MARCO, MARK OLYVER T.

ANTAMOK GOLDFIELDS MINING COMPANY, appellant, v. COURT OF

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., Appealed.

GR No. L-46892 June 28, 1940

ISSUE: Whether the Industrial Relations Tribunal is in the same category as the municipal
courts, thus Article 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 empowering the Industrial Relations
Tribunal to adopt its procedural regulations is unconstitutional for violating Article 13 of Title
VIII of the Constitution, which requires the observance of the general rules of procedure
applicable to the courts of justice. Hence, its application will result in deprivation of the right to
due process of the appellant.

COMPLAINANT’S ARGUMENT: Complainants alleged that the respondent committed

illegal acts of dismissing and suspending the employees (miners, timbermen, trammers, etc.)
despite the pendency of the case in the Industrial Relations Tribunal relative to the claims of the
said employees such as payment of higher wage and better working conditions. They argue that
the employer maliciously effected such dismissals and suspensions due to the multiple strikes
done by the employees for the purpose of securing their demands, and that the dismissals sand
suspensions were made in order to get rid of the employees involved in the strike.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT: Respondent basically denied all the allegations of the

complainant and argued that the dismissals and suspensions of the employees involved were
made in good faith. Respondent also stressed that the tribunal cannot go on to interfere with the
employer’s legitimate exercise of management prerogatives. It went further to question the
constitutionality of the procedure of the Industrial Relations Tribunal, laid down in Art. 20 of
Commonwealth Act. 103, as contrary to the express provision of the Constitution, which
mandates it to abide by the same procedure applicable in municipal courts. Consequently,
respondent claimed that it was denied its right to due process and equal protection of laws in the
application of the assailed law.

INSTRUCTION LEARNED: The Industrial Relations Tribunal is a specialized body created

by law to give life and meaning to the Constitutional fiat of promoting social justice and giving
protection to labor. According to Justice Laurel: “It should be observed at the outset that our
Constitution was adopted in the midst of surging unrest and dissatisfaction resulting from
economic and social distress which was threatening the stability of governments theworld over.
Alive to the social and economic forces at work, the farmers of our Constitution boldly met the
problems and difficulties which faced them and endeavored to crystallize, with more or less
fidelity, the political, social; and economic proposition of their age, and this they did, with the
consciousness that the political and philosophical aphorism of their generation will, in the
language of a great jurist, "be doubted by the next and perhaps entirely discarded by the third."
(Chief Justice Winslow in Gorgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis., 327; 133 NW, 209.) Embodying the
spirit of the present epoch justitia communis advocated by Grotius and Leibnitz many years ago
to be secured through the counterbalancing of economic and social forces and opportunities
which should be regulated, if not controlled, by the State or placed, as it were, in custodia
societatis. "The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people 'was thus inserted as vital principle in our Constitution. (Sec. 5, Art. II, Constitution.)
And in order that this declaration of principle may not just be an empty medley of words, the
Constitution in various sections thereof has provided the means towards its realization. For
instance, section 6 of Articles XIII declares that the State "shall afford protection to labor,
especially to working women and minors, and shall regulated the relations between landowner
and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. The same section also
states that" the State may provide for compulsory arbitration.”

RULING: No. [Commonwealth] Law No. 103 that creates a special court called the Industrial
Relations Tribunal with the power to issue its own regulations and to resolve and decide
agricultural and industrial conflicts in accordance with the dictates of justice and equity, cannot
be challenged on the grounds that it increases the deprivation of liberty and property without due
process of law; nor does it conflict with the precept of Article 13, Title VIII, of the Constitution
because the Industrial Relations Tribunal is not of the same category as the municipal courts,
peace courts and first instance courts for which the rules of the courts by the Supreme Court.

In conformity with the constitutional objective and cognizant of the historical fact that
industrial and agricultural disputes had given rise to disquietude, bloodshed and revolution in our
country, the National Assembly enacted Commonwealth Act No. 103, entitled "An Act to afford
protection of labor by creating a Court of Industrial Relations empowered to fix minimum wages
for laborers and maximum rental to be paid tenants, and to enforce compulsory arbitration
between employers or landlords, and employees or tenants, respectively; and by prescribing
penalties for the violation of the orders.

RATIO: The Industrial Relations Tribunal is a specialized body which has its own rules of
procedure and it does not belong to the category of municipal courts. Due to its purpose of
settling disputes between labor and capital through compulsory arbitration, it was empowered to
create its own rules in pursuance of the Constitutional mandate of giving protection to labor and
promoting social justice.
MARCO, MARK OLYVER T.

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

ISSUE: Whether the rules and regulations issued by the Director of Public Works which
prohibits animal-drawn vehicles to pass and pick up passengers on the national roads on
designated hours infringe upon the Constitutional mandate of promoting of social justice.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT: Petitioner alleged that the rules and regulations issued by the
Director of Public Works which prohibits animal-drawn vehicles to pass and pick up passengers
on the national roads on designated hours to the detriment not only of their owners but of the
riding public as well runs afoul with the Constitutional mandate of promoting of social justice by
trampling upon the well-being and economic security of all people.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT: The purpose of the assailed rules and regulation is to

promote safe transit on the roads and avoid obstructions thereat in the interest and convenience
of the public.

INSTRUCTION LEARNED: The government has the duty, as mandated by the Fundamental
Law, to uphold and promote one of its primary objectives: social justice. This task is not merely
trivial since it involves a delicate balancing of different economic and social forces for the
ultimate goal of promoting the welfare of the masses. In doing so, the State may infringe upon
private rights in order to achieve the noble mandate of perpetuating the common good. This is
aptly embraced in the latin maxim, salus populi est suprema lex.

RULING: No. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a
mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of
all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic
and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of
salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number."

RATIO: The concept of social justice does not exist to favor a specific class of persons or
people only. It involves a delicate balancing of different social and economic forces for the
ultimate goal of promoting the welfare of the people.
MARCO, MARK OLYVER T.

PHILIPPINE MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS' ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, vs.

PREMIERE PRODUCTIONS, INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. L-5621 March 25, 1953

ISSUE: Whether the ruling of the Court of Industrial Relations granting the employer authority
to lay-off workers may be properly sustained on appeal when the decision was arrived at only
through an ocular inspection and not a full blown trial; and that the record of the case subject of
the petition for review is bereft of clear basis on which the decision was anchored which
effectively casts doubts on the validity of the assailed decision.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT: Petitioner argues that the laborers were not given an
opportunity to present their evidence to disprove the claim of lack of work and that they should
have been given such opportunity to do so via a full blown trial, and not merely an ocular
inspection conducted by the judge through which the latter based his decision. In other words,
the petitioner claims that the workers were denied of their right to due process.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT: Respondent claims that the petitioner had its day in court
because its counsel was present in the investigation or ocular inspection and even presented some
witnesses to protect its interest.

INSTRUCTION LEARNED: Although the Court of Industrial Relations may adopt its own
rules of procedure and may act according to justice and equity without regard to technicalities,
and for that matter is not bound by any technical rules of evidence (section 20, Commonwealth
Act No. 103), it can ignore or disregard the fundamental requirements of due process in the trials
and investigation of cases brought before it. The right to a hearing is a cardinal primary right
which includes the right of the party interested to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof must be observed. (Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Philippine Labor Union,
71 Phil., 124, 129). An ocular inspection of the premise involved is proper if the court finds it
necessary, but such is authorized only to help the court in clearing a doubt, reaching a
conclusion, or finding the truth. But it is not the main trial nor should it exclude the presentation
of other evidence which the parties may deem necessary to establish their case. It is merely an
auxiliary remedy the law affords the parties or the court to reach an enlightened determination of
the case

RULING: No. The right to labor is a constitutional as well as statutory right. Every man has a
natural right to the fruits of his own industry. A man who has been employed to undertake
certain labor and has put into it his time and effort is entitled to be protected. The right of a
person to his labor is deemed to be property within the meaning of constitutional guarantees.
That is his means of livelihood. He cannot be deprived of his labor or work without due process
of law.

Moreover, since essential matters for the resolution of the case on the petition for review
do not appear clear to the Court due to incomplete records (factual matters on record was not
elevated because what was raised was pure questions of law), it was inclined to resolve the doubt
in favor of labor considering the spirit of our Constitution.

RATIO: In pursuance of the protection given by the Constitution to labor, any doubts arising
from any labor controversy must be resolved in favor of labor. Moreover, the fundamental right
to due process cannot be ignored by a labor tribunal despite being given the authority to adopt its
own rules of procedure, and is not bound by technical rules of evidence, on any labor case.
MARCO, MARK OLYVER T.

ORO ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION and LORETO L. CECILIO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 110861. November 14, 1994

ISSUE: Whether R.A. 7641 (Retirement Law) can be made to apply to existing employment
contract (retroactively), including those labor cases pending appeal wherein the question of
whether the employee has been retired has not been resolved.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT: Petitioner argued that R.A. 7641 cannot be given retroactive
effect as to cover private respondent who, at the age of 65 years, allegedly retired from
employment prior to the effectivity of the said law. In effect it argues that the respondent cannot
take advantage of the curative effect of the new law (and take advantage of its better benefit) and
instead, the old law on retirement should control.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT: Respondent argued that there being no collective bargaining

agreement that granted retirement benefits, conformably with Section 14 of the Implementing
Rules of the Labor Code, she should be entitled to a "termination pay equivalent at least to one-
half month salary for every year of service. Moreover, while there apparently was some kind of a
retirement plan then being devised by the company for its retiring employees, it was, however,
never formalized or implemented.

INSTRUCTION LEARNED: Social legislations such as R.A. 7641 (Retirement Law) is an

exercise of the State’s police power, and labor contracts are contracts imbued with public interest
which must yield to the common good, hence subject to such regulatory power. The exercise of
police power though enactment of social legislations is for the purpose, among others, of
implementing the Constitutional mandate of promoting social justice, protection of the working
class, and in upholding the welfare of the people.

RULING: Yes. RA 7641 is undoubtedly a social legislation. The law has been enacted as a labor
protection measure and as a curative statute that — absent a retirement plan devised by, an
agreement with, or a voluntary grant from, an employer — can respond, in part at least, to the
financial well-being of workers during their twilight years soon following their life of labor.
There should be little doubt about the fact that the law can apply to labor contracts still existing
at the time the statute has taken effect, and that its benefits can be reckoned not only from the
date of the law’s enactment but retroactively to the time said employment contracts have started.
This is consistent with the principle that social legislation should be interpreted in favor of
workers in the light of the Constitutional mandate that the State shall afford protection to labor.

The retroactive effect of social legislation also finds it basis in the principle that police
power legislation intended to promote public welfare applies to existing contracts. It was held in
Ongsiako v. Gamboa that a police power measure being remedial in character covers existing
situations; otherwise, it would be self-defeating. Moreover, constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, morals and general welfare.’

It is not accurate to assert that the right to retirement benefits started from the enactment
of the present Labor Code. Justice Laurel had occasion give his well-known definition of social
justice in Calalang v. Williams. Thus: ‘Social justice is ‘neither communism, nor despositism,
nor atomism, nor anarchy,’ but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may
at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex.’ The present Civil Code has a chapter on labor contracts, the first article of which
recognizes that the relations between capital and labor ‘are not merely contractual. They are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good.’"

RATIO: RA 7641 is a social legislation enacted as a labor protection measure and as a curative
statute for the benefit of the worker. The law applies to labor contracts still existing at the time
the statute has taken effect, and that its benefits can be reckoned not only from the date of the
law’s enactment but retroactively to the time said employment contracts have started. This is
consistent with the principle that social legislation should be interpreted in favor of workers in
the light of the Constitutional mandate that the State shall afford protection to labor.
MARCO, MARK OLYVER T.

BISHOP SHINJI AMARI V. VILLAFLOR JR.,

G.R. NO. 224521 FEBRUARY 17, 2020

ISSUE: Whether a missionary belonging to a religious congregation may be considered an

employee, thus his dismissal is not purely an ecclesiastical affair and may be properly passed
upon by labor tribunals or courts.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT: There can be no employer-employee relationship between the

religious congregation and the respondent since the matter involves ecclesiastical affairs.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT: His receipt of letter of appointment and salary as an

instructor is an indication of employer-employee relationship between him and the congregation.

INSTRUCTION LEARNED: The Constitutional precept of separation of the church and the
state is a limitation on the State’s power of giving aid and protection to labor since the State
cannot just simply interfere in purely ecclesiastical matters.

RULING: No. To establish that there is indeed an employer-employee relationship, the so-called
“four-fold test” must be shown by the respondent, however he failed to do so. First, the
appointment letter refers to his appointment as a missionary and not as an instructor, and
respondent was removed as a missionary. Second, respondent did not clearly establish the
payment of wages. Third, the inherent power of religious congregations to discipline its members
includes the power to dismiss an erring member. And lastly, the congregation’s power of control
(the most important test) is only up to the extent of the areas of missionary work. No further
evidence was presented by the respondent to establish employer-employee relationship.

RATIO: A claim of illegal dismissal is dependent on the existence of the employer-employee

relationship. Absence of any evidence establishing employer-employee relationship, dismissal o
the respondent as missionary of the religious congregation is an ecclesiastical affair which is
beyond the power of review by the state.
MARCO, MARK OLYVER T.

BISHOP SHINJI AMARI V. VILLAFLOR JR.,

G.R. NO. 224521 FEBRUARY 17, 2020

ISSUE: Whether a missionary belonging to a religious congregation may be considered an

employee, thus his dismissal is not purely an ecclesiastical affair and may be properly passed
upon by labor tribunals or courts.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT: There can be no employer-employee relationship between the

religious congregation and the respondent since the matter involves ecclesiastical affairs.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT: His receipt of letter of appointment and salary as an

instructor is an indication of employer-employee relationship between him and the congregation.

INSTRUCTION LEARNED: The Constitutional precept of separation of the church and the
state is a limitation on the State’s power of giving aid and protection to labor since the State
cannot just simply interfere in purely ecclesiastical matters.

RULING: No. To establish that there is indeed an employer-employee relationship, the so-called
“four-fold test” must be shown by the respondent, however he failed to do so. First, the
appointment letter refers to his appointment as a missionary and not as an instructor, and
respondent was removed as a missionary. Second, respondent did not clearly establish the
payment of wages. Third, the inherent power of religious congregations to discipline its members
includes the power to dismiss an erring member. And lastly, the congregation’s power of control
(the most important test) is only up to the extent of the areas of missionary work. No further
evidence was presented by the respondent to establish employer-employee relationship.

RATIO: A claim of illegal dismissal is dependent on the existence of the employer-employee

relationship. Absence of any evidence establishing employer-employee relationship, dismissal o
the respondent as missionary of the religious congregation is an ecclesiastical affair which is
beyond the power of review by the state.
MARCO, MARK OLYVER T.

PHILIPPINE SPAN ASIA CARRIERS CORPORATION (FORMERLY SULPICIO

LINES, INC.), PETITIONER, V. HEIDI PELAYO, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 212003 FEBRUARY 28, 2018

ISSUE: Whether inconvenience, disruption, difficulty, or disadvantage that an employee must

endure, including preventive suspension imposed upon the worker pending investigation of
anomalous acts in the workplace, wherein the worker has probable participation due to the nature
of his work, amounts to constructive dismissal, and therefore a form of mistreatment of labor.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT: Petitioner denied liability (for constructive dismissal)

asserting that respondent was merely asked to come to its main office "to shed light on the
discovered anomalies" and was "only asked to cooperate in prosecuting the primary suspects in
the anomaly. It also decried respondents seeming attempt at "distancing herself from the ongoing
investigation of financial anomalies discovered."

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT: Private respondent claimed that she was being coerced by
petitioner to admit complicity to the anomalous acts committed by her co-workers, and that the
investigation being conducted by petitioner was a form of harassment.

INSTRUCTION LEARNED: "Not every inconvenience, disruption, difficulty, or disadvantage

that an employee must endure sustains a finding of constructive dismissal." It is an employer's
right to investigate acts of wrongdoing by employees. Employees involved in such investigations
cannot ipso facto claim that employers are out to get them. Their involvement in investigations
will naturally entail some inconvenience, stress, and difficulty. However, even if they might be
burdened - and, in some cases, rather heavily so - it does not necessarily mean that an employer
has embarked on their constructive dismissal.” – Leonen, J., Ponente

RULING: No. It is an employer's right to investigate acts of wrongdoing by employees.

Employees involved in such investigations cannot ipso facto claim that employers are out to get
them. Their involvement in investigations will naturally entail some inconvenience, stress, and
difficulty. However, even if they might be burdened - and, in some cases, rather heavily so - it
does not necessarily mean that an employer has embarked on their constructive dismissal.

An employer who conducts investigations following the discovery of misdeeds by its

employees is not being abusive when it seeks information from an employee involved in the
workflow which occasioned the misdeed. Basic diligence impels an employer to cover all bases
and inquire from employees who, by their inclusion in that workflow, may have participated in
the misdeed or may have information that can lead to the perpetrator's identification and the
employer's adoption of appropriate responsive measures. An employee's involvement in such an
investigation will naturally entail difficulty. This difficulty does not mean that the employer is
creating an inhospitable employment atmosphere so as to ease out the employee involved in the
investigation.

RATIO: “While adopted with a view to give maximum aid and protection to labor, labor laws
are not to be applied in a manner that undermines valid exercise of management prerogative.
Indeed, basic is the recognition that even as our laws on labor and social justice impel a
"preferential view in favor of labor," [e]xcept as limited by special laws, an employer is free to
regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including
hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used,
processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees,
work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of work.