Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Parungo
Remedial Law Review 1 SAT 9:00am-12:00pm
Assignment 2
1. Upon the filing of a civil or criminal action, the court shall issue an order
a. Contents:
i. declaring whether or not the case shall be governed by this Rule.
b. Note: A patently erroneous determination to avoid the application of the Rule on
Summary Procedure is a ground for disciplinary action. (Sec. 2)
FACTS:
Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the lower court for the stabbing/killing of Alfredo
Casabal after the latter rescued minors being held by the former.
Pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits.
The accused alleged that he was denied the right to counsel. During the arraignment he appeared
without counsel,so the court appointed a counsel de officio. Thereafter, he moved that the arraignment
be reset so he can engage the services of his own counsel however, during the arraignment, he still
appeared without one. The arraignment proceeded with him being assisted by the counsel de officio.
During the trial, the same counsel appeared and cross-examined for the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was denied of his right to counsel
HELD:
NO. Herein, the accused was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted him in all stages of the
proceedings.The option to hire ones counsel cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics,
trifle with the Rules or prejudice the equally important right of the State and the offended party to
speedy and adequate justice.
The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial
system where an accused is pitted against the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is also a
recognition of the accused not having the skill to protect himself before a tribunal which has the power
to take his life or liberty.
The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is rendered, even on appeal. RA
7438 provides that any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.
The right is however not absolute and is waivable; a) the state must balance the private against the
state's and offended party's equally important right to speedy and adequate justice, and b) the right is
waivable as long as the waiver is unequivocal, knowing, and intelligently made.
FACTS:
On January 6, 1996, Paula and Albert Bandibas were killed and robbed. As a part of the investigation
and as a result of a witness’ testimony, Edwin and Leandro Morial were asked several questions by the
policemen and were invited to the police station for continuing investigation. They were turned over to
SPO4 Andres Fernandez and later interrogated again after they woke up at past 6 in the morning. That
investigation conducted by SPO4 Fernandez resulted into the admission by Leandro that he was one of
those who participated in the robbery with homicide. With the latter’s consent, his statements were
reduced into writing. SPO4 Fernandez then advised him of his right to remain silent and to have a
counsel, whatever will be his answer will be used as evidence in court. SPO4 Fernandez volunteered
to obtain a lawyer for the suspect, to which Leandro consented. Atty. Aguilar was contacted by the
former and he first met the latter at January 9, 1996 at about 8:00 in the morning. After Leandro agreed
to answer voluntarily knowing that the same can be used against him as evidence in court, the
investigation was conducted by SPO4 Fernandez with the presence of the counsel. After “all the
material points” were asked, Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator if he can leave due to very important
engagement. The latter agreed to the lawyer’s request. But before leaving, Atty. Aguilar
asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer questions in his absence, the latter agreed. During and
despite Atty. Aguilar’s absence, SPO4 Fernandez continued with the investigation and propounded
several more questions to Leonardo, which the latter answered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Leonardo Morial’s right to counsel was waived during the investigation.
RULING:
Leonardo was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation; therefore his
quasi-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him and his other co-accused. The Court
stressed out that an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting
him from the very start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify that Atty. Aguilar only left
after Leonardo had admitted that he and his companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty. Aguilar
rationalize that he only left after Leonardo had admitted the “material points”, referring to
the participation of the three accused to the crime. Both are invalid since Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438
requires that “any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.” Furthermore, the last paragraph of Section 3 states that “in the absence of any
lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted.”
Even granted that Leonardo consented Atty. Aguilar’s departure during the investigation and to answer
questions during the lawyer’s absence, such consent was an invalid waiver of his right to counsel and
his right to remain silent. Under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, these rights cannot be waived
unless the same is made in writing and in the presence of the counsel. In the case at bar, no such
written and counseled waiver of these rights was presented as evidence.
3.3
3.4
CRESPO VS MOGUL
FACTS:
On April 18, 1977 the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo.
When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the
ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. In an
order, the presiding judge, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by
the accused in the CA which was eventually granted while perpetually restraining the judge
from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the
Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.
The Undersecretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and
directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused.
But the respondent judge denied the motion.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the
Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated
for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
HELD: YES.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by
the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to
the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require
that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as we all know is to see that justice is done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of
his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of
evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent
judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not
shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such
circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the
hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. The least
that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over
the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and
control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
FACTS:
In 1974, Antonio de los Reyes (Head Executive Assistant of Department of Public Information)
filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command against Tatad (who
was then Secretary of the Dept. of Public Information). Allegations therein relate to alleged
violations of RA 3019 (anti-graft). No action was taken on said report. 5 years later (1979),
Tatad resigned from his post as department head. 2 months later, de los Reyes filed a
complaint with the Tanodbayan against Tatad alleging the same things. In 1980, the
resignation of Tatad was accepted by Pres. Marcos. In the same year, the Tanodbayan
referred the complaint to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact finding investigation.
Thereafter, an investigation report was made stating that based on evidence gathered, Tatad
violated RA 3019.
Tatad filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that he has immunity from
prosecution (PD 1791). This was denied. So pleadings were instead submitted. By 1982, all
affidavits and counter-affidavits were already with the Tanodbayan for final disposition. Note
that it was only in 1985 when the Tanodbayan made a resolution recommending that
informations be filed with the Sandiganbayan against Tatad. 2 months after, Five informations
were filed with the Sandiganbayan (3 informations for failure to file SALN, the other two relate
to bribery and giving undue advantage to a private corporation).
Tatad filed a motion to quash with the Sandiganbayan alleging, among other things, that the
prosecution deprived him of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the
cases filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction to file the information and that the
offenses charged had already prescribed. On the other hand, Tanodbayan submitted that
based on jurisprudence, the filing of the complaint with them interrupted that prescription period
so the offenses are not really prescribed yet. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law
such as BP 195, extending the period of limitation with respect to criminal prosecution, unless
the right to acquittal has been acquired, is constitutional.
Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. It held that based on the Rule 117 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the defect in the information can be cured by amendment. So
several months after this resolution, an amended information was filed by the Tanodbayan
changing the dates of the commission of the offenses.
MR filed by Tatad – also denied. Hence, this certiorari and prohibition (Rule 65) was filed with
the SC. Tatad claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of due
process and speedy disposition of cases in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary
investigation and in filing the corresponding information only after more than a decade from the
alleged commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to loss of jurisdiction and
authority to file the informations.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed this by saying that the applicability of the authorities cited by
Tatad to the case at bar was "nebulous;" that it would be premature for the court to grant the
"radical relief" prayed for at this stage of the proceeding; that the mere allegations of "undue
delay" do not suffice to justify acceptance thereof without any showing "as to the supposed lack
or omission of any alleged procedural right granted or allowed to the respondent accused by
law or administrative fiat" or in the absence of "indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse"
committed by the Tanodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary investigation; that such facts
and circumstances as would establish petitioner's claim of denial of due process and other
constitutionally guaranteed rights could be presented and more fully threshed out at the trial.
ISSUE:
Was Tatad deprived of his constitutional right to due process and the right to "speedy
disposition" of the cases against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? (YES)
HELD:
In a number of cases, the SC has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to
spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear
that the accused has been deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed
rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated in
those cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case. A review of the facts at hand cannot but leave the impression that political motivations
played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. First, the
complaint came to life only after Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Second,
departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which
require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the
respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential
Security Command for finding investigation and report.
SC held that there was a blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but
revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecution was
politically motivated. Prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that
their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other
purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest
of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor,
weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure
may the public's perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation cannot be
justified on the basis of the facts on record. PD 911 prescribes a10 day period for the
prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While
this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it cannot be disregarded or
ignored completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly cannot be assumed that the law has
included a provision that is deliberately intended to become meaningless and to be treated as a
dead letter.
The long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case is violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation,
including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution
of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed
by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but
under the constitutionally guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section
16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is
violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. It
has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not
be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant
dismissal of the information. True — but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be
corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device
for setting back time.