111
UNIVERSAL MALE DOMINANCE: AN ETHNOLOGICAL ILLUSION
Karla O. Poewe
THE INFLUENCE OF TWO PARADIGMS
Despite the fact that positivism and
dialectical materialism have each undergone
considerable change (even merging as in the
prevailing positivistic "Marxism"), certain
basic principles continue to keep the two
paradigms distinct.
As is well known, according to Engels, (who
is more systematic than Marx in this issue and
sometimes questionably rigid), dialectics is the
science of interconnections. It is therefore
postulated that social and natural systems are
based on relations of interdependence. The con-
sequent structures are not simply products of
the mind (in the sense of theoretical abstrac-
tion which model a separate reality), they are
real material structures or regularities in nature
[ 1 ]. Both thought and nature are governed by
dialectical movement. Consequently, their com-
mon structure can be understood only through
conceptualization of those dialectical relations
that determine it, not through its transient sur-
face form. Engels, who in this respect took his
cues from Hegel, argued that three 'laws' con-
stitute dialectics: the transformation of quan-
tity into quality and vice versa, the interpenetra-
tion of opposites, and the negation of the nega-
tion [2].
In their concern with the unity of opposites,
with process, and with the distinction between
basic process and appearance, or inner connec-
Karla O. Poewe is Assistant Professor and Chairperson of
Anthropology at the University of Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada.
0 3 0 4 - 4 0 9 2 / 8 0 / 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 / $ 02.25 9 1980 Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company
tion and surface manifestation, critical-radical
dialectical thinkers are starkly opposed to
positivists. Positivists have formulated their
own criteria to determine what kinds of con-
tents in our statements about the world deserve
the name of knowledge [3]. In contrast with
dialectics, the positivistic rule of phenomenal-
ism states that there is no real difference
between "essence" and "phenomenon."
Scientists are entitled to record only that
which is actually manifested in experience and
subject to experimental control, all the rest is
metaphysics. Positivists eschewed "negativism."
To be positive meant that any insight for-
mulated in general terms should be based on
the "certainties" of science. Finally, according
to a certain definition of "nominalism",
generalizations can refer only to individual con-
crete objects [4]. Interconnections occur in the
realm of abstraction not reality. This method-
ological stance, which calls upon us to opera-
tionalize concepts, to collect individual observ-
able facts, to order, classify, and correlate these
with one another in order to predict future
trends, is to dialectical thinkers no more than
trading in illusions.
The distinction between these two paradigms
is important to us because in the study of
male-female relations the positivistic perspec-
tive has hardened. Even where researchers have
borrowed from dialectics, they have borrowed
the notion of opposites without that of inter-
penetration and process.
This borrowing of dualism, without the con-
straints of a dialectical attitude, has had two
112
detrimental consequences for the study of
women. First, it has conceived men and women
as opposed types each associated with inherent
characteristics which remain ever the same. The
habit of combining the male aspect of a subjec-
tive duality with the ahistorical and universal
quality of dominance, has channeled studies
about male-female relations into a male dom-
inated cul-de-sac. It is but a small step to pro-
ject male dominance, associated under capital-
ism with the ascendancy of the public over the
domestic domain, onto the rest of the social
world. Second, men and women, treated as
rigidly opposed and mutually exclusive abstrac-
tions (reifications), are associated by analogy
with other simplistic structural and ahistorical
oppositions such as culture/nature [5], public/
domestic [ 6 ], prestige/generative power [ 7 ].
Conceptual dichotomization is dangerous be-
cause under its influence positivists tend to
treat their subject matter as "either, or" phen-
omena; if women are "gifts," they cannot also
be actors, men are "actors." In contrast,dialect-
ical thinkers treat their subject matter as "this
and that" phenomena; "both sexes then take
on actor and enabling gift roles at some point
in life" [8].
It is important to identify the influence of
these two competing paradigms on our theories
precisely because we are not involved in a mere
battle of the sexes, as Lancaster [9] jocularly
suggests in his reply to Poewe [ 10]. The im-
portant question for anthropologists is whether
or not the recognition that men and women
may have separate and different interests, ideol-
ogies, and powers will affect future theorizing.
Setting aside a section in texts devoted to male-
female issues does not resolve the tension in our
explanatory theories. When we talk about
personality among pastoralists, for example, do
we mean that of men, women, or both? Do we
distort ethnoscientific explanations of other
peoples when we translate their bisexual kin
categories into our predominantly unisexual
ones? No one of my generation, who has given
some thought to the nature of male-female rela-
tions, can rest easy without answers to these
and other related questions [ 11 ].
THE THEORETICAL DEMISE OF WOMEN
Matriarchies died with the demise of the
theory of unilineal evolution and the assign-
ment of dialectical thought to the realm of
metaphysics [12]. Belief in patriarchies lingers
on [ 13 ]. Anthropologists, who are unconvinced
by the universality of male dominance,
cautiously look at matrilineal societies for
alternatives to male domination. But if there
was hope of finding in matriliny women who
function as ]ural persons with title to property,
power to make decisions, and ability to manage
resources, this hope was easily extinguished. To
this day, we take to the field androcentric
frameworks and male egos.
The potential existence of non-dominated
women in matrilineal societies has been ignored
for several other reasons. First, the irrelevance
of women as political figures, strategists, and
decision-makers was assured by Levi-Strauss'
[14] theory which envisioned the formation of
primitive societies from the exchange of women
among groups of men. Second, Schneider [ 15 ]
drew attention to the fact that, since in-
heritance and succession in matrilineal societies
supposedly passed from mother's brother to
sister's son, women played secondary decision-
making roles even in matrilineal societies. While
women look after children, he argued, men
have final authority over women and children.
Third, based on tenuous research of non-
human primate behavior, Fox legitimized the
assumption of universal male control by assum-
ing that "men usually exercise control" [16].
Of his four basic principles only one deals with
women; they reproduce. Three define men
who copulate, politick, and exchange.
Finally, having analytically robbed women
of authority, Schlegel [ 17] expounded a last-
gasp theory which argued that in certain set-
tings women are at least autonomous if not
equivalent to men. According to Schlegel's

theory, provided the obligations and fights of
husbands and brothers are about equal, women
have the option of playing off one set of males
against the other, thereby assuring their sense
of autonomy.
All these theories construct positions of
secondary status for women. In my own re-
search among the matrilineal peoples of
Luapula (Zambia), however, I observed that
women played a central role in the economic
and political affairs of the society. Consequent-
ly, I am persuaded that the time has come once
more to examine the assumption of male
dominance.
Whether recently or in the past, only a few
social scientists have raised significant ques-
tions about the differential power and control
of the sexes. Most have not, however, aban-
doned the notion of universal sexual asym-
metry. Consequently, the accounts to be
probed in the following pages, can be loosely
classified into two major schools of thought:
those who uphold universal male dominance,
and those who reject it. The former predom-
inantly subscribe to the tenets of positivism or
empiricism, the latter to dialectical inquiry in
what can be broadly understood as the Marxist
tradition.
POSITIVISM: UPHOLDERS OF UNIVERSAL MALE
DOMINANCE
Several theoretical frameworks reflecting
vested interests underpin the assumption of
pervasive male dominance. For example, some
anthropologists who follow the rationalist tradi-
tion channel their data through a Cartesian
paradigm which deduces social structures from
a limited number of principles [ 18 ]. Since
these principles are universal, they are biolog-
ically founded and stand for a truth that is im-
mutable. Acceptable reality is reality guided by
the assumptions, the rest is unspeakable.
Other anthropologists, one might call them
tactical empiricists, are uncomfortable with de-
ductions from human behavioral universals.
113
These researchers turned to the study of simple
band societies for confirmation 6f male dom-
inance. Despite the fact that the results have
been ambiguous [ 19 ], in a recent paper Divale
and Harris [20] claimed to have demonstrated
the universality of male supremacy.
Finally, some anthropologists are variationists.
These researchers, often women, accept uni-
versal sexual asymmetry, but argue that power
and oppression of women vary in different
social settings. By accepting the notion that
anything men do is of greater value, they fail to
recognize that women may have interests and
ideologies different than those of men [21 ].
Rosaldo states her thesis as follows: "Women
may be important, powerful, and influential,
but it seems that, relative to men of their age
and social status, women everywhere lack
generally recognized and culturally valued
authority" [22]. This thesis, and the sub-
ordinate conditions of women, is explained in
terms of a coarse "structural model" based on
the assumed universal-dualistic distinction
between domestic and public spheres of activ-
ities [23].
CRITIQUE OF THE MALE SUPREMACY COMPLEX
In an attempt to reinterpret the origin, devel-
opment, and nature of the human race, Morgan
observes:
A very high proportian o f the thinking on these topics is
androcentric (male-centered) in the same way as pre-
Copernican thinking was geocentric. It's just as hard for
man to break the habit o f thinking o f himself as central to
the species as it was to break the habit of thinking o f him-
self as central to the Universe [24].
It is important to see Divale's and Harris'
proof of pervasive male supremacy in context.
Their explanation is backed by positivistic and
hierarchical thought which is constrained to see
men as central to society and in control of both
women and resources. Break their male centric-
ity and a quite different interpretation emerges.
Divale and Harris argue that evidence of the
male supremacy complex consists of "asym-
114
metrical frequencies of sex-linked practices and
beliefs" [25]. Specifically, four institutions oc-
cur in predominantly male-centered form:
(1) post-marital residence and descent rules,
(2) marriage forms, (3) brideprice, and
(4) political institutions and warfare [26].
Divale and Harris are wrong on several
grounds. First, they are wrong in their sugges-
tion that patrilocality, polygyny, brideprice,
and political institutions are male-centered
social formations [27]. Guided by a dualistic
conception of men and women, Divale and
Harris fell into the positivistic trap of cross-
culturally correlating men with unitary institu-
tions that are assumed to show male predilec-
tions. In contrast, the dialectical interpretation
is that institutions are neither male- nor female-
centered. Rather, given diverse political econ-
omies (based on the reciprocal relationship
between ideologies and institutions) different
male-female interaction patterns occur. It is,
therefore, necessary to study particular
societies in order to determine the nature of
these interaction pattems.
Second, subject to the positivistic rule of
radical empiricism which insists that the world
we know is a collection of individual and con-
crete observable facts, Divale and Harris iden-
tify discrete residential patterns, one for each
society. Individual residential patterns are
counted, interpreted as occurring most frequent-
ly in male-centered form, and seen as support-
ing the male supremacy pattern. In the process
Divale and Harris commit three errors. They
overlook the contextual and logical relation-
ship between residence and descent. They are
insensitive to the possibility that residential pat-
terns, treated as individual units, are subject to
misclassification [28]. Finally, they ignore the
fact that residential patterns are usually dyna-
mic and cannot be fixed identities.
Regarding residence and descent, Divale and
Harris [29] argue that evidence for male dom-
inance is strengthened by "two remarkable
facts:" first, by the more frequent occurren'ce
of avunculocality than matrilocality in matri-
lineal societies; and second, by the non-
occurrence of the opposite to avunculocality,
namely, amitalocality in matrilineal societies.
To live amitalocally in a matrilineal society
where succession and inheritance pass from MB
to ZS is unsound economics. Neither husband
nor wife stand to benefit from this
arrangement.
In a matrilineal society where MBD is ideol-
ogically equated with FZD, it would be hard to
determine whether residence should be called
avunculocal, amitalocal, patrilocal or matrilocal.
To live with the wife's MB, in this instance,
would also mean living with the husband's F,
and to live with the wife's FZ would mean liv-
ing with the husband's M.
There is nothing to prevent a man, in a matri-
lineal society, from taking his wife to live with
him near his mother. This form of residence is
frequently termed virilocality or patrilocality
on the assumption that the groom or the
groom's father is the pivotal figure. In Luapula,
this form of matrilocality (with HM) was, in
fact, a pragmatic alternative for some sons of
wealthy mothers. The frequent occurrence in
matriliny of avunculocality or, for that matter,
patrilocality may be spurious.
Misclassification is not only possible, actual
examples are already on record. Amitalocality
was one residential option among the patrilineal
Lovedu. After a girl's marriage to her FZ or her
FZS, the couple or bride resided amitalocally.
Since the bride's FZ husband, being a man, was
considered the pivotal figure on the assumption
that in patrilineal societies male ego's father is
dominant, this residence was misclassified as
patrilocality and male ego was said to have mar-
ried his MBD [30].
Lovedu women acquire and control property
[31 ]. It is they who have the right, enforceable
by law, to daughters-in-law. Whether the son or
the woman herself marries her daughter-in-law,
the latter resides amitalocally because the
mother-in-law has rights to her services.
The instance of the Lovedu [32] as that of
the Nuer [33] underlines other misperceptions

in the thought of Divale and Harris. The
Lovedu and Nuer have several residential pat-
terns. It is, therefore, misleading to classify a
society on the basis of only one residential
form. The controversy over residence among
band and tribal societies has raged for some
time. Indeed, few researchers feel comfortable
with classifications of societies based on, for all
practical purposes, one residential pattern [34].
These cases also demonstrate that it is wrong
to assume that patrilineal descent and patrilocal
residence are necessarily male-centered forms
[35]. Okonjo [36] argues that most West
African societies are patrilineal, polygynous,
and patrilocal but were nevertheless character-
ized by dual-sex systems in which a female
hierarchy paralleled a male hierarchy. "Each
sex managed its own affairs and had its own
kinship instiutions, age grades, and secret and
title societies" [37]. Van Allen equally em-
phasized that women's associations in West
African societies articulated women's interest
as opposed to those of men [38].
In my own work, I observed another popular
form of residence. A husband frequently took
his wife to live, specifically, with his sister be-
cause the latter, who usually headed an in-
dependent matricentric unit or household
lineage, had cultivated and managed several
fields and was able to give economic backing to
marital units of her siblings. Given the profes-
sionally established androcentric perspective,
this form of residence is often called virilocality,
or even patrilocality, because the ownership
and managerial roles of women are largely over-
looked [39].
Residential patterns are rarely discrete
unitary phenomena. Indeed, residence makes
sense only when considered processually, in
conjunction with the developmental cycle of in-
dividuals and households. Residence patterns
for productive young adults tend to be differ-
ent from those of retired adults, and so forth.
Contrary to Divale and Harris [40] in many
matrilineal societies couples may begin their
life in matrilineal settings, but under conditions
115
of contact with the industrial-market system,
pass through a patrilocal phase and revert to
matrilocality upon retirement, loss of capital,
or underdevelopment [41 ]. Far from being
rigidly male dominated, male-female interac-
tion undergoes subtle adjustments in power
structure through the course of a marriage.
Polygyny, which Divale and Harris [42] con-
sider a male-centered arrangement, is said to oc-
cur 141 times more frequently than polyandry.
It is, therefore, taken to support the assump-
tion of pervasive male dominance. Again, this
kind of counting assumes one marriage form
per society. In actuality most societies display
several forms of marriage [43 ].
Not only do most societies practice several
forms of marriage, but family may also be mis-
classified. Cunnison discusses primarily bilateral
families and polygynous unions [44]. In actual
fact families in Luapula may be nuclear,
polygynous, polyandrous, bilateral or matri-
lateral extended. The most common arrange-
ment, however, is a polygynous-polyandrous,
or better, a gynandrous association. A man may
have several "wives" in different villages along
the valley, while a woman has several visiting
"husbands" [45 ].
More importantly, it can be argued that
polygyny is not symptomatic male dominance
(except as an ideological justification); rather,
it is about maximization of reproduction. In
the history of the species maximization of
reproduction surely had adaptive advantages.
No matter the frequency of sexual intercourse
in polyandrous unions, once the woman is
pregnant it will take nine months to produce
offspring. In polygynous unions all women may
be pregnant at the same time.
Polygyny and female infanticide are signif-
icantly related in warring band societies for the
following reasons which have, however, to do
with population control, not with male
supremacy: (a) polygyny maximizes reproduc-
tion (of males and females); (b) female in-
fanticide eliminates "excessive" numbers of
females; (c) hence polygyny and female in-
116
fanticide maximize the reproduction of males;
(d) female infanticide, maximization of male
reproduction, and warfare ensure the survival
of band societies in hostile environments at the
same time that they require regulate population
growth. A good percentage of men are killed in
warfare. (e) Population growth is regulated by
killing females as infants to reduce reproduc-
tion, and by killing males as adults to ensure
defense.
We now know that in most band and horti-
cultural societies women produce most of the
food and services for themselves, their off-
spring, and their husbands [46]. Consequently,
Divale and Harris are wrong when they argue
that in female-centered societies the occurrence
of polyandry rather than polygyny would be
more frequent. In poor settings, permanent
polyandry is logically disadvantageous to
women because one woman would have to pro-
vide food and services for offspring as well as
for several husbands (in patrilinealpolyandries)
or brothers (in matrilineal polyandries).
Servicing adult males is very demanding in un-
developed areas [47].
Divale and Harris argue that the non-
existence of a logical opposite to brideprice
further confirms the absence of female-
centeredness. According to them, dowry is not
the logical opposite to brideprice (it is not
groomprice) because dowry implies "compensa-
tion for the cost of maintaining an economical-
ly burdensome woman" [48]. The fact that
dowry and brideprice occur in different sorts of
ecological, social, structural, and economic set-
tings has seemingly escaped Divale and Harris.
Goody, not to mention others, had already
pointed to the correlations between: (a) plough
agriculture, private land ownership, and male
farming, and (b) shifting cultivation, communal
land ownership, and female farming [49].
I wish to add the following suggestions:
under conditions (a), the value o f women is in-
creased by female fertility, a dowry (which
does constitute groomprice), and/or groom
service, i.e., the rights of the groom and his kin
to the labor (as well as the reproductive power)
of his wife.
In contrast, under conditions (b), the value
o f men is increased by male fertility, brideprice,
and/or brideservice, i.e., the rights of the bride
and her kin to the labor power (as well as the
reproductive power) of her husband. In the ap-
propriate ecological-economic settings, there-
fore, groomprice is the logical opposite to
brideprice.
Divale and Harris exemplify positivistic
thought. The logical course of their explanation
is from natural constraint to behavioral practice
to cultural institution [50]. Each segment in
this series is a separate analytical realm and all
analytical realms are represented by aggregate
individual facts. If the right circumstances are
chosen, such as food scarcity and overpopula-
tion, men spring into action as they conduct
war, and culture codifies this action as male
dominance. Explanations are unidirectional,
from biology to culture, and unidimensional, a
matter of constraint. To understand male
dominance, the argument is referred back a seg-
ment in the "chain of effect" to behavioral
practice and from there to natural constraints
[51].
THE DIALECTICAL REJECTION OF UNIVERSAL
MALE DOMINANCE
Those who reject the universality of male
dominance have generally worked with a
paradigm that values the use of a dialectical
imagination [ 52 ]. Specifically, two theoretical
frameworks, unilineal evolution and Marxism
have been applied to the problem of female
power and subjugation [53].
Early unilineal evolutionists such as
Bachofen argued that male predominance was a
relatively recent development in the history of
mankind preceded by an era of female dominion
(matriarchies). According to Bachofen, out of
the first era of unregulated sexual intercourse
(female substance) there rose the Demetrian
stage of matrimonial matriarchy (female

spirituality) followed, finally, by patriarchy or
the ascendancy of idea and spirit over substance.
The argument is more complex, however, than
that based on the gross dichotomy between
either nature (i.e., female sensuality) or culture
(i.e,, the ascendancy of idea and restraint).
If Bachofen did not intend a simple nature-
culture opposition, what did he mean by
female substance, female spirituality, and
patriarchy? I suggest that he is describing the
process of the emergence of the family as a
socioeconomic institution negating tribal and
clan organization. The latter is founded on com-
munal relationships, while family, in opposition
to them, is based on individual relations [54].
Female substance is simply the dominant
symbol which stands for multi-dimensional
identification of oneself with others [ 55 ]. But
more than this, the identification is regarded as
a material reality, not an abstraction. It is an
identification in flesh, bone, and blood. Kinship
is conceptualized substance, a normative image,
not nature.
Makarius, and Poewe and Lovell have shown
that the tribal notion of kinship "cannot be re-
duced to a pure, formal, genealogical relation-
ship" [56]. It cannot be reduced to parent-
child relationships, or reified as absolute gender
distinctions [ 57 ].
It is only in civilization and through the identification of in-
dividual family relations with biological relations that kin-
ship tends to be regarded as a purely biological relation,
based on common descent [58].
To the extent that family emerges at all in a
tribal or clan-based system, it is initially
secondary and, like descent groups, ancestor-
focused [59]. Given that the system is based on
matfi-clans, we find here the meaning of
Bachofen's matrimonial matriarchy or female
spirituality. The latter refers to a matrimonial
system still based on dominant female symbols,
as occurs for example, in matrilineal Luapula
and other matrilineal societies [60].
The notion that kinship represents c o m m o n
identity as shared substance and that shared
117
substance is associated with norms which call
for collective action, exemplifies Engels' in-
sistence that mental and material structures are
united through the mediation of behavior. The
emergence of the nuclear family as an economic
institution is also the process of alienation, of
the separation of spirit from substance, of goal
from means. The latter is a recurrent theme in
German thought which has, through Marx's
dialectical reasoning and Weber's ideal
types, deeply, although unreflectively, in-
fluenced American thinking.
Weber always warned against "falschen
Begriffsrealismus" (false conceptual realism or
reification). For him no institution ever existed
"except inasmuch as those concerned subjec-
tively accept their uniting function" [61].
Unfortunately his warning went unheeded, for
his ideal types were turned into biological
absolutes.
In the Marxist tradition, it is necessary to
trace the root of the "gradual enslavement of
women." The fact that unilineal evolution, or
the view that modernization may be largely
detrimental to sexual equality is unpopular [62],
should not blind us to the real contribution of
Marxism in this respect, namely, the discussion
of the transition from conditions of female pre-
dominance to those of male predominance.
Regarding the transition from the matriarchal
to the present stage (from pairing marriage
based on reciprocal exchange in communal
society to monogamy based on commodity ex-
change in class society), Leacock explains
Engels' position as follows:
... the division of labor and development of commodity pro-
duction enabled new wealth in the form of slaves and herds
to be accumulated by single individuals, thereby leading to a
conflict between the family and the gens. Since m e n o w n e d
the instruments of labor ... conflict between family and
gens took the form of a conflict between the opposing prin-
ciples of father right and mother right. 'As wealth increased
it made the man's position in the family more important
than the woman's, and ... created an impulse to exploit this
strengthened position in order to overthrow, in favor of his
children, the traditional order of inheritance' [63].
While we no longer talk of a world historical
118
defeat of the female sex, the development of
conflicts between nuclear families and (matri)
clans in the context of the industrial-market
system is well recorded in the ethnographic
literature [64].
In Luapula, Zambia, for example, these con-
flicts are the result of a central structural contra-
diction inherent in matriliny, namely, the contra-
diction between relations of production which
are individualistic in nature and distribution
processes which involve social relationships that
are communalistic in character [65]. The contra-
diction results primarily from matrilineal in-
heritance practices which ensure that wealth ac-
crues to the lineage only. In the market-
industrial context, conflicts are vitiated because
matrilineal inheritance limits cooperation
among nuclear family members and discourages
investment in family enterprises [66]. These
conflicts are so real, that business-minded
Luapulans, especially men, join Protestant in-
stitutions and use Protestant ideologies in an ef-
fort to justify and further their new commer-
cial interests - interests which run contrary to
matrilineal practices largely supported by
women [67]. When Luapula men have com-
pleted the transition to nuclear families, a pro-
cess which they initiated despite women's re-
sistance, they will have downgraded the status
of females.
Whatever the shortcomings of past analyses
that reject universal sexual asymmetry, three
notions remain valid. First, matriarchy (or
generally matricentricity) is associated with un-
hampered reproduction. The association im-
plies that there are two situations which free
women from the oppression of pregnancy:
those in which women are free to reproduce or
abort at will without concern for paternity or
legitimacy (conditions which prevail in matri-
lineal societies), or situations where they are
free to use artificial birth control. Second,
matriliny is associated with a mode of produc-
tion different from that of private ownership
and capitalism. Third, matricentricity (or matri-
lineality) is associated with women who are
jura1 persons - in control of power, authority,
and economic resources [68 ].
The favorable position enjoyed by Luapula
women with reference to control over resources
owes much to three factors: female control
over reproduction, female control over critical
resources, and a matrilineal ideology reinforcing
the cultural centrality of women. Variables of
ideology, behavior vis-a-vis resources, and
vested interest, which illuminates the intercon-
nection between the first two, will loom large
in the heuristic framework presented later.
Vested interests of women differ from those of
men in any society, but especially in societies
where the division of labor is based primarily
on sex [69]. Correlatively, female ideologies
and representations of the world differ from
those of men, yet only now are they being
systematically understood [70].
In some matrilineal societies we are still able
to witness women in control of their resources
and daily lives. Under the combined pressures
of the market system, government policies, and
Protestant ideologies, however, men increasing-
ly create and control nuclear families and thus
women. The marvel of matriliny, as ideology
and practice, is that it has for so long persisted
in preventing the domination of one sex by the
other only to have its axial significance ignored
in Western civilization [71 ].
THE DANGERS OF DUALISM: CAPITALISM-
SOCIALISM; DIONYSIAN-APOLLON IAN;
PATRI LINY-MATRI LINY; MAN-WOMAN
In a recent study, Mitzman points out that a
dual pattern was discernible in German thought
from Schiller to Max Weber [72]. In a rapidly
industrializing Germany, the dualism, repre-
sented by two highly valued, but endangered,
personality types, expressed the yearnings for
the preservation of communalism and entre-
preneurialism, respectively.
Of interest to this discussion, because it
should arouse our suspicion, is, the fact that the
two personality types parallel two social

systems and political styles not merely among
humans but now also among non-human
primates [73]. The two ideal personality types,
to be preserved from bureaucratic stultification,
are of course the Apollonian and Dionysian.
The Apollonian personality is characterized as
seeking internal peace, the Dionysian, mastery
of subject over object [74]. In the first spirit is
immanent, in the second it is projected beyond
the universe; the first is associated with
matriliny, the second with patriliny [75].
In patrilineal systems, epitomized by social
control, the individual is kept "in line" by striv-
ing for an infinitely regressive, outwardly pro-
jected goal. Reaching for an abstract goal con-
trois behavior because a person is required to
cultivate self-discipline and will-power as means
to an end. Here, ostensibly, are the makings of
the Dionysian personality, of men.
In matrilineal systems, the individual is social-
ly integrated, continually accommodating his
needs to those of kin and neighbor. Here the
social context delimits the scope of the in-
dividual will and fulfills spiritual and material
needs [76]. Individual behavior is governed by
norms which are embodied, shared, and acted
out by those who are part of the community.
Consequently, the individual learns to cultivate
awareness of the needs and desires of others.
We have here the makings of the Apollonian
personality and, seemingly, of women.
Why discuss these two alternative social sys-
tems and personality types? Because it is neces-
sary to nullify the overly simplistic, if fashion-
able, literal and universal association ot women
with nature and men with culture. Chodorow's
proposition [77], that in any given society,
feminine personality comes to define itself in
relation to other people (because it is Apollo-
nian) more than masculine personality does
(because it is Dionysian), is typically, and in-
excusably naive.
The point is not that women are universally
less "individuated" than men and have more
"flexible ego boundaries." Rather, the point is
that both men and women in different societies
exemplify personality characteristics which are
119
more or less in accordance with the dominant
values embodied in the cultural system. In
other words, some societies are based on male
dominance, others are not.
A male idiom signifies Western hierarchical
and corporate structures [78]; a female idiom
pervades Western domesticity [79]. The
Western male idiom is nothing other than the
Dionysian personality; but to talk about an
idiom or ideology is not the same as talking
about biology. The point is, certain structural
settings select for the expression of compatible
personality traits. Both men and women, when
they participate in that setting, assume the re-
quired personality characteristics. If this were
not so, we would have to argue that all socialist-
ic or matrilineal societies are peopled with
women, capitalistic or patrilineal ones with
men. It is absurd, therefore, to insist that men
who dominate our corporate economic world
and who display Dionysian traits because they
are driven to succeed in the system are, there-
fore, significantly different in their biopsychol-
ogical make-up from all women across the
globe and biopsychologically similar to all other
men. All one can claim to have found are two
ideal typical conceptual systems, capitalistic
and socialistic and, not surprisingly, two corre-
sponding conceptualized personality types
[80]. We cannot claim that only these two
types correspond to reality, least of all that
they are biologically determined. The sole
biologically determined phenomenon in all
this would appear to be our ability to con-
ceptualize.
CONCLUSION: SEXUAL INTERACTION PATTERNS
I shall now attempt to formulate the basic
problem concerning men and women, and pro-
pose a preliminary, even if, at the moment, a
somewhat mechanistic analytical framework, in
which to approach it. To this end, my task will
be to establish the existence of a variety of
male-female interaction patterns, the problem
is to explain variations in male-female power
distribution.
120

Social systems are in constant states of flux and/or different resources? Who controls
owing both to the interaction, and changing society's major or critical resources? Are re-
societal images, of men and women [81]. sources controlled by women important to the
People develop discrete vested interests during overall economy? Where control of resources is
the course of their activities in varying socio- not based on sex, or where all resources are con-
economic settings. Their interests are usually trolled by one sex, the variable is non-dif-
centered around concerns of maintaining ferentiated (-). Behavioral non-differentiation
security and aspiring to a better life, as cultural- (-) means one of two things. On the one hand,
ly defined. Depending on their interests, in- it refers to the fact that tasks are interchange-
dividuals either continue to adhere to dom- able and sex is totally irrelevant. On the other
inant behavior patterns and ideologies, or they hand, it means that one sex controls all critical
adopt counterpoint ideologies to justify resources; should members of the opposite sex
divergent interest and behavior patterns. In want access to resources, they would have to as-
some societies counterpoint ideologies remain sume the behavior pattern of those in control.
disguised and express themselves only through Interest differentiation refers to strategies of
"discrete and carefully veiled acts of rebellion" maintaining or gaining advantage. The follow-
[821. ing questions will have to be answered. In situa-
Given three major variables, ideology, inte- tions involving problems about resources or in-
rests, and behavior with respect to resources, stitutions, do men and women advocate similar
and two values for each variable, sexual dif- or different solutions? Do the sexes use similar
ferentiation (+) and non-differentiation (-), or different strategies for mobilization to pro-
eight simple models of male-female interaction tect their respective interests? If men and
are possible. Rogers uses two variables [83], women use similar strategies, the variable is non-
ideology and behavior, with the above two differentiated (-). When different strategies are
values and consequently discusses four logical used by each sex, the variable is differentiated (+).
possibilities. The eight varieties of sexual inter- Ideological differentiation presents a more
action are shown in Table I. complex problem. First, it refers to the fact that
Behavioral differentiation (+) shall mean that males and females may view themselves as
each sex assumes different roles, participates in fundamentally different from each other, as
different activities, and controls different re- separate entities with different capabilities.
sources. The following questions require Their views of one another may or may not be
answers. Do men and women control separate in agreement. Men may see themselves as re-
sponsible and capable (+) but view women in
the opposite light (-). Alternatively, women
TABLE I
may see both themselves and men as incapable
Sexual Interaction Patterns
and irresponsible (-). A number of permuta-
tions are possible. (See Table II). Dwyer calls
Ideology Interests Behavior these evaluative statements by the sexes of
1, B - - sexual non-differentiation
themselves and one another sexual ideologies
2~ -- - + dominance-dependence [84].
3, -- + + recipro cal-dependence Second, ideological differentiation refers to
4. + + + sexual-parallelism
the fact that each sex may have its own values,
5~ + - dominance-antagonism
6. + - + mythical-domination goals, and perception of the universe. Ideol-
7. + + - separate social systems, one ogical differentiation in Table I refers to this
for each sex latter sense.
8. + - - warring of the sexes
Two kinds of questions require answers. On
 121

TABLE II value the same things, ideology is non-

differentiated (-).
Interaction Pattern, Ideology, and Differentiation
The question regarding status assignment and
Interaction Ideological status Male Sexual mutual evaluation of the sexes is vital. We must
pattern as seen by dominance antagonism know what status men assign both themselves
men (M) and yes (+) yes (+) and women, and what status women assign
w o m e n (W) no (-) no (-)
both themselves and men. In other words, in-
1. M-M+W+ - herent in dominant ideologies are sexual ideol-
W-M +W+ ogies, and the combination of the two, often
2. M-M+W- +
W-M + W - (actual)
the contradiction between them, determines
3. M-M+W- + + both the presence or absence of sexual antagon-
W-M + W + (symbolic) (male-female) ism and the nature of domination.
4. M-M+W+ - +
With respect to male dominance, some obvi-
W-M -W + (male)
5. M-M +W- + + ous expectations follow. Whenever women are
W-M - W - (actual) (female) assigned low status by men and/or by them-
6. M-M +W- + selves, some form of male dominance occurs.
W-M + W - (mythical)
The dominance, however, may be actual, myth-
The symbols read, men see men as capable (+) and w o m e n as ical but publicly accepted by both sexes [86],
capable (+); w o m e n see men as capable (+) and w o m e n as or symbolic but publicly rejected by women
capable (+).
[87] (see Table II). A balance of power
between the sexes occurs in three instances, in
systems without sexual dominance and in sys-
the one hand, we need to know what status the tems where male dominance is mythical or sym-
dominant ideology assigns men and women. On bolic. Where male dominance is symbolic it
the other hand, we must determine whether or means that men control ritual and ancestor
not men and women accept the status assign- cults, while women tend to be in charge of
ment and, therefore, the dominant ideology. economic production [88]. In contrast, where
Whether men and women have separate ideol- male dominance is mythical, neither men nor
ogies is relatively easy to discover and answer. women exclusively control symbolic resources,
Where ideological differentiation occurs, one or Rather women have actual power, but both
the other sex may follow a counterpoint to the sexes behave in public as i f men made the final
dominant ideology. Under such circumstances, decisions [89].
disagreement is likely regarding the relative Of eight possible interaction patterns, six are
value of particular resources. Women may con- known to exist. Numbers seven and eight are
sider resources controlled by men as unim- 9hypothetical. Absence of sexual differentiation
portant, while men may hold the opposite valua- has been found in parts of Southeast Asia and
tion. Alternatively, male resources may be the West Indies. Dominance-dependence
publicly recognized as important by both sexes generally depicts male-female interaction in
but privately belittled by them. Differentiation Westem industrial societies. Reciprocal-
is difficult to determine in those instances dependence describes male-female dynamics of
where on the whole both sexes adhere to a the Western New Guinea Highlands [90].
dominant ideology, but where one sex is con- Sexual parallelism is found not only in Luapula,
strained to practice an informal or magical ver- Zambia but also in parts of West Africa and, for
sion of it [85 ]. For the sake of simplicity, when that matter, among 19th century Shaker com-
both sexes conform to the tenets of the same munities [91 ]. Dominance-antagonism de-
dominant ideology, or when men and women scribes sexual ideologies and interaction pat-
122
terns in Islamicized Morocco [92]. Finally,
mythical-domination summarizes the sexual
politics of peasant communities [93 ].
Women share equal status and power with
men (as in 1, Table I), where the rate of inter-
changeability of tasks is high. Not only do men
and women perform the same tasks in a work
pattern that brings them together, but they
share the same interests and see one another as
equal [94]. Male-female relations are
dominance-dependent (as in 2, Table I) when
the critical values, goals, and interests of the
sexes are the same, but when one of the sexes,
usually men, control most of the major re-
sources needed to realize valued goals. Male-
female relations are reciprocally-dependent (as
in 3) when the critical values are shared, but
when the means available to the sexes, and the
specific interests paralleling these means,
diverge in significant ways; in other words,
when one of the sexes produces those critical
products which the other sex needs for ex-
change and public validation of his personal
achievements and his family's prominence [95].
In contrast, male-female relations are sexually
parallel (as in 4) when their values, goals, and
interests are distinct, as they are in Luapula,
and when each sex independently owns and
manages largely separate and distinct resources
in order to achieve valued ends [96].
The fifth interaction pattern found predom-
inantly in the Islamicized world is fascinating
for several reasons. Secluded women frequently
own no resources except those which they
pilfer from husbands and convert into valuables.
The latter are usually hidden. Nevertheless,
men and women adhere to the same dominant
religious ideology. While both sexes agree in
their devaluation of women, they disagree in
their evaluation of men. The latter generally see
themselves as able to acquire virtues of self-
control and responsibility. Women, however,
view men as uncontrolled, self-indulgent, and
irresponsible [97 ]. Not unexpectedly, both
sexes are conservative in the strategies they fol-
low to realize their interests. While men largely
advocate maintenance of the status quo,
women advocate the application of more
stringent controls on men.. To the extent, there-
fore, that change is desired at all, it is of a reac-
tionary nature.
According to Rogers, mythical-domination
(as in 6) depicts those peasant situations where
women, who control domestic resources,
manage all there is to control in that setting.
Publicly women pay lip-service to male domina-
tion, privately they decide how resources are to
be deployed. Women and men maintain the
myth of male dominance because it gives men
the "appearance of power and control over all
sectors of village life, while at the same time giv-
ing to the former [women] actual power over
those sectors of life in the community which
may be controlled by villagers" [98].
Now a word about the remaining two
hypothetical interaction patterns. Where the
sexes want different things (where their ideol-
ogies and interests are discrete), but where both
control the same resources, separate social sys-
tems for each sex must result (as in 7). Canada
apparently has a Woman's Independent
Separatist Party (WISP) whose primary objec-
tive it is to form a separate country tailored to
the cultural and economic needs of women.
Finally, where women have distinct and
separate ideologies, but where the interests
they have in controlling and managing re-
sources resemble those of men (as in 8), war
between the sexes is likely.
Our obsession with dichotomies and our
need to ground explanations in biology have
channeled studies about male-female relations
into a male dominated cul-de-sac. The frame-
work presented here is not ultimate. Its pur-
pose is to direct our attention to the diversity
of existing (and potential) male-female inter-
action patterns. Attention to these patterns will
help explain the subtle, typically misperceived,
relations between men and women in varying
cultural contexts.

NOTES
1 Bridget O'Laughlin, "Marxist Approaches in Anthropology,"
in Bernard J. Siegel (ed.),Annual Review o f Anthropology
(Palo Alto: Annual Review Inc., 1975), pp. 342,341-370.
2 Z.A. Jordan, The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 168,170, 171.
Jordan argues that the transformation of quantity into
quality is meant "to state an invariant connection between
the increase and decrease in quantity and the change in
quality" (as when water changes from a liquid into a solid
state at 0 degrees C). The law of the interpenetration of op-
posites "states that the world is full of contradictions in so
to speak corporeal forms." Finally, and simply, the first
negation of the third law stands for 'negation of the thesis,'
and 'negation of the negation' stands for synthesis. Despite
an appearance of analytical fragmentation, the emphasis is
on continual process.
3 Leszek Kolakowski, The Alienation o f Reason (Garden
City: Doubleday, 1968).
4 /bid.,p. 5.
5 Claude L~vi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures o f Kinship
(London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, second edition, 1969;
first French edition, 1949).
6 Louise Lamphere, "Strategies, Cooperation, and Conflict
Among Women in Domestic Groups," in Michelle Zimbalist
Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere (eds.), Women, Culture, and
Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974),
pp. 97-112.
7 C.S. Lancaster, "Women, Horticulture, Society in Sub-
Saharan Africa," American Anthropologist, vol. 78,no. 3
(1976), pp. 539-564.
8 Karen Sacks, "State Bias and Women's Status," American
Anthropologist, vol. 78, no. 3 (1976), pp. 567,565-569.
9 C.S. Lancaster, "Battle of the Sexes in Zambia: A Reply to
Karla Poewe," American Anthropologist, vol. 81, no. 1
(1979), pp. 117,117-119.
10 Karla O. Poewe, "Women, Horticulture, and Society in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Some Comments," American
Anthropologist, vol. 81, no. 1 (1979), p. 115.
11 Karla O. Poewe and Peter R. Lovell, "Marriage, Descent and
Kinship: on the Differential Primacy of Institutions in
Longana and Luapula" Africa (1979).
12 Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1973).
13 Steven Goldberg, The Inevitability o f Patriarchy (New York:
William Morrow and Company, 1973); William Tulio Divale
and Marvin Harris, "Population, Warfare, and the Male
Supremacist Complex," American Anthropologist, vol. 78,
no. 3 (1976), pp. 521-538.
14 L6vi-Strauss, op. cir., 1969, p. 8.
15 David M. Schneider, "Introduction: The Distinctive
Features of Matrilineal Descent Groups," in David M.
Schneider and Kathleen Gough (eds.), Matrilineal Kinship
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 1-29.
16 Robin Fox, Kinship and Marriage (Baltimore: Penguin
Books, 1967), p. 31.
17 Alice Schlegel, Male Dominance and Female Autonomy
(HRSF Press, 1972).
123
18 Ldvi-Strauss, op. cir., 1969; Schneider, op. cir., 1962; Fox,
op. cit., 1967.
19 Eleanor B. Leacock, "Matrilocality in a Simple Hunting
Economy (Montagnais-Naskapi)," Southwestern Journal o f
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20 Divale and Harris, op. cit., 1976.
21 Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere (eds.),
Woman, Culture, and Society, (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1974); Sherry B. Ortner, "Is Female to
Male as Nature Is to Culture?," ibid., pp. 67-87.
22 Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo, "Woman, Culture, and Society:
A Theoretical Overview," ibid., pp. 17, 17-42.
23 /bid., p. 35.
24 Elaine Morgan, The Descent of Woman (New York: Bantam
Books, 1972), p. 62.
25 Divale and Harris, op. cir., 1976, p. 521.
26 /bid., p. 524.
27 M.G. Bicchieri, "A Cultural Ecological Comparative Study
of Three African Foraging Societies," in David Damas (ed.),
op. cir., pp. 176, 172-179.
28 De Lepervanche, "Descent, Residence and Leadership in
the New Guinea Highlands," Oceania, vol. 38, no. 3 (1968),
pp. 163-187.
29 Divale and Harris, op. cit., 1976, p. 521.
30 George Peter Murdock, Africa: Its People and Their Culture
History (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), p. 388.
31 E.J. Krige, "Woman-Marriage, with Special Reference to the
Lovedu: Its Significance for the Definition of Marriage,"
Africa, vol. 44 (1974), pp. 11-36; J.D. Krige and E.J. Krige,
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32 ldem.
33 Kathleen Gough, "Nuer Kinship: A Re-examination," in
T.O. Beidelman (ed.), The Translation o f Culture (London:
Tavisto'ck Publications, 1971), pp. 79-121; Sacks, op. cir.,
1976, pp. 565-569.
34 de Lepervanche, op. cit., 1968, pp. 163-187; Leacock, op.
cit., 1955, pp. 31-47; June Helm, "Remarks on the
Methodology of Band Composition Analysis," in David
Damas (ed.), op. cit., pp. 212-217; Patricia Draper, "!Kun_g
Women: Contrasts in Sexual Egalitarianism in Foraging and
Sedentary Contexts," in Rayna R. Reiter (ed.), Toward an
Anthropology o f Women (New York: Monthly Review
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35 Gough, op. cir., 1971, pp. 79-121; Judith Van Allen,
" 'Sitting on a Man': Colonialism and the Lost Political
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Studies, vol. 6, no. 2 (1972), pp. 165-181.
36 Kamene Okonjo, "The Dual-Sex Political System in
Operation: Igbo Women and Community Politics in
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(eds.), Women in Africa (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1976), pp. 45, 45-58.
37 /bid., p. 47.
38 Judith Van Allen, " 'Aba Riots' or Igbo 'Women's War'?
Ideology, Stratification, and the Invisibility of Women," in
Nancy J. Hatkin and Edna G. Bay (eds.), op. cit., pp. 69,
59-85.
124
39 Ian Cunnison, The Luapula Peoples of Northern Rhodesia:
Custom and History in Tribal Society (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1959).
40 Divale and Harris, op. cit., 1976,p. 523.
41 Elizabeth Colson, The Social Consequences of
Resettlement (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1971); Karla O. Poewe, "Matriliny in the Throes of Change:
Kinship, Descent, and Marriage in Luapula, Zambia,"
Africa, vol. 48, no. 4 (1978a), pp. 353-367.
42 Divale and Harris, op. cit., 1976, p. 523.
43 Gerald D. Berreman, "Pahari Polyandry: A Comparison,"
American Anthropologist, vol. 64 (1962), pp. 61, 60-75;
Barbara C. Lewis, "Economic Activity and Marriage Among
Ivoirian Urban Women," in Alice Schlegel (ed.), Sexual
Stratification: A Cross-Cultural View (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 161-191; Karla O.
Poewe, "Religion, Matriliny, and Change: Jehovah's
Witnesses and Seventh-Day Adventists in Luapula, Zambia,"
American Ethnologist, vol. 5, no. 2 (1978b), pp. 303-321;
Audrey I. Richards, "Some Types of Family Structure
amongst the Central Bantu," in A.R. Radcliffe-Brown and
C.D. Forde (eds.), African Systems of Kinship and Marriage
(London: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp. 207-251.
44 Cunnison, op. cit., 1959, pp. 84, 89.
45 Karla O. Poewe, Matrilineal Ideology: Male-Female
Dynamics in Luapula, Zambia (London: Academic Press
for International African Institute, 1979); Poewe and
Lovell, op. cit., 1979.
46 Richard Lee and Irven DeVote (eds.), Man the Hunter
(Chicago: Aldine Press, 1968).
47 Berreman, op. cir., 1962, pp. 60-75.
48 Divale and Harris, op. cit., 1976, p. 523.
49 Jack Goody, Production and Reproduction (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 33-34.
50 Marshall Sahlins, Culture and Practical Reason (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 60.
51 Ibid., p. 61.
52 Sacks, op. cit., 1976. Jay, op. cir., 1973.
53 J.L Bachofen, Myth, Religion and Mother Right (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1967; Original: Das Mutterrecht,
Stuttgart, 1861); Frederick Engels, The Origins o f the
Family, Private Property and the State, trans. Ernest
Untermann (Chicago: Charles Kerr, 1892); Eleanor
Leacock, "Introduction," in Frederick Engels, Origins
of the Family, Private Property and the State ed. by
Eleanor Leacock (New York: International Publishers,
1972).
54 Raoul Makarius, "Ancient Society and Morgan's Kinship
TheorY' 100 Years After," Current Anthropology, vol. 18,
no. 4 (1977), pp. 709-729.
55 Poewe and Lovell, op. cit., 1979.
56 Makarius, op. cit., 1977, p. 714; Poewe and Lovell, op. cir.,
1979.
57 Ib/d.
58 Makarius, op. cir., 1977, p. 714.
59 Poewe and Lovell, op. cir., 1979.
60 1bid. ; Mac Marshall, "The Nature of Nurture," American
Ethnologist, vol. 4, no. 4 (1977), pp. 643-662; Annette B.
Weiner, Women o f Value: Men o/Renown: New
Perspectives in Trobriand Exchange (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1976).
61 W.F. Wertheim, Evolution and Revolution ,(Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books, 1974), p. 91.
62 Makarius, op. cit., 1977; Laurel Bossen, "Women in
Modernizing Societies," American Ethnologist, vol. 2, no. 4
(1975), pp. 599, 587-601.
63 Leacock, op. cit., 1972, pp.41-42.
64 Colson, op. cit., 1971; Scarlett Epstein, "Personal Capital
Formation among the Tolai of New Britain," in R. Firth
and B.S. Yamey (eds.), Capital, Saving and Credit in Peasant
Societies (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964),
pp. 53-68; Richard Salisbury, Vunamani: Economic
Transformation in a Traditional Society (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1970); Poewe, op. cit., 1979.
65 Poewe, op. cit., 1978b.
66 Emmanual Terray, "Classes and Class Consciousness in the
Abron Kingdom of Gyaman," in Maurice Bloch (ed.),
Marxist Analyses and Social Anthropology (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1975), pp. 85-135.
67 Poewe, op. cir., 1978a.
68 Nancy Tanner, "Matrffocality in Indonesia and Africa and
Among Black Americans," in Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo
and Louise Lamphere (eds.), op. cir., pp. 129-156.
69 Bolanie Awe, "The lyalode in the Traditional Yoruba
Political System," in Alice Schlegel (ed.), op. cit., 1977,
pp. 144-160.
70 Daisy Hilse Dwyer, "Ideologies of Sexual Inequalities and
Strategies for Change in Male-Female Relations," American
Ethnologist, vol. 5, no. 2 (1978), pp. 227-240; Alice
Schlegel, "Towards a Theory of Sexual Stratification," in
Alice Schlegel (ed.), op. cit., 1977, pp. 1-40.
71 Ibid.
72 Arthur Mitzman, Sociology and Estrangement (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1973); p. 6.
73 Robin Fox, "Primate Kin and Human Kinship," in Robin
Fox (ed.), Biosocial Anthropology (London: Malaby Press,
1975), pp. 9-35; Jane Beckman Lancaster, "Sex Roles in
Primate Societies," in Michael S. Teitelbaum (ed.), Sex
Differences (Garden City: Anchor Press,,1976), pp. 22-61.
74 Mitzman, op. cir., 1973, p. 12.
75 Guy E. Swanson, Religion and Regime: A Sociological
Account o f the Reformation (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1967); Fox, op. cit., 1975, pp. 22-61.
76 Mitzman, op. cit., l~J73, p. 11.
77 Nancy Chodorow, "Family Structure and Feminine
Personality," in Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and Louise
Lamphere (eds.), op. cit., pp. 43-66.
78 Margaret Hennig and Anne Jardim, The Managerial Woman
(New York: Pocket Books, 1978).
79 Chodorow, op. cit., 1974, pp. 43-66.
80 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f
Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (London: George Allen
and Unwin Ltd., 1930); Mitzman, op. cit., 1973; Swanson,
op. cir., 1967.
81 Wertheim, op. cit., 1974, p. 92.
82 Daisy Hilse Dwyer, Images and Self-Images: Male and
Female in Morocco (New York: Columbia University Press,
1978), p. 162.
83 Susan Carol Rogers, "Woman's Place: A Critical Review of
Anthropological Theory," Comparative Studies in Society
vol. 20, no. 1 (1978), pp. 154,123-162.

84 Dwyer, op. cir., 1978.
85 Fatima Mernissi, Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics
in a Modern Muslim Society (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1975).
86 Susan Carol Rogers, "Female Forms of Power and the
Myth of Male Dominance: A Model of Female/Male Inter-
action in Peasant Society," American Ethnologist, vol. 2,
no. 4 (1975), pp. 727-756.
87 Marilyn Strathern, Women in Between (London: Seminar
Press, 1972).
88 Ibid.; L.L. Langness, "Rituals, Power, and Male Dominance
in the New Guinea Highlands," in Raymond D. Fogelson
and Richard N. Adams (eds.), The Anthropology o f Power
(New York: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 3-22.
89 Rogers, op. cit., 1975.
90 D.K. Feil, "Women and Men in the Enga Tee," American
DialecticalAnthropology 5 (1980) 111-125
Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in The Netherlands
125
Ethnologist, vol. 5, no. 2 (1978), pp. 263-279; Strathern,
op. cit., 1972; Langness, op. tit., 1977.
91 Michael P. Carrol, "Engels on the Pre-Patriarchal Family:
Some Case Studies and a New Hypothesis," Sociological
Symposium, vol. 15 (1976), pp. 41, 28-47.
92 Mernissi, op. cit., 1975; Dwyer, op. cit., 1978.
93 Rogers, op. cit., 1975.
94 Albert Bacdayan, "Mechanistic Cooperation and Sexual
Equality Among the Western Bontoc," in Alice Schlegel (ed.),
op. cit., 1977, pp. 270-291; Constance Sutton and Susan
Makieksy-Barrow, "Social Inequality and Sexual Status in
Barbados," ibid., pp. 292-325.
95 Feil, op. cir., 1978; Langness, op. cit., 1977.
96 Poewe, op. cit., 1979.
97 Mernissi, op. cit., 1975; Dwyer, op. cit., 19781
98 Rogers, op. cit., 1975, p. 729.