SECOND DIVISION
activities concerning the subject land until further orders. v[5]
[G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998]
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF
BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF
SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA,
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some
alleged farmer-beneficiaries in front of the Department of
Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City on October 9, 1997
commanded nationwide attention that even church leaders and
some presidential candidates tried to intervene for the strikers
cause.
The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision i[1] of the
Office of the President (OP), issued through then Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, which
approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)-
hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional
area. This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called
Win-Win Resolutionii[2] on November 7, 1997, substantially
modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become
final and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval
of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent
of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one
hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-
beneficiaries.
But, did the Win-Win Resolution culminate in victory for all the
contending parties?
The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come to this
Court urging us to annul and set aside the Win-Win Resolution
and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the
Department of Agrarian Reform from implementing the said
Resolution.
Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the
legal effect of the Win-Win Resolution issued by the Office of the
President on its earlier Decision involving the same subject
matter, which had already become final and executory?
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from the
pleadings, may be stated as follows:
1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente,
Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr.
Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of
the petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 14371iii[3] of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of
Bukidnon.
2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the
Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc.
(DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10)
years under the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly
annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April,
1994.
3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-
hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the
land value at P2.38 million.iv[4]
4. NQSRMDC resisted the DARs action. In February, 1992, it
sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director,
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon,
the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their
authorized representatives to desist from pursuing any activity or
5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional
Director issued a memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, directing
the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the
name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings to
determine the just compensation of the subject property.
NQSRMDC objected to these moves and filed on June 9, 1992 an
Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order of March 31, 1992
and to nullify the summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR
Regional Director and Land Bank on the valuation of the subject
property.
6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the
Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering the DAR Regional Director and
Land Bank to seriously comply with the terms of the order dated
March 31, 1992; (b) nullifying the DAR Regional Directors
memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and the summary
proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and (c) directing the
Land Bank to return the claim folder of Petitioner NQSRMDCs
subject property to the DAR until further orders.vi[6]
7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled
the trust account it opened in the name of petitioner NQSRMDC. vii
[7]
8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of
Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed
Resolution No. 6,viii[8] dated January 7, 1993, designating certain
areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon
Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated.
9. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES)
Decision of March 29, 1996, pertinent portions of which we
quote:
Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao,
Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24
converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San
Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to
industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to
attract investors who can inject new economic vitality, provide
more jobs and raise the income of its people.
Parenthetically, under said section, 4 th to 5th class municipalities
may authorize the classification of five percent (5%) of their
agricultural land area and provide for the manner of their
utilization or disposition.
On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use
Committee approved the said Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11
December 1993, the instant application for conversion was filed
by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA
(Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association).
Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon
Provincial Board, on the basis of a Joint Committee Report
submitted by its Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian
Reform and Socio-Economic Committee approved, on 1 February
1994, the said Ordinance now docketed as Resolution No. 94-95.
The said industrial area, as conceived by NQSRMDC (project
proponent) is supposed to have the following components:
1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the
following: Institute for Continuing Higher Education; Institute for
Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical School); Institute
for Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and
Mindanao Sports Development Complex which covers an area of
24 hectares;
2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn
processing for corn oil, corn starch, various corn products; rice
processing for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice; cassava
processing for starch, alcohol and food delicacies; processing
plants, fruits and fruit products such as juices; processing plants
for vegetables processed and prepared for market; cold storage
and ice plant; cannery system; commercial stores; public
market; and abattoir needing about 67 hectares;
3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for
recreation, horse-back riding, memorial and mini-zoo estimated
to cover 33 hectares; and
4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-
room hotel, restaurants, dormitories and a housing project
covering an area of 20 hectares.
The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January
4, 1995, adopted by the Department of Trade and Industry,
Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its flagship projects. The
same was likewise favorably recommended by the Provincial
Development Council of Bukidnon; the municipal, provincial and
regional office of the DAR; the Regional Office (Region X) of the
DENR (which issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate on
June 5, 1995); the Executive Director, signing By Authority of
PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ, Office of the President Mindanao; the
Secretary of DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D.
Clemente.
In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration,
Provincial Irrigation Office, Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru
Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation Office,
interposed NO OBJECTION to the proposed conversion as long as
the development cost of the irrigation systems thereat which is
P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by the developer x x x.
Also, the Kisolon-San Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose
Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, interposed no
objection to the proposed conversion of the land in question as it
will provide more economic benefits to the community in terms
of outside investments that will come and employment
opportunities that will be generated by the projects to be put up
x x x.
On the same score, it is represented that during the public
consultation held at the Kisolan Elementary School on 18 March
1995 with Director Jose Macalindong of DAR Central Office and
DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the people of the affected
barangay rallied behind their respective officials in endorsing the
project.
Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation,
however, on November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary
Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant
application for the conversion of the subject land from
agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same
under the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the
distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries on the following
grounds:
1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with
irrigation facility;
2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory
Acquisition (NCA);
3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered
by NCA is not applicable;
4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package
arrangements for the beneficiaries;
5. The procedures on how the area was identified and reclassified
for agro-industrial project has no reference to Memo Circular No.
54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and E.O. No.
124, Series of 1993.
A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed on
January 9, 1995 by applicant but the same was denied (in an
Order dated June 7, 1995).ix[9]
10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director
to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the
property.x[10]
11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed xi[11] the
order of denial to the Office of the President and prayed for the
conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would
be more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon.
12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretarys order,
NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995, filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction, xii
[12] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.
13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G.
Dominguez, then Presidential Assistant for Mindanao, after
conducting an evaluation of the proposed project, sent a
memorandumxiii[13] to the President favorably endorsing the
project with a recommendation that the DAR Secretary
reconsider his decision in denying the application of the province
for the conversion of the land.
14. Also, in a memorandum xiv[14] to the President dated August
23, 1995, the Honorable Rafael Alunan III, then Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG),
recommended the conversion of the subject land to
industrial/institutional use with a request that the President hold
the implementation of the DAR order to distribute the land in
question.
15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 37614, issued a Resolution xv[15] ordering the parties to
observe status quo pending resolution of the petition. At the
hearing held in said case on October 5, 1995, the DAR, through
the Solicitor General, manifested before the said court that the
DAR was merely in the processing stage of the applications of
farmers-claimants and has agreed to respect status quo pending
the resolution of the petition.xvi[16]
16. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through
then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in
OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the
DAR Secretarys decision, the pertinent portions of which read:
After a careful evaluation of the petition vis--vis the grounds
upon which the denial thereof by Secretary Garilao was based,
we find that the instant application for conversion by the
Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be
sure, converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-
industrial would open great opportunities for employment and
bring about real development in the area towards a sustained
economic growth of the municipality. On the other hand,
distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not even
tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such benefits.
Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime
agricultural land with irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to
mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is true that there
is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely
passes thru the property (as a right of way) to provide water to
the ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land itself,
subject of the instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was,
for several years, planted with pineapple by the Philippine
Packing Corporation.
On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of
Compulsory Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on
withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable,
suffice it to state that the said NCA was declared null and void by
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the
DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No.
6657, the subject property could not validly be the subject of
compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the lease
contract with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National Company, or
until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office and the
Land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to `desist from
pursuing any activity or activities covering petitioners land.
On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the
Quisumbing family has already contributed substantially to the
land reform program of the government, as follows: 300
hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70s and another 400
hectares in the nearby Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon,
ten (10) years ago, for which they have not received just
compensation up to this time.
Neither can the assertion that there is no clear and tangible
compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries hold
water as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries to speak
about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated.
Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of
identifying/reclassifying the subject property for agro-industrial
purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law
granting autonomy to local government units in the management
of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of Section
20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for any
other interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants
local government units autonomy in their local affairs including
the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and
provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities.
WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said
legal mandate and in view of the favorable recommendations of
the various government agencies abovementioned, the subject
Order, dated November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary,
Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE and the
instant application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED. xvii
[17]
17.On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of
the OP decision.
18 On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision
of March 29, 1996, NQSRMDC and the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a Memorandum of
Agreement whereby the former donated four (4) hectares from
the subject land to DECS for the establishment of the NQSR High
School.xviii[18]
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-
hectare donated to DECS, it discovered that the title over the
subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out
that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the
Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by
Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just
compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on
August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 xix[19] of the
Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25,
1995, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the name
of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536 xx[20] of the
Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint xxi[21]
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon
(Branch 9), docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment
and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR
and 141 others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining
Order on April 30, 1997xxii[22] and a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction on May 19, 1997,xxiii[23] restraining the DAR and 141
others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC
the possession of the subject land.
20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order xxiv[24] was issued by
then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DARs motion
for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further
declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already
become final and executory.
21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for
reconsideration of the June 23, 1997 Order of the President.
22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the RTC was challenged by some alleged farmers
before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44905, praying for the
lifting of the injunction and for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition from further trying the RTC case.
23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries
began their hunger strike in front of the DAR Compound in
Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On
October 10, 1997, some persons claiming to be farmer-
beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed a motion for
intervention (styled as Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P.
Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP Decision allowing the
conversion of the entire 144-hectare property be set aside. xxv[25]
24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the
strikers and promised to resolve their grievance within the
framework of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding
Task Force (FFTF) chaired by Agriculture Secretary Salvador
Escudero to look into the controversy and recommend possible
solutions to the problem.xxvi[26]
25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved
the strikers protest by issuing the so-called Win/Win Resolution
penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of
the President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated
March 29, 1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. NQSRMDCs application for conversion is
APPROVED only with respect to the
approximately forty-four (44) hectare portion
of the land adjacent to the highway, as
recommended by the Department of
Agriculture.
2. The remaining approximately one hundred
(100) hectares traversed by an irrigation
canal and found to be suitable for agriculture
shall be distributed to qualified farmer-
beneficiaries in accordance with RA 6657 or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
with a right of way to said portion from the
highway provided in the portion fronting the
highway. For this purpose, the DAR and
other concerned government agencies are
directed to immediately conduct the
segregation survey of the area, valuation of
the property and generation of titles in the
name of the identified farmer-beneficiaries.
3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby
directed to carefully and meticulously
determine who among the claimants are
qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby
further directed to expedite payment of just
compensation to NQSRMDC for the portion of
the land to be covered by the CARP,
including other lands previously surrendered
by NQSRMDC for CARP coverage.
5. The Philippine National Police is hereby
directed to render full assistance to the
Department of Agrarian Reform in the
implementation of this Order.
We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113
farmers on October 10, 1997 without ruling on the propriety or
merits thereof since it is unnecessary to pass upon it at this time.
SO ORDERED.xxvii[27]
A copy of the Win-Win Resolution was received by Governor
Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao,
Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997 xxviii[28] and, on
December 4, 1997, they filed the present petition for certiorari,
prohibition (under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and
injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.),
against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and
DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene xxix[29]
was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel,
claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were
previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform
beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property subject of this case.
The motion was vehemently opposedxxx[30] by the petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the
petitioners claim that the Office of the President was prompted to
issue the said resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike
led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in
pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the
President to come up with this purely political decision to
appease the farmers, by reviving and modifying the Decision of
29 March 1996 which has been declared final and executory
in an Order of 23 June 1997.xxxi[31] Thus, petitioners further
allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond
his jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7
November 1997.xxxii[32] They availed of this extraordinary writ of
certiorari because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. xxxiii[33] They never filed a
motion for reconsideration of the subject Resolution because (it)
is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile
exercise to seek a reconsideration .xxxiv[34]
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the
petition and prayed that it be dismissed outright on the following
grounds:
(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a
petition for review directly with the Court of Appeals in
accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of
the assailed Win-Win Resolution before filing the present
petition; and
(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
These are the preliminary issues which must first be resolved,
including the incident on the motion for intervention filed by the
alleged farmer-beneficiaries.
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse
of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line
between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An
error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by
an appeal.xxxv[35] On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is
one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer
or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction.xxxvi[36] This error is correctable only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.xxxvii[37]
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments,
final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising
quasi-judicial functions,xxxviii[38] including the Office of the
President,xxxix[39] may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing
a verified petition for reviewxl[40] within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution, xli[41]
whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law.xlii[42]
However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy
prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the present
petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is
patently illegalxliii[43] and was issued with grave abuse of
discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C.
Coronas) jurisdictionxliv[44] when said resolution substantially
modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had
long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial
issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of
judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus,
the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed
resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. The
pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
xxx xxx x x x.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary
cases cases in which the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial
body is wholly void.xlv[45]
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person
aggrieved by the assailed illegal act may file a verified petition
(for certiorari) in the proper court. The proper court where the
petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65
which reads:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or
in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves
the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless
otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (4a)
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, xlvi[46] prohibitionxlvii[47]
and mandamus.xlviii[48] But the jurisdiction of these three (3)
courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to
acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person, the petition must be filed with the Regional
Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or
omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed
only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law
or the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of
concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al.,xlix[49]
through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
x x x. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
(as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which
may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective
regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial
Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate
Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latters
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to
those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as
a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance
of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should
be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. (Citations omitted)
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take
cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and
which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: l[50] Uy
vs. Contreras, et. al.,li[51] Torres vs. Arranz,lii[52] Bercero vs. De
Guzman,liii[53] and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. liv[54] As we
have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is
a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon
the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Courts docket.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary
jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy
justicelv[55] and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put
an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed
by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed
resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the
assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to
file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result
in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the
higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of
Appeals:lvi[56]
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules
and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the
higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we
forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should
have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to
the merits of the case."
As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a
fatal procedural lapse when they failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed resolution before seeking judicial
recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion is not necessary
when the questioned resolution is a patent nullity, lvii[57] as will
be taken up later.
With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the
filing by the petitioners of: (a) a petition for certiorari, prohibition
with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 37614) with the
Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint for annulment and cancellation
of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others
(Civil Case No. 2687-97) with the Regional Trial Court of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c) the present petition, constitute
forum shopping.
We disagree.
The rule is that:
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse
opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other
than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not
only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in
connection with litigation commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to
defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an
unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling.
This specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the
second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction (citations omitted).
The test for determining whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case of
Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34), x x x and that is, forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in the other, as follows:
There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC
Case No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions, as well as identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts, and the identity on the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action, will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action
pendant.'lviii[58]
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not
guilty of forum shopping. The test for determining whether a
party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the
action under consideration. A cursory examination of the cases
filed by the petitioners does not show that the said cases are
similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretarys order to
proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the
subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with
damages, was based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in
applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDCs title, used
documents which were earlier declared null and void by the
DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title was made
without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice to
NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is
entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the
nullification of the assailed Win-Win Resolution of the Office of
the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was
issued long after the previous two cases were instituted.
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the
motion for intervention filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries,
which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their motion,
movants contend that they are the farmer-beneficiaries of the
land in question, hence, are real parties in interest. To prove
this, they attached as Annex I in their motion a Master List of
Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was
made pursuant to the directive in the dispositive portion of the
assailed Win-Win Resolution which directs the DAR to carefully
and meticulously determine who among the claimants are
qualified farmer-beneficiaries. However, a perusal of the said
document reveals that movants are those purportedly Found
Qualified and Recommended for Approval. In other words,
movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a
party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means
a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest.lix[59] Undoubtedly, movants interest over the land in
question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in
interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants
based their motion is, as intimated earlier, null and void. Hence,
their motion for intervention has no leg to stand on.
Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory
Decision dated March 29,1996 can still be substantially modified
by the Win-Win Resolution.
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the
President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order
No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the
President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws,
become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall
be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious
cases. (Emphasis ours)
It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court
shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June
23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and
executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to
re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its
jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to
entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the
basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for
reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March
29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was
permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as
provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the
said motion should not have been entertained considering that
the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed,
thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into
finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening
the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision
which had already become final and executory, was in gross
disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality
to administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.lx[60] we held:

Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the
Office of the President had long become final and executory, the
same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-
established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial
authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of
a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata [Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdijna
Merchandizing Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-
15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.] The rule of res
judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial
and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative
officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the
judgments of courts having general judicial powers [Brillantes v.
Castro, supra at 503].

The orderly administration of justice requires that the

judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must
reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The
noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. lxi[61]
This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without
which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and
adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those
who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such
principle must immediately be struck down.

Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which substantially

modified the Decision of March 29, 1996 after it has attained
finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by
Justice Thomas A. Streetlxii[62] in a 1918 case,lxiii[63] is a lawless
thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.lxiv[64]

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The

challenged Resolution dated November 7, 1997, issued by the
Office of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave To Intervene
filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Melo, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

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