PROXIMATE CAUSE

Bataclan Case: that cause, which, in natural and TESTS OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without Quasi-delictual actions involve three (3) requirements:
which the result would not have occurred. 1) negligence; 2) damage; and 3) the causal
connection between the damage and the negligent act
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and or omission.
producing the injury, either immediately or by settling
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and The initial step in determining proximate cause is to
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal determine if the negligent act or omission of the
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final defendant is the “cause-in-fact” of plaintiff’s damage
event in the chain immediately affecting the injury as or injury.
a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person Sine Qua Non Test
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily - defendant’s conduct is the cause in fact of the
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground injury under the but for test if the damage
to expect at the moment his act or default that an would not have resulted had there been no
injury to some person might probably result therefrom. negligence on the part of the defendant.
Conversely, defendant’s negligent conduct is
REMOTE CAUSE not the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s damage if
- as that cause which some independent force the accident could not have been avoided in the
merely took advantage of to accomplish absence thereof.
something not the natural effect thereof. - Bataclan vs. Medina (supra) includes a
statement that the cause should be that without
Urbano v. IAC: A prior and remote cause cannot be which the damages would not have resulted.
made the be of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to Substantial Factor Test
the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if - The substantial factor test, on other hand,
there intervened between such prior or remote cause makes the negligent conduct the cause in fact
and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and of the damage if it was a substantial factor in
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury producing the injuries. In order to be a
would not have happened but for such condition or substantial factor in producing the harm, the
occasion.  ACQUITTED. causes set in motion by the defendant must
continue until the moment of the damage or at
CONCURRENT CAUSES least down the setting in motion of the final
- The proximate cause is not necessarily the sole active injurious force which immediately
cause of the accident. The defendant is still produced or preceded the damage.
liable in case there is concurrent causes -
brought about by acts or omissions of third It is believed that the “NESS” test can also be applied
persons. in multiple causation cases. There is no statutory
provision that fixes the applicable test hence the NESS
In cases where there is concurrent causes or test is an acceptable test and it might even be superior
negligence, the joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable. in multiple causation cases. The act or omission is a
cause-in-fact if it is a necessary element of a
Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of sufficient set (NESS)
Appeals: It is sufficient that his negligence,
concurring with one or more efficient causes other Causality means “that the damage would not have
than plaintiff’s, is the proximate cause of the injury. resulted without fault or negligence of the defendant”
Accordingly, where several causes combine to while adequacy means that the fault of the defendant
produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability would normally result in the damage suffered by the
because he is responsible for only one of them, it obligee.
being sufficient that the negligence of the person
charged with injury is an efficient cause without which CAUSE AND CONDITION
the injury would not have resulted to as great an
extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the In Phoenix Construction vs. Intermediate Appellate
person injured. Court, the Supreme Court adopted the view that it is
no longer practicable to distinguish between cause and
It was ruled, however, that the plaintiff cannot recover condition.
if the negligence of both the plaintiff and the
defendant can be considered the concurrent proximate There is no question, therefore, that even if the
causes of the injury. defendant had only created a condition, he may be
held liable for damages if such condition resulted in ordinary care but failed to exercise such last clear
harm to either person or property. chance and d. Accident occurred as proximate cause
of such failure •
The first class of dangerous conditions includes Who may invoke: Plaintiff • NOTE: The doctrine is
things which are inherently dangerous because they inapplicable to a. Joint tortfeasors b. Defendants
retain their potential energy in full, even if they are concurrently negligent c. As against 3rd persons
stored or handled with utmost care.
DEFENSES
The second class of dangerous conditions includes
cases where objects are placed in such a way that other CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
people’s right of way is not recognized.
Contributory negligence is defined as conduct on the
The third class includes defective construction of a part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause
building. to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard to which he is required to conform for his
EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE own protection.
- An efficient intervening cause is one that
destroys the causal connection between the CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE - the plaintiff
negligent act and injury and thereby negatives was also negligent together with the defendant; to
liability. constitute a defense, proximate cause of
injury/damage must be the negligence of defendant
There is no efficient intervening cause if the force
created by the negligent act or omission have either: CONCURRENT NEGLIGENCE – if both parties
(1) remained active itself or (2) created another force are equally negligent the courts will leave them as
which remained active until it directly caused the they are; there can be no recovery
result, or (3) created a new active risk of being acted
upon by the active force that caused the result. Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
The test of the sufficiency of an intervening cause to cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
defeat recovery for negligence is not to be found in the only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause
mere fact of its existence, but rather in its nature and of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the
manner in which it affects the continuity of operation plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
of the primary cause or the connection between it and mitigate the damages to be awarded. 
the injury.
EMERGENCY RULE - "one who suddenly finds
FORESEEABLE INTERVENING CAUSE. himself in a place of danger, and is required to act
The rule in this jurisdiction is to the effect that without time to consider the best means that may be
foreseeable intervening causes cannot be considered adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
sufficient intervening causes. negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to have been a better
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening method, unless the emergency in which he finds
cause is one which in ordinary human experience is himself is brought about by his own negligence."
reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the NOTE: Applicable only to situations that are sudden
defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular and unexpected such as to deprive actor of all
circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among opportunity for deliberation (absence of
other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or foreseeability); the action shall still be judged by the
the defendant may be negligent only for that reason. standard of the ordinary prudent man

DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE - even FORTUITOUS EVENT - no person shall be

though a person’s own acts may have placed him in a responsible for those events which cannot be foreseen,
position of peril and an injury results, the injured is or which through foreseen were inevitable
entitled to recover if the defendant thru the exercise of REQUISITES:
reasonable care and prudence might have avoided a. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
injurious consequences to the plaintiff. This defense is occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply
available only in an action by the driver or owner of with his obligation, must be independent of the human
one vehicle against the driver or owner of the other will; Valenzuela v. CA, 253 SCRA 303 – An
vehicle involved. individual will nevertheless be subject to liability if
the emergency was brought about by his own
REQUISITES: a. Plaintiff was in a position of negligence.
danger by his own negligence b. Defendant knew of b. It must be impossible to foresee the event which
such position of the plaintiff c. Defendant had the least constitutes caso fortuito or if it can be foreseen it must
clear chance to avoid the accident by exercise of be impossible to avoid
c. The occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner
d. The obligor must be free from any participation in
the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.

GENERAL RULE: Fortuitous Event is a complete

defense and a person is not liable if the cause of the
damage is a fortuitous event. •
EXCEPTION: It is merely a partial defense and the
courts may mitigate the damages if the loss would
have resulted in any event [Art. 2215(4) NCC] •
NOTE: A person may still be liable for a fortuitous
event if such person made an ASSUMPTION OF
RISK.

DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK –

Volenti non fit injuria
REQUISITES:
a. Intentional exposure to a known danger
b. One who voluntarily assumed the risk of an injury
from a known danger cannot recover in an action for
negligence or an injury is incurred
c. Plaintiff’s acceptance of risk (by law/contract/nature
of obligation) has erased defendant’s duty so that his
negligence is not a legal wrong
d. Applies to all known danger.

DUE DILIGENCE - diligence required by

law/contract/ depends on circumstances of persons,
places, things.

PRESCRIPTION a. Injury to right of plaintiff/quasi

delict - 4 years b. Defamation - 1 year c. When no
specific provision, must be counted from the day they
may be brought

PROSCRIPTION AGAINST DOUBLE

RECOVERY - Responsibility for fault or negligence
under quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct
from civil action arising from the RPC but plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for same act or
omission of the defendant