
Court ruled that all complaints should specify the
amount of damages prayed for not only in the body of
the complaint but also in the prayer; that said
damages shall be considered in the assessment of the
filing fees in any case; and that any pleading that fails
to comply with such requirement shall not be accepted
nor admitted, or shall, otherwise, be expunged from
the record. (Ng Soon v. Alday)
2. However, while the payment of the prescribed
docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, even
its non-payment at the time of filing does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long
as the fees is paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglemantary period, more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules
prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient
filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there
was no intention to defraud the government, the
Manchester rule does not apply. (Intercontinental
Broadcasting v. Legasto)
3. The amounts claimed need not be initially
stated with mathematical precision. The same Rule
141, Section 5(a), allows an appraisal “more or less.”
In other words, a final determination is still to be made
by the Court, and the fees ultimately found to be
payable will either be additionally paid by the party
concerned or refunded to him, as the case may be. The
above provision clearly allows an initial payment of the
filing fees corresponding to the estimated amount of
the claim subject to adjustment as to what later may
be proved. If what is proved is less than what was
claimed, then a refund will be made; if more, additional
fees will be exacted. Otherwise stated, what is subject
to adjustment is the difference in the fee and not the
whole amount. (Ng Soon v. Alday)
4. Where the civil action is impliedly instituted
together with the criminal action, the actual damages
claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not
included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing
fees are to be paid only if other items of damages such
as moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages
are alleged in the complaint or information, or if they
are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment. (Manantan v. CA)
5. Considering that the Rules of Criminal
Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for
the award of damages are a first lien on the judgment,
the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact
to the institution of the criminal action. The filing fees
are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal
complaint or information. (Manantan v. CA)

*Only the relevant portions will be reproduced here.
SC Circular No. 7 (March 24, 1983)
In "Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals", x x x this Court condemned the practice
of counsel who in filing the original complaint
omitted from the prayer any specification of the
amount of damage although the amount of over P78
million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This
Court observed that "(T)his is clearly intended for no
other purpose than to evade the payment of the
correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk,
in the assessment of the filing fees. This fraudulent
practice was compounded when, even as this Court
had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered
an investigation, petitioner through another counsel
filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of
the amount of damages being asked for in the body
of the complaint. . . . ."
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all
complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages
being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading
but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any
case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or
shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less
the payment of the docket fee based on the amount
sought in so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
SC Circular No. 57-97 (September 17, 1997)
(Rule 111, Section 1(b))
SC Circular No. 70-97 (October 21, 1997)
In implementation of the provisions of Circular No.
57-97 prescribing rules and guidelines in the filing
and prosecution of criminal cases under [B.P. 22],
the following procedures shall be followed in (a) the
collection of the filing fees subject of said Circular
No. 57-97 and other legal fees involved; and (b) the
docketing of the criminal case or cases on the
violation of B.P. 22:
50
1. The Office of the Clerk of Court shall receive the
information filed by the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor or the Provincial/City Prosecutor Office.
Upon receipt, the information shall be entered in a
separate record book and assigned an undocketed
number (UDK No.) consisting of (a) the Investigation
Slip No. ("I.S. No.") appearing on the said
information for easy identification; and (b) a
number, starting with No. 1 (Example: UDK No.
6789-1);
2. Thereafter, the Clerk of Court shall, by form letter
(Annex "A"), notify and advise the complainant of (a)
the filing of the information; and (b) the requirement
as to the payment in full of the filing fees under
Circular No. 57-97 based upon the computation
stated therein. The State Prosecutor, the
Provincial/Assistant Provincial Prosecutor or the
City/Assistant City Prosecutor who filed the
information and the respondent shall be furnished
with copies of the accomplished form letter sent by
the Clerk of Court;
3. The complainant shall have a period of ten (10)
days from receipt of the letter within which to pay
the filing fees. Should the complainant fail to pay
the filing fees within the ten (10)-day period stated
herein, the case folder shall be archived. After the
lapse of two (2) months, the records may be
disposed of
4. Upon receipt of the filing fees under Circular No.
57-97, the information shall be entered in the
court's general docket book and assigned the court
case number. Thereafter, the Clerk of Court shall
cause the inclusion of the case in the raffle of cases.
The filing fees and other legal fees shall be processed
in accordance with the flowchart attached herewith
as Annex "B."
5. In the event that the amount of the actual
damages claimed exceeds the maximum amount of
P200,000.00, the filing fees to be collected in excess
of the aforementioned amount shall be in
accordance with the provisions of Section 7 (a), Rule
141 of the Rules of Court.
6. This Circular shall take effect on 1 November
1997 and shall remain in force until further orders.
 APPENDIX

Guidelines for awarding civil indemnity in criminal cases (as summarized in People v. Jugueta)

I. For crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation, Infanticide1, and other crimes involving
death of a victim where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages2 – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted3:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

1 Note that if the crime penalized in Article 255 [Infanticide] was committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing
her dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods, and if said crime was committed
for the same purpose by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal. (As amended by R.A.
7659). Hence, the damages to be awarded should be the same as in Roman Numeral Number Five (V) of the summary, i.e., In other
crimes that result in the death of the victim and the penalty consists of divisible, because the prescribed penalties are divisible.
2 Exemplary damages in rape cases are awarded for the inherent bestiality of the act committed even if no aggravating circumstance

attended the commission of the crime.

3 There is no frustrated stage in the crime of rape.

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 c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or sexual abuse results,
the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty, extent of violence and sexual
abuse; and the number of victims where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed. In other complex crimes where
death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages depend
on the prescribed penalty and the penalty imposed, as the case may be.

IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide, Robbery with Rape, Robbery with Intentional
Mutilation, Robbery with Arson, Rape with Homicide, Kidnapping with Murder, Carnapping with Homicide or
Carnapping with Rape, Highway Robbery with Homicide, Qualified Piracy, Arson with Homicide, Hazing with Death,
Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation and other crimes with death, injuries, and sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where
the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the penalty imposed
is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua although death did not occur.

1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds4 and could have died if not for a timely medical
intervention, the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua.

2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical
intervention, the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

4 This is so because there are no stages of the component crime in special complex crimes but the victims must be compensated as
if the component crimes were separately committed.
52
 a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

In Robbery with Physical Injuries, the amount of damages shall likewise be dependent on the nature/severity of
the wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.

The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s or perpetrator/s are
themselves killed or injured in the incident.

Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that for every additional rape
committed, whether against the same victim or other victims, the victims shall be entitled to the same damages unless
the other crimes of rape are treated as separate crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple rape/qualified
rape shall apply.

V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, i.e.,
Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender 5 , Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
1.1 Where the crime was consummated:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where there are no
stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00

If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the Information 6, in addition to
the above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages
for consummated; ₱30,000.00 for frustrated; and ₱20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded.

VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death occurs in the course
of the rebellion, the heirs of those who died are entitled to the following 7:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.008
B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion and could have died if
not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

5 If the crime of infanticide in Art. 255 of the RPC was committed by the mother of the child or by the maternal grandparent/s in
order to conceal her dishonor, the penalties against them are divisible, i.e., prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods,
and reclusion temporal, respectively.
6 People v. Catubig
7 Although the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion perpetua, the damages awarded should be the same as those where the

penalty is death due to the gravity of the offense and the manner of committing the same.
8 In order to deter the commission of the crime of rebellion and serve as an example, exemplary damages should be awarded.

53
 VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in
court, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded.

To reiterate, Art. 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity is
P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount cannot be changed, increasing
the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance
warrants it.

54