Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
A.M. No. RTJ-93-1062 August 25, 1994
ELIZA RATILLA DE LA CRUZ, assisted by Enriqueta R. de la Cruz, EDELINE CUISON, assisted by Estrella Cuison,
ANA MARIA CRUZ, assisted by Nieves Cruz and LOLITA SANTIAGO, assisted by Epifania del
Rosario, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION, Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, respondent.
D E C I S I O N 1
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a case of a judge being made to account for his acquittal of an accused on reasonable doubt.
Respondent Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, is
administratively indicted for gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment for acquitting the
accused who was charged before his court with acts of lasciviousness. Parenthetically, respondent is not accused of
rendering an erroneous judgment spawned in bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption; much less is immorality
imputed to him.
Complainants Eliza Ratilla de la Cruz, 13, Edeline Cuison, 11, Ana Maria Cruz, 12, and Lolita Santiago, 12,2 alleged
before the trial court that they were summoned by their coach, accused Loreto Estrella, Jr., together with other
volleyball players, to his classroom at about five o'clock in the afternoon of 16 November 1988. He told them that he
had to inspect their private parts for the presence of public hair as required by MEC (now DECS) memorandum
circulars. In three (3) groups, two (2) of threes and one (1) of two, their coach told them to enter the "health corner
room" where they removed their shorts and panties and showed their private parts to him which he touched and
stroked.
Eliza, Edeline, Ana Maria and Lolita, with the assistance of their guardians, charged their coach in four (4) separate
criminal complaints commonly alleging that he —
. . . . being a public school teacher and in relation to the discharge of his duties as the coach of the girls volleyball
team of Bustos Central School, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs, commit an
act of lasciviousness upon the person of (complainant) by then and there touching her private parts against the
latter's will and by means of force.
In the joint trial that ensued, the four (4) girls testified almost identically that upon instruction of the accused they
reluctantly pulled down their shorts and panties and when their private parts were already uncovered, the accused in
kneeling or squatting position touched their exposed private parts. They described on the witness stand the
expression on the face of the accused while allegedly stroking their private parts several times which lasted for about
five minutes each as that of elation, "with his eyes wide open in wild excitement."
The accused on his part admitted having examined the pubic hair of the girls, particularly to be sure that as members
of his volleyball team not one of them was above 13 in strict compliance with specific school directives and
guidelines. He however denied that he touched their private parts and threatened them afterwards.
Upon hearing the prosecution and the defense, respondent Judge observed that the girls consented, without any
force employed upon them, to strip themselves from waist down although with understandable reluctance because of

1
their desire to be in the team considering that according to MEC Regional Memorandum No. 90, Series of 1981, in
relation to MEC Order No. 66, Series of 1979, failure to submit to physical examination would automatically disqualify
a candidate from the volleyball team. Respondent Judge was convicted that —
. . . what he (accused) did touch was only what is called the mons veneris  or that part of the female sexual organ
where pubic hair could grow. No one of these complainants said that accused also touched the inner part or genital
orifice of their private parts. If he did, it is inconceivable that not one of them made any outcry from that health corner
room where they were inspected inside in groups of three or two, one group at a time. The Court also refuses to
believe that accused touched each one of them several times for about five minutes. That is very unlikely and
improbable, not to mention that they never said that before in the police investigation, as well as what they now say
the wild excitement on the face of accused while touching them.
To better understand and appreciate the rationale of respondent's decision in the light of the charges hurled against
him, i.e., gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it is imperative to quote from his
decision which we find exhaustively argued —
Understandably, the accused now denies touching the private parts of the four private complainants. That touching is
the very accusation of lascivious act imputed against him. He could have very well said that, no matter how improper
and humiliating for the girls it would seem to be, it was part of the necessary inspection he was assigned to do as
their coach by the guidelines provided by the then Ministry of Education and Culture Order No. 66, Series of 1979
(Exh. "1"), and its implementing rules and guidelines (Exhs. "2" to "8"), in determining the age eligibility and
qualification of would-be young athletes to participate in the forthcoming provincial sports event, taking into
consideration, among other things, "breast enlargement" and "presence of pubic hair." Growing pubic hair on young
girls just above 13 years of age might still be hardly traceable and accused could probably say that he had to feel it
with his fingers to be sure that his very eyes were not deceiving him, but he should have used his better sense of
propriety and kind consideration to save the girls from the anguish and humiliation of being touched on the most
delicate parts of their bodies. There seemed to be no urgency for that in the fulfillment of his duty as a coach and in
obedience to the MEC directive, to see to it that ineligible over-aged players are not allowed to play in the athletic
meet then forthcoming, lest he be found responsible and "be suspended from athletic meets throughout his life,
without prejudice to the filing of administrative charges against him even after the athletic meet is over" (Exh. "3-A").
To repeat, the Court is inclined to entertain doubt if the act of accused complained of was a manifestation of his lewd
designs and not just his repulsive way of following the silly MEC guideline of determining the age qualification of
prospective young athletes which did not even discriminate that female athletes should be inspected for the presence
of pubic hair or enlarged breasts by a female coach. First of all, if his real motivation was just to satisfy his lust it was
unnatural for him to do that by inspecting the girls eight in all of their private parts one group of three at a time, the
last of which was a group of two. In other words, he did not inspect any of the girls alone in the secrecy of the health
corner room inside his classroom, in which situation he could have taken liberties with the girl(s) unwitnessed by a
third person. Added to this, as already noted, is the fact that he did not touch any of the girls on any other part of her
body, like her chest for example, to find out if she already had enlarged breasts. The act of the accused subject of the
present accusation seems to the Court not the product of a criminal mind, so much so that he deserves to be
exonerated from the charge in each of the four informations. However, for such act of indiscretion, though not
felonious but still wrongful, which directly resulted to the mental anguish and humiliation of each of the four young
complainants in these cases, the accused must answer for such moral damages they suffered.
A careful analysis of the decision of respondent Judge fails to persuade us that for rendering such well-reasoned
verdict he is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. In Revita v.
Rimando 3 we said —
. . . . ( i )t may be argued that the respondent committed an error of judgment in dismissing the complaint for grave
slander and thus causing (at least in complainant's opinion) a miscarriage of justice.

2
However, there is no proof that the error was attributable to a conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an
injustice (In re Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, January 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107, 119). "As a matter of public policy,
in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous" (48 C.J.S. 974).
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of
his official duties must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In the case before us, the administrative complaint does not
even allege that the erroneous decision of respondent was thus motivated.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal and an administrative charge. As a crime, it is punished
under Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code the elements of which are: (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a
judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; and, (d) the judge knows that his
judgment is unjust. 4 The gist of the offense therefore is that an unjust judgment be rendered maliciously or in bad
faith, that is, knowing it to be unjust. 5
An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, or both. The source of an
unjust judgment may be error or ill-will. There is no liability at all for a mere error. It is well settled that a judicial
officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for any error which he commits,
provided he acts in good faith. Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability. If in rendering judgment the judge fully
knew that the same was unjust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and must have been actuated and
prevailed upon by hatred, envy, revenge, greed, or some other similar motive. 6 As interpreted by Spanish courts, the
term "knowingly" means sure knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice. 7 Mere error therefore
in the interpretation or application of the law does not constitute the crime.
The nature of the administrative charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is the same as the criminal
charge. Thus, in this particular administrative charge, it must be established that respondent Judge rendered a
judgment or decision not supported by law and/or evidence and that he must be actuated by hatred, envy, revenge,
greed, or some other similar motive. In the case at bench, the motive of respondent Judge is not even alleged.
May it be asked: Of what law was respondent Judge grossly ignorant when he acquitted the accused? Corollarily, did
he knowingly render an unjust judgment when he extensively discussed and satisfactorily explained his decision?
If we hold respondent guilty as charged, then we might be telegraphing the wrong signals to our trial judges. For
then, where administrative sanctions are imposed on them for rendering judgments of acquittal based on reasonable
doubt or on difficult questions of law, they would be inclined, and not without practical reason, to hand down verdicts
of conviction, in case of doubt. For that course would be safer for them to pursue since, after all, erroneous
convictions may still be corrected on appeal. But that would be disregarding the true concept and judicial implication
of "reasonable doubt" in criminal cases, under which judges are directed according to the Rules of Court to render a
judgment of acquittal. 8 Reasonable doubt is —
. . . . that state of the case which, after full consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in such a
condition that they cannot say that they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.
Every person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. If, upon such proof, there is reasonable doubt
remaining, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of it by acquittal. It is not sufficient to establish a probability, though
a strong one, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than otherwise, but the evidence must establish the truth
of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies
the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it, and, in order to find the defendant
guilty, the evidence must be such as to exclude every single reasonable hypothesis, except that of the guilt of the
defendant. In other words, all of the facts proved must be consistent with, and point to, the guilt of the defendant, not
only, but the facts must be inconsistent with her innocence. It matters not how clearly the circumstances point to guilt,
still, if they are reasonably explainable on a theory which excludes guilt, then it cannot be said that the facts in the
case are sufficient to satisfy the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the defendant, and in that event she

3
should be acquitted. If, after consideration of the whole case, any one of the jury should entertain a reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the defendant, it is the duty of such juror not to vote for a verdict of guilty, and if after a consideration of
the whole case, fully, carefully, and honestly made after comparison, still one of the jury should entertain a
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, it would then be the duty of such juror not to vote for a verdict of
guilty.9
If for every error of a judge — although we do not find any in the case of respondent — he should be punished, then
perhaps no judge, however good, competent and dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judicial
service without a tarnished image. Somehow along the way he may commit mistakes, however honest. This does not
exclude members of appellate courts who are not always in agreement in their views. Any one belonging to the
minority opinion may generally be considered in error, and yet, he is not punished because each one is entitled to
express himself. This privilege should extend to trial judges so long as the error is not motivated by fraud, dishonesty,
corruption, 10 or any other evil motive.
Ordinarily, the act of a man in touching and stroking the private parts of a woman is, by itself, lewd for no hand of a
man would wander or venture near her manzanas prohibidas  if not for a lascivious motivation. But even if the
accused stroked and touched the girls on their montes veneris, 11 respondent nevertheless absolved the accused of
criminal liability on the theory that the complained acts may no longer be considered lascivious in view of the
directives and implementing rules and guidelines of the then Ministry (now Department) of Education, Culture and
Sports which imposed on the coaches of boys' and girls' volleyball teams the responsibility of excluding overaged
players from their teams using as one of the criteria the presence of pubic hair. In other words, since the complained
acts may be considered lawful under MECS orders, rules and guidelines, respondent Judge may have had reason to
conclude that lewdness could no longer be merely presumed.
Although we are not supposed to pass upon the merits of the case, a cursory discussion thereon is deemed
necessary for the purpose of establishing that respondent, in rendering a judgment of acquittal, did not disregard,
much less violate, any law or known jurisprudence. In People v. Balbar 12 we ruled that the presence or absence of
lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances. This supports
our conviction that in the case at bench the accused did not have a criminal mind at all, hence, his acquittal by the
respondent. After all, in the face of two plausible self-sustaining theories, albeit contradictory, one for conviction and
the other for acquittal, the latter prevails under the constitutional presumption of innocence, applying as our
parameter the test spelled out in the preceding paragraphs.
We reiterate that "mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce an inference
of ignorance or bad faith, or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision, are irrelevant and immaterial in an
administrative proceeding against him." 13 In Ad Hoc Committee Report re Judge Silverio S. Tayao, RTC, Branch
143, Makati, and Morada v. Judge Tayao, 14 this Court through Mr. Justice Feliciano incisively and appropriately
explained—
. . . . By its nature, judicial discretion involves the exercise of judgment on the part of the judge. The judge must be
allowed a reasonable latitude for the operation of his own individual view of the case, his appreciation of the facts,
and his understanding of the applicable law on the matter. Judicial discretion is, of course, not unlimited; it must be
guided and controlled by well-known rules and principles . . . .
If Judge Tayao committed any error at all, it was an error of judgment and it is important to recall the firmly
established principle that a judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of judgment, in the absence of
a showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose:
"A Judge cannot be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively, for an erroneous decision
rendered by him in good faith (In re: Petition for the Dismissal from Service and/or Disbarment of Judge Baltazar R.
Dizon, 173 SCRA 719 [1989]).
1. As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous (Revita vs. Rimando, 98 SCRA

4
619 [1980]; Ubongon vs. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30 [1980]; Ramirez vs. Corpuz-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462 [1986]; Abad vs.
Bleza, 145 SCRA 1 [1986]; Heirs of Julio Rosas vs. Reyes, 188 SCRA 236 [1990]; Pilipinas Bank vs. Tirona-Liwag,
190 SCRA 834 [1990]).
Mere errors in the appreciation of such evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance
or bad faith, or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision, are irrelevant and immaterial in an
administrative proceeding against him. No one, called upon to try facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice, can be infallible in his judgment. All that is expected of him is that he follow the rules prescribed
to ensure a fair and impartial hearing, assess the different factors that emerge therefrom and bear on the issues
presented, and on the basis of the conclusions he finds established, with only his conscience and knowledge of the
law to guide him, adjudicate the case accordingly (Vda. de Zabala vs. Pamaran, 39 SCRA 430 [1971])."
Pertinently, it may be mentioned that on 26 February 1992, or almost a year before respondent Judge handed down
his subject decision on 8 January 1993, then Judge Narciso T. Atienza of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 16, likewise acquitted the same accused on a similar charge of acts of lasciviousness committed on
one Sarah Jane Lapuz, an aspirant to the track and field team coached by the accused. His decision was never
questioned. Incidentally, Judge Atienza was later elevated to the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the administrative charges of gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
against respondent JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch
12, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.
 
Separate Opinions
ROMERO, J.,  dissenting:
I find it difficult to agree with the majority opinion that the charge against respondent judge be dismissed, thereby
exonerating him from any administrative liability. I am likewise unable to join the decision of my distinguished
colleagues subscribing to the finding of respondent judge that no acts of lasciviousness were committed by the
accused Loreto Gaspar Estrella, Jr. alias "Boy Turko" in Criminal Cases 614-M-89, 615-M-89, 616-M-89 and 617-M-
89.
The Office of the Court Administrator itself, after some four (4) months of investigation and evaluation, noted in its
Report that the "respondent judge in his decision defied human logic because by complying with the supposed DECS
order, there was no need to touch and stroke the girls' private parts," especially as it is not disputed that the accused
did so with pleasure in his eyes. Considering the moral ascendancy amounting to intimidation which the accused had
over the complainants, he may be said to have subdued the free exercise of their will, such dominating compulsion
directed against their chastity resulting in their mental anguish and humiliation. The OCA recommended a
P20,000.00 fine coupled with a stern warning that a repetition thereof would merit a harsher sanction.
The judge himself, in his decision dated January 8, 1993, admitted that "touching the girls' private parts was a
repulsive way of following the silly MEC guideline of determining the age qualification of prospective athletes" for the
girls' volleyball team. Indeed, is there no other, and certainly less "repulsive" way of gauging the fitness of an aspiring
athlete than the tactile?
Moreover, the respondent judge, in his attempt to disprove any lewd designs on the part of the accused, stated:
"Added to this, as already noted, is the fact that he did not touch any of the girls on any other part of her body, like

5
her chest for example, to find out if she already had enlarged breasts." After having invaded the most private, nay,
the most sacred part of a girls' body, any other molestation pales into insignificance.
To my mind, any teacher who uses administrative guidelines of the Ministry of Education as an excuse to satisfy his
lust and inflict his lecherousness on innocent girls deserves strong condemnation from any judge worth the robe he
dons and who is regarded in the community as an upright, moral and just man.
That another case was brought against the accused on a similar charge of acts of lasciviousness on another female
aspirant to the track and field team, even if another misguided judge saw fit to deliver a judgment of acquittal, is
strongly indicative of the propensity of said accused to take advantage of chaste girls under his charge. Such morally
perverse officials from whom the public would expect a higher standard of morality inasmuch as they stand as
guardians of young girls in loco parentis in the school premises should have received more than just a figurative slap
on the wrist (in this case moral damages), from respondent judge. The latter had the opportunity to mete out a
penalty cum a resounding reminder on the accused with respect to his moral responsibilities as a teacher. Sad to
say, he passed up this opportunity. Who is to say who is the worse transgressor, the offender himself or the one who
by virtue of his position of authority could have induced the former to henceforth tread the path of rectitude? We can
only lament the fact that both share the same lax moral standards to the detriment of the present and future crop of
prospective virginal athletes. The judiciary would undoubtedly be better off minus one judge of the questionable
moral scruples of respondent.
 
# Separate Opinions
ROMERO, J.,  dissenting:
I find it difficult to agree with the majority opinion that the charge against respondent judge be dismissed, thereby
exonerating him from any administrative liability. I am likewise unable to join the decision of my distinguished
colleagues subscribing to the finding of respondent judge that no acts of lasciviousness were committed by the
accused Loreto Gaspar Estrella, Jr. alias "Boy Turko" in Criminal Cases 614-M-89, 615-M-89, 616-M-89 and 617-M-
89.
The Office of the Court Administrator itself, after some four (4) months of investigation and evaluation, noted in its
Report that the "respondent judge in his decision defined human logic because by complying with the supposed
DECS order, there was no need to touch and stroke the girls' private parts," especially as it is not disputed that the
accused did so with pleasure in his eyes. Considering the moral ascendancy amounting to intimidation which the
accused had over the complainants, he may be said to have subdued the free exercise of their will, such dominating
compulsion directed against their chastity resulting in their mental anguish and humiliation. The OCA recommended
a P20,000.00 fine coupled with a stern warning that a repetition thereof would merit a harsher sanction.
The judge himself, in his decision dated January 8, 1993, admitted that "touching the girls' private parts was a
repulsive way of following the silly MEC guideline of determining the age qualification of prospective athletes" for the
girls' volleyball team. Indeed, is there no other, and certainly less "repulsive" way of gauging the fitness of an aspiring
athlete than the tactile?
Moreover, the respondent judge, in his attempt to disprove any lewd designs on the part of the accused, stated:
"Added to this, as already noted, is the fact that he did not touch any of the girls on any other part of her body, like
her chest for example, to find out if she already had enlarged breasts." After having invaded the most private, nay,
the most sacred part of a girls' body, any other molestation pales into insignificance.
To my mind, any teacher who uses administrative guidelines of the Ministry of Education as an excuse to satisfy his
lust and inflict his lecherousness on innocent girls deserves strong condemnation from any judge worth the robe he
dons and who is regarded in the community as an upright, moral and just man.

6
That another case was brought against the accused on a similar charge of acts of lasciviousness on another female
aspirant to the track and field team, even if another misguided judge saw fit to deliver a judgment of acquittal, is
strongly indicative of the propensity of said accused to take advantage of chaste girls under his charge. Such morally
perverse officials from whom the public would expect a higher standard of morality inasmuch as they stand as
guardians of young girls in loco parentis in the school premises should have received more than just a figurative slap
on the wrist (in this case moral damages), from respondent judge. The latter had the opportunity to mete out a
penalty cum a resounding reminder on the accused with respect to his moral responsibilities as a teacher. Sad to
say, he passed up this opportunity. Who is to say who is the worse transgressor, the offender himself or the one who
by virtue of his position of authority could have induced the former to henceforth tread the path of rectitude? We can
only lament the fact that both share the same lax moral standards to the detriment of the present and future crop of
prospective virginal athletes. The judiciary would undoubtedly be better off minus one judge of the questionable
moral scruples of respondent.

7
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-58889. July 31, 1986.]

NATHANIEL S. MANIPON, JR., Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, Second Division composed of HON. BERNARDO

P. FERNANDEZ as Acting Presiding Justice and HON. BUENAVENTURA J. GUERRERO and HON. MOISES C.
KALLOS, as Associate Justices, Respondents.

Guillermo B. Bandonill for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for Respondents.

DECISION
FERNAN, J.:
This is a case of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.

In its decision dated September 30, 1981, the Sandiganbayan found accused Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., 31, guilty of
direct bribery, sentenced him to four months and twenty days of arresto mayor with temporary special disqualification
for eight years and one day and a fine of P2,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs.

Manipon came to this Court on petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the judgment of conviction. The
Court dismissed the petition, "the question raised being factual and for lack of merit." 1 However, upon motion for
reconsideration, the Court reconsidered its resolution and gave due course to the petition. 2

The facts of this case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and Benguet, Branch IV, was
assigned to enforce an order of the Minister of Labor dated October 31, 1979 directing the Sheriff of Baguio City or
his deputy to execute the decision of the labor arbiter in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79 entitled "Longog Tabek, et
al v. Harry Dominguez et al" and to make a return within thirty (30) days from said date. 3 The labor arbiter’s decision
ordered Harry Dominguez, a building contractor and the then municipal mayor of Tadian, to pay Longog Tabek and
the other judgment creditors the amount of P2,720.00 with interest, as the balance of their work contract. 4

Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon on November 9, 1979 sent a notice to the Commercial Bank and Trust branch
[Comtrust] in Baguio City garnishing the bank accounts of Dominguez. 5 The bank agreed to hold the accounts. For
one reason or another, Manipon did not inform the labor arbiter of the garnishment nor did he exert efforts to
immediately satisfy the judgment under execution.

On November 12, 1979, Dominguez sought Manipon’s help in the withdrawal of the garnished account. Manipon told
Dominguez that the money could not be withdrawn.

However, on December 27, 1979 when the two met again at the Office of the National Intelligence and Security
Authority [NISA] in Baguio City, Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy the withdrawal so they will have
something for the New Year." 6 Dominguez interpreted this to mean that Manipon would withdraw the garnished
amount for a consideration. Dominguez agreed and they arranged to meet at the bank later in the afternoon. After
Manipon left, Dominguez confided the offer to NISA Sub-Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They then hatched up
a plan to entrap Manipon by paying him with marked money the next day. Col. Sanchez and a Col. Aguana were able

8
to put up P700.00 in fifty peso bills which were then authenticated, xeroxed and dusted with fluorescent powder. 7

Thus, at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of December 28, 1979, Dominguez went to Comtrust as planned.
Manipon showed up with two companions, named Deputy Sheriff Crisanto Flora and Baltazar Pacis. Manipon
delivered his letter to the bank lifting the garnishment. 8 Then Dominguez prepared a withdrawal slip for P2,500.00. 9
As soon as Dominguez received the money from the teller, he took out P300.00 therefrom added it to the P700.00 in
marked bills and handed the total amount of P1,000.00 to Manipon. Then they all left the bank. Dominguez walked
over to his car and drove off. Manipon and his two companions walked down Session Road. Moments later, PC and
NISA operatives accosted them, seized the P1,000.00 from the left breast pocket of Manipon and thereafter brought
them to Camp Dangwa for questioning. Manipon was subjected to an ultraviolet light test and found positive for
fluorescent powder. However, after executing a certification relative to the money recovered, he refused to give any
statement. 10 He filed his sheriff’s return unsatisfied on February 20, 1980 or after 114 days. 11

Originally, Manipon was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 46 for having demanded and received
P1,000.00 from Dominguez, a private individual, for a favor extended by him to the latter, i.e., by not enforcing the
garnishment order issued to Comtrust which was his official duty. However, in an amended information dated
February 16, 1981, the charge was changed to direct bribery under the Revised Penal Code. 12

Manipon was released on bail. When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty. 13

In his brief, Manipon contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him of direct bribery, in not giving
credence to the defense theory that there was novation of the money judgment and in admitting illegally-obtained
evidence.

The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the following elements: (1)
that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or
promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or
any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do, and (4) that the
crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. 14 The promise of a public officer to perform an
act or to refrain from doing it may be express or implied. 15

It is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the crime Manipon was the deputy sheriff of the Court of First
Instance of Benguet and Baguio assigned to implement the execution order issued in NLRC Cass No. RB-1-C-1428-
79. It is also not disputed that Manipon garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust and that he lifted the
same on December 28, 1979 after which he received P1,000.00 from Dominguez.

It is the theory of the defense that the P1,000.00 Manipon collected from Dominguez on December 28, 1979 was not
a bribe but a payment in partial satisfaction of the judgment under execution to which the judgment creditors headed
by Longog Tabek had agreed.

Manipon narrates that during his meeting with Dominguez at the NISA office on December 27, 1979, Dominguez
requested Manipon to convey to the creditors that he was only willing to pay for the time being a partial amount of
P1,000.00, the balance of P1,720.00 to be paid after the New Year. 16 So he visited Longog Tabek who was the
"lead man." Tabek, an illiterate, consented to the lesser amount because he needed money badly. 17 His
arrangements with Tabek and Dominguez were all verbal. At that time he found no reason to have some written
memorandum for his own protection.

At Comtrust after Dominguez had given him the P1,000.00 Manipon made a move to hand him a temporary receipt
but Dominguez brushed it aside and said he was in a hurry. 18

Manipon maintains that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge. He said that in 1978 he and Flora had

9
levied execution against several vehicles owned by Dominguez, an act which the latter had openly resented. 19

The defense theory is so incredible that it leaves no doubt whatsoever in the Court’s mind that Manipon is guilty of
the crime charged.

It is very strange indeed that for such an important agreement that would agreement a final judgment, no one took
the bother of putting it down or paper. Of course Manipon would have us believe that there was no need for it
because he trusted Dominguez and Tabek. And yet did he not also claim that Dominguez had framed him up
because of a grudge? And if there was really an agreement to alter the judgment, why did he not inform the labor
arbiter about it considering that it was the labor arbiter who had issued the order of execution? Manipon could not
give satisfactory explanations because there was no such agreement in the first place.

The temporary receipt 20 adduced by Manipon, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, is a last-minute
fabrication to provide proof of the alleged agreement for the trial payment of the judgment debt. Contrary to
Manipon’s claim, it is hard to believe that Dominguez was not interested in getting said temporary receipt because
precisely that was the proof he needed to show that he had partially complied with his legal obligation.

The testimonies of Crisanto Flora and Longog Tabek are of no help either to the defense. Flora is Manipon’s co-
sheriff and is therefore biased. On the other hand, Tabek, on several occasions on the witness stand, answered with
obvious hesitation, betraying himself to be a rehearsed witness. While he claimed that he was the supposed
headman of the other creditors, he could not present any authority that would allow him to speak for them, let alone
agree to receive a lesser amount in their behalf. He even admitted that he did not know their names. 21

Indeed, Manipon’s behavior at the very outset, had been marked with irregularities. As early as November 9, 1979,
he had already garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust, but he did not notify the labor arbiter so that
the corresponding order for the payment by the bank of the garnished amount could be made and the sum withdrawn
immediately to satisfy the judgment under execution. His lame excuse was that he was very busy in the sheriff’s
office, attending to voluminous exhibits and court proceedings. That was also the same excuse he gave for not
informing the labor arbiter of the novation. In fact he candidly admitted that he never communicated with the NLRC
concerning the garnishment. He returned the writ unsatisfied only on February 20, 1980 although by its express
terms, it was returnable within thirty days from October 29, 1979. 22 Clearly, Manipon had planned to get Dominguez
to acquiesce to a consideration for lifting the garnishment order.

Manipon was also asked about the affidavit he executed during the preliminary investigation. 23 That affidavit
contained two annexes but the temporary receipt which he allegedly prepared on December 28, 1979 was not
included. He said he misplaced it in his office and found it only several weeks after he had made the affidavit. 24 This
leads us to strongly suspect there was actually no temporary receipt at all at the time of payment on December 28
and that it was concocted by the defense as a last-ditch effort to make the authorities believe that what had
transpired was not a payoff but a legitimate partial satisfaction of a judgment debt.

In the final analysis, it all boils down to credibility. In this regard, the prosecution witnesses have acquitted
themselves well. The Sandiganbayan did not err in giving weight and credence to their version instead of Manipon’s.
Indeed, Manipon’s guilt for the crime of direct bribery has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Dwelling on one last point, Manipon has pointed out that the P1,000.00 was illegally seized because there was no
valid search warrant and therefore inadmissible.

The argument is untenable. The rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an
absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to the rule recognized in this jurisdiction. These are: 1) search
incidental to an arrest, 2) search of a moving vehicle, and 3) seizure of evidence in plain view.25cralaw:red

10
In the case at bar, the records show that at about 2:00 p.m. on December 28, 1979, NISA Sub-Station Commander
Colonel Luisito Sanchez held a final briefing among his men and some operatives from the Benguet Philippine
Constabulary concerning the planned entrapment. He had earlier received word from Dominguez that the lifting of the
garnishment would be effected that afternoon and he informed them that Manipon was asking money from
Dominguez. 26 As Colonel Sanchez earlier testified, part of the money to be withdrawn after lifting the garnishment
was to be given to the accused 27 for agreeing to lift the order of garnishment. After the briefing which lasted from
ten to fifteen minutes, they all headed for the Comtrust bank.

NISA Agent Caesar Murla stationed himself near the door of the bank so that he could observe what transpired
inside the bank. 28 He testified that he saw Dominguez give the marked money to Manipon which the latter accepted
and counted. Upon seeing Manipon take the money from Dominguez, Agent Murla gave a signal to some of the
agents positioned nearby by placing his right hand on his head to indicate that the money had changed hands.
Immediately thereafter, Dominguez left the bank, Manipon placed the money in his left breast pocket and followed
suit. As Manipon walked past Murla on his way out, the latter gave another signal by putting his hand on his left
breast to indicate that Manipon had placed the money in his left breast pocket. 29

Upon noticing the second signal, the NISA agents and the PC operatives approached Manipon and his two
companions. After identifying themselves as peace officers, they retrieved the P1,000.00 from Manipon. Through it
all, Manipon remained amazingly silent and voiced no protest. 30

The search and seizure of the P1,000.00 from Manipon would therefore fall within the first exception. The search was
made as an incident to a lawful arrest, in accordance with our pronouncement in Moreno v. Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439,
reiterated in Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which
was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the
means of committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The evident purpose of this exception is both to protect the arresting officer against physical harm from the person
being arrested who might be armed with a concealed weapon and also to prevent the person arrested from
destroying evidence within his reach. 31

Since the other issues raised by Manipon are factual, they need not be discussed here.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is denied for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner
accused Nathaniel Manipon, Jr. The decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 30, 1981 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

11
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-75160. March 18, 1988.]

LEONOR FORMILLEZA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

K.V. Faylona & Associates for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for Respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; REMEDY AVAILABLE TO REVIEW DECISIONS OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN. — Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, governs the procedure through which cases
originating from the Sandiganbayan are elevated to this Court. Under Section 7 thereof, the decisions and final
orders of the Sandiganbayan are subject to review on certiorari by the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. This Court has ruled that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule
45, subject to certain rare exceptions. Simply stated, one way through which a decision or final order of the
Sandiganbayan can be elevated to the Supreme Court is a Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and, as a general
rule, only questions of law may be raised therein.

2. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ALLEGATION OF FACTS DETERMINES CRIME CHARGED. — Going now to the
question of law raised in the instant Petition, We believe that the ruling in People v. Abesamis, (93 Phil. 712) contrary
to the contention of the petitioner, is authority for the view that the allegation of facts, not the denomination of the
offense by the prosecutor, determines the crime charged.

3. ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL;

EXCEPTION. — Indeed, the general rule is that only question of law may be raised in a petition of this character. The
general rule admits exceptions, one of which is when the findings of fact made by the trial court overlooked certain
facts of substance and value and which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. This observation was made
by this curt in Peñaverde v. Sandiganbayan, cited by the Solicitor General.

4. CRIMINAL LAW; INDIRECT BRIBERY; ACCEPTANCE OF GIFT OR CONSIDERATION, ESSENTIAL

INGREDIENT. — The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is
that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration. There must be a clear
intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as his own property from
then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied
by any other sign, circumstance or act to show that the crime of indirect bribery has been committed. To hold
otherwise will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting within their physical
custody some gift money or other property.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; MORAL CERTAINTY, CONSTRUED. — Moral certainty, not absolute certainty, is
needed to support a judgment of conviction. Moral certainty is a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and
conscience of those who are to act upon a given matter. Without this standard of certainty, it may not be said that the
guilt of the accused in a criminal proceeding has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

12
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Petition for review of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan.

The records of the case disclose that petitioner Leonor Formilleza has been with the government service for around
20 years. She was the personnel supervisor of the regional office of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) in
Tacloban City, Leyte since October 1, 1982. Her duties include the processing of the appointment papers of
employees.

On the other hand, a certain Mrs. Estrella Mutia was an employee of the NIA from February, 1978 up to March, 1985.
Her appointment was coterminous with a project of the NIA. On December 31, 1983, her appointment was
terminated. This notwithstanding, she continued working for the NIA pursuant to the verbal instructions of the regional
director of the Administration.

Mrs. Mutia testified that she took steps to obtain either a permanent or at the least a renewed appointment; that when
she approached the regional director about the matter she was advised to see the petitioner who was to determine
the employees to be appointed or promoted; and that the petitioner refused to attend to her appointment papers
unless the latter were given some money.

On February 27, 1984, Mrs. Mutia reported her problem to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) authorities in the
province. The PC officials told her that steps were to be taken to entrap the petitioner. The entrapment equipment
consisted of marked paper money bills worth P100.00. The PC officials concerned were colleagues of the husband of
Mrs. Mutia in the PC.

The first attempt to entrap the petitioner was on February 28, 1984. The plan did not materialize as the petitioner did
not show up at the designated rendezvous at the NIA building canteen.

The second attempt was on February 29, 1984, this time with results. That morning, the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia
met in their service bus on their way to work. The two women supposedly agreed to meet at the canteen later that
morning at 9:00 o’clock. Thereafter, Mrs. Mutia notified the PC authorities who were to arrange the entrapment. The
PC soldiers involved in the arrangement were identified as Sergeants Eddie Bonjoc, Efren Abanes and Ignacio
Labong.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Everyone who was to participate in the entrapment was ready. Mrs. Mutia went to see the petitioner in her office after
which the two of them proceeded to the canteen. Some of their officemates — Mrs. Florida Sevilla and a certain Mrs.
Dimaano — joined them in the canteen. They occupied two square-shaped tables joined together. The petitioner sat
at the head of the table with Mrs. Mutia seated at her left, Mrs. Dimaano at her (the petitioner’s) right and Mrs. Sevilla
at the right of Mrs. Dimaano. Sergeants Bonjoc and Labong sat at another table while Sergeant Abanes was alone in
still another table. The latter brought along a camera in order to take photographs of the entrapment. The marked
money was folded altogether.

Mrs. Mutia maintains that after they had finished taking their snacks, she handed the marked money bills under the
table with her right hand to the petitioner who received the same with her left hand. At that moment, Sergeant Bonjoc
approached the petitioner and held her hand holding the money bills. Sergeant Abanes brought out his camera and
took photographs of the sequence of events. He was able to take seven photographs. 1

The petitioner was arrested by the soldiers despite her objections to the entrapment. She was brought to the PC
crime laboratory in the locality where she was found positive for ultra-violet powder. In the presence of the corporate
counsel of the NIA, the petitioner denied accepting any bride money from Mrs. Mutia.

13
The case was brought to the Sandiganbayan where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9634. Arraigned on
January 10, 1985, the petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and went to trial on May 13, 1985.

In the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution argued that the entrapment arranged by the PC
operatives was necessary because the petitioner was asking money from Mrs. Mutia in consideration for having the
appointment papers of the latter facilitated. On the other hand, the petitioner maintains her innocence — that there
was no entrapment; the scenario was but a scheme set up by Mrs. Mutia and her husband’s colleagues in the PC.
The petitioner denies having accepted the supposed bribe money.

The Sandiganbayan relying on the theory of the prosecution observed in a decision promulgated on July 14, 1986, 2
as follows —

"Upon consideration of the evidence. We find the prosecution’s version credible.

"Two days before the entrapment, Mrs. Mutia complained to the PC authorities about the inaction of the accused on
her appointment papers due to her failure to give grease money. She executed a sworn statement to that effect, . . . It
was the PC who planned the entrapment and supplied the marked money. Sgt. Efren Abanes, who dusted the money
bills with fluorescence powder and who was a member of the entrapment team, witnessed the delivery and receipt of
the money by the accused and the complainant and he saw how the folded money was handed by Mrs. Mutia with
her right hand underneath the table and received by the accused with her left hand. That was also how Mrs. Mutia
described the manner she delivered the money to the accused — the money bills were rolled which she handed to
accused with her right hand underneath the table. Although Sgt. Abanes had a camera with him to photograph the
entrapment, he could not prematurely expose the camera to allow a shot of the actual giving of the money lest the
accused notice his presence and intention and thereby thwart the operation. But after the money had been delivered
and received, he immediately took out his camera and snapped pictures, one of them depicting the accused held by
Sgts. Bonjoc and Labong on the left hand . . ., and another showing the accused also held on the left hand by one of
the PC men, and the complainant, Mrs. Mutia, drinking from a glass . . .

"The fact that Mrs. Mutia’s husband is a PC man himself does not detract from the credibility of Sgt. Abanes who took
part in the entrapment, took pictures, and testified about the incident in court. Sgts. Abanes, Bonjoc and Labong were
not the only public authorities privy to the operation. Capt. Pedro Pates was the one to whom Mrs. Mutia reported the
accused’s demand for money; it was he who broached the idea of entrapping the accused; and it was Major
Fernando Pace who supplied the money and caused it to be marked with powder. It is inconceivable that all these
commissioned and non-commissioned officers had lent themselves to take part in an unholy cabal of falsely
incriminating a female government employee on the mere urging of one of their associates.

"Just as unreasonable is the insinuation that Mrs. Mutia had inveigled the accused to the canteen and resorted to the
insidious machination of planting money in her hand in a simulated entrapment simply because she thought the
accused was not helping her in her application for appointment to a regular item.

"Mrs. Florida Sevilla’s presence on the same table with the complainant and the accused may be conceded. But her
testimony that she did not see anything that took place between the complainant and the accused before the PC
operative pounced upon the accused, and the latter angrily asked the complainant what she was trying to do to her,
does not improve the cause of the defense. As portrayed by the accused, she was at the head of the rectangular
table with the complainant at her left: Mrs. Dimaano at her right, and Mrs. Sevilla next to Mrs. Dimaano. Since the
money, according to the complainant and Sgt. Abanes, was handed to and received by the accused underneath the
table, it is not surprising that Mrs. Sevilla who was two seats away from the accused did not see it." 3

The respondent court ruled that the crime committed by the petitioner was not Direct Bribery as defined in Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code cited in the Information but Indirect Bribery as defined under Article 211 of the same

14
code. Citing the case of People v. Abesamis, 4 the respondent court was of the opinion that she could be convicted
for Indirect Bribery under the Information for Direct Brivery to which she pleaded and entered into trial inasmuch as it
is the allegation of facts rather than the denomination of the offense by the provincial fiscal that determines the crime
charged.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Thus, the respondent court found the petitioner guilty of Indirect Bribery and sentenced her to four months of arresto
mayor, suspension from public office, profession or calling, including the right of suffrage, and public censure.

On August 23, 1986, the petitioner elevated the case to this Court by way of the instant Petition for Review. The
thrust of the Petition is that the conclusions reached by the Sandiganbayan are not supported by the evidence.
Moreover, the petitioner disputes the applicability and/or correctness of the ruling of this Court in People v. Abesamis
relied upon by the respondent court.

As instructed by this Court, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its Comment on the Petition. In opposing the
Petition, the Solicitor General maintains that only questions of law may be raised in the instant case and the
respondent court did not commit any error of law. The Solicitor General also stresses therein that the findings of fact
made by the Sandiganbayan are supported by the evidence on record and deserve full faith and credit. The Solicitor
General adds that the question of credibility is addressed mainly to the trier of facts, in this case, the Sandiganbayan.

The parties submitted subsequent pleadings in support of their stand. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for
decision.

We find merit in the Petition.

Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, governs the procedure through which cases originating from the
Sandiganbayan are elevated to this Court. 5 Under Section 7 thereof, the decisions and final orders of the
Sandiganbayan are subject to review on certiorari by the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. This Court has ruled that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45, subject
to certain rare exceptions. 6 Simply stated, one way 7 through which a decision or final order of the Sandiganbayan
can be elevated to the Supreme Court is a Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and, as a general rule, only questions
of law may be raised therein. The Solicitor General cites the case of Peñaverde v. Sandiganbayan 8 in support of this
view.

Going now to the question of law raised in the instant Petition, We believe that the ruling in People v. Abesamis,
contrary to the contention of the petitioner, is authority for the view that the allegation of facts, not the denomination
of the offense by the prosecutor, determines the crime charged. Anent the argument on the correctness of the ruling,
the petitioner had not succeeded in showing any cogent basis for reversing or modifying the same.

The remaining argument that the judgment of conviction is not supported by the evidence raises a question of fact
inasmuch as the resolution of the issue would require this Court to sort out and re-examine the evidence presented in
the trial. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Peñaverde v. Sandiganbayan, the Solicitor General moves for the denial
of the Petition. The Solicitor General adds that the credibility of witnesses is a matter better left to the appreciation of
the trial court, in this case, the Sandiganbayan.cralawnad

Indeed, the general rule is that only question of law may be raised in a petition of this character. The general rule
admits exceptions, one of which is when the findings of fact made by the trial court overlooked certain facts of
substance and value and which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. This observation was made by this
curt in Peñaverde v. Sandiganbayan, cited by the Solicitor General, to wit —

"With respect to the allegation that there was error on the part of respondent Sandiganbayan in concluding that
petitioners conspired finding was the credibility of witnesses. Pursuant to Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,

15
in relation to Section 2 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are entitled to great
respect and only questions of laws (sic) may be raised to the Supreme Court. Besides, well settled is the rule that the
findings of (the) trial court on credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed unless such findings overlook certain facts
of substance and value which, if considered, might affect (the) results of (the) case." 9

We believe that the exception to the general rule calls for application in this case.

The fundamental axiom underlying a criminal prosecution is that before the accused may be convicted of any crime,
his guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, if there are substantial facts which were overlooked by the
trial court but which could alter the results of the case in favor of the accused, then such facts should be carefully
taken into account by the reviewing tribunal.

In the case before Us, there are substantial facts and circumstances which appear to be favorable to the accused but
which were not carefully considered by the Sandiganbayan. The failure to do so is most unfortunate considering that
the Sandiganbayan is the first and last recourse of the accused before her case reaches the Supreme Court where
findings of fact are generally conclusive and binding.

The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code 10 is that the public
officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part
of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as his own property from then on, such as
putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign,
circumstance or act to show that the crime of indirect bribery has been committed. To hold otherwise will encourage
unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting within their physical custody some gift money or
other property.

Did the petitioner accept the supposed bribe money? The Sandiganbayan noted that the photographs of the
entrapment show that the petitioner was accosted by the PC soldiers after she accepted the marked money. Against
the evidence of the prosecution that the money was handed to petitioner by Mrs. Mutia under the table is the
assertion of petitioner that it was when she stood up that Mrs. Mutia suddenly placed something in her hand which
she did not know to be money and when she saw that it was money she threw it away. 11 An examination of the
seven photographs that were allegedly taken immediately after the passing of the money shows that the petitioner
was standing up when the PC agents apprehended he. This corroborates petitioner’s story. There was no picture
showing petitioner to be seated which should be her position immediately after the money was handed to her under
the table, which should be the case according to the version of the prosecution. 12 None of the photographs show
the petitioner in the process of appropriating or keeping the money after it was handed to her. Two of the seven
photographs that were taken outside the canteen appear to be of no relevance to the operation.

As the petitioner was admittedly handed the money, this explains why she was positive for ultra-violet powder. It is
possible that she intended to keep the supposed bribe money or may have had no intention to accept the same.
These possibilities exist but We are not certain.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

However, what is revealing is that Mrs. Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano were present around the table in the canteen with
the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia when the latter allegedly handed the money to the petitioner. There were other persons
in the premises like the PC agents whose identities petitioner possibly did not know. Under the circumstances and in
such a public place it is not probable that petitioner would have the nerve to accept bribe money from Mrs. Mutia
even under the table. If the petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money from Mrs. Mutia at the canteen,
the petitioner would not have invited her officemate Mrs. Sevilla to join them. Mrs. Sevilla stated she did not see the
alleged passing of the money. She could not have seen the money as it was passed on under the table or when, as
petitioner said, it was quickly placed in her hand when she stood up. What Mrs. Sevilla is sure of is that when they
were about to leave the canteen, two (2) men approached petitioner, one of whom took pictures, and the petitioner
shouted at Mrs. Mutia, "What are you trying to do to me?" 13 The reaction of petitioner is far from one with a guilty

16
conscience.

Moral certainty, not absolute certainty, is needed to support a judgment of conviction. Moral certainty is a certainty
that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon a given matter. 14 Without this
standard of certainty, it may not be said that the guilt of the accused in a criminal proceeding has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.

With all these circumstances taken into account altogether, We are left at a loss as to the guilt of the accused.
Overlooked by the Sandiganbayan, these facts and circumstances make out a good case for the petitioner.

Accordingly, the Court holds that the guilt of the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 9634 has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. She is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 9634 is hereby
SET ASIDE. The petitioner Leonor Formilleza is hereby ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt. We make no
pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

17
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 112761-65. February 3, 1997.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PORFERIO M. PEPITO, Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Dimnatang T . Saro for Accused-Appellant.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; MOTION TO SUSPEND PROSECUTION; DENIAL THEREOF CANNOT BE QUESTIONED
AFTER 15 YEARS OF TRIAL. — On the date scheduled for hearing of appellant’s motion to suspend the
proceedings in his cases pursuant to Section 6 of PD 1082, his counsel failed to appear and substantiate the
allegations in his motion. The trial court proceeded with the hearing of the motion found no merit thereto and denied
the same. Appellant’s counsel received a copy of the Order of denial and was notified of the continuation of the
hearing of said cases. Appellant did not challenge the correctness of this ruling by way of a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals. Instead, he proceeded to adduce evidence in his defense. After more than
fifteen (15) years of trial of his cases, appellant cannot now impugn the Order of the court denying his motion to
suspend his prosecution.

2. CRIMINAL LAW; MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS; ELABORATED. — In cases of malversation of public

funds, the mere failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, is prima facie evidence that he has put such funds or
property to personal use. An accountable officer may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of direct
proof of misappropriation so long as there is evidence of shortage in his accounts which he is unable to explain.
Indeed, to justify conviction for malversation of public funds, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused
received public funds or property and that he could not account for them or did not have them in his possession and
could not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the same.

3. ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS; ALL PRESENT. — In the case at bar, all the elements of malversation of public funds are
present, viz.: (a) the offender is a public officer, (b) he had custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office, (c) these funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable, and (d)
that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence permitted another
person to take them.

4. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; NOT APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. —

For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be appreciated, it must be proven that the accused freely
placed himself at the disposal of law enforcing authorities. The records confirm that appellant was arrested and
detained for the crimes charged upon the issuance of the Order for his arrest. Appellant was only released from
custody upon the approval of his bailbond. Under the circumstances, appellant cannot be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.

18
DECISION

PUNO, J.:
Accused-appellant PORFERIO PEPITO appeals from the Decision of the trial court convicting him of Malversation of
Public Funds through Falsification of Official Documents on five (5) counts.

Appellant, as Acting Postmaster of Iligan City, was charged with misappropriating government funds by manipulating
his records and making it appear that he paid a number of postal money orders although no such payments were
made. Appellant was found short in his cash accounts, as follows: (a) P23,643.73 for October 1975; 1 (b) P11.07 for
December 1975; 2 (c) P7,283.59 for the month of January 1976; 3 (d) P30,052.25 for April 1976, and; 4 (e)
P42,302.97 for May 1976. 5

Except for the dates and amounts involved, appellant was similarly charged in five (5) separate Information 6 as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That sometime during the month of __________, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Porferio Pepito, Acting Postmaster of Iligan City, with official station thereat, and
as such accountable officer, responsible for funds collected and received by him by reason of his position, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and fraudulently and with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, embezzle and
take away government funds in his possession in the amount of __________ accused employing deceit, false
manifestation and fraudulent misrepresentations, manipulated his records to make it appear that on the month of
__________, the Money Order Paid by him was __________, although his payments amounted only to __________,
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts and that by virtue of such falsification in his record of payments,
the said accused successfully appropriated and converted to his own personal use and benefit the sum of
__________, to the damage and prejudice of the Bureau of Post, Manila, Philippines, in the aforementioned amount
of __________.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 217 and Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code."cralaw virtua1aw library

First, the facts. In a letter, 7 dated August 5, 1976, CESAR L. JUAN, Regional Director of the Bureau of Posts,
Region X, Cagayan de Oro City, requested the Office of the City Auditor, Iligan City, to audit the accounts of
appellant PORFERIO PEPITO, Acting Postmaster of Iligan City. Earlier, an audit team from the Office of Regional
Director Juan uncovered certain anomalies regarding appellant’s postal money order transactions at the Iligan City
Post Office. However, due to lack of time, the team failed to determine the exact figure involved in the anomaly.
Hence, their request for assistance from the City Auditor’s Office. 8

Iligan City Auditor FRANCISCO APARECE immediately formed an audit team composed of Assistant City Auditor
HONORIO N. PABLICO and Auditor ROMULO ORBE. 9 They started their audit on August 19, 1976 and
concentrated on the postal money order transactions of appellant. They examined the cash in appellant’s possession
and verified the records of the postal money orders (PMOs), the payment of these checks, and all depository funds of
said post office in government banks and in the Bureau of Posts, Manila, covering the period from July 1, 1975 to
August 9, 1976. 10

Asst. Auditor Pablico outlined the procedure for payment of postal money orders, thus: The postmaster pays the
postal money order (PMO) upon presentation to him. The PMO paid cards, evidencing payment of the PMOs, are
then kept by the postmaster as custodian. The postmaster then prepares a list of the PMOs he paid for a period of

19
fifteen (15) days. Hence, in a month, the postmaster prepares two (2) lists or records of payment: one for the first
fifteen days of the month, and another list for the next fifteen days. The PMO paid cards and the lists are then sent to
the central office of the Bureau of Posts in Manila for safekeeping. A copy of each list is sent to the Regional Office of
the Bureau of Posts, another copy is sent to the City Auditor’s Office and the last copy is retained by the Postmaster
himself. 11

The audit team verified the total amount of PMO payments appearing on the lists or records prepared by appellant.
They totalled the daily PMO payments of appellant and cross-checked them with appellant’s entry on the cash book.
These reveal the total money order payments of appellant for the month. After totalling the PMO payments of the
postmaster per month, the audit team requested the Central Office of the Bureau of Posts in Manila, through its
regional office, to furnish them the PMO paid cards, evidencing payments of the PMOs during the period covered by
their audit. 12

Upon receipt of the PMO paid cards, the audit team cross-checked the paid cards with the record of the PMOs
allegedly paid by appellant. They discovered that some PMOs were listed as paid but were not supported by paid
cards. The audit team uncovered these discrepancies for the months of October and December, 1975 and for the
months of January, April and May, all of 1976. Based on the records, the total PMOs paid by appellant during the
period covered by the audit was P494,720.85, but only P250,090.60 was supported by PMO paid cards. The balance
of two hundred forty-four thousand six hundred thirty pesos and twenty-five centavos (P244,630.25) was disallowed
in audit for lack of supporting documents. Hence, the cash shortage in appellant’s account. 13 Appellant asked the
auditors to double-check their findings but the audit team came out with the same result.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

In a letter 14 dated February 25, 1977, the audit team informed appellant of the shortage in his cash accounts. They
demanded from appellant the immediate restitution of the missing funds and an explanation why no criminal and
administrative sanctions should be taken against him. 15 No action was taken by appellant to restore and explain his
shortage of funds. Hence, five (5) criminal Informations for malversation of public funds through falsification of official
documents were filed against him.

After the prosecution formally offered its evidence and rested its case on December 18, 1978, the continuation of the
hearing for the presentation of the defense evidence was suspended due to the transfer of then Presiding Judge
Leonardo I. Cruz to Angeles City.

It was only after two (2) years, or on August 13, 1982, that continuation of the trial resumed for the presentation of the
defense evidence. However, on the scheduled date of hearing, appellant, through counsel, filed a motion to suspend
the trial 16 on the ground that he has applied for and was conditionally granted an amnesty under P.D. 1082 by the
11th Amnesty Commission of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, for said cases. Appellant prayed that pursuant to Section 6
of P.D. 1082, further proceedings in his cases be held in abeyance pending final approval of his conditional amnesty
by the President of the Philippines.

The fiscal opposed 17 the motion on the ground that the conditional amnesty of appellant was spurious for it was
issued by a person not duly authorized for the purpose.

Resolution of this motion was deferred for six (6) years with the subsequent reorganization of the judiciary and the re-
raffling of appellant’s cases. Finally, in an Order, 18 dated September 9, 1988, appellant’s motion to suspend the trial
of the cases was set for hearing by the new presiding Judge Tago M. Bantuas. However, on the date set, appellant’s
counsel failed to appear. Judge Bantuas continued with the hearing of appellant’s motion and denied appellant’s
motion to suspend the trial. The continuation of the hearing of the cases was set on January 10, 1989. Upon receipt
of the Order and Notice of Hearing, appellant’s counsel, Atty. Dimnatang T. Saro, filed a motion to postpone the
hearing due to conflict of schedule. 19 Hearing was thus reset to February 7, 1989. 20

Again, a series of motions to defer the hearing was filed at appellant’s instance and granted by the trial court. It was

20
only on January 24, 1992 that the new presiding Judge Maximino Magno-Libre issued an Order admitting the
evidence offered by the prosecution. 21 On July 14, 1992, the defense commenced to adduce its evidence and
presented appellant as its lone witness.

On the stand, appellant denied there was shortage in his cash accounts. After he was informed of the missing funds,
he asked the audit team to re-examine the records for his cash on hand has always tallied with his cashbook. His
office had been subjected to various regular audit examinations by different offices, namely: the Bureau of Treasury,
the District Postal Inspector, the Postal Audit Examiners and the Iligan City Auditor’s Office. None of these offices
found any irregularity in his accountabilities. He urged that there must have been some error or inaccuracy in the
conduct of the audit. He further charged that the malversation cases were filed against him for political reasons for
the late Governor Arsenio Quibranza had a grudge against his son-in-law. 22

Appellant admitted that when he was found short in his cash accounts, he applied for amnesty under P.D. 1082.
When he was informed by then Presiding Judge Dalisay and Prosecutor Lagcao that he would have to admit his guilt
in his application for amnesty since amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, he still proceeded with his
application for his friends in Lanao del Sur assured him that his amnesty would be immediately processed and
approved. His conditional amnesty has been granted but it is still pending final approval by the President for allegedly
there is someone in Manila who is blocking the grant of his amnesty. 23

After trial, the court rendered judgment 24 on September 8, 1993 finding appellant guilty of the crime charged. The
dispositive portion reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, in accordance with the provisions of Article(s) 217, 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, the Court finds accused guilty on all the five (5) counts he is charged (with) and is hereby sentenced, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. As to Criminal Case No. 277, since the amount misappropriated is P23,643.73, Accused should be penalized
according to the penalty provided in Paragraph No. 4 of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code which is reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. Since according to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be applied in its maximum period, Accused is meted out a penalty of reclusion perpetua.

"2. As to Criminal Case No. 278, considering that the amount misappropriated was P11.07, according to Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period,
thus, Accused should be meted out the penalty prescribed in Article 171 and in applying the provisions of the
indeterminate sentence law, Accused should be meted the indeterminate prison terms of six (6) years prision
correccional to twelve (12) years prision mayor.

"3. As to Criminal Case No. 274, since the amount malversed was P7,283.79, Accused should be penalized
according to Paragraph No. 3 of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code and should be meted out an indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal.

"4. As to Criminal Case No. 275, considering that the amount misappropriated is P30,052.20, the penalty imposed
should be akin to the penalty prescribed in Criminal Case No. 277 mentioned in Paragraph 1 hereof, which
is reclusion perpetua; and

"5. As to Criminal Case No. 276, considering that the amount subject of malversation is P37,558.30, then the
necessary penalty of reclusion perpetua should also be meted out against accused.

"Finally, Accused is also hereby ordered to pay the government the total sum of P98,549.99, which is the aggregate
government funds actually misappropriated, for restitution in accordance with Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code.

21
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

Hence this appeal where appellant contends that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUSPEND THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASES PENDING FINAL ACTION ON THE CONDITIONAL AMNESTY GRANTED TO
THE APPELLANT;

II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES OF
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THRU FALSIFICATION OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS; AND

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

First. Appellant charges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suspend the proceedings in these cases
pursuant to Section 6 of P.D. 1082. 25 Hence, the proceedings of the trial court are null and void and the judgment of
conviction against him should be vacated.

We do not subscribe to appellant’s contention. On the date scheduled for hearing of his motion, appellant’s counsel
failed to appear and substantiate the allegations in his motion. The trial court proceeded with the hearing of the
motion, found no merit thereto and denied the same. Appellant’s counsel received a copy of the Order of denial and
was notified of the continuation of the hearing of said cases. Appellant did not challenge the correctness of this ruling
by way of a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. 26 Instead, he proceeded to adduce
evidence in his defense. After more than fifteen (15) years of trial of his cases, appellant cannot now impugn the
Order of the court denying his motion to suspend his prosecution. 27

Second. Appellant contends that there was no clear showing that he misappropriated the missing funds. Allegedly,
his office has been regularly audited by different agencies and none has found him short in his accountabilities. He
insists on the inaccuracy of the audit report of the City Auditor’s Office which examined his cash and accounts.

We find no merit in the contention. It is settled that in cases of malversation of public funds, the mere failure of a
public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any
duly authorized officer, is prima facie evidence that he has put such funds or property to personal use. 28 An
accountable officer may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation so long
as there is evidence of shortage in his accounts which he is unable to explain. 29 Indeed, to justify conviction for
malversation of public funds, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused received public funds or property
and that he could not account for them or did not have them in his possession and could not give a reasonable
excuse for the disappearance of the same. 30

In the case at bar, all the elements of malversation of public funds are present, viz: (a) the offender is a public officer,
(b) he had custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office, (c) these funds or property
were public funds or property for which he was accountable, and (d) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented, or through abandonment or negligence permitted another person to take them. 31 Appellant, as Acting
Postmaster of Iligan City has custody of the funds of his Office. A portion of these funds was used in the payment of
postal money orders (PMOs) presented to him. As evidence of these payments, the Postmaster accomplishes the
PMO paid cards and makes a list of the PMOs he paid for a given period. These lists and paid cards are then sent to
the Central Office of the Bureau of Post for safekeeping. An audit of the PMO transactions of appellant, however,
disclosed that some of his PMO payments were not supported by PMO paid cards.

Appellant’s assertion that the audit made by the Office of Iligan City Auditor was inaccurate remains an

22
unsubstantiated allegation. Although appellant insisted on this alleged inaccuracy during the trial, he cannot point to
the specific procedure where the auditors erred in examining his accountabilities. 32 Noticeably, appellant did not
present any document to show that the audit of other government agencies covered also the PMO transactions of the
post office for the same period covered by the audit of the City Auditor.

Appellant also faults the trial court for considering as an admission of guilt his application for amnesty under P.D.
1082. Regardless of this consideration, however, the totality of the prosecution evidence has proved the guilt of
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the auditors and the documentary evidence adduced clearly
proved appellant’s shortage of funds and his corresponding liability therefor as an accountable officer. The
testimonial and documentary evidence of the prosecution were not successfully rebutted by the defense.

Finally, appellant contends that the trial court failed to consider in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. Allegedly, he voluntarily surrendered to the court of justice and posted bail for his provisional liberty before
a warrant for his arrest could be issued.

The rule is clear that for the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be appreciated, it must be proven that
the accused freely placed himself at the disposal of law enforcing authorities. The records confirm that appellant was
arrested and detained by the INP Station of Marawi City for the crimes charged upon the issuance of the Order 33 for
his arrest on February 9, 1978. Appellant was only released from custody 34 upon the approval of his bailbond on
March 27, 1978. Under the circumstances, appellant cannot be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting appellant PORFERIO M. PEPITO for five (5) counts of
Malversation of Public Funds Through Falsification of Official Documents is AFFIRMED. Costs against Appellant.

SO ORDERED.

23
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005
NORMA A. ABDULLA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Convicted by the Sandiganbayan1 in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal use of public funds defined and
penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known as technical malversation,
appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on petition for review under Rule 45.
Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under an Information which pertinently reads:
That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both
public officers, being then the President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason
of their positions and duties are accountable for public funds under their administration, while in the performance of
their functions, conspiring and confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the
Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful
authority, apply for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00),
Philippine Currency, which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school
teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant’s co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and
sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision2 dated August 25, 2000 (promulgated on September 27,2000), as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Mahmud Darkis and Nenita P. Aguil are hereby acquitted of the crime
charged. The cash bond posted by each of the said accused for their provisional liberty are hereby ordered returned
to each of them subject to the usual auditing and accounting procedures.
Accused Norma Abdulla is hereby convicted of the crime charged and is hereby meted a fine of three thousand
pesos, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. She is further imposed the
penalty of temporary special disqualification for a period of six (6) years. She shall also pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellant’s sentence by deleting the temporary
special disqualification imposed upon her, thus:
Premises considered, the decision of this Court dated August 25, 2000, is hereby amended to the effect that the
penalty of temporary special disqualification for six (6) years is hereby cancelled and set aside. Hence, the last
paragraph of said decision shall read as follows:
Accused Abdulla is hereby convicted of the crime charged and is hereby meted a fine of three thousand pesos,
pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. She shall also pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.3

24
Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.
The record shows that the prosecution dispensed with the presentation of testimonial evidence and instead opted to
mark in evidence the following exhibits:
EXHIBITS   DESCRIPTION

     

"A"   Audit Report which is denominated as Memorandum of Commission on

Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga City, from the Office of the Special Audit
Team, COA, dated May 8, 1992, consisting of nine (9) pages;

     

"B"   Certified Xerox copy of a letter from the Department of Budget and
Management through Secretary Guillermo N. Carague to the President of
the Sulu State College dated October 30, 1989;

     

"C"   Certified copy of the DBM Advice of Allotment for the Year 1989;

     

"C-1"   The entry appearing in Exhibit "C" which reads: "Purpose – release
partial funding for the conversion of 34 Secondary School Teacher
positions to Instructor I items; Fund Source – lump-sum appropriation
authorized on page 370 of RA 6688 and the current savings under
personal services;"

     

"D"   Manifestation filed by accused Norma Abdulla herself dated November

24, 1997 consisting of two (2) pages appearing on pages 225 to 226 of
the record;

     

"E"   Motion filed by the accused through Atty. Sandra Gopez dated February
9, 1998 found on pages 382-a and 382-b of the records of this case; and

     

"F"   Prosecution’s Opposition to the motion marked as Exhibit "E" dated

February 11, 1998, consisting of three (3) pages, appearing in pages 383
to 385 of the record.4
Thereafter, the prosecution immediately made its Formal Offer of Evidence, and, with the admission thereof by the
court, rested its case.
The defense proceeded to adduce its evidence by presenting four (4) witnesses, namely, accused Mahmud Darkis,
who was the Administrative Officer of Sulu State College, Jolo, Sulu; accused Nenita Aguil, the Cashier of the same
College; appellant Norma Abdulla herself, who was the College President; and Gerardo Concepcion, Jr., Director IV
and Head of the Department of Budget and Management, Regional Office No. 9, Zamboanga City.

25
The undisputed facts, as found by the Sandiganbayan itself:
The evidence on record xxx show that the request for the conversion of thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers to
Instructor I items of the Sulu State College, through its former president, accused Abdulla, was approved by the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM); that consequent to the approval of the said request, was the
allotment by the DBM of the partial funding for the purpose of paying the salary differentials of the said thirty-four (34)
secondary school teachers in the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) sourced from the "lump sum
appropriation authorized on page 370 of R.A. 6688 [should be page 396 of RA 6688 (General Appropriations Act
January 1 – December 31, 1989)] and the current savings under personal services of said school (Exhibits `B,’ `C’
and `C-1;’ Exhibit `18,’ pp. 32-35; tsn, hearing of September 22, 1998, pp. 6 to 25 and 26); that out of the thirty-four
(34) secondary school teachers, only the six (6) teachers were entitled and paid salary differentials amounting to
P8,370.00, as the twenty-eight (28) teachers, who were occupying Teacher III positions, were no longer entitled to
salary differentials as they were already receiving the same salary rate as Instructor I (Exhibit `A,’ p. 4, par. 1;
Exhibits `1’ to `6,’ inclusive; Exhibit `14-A;’ tsn, hearing of September 22, 1998, pp. 6 to 8; tsn, hearing of September
23, 1998, pp. 10-11); and that the amount of P31,516.16, taken from the remaining balance of the P40,000.00
allotment, was used to pay the terminal leave benefits of the six (6) casuals (Exhibits `D’ and `E;’ Exhibits `7’ to `12,’
inclusive; tsn, hearing of September 22, 1998, pp. 13 and 34; tsn, hearing of September 23, 1998, p. 13).
Accused Abdulla was able to sufficiently justify the payment of the salary differentials of only six (6), out of the thirty-
four (34) teachers, when she testified that out of the thirty-four (34) teachers, twenty-eight (28) were already holding
the position of Secondary School Teacher III receiving the salary of Instructor I; and that the remaining six (6) were
still holding Secondary Teacher II positions and therefore receiving a salary lower than that of Instructor I so they
were paid salary differentials (tsn, hearing of September 23, 1998, pp. 8, 10 and 11). In fact, the notarized audit
investigation report (Exhibit `A,’ p. 4, 1st par.) and the Joint Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao
(Exhibit `14-a’), also point that said act of the accused is justified.
In this recourse, appellant questions the judgment of conviction rendered against her, claiming that the
Sandiganbayan erred:
"I
XXX ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN INVOKING THE PRESUMPTION OF UNLAWFUL INTENT DESPITE
EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.
II
XXX ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT
PETITIONER COMMITTED TECHNICAL MALVERSATION UNDER ARTICLE 220 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE".
The Court grants the appeal.
So precious to her is the constitutional right of presumption of innocence unless proven otherwise that appellant
came all the way to this Court despite the fact that the sentence imposed upon her by the Sandiganbayan was
merely a fine of three thousand pesos, with no imprisonment at all. And recognizing the primacy of the right, this
Court, where doubt exists, has invariably resolved it in favor of an accused.
In a judgment of acquittal in favor of two (2) accused charged of murder in People vs. Abujan,5 the Court wrote:
We are enraged by the shocking death suffered by the victim and we commiserate with her family. But with seeds of
doubt planted in our minds by unexplained circumstances in this case, we are unable to accept the lower court’s
conclusion to convict appellants. We cannot in conscience accept the prosecution’s evidence here as sufficient proof
required to convict appellants of murder. Hence, here we must reckon with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est
absolvendus.  All doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. Nowhere is this rule more compelling than in a

26
case involving the death penalty for a truly humanitarian Court would rather set ten guilty men free than send one
innocent man to the death row. Perforce, we must declare both appellants not guilty and set them free.
Similarly, the Court had to acquit an accused charged of rape in People vs. De Jesus6 on ground of reasonable
doubt, to wit:
With seeds of doubt planted in our minds by the conduct of proceedings on record, we are unable to accept the lower
court’s conclusion to convict appellant. His conviction is founded on the sole testimony of Agnes, but though a
credible witness despite her mental retardation, she showed unnecessary dependence on her mother when
identifying the father of her child. Maternal coaching taints her testimony. That her mother had to be ordered by the
judge to go outside the courtroom impresses us as significant. We are unable to accept as sufficient the quantum of
proof required to convict appellant of rape based on the alleged victim’s sole testimony. Hence, here we must fall
back on a truism of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus.  All doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated May 26, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant RUBEN LUMIBAO is ACQUITTED of the charge of rape on reasonable
doubt.
The Court’s faithful adherence to the constitutional directive imposes upon it the imperative of closely scrutinizing the
prosecution’s evidence to assure itself that no innocent person is condemned and that conviction flows only from a
moral certainty that guilt has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the words of People vs.
Pascua7 :
Our findings in the case at bar should not create the mistaken impression that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses should always be looked at with askance. What we are driving at is that every accused is presumed
innocent at the onset of an indictment. But, it has often happened that at the commencement of a trial, people’s
minds, sometimes judges too, would have already passed sentence against the accused. An allegation, or even any
testimony, that an act was done should never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really done. Proof must be
closely examined under the lens of a judicial microscope and only proof beyond reasonable doubt must be allowed to
convict. Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied.
We shall now assay appellant’s guilt or innocence in the light of the foregoing crucibles.
In her first assigned error, appellant contends that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove criminal intent
on her part. When she raised this issue in her Motion for Reconsideration before the Sandiganbayan, that court,
invoking Section 5 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, ruled in a Resolution8 promulgated on September 17, 2001, as
follows:
Anent the allegation of the movant/accused that good faith is a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation as it
would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused which the prosecution failed to prove, attention is invited to
pertinent law and rulings of the Supreme Court on the matter.
Sec. 5(b) of the Rule 131, Rules of Court, provides, `That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent.’
Hence, dolo may be inferred from the unlawful act. In several cases (Tria, 17 Phil. 303; Ballesteros, 25 Phil. 634; Sia
Tioan, 54 Phil. 52; Cueto, 38 Phil. 935; Cubelo, 106 Phil. 496), the Supreme Court ruled that `When it has been
proven that the appellants committed the unlawful acts alleged, it is properly presumed that they were committed with
full knowledge and with criminal intent, `and it is incumbent upon them to rebut such presumption.’ Further, the same
court also ruled that when the law plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by a person, the law implies the
guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law which he had violated (State
vs. McBrayer, 98 NIC 619; Sing Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil. 577, 580; Hermenigildo Bautista, CA 40 O.G. 5th
Supp. 139). If the act is criminal, then criminal intent is presumed (Francisco y Martin, CA 53 O.G. 1450).
In the case at bar, inasmuch as the prosecution had proved that a criminal act was committed by the accused under
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal intent was presumed. The accused did not present any evidence to

27
prove that no such criminal intent was present when she committed the unlawful act of technical malversation.
Hence, the presumption that the unlawful act of the accused was done with criminal intent had been satisfactorily
proven by the prosecution (Sec. 5[b], Rule 131).
The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance on Section 5 (b) of Rule 131 as basis for its
imputation of criminal intent upon appellant.
For sure, the procedural rule relied upon does not apply at all to this case. Indeed, clear it is from its very language
that the disputable presumption of the existence of unlawful or criminal intent presupposes the commission of
an unlawful act. Thus, intent to kill is presumed when the victim dies because the act of killing clearly constitutes an
unlawful act. In People vs. Gemoya,9 the Court held:
The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death, unless the accused proves by convincing evidence that
any of the justifying circumstances in Article 11 or any of the exempting circumstances in Article 12, both of the
Revised Penal Code, is present.
In fact, in a Resolution penned by Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. in People vs. Delim, 10 the Court en banc categorically
stated:
If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. (Emphasis
supplied).
Similarly, intent to gain or animus lucrandi  is presumed when one is found in possession of stolen goods precisely
because the taking of another’s property is an unlawful act. So it is that in People vs. Reyes,11 the Court held:
Accused-appellant’s contention that the animus lucrandi was not sufficiently established by the prosecution is devoid
of merit. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the
offender. Although proof of motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the robbery is circumstantial, intent
to gain or animus lucrandi may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless
special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The intent to gain may be presumed
from the proven unlawful taking. In the case at bar, the act of taking the victim’s wristwatch by one of the accused
Cergontes while accused-appellant Reyes poked a knife behind him sufficiently gave rise to the presumption.
The presumption of criminal intent will not, however, automatically apply to all charges of technical malversation
because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se  not  an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to
have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its employees in the form
of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws. Thus, in a similar
case,12 the Court reversed a conviction for technical malversation of one who paid out the wages of laborers:
There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose – payment of the wages of laborers working on
various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers’ wages enjoy as claims
against the employers’ funds and resources.
In the absence of any presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of proving by competent evidence that appellant’s
act of paying the terminal leave benefits of employees of the Sulu State College was done with criminal intent rests
upon the prosecution.
The Court notes the odd procedure which the prosecution took in discharging its undertaking to prove the guilt of
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. As it is, the prosecution did not present any single witness at all, not even for the
purpose of identifying and proving the authenticity of the documentary evidence on which it rested its case. The
prosecution definitely failed to prove unlawful intent on the part of appellant.
Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness
of the defense. The weakness of the defense does not relieve it of this responsibility. And when the prosecution fails
to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of an accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.

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A judgment of conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty. It is thus required that every circumstance
favoring his innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason and
the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. There must be moral certainty in an unprejudiced
mind that it was accused-appellant who committed the crime. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean
exoneration for accused-appellant.13
The Sandiganbayan’s improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day for the prosecution’s
deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption
of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent, this Court has no basis to affirm appellant’s conviction.
x x x. This calls to mind the oft-repeated maxim `Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea,’ which expounds a basic
principle in criminal law that a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be
innocent. Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied
by a criminal intent. It is true that a presumption of criminal intent may arise from proof of the commission of a
criminal act; and the general rule is that if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal act charged, it will be
presumed that the act was done with criminal intention and that it is for the accused to rebut this presumption. But it
must be borne in mind that the act from which such presumption springs must be a criminal act In the case at bar, the
act is not criminal. Neither can it be categorized as malum prohibitum,  the mere commission of which makes the doer
criminally liable even if he acted without evil intent.14
The second assigned error refers to the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence of all the essential elements
of the crime of technical malversation defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, which are:
"1. That the offender is a public officer;
"2. That there is public fund or property under his administration;
"3. That such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance;
"4. That he applies the same to a public use other than that for which such fund or property has been appropriated by
law or ordinance."15
Appellant contends that the prosecution was unable to prove the second and third elements of the crime
charged. 16 She argued that the public funds in question, having been established to form part of savings, had
therefore ceased to be appropriated by law or ordinance for any specific purpose.
The Court finds merit in appellant’s submission.
As found by the Sandiganbayan no less, the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) originally intended to
cover the salary differentials of thirty four (34) secondary school teachers whose employment status were converted
to Instructor I, were sourced from the "lump sum appropriation" authorized on page 370 (should be page 396) of R.A.
6688 and the current savings under personal services of said school.17
The pertinent portions of RA 6688 are reproduced hereunder:
"K.2 Sulu State College
For general administration, administration of personnel benefits, salary standardization, higher education and
secondary education services, including locally-funded project as indicated
hereunder…………………………………………………..…P 17,994,000
New Appropriations, by Function/Project
Current Operating
Expenditures

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-----------------------------------
  Personal Maintenance Capital Total
Services and Other Outlays
Operating -------------------
-------------------- Expenses -------------------

-------------------

         

A. Functions        

         

1. General Administration P 1,605,000 P 1,196,000 P P 2,801,000

and Support Services

         

2. Administration of 608,000     608,000

Personnel Benefits

         

3. Salary Standardization 57,000     57,000

         

4. Higher Education 1,967,000 577,000   2,544,000

Services

         

5. Secondary Education 2,636,000 736,000   3,372,000

Services
------------------ ----------------- -----------------

Total, Functions 6,873,000 2,509,000   9,382,000

  ------------------ -----------------   -----------------

         

B. Locally-Funded Project        

         

1. Acquisition and ------------------ ----------------- 8,612,000 8,612,000

Improvements of Lands,
Construction, ------------------ -----------------
Rehabilitation or
Renovation of Buildings
and Structures, and
Acquisition of Equipment

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 Total New Appropriations, P 6,873,000 P 2,509,000 P 8,612,000 P17,994.000
Sulu State College
========== ========== ========== ==========
xxxxxxxxx
New Appropriations, by Object of Expenditures
(In Thousand Pesos)

A. Functions/Locally-Funded Project

Current Operating Expenditures  

Personal Services  

Total Salaries of Permanent Personnel 4,148

Total Salaries and Wages of Contractual and Emergency Personnel 146

Total Salaries and Wages 4,294

Other Compensation

Honoraria and Commutable Allowances 185

Cost of Living Allowances 1,292

Employees Compensation Insurance Premiums 44

Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 35

Medicare Premiums 18

Merit Increases 20

Salary Standardization 37

Bonuses and Incentives 511

Others 437

   

Total Other Compensation 2,579

O1 Total Personal Services 6,873

The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the
Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public
fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of
Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary
differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The Court has unequivocably ruled in Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan18 that in the absence of a law or ordinance
appropriating the public fund allegedly technically malversed (in that case, the absence of any law or ordinance

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appropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting of Barangay Jalung Road), the use thereof for another public purpose
(there, for the payment of wages of laborers working on projects other than the Barangay Jalung Road) will not make
the accused guilty of violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary
differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot
be held guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating
said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed decision and resolution of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23261 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant ACQUITTED of the
crime charged against her. The cash bond posted by appellant for her provisional liberty, if any, is ordered returned
to her subject to the usual auditing and accounting procedures.
SO ORDERED.

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