MARCO, MARK OLYVER T.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW 4-BLOCK A

MARCOS ET AL V. MANGLAPUS

G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989

Facts:

Former President Ferdinand Marcos petitioned the Supreme Court for mandamus and
prohibition praying that the respondents issue travel documents to him and his immediate family
and to enjoin the implementation of the President Corazon Aquino’s decision to bar their return
to the Philippines. Petitioners invoked their rights under the Constitution and under International
Law specifically the right to travel and the liberty of abode, among others, to support their stand.
And in invoking the power of the Court, petitioners insisted that the issue involves a justiciable
question, where the Court may wield its judicial power. While the government, as represented by
the Solicitor General, contended that the matter in issue is a political one, where the Court is
prohibited from inquiring upon by virtue of the principle of separation of powers, and that the act
complained of is a matter that belongs exclusively within the sphere and discretion of the
Executive.

Issues:

1.) Whether the act of the President in barring the return of Former President Marcos and his
immediate family in the Philippines involves a political question which the Court is prohibited
from inquiring upon by virtue of the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the
Constitution.

2.) Whether the President has the power under the Constitution to prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.

Ruling:

1.) No. The matter in issue is a justiciable question, hence falls upon the ambit of the Court’s
judicial power. Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Given this wording, we cannot agree
with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Court to decide. The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous
constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless
there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for
the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We
cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how
premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon
though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we
amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the
power is reserved to the people.
 There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the
political question doctrine. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by
petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not
intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political questions are
involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is
being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter
alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang
v. Garcia G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481 that:

Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of
separation of powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his
own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is
more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is
supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the
sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so
acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally
supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check — not to
supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of
his act.

Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual
bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or
acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.

2.) Yes. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific
powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power ". The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Even the members of the Legislature have
recognized that indeed Mrs. Aquino has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses
from returning, as per House Resolution No. 1342.

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common
good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's
residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the
President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power
of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws
that the needs of the nation demand. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and
defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take
care that the laws are faithfully executed.
 The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot
be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode
and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter
that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are
implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect
general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a
broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT

G.R. No. 166471 March 22, 2011

Facts:

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) filed with the National Water Resources
Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and
maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD), a local
water utility, opposed TMPC's application. LTWD claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No.
198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive.

The NWRB approved TMPC's application for a CPC. The NWRB held that LTWD's
franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and found that
TMPC is legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system. The
RTC set aside the NWRB's decision and cancelled TMPC's CPC, stating that "the Constitution
does not necessarily prohibit a franchise that is exclusive on its face, meaning, that the grantee
shall be allowed to exercise this present right or privilege to the exclusion of all others.
Nonetheless, the grantee cannot set up its exclusive franchise against the ultimate authority of the
State."

Issues:

1.) Whether an agency or any instrumentalities of the government may directly or indirectly
create exclusive franchises for the operation of a public utility contrary to the express mandate of
the Constitution that operation of a public utility shall not be exclusive in character.

2.) Whether the grant of exclusive franchise by an agency or any instrumentalities of the
government may properly be justified and upheld on the basis of the State’s exercise of police
power.

Ruling:

1.) No. The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the
operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions (the latter in Section 11, Article XII) expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of
franchises that are exclusive in character. When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to
do but to apply it. In Republic of the Philippines v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc., and
other cases, the Court held that, "The Constitution is quite emphatic that the operation of a public
utility shall not be exclusive."

Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that are
exclusive in character. What the President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly
they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly
franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water
district and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are
exclusive in character.
 In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos)
created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and
the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 of PD No. 198
states that, "No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency xxx unless and except to
the extent that the board of directors consents thereto xxx subject to review by the
Administration." Section 47 creates a glaring exception to the absolute prohibition in the
Constitution. Clearly, it is patently unconstitutional.

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always
prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The
duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to
it.

2.) No. The dissenting opinion states two "reasonable and legitimate grounds" for the
creation of exclusive franchise: (1) protection of "the government’s investment," and (2)
avoidance of "a situation where ruinous competition could compromise the supply of public
utilities in poor and remote areas."

There is no "reasonable and legitimate" ground to violate the Constitution. The

Constitution should never be violated by anyone. Right or wrong, the President, Congress, the
Court, the BOD and the LWUA have no choice but to follow the Constitution. Any act, however
noble its intentions, is void if it violates the Constitution. This rule is basic.

In Social Justice Society, the Court held that, "In the discharge of their defined functions,
the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of
the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed." In Sabio, the Court held that,
"the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is ‘the basic and paramount law to which x x x
all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however
noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution.’ In Bengzon v. Drilon, the Court held
that, "the three branches of government must discharge their respective functions within the
limits of authority conferred by the Constitution." In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, the
Court held that, "The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with
which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to the Constitution’s commands.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed."

Police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution. Police power is the
plenary power vested in Congress to make laws not repugnant to the Constitution. This rule is
basic.

In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., the

Court held that, "Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the
Constitution." In Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, the
Court held that, police power "is ‘the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances x x
x not repugnant to the constitution.’"

In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court held that, "police
power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes
and ordinances x x x not repugnant to the Constitution."
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON STRAIT v.
SEC. ANGELO REYES

G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015

Facts:

The government, through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration
Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical
studies of the Tañon Strait. JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around Strait. A multi-
channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine
the area's underwater composition. The Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait
(PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the Initial
Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the
approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC. The EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to
the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months
later, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu
Province.

Petitioners then applied to the Court for redress, via two separate original petitions
wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among
others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether the service contract is prohibited on the ground that there is no general law
prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts
involving oil exploration and extraction.

Ruling:

No. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous

petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration
and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote
the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government
and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and
the revenues to the Philippine Government.

Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in
1972, before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise
repealed.

Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a
construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should
be preferred. This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections expounding on this point,
pronounced: It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in
harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its
construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.

Note that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a
service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and
utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed
by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.
DE CASTRO VS. JBC

G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010

Facts:

This case involves a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the
Court. The said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the
nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees and submit it
to the incumbent President. Movants argue that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII,
Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover the
members of the Judiciary, and they contended that the principle of stare decisis is controlling,
and insisted that the Court erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.

Issues:

1.) Whether the Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII?

2.) Whether the principle of stare decisis binds the Court and therefore it has erred in
disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela ruling.

Ruling:

1.) No. The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on
presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the
dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional Commission did
not concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision
on nepotism. Election ban on appointments does not extend to the Supreme Court. The Court
upheld its March 17, 2010 decision ruling that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution against presidential appointments immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of the term of the outgoing president does not apply to vacancies in the
Supreme Court.

2.) No. The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by
precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a
particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. The
adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom,
where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a common-law
system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial
pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only
when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such
reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the
sake of convenience and stability.

To insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that
its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality
and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the
innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid
down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.