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A Theory of Aspectuality
The Interaction between Temporal and Atemporal Structure
Henk J. Verkuyl
Book DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511597848
Online ISBN: 9780511597848
Hardback ISBN: 9780521443623
Paperback ISBN: 9780521564526
Chapter
5 - Numerals and quantifiers: one level up pp. 111-121
Chapter DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511597848.009
Cambridge University Press

5 Numerals and quantifiers:
one level up
5.0 Introduction
There is a line of analysis of NP-quantification in GQT in which NPs are taken
to be of type <«e,t>,t>,l>. Scha (1981) and Verkuyl (1981) are among the
earliest publications in this tradition, both building further on Bartsch (1973)
and Bennett (1975). The main goal of Verkuyl (1981) was to build a sort of
bridge between the framework of Montague Grammar and the Chomskian pre-
Government-Binding X-bar Syntax. Its descriptive purpose was not to find out
what [+SQA] stands for, rather it was focussed on the treatment of numerals and
quantifiers. Yet, somewhat to my own surprise, some of its results turn out to
bear directly on the issue of quantification in aspect construal, especially as the
sort of NP-representations proposed (recall: at the <«e,/>,r>,/>-level)29 offer
a quite workable point of departure for more sophisticated extensions in the
area of temporality. Therefore, a short summary of my 1981 grammar is in
order. The present chapter is divided into two sections: section 5.1 gives a
description of an X-bar grammar d la Montague, in which syntactically and
semantically two structural positions are available for the Standard GQT-
determiners, whereas section 5.2 shows that this grammar has certain concrete
things to say and solutions to offer about the Russell-Strawson controversy.
Apart from the contribution it may have to the solution of the philosophical
controversy, it is also relevant for the question of whether or not it is necessary
to exclude terminative aspect from occurring in tautological sentences.
5.1 NP = [MET [NUM ... N*]]

The Montagovian-styled X-bar syntax proposed in Verkuyl (1981) is a vari-
able binary branching categorial syntax having rules of the following form:
(169) If a e X1 and Pe X'+VX' (or X'XX*1), then F(a,P)e X* 1 and F(a,P) =
pa (or aft
111
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112 Noun phrase structure
It is a binary branching system, in which a functor P takes a value a on the pro-

jection line of X to yield either the same type as their input or a different type.
X° is a lexical category of type <e,t>, X™ the maximal category of the projec-
tion induced by X°. For NPs, Xmax (=NP) is a fixed category in the sense that it
denotes a semantic object of type <«e,t>,t>,t> and it is obtained by a rule
requiring a fixed type-logical characterization of N1"""1 as being of type
«e,r>,/>, in order for it to qualify as the input of the NP-forming rule. This
gives a special role to the determiner as providing NP-hood to a noun. Between
N° and Nmax~1 there is a variable part, which accommodates the adjectival sub-
structure of NPs, that is for adjectives of type «e,/>,<e,r». 3 0 Thus, the gen-
eral scheme for the structure of NPs looks as in (170).
.variable
(170) [ Nmax DET [ Nmax _, NUM [ N i A * NO]]
The asterisk in (170) represents the possibility of having a series of stacked

adjectival modifiers such as in The twelve nice red wooden boxes. In the figure
this is indicated by the dots. NUM and DET are taken as operations bringing
about a change of type. NUM takes a semantic object of type <e,t> and brings it
to «e,t>,t>, whereas DET takes an object of type «e,t>,t> to yield an
<«e,r>,r>,/>-type. In its most simple form, an NP has the form in (171):
(171) [NP DET [N, NUM NO]}
where NP=Nmax and N^N"""" 1 . For convenience, I shall often use the simple
structure to clarify certain points.
The semantic rules corresponding to (169) have the traditional PTQ-format
of grammar, though the grammar was kept extensional. Numerals like two,
three, etc. are seen as the lexicalized forms of the category to which Singular
and Plural belong as abstract elements. In some languages they are grammati-
Numerals and Quantifiers: one level up 113
calized as morphemes. As a consequence, the lexical category child in sentences

like The child walked and The children walked is neutral between Singular and
Plural: the child is now analysed as [the[SG[child]]] and the children as
[the[PL[child]]].31 The relevant semantic specifications of members of the lexi-
cal category NUM are:
Element Category Type Denotation

(172) SG NUM «e,t>,«e,t>,t» XYXK[XQYA\X\=1]
(173) PL NUM «e,t>,«e,t>,t» XYWC[XQYAIXI>1]
(174) three NUM «e,t>,«e,t>,t» XYXX[XCYAIXI=3]
Here, the EL-conventions of DEF 3.3 are used: X and Y are variables of type
<e,t>. N°in (171) was restricted to Count Nouns only.
The members of NUM are semantically interpreted as functions relating sets,
just like the standard GQ-determiners.32 In (175), the function [three] applied
to a set, say [child], yields the collection of all sets X where XcflchildJ and
where each X contains three members.
(175) mX[X£YAlXI=3](|[childJ) <=> XX[Xc[child] AIXI=3]
The same applies to SG and PL. The numeral SG denotes the function |[SGJ
which yields the set of all singletons X of a set Y. In our model M,, [SG]
applied to [child] yields the collection XX[Xc|[child]AlXI=l], which is the set
of singletons {{b},{c},{d}}. Thus, in the NP the child, the collection of sets
[SG]([child]) is the semantic interpretation of N ' = S G ( N ° ) . In major
approaches to the semantics of plural NPs, such as Scha (1981) and Link
(1983), it is standard to distinguish the set AT([NJ), that is, the set of all atoms
in the power set of [N] in the model. This is done by introducing a separate
operator. It is clear that [ S G ] ( [ N ] ) is exactly this set, which is to say that (172)
is quite a natural way of introducing the set of atoms.
One of the linguistic motivations for a scheme like (170) is that it accounts
for the data in (176):
(176) a. nice quiet children
b. three nice children
c. *nice three children
d. *four three children
which suggest that the general rule is that adjectives should follow numeral
elements. Some apparent counterexamples such as the following two children
will be discussed in chapter 6.1. They may be seen as modifications of the
numerals rather than of the Noun.
DET is defined as a function of type <«e,f>,r>, «<e,t>,t>,t» operating on

members of Nma*~' and yielding a category of type «<e,t>,t>,t>. Thus, deter-
miners are taken as relations between collections of sets of individuals, in par-
ticular between IN"1*01-'! and IVPJ. Note that a part of the quantificational
information, which in GQT is associated with determiners, is now transferred
to the NUM-part of the NP. This has far-reaching linguistic consequences
because on an <«e,r>,n>,/>-analysis some of the determiners have to be made
dependent on the information provided by SG and PL. Some, for example, will
be given the lexical subcategorization information of the form [—Nmax~'],
which says that it can take both SG and PL; all needs to be marked as taking only
a plural Nmax~', every being subcategorized for SG. This does not sound unrea-
sonable as this is what speakers have to learn lexically. Some boys is analysed
as some(PL(boy)) and some boy as some(SG(boy)). So, agreement is governed
by SG and PL.
The lexical specifications of the, all, some, a and 0 are given in (177M181),
which is based on the simplified (177), which means that N1 is to be read as
jvjmax-l
(177) the [—N1] XQ\P3W[Q(W)/J>(W)]

(178) all [—N'pl] XQXP3!W[(2(W)AP(W)]
(179) some [—N1] XQ\P3W[Q(W)*P(W)]
(180) a [—N'sg] XQXP3W[Q(W)AP{W)]
g
(181) 0 [—N'pl]
Underlying this analysis is the conviction that whatever a determiner may be, it
signals whether the referent of the NP is existentially introduced or whether it
is given, that is identified by deixis, context or anaphoric reference as pertain-
ing to something introduced. This is why in (177M181) the set W is either
introduced by the existential quantifier 3 or is given by the definiteness opera-
tor 3! which is defined as follows:
(182) 3!W[a(W)]=l iff there is a W such that We a and W is deictically
or contextually or anaphorically given
Here it suffices to say that the operator 3!W was meant to provide for identify-
ing reference in the sense of Strawson's notion 'identifying description'
(Strawson 1959, 1964). In Verkuyl (1981: 586f.), the term 'identifying' was
used in this sense, in particular if it is strengthened by Lobner's (1985) treat-
ment of definiteness in terms of a function picking out a unique (i.e. unambigu-
ously identified) value. Lobner's position is compatible with the Strawsonian
position on identification, just like Kadmon's (1987) position. In this sense, the
notion of givenness used here is more closely associated with unique identifi-
cation than with familiarity, the latter based on Heim (1982). However, a
choice between the two approaches to definiteness does not affect the identifi-
cation of [+SQA]-properties.33
Compositionally, the general type-logical structure of a simple NP of the
form (177) can be characterized as follows:
(183) N° <e,t>
NUM «e,t>,«e,t>,t»
N1 «e,t>,t>
DET
N2
The structure is given bottom-top. To give some examples, sentences like The
three children came in are derived as in (1S4).34
(184)
NO child [child]
NUM three 5IY5IX[XCYAIXI=3]
N1 three(child) mX[XcYAlXI=3](|[child])
XX[X£[child]AlXI=3]
DET the XQXP3!W[(2(W)AP(W)]
N2 the(three(child))
A.0AJ>3!W[e(W)AP(W)](AX[Xc[child]AlXI=3])
kP3! W[AX[X£|[child]AlXI=3KW)A/>(W)]
Ai>3!W[[Ws[childlAlWI=3]A/>(W)]
V came in [came_in]
VP came in XX.Xcffcame in]
S the three children came in
Xi>3!Wt[WcfchildlAlWI=3]Ai>(W)](XX.Xs;Icame_in])
3!W[tWcIchildlAlWI=3]AXX.Xc[came_in](W)]
3 !W[We;[child] AlWI=3A\Vc[came_inl]
NPs like a child and three children are derived as (185) and (186), respectively:
(185)
N° child [child]
NUM SG XYXX[XCYAIXI=1]
N1 so(child) AYXX[XcYAlXI=l]([childJ)
WC[Xc[child]AlXI=l]
DET
N2 a(so(child)) A.(2A.P3W[e(W)A/>(W)](AX[Xc[childjAl]
W3W[[XX[Xc|[childSAlXI=l](W)AP(W)]
AP3W[Wc!childjAlWI=lA/>(W)]
(186)
N° child [child]]
NUM three XYX.X[XCYAIXI=3]
N1 three(child) X.YX.X[XcYAlXI=3](|[child]])
XX[Xc|[childlAlXI=3]
DET 0 A.Q^P3W[Q(W)AP(W)]
N2 0(three(child))
Ai33W[XX[Xc[[child]]AlXI=3](W)AP(W)]
XP3W[Wc|[childlAlWI=3AP(W)]
Note that N l in (185) yields a set of all singletons from the set of children in E,
as N1 in (184) and (186) yields the set of all triples of children.
There is a problem, not discussed in Verkuyl (1981), with respect to the
analysis of the (and of all). One might be inclined to demand for The three chil-
dren came in that the last line of the derivation (184) would be (187) on the
presumption that W=[child]) in the model, say M^
(187) 3! W[W=[child]l AI WI=3AWcl[came_in]l]
I leave this matter here and will continue to use c rather than = in the representa-
tion of the N, but the issue will be taken up again in chapter 6.2 and in chapter 7.5.
In order to compare the above analysis with the standard GQT-analysis,
some relevant semantic analyses are given:
(188)
a. [thesg child](|[VPJ) = [VPJe {X: [childJcXAl[childJI=l}
b. [thepl childrenl(fVPI) = |[VP]e {X: [childJeXAl[childJI>l}
c. [all children J([VPJ) = |[VP]e {X: |[child]cX}
d. Ithree children](|[VPJ) = [VPJe {X: l|[childlnXI=3}
e. Isome childrenI([VP|) = [VPJe {X: l[child]nXI>l}
(189)
a. [the(SG(child))I([VPD = 3!W[Wc[childlAlWI=lAWc|[VP]]
b. [the(PL(child))l([VP]) = 3!W[WctchildlAlWI>lAW£[VPl]
c. [all(PL(child))](|[VP]) = 3!W[Wc[child]AlWI>lAW£[VPJ]
d. [0(three(child))J([VPJ) = 3W[W£[childlAlWI=3AWc:[VP]]
e. [some(PL(child))I(IVP]) = 3W[Wc;[childlAlWI>lAWc[VPJ]
The difference is clear: the analyses in (188) amount to saying that [VPJ is an
element of a collection of sets meeting some conditions on the intersection
between [child] and |[VP], whereas the corresponding analyses in (189)
amount to characterizing a set W which is a subset of both [child] and [VP].
It is this set that we will become increasingly interested in as it may be given
structure that can be made dependent on time expressed by the verb.
Representations like (189) will have to be extended into more complex ones.
This is because the [+SQA]-notion is quite complex indeed, but also because in
Verkuyl (1981) I restricted myself to intransitive verbs only.
5.2 [N°] = 0 : Strawson vs. Russell

It is interesting to see what happens with the problematic sentences of the pre-
ceding chapter, such as (151) All dogs came in. It would be derived as follows:
(190) dog [dog]
PL A.YXX[XCYAIXI>1]
PL(dog) X.YXX[XcYAlXI>l]([dog|)
XX[Xc[dog]AlXI>l]
all XQXP3! W[(2(W) AP(W)]
all(PL(dog))
XP3 !W[XX[Xc[dogl AIXI> 1](W)AP(W)]
AJ>3!W[Wc[dog]AlWI>lAP(W)]
Due to the definition of PL something is going wrong at the level of N1. It is at
this point that the function A.YAJC[XCYAIXI>1] is applied to the set [dogj, that
is, to the empty set ex It yields the weird function XX[XcewlXI>l]. This char-
acteristic function is not only improper in the sense that it does not split the col-
lection of sets, [PL]([dog]) is also ill-defined because it contains a contradic-
tion. This is different from the situation in which in standard GQT a quantifier
becomes improper. For example, (66f) [no](A) with A=[dog] applied to sub-
sets of E would yield in M, [nol([dogj)=AX.[doglnX=0. In the definition
of XX.[dog]nX there is no contradiction involved, whereas in (190) all is
applied to a node N1, PL(dog) denoting a weird function.
Now, given the controversy between Russell and Strawson, there are two
lines of thought on which one could proceed. I will argue that at the end of
these lines the same sort of conclusion must be drawn so that one may reach a
final compromise there between two conflicting strategies, because we end up
with a terminological debate. One needs type logic to see this.
On the Strawsonian line one might say: well, given a derivation like (190)
one is obliged to stop after PL(dog), that is, at the level of N ! , because weird
functions should not be allowed to be the input of some other semantic rule.
The derivation simply stops, because whatever happens to the derivation, once
a weird function always a weird function. The syntactic machinery delivers a
well-formed sentence, but semantics refuses to give it a well-formed reading.
Strawson and his associates were obliged to assume a truth-value gap because in
a first-order representation the weirdness inevitably turns up at the point at which
truth must be assigned. Due to the type logic involved in (190), the ill-formed-
ness turns up 'earlier' in the form of a blocking of the interpretation of the NP.
This reasoning may not convince Russellians. They do not let pass the cup
of weirdness of XX[X£2WlXI>l] because they want to go on to the end of the
derivation where truth values are waiting. So the weirdness is carried over to
the level of the NP, where one ends up with a function identifying a set which
is described both as empty and non-empty by the contradictory conjunction
]. That is, all(PL(dogs)) will be interpreted as:
(191)
and this function applied to [VPJ brings about the fiercely desired truth value.
However, the presence of a contradiction suggests that one ends up with All
dogs came in being always false in case there are no dogs in a domain. This
would be quite different from what Russell wants universal sentences to mean:
he wants them to be true.
There is perhaps a more adequate way of handling this contradictory infor-
mation. The derivation (190) may be characterized metalinguistically as a case
of Exfalso sequitur quod libet (EFSQ), a tautological argument of the form
_,p—»(p-»q). That is, if [dogl=<3 one must assume that IWI=0. Call this
assumption -p. Then it follows that if IWI>1 - call this assumption p - by pick-
ing out the numeral PL, one obtains the falsum ±. By this, we may derive any
value a for the open place P, provided it is of the right logical type. In other
words, the EFSQ (192) is present in the derivation itself.
(192) X/>3!WrWc0AlWI>lAP(W)](a)
-•P P q
In my view, this is not an unreasonable thing to argue. What it does is to make
All dogs came in tautologically true in any model in which there are no dogs.
So, here Russellians may feel comfortable again.
However, a quite unexpected compromise appears to be feasible or at least a
situation in which Strawsonians and Russellians mayfindthemselves back in a
terminological debate. The main ingredient of the EFSQ is present in the NP

itself, so the problem arises before the derivation has reached the stage at
which the truth value is to be determined. So the matter can be settled before
any possible truth-value gap is in sight, that is, before the point at which the
function (191) is applied to an a. In other words, the EFSQ-structure of (191)
makes it possible to settle the matter completely independent of the value or
content of the VP. This sounds Strawsonian and indeed it is, but the difference
of opinion can now be reduced to the question of whether or not Strawsonians
would accept that the Russellian verdict 'tautologically true' resulting from
an EFSQ is equivalent to their own judgment 'undefined': one may call sen-
tences which are tautologically true undefined with respect to one particular
model.
One of the reasons for pursuing this train of thought is, of course, the simple
fact that in GQT the definitions of all and the are so congenial:
Ithe](A)=|[all](A) plus some additional constraint concerning the cardinality.
Yet, for Russell the universal sentences like All unicorns are white are always
true if [unicorn J=0, whereas The unicorn is white is false. In my view, the gap
between all and the is unnecessarily wide and yawning. The present analysis
predicts that it can be bridged. Consider the following sentences:
(193) The dog came in
(194) The dog did not come in
(195) At most two dogs did not come in
(196) At most two cats did not come in
For Strawson, the sentences (193) and (194) are in the same category as (151)
All dogs came in. For Russell they were not, as pointed out in section 4.4.
Under the present type-logical analysis, they will now also fall in the same cat-
egory, so here we find in (197) again the ESFQ-format (198).
(197) dog [dogl=0 -.P
SG X.YXX[XCYAIXI=1] P
SG(dog) XY?0C[X£YAIXI=1 ](0)
XX[X£0AIXI=1] x
(198) AJ°3!W[WG0AlWI=lA/>(W)](a)
-,P P Q
This makes (193) tautologically true rather than false. The same applies to
(195) but it also applies to (196) because the cardinality of feat] in E is 1. In
this sense, all improper use of quantifiers is brought under one heading and in
the compositionally driven bottom-top interpretation it remains essentially a

matter of the NP rather than of the VP.
One may make an even stronger claim: the present analysis makes both
(193) and (194) tautologically true (for the Russellians) or uninterpretable (for
the Strawsonians). This needs to be shown to Russellians. Recall that Russell
said that (194) is ambiguous because of the two positions available for the
negation sign.
(199) -,3x(Vy(dog(y) <-> y=x)Acame_in(x))

(200) 3x(Vy(dog(y) <-> y=x)A-1came_in(x))
On the <«e,r>,r>,r>-analysis of sentence negation, however, the negation
sign —i will not appear in front of 3W (see chapter 7.6 below). It will show up
at the place at which the VP comes in. For example, the derivation of The cat
did not come in is:
V came in |[came_inj
VP came in A.X.Xc[[came_in]]
VP not came in XX.X£|[came_in]]
S the cat did not come in
3!W[[Wc[[cat]]AlWI=l]AA.X.X<£|Icame_in]](W)]
3!W[Wcffcat]]AlWI=lAW£![came_in]]]
whereas the analysis of Nobody came in results in:

V came in |[came_inj
VP came in XX.Xc[[came_in]]
NP nobody XP-,3W[[Wc|[humanlAlWI>l]A/>(W)]
S nobody came in
-a\V[Wc|[humanl|AlWI>lAWc|Icame_inI)]
In the former case the P remains 'positive* in the sense that the NP takes the
XX-construction of the VP without 'seeing' the negation.35 The NP takes VP
the way it takes a positive VP. It is in this sense that an analysis along the lines
of (170) and (177M181) correctly expresses that (193) and (194) are in the
same way true or false or uninterpretable. This is how native speakers react if
they are confronted with them.
Finally, let us have a second look at at most:

(201) At most two dogs came in
(202) At most two dogs did not come in

At the level of NP we have the following:
(203)
In my view, these sentences are as weird as the above with all, the and at least.
This seems to show that the information expressed by IWI<n covers a range in
the set {1,2, ..., n} and not in the set {0,1,2, ...n}. For if the latter were the
case, then (201) and (202) would have truth values. As far as I can see, they
have not. But note that the strength or weakness of the analysis does not
depend on this judgment.
Summarizing, as far as all is concerned, sentences like (35) All children
came in and (151) All dogs came in express [+sQA]-information as soon as the
set A is presupposed to be non-empty. If not, the sentences in question do not
pertain to a model and cannot be interpreted terminatively due to contradictory
information. From this an important aspect of the notion of terminativity can
be derived: it is extensional in that it pertains to just one model. It needs a prop-
erly quantifying NP as denned in the Strawsonian sense. Thus it seems that the
notion of properness is needed to make warrant that an NP may express
[+SQA]. We will see later on, however, that an NP may be proper and still be
lacking the power to express cardinality at the proper extensional level. So we
have to penetrate more deeply into the nature of the quantification involved in
expressing [+SQA]-information.
53 Conclusion
The present chapter has introduced the X-bar <«e,f>,f>,f>-machinery devel-
oped in Verkuyl (1981) and it has demonstrated some of its properties. On the
basis of this, it has been argued that the formalism being employed is adequate
for dealing with representing [+SQA]-information at the right type-logical
level. An <«e,r>,r>,r>-analysis produces for a number of determiners a clear
cardinality expression of the form IWI r n, where r is a member of the set of
relations {<, <, >,>,=} and where n is a certain value, either identified or not.
This format will prove valuable later on, as it makes it possible to treat for-
mally the notion of [-SQA]. In this respect, the present chapter has laid the
foundation for the construction of an aspectual theory in which the [±SQA]-
notion can be formally articulated. However, it will also be shown that the
above framework is in need of revision at certain points.

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Cambridge Books Online

The Interaction between Temporal and Atemporal Structure

Book DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511597848

Online ISBN: 9780511597848

Hardback ISBN: 9780521443623

Paperback ISBN: 9780521564526

5 - Numerals and quantifiers: one level up pp. 111-121

Chapter DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511597848.009

Cambridge University Press

5.1 NP = [MET [NUM ... N*]]

It is a binary branching system, in which a functor P takes a value a on the pro-

(170) [ Nmax DET [ Nmax _, NUM [ N i A * NO]]

The asterisk in (170) represents the possibility of having a series of stacked

calized as morphemes. As a consequence, the lexical category child in sentences

Element Category Type Denotation

DET is defined as a function of type <«e,f>,r>, «<e,t>,t>,t» operating on

(177) the [—N1] XQ\P3W[Q(W)/J>(W)]

5.2 [N°] = 0 : Strawson vs. Russell

terminological debate. The main ingredient of the EFSQ is present in the NP

the compositionally driven bottom-top interpretation it remains essentially a

(199) -,3x(Vy(dog(y) <-> y=x)Acame_in(x))

whereas the analysis of Nobody came in results in:

Finally, let us have a second look at at most:

(202) At most two dogs did not come in

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