FIRST DIVISION
00 as and by way of
G.R. No. 159520             September 19, 2006
FELISA L. PEÑA, petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS),
respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to set aside
and to declare null and void the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53088 dated 24 April 2003 and its
Resolution2 dated 14 August 2003, which affirmed the Decision 3
of the Office of the President dated 12 May 1999 declaring as
valid and subsisting the mortgage between Queen’s Row
Subdivision, Inc., and herein respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS).
The antecedent facts of the case are:
On 13 March 1985, herein petitioner Felisa Peña acquired three
subdivision lots, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-
89547, No. T-89647, and No. T-89662 of the Register of Deeds
of Cavite, from Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc., through its
President Isabel Arrieta, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale,
with a right to repurchase the same within two months, for the
sum of P126,000.00 plus interest. However, petitioner alleged
that Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc. failed to repurchase said lots
and refused to deliver the corresponding titles of the said
subdivision lots because the same were mortgaged to herein
respondent GSIS, allegedly sometime in 1971 and 1972,
without the written approval of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) as required by Presidential Decree
No. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree."
Thus, on 21 January 1994, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Specific Performance, Annulment of Mortgage, and Damages 4
before the HLURB Regional Office against Queen’s Row
Subdivision, Inc., its President Isabel Arrieta, and respondent,
asking for the cancellation of the mortgage to respondent and
the consolidation of ownership to her, alleging that the
mortgage of the subject lots to the respondent was null and
void because it had no written approval of the HLURB as
required under Presidential Decree No. 957.
Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc. and its President Isabel Arrieta
did not file any responsive pleading. Respondent, on the other
hand, filed its Answer asserting that the subject properties had
been mortgaged, foreclosed, and transferred to its name even
before the petitioner purchased the same.
HLURB, through Housing and Land Use Arbiter Cesar A. Manuel,
rendered a Decision 5 dated 20 December 1995 in favor of
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Confirming the sale of Queen’s Row Subdivision lots
covered by TCT Nos. T-89547, T-89647, and T-89662
of the Register of Deeds of Cavite in favor of
[petitioner] and consolidating ownership thereof in
favor of the latter;
2. Declaring the mortgage of the subject lots to
respondent GSIS as voidable insofar as [petitioner] is
concerned but valid only as evidence of indebtedness
insofar as Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc. and
[respondent] GSIS are concerned;
3. Directing respondent GSIS to deliver the owners
(sic) duplicate copy (sic) of the titles of subject lots to
the [petitioner] within thirty days from finality hereof;
4. Directing the Register of Deeds of Cavite to cancel
the annotation of the mortgage on said TCTs Nos. T-
89547, T-89647, and T-89662, without prejudice to the
right of [respondent] GSIS to collect the obligation of
Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc.;
5. Directing respondents Queens Row Subdivision, Inc.
and Isabel Y. Arrieta to jointly and severally pay
[petitioner] the sums of P200,000.00 as and by way of
exemplary damages; P200,000.
moral damages; P100,000.00 plus 30% of the award
granted to [petitioner], as and for attorney’s fees and
the cost of suit.
Let copy of this judgment be furnished the Register of
Deeds of Cavite.6
On 30 January 1996, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal 7 from
the afore-mentioned Decision. On 9 February 1996, HLURB
Arbiter Manuel issued an Order 8 denying the said appeal, citing
Sections 22 and 23 of Resolution No. R-537, Series of 1994,
"Adopting the 1994 Rules of Procedure of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board,"9 which states that:
Section 22. Petition for Review. - No motion for
reconsideration of or mere Notice of Petition from the
decision shall be entertained. Within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the decision, any aggrieved party may,
on any legal ground and upon payment of the review
fee, file with the Regional Office or directly with the
Board of Commissioners a petition for review. Copy of
such a petition shall be furnished the other party and
the Regional Office in case the petition is directly filed
with the Board of Commissioners.
Within ten (10) days from receipt of a petition or an
order of elevation from the Board, the Regional Officer
shall cause the elevation of the records to the Board of
Commissioners thru the Appeals Review Group.
Section 23. Contents of a Petition for Review. – The
petition for review shall contain the petitioner’s
assignment of errors on the decision sought to be
reviewed, the issues to be resolved, the law on which it
is based and the arguments in support thereof.10
Petitioner then claimed that for failure of respondent to file the
proper mode of appeal within the reglementary period before
the HLURB, its Decision dated 20 December 1995 already
became final and executory.11
However, on 25 September 1996, respondent filed a Motion to
Declare Judgment Null and Void Ab Initio12 before the Board of
Commissioners of the HLURB, claiming that the Regional Office
of HLURB had no jurisdiction to resolve the Complaint for it
involved title to, possession of, or interest in real estate, the
jurisdiction of which belonged to the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent also contended that the mortgage transaction was
exempt from the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957
because it was entered into prior to the effectivity of the said
decree. Then, on 20 January 1997, the HLURB Board of
Commissioners issued an Order13 denying the said Motion for
lack of merit.
Dissatisfied, respondent sought reconsideration of the aforesaid
Order on 24 April 1997. Still, on 14 July 1997, 14 the HLURB
Board of Commissioners denied the Motion for Reconsideration
of the respondent because the Decision of HLURB dated 20
December 1995 has already become final and executory as
early as March 1996.15 The HLURB Board of Commissioners
granted, however, the Ex-Parte Motion for Execution dated 20
December 1995 filed by petitioner.
Once again aggrieved, respondent appealed the foregoing Order
of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office of the
President. On 12 May 1999, the Office of the President issued
the assailed Decision, declaring that:
The Order appealed from being clearly erroneous, this
Office is constrained to excuse the failure of the
[respondent] GSIS to file the proper Petition for
Review, a mere procedural infirmity incomparable to
the injustice that is sought to be prevented.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board dated July 14, 1997 is hereby SET
ASIDE and the mortgage of the subject lots to
[respondent] GSIS declared VALID and SUBSISTING.16
Consequently, on 4 June 1999, petitioner filed a Petition for
Review17 under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
before the Court of Appeals alleging that the Office of the
President committed the following grave and serious errors, to
wit: (1) in not holding that the Decision of the HLURB Regional
Office dated 20 December 1995 had become final and
executory; (2) in not holding that the HLURB Board of
Commissioners as well as the Office of the President had no
jurisdiction or authority to revive, review, change, or alter the
said final and executory Decision dated 20 December 1995; (3)
in excusing and ignoring the failure of respondent to file the
proper Petition for Review; (4) in not holding that said Decision
of the HLURB Regional Office dated 20 December 1995 was
supported by substantial evidence, and; (5) in issuing the
Decision in question dated 12 May 1999 and in setting aside the
Order of the HLURB Board of Commissioners dated 14 July 1997
and holding that the mortgage of subject lots to respondent
valid and subsisting.
The Court of Appeals subsequently rendered its Decision on 24
April 2003 denying the Petition for Review filed by petitioner
and affirming the Decision of the Office of the President dated
12 May 1999.
On 15 May 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the said Decision. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated 14 August 2003 denied said Motion because
there were no new or substantial reasons to reverse or even
modify the challenged Decision.
Hence, this Petition.
In the petitioner’s Memorandum,18 she avers that the Decision
of the HLURB Regional Office dated 20 December 1995 had long
become final and executory for failure of the respondent to
seasonably appeal or file a Petition for Review within the
reglementary period. Consequently, the Office of the President
had no more jurisdictions over such final and executory
judgment.
She further argues that a final and executory judgment
rendered by the HLURB Regional Office cannot be revived by
the filing of a Motion to Declare Judgment Null and Void Ab
Initio several months after it had become final and executory.
Finally, she claims that the Court of Appeals may have been
misled by the confusing arguments of the respondent and
overlooked the fact that the Decision of HLURB Regional Office
dated 20 December 1995 has already become final and
executory. Hence, the Court of Appeals acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
Decision of the Office of the President that reversed or changed
a final and executory judgment of the HLURB Regional Office.
In contrast, respondent, in its Memorandum, 19 maintains that
the outright dismissal of its Notice of Appeal by the HLURB
Regional Office on the ground that the filing thereof was
prohibited under the HLURB Rules, denied respondent justice
inasmuch as it has meritorious claims. Thus, the Court of
Appeals was correct in affirming the Decision of the Office of the
President that set aside the Order of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners dated 14 July 1997 and declaring as valid and
subsisting the mortgage of the subject lots to respondent.
From the foregoing arguments of the parties, this Court
identifies the following issues for resolution in this Petition, to
wit:
I. Whether the Office of the President can set aside and
reverse a judgment of the HLURB Regional Office that
has long become final and executory for failure of the
respondent to interpose the proper mode of appeal
within the reglementary period as provided for in the
1994 Rules of Procedure of HLURB; and
II. Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming the Decision of the Office
of the President that reversed a final and executory
judgment of the HLURB.
Noteworthy is that the right to appeal is neither a natural right
nor a part of due process, except where it is granted by statute
in which case it should be exercised in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. 20 In other words, appeal
is a right of statutory and not of constitutional origin. 21 The
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional 22
and the failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding
appeal will render the judgment final and executory and, hence,
unappealable,23 for it is more important that a case be settled
than it be settled right.24 Furthermore, it is axiomatic that final
and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any of
the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the
highest court of the land.25 Just as the losing party has the right
to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the
winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of
the resolution of the case.26
Under Section 2227 of the 1994 Rules of Procedure of the
HLURB, no Motion for Reconsideration of or a mere Notice of
Petition from the Decision shall be entertained. What are
required under said HLURB Rules are for the aggrieved party to
file a Petition for Review within 30 days from receipt of the
Decision on any legal ground and upon payment of the review
fee.
In the case at bar, it must be noted that after the HLURB
Regional Office rendered its 20 December 1995 Decision,
respondent, instead of filing a Petition for Review within 30 days
from receipt of the said Decision which was the proper mode of
appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, opted to file
a mere Notice of Appeal on 30 January 1996 which was denied
in the Order of HLURB Arbiter Manuel dated 9 February 1996
because it was prohibited by the Rules of HLURB. Consequently,
for failure of the respondent to file the proper mode of appeal
within the reglementary period, the afore-mentioned Decision of
the HLURB became final and executory as early as March 1996.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals mentioned in its Decision,
that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice and their strict and rigid application which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be avoided 28 and they
cannot be blindly adhered to if they would serve no other
purpose than to put into oblivion the very lis mota of the
controversy under scrutiny.29 However, there are certain
procedural rules that must remain inviolable like those setting
the periods for perfecting an appeal or filing a Petition for
Review, for it is doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal
is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that right
must comply with the statute or rules. These rules, particularly
the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the
reglementary period specified in the law, must be strictly
followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions
against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial
business.30
The Notice of Appeal filed by the respondent cannot equate to
the Petition for Review required by the HLURB Rules. The Notice
of Appeal filed by the respondent merely states that:
Respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) thru counsel, unto this Honorable Office most
respectfully gives notice that it is appealing the
Decision dated 20 December 1995 of HLURB Arbiter,
Hon. Cesar A. Manuel to the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board on both questions of law and fact.
Pasay City for Quezon City, January 30, 1996.31
whereas, the Petition for Review under Section 23 of the 1994
HLURB Rules must contain the petitioner’s assignment of errors
on the decision sought to be reviewed, the issues to be
resolved, the law on which it is based and the arguments in
support thereof. There is a wide difference between Notice of
Appeal and a Petition for Review in terms of substance that the
relaxation of the rigid rules of procedure cannot be permitted.
Furthermore, it was highly improbable for the respondent to be
so unmindful of the HLURB Rules of Procedure regarding the
proper mode of appeal. Additionally, it must be noted that when
respondent filed its Notice of Appeal, it did not even state the
reason why instead of filing a Petition for Review it filed a Notice
of Appeal. Hence, HLURB Arbiter Manuel of the Regional Office
cannot be faulted when he denied respondent’s Notice of Appeal
as it was prohibited under the HLURB Rules. Also, there is
nothing to prevent the 20 December 1995 Decision of the
HLURB Arbiter Manuel from becoming final and executory since
respondent failed to perfect its appeal in the manner and within
the period provided for in the HLURB Rules. Where a party does
not institute the correct mode of appeal such as a Petition for
Review instead of a mere Notice of Appeal, he loses it.32
Since the 20 December 1995 Decision of HLURB Regional Office
was already final and executory, no court, not even the highest
court of the land, can revive, review, change or alter the same.
It is already well settled in our jurisdiction that the decisions
and orders of administrative agencies rendered pursuant to
their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the force
and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the
doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata, which forbids
the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority, applies as well to the judicial and quasi-
judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers and
boards acting within their jurisdiction.33
In view of the foregoing, the Motion to Declare Judgment Null
and Void Ab Initio filed by respondent on 25 September 1996,
or after so many months from the finality of the Decision it
seeks to be declared null and void, can no longer be entertained
by the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The same was just an
attempt to reinstate an appeal that had already been lost. Even
granting arguendo that the said Motion was proper, still, the
allegation therein of the respondent that the HLURB Regional
Office had no jurisdiction over the case because it involved title
to, possession of, or interest in real estate, the jurisdiction of
which supposedly belonged to the Regional Trial Court, was not
sufficient to warrant the declaration of the Decision of the
HLURB as null and void. Such ground relied upon by the
respondent is untenable because the jurisdiction involving
unsound real estate practices and other matters in connection
thereto belongs to HLURB.
It must be remembered that Presidential Decre No. 1344 of 2
April 1978 expanded the jurisdiction of the National Housing
Authority (NHA) to include the following:
Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate
the real estate trade and business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed
by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against
the project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or
salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision
lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.
On 7 February 1981, Executive Order No. 648 transferred the
regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of the NHA to Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission.
Section 8. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS. — The
regulatory functions of the National Housing Authority
pursuant to Presidential Decrees No. 957, 1216, 1344
and other related laws are hereby transferred to the
Commission, together with such applicable personnel,
appropriation, records, equipment and property
necessary for the enforcement and implementation of
such functions. Among these regulatory functions are:
1. Regulation of the real estate trade and business;
2. Registration of subdivision lots and condominium
projects;
3. Issuance of license to sell subdivision lots and
condominium units in the registered units;
4. Approval of performance bond and the suspension of
license to sell;
5. Registration of dealers, brokers, and salesmen
engaged in the business of selling subdivision lots or
condominium units;
6. Revocation of registration of dealers, brokers and
salesmen;
7. Approval of mortgage on any subdivision lot or
condominium unit made by the owner or developer;
8. Granting of permits for the alteration of plans and
the extension of period for completion of subdivision or
condominium projects;
9. Approval of the conversion to other purposes of
roads and open spaces found within the project which
have been donated to the city or municipality
concerned;
10. Regulation of the relationship between lessors and
lessees; and
11. Hear and decide cases on unsound real estate
business practices; claims involving refund filed against
project owners, developers, dealers, brokers or
salesmen and cases of specific performance.
Executive Order No. 90 dated 17 December 1986 changed the
name of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission to
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). 34
When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-
judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter
pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within
the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or body. Split
jurisdiction is not favored. 35 Therefore, the Complaint for
Specific Performance, Annulment of Mortgage, and Damages
filed by petitioner against respondent, though involving title to,
possession of, or interest in real estate, was well within the
jurisdiction of the HLURB for it involves a claim against the
subdivision developer, Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc., as well as
respondent.
Attention should also be called to the fact that respondent failed
to act promptly to protect its rights after HLURB Arbiter Manuel
denied its Notice of Appeal. It did not even offer an explanation
why it took many months before it filed its Motion to Declare
Judgment Null and Void Ab Initio with the HLURB Board of
Commissioners. For such inaction of the respondent for a long
period of time, the 20 December 1995 Decision of the HLURB
Regional Office became final and executory and that was the
price respondent had to pay for its delayed reaction.
Thus, when the Office of the President acted upon the appeal of
the respondent and thereby reversing the final and executory
Decision of the HLURB Regional Office, it acted without
jurisdiction. It bears stressing that after the Decision of the
HLURB Regional Office had become final and executory as early
as March 1996, even the Office of the President had no more
jurisdiction to revive, review, change or alter the same. Such
final resolution or decision of an administrative agency also
binds the Office of the President even if such agency is under
the administrative supervision and control of the latter. 36
In sum, the Decision of the HLURB Regional Office dated 20
December 1995 had become final and executory for failure of
respondent to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period
in the manner provided for in the HLURB Rules. Hence, the said
Decision became immutable; it can no longer be amended nor
altered by the Office of the President. Accordingly, inasmuch as
the timely perfection of an appeal is a jurisdictional requisite,
the Office of the President had no more authority to entertain
the appeal of the respondent. Otherwise, any amendment or
alteration made which substantially affects the final and
executory judgment would be null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.37
This Court had stated before that administrative decisions must
end sometime, as fully as public policy demands that finality be
written on judicial controversies. Public interest requires that
proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every
step, for the rule of non quieta movere prescribes that what had
already been terminated should not be disturbed. A disregard of
this principle does not commend itself to sound public policy. 38
The rule on finality of decisions, orders or resolutions of a
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body is "not a question
of technicality but of substance and merit," the underlying
consideration therefore, being the protection of the substantive
rights of the winning party.39 Nothing is more settled in law than
that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.40
The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has
become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of
the verdict. Court must guard against any scheme calculated to
bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to
prolong the controversies. The only exceptions to the general
rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void
judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.41
The orderly administration of justice requires that the
judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must
reach a point of finality set by the law, rules, and regulations.
The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all.
This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without
which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and
adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those
who exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which violates
such principle, must immediately be struck down. 42 Indeed, the
principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined
in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known
as courts, but it extends to all bodies upon which judicial
powers had been conferred.43

As a final point. Having said that the Decision of the HLURB

Regional Office dated 20 December 1995 had become final and
executory, it was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of
the Court of Appeals to affirm the Decision of the Office of the
President reversing the HLURB Regional Office, because such
Decision was rendered by the Office of the President without
jurisdiction. Hence, when the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision of the Office of the President, it likewise acted without
jurisdiction. Well-settled is the rule that once a judgment has
become final and executory, no court, not even this Court, has
the power to revive, review, change or alter the same.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is

hereby GRANTED. Both the Court of Appeals and the Office of
the President have no more jurisdictions to review much more
to reverse the 20 December 1995 Decision of the HLURB
Regional Office, as it was already final and executory. Thus, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 April 2003 and its
Resolution dated 14 August 2003 affirming the Decision of the
Office of the President dated 12 May 1999 declaring as valid and
subsisting the mortgage between Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc.
and herein respondent are SET ASIDE and the Decision of the
HLURB Regional Office dated 20 December 1995 is hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-

Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.