AI & Soc (2005) 19: 442–463

DOI 10.1007/s00146-005-0326-5
ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Hans Chr Garmann Johnsen Æ Roger Normann

Jens Kristian Fosse
Reflexive democracy: creating actionable knowledge through
regional development coalitions

Received: 17 January 2005 / Accepted: 27 February 2005 / Published online: 21 May 2005
Ó Springer-Verlag London Limited 2005

Abstract This article seeks to develop a new theory of reflexive democracy,

based on practical cases of action research in regional development, with par-
ticular reference to regional development coalitions. Reflexive democracy is
located in the context of the debate on Scandinavian worklife, emphasising
knowledge, dialogue, and legitimacy.

Keywords Action research Æ Co-operation Æ Dialogue Æ Participation Æ

Reflexive democracy Æ Regional development coalitions

1 Introduction

In this article, we discuss the democratic aspects of a particular method for

regional development through partnership, the regional development coalition
(RDC). We argue that RDC is a method for organising the plurality of actors
and interests in a development process in the region. It is based on, and legiti-
mised by, underlying arguments that we summarise in the concept, namely,
reflexive democracy.
Reflexive democracy is our reconstruction of the perspective on democracy,
which we find in the arguments for RDCs that are rooted in a Scandinavian
work-life tradition (Johnsen 2001). There is no comprehensive outline of the
democratic theory that legitimises the RDC, but an argument can be recon-
structed from the different texts and reports that have been used to support these
coalitions. We have reconstructed the concept based on these different sources
(Gustavsen 1992, 2001, 2003; Shotter and Gustavsen 1999; Ennals and Gus-
tavsen 1999). By concept, we mean a particular and comprehensive cluster of
different theories and perspectives that form a particular method or receipt for
solving practical challenges.

H. C. G. Johnsen (&) Æ R. Normann Æ J. K. Fosse

Agder Research,
Agder University College, 4604, Kristiansand, Norway
E-mail: hans.c.G.Johnsen@hia.no Æ Tel.: +47-38-141000 Æ Fax: +47-38-141001
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In the reflexive democracy concept, focus is set on co-operation, based on

mutual understanding and developed through dialogue. We make the argument
here that the concept of reflexive democracy is vulnerable to two dimensions:
intentions of the actors and formalisation of the development process. We use
four arguments to describe the interrelation between these two dimensions.
Firstly, as emphasised by Habermas (1997), intentions to understand, and
what he calls orientation towards reflection and learning, are essential parts of
the theory of communicative action with a precondition for reflexivity.
Secondly, in line with Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel (1998, p 73), we
argue that creativity and learning is related to organisational structure in an
inverse way: too much formalisation reduces creativity. These are the arguments
in favour of open dialogues and non-formalised development processes.
Thirdly, we argue in line with Williamson (1993) that an open, non-formalised
form of co-operation, presupposes trust, but is vulnerable for opportunism.
Among opportunistic actors, there is a higher need for the formalisation of
relations. In our discussion of reflexive democracy, we will try to integrate these
insights into the concept of reflexive democracy.
Fourthly, we argue that reflexive democracy is a concept that cannot be easily
implemented instrumentally. Those actors that enter the process have to commit
themselves to learning and reflection.
There is a trade-off in the concept between openness and formalisation: in-
creased openness not only gives more creativity but also increases the likelihood
of opportunism and strategic action; while formalisation decreases the creative
potential, but increases the likelihood to succeed with the development process.
This is in line with the arguments presented by Mintzberg et al. (1998) and
Williamson (1993). Our assumptions are summarised in Fig. 1
A situation or context dominated by opportunistic and strategic actors can
lead to power play; this situation requires institutional arrangements, a high
degree of formalisation to be handled. However, if there are situations or a
context in which attitudes are trustful, this requires less formalisation, and the
ideal Agora1 can be achieved. Subsequently, we argue here that reflexive
democracy is a concept that is vulnerable to context. We discuss as to what this
implies.
The argument in this article is illustrated by some of our reflections from the
two cases of RDC in the Agder region of Norway. The structure of the article is
as follows: Firstly, in Sect. 1, Roots of reflexive democracy section, we present our
reconstruction of the normative theoretical foundation for the RDC as a con-
cept for reflexive democracy. We seek here to trace the origin of reflexive
democracy in a work-life research tradition stemming back to Tavistock. Sec-
ondly, in Sect. 2, Philisophical foundations of reflexive democracy section, we
argue that the underlying philosophical foundations of reflexive democracy are
to be found within pragmatism, communicative theory, social constructivism
and deliberative theory. Thirdly, in Sect. 3, The concept of reflexive democracy
section, we seek to operationalise the concept of reflexive democracy through a
discussion of five core arguments and show how this can be constructed into a
model of reflexive democracy. Fourthly, in Sect. 4, Empirical reflections on

1
Nowotny et al. (2001) use the name Agora to portray an arena of reflexive Habermasian
peaceful discourse between science and society.
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Fig. 1 Context defined by attitudes and level of formalisation

reflexive democracy section, we discuss some of our experiences from working

with two RDCs at Agder (Value Creation Alliance)2 and the municipality-based
RDC (Development Coalition Vennesla)3 based on the main arguments sup-
porting reflexive democracy. Fifthly, in Sect. 5, Philosophical reflections on
reflexive democracy section, we discuss experiences from the two RDCs in light
of the philosophical arguments underpinning reflexive democracy. Finally, in
Conclusion, we end with a discuss the condition that summarise our findings and
discuss the conditions for reflexive democracy in regional development.

2 Roots of reflexive democracy

Reflexive democracy is an attempt to describe a comprehensive concept of

democracy as a basis for RDC. It is mainly developed on the basis of the works
of Bjørn Gustavsen. Gustavsen himself never attempted to construct a com-
prehensive theory of democracy; however, the basic elements of such a theory
can be found in his texts.

2
For more background information see: Johnsen et al. (2005): ‘‘The Agder Story’’. In: This
Special Issue.
3
For more background information see: Fosse (2005): ‘‘The potential of dialogue in a muni-
cipal development project: Action research and planning practice’’. In: This Special Issue.
 445

The background and reasons of the VC2010 programme4 for trying to extend
the successes of the enterprise-internal development coalitions to the regional
level, stems from mainly three sources:
One, a long tradition of practical developments, which has manifested itself as
a central characteristic of Norwegian work-life. Industrial democracy was a
central issue in the public debate in Norway in the 1960s and 1970s. The issue
was encouraged through the works of Emery and Thorsrud and their studies of
democracy at work (Emery and Thorsrud 1964, 1970, 1976).
Two, there is an extensive theoretical development within Norwegian work-
life research tradition that has emphasised the importance of collaborative
arenas in and between enterprises. The enterprise internal development
coalitions and the interplay between the social partners in Norway have
contributed largely to the extent of work-life participation that we see in
Norway today, and a general democratisation of Norwegian work-life (Gus-
tavsen, Finne& Oscarsson 2001; Qvale 2002; Levin 2002). This model of
participation has also been described as the Scandinavian co-operation model
(Johnsen 2001)5 .
Three, the initiative of development and research on RDCs also stems from a
long international theoretical discussion that links back to social scientists and
philosophers like John Dewey, Kurt Lewin, Eric Trist and Carole Pateman. In
Norway, this research tradition was pursued in the 1960s with a collaborative
effort, initiated by Einar Thorsrud, between Norwegian-based researchers and
researchers from the Tavistock Institute in London. This was followed by a
series of collaborative R&D projects, programmes and reforms in Norway, of
which the last and the most comprehensive of all of them is, VC2010, com-
menced in 2001 (Qvale 2002, p 32).
There is an important point to be made, when industrial democracy is ex-
tended into RDCs. Gustavsen defends his views by means of a dialogue-oriented
approach on workplace democracy, when confronted with accusations of an
agenda in favour of changing the decision-making apparatus within an enter-
prise, as explained below:
Nobody has—on the basis of such an approach—argued that the enterprise
must be turned into a continuous general meeting. Rather the opposite: by
arguing a broad-base and deep-slice type of step-wise development process the
idea is to successively work the new pattern into the enterprise with as little
disturbing effect as possible. Nor has it been argued that management should be
done away with—just to mention another triviality from the democracy debates.
The point is to create a basis for legitimacy besides the one flowing out of the
company legislation and where the mandate is ownership based, to also include
a mandate from the people in the enterprise (Gustavsen 1992, p 75).
Extended into the regional field, this argument means that the development
coalitions can find a function and an institutional role as reflective arenas,

4
VC2010 is a co-operation between the Norwegian Research Council (NFR), The Norwegian
Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), The Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry
(NHO) and The Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND/Innovasjon
Norge). See also Gustavsen (2001).
5
See Hofstede (1980), who argues that the corporative tradition is a special feature of Scan-
dinavian work-life and Porter (1990), who argues that this represents a competitive advantage.
446

without coming into conflict with the representative democratic system and the
political leadership in the region.

3 Philosophical foundations of reflexive democracy

Reflexive democracy is a practical concept for social change. It is made up of

different theories, and different philosophical positions that are underlying these
theories. At least four positions can be identified: pragmatism, communicative
theory, deliberative theory and social constructivism.
Pragmatism has formed the philosophical basis for much of the industrial
democracy thinking. The inspiration for this work, came among others from
Kurt Lewin, and could be traced back to John Dewey (1927). He wrote: ‘‘We
had occasion to refer in passing to the distinction between democracy as a social
idea and political democracy as a system of governance.’’ (Dewey 1991 [1927],
p 143). Furthermore, he argued:
‘‘The same forces which have brought about the forms of democratic gov-
ernment, general suffrage, executives and legislations chosen by majority votes,
have also brought about conditions which halt the social and humane ideals that
demand the utilization of government as the genuine instrumentality of an
inclusive and fraternally associated public. ‘‘the new age of human relation-
ships’’ has no political agencies worthy of it. The democratic public is still
largely inchoate and unorganised’’ (Dewey 1991 [1927], p 109).
Industry is one of the arenas of society that gets the most critique for not
realising the potential of democracy. The argument of Dewey set the stage for
the later industrial democracy ‘‘movement’’. Some would argue that this became
a normative or political movement, with a strong, radical attitude to social
change. However, there was a consistent argument in this movement.
Different authors have argued for industrial democracy. In her work, Par-
ticipation and Democratic Theory (1999 [1970]), Pateman summarises some of
these arguments by placing the industrial democracy tradition within the context
of pragmatic philosophy. Pateman’s argument is that the industry represents a
political institution, and that democratic attitude and learning in society pre-
supposes the practice of democratic behaviour in that workplace. She also ar-
gues normatively in favour of asymmetry of power inside the organisation, and
furthermore she argues that democratic processes will encourage learning and
motivation at work, and subsequently economic development.
In later years this pragmatic position has been combined with communicative
theory. Bjørn Gustavsen developed his approach to democracy during the 1990s
in the mode of what we might call the communicative turn in social thinking
(Johnsen 2001). In the communicative perspective, focus is set on the commu-
nicative structures and how people interact in the form of meanings, construc-
tion and interpretation through dialogue. ‘‘The life-world forms both the
horizon for speech situations and the source of interpretations, while in turn
reproduces itself only through ongoing communicative actions.’’ (Habermas
1998, p 22). The communicative perspective is therefore focused on the inte-
gration through discourses between the individual (the subjective world), the
inter-subjective social world, and what Habermas with reference to his theory of
universal pragmatics, has called the system world. Integration between the
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‘‘objective’’ social system and the subjective life-world represents a discourse.

The concept of discourse characterises different communicative situations
according to their norms and rules and the content of the communicative pro-
cess itself. Discourses therefore convert subjective knowledge to ‘‘objective’’
social knowledge.
This integration is a result of interplays between different social processes that
are at the same time subjective, social and objective: First, there is intention. A
person can intend to be social. Communicative action is an example of intended
social action. Second, there is a binding affect of certain social processes.
Communication has such a binding effect, since we use common words and
common norms of speaking in order to get understood. Third, there is a system
level of integration through laws and through binding effects of the system.
Examples of this might be the integration of social institutions like money,
private property and market economy; they are interrelated at the system level.
This optimistic change theory, based on communicative principles, is linked to
a social constructivist perspective. Perception is therefore more fundamental
than decision-making. Following the same line of argument, a change in per-
ception would change the directions of democratic decisions (Dryzek 1996).
The Scandinavian tradition has also been inspired by a position on social
science based on an inter-subjective, constructivist perspective on knowledge
(Toulmin and Gustavsen 1996; Gustavsen 1992, 2004). This social constructivist
perspective (Collin 2003) was pioneered by Stephen Toulmin, among others
(McKelvey 2002).
The inter-subjective argument (in its principal form) implies that knowledge
is locally constructed and has no meaning outside the local context. The
communicative argument holds that all knowledge is communicated through
(everyday) language that is rooted in the life-world of the individual.
Knowledge thereby only has meaning in local, life-world contexts (Pålshaugen
2002).
We suppose that this pragmatic/communicative/deliberative/social construc-
tivist perspective, implies that some changes in the attitude of individuals are
beyond the reach of normal strategic decision-making. Subsequently, radical
changes in people’s attitudes are more likely to happen in arenas where people
engage in communicative action, than in arenas of formal decision-making.
However, communicative action also presupposes an attitude towards reflection
and learning (Habermas 1997, p 285).
We argue that reflexive democracy in line with Mode-2 arguments is intended
as an Agora in which new, innovative and inclusive ideas emerge. It is subse-
quently a process by which democracy in the positive meaning of creating a
better society for all, evolves because it is open to participation (inclusive); it is
legitimate since it is public and democratic, it is emancipatory and creative, since
as a structure, it has a low level of formalisation, is decentralised and has no
hierarchical function with predefined objectives. What we call reflexive democ-
racy is therefore a perspective on democracy, where focus is set on the processes
that are prior to political decision-making and that is creative and helps to
elaborate, reconcile and extend mutual understanding between the involved
parties.
Gibbons, Nowotny, Limoges, Scott, Trow and Schwartzman (1994) first
introduced the concept of Mode-2 knowledge production. It was later followed
448

by Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons (2001) where Mode-2 knowledge production is

placing focus on a more active and participative role of researchers in society.
They use the name Agora to portray an arena (partnership, RDC, etc.) of
reflective Habermasian peaceful discourse between science and society. At the
same time they argue that what we will see in practice when research and
practice are more integrated, is not only a smooth change in the knowledge
production, but also a change in the role of research that brings about new types
of conflicts, and new demands to define what research is.
When Nowotny et al. (2001) argued their case for Mode-2 knowledge pro-
duction, they portrayed a role for the researcher which is different from an
‘‘outsider’s provision of facts’’. In Mode-2, science becomes more ‘‘integrated’’
in society and scientists will have to share their ‘‘once exclusive systems of
communication’’ with outsiders. Research is to be instrumental, in the sense of
providing practical results that are useful for defined practitioners (Collin 2003).
Science thereby provides what is described as more socially robust knowledge.
Nowotny et al. (2001) argue that socially robust knowledge of this Mode-2 kind
is more reliable than traditional academic knowledge. It is more reliable because
it is more relevant, being a result of the process by which stakeholders have been
able to influence the development of the knowledge, in order to match a prac-
tical need and become useful in its application.
However, both RDCs and the Agora, although, supported by these philo-
sophical positions are unclear on the source of reflexive attitude. Is reflective
attitude, a precondition in the process, or a result of the process? In order to
discuss this, we need to get into a more practical set of arguments. Subsequently,
in the next section, we try to deconstruct the different arguments that make up
the concept of reflexive democracy.

4 The Concept of reflexive democracy

Reflexive democracy is a concept, that is, it is made up by a particular combi-

nation of different arguments, dimensions and theories. Gustavsen’s argument
on how to realise development coalitions consists of five core arguments. These
can be summarised under the following headlines: (1) The discursive pluralism
argument, (2) The overlapping consensus argument, (3) The numerical argument,
(4) The legitimacy argument, and (5) The learning argument. In the following, we
will show how these arguments can add up to a concept of reflexive democracy.

4.1 The discursive pluralism argument

The argument in Dialogue and Development (Gustavsen 1992) is mainly one of

democracy as a participatory and discursive process. Gustavsen questions the
possibility of establishing a democratic dialogue in working life. He observes, on
the basis of development coalitions in working life in Sweden during the latter
half of the 1980s, that the ‘‘pure’’ theory of democratic dialogue in the
Habermasian sense, is hard to obtain. Gustavsen argues that, on the one hand,
there is no need to make real the most ambitious versions of such a concept as
democratic dialogue. It can function as a regulatory principle without having to
be fully materialised in the real world (Gustavsen 1992, p 109). Gustavsen argues
 449

that, given the setting at hand, it is important not to mix the actual with the
potential; current practices with visions, since the borders of ‘‘what is possible’’
and ‘‘what is real’’ can easily become blurred (Gustavsen 1992).
Gustavsen also puts up a counterargument to this pragmatic approach to a
democratic dialogue. He states that since a development programme enters a
field of everyday discussions, it has to take everyday versions of such concepts as
points of departure. Concepts as dialogue and democracy are quite freely applied
in settings that may be quite far from the requirements of the ‘‘purist’’ (Gus-
tavsen 1992). Gustavsen states, therefore, the importance of conceptualising the
initial concepts; these cannot be too modest, since in the everyday setting with
everyday dialogue, there will be a local adaptation of the concepts anyway.
The democratic argument in Gustavsen (1992) can subsequently be sum-
marised as mainly a Habermasian argument: democratic dialogues in working
life add to the discursive plurality of society and is regulated by structures defined
by society. Shotter and Gustavsen (1999) describe in their monograph, The role
of ‘‘dialogue conferences’’ in the development of ‘‘learning regions’’: doing ‘‘from
within’’ our lives together what we cannot do apart, both the conduct and role of
dialogue conferences within the learning region programmes that were being
conducted in Sweden in the late 1980s. Gustavsen’s first argument, the discursive
pluralism argument, stressed the importance of democratic dialogue for devel-
opment and change.
Through this argument, Shotter and Gustavsen (1999) discuss how arenas for
democratic dialogue can be constructed and conducted inside a region, and the
dialogue’s crucial importance, hence constructing practical meaning for the
actors, through feeding and developing relationships between them, and between
them and their surroundings. They emphasise that this is the development driven
by learning and evolving social relationships, not consciously planned action,
but through administrative and research activities of public agencies for regional
development (Shotter and Gustavsen 1999, p 6).
Pluralism and diversity refer to the contents of the dialogue. It implies that
among the participants there must be a grounded acceptance of diversity.
Therefore, participants should consider all arguments that pertain to the issues
under discussion as being legitimate. No argument should be rejected on the
ground that it emerges from an illegitimate source. The dialogue should there-
fore be a process of exchange: ideas and arguments move to and fro between the
participants and it must be possible for everybody to develop an understanding
of the issues at stake. Acceptance of pluralism and diversity is a major strength
of a democratic system, because one has the benefit of drawing upon a broad
range of opinion and ideas which inform practice, while at the same time being
able to make decisions which gain the support of all participants (Gustavsen
1992).

4.2 The overlapping consensus argument

Shotter and Gustavsen emphasised the role of research in the RDC. They write:
‘‘The co-operation between research and regional actors can give rise to a
whole assortment of results shared between them all. Instead of the production
of academic texts solely for an audience of academic colleagues, the primary
result of such collaborative research is the joint production of new practices
450

within the region–with dialogue conferences often being a part of these prac-
tices’’ (Shotter and Gustavsen 1999, p 12).
Discursive and democratic processes in the region are part of a process of
developing identity and awareness of the inner sense of the region. Democratic
dialogues are therefore prior to political decision processes. However, it is also
supposed that this process shall produce actionable knowledge.
For Shotter and Gustavsen, it is important that the researcher can move into
the role as a participant, become an insider, and not focus on the general, and on
things of an externally related nature, on regularities like patterns and forms; but
focus on the internally interconnected particularities, unique events that hold
practical meaning. Only through such an approach can one hope to give rise to
new social practices.
Shotter and Gustavsen (1999, p 12) state this as ‘‘incipient beginnings of
possibly new relations from which regional developments can emerge’’. They
describe these processes within the region’s development organisation ideally as
a mental shift, occurring when participants including the researcher gain what
they call a relational-responsive understanding of a region’s inner-life. They
describe this as a shared, understanding of the processes; in practice, given
certain momentary surroundings, participants gain of what they should do for
the best. This responsive-relational understanding from inside the ‘‘inner life of
an region’’ allows each individual participant, not only to gain a sense of their
present place or position in relation to all the other relevant actors around
them, but also a sense of the particular openings or invitations offered to them
by the region for their own future actions (Shotter and Gustavsen (1999,
pp 13–14).
The argument in Shotter and Gustavsen (1999) is of a Rawlsian kind. That is,
the argument is mainly about overlapping consensus. Overlapping consensus as
used by Rawls (1993) refers to how people with different normative (political)
views, come to agree at a concrete level concerning issues or values. Both Rawls
(1993) and Habermas (1995) hold that the aim of stability in social interaction is
not necessarily to agree on normative (political) issues. Political conflicts are a
natural part of a pluralistic society. However, some sort of consensus has to
exist, in order to have peaceful co-existence in society. Thus, in general, there has
to be some sort of agreement or acceptance in the institutional level. Rawls
(1993) presupposes in his idealised model that agreement is reached between
independent individuals that are rational, in the sense of being able to articulate
their interests and to see these as integrated in the overall structure of society. It
is also implicit in Rawls’ and Habermas’ argument that these individuals have an
institutional basis for instance in the form of rights, and that no part can
dominate the other.
Shotter and Gustavsen write: ‘‘Thus each participant can, from their own
unique place in the ‘‘relational landscape’’ they all share, make a unique con-
tribution to the region’s development in a way that fits in with those of all
others.’’ (1999, p 14). This argument has an epistemological dimension, in the
sense that it implies that interests do not exist as some predefined phenomenon,
but appears and develops in a dialogical, in relational processes.
Therefore, the main objective of dialogues is to influence in a positive way the
perception of participants. By positive way, it is meant that citizens develop
relational, responsive and democratic values. Common knowledge found in a
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shared set of values can be termed social robust knowledge. It is emphasised by

Greenwood (2002), firstly that the action researcher and participants are col-
laborative producers of knowledge, and secondly that social robust knowledge is
reliable because those affected are the ones who participate in its production. We
will, thereby, refer to social robust knowledge as knowledge based on the values
and interests of the people that are affected by the knowledge.

4.3 The numerical argument

In their book, Work organization and Europe as a Development Coalition, Ennals

and Gustavsen (1999) make an argument for Europe as a development coalition.
The core of their argument is that between the conflicting pressures of liberal
capitalism and state socialism, a third European way can be discerned, based on
social partnerships. They argue further that the kernel of this alternative is
found and can be seen in work organisation. Ennals and Gustavsen state that:
‘‘The concern to improve the work environment has led to consideration of
legislation and regulation, raising fundamental questions about the institutions
which interact in modern Western democratic societies’’ (Ennals and Gustavsen
1999, p 76).
An important lesson from industrial democracy is that there has to exist
arenas where actors can participate. If there are too few arenas, the develop-
mental dynamics of an enterprise or in this case a region will suffer. Ennals and
Gustavsen therefore place a numerical demand on the arenas, and criticise
systems solely based on representative approaches without direct participation
(Ibid. 69).
Ennals and Gustavsen (1999) make a further argument in their discussion of
development coalitions in Europe. Their argument is mainly a numerical one
and resembles that found in deliberative democratic theory (Dryzek 1996). They
argue that creating new arenas for dialogue on the regional level adds to the
plurality of democratic activities and subsequently strengthens democracy in
society. They argue against a ‘‘grand theory’’ of democracy, and advocate a
pragmatic third way. Further more, their argument is that development coali-
tions contribute to the breadth of experience in the democratic process in
society.
This calls for new discursive and reflexive arenas; the dialogue should unfold
in an arena that ideally should liberate participants from systemic, structural
and power ties. Therefore, e.g. neither a boardroom nor a county council are
ideal arenas. The arenas should promote equality between the partners. This is
also a core idea when constructing arenas like RDC.
The numerical argument is used to legitimise two forms of participation:
direct and indirect. Firstly, it must be possible for all concerned to participate,
and relevant work experience is the basis for participation. This is the only type
of experience which, by definition, all participants have. At least some of the
experience, which each participant has when entering the dialogue should be
considered legitimate. Secondly, in development coalitions there is a limit to
participation, which implies that both management and employee representa-
tives take part. However, when arguing their views, representatives have to
anchor their arguments in internal dialogues in their organisation.
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4.4 The legitimacy argument

Legitimacy is important in this perspective. Legitimacy performs certain social

functions; it contributes by bringing people together to perform certain acts; it
makes certain aims acceptable to actors; it makes it possible for actors unknown
to each other to approach each other with a certain degree of trust and confi-
dence. Legitimacy can in this sense be seen as a ‘‘force field’’, not only as
something that is at work in a social landscape but also as something, that plays
a major role in constituting the landscape; a landscape that would not exist
without this legitimacy. Legitimacy is in other words a prime constitutive force
(Gustavsen et al. 2001, p 262).
In his presentation of the VC2010 programme, Gustavsen (2001) argues that
the encouragement of development coalitions in Norway will gain legitimacy
from two sources: one from above because the social partners have a long
tradition of co-operation, and of regulated behaviour in interaction with soci-
ety’s legal structure, and the other from below, since the programme was sup-
posed to be anchored in broad participation in companies. Development
coalitions in regions would therefore be democratic because of these two regu-
lating forces.
There should also be some kind of rule of law, grounded within the reflexive
arena. These bindings could be institutional, where the arena is anchored to
representative structures. But ‘‘rule of law’’ should most importantly function as
a safety vent, a possibility to regulate relational stances between partners when
situations otherwise are locked. It is therefore important that work roles,
authority, etc. of all the participants can be made subject to discussion, and that
no participant is exempt in this respect. Another factor is that nobody can
participate ‘‘on paper only’’. The possibility for face-to-face dialogue should
always be present (Gustavsen 1992). Therefore, the points, arguments, etc.,
which are to enter the dialogue should be made by a participating actor.
Some demands should also be put on participants in terms of an under-
standing of democracy, which should be manifested as a democratic attitude.
These attitudes are not exposed directly, but are built into the guiding rules of
behaviour in the dialogue process. There should, for instance, be an acceptance
of all participants as equal, an acceptance that other participants can have better
arguments. The participants should be able to tolerate an increasing degree of
difference of opinion. It should be possible for everybody to develop an
understanding of the issues at stake. And everybody should also be active.
Consequently, each participant has an obligation not only to put forth his or her
own ideas but also to help others to contribute their ideas (Gustavsen 1992).

4.5 The learning argument

In Gustavsen (2003), there is a report from some of the processes established

through the VC2010 programme. Here they argue that the programme is mainly
a learning process for regional partners, and one that establishes a broader set of
dialogues, not as political discourses but as arenas for connecting parties in
dialogues and learning. The use of researchers in the programme is argued on
the ground that they represent a reflective capacity that can encourage the
reflective processes in the region.
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When fulfilled, a democratic process should lead to reflection and learning.

The logic of this reasoning is found within John Dewey’s works, where he links
the ethics of participatory democracy into knowledge generation processes
(Levin and Greenwood 2001, p 104). The model also indicates anticipated
outcomes from these reflections and learning processes. This is in line with the
argument of Kurt Lewin and John Dewey, that democracy is something that has
to be learned anew for each generation. Both also saw democracy as a much
more difficult social structure to maintain than autocracy. Lewin meant that AR
supports this learning, because AR increases our understanding of democracy.
He considered AR as the experimental use of the social sciences to enhance
democratic processes (Lewin 1948).
In light of this concept, one should not comprehend democracy in static and
linear terms, but as a dynamic and interactive learning process, a process that
requires conscious and long-term work. Learning is about developing, under-
standing and reflective capacity to handle challenges. Although no direct ref-
erence to that is made, it is natural to link this idea to what Argyris (1992) called
the double-loop learning. The RDC thereby becomes an arena for knowledge
production.

4.6 Modelling the reflexive democracy concept

From the review of the arguments underpinning the reflexive democracy con-
cept, we here by construct the following model. The main process in reflexive
democracy is the learning process. The collaborative learning process in reflexive
democracy is supposed to be regulated by the rule of law in society and mutual
agreements between the parties. Furthermore, reflexive democracy in RDCs is
supposed to work through overlapping consensus, add to the plurality of dis-
courses, and the process is supposed to generate socially robust and actionable
knowledge as an output.6
In the model we construct a coherent map of the relations between the dif-
ferent elements in the reflexive democracy concept. The main points in the
conditions for the reflexive democracy model are found within the philosophical
foundation and within the arguments that have been discussed.
We have chosen three groups of conditions as the basis for the model: system-
level conditions (new arenas, broad participation, and rule of law), social-level
conditions (pluralism and diversity and democratic attitude) and actor-level
conditions (orientation towards learning and reflection, and contextual knowl-
edge). It is within the model anticipations that these conditions are sufficient to
encourage reflection and learning. Furthermore, these reflective processes should
give us consensus-based, socially robust and actionable knowledge.
In the following, we will discuss some of our experiences from working with
two RDCs at Agder, the Value Creation Alliance (Johnsen et al. 2005/this
special issue) and the municipality based RDC the Development Coalition
Vennesla (Fosse 2005/this special issue). On the basis of conditions indicated in
the model of reflexive democracy we discuss each of the two RDCs.

6
Reflexive democracy is different from the formal political process in society. Reflexive
democracy is thereby supposed to avoid conflict with representative democracy. This is a
discussion that we do not take in this paper.
454

5 Empirical reflections on reflexive democracy

5.1 Reflexive democracy in the two agder cases

In the following empirical reflections, we try to assess the practical development

in two RDCs in Agder in light of theory. In this respect, we regard the model we
have developed for reflexive democracy as an analytical framework.
The two RDCs that we partly developed at Agder was designed on basis of
the philosophical foundation and the arguments supporting reflexive democ-
racy. The underlying philosophical arguments, as well as the method of working,
intentions, and role of research were communicated to participants through a
series of documents, presentations, meetings and discussions. This was also on
the basis that Agder received its funding from the Norwegian Research Council.
The two cases that are presented here are more thoroughly presented in
Johnsen and Normann (2004) and Johnsen et al. (2005/this special issue), where
the Value Creation Alliance is discussed, and in Fosse (2005/this special issue),
where the Development Coalition Vennesla is discussed. The two RDC repre-
sent different experiences, but is based on the same normative and theoretical
foundation. Somewhat simplified, we could say that one of the cases could be
argued as a strong affirmation of the superiority of reflexive democracy
(Development Coalition Vennesla), while the other case represents an argument
for rejection of the concept (Value Creation Alliance). We would emphasise that
these reflections on how the two RDCs have functioned in light of the analytical
framework of reflexive democracy, represent our personal assessments, reflec-
tions and experiences with the projects so far. Both RDCs are still ongoing
research and development activities. In the Tables 1, 2 and 3 below, we have
commented on and assessed the two RDCs at Agder according to the conditions
in the reflexive democracy concept (note that Tables 1, 2 , 3, 4, 5 match Fig. 2).

Table 1 Dimensions in the model of reflexive democracy: system level conditions

System-level Assessment of the Value Assessment of Development

conditions Creation Alliance Coalition Vennesla

New arenas New discursive arenas for
dialogue and development
were established
Broad participation On activity level, participation
was broad, on steering level, a
small group dominated
Rule of law The alliance was a self-established body.
Members were representatives of
legitimate institutions. However,
no procedures on how to organise
the work in the alliance was predefined,
and its actions and decisions had a
unclear formal standing
New discursive arenas for
dialogue and development
were established
On activity level,
participation was broad,
on steering level, a larger
group than in the Value
Creation Alliance
participated
The representative political
body in the municipality
gave mandate. The process
followed procedures that
were close to normal
procedures in the formal
decision making process in
the municipality
 455

Table 2 Dimensions in the model of reflexive democracy: social-level conditions

Social level Assessment of the Value Assessment of Development

conditions Creation Alliance Coalition Vennesla

Pluralism and The alliance was composed A broad spectrum of

diversity of people that were earlier
established as resource persons
in the region. Few new persons
were engaged. On activity level,
many people, including employees
that normally are not active
in such processes, took part
Democratic On the basis of data we have on
attitude attitude we have seen strategic
action and power play unfolding
representatives of groups and
interests were invited and also
took part in the process
On the basis of data we have
participants has showed
democratic attitude similar to
the norms that are usual in
municipality committee work

The main difference between the two coalitions, regarding system-level con-
ditions, is the broad participation and ‘‘rule of law’’ condition, where Devel-
opment Coalition Vennesla had a significantly clearer position than the Value
Creation Alliance, due to its anchoring in a representative political body in the
municipality.
Development Coalition Vennesla is anchored in the municipality structure.
This implies that it has to comply with formal procedures that exist in munic-
ipality administration, and this seems to have had influence on the attitude of
participants. In the region the Value Creation Alliance was a new institution
with a weaker set of institutional norms. This difference in strength in institu-
tional norms represents the main difference between the two RDCs.
Actor-level conditions are complicated to assess; we have few data, which is
certainly, an important condition that substantially has influenced the processes.
We suggest that more emphasis should be applied on it in future research.
Learning and change are slow processes. It is maybe unrealistic to expect
changes in values and attitudes to emerge in a short project period. However, we

Table 3 Dimensions in the model of reflexive democracy: actor-level conditions

Actor level Assessment of the Value Assessment of Development

conditions Creation Alliance Coalition Vennesla

Orientation towards On the basis data we have, In general, some of the actors
learning and reflection our assessment is that the have stated that they were willing
members of the Alliance to learn and later that they have
were diverse in this respect. learned a lot from the process.
Some seemed to be willing to Our assessment of the discussions
learn, others were more in the committees is that there was
instrumental and strategic a willingness to learn
in their actions
Contextual knowledge The members of the Alliance The members of the coalition had a
had a diverse contextual diverse contextual knowledge of the
knowledge of the region municipality
456

Table 4 Dimensions in the model of reflexive democracy: process output

It is within the model Assessment of the Value Assessment of the Development

anticipations that these Creation Alliance Coalition Vennesla
conditions are sufficient
to encourage

Development of new A lot of concrete, new The outcome of the process

identities and perspectives initiatives have resulted has been a new agenda for
from the process on activity development of the municipality
level. However, at Alliance
level, some of the key
stakeholders saw the
project as a mean to
implement previously
defined strategies
Development of The process in the Alliance The municipality argues that they
democratic competence included an extensive have learned from this type of
networking ‘‘behind broad participation and this
closed doors’’, and way of working with development.
consequently it is not in Decided changes were implemented
accordance with
transparency and
democratic attitude
in all attitude

argue that it is reasonable to expect that actors engaged in such projects are also
willing to learn and show commitment towards learning.
Our overall assessment is that Development Coalition Vennesla has been
more successful than the Value Creation Alliance. Concrete actions have been

Table 5 Dimensions in the model of reflexive democracy: actions output

This should lead to Assessment of the Assessment of the Development

decisions that meet Value Creation Alliance Coalition Vennesla
the following criteria

Creating actionable To some extent, The focus on A concrete action

knowledge much of the action research
has been practical, action
table knowledge. However,
since the process ended in
conflict, less output than
planned emerged from
the work
Decisions based on In the early phase of the
overlapping consensus project, before the conflict,
overlapping consensus seemed
to be present. However, this
did not last
Social robust It is our assessment that the
knowledge Alliance has not been able
to produce socially
robust knowledge
like the initialisation of a
new local business park
has been implemented
It has been a broad
consensus egarding
decisions
It is too early to draw an
unambiguous conclusion,
But the development has
been more positive than in
the Alliance
 457

Fig. 2 A model for reflexive democracy

taken based on broad decisions and the conflict level has been manageable in
Development Coalition Vennesla. Furthermore, we argue that the process in
Vennesla was more formalised, and created more specific results, than the Value
Creation Alliance. However, within the Value Creation Alliance framework,
some really new, inventive initiatives were taken. Because of the conflict, they
have not yet come to fruition. Again, we emphasise that these findings do not
argue for or against reflexive democracy, but rather illustrates some practical
challenges that the concept has to meet. These findings are, however, rather
surprising to us. Our expectation was that the open and informal process in the
Value Creation Alliance would be more creative than the more formalised
process in the municipal Development Coalition Vennesla.
It is supposed to be a long-term feedback and learning effect (double-loop
learning) of this process that leads to improve system level and actors condition.
Besides the reflection and assessment made here, we have not been able to assess
these long-term effects.

6 Philosophical reflections on reflexive democracy

The analytical framework of reflexive democracy is as we have showed, based on a

foundation of different philosophical positions. There are, however, inherent
conflicts in this concept. There are conflicts between the pragmatic, the commu-
nicative of deliberative and the social constructivist positions. Not all social
constructivists will accept Habermas’ universal pragmatics, and Habermas him-
self is not a social constructivist in a strong sense, just to mention a few areas of
potential conflicts. We do not make a comprehensive discussion of this , but would
like to point out some more practical areas in which the reflexive democracy
concept is challenged and the illustrate this with the experiences from Agder.
458

6.1 Pragmatism

Reflexive democracy is supposed to be concerned with developing new per-

spectives and mutual understanding, rather than distributing resources and
handle conflicts of interests. We could shortly describe the main dimensions or
principles in this argument as: (a) focused on the interpersonal democratic
processes, rather than the representative system, (b) supposing that there is a
‘‘liberalisation’’ potential in creating more democratic social forms, (c) arguing
that more direct, participatory democracy is essential for the working of the
representative democracy.
Axel Honnet is one, among many, who has criticised Habermas communi-
cative theory, on the ground that it does not pay attention to the issue of
interests (Honnet 1998). In his critique, he claims that Habermas ends in pro-
ceduralism, because he is anxious about an ethical (cultural) foundation of
politics. Furthermore, he argues that the formulations of interests have to
happen in the social and therefore, the individual is anchored in the social, and is
not an independent entity. The idea of social processes independent of interests
is therefore at best naı̈ve. Rather, from the social interaction she/he defines
interests that relates to the political nature. Interests are then articulated
through communication.
In the Value Creation Alliance, different interests are represented. In the
process we have seen strategic and opportunistic behaviour unfold. On the basis
of the pragmatism, we would argue that in an RDC with disagreements, there
would at least be a result in the form of some sort of learning. However, we
claim that this is not a sufficient argument in order to legitimise opportunistic
behaviour. Therefore, pragmatism does not represent a sufficient legitimising
philosophy for RDCs.

6.2 Communicative theory

Gustavsen (1992) questions whether it is reasonable to decouple the dialogue

aspect of democracy from the other aspects, and apply even the dialogue aspect
in what seems to be a ‘‘soft’’ way with, for instance, little emphasis on the
various ‘‘rule of law’’ mechanisms in a democratic system. He argues that such a
coupling is not as remote as it may appear at first glance (Gustavsen 1992,
p 109). Gustavsen argues that the agreement between the social partners in
working life, and the formal regulations of working life, does indeed establish
such a regulating structure.
Gustavsen continues this discussion into the realm of power, and its role in
relation to the introduction to democratic forms of communication. He first
states that the Weberian definition of power as the possibility to forcing one’s
will in spite of resistance, is too narrow. He further states that in actual practice
power is not silent, power manifests itself just in the way discussions are
structured, agendas set, concepts selected and arguments developed. Gustavsen
argues that the potential of ‘‘non-discourse’’ can only play itself out against a
background of discourse, and that therefore power is found primarily in the
discourses and not as a force operating outside them and making them subject to
constraints. Therefore, the possibilities for a democratic dialogue in the face of
power can only be investigated trying to develop dialogues and seeing what
 459

happens (Gustavsen 1992, p 110). Gustavsen therefore argues that there has to
be some kind of rule of law, which regulates power.
Extended into the regional field, this argument means that development
coalitions can find a function and an institutional role, without coming into
conflict with the representative democratic system and the political leadership in
the region.
In the more practical application of these principles, Gustavsen (1992) makes
an argument in four steps: (1) if we can change patterns of communication, (2)
we might change the issues that are subjected to development and in the way in
which the development work is preformed, (3) which might lead to changes in
work organisation, (4) and finally that will probably lead to changes in the
selection and the configuration of technological elements (such as: innovation
and improvement). This illustrates how vulnerable is the reflexive democracy
concept . The communicative process presupposes an orientation among actors
towards reflection and learning.
We do not have data from the two RDCs on actors’ attitude towards
reflection and learning. However, we have seen changes in work organisation at
Development Coalition Vennesla, a change that we have not seen in the Value
Creation Alliance. Referring to Gustavsen (1992), this might be interpreted as
an effect on communicative processes at Vennesla.

6.3 Deliberative theory

The deliberative argument holds that it is important to stimulate a high level of

discursive activity in society. It could be argued that RDCs adds both to the
number of and plurality of discursive processes. However, there is a large,
undeveloped area of exploring the relation between different discursive forms,
for instance, between reflexive and representative democracy. Reflexive
democracy does not address the conflicts that can occur with representative
democracy, and discussing such reflections in detail goes beyond the ambition of
this paper.
However, we will argue that when a programme such as VC2010 takes the
initiative to establish new democratic arenas in the region, we cannot neglect this
issue. Because new arenas do play a role and have power that influence other
democratic processes. They enter into a field that should be regulated, among
others, by democratic processes. At least, there should be positive examples (as
there were in the industrial democracy case) that show how the complicated and
intricate relation between the reflexive process and other aspects of democratic
governance is handled.
Based on this argument, Honneth (1998) will claim that any political process
(such as reflexive democracy) has to relate to interests. A defence of Habermas’
communicative action against this attack would be to argue that interests are
social representations of values, developed through communication because
communication has a reflexive function (interests are not precommunicative
phenomenon). Therefore communication transcends both interests and power
play. The normative communicative theory makes peaceful social change
(consensus) a benchmark, or represents what we have called an ideal theory.
If we take a closer look at the two RDCs we discuss here, there is a difference
in how they were integrated into the democratic process. At Vennesla, the RDC
460

got a direct mandate from the representative democratic system in the munici-
pality. The process thereby had direct democratic legitimacy and extended the
democratic process. The same was not the case in the Value Creation Alliance.
The democratic contribution of this RDC seen in retrospect is dubious. It was
supposed that legitimacy was given by the underlying and broad support by
enterprises and employees, organised by the social partners. However, we
question as to what extent the representatives of the social partners had open
dialogues with, and broad support by, their members on the issues discussed in
the Alliance. For a broader discussion of this topic, see Johnsen and Normann
(2004).
So we could argue that although communicative theory, and thereby reflexive
democracy, has undercommunicated the problem of underlying interests and
lack of legitimacy and representativity, ideally, the communicative perspective
gives us access also to analyse conflicts, decomposition, meaning-deterioration,
and disintegration (as abbreviation from this ideal).

6.4 Social constructivism

The communicative turn implied a shift in focus from issues related to negoti-
ations, interests, distribution of material goods, and organisational structure, to
issues related to learning, understanding, dialogues and cognitive constructions.
An underlying idea was that the way we perceive the world in cognitive terms
defines the way we act in the social world.
However, this general statement does not tell us how the researcher should
handle conflicts, when dragged into the political power play. One social con-
structivist perspective could be to argue that the underlying conflict relates, not
to intention, but to different interpretations and constructions of reality.
On the one hand, in the Value Creation Alliance case, the researchers and
the regional actors simply had different interpretations of events. There was a
need to have a better process, in order to develop mutual constructions of
social events. However, we do not regard this argument as valid. Partners not
only disagreed, but power was also used to remove researchers; the dialogue
was not open, and the arguments that were presented were not openly dis-
cussed.
Flyvbjerg (2001) argues that you as a researcher should go for the values you
hold, accept that you are a part of a power structure, use the power-structures
actively to get things done: to analyse stakeholders and to change potential
resistance; to make a strategy overcome these barriers, etc. However, he neither
tells us how to deal with power conflicts between the researcher and the field nor
does he discuss a situation where the role of the researcher itself is under attack.
In another article, we have discussed this issue (Johnsen and Normann 2004)
based on the Agder case. We argue there that the role of the action researcher in
large scale projects like regional development is underdeveloped. We hereby call
for a clarification of this role.
On the other hand, we think it is wrong to interpret the social constructivist
argument in an instrumental way. There is a limit to instrumental design of
social constructed effects. Changes in social perception is a very complex process
that takes time, probably longer time than the 3–4 years project period of the
two RDCs at Agder.
 461

7 Conclusion

In conclusion we like to point to some more general reflections related to our

experience with the reflexive democracy. We subscribe to the normative idea of
reflexive democracy, that is, we regard it as a concept with the potential of being
an arena for innovation and creativity, and an arena that supplements other
democratic arenas and extends democracy. However, we regard the concept of
reflexive democracy as vulnerable.
The two challenges that we introduced in Fig. 1 seem to be particularly relevant
to consider: the intention of the actors and the level of formalisation of the process.
These two challenges can be identified as two dimensions that form the context in
which reflexive democracy operate. In Fig. 3, below we have elaborated on Fig. 1
and identified nine different contexts that appear as a result of different combi-
nations of actors’ attitudes and degrees of formalisation of the development
process. The normative objective is to have, as little formalisation, and as much
learning and reflection as possible (lower left corner in Fig. 3 below).
Reflexive democracy is a process of learning and is also supposed to con-
tribute to change in the context (double-loop learning). However, the argument
we make in the Fig. 3 above, is that some contexts are so formalised or are so
ridden by opportunistic behaviour, that it is difficult to realise the intention of
reflexive democracy.
It would be too much of a simplification to argue that any of the contexts
match the context of the two RDCs at Agder. However, as argued earlier, there

Fig. 3 How reflexive democracy respond to different context defined by level of formalisation
of the process and type of rational and intention of actors
462

is a difference in context for the two RDCs. We see this difference in context as a
significant argument for explaining as to why one of the RDCs succeeded and
the other did not. In our view, this is to be found within the dimensions in Fig. 3.
We have argued earlier that reflexive democracy is a vulnerable concept. We
argue here that the context seems to be crucial for how the dialogue and the
reflexive process unfold. We have identified two important dimensions: attitude
and level of formalisation. while reflexive democracy in a short-term perspective
operates within a given context, it is also supposed to work towards changing
the context in a long-term perspective.
The intention of reflexive democracy was to contribute to socially robust and
actionable knowledge in society that should meet the following criteria: The first
is that decision and actions are based on overlapping consensus. The point for
most actors to participate is to see practically applicable results of their work,
therefore the dialogue should continuously produce agreements that can provide
platforms for practical action. The second condition is that outcomes lead to the
development of new identities and perspectives. Over time, and working in such
processes as here described, one will develop and institutionalise common and
shared identities and perspectives, which in turn will make decision-making and
action-taking based on overlapping consensus natural. The third requirement is
that outcomes lead to the development of democratic competence. This in turn
adds value to democracy in general.
The model for reflexive democracy can of course be criticised for representing
a circular argument, democratic attitude as a condition and democratic com-
petence as an output. We do, however, not consider the model linear but
interactive. This means that the model cannot be implemented and succeeded
within one linear process. In fact, we argue that this is not an instrumental
concept to be implemented. Rather, there have to be reflections and learning
grounded in the dialogue and processes, and intention to continue mutual
development, in order to succeed with this concept.
We argue that reflexive democracy is an interesting concept to be further
explored. It would be interesting to look deeper into among other concepts as
well: the communicative structures in such processes, the relation between
reflexive and representative democracy; and knowledge transfer and creativity in
such processes.

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