EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES: INSANITY

G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.

Carlos S. Tan for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores, municipality of Ormoc, Leyte.
On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors were entertained in the
house. Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to
sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried
to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and
tried to attack his father after which he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then seven months
pregnant, died five days later as a result of her wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the
mother's womb.

An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he was sentenced by the
trial court to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum
of P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.

It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the defendant had a quarrel over
a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight, and when
he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the commission of the
crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the afternoon he had a severe
stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was then when he fell asleep. The defendant
states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla
held his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come
down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him
that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself.
As his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.

The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife, but that he loved her
dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for assaulting them.

Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged, were not
voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.

In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a motive for
committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not known to
us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden away and
inaccessible to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme moral perversion may lead a
man commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. But under the special
circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking
into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under whose
protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as may be
inferred from the evidence presented, we find not only a lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit
the acts complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts.

Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that considering
the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of an hallucination
and not in his right mind.

We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the deceased was direct result of
the defendant's act performed in order to inflict it. Nevertheless we may say further that the evidence does not
clearly show this to have been the case, but that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody saw how the
wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his wife. He only seemed to have heard her
say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted
the defendant at the door of the room as he was coming out. The defendant did not dream that he was
assaulting his wife but he was defending himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really
wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.
In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the courts finds that the
defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be confined
in the Government insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds that his
liberty would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Street, Ostrand, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.
 G.R. No. L-45130 February 17, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant.

Undersecretary of Justice for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:

On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an information charging Celestino
Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with the crime of murder, committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused,
with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any
justifiable motive and with the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison, attack, assault and stab the said
Carlos Guison on the different parts of his body with a knife, thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries, to
wit:

"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the superior surace of the right lobe of
the liver; and three non-penetrating stab wounds located respectively at the posterior and lateral lumbar region,
and left elbow", which directly caused the death of the said Carlos Guison three days afterwards.

On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused. The defense counsel forthwith
objected to the arraignment on the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time
confined in the Psychopatic Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order requiring the Director of the Hospital
to render a report on the mental condition of the accused. Accordingly, Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant alientist,
rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On March 23, 1935, the case was again called for the
arraignment of the accused, but in view of the objection of the fiscal, the court issued another order requiring
the doctor of the Psyhopatic Hospital who examined the defendant to appear and produce the complete record
pertaining to the mental condition of the said defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared
before the court on March 26, 1935 for the necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution and the defense
asked the court to summon the other doctors of the hospital for questioning as to the mental condition of the
accused, or to place the latter under a competent doctor for a closer observation. The trial court then issued an
order directing that the accused be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant alienist of the Psychopatic
Hospital for his personal observation and the subsequent submission of a report as to the true mental condition
of the patient. Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his report,
Exhibit 5, on June 11, 1935. On June 28, 1935, the case was called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared before the
court and ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating that the accused was not in a condition to defend himself. In view
thereof, the case was suspended indefinitely.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant could be discharged from the
hospital and appear for trial, as he was "considered a recovered case." Summoned by the court, Dr.
Fernandez, appeared and testified that the accused "had recovered from the disease." On February 27, 1936,
the accused was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had.
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the information above-quoted
and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to
pay the costs.

The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following assignment of errors:

A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the accused has had dementia only
occasionally and intermittently and has not had it immediately prior to the commission of the defense.
B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case further shows that during and immediately
after the commission of the offense, the accused did not show any kind of abnormality either in behavior,
language and appearance, or any kind of action showing that he was mentally deranged.
C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that burden was on the defense to show hat
the accused was mentally deranged at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the defense did not
establish any evidence to this effect.
D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and in not acquitting him thereof.

It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino Bonoan met the now deceased
Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at
the time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech turned around and saw
the accused withdrawing his right hand, which held a knife, from the side of Guison who said, also in Tagalog,
"I will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him and then stabbed Guison thrice on the left
side. The assaultt was witnessed by policeman Damaso Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan
and took possession of the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine General Hospital where he died
two days later. Exhibit C is the report of the autopsy performed on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los
Angeles.

As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does not seem necessary to indulge in
any extended analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The defense set up being that of
insanity, the only question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the defendant-appellant was insane
at the time of the commission of the crime charged.

On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental corollaries as to the legal
presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence required, theories abound and authorities are in sharp
conflict. Stated generally, courts in the United States proceed upon three different theories. (See Herzog, Alfred
W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in Criminal Cases, p.
11 et seq.) The first view is that insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance and as must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt when the commission of a crime is established, and the defense of insanity is not
made out beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the time of
committing the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the ground of
insanity (Hornblower, C. J., in State vs. Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The second view is that an affirmative
verdict of insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity is not to be
established beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence" (10th ed.,vol. I, sec.
338), this is the rule in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. vs. Higginson, 1 Car. & K., 130), and
in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. The third view is that the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt (Dais vs. United States, 160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs.
United States, 186 U. S., 413; 46 Law. ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States vs. Lancaster, 7 Biss.,
440; Fed. Cas. No. 15,555; United States vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This liberal view is premised on the
proposition that while it is true that the presumption of sanity exists at the outset, the prosecution affirms every
essential ingredients of the crime charged, and hence affirms sanity as one essential ingredients, and that
a fortiori where the accused introduces evidence to prove insanity it becomes the duty of the State to prove the
sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs. Bacos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).
The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime, but insanity is presumed, and ". . . when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the
defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. . . ." (U. S. vs. Martinez
[1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We affirm and reiterate this doctrine.

In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane at the time he killed the
deceased, the obligation of proving that affirmative allegation rests on the defense. Without indulging in fine
distinctions as to the character and degree of evidence that must be presented sufficiently convincing evidence,
direct or circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the judicial mind that the accused was insane at the time of
the perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is
permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind a reasonable period both before and after that time.
Direct testimony is not required (Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo., 404; 35 S. W.,
1145; State vs. Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E., 14; People vs. Tripler, I
Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of derangement essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to
established insanity as a defense. Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts,
the motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to the practice of
people of sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore, cicumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffice
(People vs. Bascos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).
The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at the time of the commission of the
act for which he was prosecuted on the theory that the insanity was only occassional or intermittent and not
permanentor continuous (32 C. J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are appraised of the danger of indulging in the
preseumption ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or spasmodic insanity.We appreciate the reason forthe
contrary rule. To be sure, courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity,
mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane
murderers escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not
cconcerned with connecting two or more attacks of insanity to show the continuance thereof during the
intervening period or periods but with the continuity of a particular and isolated attack prior to the commission of
the crime charged, and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately following the commission of the
act complained of. Upon the other hand, there are facts and circumstances of record which can not be
overlooked.The following considerations have weighed heavily upon the minds of the majority of this court in
arriving at a conclusion different from that reached by the court below:.
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the prosecution, it appears that the herein
defendant-appellant, during the periods from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to January 10,
1926, was confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a disease diagnosed
as dementia præcox. His confinement during these periods, it is true, was long before the commission of the
offense on December 12, 1934, but this is a circumstance which tends to show that the recurrence of the
ailment at the time of the occurence of the crime is not entirely lacking of any rational or scientific foundation.

(b) All persons suffering from dementia præcox are clearly to be regarded as having mental disease to a
degree that disqualifies them for legal responsibility for their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico-Legal Relations
by Dr. Albert M. Barrett in Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology, vol. I, p. 613).
According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Insular Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms of dementia
præcox, in certain peeriods of excitement, are similar to those of manic depresive psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.)
and, in either case, the mind appears "deteriorated" because, "when a person becomes affected by this kind of
disease, either dementia præcox or manic depresive psychosis, during the period of excitement, he has no
control whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if viewed under the general medico-legal classification of
manic-depressive insanity, "it is largely in relation with the question of irrestible impulse that forensic relations
of manic actions will have to be considered. There is in this disorder a pathologic lessening or normal
inhibitions and the case with which impulses may lead to actions impairs deliberations and the use of normal
checks to motor impulses" (Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol, I,
p. 617).

(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, at one time an interne at San
LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately preceding December 12, 1934 — the date when the crime was
committed — the defendant and appellant had "an attack of insomnia", which is one of the symptoms of, and
may lead to, dementia præcox (Exhibit 3, defense testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).
(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the police station on the very same
day of the perpetration of the crime, and although attempted were made by detectives to secure a statement
from him (see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was sent by the police
department to the Psychopathic Hospital the day following the commission of the crime. This is an indication
that the police authorities themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the acused, which doubt found
confirmation in the official reports submitted by the specialists of the San Lazaro Hospital.

(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio Joson, which report was made within
the first month of treatment, the defendant was suffering from a form of psychosis, called manic depressive
psychosis.We quote the report in full:

INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL

MANDALUYONG, RIZAL
January 15, 1935.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic

Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,

Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the
Secret Service of the City of Manila
for mental examinition.

1. MENTAL STATUS:

(a) General behavior. — The patient is undetective, staying most of the time in his bed with his eyes closed and
practically totally motionless. At other times, however, but on very rare occassions and at short intervals he
apparently wakes up and then he walks around, and makes signs and ritualistic movements with the
extremities and other parts of the body. Ordinarily he takes his meal but at times he refuses to take even the
food offered by his mother or sister, so that there have been days in the hospital when he did not take any
nourishment. On several occassions he refused to have the bath, or to have his hair cut and beard shaved, and
thus appear untidy. He would also sometimes refuse his medicine, and during some of the intervals he
displayed impulsive acts, such as stricking his chest or other parts of the body with his fists and at one time
after a short interview, he struck strongly with his fist the door of the nurse's office without apparent motivation.
He also sometimes laughs, or smiles, or claps his hands strongly without provocation.

(b) Stream of talk. — Usually the patient is speechless, can't be persuaded to speak, and would not answer in
any form the questions propounded to him. Very often he is seen with his eyes closed apparently praying as he
was mumbling words but would not answer at all when talked to. At one time he was seen in this condition with
a cross made of small pieces of strick in his hand. He at times during the interviews recited passages in the
literature as for example the following.

"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del hombre. (Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty
are among the attributes of a dependable character.)"
At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the hospital.

(c) Mood. — Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times he looks anxious and rather irritable. He
himself states that the often feels said in the hospital.

(d) Orientation. — During the periods that he was acccessible he was found oriented as to place and person
but he did not know the day or the date.

(e) Illusion and hallucination. — The patient states that during the nights that he could not sleep he could hear
voices telling him many things. Voices, for example, told that he should escape. That he was going to be killed
because he was benevolet. That he could sometimes see the shadow of his former sweetheart in the hospital.
There are times however when he could not hear or see at all anything.

(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. — On one occassion he told the examiner that he could not talk in his first
day in the hospital because of a mass he felt he had in his throat. He sometimes thinks that he is already dead
and already buried in the La Loma Cemetery.

(g) Compulsive phenomena. — None.

(h) Memory. — The patient has a fairly good memory for remote events, but his memory for recent events or for
example, for events that took place during his stay in the hospital he has no recollection at all.

(i) Grasp of general informartion. — He has a fairly good grasp of general information. He could not, however,
do simple numerial tests as the 100-7 test.
( j) Insight and judgment. — At his fairly clear periods he stated that he might have been insane during his first
days in the hospital, but just during the interview on January 14, 1935, he felt fairly well. Insight and judgment
were, of course, nil during his stuporous condition. During the last two days he has shown marked
improvement in his behavior as to be cooperative, and coherent in his speech.

2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:

The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found suffering from a form of physchosis,
called Manic depressive psychosis.
(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D.
Assistant Alienist

In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, another assistant
alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital, the following conclusion was reached:

I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering from the Manic Depressive form of
psychosis. It might be premature to state before the court has decided this case, but I believe it a duty to state,
that this person is not safe to be at large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a personality lacking in
control, overtly serious in his dealings with the every day events of this earthly world, taking justice with his own
hands and many times executing it in an impulsive manner as to make his action over proportionate — beyond
normal acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly religious, too idealistic has taste and desires as to make him queer
before the average conception of an earthly man.
He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of realities.

(Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist

To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime, the prosecution called on policeman Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that upon
arresting the defendant-appellant he inquired from the latter for the reason for the assault and the defendant-
appellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55 and would pay; that appellant bought the knife,
Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had been watching for Guison in order to
kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also called and corroborated the testimony of
policeman Arnoco. That such kind of evidence is not necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during the
commission of the offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine,
University of Edinburg, said in his work on Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type
of dementia præcox, "the crime is ussually preceded by much complaining and planning. In these people,
homicidal attcks are common, because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that their
property is being taken."

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was demented at the time he
perpetrated the serious offense charged in the information and that conseuently he is exempt from criminal
liability. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-appellant acquitted,
with costs de oficio in both instances. In conforminty with paragraph 1 of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code,
the defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such other hospital for the insane as may
be desiganted by the Director of the Philippine Health Service, there to remain confined until the Court of First
Instance of Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

IMPERIAL, J., dissenting:

I agree with the dissenting opinions of Hustices Diaz and Concepcion.

There is not question as to the facts constituting the crime imputed to the accused. The disagreement arises
from the conclusions which both opinions attempt to infer therefrom. The majority opinon establishes the
conclusion that the accused was not in his sound mind when he committed the crime because he was then
suffering from dementia præcox. The dissenting opinions, in establishing the conclusion that the accused was
then in the possession of his mental facilities, or, at leats, at a lucid interval, are based on the fact admitted by
the parties and supported by expert testimony, that the accused, before the commission of the crime, had been
cured of dementia præcox and later of manic depressive psychosis. The majority opinion admits that there is
no positive evidence regarding the mantal state of the accused when he comitted the crime, but it infers from
the facts that he must have then been deprived of his reason. This inference is not sufficiently supported by the
circumtantial evidence. I it is admitted that the legal presumption is that a person who commits a crime is in his
right mind (U. S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil., 62; U. S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil., 547; U. S. vs. Zamora, 32
Phil., 218; U. S. vs. Martinez, 34 Phil., 305; People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil., 204), because the law presumes all
acts and ommissions punishable by law to be voluntary (art. 1, Penal Code; article 4, subsection 1, Revised
Penal Code), and if, as it appears, there is sufficient or satisfactory evidence that the accused was mentally
incapacitated when he committed the crime, the conclusion of fact must be the same presumption established
by law, that is, that he was in his right mind, and the conclusion of law must be that he is criminal liable.

There is another detail worth mentioning which is that no credit was given to the conclusions of fact arrived at
by the judge who tried the case. He observed and heard the witnesses who testified and he had the advantage
of testing their credibility nearby. After weighing all the evidence he arrived at the conclusion that the accused
committed the crime while he was in his right mind. This court generally gives much weight to the conclusions
of fact of the judge who tried the case in the first instance and does not reject them useless they are clearly in
conflict with the evidence.
DIAZ, J., dissenting:

I do not agree to the majority opinion. The appellant committed the crime while he was sane, or at least, during
a lucid interval. He did not kill his victim without rhyme or reason and only for the sake of killing him. He did so
to avenge himself or to punish his victim for having refused, according to him, to pay a debt of P55 after having
made him many promises. He so stated clearly to the policeman who arrested him immediately after the
incident; and he made it so understood to the witness Mariano Yamson, a friend of both the appellant and his
victim, before the commission of the crime.
The law presumes that everybody is in his sound mind because ordinarily such is his normal condition. Insanity
is an exception which may be said to exist only when thereis satisfactorily evidence establishing it and it
certainly is not always permanent because there are cases in which it comes and takes place only occasionaly
and lasts more or less time according to the circumstances of the individual, that is, the condition of his health,
his environment, and the other contributory causes thereof. The law itself recognizes this, so much so that in
establishing the rule that insane persons are excempt from criminal liability, because they commit no crime, it
also makes the exception that this is true only when they have not acted during a lucid intervals (art. 12,
subsec. 1, of the Revised Penal Code).

The appellant was afflicted with insanity only for a few days during the months stated in the majority opinion;
April 1922 and January 1926, but he was later pronounced cured in the hospital where he had been confined
because he had already returned to normalcy by recovering his reason. For this one fact alone, instead of
stating that he acted during a lucid interval on said occasion, it should be said on the contrary, taking into
consideration the explanations given by him to the policemen who arrested him and to other witnesses for the
prosecution with whom he had been talking before and after the incident, that he acted while in the full
possession of his mental faculties.

The fact that the appellant was aflicted with manic depressive psychosis after the crime, as certified by Drs.
Toribio Joson, J. A. Fernandez and Elias Domingo who examined him, does not prove that he was so afflicted
on the date and at the time of the commission of the crime nor that said ailment, taking for granted that he was
suffering therefrom, had deprived him of his reason to such an extent that he could not account for his acts.

There is no evidence of record to show that the appellant was actually insane when he committed the crime or
that he continued to be afflicted with said ailment for which he had to be confined in the insane asylum for
some days during the months above-stated, in 1922 and 1926. The most reasonable rule which should be
adopted in these cases is the one followed by various courts of the United States stated in 32 C. J., 757,
section 561, and 16 C. J., 538, 539, section 1012 as follows:
If the insanity, admitted, or proved, is only occassional or intermittent in its nature, the presumption of its
continuance does not arise, and he who relies on such insanity proved at another time must prove its existence
also at the time alleged. (32 C. J., 757, sec. 561.)

Where it is shown that defendant had lucid intervals, it will be presumed that the offense was committed in one
of them. A person who has been adjudged insane, or who has been committed to a hospital or to an asylum for
the insane, is presumed to continue insane; but as in the case of prior insanity generally, a prior adjudication of
insanity does not raise a presumption of continued insanity, where the insanity is not of a permanent or
continuing character, or where, for a considerable period of time, the person has been on parole from the
hospital or asylum to which he was committed, or where he escaped from the asylum at a time when he was
about to be discharged. (16 C. J., 538, 539, sec. 1012.)

On the other hand, in Clevenger's Medical Jirusprudence of Insanity (vol. 1, pp. 482 and 484, the following
appears:

Fitful and exceptional attacks of insanity are not presumed to be continuous. And the existence of prior or
subsequent lunacy, except where it is habitual, does not suffice to change the burden of proof. And where an
insane person has lucid intervals offenses committed by him will be presumed to have been committed in a
lucid intervals unless the contrary appears. The maxim "Once insane presumed always to be insane" does not
apply where the malady or delusion under which the alleged insane person labored was in its nature accidental
or temporary, or the effect of some sickness or disease.

And in order to raise a presumption of continuance it must be of permanent type or a continuing nature or
possessed of the characteristics of an habitual and confirmed disorder of the mind. And it must appear to have
been of such duration and character as to indicate the probability of its continuance, and not simply the
possibility or probability of its recurrence. And there should be some evidence tending to show settled insanity
as contradistinguished from temporary aberration or hallucination, to justify an instruction which does nor
recognize such a distinction.

It is alleged that the appellant was suffering from insomia before he committed the crime in question. Such
condition does not necessarily prove that on the day in question he was actually insane. Insomia, according to
Dr. Elias Domingo, is not an exlcusive symptom of insanity; other diseases and ailments also have it (t. s. n.,
p.19).

In view of the foregoing considerations and of those stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Concepcion, I
vote for the affirmance of the appealed sentence, because in my opinion it is supported by the evidence and in
accordance with law.
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:

I dissent: Above all, I wish to state: (1) that the crime committed by the accused is an admitted fact; and (2) that
I adhere to the statement of the majority that it is settled in this jurisdiction that a defense based upon the
insanity of the accused should be established by means of clear, indubitable and satisfactory evidence.

On December 12, 1934, the accused stabbed the deceased Carlos Guison who, as a result the wounds
received by him, died in the hospital two days after the aggression.

It is alleged that the accused was insane at the time he committed this crime. What evidence is there of record
in support of this defense? Mention has been made of the fact that the accused had been confined in the san
Lazaro Hospital and later in the Psychopathic Hospital. He was confined in the San Lazaro Hospital from April
11 to April 26, 1922. He returned to the hospital on January 6, 1926, and left on the 10th of said month and
years. Dr Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital was questioned as follows:

Q. When he left the hospital, can you state whether he was already completely cured of his insanity? — A. He
wassocially adjustable.

Q. What do you mean by socially adjustable? — A. That he could adapt himself to environment.
There is no evidence that from the month of January, 1926, when he was declared cured at the Psychopathic
Hospital, to December 12, 1934, the date of the crime, he had shown signs of having had a relapse. Therefore
it is a proven fact during the long period of nine years the accused had been sane.

It is alleged, however, that four days before the crime the accused was under treatment by Dr. Celedonio S.
Francisco because he was suffering from insomia. Dr. Francisco admitted that he was not a specialist in mental
diseases. He is, therefore, disqualified from testifying satisfactorily on the mental condition of the accused four
days before the crime; and in fact neither has Dr. Francisco given any convincing testimony to prove that when
the accused was under treatment by him he was suffering from dementia præcox, as the only thing he said was
that the accused-appellant had an attack of insomia which is one of the symptoms of and may lead to dementia
præcox (Exhibit 3; t. s. n., pp. 13, 14). This is not an affirmation of a fact but of a mere possibility. The
innoncence of the accused cannot be based on mere theories or possibilities. To prove insanity as a defense,
material, incontrovertible facts, although circumstantial, are necessary.

On the contrary the evidence shows that on the day the accused committed the crime he talked and behaved
as an entirely normal man. Policemen Damaso T. Arnoco and Benjamin Cruz testified that the accused, after
having been asked why he had attacked Carlos Guison, replied that it was because Guison owed him P55 for a
long time and did not pay him. The accused stated that he bought the knife with which he had stabbed Guison
on Tabora Street for fifty centavos and he had been waiting for two days to kill Guison. The accused took his
dinner at noon on December 12th. The statement of the accused which was taken in writing by detectives
Charles Strubel and Manalo on December12th was left unfinished because Cruz of the Bureau of Labor arrived
and told the accused not to be a fool and not to make any statement. Thereafter the accused refused to
continue his statement. All of these show that on that day the accused behaved as a sane man and he even
appeared to be prudent, knowing how to take advantage of advice favorable to him, as that given him by Cruz
of the Bureau of Labor. Furthermore it cannot be said hat the accused had stabbed Guison through
hallucination because it is an established fact that his victim really owed him money as confirmed by the fact
that when Guison was stabbed he cried to the accused "I am going to pay you", according to the testimony of
an eyewitness. Therefore the motive of the aggression was a real and positive fact: vengeance.

Some days after the commission of the crime, the accused was placed under observation in the Psychopathic
Hospital because he showed symptoms of a form of psychosis called depressive psychosis from which he had
already been cured when the case was tried. This pyschosis is of course evidence that the accused was
afflicted with this ailment after the commission of the crime. It would not be casual to affirm that the commission
of the crime had affected his reason. Nervous shock is one of the causes of insanity (Angeles, Legal Medicine,
p. 728); but it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the accused was also mentally deranged on the day of
the crime, aside from the ciscumstance that the evidence shows just the contrary. I am, therefore, of the
opinion that the appealed sentence should be affirmed.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-3246. November 29, 1950.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ABELARDO FORMIGONES, Defendant-

Appellant.

Luis Contreras, for Appellant.

Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; IMBECILITY AS EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES; REQUISITES. — In order

that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so
as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason of discernment and freedom
of the will at the time of committing the crime.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and take violent measures to the extent of
killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his
honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile.

3. ID.; ID.; FEEBLEMINDEDNESS AND ACT IN A FIT OF JEALOUSY AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

— Feeblemindedness of the accused warrants the finding i his favor of the mitigating circumstance provided for
in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code and the fact that the accused
evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy, he is, likewise entitled to the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6
of the same article — that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion
or obfuscation.

4. ID.; ID.; PENALTY. — The penalty applicable for parricide under article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is
composed only two indivisible penalties, to wit, reclusion perpetua to death. Altho the commission of the act is
attended by some mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset them, article 63 of
the said code is the one applicable and must be applied.

5. id.; id.; attention OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE INVITED TO THE CASE. — When the court believes that the
appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty the case should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, i
his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to the death or otherwise apply
executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur finding the appellant guilty
of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P2,000, and to pay the costs. The following facts are not disputed.

In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao,
Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children. From
there they went to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of Binahian of the
same municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay. After about a month’s stay or rather
on December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia Agricola was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house.
The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house
and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage
resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground,
immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid
her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by the people
who came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed
and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father.

Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written statement, Exhibit D, wherein he
admitted that he killed his wife. The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because according to his statement
he used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother
Zacarias; that he suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his wife had
become indifferent to him (defendant).

During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of Sipocot, the accused pleaded
guilty, as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance, the defendant entered a plea
of not guilty, but did not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where
Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there was rather strange and that he behaved like an
insane person; that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his fellow
prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings; that he would refuse to take
a bath and wash his clothes until forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus
with his fellow prisoners, or even alone by himself without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell
was opened, he suddenly darted from inside into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain his
liberty.

The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal
liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court rejected this same theory and we are
inclined to agree with the lower court. According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez,
who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not
imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.

In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code
are copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent and applicable.
We quote Judge Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to
43:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it
is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused
be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least
discernment; 46 that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of
freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of
the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his
mental faculties does not exclude imputability. 49

"The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equalled to imbecility or insanity.

"The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant
had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime,
it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary,
and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the
basis of his mental. condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved."cralaw virtua1aw library

As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to
stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental
condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. From the case of United States v. Vaquilar (27 Phil.
88), we quote the following syllabus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to indicate that the accused was moved
by a wayward or hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other testimony to the effect that, while in
confinement awaiting trial, defendant acted absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to establish the defense of
insanity. The conduct of the defendant while in confinement appears to have been due to a morbid mental
condition produced by remorse."cralaw virtua1aw library

After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to the
evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so
as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five
children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of
his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and take
violent measures to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that
in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his
suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.

But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a mere product of
hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to the
following effect. In addition to the observations made by appellant in his written statement Exhibit D, it is said
that when he and his wife first went to live in the house of his half brother, Zacarias Formigones, the latter was
living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant. However, after the family of Abelardo was settled in the
house, Zacarias not only frequented said house but also used to sleep there nights. All this may have aroused
and even partly confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking.

The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those unfortunate beings, simple and
even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action in picking up the body of his wife
after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor, and lying beside her for
hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one though he thought that she had betrayed him.
Although he did not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made no effort to flee and compel the police to
hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial
he made no effort to deny or repudiate said written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and
expense of catching him, and insuring his conviction.

Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery attended the commission of the crime. It seems that the prosecution was not intent on proving it. At
least said aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the complaint either in the justice of the peace court or
in the Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt and we therefore decline to
find the existence of this aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that the accused is
feebleminded warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8
or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely, that the accused is "suffering some physical
defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense or communication with his fellow beings," or such
illness "as would diminish the exercise of his will power." To this we may add the mitigating circumstance in
paragraph 6 of the same article, — that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation. The accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.

With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance to offset them, at first
we thought of the possible applicability of the provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code
for the purpose of imposing the penalty next lower to that prescribed by article 246 for parricide, which
is reclusion perpetua to death. It will be observed however, that article 64 refers to the application of penalties
which contain three periods whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties,
each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, which is not true in
the present case where the penalty applicable for parricide is composed only of two indivisible penalties. On
the other hand, article 63 of the same Code refers to the application of indivisible penalties whether it be a
single divisible penalty, or two indivisible penalties like that of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore clear
that article 63 is the one applicable in the present case.

Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Interpreting a similar legal provision the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Guevara (10 Phil. 37),
involving the crime of parricide, in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old Penal Code) which
corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice Arellano
said the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"And even though this court should take into consideration the presence of two mitigating circumstances of a
qualifying nature, which it can not afford to overlook, without any aggravating one, the penalty could not be
reduced to the next lower to that imposed by law, because, according to a ruling of the court of Spain, article 80
above-mentioned does not contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule 5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art.
64 of the Rev. Penal Code). (Decision of September 30, 1879.)

"Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which is inevitable and which, under the
law, must be sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional power conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of
the Penal Code; and.

"Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby order that a proper petition be filed
with the executive branch of the Government in order that the latter, if it be deemed proper in the exercise of
the prerogative vested in it by the sovereign power, may reduce the penalty to that of the next lower."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Then, in the case of People v. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604), another parricide case, the Supreme Court in affirming
the judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to reclusion perpetua, said that notwithstanding the numerous
mitigating circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the penalty for parricide as fixed by article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code is composed of two indivisible penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3
of article 63 of the said Code must be applied. The Court further observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has exhibited such moral turpitude as
requires life imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, we
respectfully invite the attention of the Chief Executive to the case with a view to executive clemency after
appellant has served an appreciable amount of confinement."cralaw virtua1aw library

In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the judgment of the lower court with
the modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has
undergone. Appellant will pay costs.

Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two cases above cited, and
believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be brought to the attention of the
Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to death
or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., I concur in the result.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33211 June 29, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ERNESTO PUNO y FILOMENO, Accused whose death sentence is under review.

AQUINO, J.:

This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a defense the exempting circumstance of insanity.
There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the afternoon of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney
driver, entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a widow. The house was located in
the area known as Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal

On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying: "Mangkukulam ka mambabarang mayroon
kang bubuyog". Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck her several times on the head with a hammer until
she was dead.

The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was in the bedroom with the old woman, and by Lina
Pajes, 27, a tenant of the adjoining room. They testified that Puno's eyes were reddish. His look was baleful
and menacing. Puno was a neighbor of Aling Kikay.

After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria had taken refuge, and, according to Hilaria, he
made the following confession and threat: "Huwag kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo
na umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa matanda." Or, according to Lina, Puno
said: "Pinatay ko na iyong matanda. Huwag kayong tumawag ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang
paghihigantihan ko. "

After the killing, Puno fled to his parents' house at Barrio Tugatog, Malabon and then went to the house of his
second cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at Barrio San Jose, Calumpit, Bulacan, reaching that place in the
evening. How he was able to go to that place, which was then flooded, is not shown in the record.

Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had left, notified the Malabon police of the killing. Corporal
Daniel B. Cruz answered the call. He found Aling Kikay sprawled on her bed already dead, Her head was
bloody. Her blanket and pillows were bloodstained. He took down the statements of Lina and Hilaria at the
police station. They pointed to Puno as the killer (pp. 15- 17, Record).

A medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an autopsy. He certified that the victim
had lacerated wounds on her right eyebrow and contusions on the head caused by a hard instrument, On
opening the skull, the doctor found extensive and generalized hemorrhage. The cause of death was
intracranial, traumatic hemorrhage (Exh. A).

Puno's father surrendered him to the police. Two Malabon policemen brought him to the National Mental
Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 10, 1970 (p. 14, Record). He was charged with murder in the
municipal court. He waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation.

On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in the
information as aggravating circumstances were evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of
sex.

Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about five months after the killing, pretended that he did
not remember having killed Aling Kikay- He believes that there are persons who are "mangkukulam,"
"mambabarang" and "mambubuyog and that when one is victimized by those persons, his feet might shrink or
his hands might swan. Puno believes that a person harmed by a "mambabarang" might have a headache or a
swelling nose and ears and can be cured only by a quack doctor (herbolaryo). Consequently, it is necessary to
kill the "mangkukulam" and "mambabarang".
Puno is the third child in a family of twelve children. He is married with two children. He finished third year high
school. His father is a welder. Among his friends are drivers. (Exh- B).

Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Puno's wife, testified that on the night before the murder, Puno's eyes were reddish. He
complained of a headache. The following day while he was feeding the pigs, he told Zenaida that a bumble bee
was coming towards him and he warded it off with his hands. Zenaida did not see any bee.

Puno then went upstairs and took the cord of the religious habit of his mother. He wanted to use that cord in
tying his dog. He asked for another rope when Zenaida admonished him not to use that cord. Puno tied the dog
to a tree by looping the rope through its mouth and over its head. He repeatedly boxed the dog.

Aida Gabriel, Zenaida's elder sister, saw Puno while he was boxing that dog. Aida observed that Puno's eyes
were bloodshot and his countenance had a ferocious expression.

Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno came to their house in Barrio San
Jose, Calumpit. Ernesto was soaking wet as there was a flood in that place. He was cuddling a puppy that he
called "Diablo". He called for Teotimo's mother who invited him to eat. Ernesto did not eat. Instead, he fed the
puppy.
Ernesto introduced Teotimo to his puppy. Then, he sang an English song. When Teotimo asked him to change
his wet clothes, Ernesto refused. Later, he tried on the clothes of Teotimo's father. When told that Teotimo's
father had been dead for a couple of years already, Ernesto just looked at Teotimo.

While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again. Then he emitted a moaning sound until he fell asleep.
Ernesto was awakened the next morning by the noise caused by persons wading in the flood. Ernesto thought
they were his fellow cursillistas.

The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead of proving that puno was insane when he killed
Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified that Puno acted with discernment.

Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of the Dr. Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital, to whom
Puno was referred for treatment ten times between September 8, 1966 and July 24, 1970, testified that Puno
was an out-patient who could very well live with society, although he was afflicted with "schizophrenic reaction";
that Puno knew what he was doing and that he had psychosis, a slight destruction of the ego. Puno admitted to
Doctor Maravilia that one cause of his restlessness, sleeplessness and irritability was his financial problem (7
tsn November 4, 1970). Doctor Maravilla observed that Puno on July 4, 1970 was already cured.

Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno was first brought to that hospital on
July 28, 1962 because his parents complained that he laughed alone and exhibited certain eccentricities such
as kneeling, praying and making his body rigid. Doctor Robles observed that while Puno was suffering from
"schizophrenic reaction", his symptoms were "not socially incapacitating" and that he could adjust himself to his
environment (4 tsn January 20, 1971). He agreed with Doctor Maravilla's testimony.

Doctor Carlos Vicente, a medical specialist of the National Mental Hospital, testified that from his examination
of Puno, he gathered that Puno acted with discernment when he committed the killing and that Puno could
distinguish between right and wrong (5 tsn January 1 1, 197 1). Doctor Vicente also concluded that Puno was
not suffering from any delusion and that he was not mentally deficient; otherwise, he would not have reached
third year high school (8-19 tsn January 1 1, 197 1).

On December 14, 1970 or three months after the commission of the offense, Doctors Vicente, Robles and
Victorina V. Manikan of the National Mental Hospital submitted the following report on Puno (Exh. B or 2):

Records show that he had undergone psychiatric treatment at the Out-Patient Service of the National Mental
Hospital for schizophrenia in 1962 from which he recovered; in 1964 a relapse of the same mental illness when
he improved and in 1966 when his illness remained unimproved.

His treatment was continued at the JRR Memorial Hospital at the San Lazaro Compound up to July, 1970. He
was relieved of symptoms and did not come back anymore for medication. On September 8, 1970, according to
information, he was able to kill an old woman. Particulars of the offense are not given.

MENTAL CONDITION

... Presently, he is quiet and as usual manageable. He is fairly clean in person and without undue display of
emotion. He talks to co-patients but becomes evasive when talking with the doctor and other personnel of the
ward. He knows he is accused of murder but refuses to elaborate on it.
xxx xxx xxx
REMARKS

In view of the foregoing findings, Ernesto Puno, who previously was suffering from a mental illness called
schizophrenia, is presently free from any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms.

The seeming ignorance of very simple known facts and amnesia of several isolated accounts in his life do not
fit the active pattern of a schizophrenic process. It may be found in an acutely disturbed and confused patient
or a markedly, retarded individual of which he is not.
However, persons who recover from an acute episode of mental illness like schizophrenia may retain some
residual symptoms impairing their judgment but not necessarily their discernment of right from wrong of the
offense committed.

The foregoing report was submitted pusuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court and the order of the trial court
dated November 16, 1970 for the mental examination of Puno in the National Mental Hospital to determine
whether he could stand trial and whether he was sane when he committed the killing.

The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or knew that the killing of Francisca Col was wrong and that he
would be punished for it, as shown by the threats which he made to Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes, the old
woman's companions who witnessed his dastardly deed.

The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal maniac who had gone berserk, he would have killed
also Hilaria and Lina. The fact that he singled out Aling Kikay signified that he really disposed of her because
he thought that she was a witch.

Judge Onofre A. Villaluz said that during the trial he "meticulously observed the conduct and behavior of the
accused inside the court, most especially when he was presented on the witness stand" and he was convinced
"that the accused is sane and has full grasp of what was happening" in his environment.

The trial court convicted Puno of murder, sentenced him to death and ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim
an indemnity of twenty-two thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 509).

His counsel de oficio in this review of the death sentence, contends that the trial court erred in not sustaining
the defense of insanity and in appreciating evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex as
aggravating circumstances.
When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility, the evidence on this point must refer to
the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution (U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil.
547). Insanity should be proven by clear and positive evidence (People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204).

The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed Francisca Col because he had chronic
schizophrenia since 1962; he was suffering from schizophrenia on September 8, 1970, when he liquidated the
victim, and schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which deprives a person of discernment and freedom of will.

Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused must be deprived completely of
reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime (People vs- Formigones, 87
Phil. 658, 660).

Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is
deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability." (People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688, October 17, 1980; People vs. Renegade, L-27031,
May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 275, 286; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292. As to "el trastorno mental transitorio as
an exempting circumstance, see I Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 15th Ed., 1974. pp. 498-504 and art. 8 of the
Spanish Penal Code.)

After evaluating counsel de oficio's contentions in the light of the strict rule just stated and the circumstances
surrounding the killing, we are led to the conclusion that Puno was not legally insane when he killed the
hapless and helpless victim. The facts and the findings of the psychiatrists reveal that on that tragic occasion
he was not completely deprived of reason and freedom of will.

In People vs. Fausto y Tomas, 113 Phil. 841, the accused was confined in the National Mental Hospital for
thirteen days because he was suffering from schizophrenia of the paranoid type. His confinement was
recommended by Doctor Antonio Casal of the San Miguel Brewery where the accused used to work as a
laborer. About one year and two months later, he killed Doctor Casal because the latter refused to certify him
for re-employment. His plea of insanity was rejected. He was convicted of murder.

In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the killing as murder. The qualifying circumstance is
abuse of superiority. In liquidating Francisco Col, Puno, who was armed with a hammer, took advantage of his
superior natural strength over that of the unarmed septuagenarian female victim who was unable to offer any
resistance and who could do nothing but exclaim " Diyos ko ".

Thus, it was held that "an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless
woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which qqqs sex and the weapon used in the
act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself" (People vs. Guzman, 107 Phil.
1122, 1127 citing U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; U.S. vs. Camiloy 36 Phil. 757 and People vs. Quesada, 62
Phil. 446).
Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be appreciated because the evidence does not show
(a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit
had clung to his determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution
of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act (People vs. Ablates, L-33304, July 31,
1974, 58 SCRA 241, 247).

The essence of premeditation "es la mayor perversidad del culpable juntamente con su serenidad o frialdad de
animo." It is characterized (1) "por la concepcion del delito y la resolucion de ejecutarlo firme, fria, reflexival
meditada y detenida" and (2) "por la persistencia en la resolucion de delinquir demostrada por el espacio de
tiempo transcurrido entre dicha resolucion y la ejecucion del hecho Premeditation should be evident, meaning
that it should be shown by "signos reiterados v externos, no de meras sospechas" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo
Penal, 1974 or 15th Ed., pp- 582-3).

Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of her old age should be appreciated as
generic aggravating circumstances. Disregard of sex is not aggravating because there is no evidence that the
accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed manifest disrespect to her
womanhood (People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548; People vs. Mori, L-23511-2, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382,
404, People vs, Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De Jesus, 14 Phil. 190).

However, those two aggravating circumstances are off-set by the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender to the authorities and, as contended by counsel de oficio, the offender's mental illness (mild
psychosis or schizophrenic reaction) which diminished his will-power without however depriving him of
consciousness of his acts. (See People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, People vs. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and People
vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658.)

Thus, it was held that la equivocada creencia de los acusados de que el matar a un brujo es un bien al publico
puede considerarse como una circunstancia atenuante pues los que tienen la obsession de que los brujos
deben ser eliminados estan en la misma condicion que aquel que, atacado de enfermedad morbosa pero
consciente aun de lo que hace, no tiene verdadero imperio de su voluntad" (People vs. Balneg 79 Phil. 805,
810).

It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder should be imposed (Arts. 64[41 and 248, Revised
Penal Code).

WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua The indemnity
imposed by the trial court is affirmed. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, CJ., concurring:

I am unable to arrive at that stage of moral certainty as to the guilt of the accused and hence concur in the
dissent of Justice Makasiar, with the observation that the reference in the exhaustive opinion of Justice Aquino
to Ambat, where he was also the ponente, with its learned and scholarly discourse on the law on insanity, gives
me the opportunity to express my preference for a liberal reading of Durham v. US, 1 therein cited. For some
eminent commentators, the M' Naghten doctrine no longer speaks with authority. In the light of the advances in
medical science there is, for me, a need for the reexamination of what until now are authoritative
pronouncements on this subject.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The appellant should not be held liable for the crime of murder. He was mentally ill when he
committed the alleged killing of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), a 72-year old widow. His medical records, as
properly evaluated and confirmed by the expert testimony of the three physicians/psychiatrists who examined
and treated him, undeniably establish the fact that appellant had been ailing with a psychotic disorder medically
known as chronic schizophrenia of the paranoid type.

Inevitably, WE must look into the nature of appellant's mental disease. Thus, Noye's Modern Clinical
Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, explains:
Symptomatically, the schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior apparent in
aloofness, suspiciousness, or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated
emotionality, often ambivalently directed and considered inappropriate by the observer. The interpersonal
perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusional and hallucinatory material. (p. 355, supra).

Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality,
and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is the most
common form of psychosis and usually develops between the ages of 15 and 30 (Encyclopedia and Dictionary
of Medicine and Nursing, MillerKeane p. 860).

For a clear appreciation of appellant's mental condition, quoted hereunder are pertinent portions of the
discussion on the paranoid type of schizophrenia:

Paranoid Types. The features that tend to be most evident in this type or phase are delusions, which are often
numerous, illogical, and disregardful of reality, hallucinations, and the usual schizophrenic disturbance of
associations and of affect, together with negativism.
Frequently the prepsychotic personality of the paranoid schizophrenic is characterized by poor interpersonal
rapport. Often he is cold, withdrawn, distrustful, and resentful of other persons. Many are truculent, have a chip-
on-the-shoulder attitude, and are argumentative, scornful, sarcastic, defiant, resentful of suggestions or of
authority, and given to caustic remarks. Sometimes flippnant, facetious responses cover an underlying hostility.

... The patient's previous negative attitudes become more marked, and misinterpretations are common. Ideas
of reference are among the first symptoms. Disorders of association appear. Many patients show an
unpleasant emotional aggressiveness, Through displacement, the patient may begin to act out his hostile
impulses. His grip on reality begins to loosen. At first his delusions are limited, but later they become numerous
and changeable ... Delusions of persecution are the most prominent occurrences in paranoid schizophrenia,
but expansive and obviously wish- fulfilling Ideas and hypochondriacal and depressive delusions are not
uncommon. With increasing personality disorganization, delusional beliefs become less logical. Verbal
expressions may be inappropriate and neologistic. The patient is subjected to vague magical forces, and his
explanations become extremely vague and irrational. Imaginative fantasy may become extreme but take on the
value of reality. Repressed aggressive tendencies may be released in a major outburst some inarticulate
paranoids may manifest an unpredictable assaultiveness. Many paranoid schizophrenics are irritable,
discontented, resentful, and angrily suspicious and show a surely aversion to being interviewed. Some manifest
an unapproachable, aggressively hostile attitude and may have in a bitter aloofness" Noye's Modern Clinical
Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, pp. 380 and 381, emphasis supplied).
On the prognosis of schizophrenia, the aforenamed source thus further states:

Occasionally one observes a schizophrenic episode of a mild, fleeting nature with no subsequent recurrence In
many instances, however, the favorable outcome should be characterized as 'social recovery rather than as
'cured' or as full recovery. By this it is meant that the patient is able to return to his previous social environment
and to previous or equivalent occupation, but with minor symptoms and signs, such as irritability, shyness, or
shallowness of affective responses.

From what has been said, it is evident that in any given case the effect upon the personality and future
adjustment of the appearance of a schizophrenic reaction may be quite uncertain. In some cases the course is
continuously progressive; in others it is intermittent. More frequently it is a question of remissions and relapses
in which, although from the first interests and habits tend to be undermined insidiously, there occur periods of
adjustment at a lower level for a considerable period of time. It is estimated that 40 per cent of' the
schizophrenic patients who enter public mental hospitals or clinics recover or improve; the other 60 per cent fail
to improve or ultimately suffer that permanent malignant disorganization of personality somewhat inaccurately
designated as deterioration Of committed patients who improve sufficiently to be released, about 80 per cent
leave the mental hospital within the first year of residence. The expectancy of recovery falls with each year of
continued illness. Roughly, about one-third of those patients who are hospitalized during the first year of their
illness make a fairly complete recovery; one-third get a bit better and become able to return to outside life but
remain damaged personalities and may have to return to the hospital from time to time. ... (pp. 387-
388, supra emphasis supplied).
When appellant was examined and treated for the first time on July 28, 1962, his father revealed the patient's
initial symptoms of laughing alone and making gestures, poor sleep and appetite, praying and kneeling always
and making his body rigid (per consultation chart, p. 154, CCC rec.). Upon interview on aforesaid date,
appellant stated that "he could see God" and "That a neighbor is bewitching her" ("pinapakulam ako") Why?
"hindi ko alam kung bakit" (p. 156, CCC rec.).

Appellant underwent eighteen (18) treatments and checkups from July 28, 1962 to July 24, 1970 which covered
eight (8) years before the alleged crime was committed on September 8, 1970 (Medical Certificates, pp. 25 and
26, CCC rec.). In the medical certificate dated September 15, 1970, the following was reflected:
Diagnosis — Schizophrenic Reaction — Recovered (1962) Improved (1964) Unimproved (1966).

Per the same record dated November 22, 1966, appellant's diagnosis was described as "Schizo- Reaction
Relapse" and his condition of termination was indicated as "Unimproved".

In appellant's "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated January 31, 1968 (p. 126, CCC rec.), his
condition of termination was described as merely "improved" neither "recovered" nor "unimproved".

In another "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated August 31, 1968, patient's condition of termination
was also described as "improved" only and "treatment not completed" was noted therein (p. 137, CCC rec.).

Appellant was treated eighteen (18) times in the National Mental Hospital and Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital
from July 28, 1962 to July 24, 1970 or for a span of 8 years, characteristic of the chronic nature of his mental
disease (pp- 4-5, TSN, November 12, 1970). Thus, on direct examination, Dr. Carlos Vicente confirmed:
Q — From your study, when he was an out patient at the National Mental Hospital and its extension at the Jose
Reyes Memorial Hospital, would you say that he was and has been suffering from chronic schizophrenia?

A — Yes, chronic, because it started in 1962 and became in remission in 1970, July. (p. 10, TSN, January 11,
1971, emphasis supplied).

For chronic schizophrenia, the patient does not recover fully in two months' time. His condition may simply be
"in remission", which term means "social recovery", not cured or fully recovered. Dr. Vicente thus stated:
Q — How long, if there is any usual period, does a schizophrenic attack last at any given time?

A — That is waivable (sic). There are those who cannot recover after ten days or three months (p. 14, TSN,
January 11, 19 7 1, emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

On a schizophrenic's behavior pattern:
Q — Is it possible that a person suffering from chronic schizophrenia can have a violent reaction?

A — Yes, it is Possible, if he was at that time. If he is schizophrenic at the time" (Testimony of Dr. Carlos
Vicente, p. 10, TSN, January 20, 197 1, emphasis supplied).

Q — By suffering from schizophrenia, would you say that his suffering has affected his power of control over
his will?

A — During the time that he was suffering, he could not stick to the right. He made mistakes at the time that he
was mentally sick.
Q — His power of control over his will to commit a crime is affected?
A — Yes, sir.

Q — Are you sure of that?

A — Yes, somehow it is controlled by some Ideas, example, one who has that (im)pulse to kill will kill"
(Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 17, TSN, January 11, 1971, emphasis supplied).

On the mental condition of appellant when the alleged crime was committed which is and should be considered
determinative of his liability:

Q — Would you be able to state Doctor whether the accused when he committed the act was suffering from an
onset of schizophrenic reaction from which he has been known to be suffering since 1962"

A — It is possible, sir, that he was already suffering from an onset of the schizophrenic reaction at that time"
(Testimony of Dr. Reynaldo Robles, p. 6, TSN, January 20,1971, emphasis supplied).

It should be stressed that between July 24, 1970 when appellant suffered from his last attack or relapse and
September 8, 1970 when he committed the alleged crime, barely 1 month and 15 days had elapsed. Medically
speaking, the interval was not sufficient time for appellant's full recovery nor did such time give any guaranty for
his mental disease to be "cured."

Appellant was stin mentally sick at the time he attacked the victim. He previously suffered from a "displacement
of aggressive and hostile behavior" when he got angry with his wife and when he tied and boxed their dog. He
had the mental delusion that a "mangkukulam" was inflicting harm on him. This delusion found its mark on the
victim whom he believed was the "mangkukulam" and fearing that she would harm him, appellant had to kill her
in self-defense. Simply stated, the victim was a mere consequence of his mental delusion. He killed the
"mangkukulam" as personified by the victim; he did not kin Aling Kikay herself. And the said fatal act was made
by appellant in defending himself from the "mangkukulam".
While it has been established that appellant was "manageable" and was "presently free from any social
incapacitating psychotic symptoms" during the trial, the fact remains that at the very moment of the commission
of the alleged crime, he was still a mentally sick person. No evidence was produced to prove otherwise against
the bulk of appellant's medical history for 8 years clearly indicative of his mental psychosis.

As earlier stated, "social recovery" of a schizophrenic does not mean that he is "cured" (totally recovered) from
the disease.

In view of the foregoing, appellant should be acquitted of the charge of murder.

Teehankee, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, CJ., concurring:

I am unable to arrive at that stage of moral certainty as to the guilt of the accused and hence concur in the
dissent of Justice Makasiar, with the observation that the reference in the exhaustive opinion of Justice Aquino
to Ambat, where he was also the ponente, with its learned and scholarly discourse on the law on insanity, gives
me the opportunity to express my preference for a liberal reading of Durham v. US, 1 therein cited. For some
eminent commentators, the M' Naghten doctrine no longer speaks with authority. In the light of the advances in
medical science there is, for me, a need for the reexamination of what until now are authoritative
pronouncements on this subject.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The appellant should not be held liable for the crime of murder. He was mentally ill when he
committed the alleged killing of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), a 72-year old widow. His medical records, as
properly evaluated and confirmed by the expert testimony of the three physicians/psychiatrists who examined
and treated him, undeniably establish the fact that appellant had been ailing with a psychotic disorder medically
known as chronic schizophrenia of the paranoid type.

Inevitably, WE must look into the nature of appellant's mental disease. Thus, Noye's Modern Clinical
Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, explains:

Symptomatically, the schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior apparent in
aloofness, suspiciousness, or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated
emotionality, often ambivalently directed and considered inappropriate by the observer. The interpersonal
perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusional and hallucinatory material. (p. 355, supra).

Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality,
and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is the most
common form of psychosis and usually develops between the ages of 15 and 30 (Encyclopedia and Dictionary
of Medicine and Nursing, MillerKeane p. 860).

For a clear appreciation of appellant's mental condition, quoted hereunder are pertinent portions of the
discussion on the paranoid type of schizophrenia:

Paranoid Types. The features that tend to be most evident in this type or phase are delusions, which are often
numerous, illogical, and disregardful of reality, hallucinations, and the usual schizophrenic disturbance of
associations and of affect, together with negativism.

Frequently the prepsychotic personality of the paranoid schizophrenic is characterized by poor interpersonal
rapport. Often he is cold, withdrawn, distrustful, and resentful of other persons. Many are truculent, have a chip-
on-the-shoulder attitude, and are argumentative, scornful, sarcastic, defiant, resentful of suggestions or of
authority, and given to caustic remarks. Sometimes flippnant, facetious responses cover an underlying hostility.

... The patient's previous negative attitudes become more marked, and misinterpretations are common. Ideas
of reference are among the first symptoms. Disorders of association appear. Many patients show an
unpleasant emotional aggressiveness, Through displacement, the patient may begin to act out his hostile
impulses. His grip on reality begins to loosen. At first his delusions are limited, but later they become numerous
and changeable ... Delusions of persecution are the most prominent occurrences in paranoid schizophrenia,
but expansive and obviously wish- fulfilling Ideas and hypochondriacal and depressive delusions are not
uncommon. With increasing personality disorganization, delusional beliefs become less logical. Verbal
expressions may be inappropriate and neologistic. The patient is subjected to vague magical forces, and his
explanations become extremely vague and irrational. Imaginative fantasy may become extreme but take on the
value of reality. Repressed aggressive tendencies may be released in a major outburst some inarticulate
paranoids may manifest an unpredictable assaultiveness. Many paranoid schizophrenics are irritable,
discontented, resentful, and angrily suspicious and show a surely aversion to being interviewed. Some manifest
an unapproachable, aggressively hostile attitude and may have in a bitter aloofness" Noye's Modern Clinical
Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, pp. 380 and 381, emphasis supplied).
On the prognosis of schizophrenia, the aforenamed source thus further states:

Occasionally one observes a schizophrenic episode of a mild, fleeting nature with no subsequent recurrence In
many instances, however, the favorable outcome should be characterized as 'social recovery rather than as
'cured' or as full recovery. By this it is meant that the patient is able to return to his previous social environment
and to previous or equivalent occupation, but with minor symptoms and signs, such as irritability, shyness, or
shallowness of affective responses.

From what has been said, it is evident that in any given case the effect upon the personality and future
adjustment of the appearance of a schizophrenic reaction may be quite uncertain. In some cases the course is
continuously progressive; in others it is intermittent. More frequently it is a question of remissions and relapses
in which, although from the first interests and habits tend to be undermined insidiously, there occur periods of
adjustment at a lower level for a considerable period of time. It is estimated that 40 per cent of' the
schizophrenic patients who enter public mental hospitals or clinics recover or improve; the other 60 per cent fail
to improve or ultimately suffer that permanent malignant disorganization of personality somewhat inaccurately
designated as deterioration Of committed patients who improve sufficiently to be released, about 80 per cent
leave the mental hospital within the first year of residence. The expectancy of recovery falls with each year of
continued illness. Roughly, about one-third of those patients who are hospitalized during the first year of their
illness make a fairly complete recovery; one-third get a bit better and become able to return to outside life but
remain damaged personalities and may have to return to the hospital from time to time. ... (pp. 387-
388, supra emphasis supplied).

When appellant was examined and treated for the first time on July 28, 1962, his father revealed the patient's
initial symptoms of laughing alone and making gestures, poor sleep and appetite, praying and kneeling always
and making his body rigid (per consultation chart, p. 154, CCC rec.). Upon interview on aforesaid date,
appellant stated that "he could see God" and "That a neighbor is bewitching her" ("pinapakulam ako") Why?
"hindi ko alam kung bakit" (p. 156, CCC rec.).

Appellant underwent eighteen (18) treatments and checkups from July 28, 1962 to July 24, 1970 which covered
eight (8) years before the alleged crime was committed on September 8, 1970 (Medical Certificates, pp. 25 and
26, CCC rec.). In the medical certificate dated September 15, 1970, the following was reflected:

Diagnosis — Schizophrenic Reaction — Recovered (1962) Improved (1964) Unimproved (1966).

Per the same record dated November 22, 1966, appellant's diagnosis was described as "Schizo- Reaction
Relapse" and his condition of termination was indicated as "Unimproved".

In appellant's "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated January 31, 1968 (p. 126, CCC rec.), his
condition of termination was described as merely "improved" neither "recovered" nor "unimproved".

In another "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated August 31, 1968, patient's condition of termination
was also described as "improved" only and "treatment not completed" was noted therein (p. 137, CCC rec.).

Appellant was treated eighteen (18) times in the National Mental Hospital and Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital
from July 28, 1962 to July 24, 1970 or for a span of 8 years, characteristic of the chronic nature of his mental
disease (pp- 4-5, TSN, November 12, 1970). Thus, on direct examination, Dr. Carlos Vicente confirmed:

Q — From your study, when he was an out patient at the National Mental Hospital and its extension at the Jose
Reyes Memorial Hospital, would you say that he was and has been suffering from chronic schizophrenia?

A — Yes, chronic, because it started in 1962 and became in remission in 1970, July. (p. 10, TSN, January 11,
1971, emphasis supplied).

For chronic schizophrenia, the patient does not recover fully in two months' time. His condition may simply be
"in remission", which term means "social recovery", not cured or fully recovered. Dr. Vicente thus stated:
Q — How long, if there is any usual period, does a schizophrenic attack last at any given time?

A — That is waivable (sic). There are those who cannot recover after ten days or three months (p. 14, TSN,
January 11, 19 7 1, emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx

On a schizophrenic's behavior pattern:

Q — Is it possible that a person suffering from chronic schizophrenia can have a violent reaction?

A — Yes, it is Possible, if he was at that time. If he is schizophrenic at the time" (Testimony of Dr. Carlos
Vicente, p. 10, TSN, January 20, 197 1, emphasis supplied).

Q — By suffering from schizophrenia, would you say that his suffering has affected his power of control over
his will?
A — During the time that he was suffering, he could not stick to the right. He made mistakes at the time that he
was mentally sick.
Q — His power of control over his will to commit a crime is affected?

A — Yes, sir.

Q — Are you sure of that?

A — Yes, somehow it is controlled by some Ideas, example, one who has that (im)pulse to kill will kill"
(Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 17, TSN, January 11, 1971, emphasis supplied).

On the mental condition of appellant when the alleged crime was committed which is and should be considered
determinative of his liability:

Q — Would you be able to state Doctor whether the accused when he committed the act was suffering from an
onset of schizophrenic reaction from which he has been known to be suffering since 1962"

A — It is possible, sir, that he was already suffering from an onset of the schizophrenic reaction at that time"
(Testimony of Dr. Reynaldo Robles, p. 6, TSN, January 20,1971, emphasis supplied).
It should be stressed that between July 24, 1970 when appellant suffered from his last attack or relapse and
September 8, 1970 when he committed the alleged crime, barely 1 month and 15 days had elapsed. Medically
speaking, the interval was not sufficient time for appellant's full recovery nor did such time give any guaranty for
his mental disease to be "cured."

Appellant was stin mentally sick at the time he attacked the victim. He previously suffered from a "displacement
of aggressive and hostile behavior" when he got angry with his wife and when he tied and boxed their dog. He
had the mental delusion that a "mangkukulam" was inflicting harm on him. This delusion found its mark on the
victim whom he believed was the "mangkukulam" and fearing that she would harm him, appellant had to kill her
in self-defense. Simply stated, the victim was a mere consequence of his mental delusion. He killed the
"mangkukulam" as personified by the victim; he did not kin Aling Kikay herself. And the said fatal act was made
by appellant in defending himself from the "mangkukulam".

While it has been established that appellant was "manageable" and was "presently free from any social
incapacitating psychotic symptoms" during the trial, the fact remains that at the very moment of the commission
of the alleged crime, he was still a mentally sick person. No evidence was produced to prove otherwise against
the bulk of appellant's medical history for 8 years clearly indicative of his mental psychosis.

As earlier stated, "social recovery" of a schizophrenic does not mean that he is "cured" (totally recovered) from
the disease.
In view of the foregoing, appellant should be acquitted of the charge of murder.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
PARAS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the Decision* of the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region, Branch 54,
Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting the accused of the crime of murder.

The pertinent facts of the case are:

On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga filed an information charging
Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with the felony of murder, committed as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Apalit, Province of Pampanga, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with
a knife, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in
the chest, stomach, throat and other parts of the body thereby inflicting upon her fatal wounds which directly
caused the death of said Belen Macalino Sigua.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, evident premeditation and the generic
aggravating circumstance of disrespect towards her sex, the crime was committed inside the field office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, taking
advantage of superior strength and cruelty. (Record, p. 2)
On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits
thereafter ensued.

The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March 16, 1987 between the hours of 2:00
and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a male person, identified as the accused, went to the place where Mrs. Sigua
was holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused
drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. Accomplishing the
morbid act, he went down the staircase and out of the DAR's office with blood stained clothes, carrying along a
bloodied bladed weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987; TSN, pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).

The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz Cabugawan reveals that the victim
sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.

Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the latter part of February, 1987, the
accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning the actuations of his wife (the victim) in requiring so
many documents from the accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused the procedure in the Department
of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said "never mind, I could do it my own way." Rodolfo Sigua further
testified that his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he spent the amount of P75,000.00 for the funeral and
related expenses due to the untimely death of his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).

The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of the
offense.

The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused. According to her, her
husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went to Lebanon for six (6) months. Later, in
December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder. Her husband did not finish his
two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent medical treatment. He was confined for
one week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his monthly check-up. Because of his sickness, he was not
able to resume his farming. The couple, instead, operated a small store which her husband used to tend. Two
weeks prior to March 16, 1987, she noticed her husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their
children when he was not used to it before; demanding another payment from his customers even if the latter
had paid; chasing any child when their children quarrelled with other children. There were also times when her
husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not. On the fateful day of
March 16, 1987, at around noon time, her husband complained to her of stomach ache; however, they did not
bother to buy medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain therein. Thereafter, he went back to the
store. When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer there. She got worried as he was not in his
proper mind. She looked for him. She returned home only when she was informed that her husband had
arrived. While on her way home, she heard from people the words "mesaksak" and "menaksak" (translated as
"stabbing" and "has stabbed"). She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around,
including the barangay officials. She instinctively asked her husband why he did such act, but he replied, "that
is the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart." Her husband further said that if he would not be
able to kill the victim in a number of days, he would die, and that he chose to live longer even in jail. The
testimony on the statements of her husband was corroborated by their neighbor Thelma Santos who heard
their conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July 10, 1987). Turning to the barangay official, her husband
exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you surrender me." However, the barangay official did not bother to get the
wallet from him. That same day the accused went to Manila. (TSN, pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981)
Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the
accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated August 17, 1987, on August
25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic or insane long
before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and that his insanity was classified under organic
mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-33, June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-
27, August 2, 1988).

Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder. However, he was not able to finish his
two-year contract when he got sick. He had undergone medical treatment at Macabali Clinic. However, he
claimed that he was not aware of the stabbing incident nor of the death of Mrs. Belen Sigua. He only came to
know that he was accused of the death of Mrs. Sigua when he was already in jail. (TSN, pp. 5-14, July 15,
1988)

Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente Balatbat testified that the accused was his
patient. He treated the accused for ailments secondary to a stroke. While Dr. Ricardo Lim testified that the
accused suffered from oclusive disease of the brain resulting in the left side weakness. Both attending
physicians concluded that Rosalino Dungo was somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in
their clinic. Dr. Leonardo Bascara further testified that the accused is functioning at a low level of intelligence.
(TSN, pp. 620, September 1, 1988; TSN, pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988).

On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of murder, the
Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused as follows:

1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the law;

2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as actual damage, P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)

The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the perpetration of the criminal act. The act of
concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He was apprehended
and arrested in Metro Manila which indicates that he embarked on a flight in order to evade arrest. This to the
mind of the trial court is another indication that the accused was sane when he committed the crime.

It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already admitted by the defendant-appellant.
The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not the accused was insane during the commission of the crime
changed.

One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal sense
entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is the product
of a mental disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal responsibility, it
is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused
be deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be complete absence or
deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151)

It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border between sanity and insanity.
Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the existence of insanity, namely:
delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion is manifested by a false
belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which would be incredible under the given circumstances to
the same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an insane person believes in a state of
things, the existence of which no rational person would believe. A person acts under an irresistible impulse
when, by reason of duress or mental disease, he has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to
avoid the act in question, his free agency being at the time destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person
is insane when he suffers from such perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him
incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)

So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test or criterion for insanity.
However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity under Section 1039 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or defect
of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or
organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered function of the sensory or of the
intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a deranged
and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person
has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.

Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as
evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct inconsistent
with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident bargains.

Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person whose sanity is in issue, at the
very time of doing the act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive evidence of his
mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in question. Direct testimony
is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. The vagaries
of the mind can only be known by outward acts: thereby we read the thoughts, motives and emotions of a
person; and through which we determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
(People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)
In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the National Center for Mental Health,
concluded that the accused was suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under organic mental disorder
secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke before, during and after the commission of the crime charged.
(Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental illness of the accused was characterized by perceptual disturbances
manifested through impairment of judgment and impulse control, impairment of memory and disorientation, and
hearing of strange voices. The accused allegedly suffered from psychosis which was organic. The defect of the
brain, therefore, is permanent.

Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the accused was permanent and did not
have a period for normal thinking. To quote

Q Is there such a lucid intervals?

A In this case, considering the nature of the organic mental disorder, the lucid intervals unfortunately are not
present, sir.
(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)

However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of psychosis may be treated with
medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988). Thus, although the defect of the brain is permanent, the
manifestation of insanity is curable.
Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis since January of 1987, thus:

Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine the length of time the patient has been mentally ill?

A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a stroke abroad. If I may be allowed to scan my record, the
record reveals that the patient had a stroke in Riyadh about seven (7) months before his contract expired and
he was brought home. Sometime in January of 1987, the first manifestation is noted on the behavioral
changes. He was noted to be in deep thought, pre-occupied self, complaining of severe headache, deferment
of sleep and loss of appetite; and that was about January of 1987, Sir. (TSN, pp. 21-22, August 2, 1988)

The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the National Center for Mental Health,
specifically on Dr. Echavez's assessment that the accused has been insane since January of 1987 or three (3)
months before the commission of the crime charged. The doctors arrived at this conclusion based on the
testimonies of the accused's wife and relatives, and after a series of medical and psychological examinations
on the accused when he was confined therein. However, We are still in quandary as to whether the accused
was really insane or not during the commission of the offense.

The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused, though he may be insane, has no
lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that a month or few weeks prior to the commission of the crime charged
the accused confronted the husband of the victim concerning the actuations of the latter. He complained
against the various requirements being asked by the DAR office, particularly against the victim. We quote
hereunder the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua:
Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having met the accused Rosalino Dungo?
A Yes, sir.

Q Where?
A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.

Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of February 1987, when you met the accused at your
residence?

A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what he wanted, accused told me that he wanted to know
from my wife why she was asking so many documents: why she was requiring him to be interviewed and file
the necessary documents at the Office of the DAR. Furthermore, he wanted to know why my wife did not want
to transfer the Certificate of Land Transfer of the landholding of his deceased father in his name.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of February 1987 that your wife the late Belen Macalino
Sigua was making hard for him the transfer of the right of his father, what did you tell him?

A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife? Why are you asking this question of me?"

Q What was his answer?

A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but sent somebody to her office to make a request for
the transfer of the landholding in the name of his deceased father in his name.
Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what was the comment of the accused?

A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is making things difficult for the transfer of the
landholding in the name of my father and my name."

(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987)

If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be mentally ill during this
confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have
wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering from impairment of the memory, We
infer from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts. This event proves that the accused was
not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid intervals.
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that the appellant could have been
aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it. To quote:
Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not necessarily the accused, when asked by the Court
the whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that his lawyer is not yet in Court and that he is waiting for his
counsel to appear and because his counsel did not appear, he asked for the postponement of the hearing of
the case and to reset the same to another date. With those facts, do you consider him insane?
A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.

Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?

A Yes, sir.

COURT
Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your conclusion?

A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I made a laboratory examination, in short all the
assessment necessary to test the behavior of the patient, like for example praying for postponement and
fleeing from the scene of the crime is one situation to consider if the patient is really insane or not. If I may
elaborate to explain the situation of the accused, the nature of the illness, the violent behavior, then he appears
normal he can reason out and at the next moment he burst out into violence regardless motivated or
unmotivated. This is one of the difficulties we have encountered in this case. When we deliberated because
when we prepared this case we have really deliberation with all the members of the medical staff so those are
the things we considered. Like for example he shouted out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that particular
moment he was aware of what he did, he knows the criminal case.
COURT

Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he shouted that he killed the victim in this case, Mrs.
Sigua, do we get it that he shouted those words because he was aware when he did the act?

A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there. (TSN, pp. 37-41, August 2, 1983; emphasis
supplied)
Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. The statement of one of the expert
witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the accused knew the nature of what he had done
makes it highly doubtful that accused was insane when he committed the act charged. As stated by the trial
court:

The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the act was sane. The evidence shows
that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was carrying an envelope where the fatal weapon was
hidden. This is an evidence that the accused consciously adopted a pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness
of the attack classified the killing as treacherous and therefore murder. After the accused ran away from the
scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, he was apprehended and arrested in Metro
Manila, an indication that he took flight in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the Court is another indicia
that he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim (Rollo, p. 63)

There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence presented. (People v.
Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had the privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of the
witnesses and therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not.

Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused.1âwphi1 However, in the defense
of insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity. The burden of proving the
affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. Thus:

In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for crime, the starting premise is that the law
presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code: U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305) Otherwise
stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts were done
unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288). . . . Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the
burden of proving its existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)

The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Insanity is a defense in a confession and avoidance and as such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Insanity must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground of insanity.
Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of overcoming the presumption that he committed the
crime as charged freely, knowingly, and intelligently.

Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity.
(People v. Bonoan, supra) PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is hereby
AFFIRMED without costs.

SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., concurs in the result.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54135 November 21, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Causapin, Millar & Tutana Law Office for defendant-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan convicting
him of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify complainant Estelita Ronaya in
the amount of P10,000.00 by way of moral damages, and to pay the costs.

The facts were summarized by the trial court in the following manner:

The prosecution's evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya who was then only
fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the mother of the accused, Ines Rafanan alias "Baket Ines"
with a salary of P30.00 a month.

The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same house at Barangay San
Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married and had two children.

On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of the accused to help
in their store which was located in front of their house about six (6) meters away. Attending to the store at the
time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused called the complainant to help him close
the door of the store and as the latter complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside
the store and said, "Come, let us have sexual intercourse," to which Estelita replied, "I do not like," and
struggled to free herself and cried. The accused held a bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet including the handle which he
pointed to the throat of the complainant threatening her with said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced her to
lie down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants and after unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top
of complainant and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her inspite of her resistance and struggle. After the
sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to her mother or anybody in
the house, otherwise he would kill her.

Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and did not leave the house of the
accused that same evening. In fact, she slept in the house of the accused that evening and the following
morning she scrubbed the floor and did her daily routine work in the house. She only left the house in the
evening of March 17, 1976.

Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what happened the night before
in the store between Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel ensued among them prompting Estelita Ronaya to go
back to her house. When Estelita's mother confronted her and asked her why she went home that evening, the
complainant could not answer but cried and cried. It was only the following morning on March 18, 1976 that the
complainant told her mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon knowing what happened to her
daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately accompanied her to the house of Patrolman Bernardo
Mairina of the Villasis Police Force who lives in Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina is
a cousin of the father of the complainant. He advised them to proceed to the municipal building while he went
to fetch the accused. The accused was later brought to the police headquarter with the bolo, Exhibit "E", which
the accused allegedly used in threatening the complainant. 1

At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial and in due course of
time, the trial court, as already noted, convicted the appellant.

The instant appeal is anchored on the following:

Assignment of Errors

1. The lower court erred in basing its decision of conviction of appellant solely on the testimony of the
complainant and her mother.

2. The lower court erred in considering the hearsay evidence for the prosecution, "Exhibits B and C".
3. The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of the expert witnesses, as to the mental condition of the
accused-appellant at the time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape.

4. The lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the alleged rape was suffering from
insanity. 2

Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of her mother whose testimonies he contends are
contradictory. It is claimed by appellant that the testimony of complainant on direct examination that she
immediately went home after the rape incident, is at variance with her testimony on cross examination to the
effect that she had stayed in the house of appellant until the following day. Complainant, in saying that she left
the house of appellant by herself, is also alleged to have contradicted her mother who stated that she (the
mother) went to the store in the evening of 17 March 1979 and brought Estelita home.
The apparently inconsistent statements made by complainant were clarified by her on cross examination. In
any case, the inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential details which do not touch upon the manner
in which the crime had been committed and therefore did not in any way impair the credibility of the
complainant. 3

The commission of the came was not seriously disputed by appellant. The testimony of complainant in this
respect is clear and convincing:

Fiscal Guillermo:

Q Now, we go back to that time when according to you the accused pulled you from the door and brought you
inside the store after you helped him closed the store. Now, after the accused pulled you from the door and
brought you inside the store what happened then?
A "You come and we will have sexual intercourse," he said.

Q And what did you say?

A "I do not like," I said.

Q And what did you do, if any, when you said you do not like to have sexual intercourse with him?

A I struggled and cried.

Q What did the accused do after that?

A He got a knife and pointed it at my throat so I was frightened and he could do what he wanted to do. He was
able to do what he wanted to do.

Q This "kutsilyo" you were referring to or knife, how big is that knife? Will you please demonstrate, if any?
A This length, sir. (Which parties agreed to be about one and one-half [1-1/2] feet long.)
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Guillermo:

Q Now, you said that the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with you after he placed the bolo or that
knife [at] your throat. Now, will you please tell the court what did the accused do immediately after placing that
bolo your throat and before having sexual intercourse you?

A He had sexual intercourse with me.

Q What was your wearing apparel that evening?
A I was wearing pants, sir.

Q Aside from the pants, do you have any underwear?

A Yes, sir, I have a panty.

Q Now, before the accused have sexual intercourse with you what, if any, did he do with respect to your pants
and your panty?

A He removed them, sir.

Q Now, while he was removing your pants and your panty what, if any, did you do?

A I continued to struggle so that he could not remove my pants but he was stronger that's why he succeeded.

Q Now, after he had removed your panty and your pants or pantsuit what else happened?
A He went on top of me, sir.
Q At the time what was the accused wearing by way of apparel?

A He was wearing pants.

Q When you said he went on top of you after he has removed your pantsuit and your panty, was he still
wearing his pants?
A He unbuttoned his pants and unfastened the zipper of his pants.
Q And after he unbuttoned and unfastened his pants what did you see which he opened?

A I saw his penis.

Q Now, you said that after the accused has unzipped his pants and brought out his penis which you saw, he
went on top of you. When he was already on top of you what did you do, if any?
A I struggled.

Q Now, you said that you struggled. What happened then when you struggled against the accused when he
was on top of you?

A Since he was stronger, he succeeded doing what he wanted to get.

xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Alright, what do you mean by he was able to succeed in what he wanted to get?
Fiscal Guillermo:

Considering the condition of the witness, your honor, with tears, may we just be allowed to ask a leading
question which is a follow-up question?
Witness:

A He inserted his private part inside my vagina.

Fiscal Guillermo:

Q Now, when he inserted his private part inside your vagina what did you feel, if any?

A I felt something that came out from his inside.

Q Now, how long, if you remember, did the accused have his penis inside your vagina:?

A Around five minutes maybe, sir.

Q After that what happened then?
A He removed it.
Q After the accused has removed his penis from your vagina what else happened?

A No more, sir, he sat down.

Q What, if any, did he tell you?

A There was, sir. He told me not to report the matter to my

mother and to anybody in their house.

Q What else did he tell you?
A He told me that if I told anyone what happened, he will kill me.
Q After that where did you go?

A I went home already, sir. 4

The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as
schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. At the urging of his counsel, the trial court
suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for
observation and treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was admitted into the hospital
on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978.

During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports on the mental and physical condition of
the appellant, all signed by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip and Dr. Arturo E. Nerit, physician-in-charge and chief,
Forensic Psychiatry Service, respectively.

In the first report dated 27 January 1977, the following observations concerning appellant's mental condition
were set forth:

On admission he was sluggish in movements, indifferent to interview, would just look up whenever questioned
but refused to answer.

On subsequent examinations and observations he was carelessly attired, with dishevelled hair, would stare
vacuously through the window, or look at people around him. He was indifferent and when questioned, he
would just smile inappropriately. He refused to verbalize, even when persuaded, and was emotionally dull and
mentally inaccessible. He is generally seclusive, at times would pace the floor, seemingly in deep thought.
Later on when questioned his frequent answers are "Aywan ko, hindi ko alam." His affect is dull, he claimed to
hear strange voices "parang ibon, tinig ng ibon," but cannot elaborate. He is disoriented to 3 spheres and has
no idea why he was brought here.
The report then concluded:

In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is found suffering
from a mental disorder called schizophrenia, manifested by carelessness in grooming, sluggishness in
movements, staring vacuously, indifferen[ce], smiling inappropriately, refusal to verbalize, emotional dullness,
mental inaccessibility, seclusiveness, preoccupation, disorientation, and perceptual aberrations of hearing
strange sounds. He is psychotic or insane, hence cannot stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and
treatment. 5

The second report, dated 21 June 1977, contained the following description of appellant's mental condition:

At present he is still seclusive, undertalkative and retarded in his reponses. There is dullness of his affect and
he appeared preoccupied. He is observed to mumble alone by himself and would show periods of being
irritable saying — "oki naman" with nobody in particular. He claim he does not know whether or not he was
placed in jail and does not know if he has a case in court. Said he does not remember having committed any
wrong act and the following conclusions:
In view of the foregoing examinations and observations Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is at present time
still psychotic or insane, manifested by periods of irritability — cursing nobody in particular, seclusive,
underactive, undertalkative, retarded in his response, dullness of his affect, mumbles alone by himself,
preoccupied and lack of insight.
He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and treatment. 6

In the third report, dated 5 October 1977, appellant was described as having become "better behaved,
responsive" and "neat in person," and "adequate in his emotional tone, in touch with his surroundings and . . .
free from hallucinatory experiences." During the preceding period, appellant had been allowed to leave the
hospital temporarily; he stayed with a relative in Manila while coming periodically to the hospital for check-ups.
During this period, he was said to have been helpful in the doing of household chores, conversed and as freely
with other members of the household and slept well, although, occasionally, appellant smiled while alone.
Appellant complained that at times he heard voices of small children, talking in a language he could not
understand. The report concluded by saying that while appellant had improved in his mental condition, he was
not yet in a position to stand trial since he needed further treatment, medication and check-ups. 7

In the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in household chores and no
longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed" and "oriented" and as denying having
hallucinations. The report concluded that he was in a "much improved condition" and "in a mental condition to
stand court trial." 8
Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested that appellant was
sick one or two years before his admission into the hospital, in effect implying that appellant was already
suffering from schizophrenia when he raped complainant. 9 The defense next presented Raquel Jovellano, a
psychiatrist engaged in private practice, who testified that she had examined and treated the appellant.
Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. —

The following are exempt from criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the
court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which
he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.

xxx xxx xxx

Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only in People vs.
Formigones 10 that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity, quoting extensively from
the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, thus:

The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it
is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused
be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least
discernment; (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur. Crim. 413.) that there be
a complete absence of the power to discern, (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 29, 1916; 96 Jur.
Crim. 239) or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239) For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the
commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
April 20, 1911; 86 Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be [equated with] imbecility or insanity.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had
previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it
will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be
voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability,
on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved. (Emphasis supplied.)

The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases. 11 A linguistic or
grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable tests:
(a) the test of cognition — "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act," and (b) the test
of volition — "or that there be a total deprivation freedom of the will." But our caselaw shows common reliance
on the test of cognition, rather than on a test relating to "freedom of the will;" examination of our caselaw has
failed to turn up any case where this Court has exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was totally
deprived of "freedom of the will," i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of intelligence." This is
perhaps to be expected since a person's volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is presented as
desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any case, where the accused
failed to show complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court has recognized at most a mitigating, not
an exempting, circumstance in accord with Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code: "Such illness of the
offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts." 12

Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability
to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly
called dementia praecox, it is said to be the most common form of psychosis an usually develops between the
ages 15 and 30. A standard textbook in psychiatry describes some of the symptoms of schizophrenia in the
following manner:
Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizophrenia: a disturbance of association,
a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of activity. Bleuler also stressed the dereistic attitude of the
schizophrenic — that is, his detachment from reality and consequent autism and the ambivalence that
expresses itself in his uncertain affectivity and initiative. Thus, Bleuler's system of schizophrenia is often
referred to as the four A's: association, affect, autism, and ambivalence.
xxx xxx xxx

Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia that he considered in no way
specific for the disease but of great pragmatic value in making a diagnosis. Schneider's first-rank symptoms
include the hearing of one's thoughts spoken aloud, auditory hallucinations that comment on the patient's
behavior, somatic hallucinations, the experience of having one's thoughts controlled, the spreading of one's
thoughts to others, delusions, and the experience of having one's actions controlled or influenced from the
outside.

Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on the basis of second-rank
symptoms, along with an otherwise typical clinical appearances. Second-rank symptoms include other forms of
hallucination, perplexity, depressive and euphoric disorders of affect, and emotional blunting.
Perceptual Disorders

Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia . . . .

Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding external stimuli are common
symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are auditory hallucinations, or the hearing of voices. Most
characteristically, two or more voices talk about the patient, discussing him in the third person. Frequently, the
voices address the patient, comment on what he is doing and what is going on around him, or are threatening
or obscene and very disturbing to the patient. Many schizophrenic patients experience the hearing of their own
thoughts. When they are reading silently, for example, they may be quite disturbed by hearing every word they
are reading clearly spoken to them.

Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory hallucinations in schizophrenic patients, but they are
not rare. Patients suffering from organic of affective psychoses experience visual hallucinations primarily at
night or during limited periods of the day, but schizophrenic patients hallucinate as much during the day as they
do during the night, sometimes almost continuously. They get relief only in sleep. When visual occur in
schizophrenia, they are usually seen nearby, clearly defined, in color, life size, in three dimensions, and
moving. Visual hallucinations almost never in one of the other sensory modalities.
xxx xxx xxx

Cognitive Disorders

Delusions. By definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by reasoning, and that are
idiosyncratic for the patient — that is, not part of his cultural environment. They are among the common
symptoms of schizophrenia.

Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key symptom in the paranoid type of schizophrenia.
The conviction of being controlled by some unseen mysterious power that exercises its influence from a
distance is almost pathognomonic for schizophrenia. It occurs in most, if not all, schizophrenics at one time or
another, and for many it is a daily experience. The modern schizophrenic whose delusions have kept up with
the scientific times may be preoccupied with atomic power, X-rays, or spaceships that take control over his
mind and body. Also typical for
many schizophrenics are delusional fantasies about the destruction of the world. 14
In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumtance, 15
it has mostly been rejected by the Court. In each of
these cases, the evidence presented tended to show that if there was impairment of the mental faculties, such
impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.
The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same situation. Dr. Jovellano declared as follows:
(Fiscal Guillermo:)

Q Now, this condition of the accused schizophrenic as you found him, would you say doctor that he was
completely devoid of any consciousness of whatever he did in connection with the incident in this case?
A He is not completely devoid of consciousness.

Q Would you say doctor, therefore, that he was conscious of threatening the victim at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape?

A Yes, he was conscious.

Q And he was conscious of forcing the victim to lie down?

A Yes.

Q And he was also conscious of removing the panty of the victim at the time?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious and knows that the victim has a vagina upon which he will place his penis?

A Yeah.
Q And he was conscious enough to be competent and have an erection?
A Yes.

Q Would you say that those acts of a person no matter whether he is schizophrenic which you said, it deals
(sic) some kind of intelligence and consciousness of some acts that is committed?
A Yes, it involves the consciousness because the consciousness there in relation to the act is what we call
primitive acts of any individual. The difference only in the act of an insane and a normal individual, a normal
individual will use the power of reasoning and consciousness within the standard of society while an insane
causes (sic) already devoid of the fact that he could no longer withstand himself in the ordinary environment,
yet his acts are within the bound of insanity or psychosis.

Q Now, Doctor, of course this person suffering that ailment which you said the accused here is suffering is
capable of planning the commission of a rape?
A Yes, they are also capable.

Q He is capable of laying in wait in order to assault?

A Yes.

Q And would you say that condition that ability of a person to plan a rape and to perform all the acts
preparatory to the actual intercourse could be done by an insane person?

A Yes, it could be done.

Q Now, you are talking of insanity in its broadest sense, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what is wrong?

A Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know what is wrong but yet there is no
inhibition on the individual.
Q Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act they are going to commit is wrong?

A Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost the inhibition. The reasoning is
weak and yet they understand but the volition is [not] there, the drive is [not]
there.

Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before
and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused
should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is committed. 18 Appellant rested
his case on the testimonies of two (2) physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport
to characterize his mental condition during that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to
circumtances occurring on or immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad
statements based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia. Curiously, while it was
Dr. Masikip who had actually observed and examined appellant during his confinement at the National Mental
Hospital, the defense chose to present Dr. Nerit.

Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.

In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting because it
does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts, may be considered as a mitigating
circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., as an illness which diminishes the exercise of
the offender's will-power without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. Appellant should
have been credited with this mitigating circumstance, although it would not have affected the penalty imposable
upon him under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code: "in all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua in this case), it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed."
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the amount of moral damages is
increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132319 May 12, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:

What distinguishes man from beast is his intellect. Man's action is guided and controlled by his mind. Law is
designed for rational beings as it is based on our inherent sense of right which is inseparable from reason.
Thus, when man's reasoning is so distorted by disease that he is totally incapable of distinguishing right from
wrong, he loses responsibility before the law. In the case at bar, we are asked to resolve whether or not the
accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the crime he committed.

Accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO was charged with parricide for killing his wife LILIA MADARANG
in an Information 1 which reads:

That on or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion, municipality of Infante, province of Pangasinan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with evident premeditation and
treachery, armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab
LILIA M. MADARANG, his legitimate wife, inflicting upon her stab wound 4 1/2 inches by 1 1/2 inch(es) long
and 3/16 of an inch wide, located just below the left clavicle 1 3/4 inch(es) lateral to the supra-sternal notch,
and plowed along the interpace slightly coursing upward and posteriorly and stab wound 1 inch in length,
gaping and 3 1/2 inch(es) deep, located at the right arm at its medial aspect, coursing upwards and medially
towards the apex of the right axilla which caused her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of Lilia M. Madarang.
Contrary to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code.

At the arraignment, the accused refused to enter a plea. Pursuant to the Rules, the trial court entered a "not
guilty" plea for him. At the initial hearing of the case on May 5, 1994, the accused's counsel manifested that his
client had been observed behaving in an abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. Thus, the Court called the
accused to the stand but he refused to answer any of the questions propounded by the court. Hence, on the
same date, the Court issued an Order 2 directing the transfer of the accused to the National Center for Mental
Health (NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation to determine his fitness to stand trial.

The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he was suffering from a form of psychosis
known as schizophrenia. The accused was detained at the hospital and was administered medication for his
illness. On June 19, 1996, after more than two (2) years of confinement, the accused was discharged from the
NCMH and recommitted to the provincial jail as he was already found fit to face the charges against him. 3

At the resumption of the hearing, a reverse trial was conducted. The accused proceeded to adduce evidence
on his claim of insanity at the time he committed the offense.

As culled from the testimonies of the accused, his mother-in-law AVELINA MIRADOR, and his daughter
LILIFER MADARANG, the following facts were established: The accused and Lilia Mirador were legally married
and their union was blessed with seven (7) children. The accused worked as a seaman for sixteen (16) years.
He was employed in a United States ship until 1972. In 1973, he worked as a seaman in Germany and stayed
there for nine (9) years, or until 1982. Thereafter, he returned to his family in Infanta, Pangasinan, and started a
hardware store business. His venture however failed. Worse, he lost his entire fortune due to cockfighting. 4

In the latter part of July 1993, the accused, his wife Lilia and their children were forced to stay in the house of
Avelina Mirador as the accused could no longer support his family. Moreover, Lilia was then already heavy with
their eight child and was about to give birth. 5

On September 3, 1993, at about 5:00 p.m., the accused and Lilia had a squabble. The accused was jealous of
another man and was accusing Lilia of infidelity. In the heat of the fight and in the presence of their children, the
accused stabbed Lilia, resulting in her untimely demise. 6

AVELINA MIRADOR was then in the pigpen when she heard the children of the accused shouting and crying
inside her house. She called out to them and asked what was wrong. She received no reply. Her nephew
barged into the house and brought out the children one at a time, leaving the accused with Lilia. While passing
by Avelina, her nephew warned her: "You better run." Avelina then saw the accused emerge from the house
holding a bolo. She scampered for safety. 7

She declared that during the period that the accused and his family stayed in her house, she did not notice
anything peculiar in accused's behavior that would suggest that he was suffering from any mental illness.
Neither did she know of any reason why the accused killed his wife as she never saw the two engage in any
argument while they were living with her. 8

The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident. He could not remember
where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one of the
hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned about her death.
He, however, was not aware of the cause of her demise. He claimed that he did not know whether he suffered
from any mental illness and did not remember being confined at the NCMH for treatment. 9

DR. WILSON S. TIBAYAN, a resident doctor of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), declared that
the accused was committed to the NCMH on July 4, 1994 upon order of the court. The NCMH conducted three
(3) medical and psychiatric evaluations of the accused during his confinement therein. Based on the first
medical report, dated August 2, 1994, 10 the accused was found to be suffering from insanity or psychosis,
classified as schizophrenia. Dr. Tibayan explained that schizophrenia is a mental abnormality characterized by
impaired fundamental reasoning, delusions, hallucinations, preoccupation with one's thoughts, poor self-care,
insight and judgment, and impaired cognitive, social and occupational functions. The patient may be incapable
of distinguishing right from wrong or know what he is doing. He may become destructive or have a propensity
to attack any one if his hallucinations were violent. 11 A schizophrenic, however, may have lucid intervals during
which he may be able to distinguish right from wrong. 12 Dr. Tibayan opined that the accused's mental illness
may have begun even prior to his admission to the NCMH and it was highly possible that he was already
suffering from schizophrenia prior to his commission of the crime. 1

By December 21, 1994, as per the second medical report, the accused was still suffering from schizophrenia.
After one and a half years of confinement, the third psychiatric evaluation of the accused, dated May 27,
1996, 14 showed that his mental condition considerably improved due to continuous medication. The accused
was recommended to be discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to jail to stand trial. 15

The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the presumption of sanity at the time he
committed the offense. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and circumstances of this case, this Court is of the view that
accused Fernando Madarang is of sound mind at the time of the commission of the offense and that he failed
to rebut by convincing proof the evidence on record against him to exempt him from criminal liablity. And since
the death penalty was suspended or abolished at the time of the commission of the offense, this Court hereby
sentences the accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED. 16
Hence this appeal.

The appellant insists that at the time he stabbed his wife, he was completely deprived of intelligence, making
his criminal act involuntary. His unstable state of mind could allegedly be deduced from the following:

First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Hence, he was completely unaware of his acts that fateful
day and must have committed the crime without the least discernment.
Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved he was then afflicted with schizophrenia. He cited the
testimony of Dr. Tibayan that a schizophrenic may go into extremes — he may be violent and destructive, or
very silent and self-focused. The appellant exhibited his violent tendencies on that fateful day. He killed his wife
and Avelina and her nephew were so frightened that they ran away at the sight of him holding a bolo. He did
not seem to recognize anybody and could have turned to anyone and inflicted further injury. He avers that this
is peculiar only to persons who are mentally deranged for a sane person who just committed a crime would
have appeared remorseful and repentant after realizing that what he did was wrong.

Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion that there was a high possibility that he was already
suffering from insanity prior to his commission of the crime on September 3, 1993. 17 The defense posits that
his mental illness may have been caused by his loss of fortune. His hardware business, which he started
through 16 years of working as a seaman, went bankrupt. He ended up virtually dependent on his mother-in-
law for his family's support and all these may have been beyond his capacity to handle.

The appellant further contends that the fact that he and his wife never engaged in a fight prior to that fateful day
should be considered. The marked change in his behavior when he uncharacteristically quarreled with his wife
on that day and suddenly turned violent on her confirms that he was mentally disturbed when he committed the
crime.

Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill Lilia who was scheduled to give birth to their eighth
child three (3) days prior to the killing. Unless overpowered by something beyond his control, nobody in his
right mind would kill his wife who was carrying his child. Jealousy, the appellant posits, is not a sufficient reason
to kill a pregnant spouse.
We find these arguments without merit.
In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an offense. The
insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed with the
faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that which renders human actions laudable or
culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An insane
accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No purpose of criminal law is served
by punishing an insane accused because by reason of his mental state, he would have no control over his
behavior and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the future. 18

A number of tests evolved to determine insanity under the law. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the traditional
test is the M'Naghten rule of 1843 which states that "to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." The M'Naghten rule is a cognitive measure of
insanity as the accused is required to know two things: the nature and quality of the act, and that the act was
wrong. This rule has been criticized for its ambiguity. It was debated whether the word "wrong" referred to
moral or legal wrong. The importance of the distinction was illustrated by Stephen 19 as follows: A kills B
knowing that he is killing B and it is illegal to kill B but under an insane delusion that God has commanded him
to kill B to obtain the salvation of the human race. A's act is a crime if the word "wrong" means illegal but it is
not a crime if the word "wrong" means morally wrong. The word "know" was also assailed as it referred solely
to intellectual reason and excluded affective or emotional knowledge. It was pointed out that the accused may
know in his mind what he is doing but may have no grasp of the effect or consequences of his
actions. 20 M'Naghten was condemned as based on an obsolete and misleading concept of the nature of
insanity as insanity does not only affect the intellectual faculties but also affects the whole personality of the
patient, including his will and emotions. It was argued that reason is only one of the elements of a personality
and does not solely determine man's conduct. 21

Subsequently, M'Naghten was refined by the "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming
defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of
disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him to
prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." Thus, even if the accused knew that what
he was doing was wrong, he would be acquitted by reason of insanity if his mental illness kept him from
controlling his conduct or resisting the impulse to commit the crime. This rule rests on the assumption that there
are mental illnesses that impair volition or self-control, even while there is cognition or knowledge of what is
right and wrong. 22 This test was likewise criticized on the following grounds: (1) the "impulse" requirement is
too restrictive as it covers only impulsive acts; (2) the "irresistible" requirement is also restrictive as it requires
absolute impairment of the freedom of the will which cases are very rare; (3) it will not serve the purpose of
criminal law to deter criminals as the will to resist commission of the crime will not be encouraged, and; (4) it is
difficult to prove whether the act was the result of an insane, irresistible impulse. 2

Then came the Durham "product" test in 1954 which postulated that "an accused is not criminally responsible if
his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect." 24 Critics of this test argued that it gave too much
protection to the accused. It placed the prosecution in a difficult position of proving accused's sanity beyond
reasonable doubt as a mere testimony of a psychiatrist that accused's act was the result of a mental disease
leaves the judge with no choice but to accept it as a fact. The case thus becomes completely dependent on the
testimonies of experts. 25

Then came the ALI "substantial capacity" test, integrated by the American Law Institute (ALI) in its Model Penal
Code Test, which improved on the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests. The new rule stated that a person
is not responsible for his criminal act if, as a result of the mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity
to appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 26 Still, this test
has been criticized for its use of ambiguous words like "substantial capacity" and "appreciate" as there would
be differences in expert testimonies whether the accused's degree of awareness was sufficient. 27 Objections
were also made to the exclusion of psychopaths or persons whose abnormalities are manifested only by
repeated criminal conduct. Critics observed that psychopaths cannot be deterred and thus undeserving of
punishment. 28

In 1984, however, the U.S. Congress repudiated this test in favor of the M'Naghten style statutory formulation.
It enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act which made the appreciation test the law applicable in all
federal courts. The test is similar to M'Naghten as it relies on the cognitive test. The accused is not required to
prove lack of control as in the ALI test. The appreciation test shifted the burden of proof to the defense, limited
the scope of expert testimony, eliminated the defense of diminished capacity and provided for commitment of
accused found to be insane. 29

In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is
required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is
deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power
to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability. 30

The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual
means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a
person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused
requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by
a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own
perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. 31 The
testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged. 32

In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was committed to
the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often accompanied by hallucinations
and delusions. Formerly called dementia pracecox, it is the most common form of
psychosis. 3 Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior
apparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality,
often ambivalently directed. The interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusions
and hallucinations. In the most disorganized form of schizophrenic living, withdrawal into a fantasy life takes
place and is associated with serious thought disorder and profound habit deterioration in which the usual social
customs are disregarded. 34 During the initial stage, the common early symptom is aloofness, a withdrawal
behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would seem preoccupied
and dreamy and may appear "far away." He does not empathize with the feelings of others and manifests little
concern about the realities of life situations. The schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of rejection and an
intolerable lack of self-respect. He withdraws from emotional involvement with other people to protect himself
from painful relationships. There is shallowness of affect, a paucity of emotional responsiveness and a loss of
spontaneity. Frequently, he becomes neglectful of personal care and cleanliness. 35 A variety of subjective
experiences, associated with or influenced by mounting anxiety and fears precede the earliest behavioral
changes and oddities. He becomes aware of increasing tension and confusion and becomes distracted in
conversation manifested by his inability to maintain a train of thought in his conversations. Outwardly, this will
be noticed as blocks or breaks in conversations. The schizophrenic may not speak or respond appropriately to
his companions. He may look fixedly away, or he may appear to stare, as he does not regularly blink his eyes
in his attempt to hold his attention. 36

None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms
associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure, the
record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to
that fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the appellant was already
suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also declared that schizophrenics have lucid
intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing right from wrong. 37 Hence the importance of adducing
proof to show that the appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the offense. Although the
appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing incident, the evidence of insanity
after the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal
behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Evidence on the alleged insanity
must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. 38

In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish his claim of insanity at
the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the appellant was completely of
unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime. The arguments advanced by the
appellant to prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one, his claim that he has absolutely no
recollection of the stabbing incident amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with facility. The fact
that Avelina and her nephew were frightened at the sight of the appellant holding a bolo after he killed his wife
does not, by any stretch of imagination, prove that the appellant has lost his grip on reality on that occasion.
Neither is the appellant's seemingly non-repentant attitude immediately after he stabbed his wife an indicium of
his alleged insanity. Even criminals of stable mental condition take this non-remorseful stance. Similarly, that
the appellant and his wife were never seen quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself prove the
appellant's unstable mental condition. Neither can it be said that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a
pregnant spouse. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where lives had been terminated for the flimsiest
reason.

The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that he lost his business and became totally dependent on
his mother-in-law for support. We find this, however, purely speculative and unsupported by record. To be sure,
there was no showing of any odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant after he lost his fortune and
prior to his commission of the crime that may be symptomatic of his mental illness. In fact, the appellant's
mother-in-law declared that during the time that she knew the appellant and while he lived in her house, she did
not notice anything irregular or abnormal in the appellant's behavior that could have suggested that he was
suffering from any mental illness.

An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He admits committing the crime
but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at the time of its commission. Hence, the accused is
tried on the issue of sanity alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial
on the issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the crime. 39 As the appellant, in the case at bar,
failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed his wife, we are constrained
to affirm his conviction.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting the appellant of the crime of parricide is
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 138453 : May 29, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. MELECIO ROBIOS y DOMINGO, Appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Where the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, as in the present case for parricide
with unintentional abortion, the lesser one shall be applied in the absence of any aggravating circumstances.
Hence, the imposable penalty here is reclusion perpetua, not death.
The Case

For automatic review by this Court is the April 16, 1999 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling,
Tarlac (Branch 68), in Criminal Case No. 95-45, finding Melecio Robios2 y Domingo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and sentencing him to death. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Melecio Robios guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion, this Court hereby renders judgment sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
DEATH by lethal injection. He is also ordered to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim;
and P22,800.00 as actual damages.3cräläwvirtualibräry

In an Information dated May 31, 1995,4 appellant was accused of killing his pregnant wife and the fetus inside
her. It reads thus:

That on or about March 25, 1995 at around 7:00 a.m. in Brgy. San Isidro, Municipality of Camiling, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Melecio Robinos, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab by means of a bladed knife 8 inches long, his legitimate
wife Lorenza Robinos, who was, then six (6) months pregnant causing the instantaneous death of said Lorenza
Robinos, and the fetus inside her womb.5cräläwvirtualibräry

When arraigned on July 27, 1995, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel,6 pleaded not guilty.7 After due
trial, the RTC convicted him.

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the prosecutions version of how appellant assaulted his
pregnant wife, culminating in a brutal bloodbath, as follows:

1. On March 25, 1995, at around seven oclock in the morning, fifteen-year old Lorenzo Robios was in his
parents house at Barangay San Isidro in Camiling, Tarlac. While Lorenzo was cooking, he heard his parents,
appellant Melecio Robios and the victim Lorenza Robios, who were at the sala, quarrelling.

2. Lorenzo heard his mother tell appellant, Why did you come home, why dont you just leave? After hearing
what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a distance of about five meters, saw appellant, with a double-bladed knife,
stab Lorenza on the right shoulder. Blood gushed from where Lorenza was hit and she fell down on the floor.
Upon witnessing appellants attack on his mother, Lorenzo immediately left their house and ran to his
grandmothers house where he reported the incident.

3. At around eight oclock in the morning of the same day, Benjamin Bueno, the brother of the victim Lorenza
Robios, was at the house of his mother Remedios Bueno at Barangay San Isidro. Benjamin, a resident of
Barangay Mabilang in Paniqui, Tarlac, went to his mothers house for the purpose of informing his relatives that
on the evening of March 24, 1995, appellant had killed his uncle, Alejandro Robios, at Barangay Mabilang.
However while Benjamin was at his mothers house, he received the more distressing news that his own sister
Lorenza had been killed by appellant.
4. Upon learning of the attack on his sister, Benjamin did not go to her house because he was afraid of what
appellant might do. From his mothers house, which was about 150 meters away from his sisters home,
Benjamin saw appellant who shouted at him, Its good you would see how your sister died.

5. Benjamin sought the help of Barangay Captain Virgilio Valdez who called the police station at Camiling,
Tarlac. SPO1 Herbert Lugo and SPO3 Tirso Martin, together with the other members of the PNP Alert Team at
Camiling, Tarlac, immediately went to Barangay San Isidro. The police, together with Benjamin Bueno and
some barangay officials and barangay folk, proceeded to the scene of the crime where they saw blood dripping
from the house of appellant and Lorenza. The police told appellant to come out of the house. When appellant
failed to come out, the police, with the help of barangay officials, detached the bamboo wall from the part of the
house where blood was dripping. The removal of the wall exposed that section of the house where SPO1 Lugo
saw appellant embracing [his] wife.

6. Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor. Appellant, who was lying on his side and holding a
bloodstained double-bladed knife with his right hand, was embracing his wife. He was uttering the words, I will
kill myself, I will kill myself. Lorenza, who was lying on her back and facing upward, was no longer breathing.
She appeared to be dead.

7. The police and the barangay officials went up the stairs of the house and pulled appellant away from
Lorenzas body. Appellant dropped the knife which was taken by SPO3 Martin. Appellant tried to resist the
people who held him but was overpowered. The police, with the help of the barangay officials present, tied his
hands and feet with a plastic rope. However, before he was pulled away from the body of his wife and
restrained by the police, appellant admitted to Rolando Valdez, a neighbor of his and a barangay kagawad, that
he had killed his wife, showing him the bloodstained knife.

8. Upon examining Lorenza, SPO1 Lugo found that she was already dead. She was pale and not breathing.
The police thus solicited the services of a funeral parlor to take Lorenzas body for autopsy. Appellant was
brought to the police station at Camiling, Tarlac. However, he had to be taken to the Camiling District Hospital
for the treatment of a stab wound.

9. After the incident, Senior Inspector Reynaldo B. Orante, the Chief of Police at Camiling, Tarlac, prepared a
Special Report which disclosed that:

The victim Lorenza Robios was six (6) months pregnant. She suffered 41 stab wounds on the different parts of
her body.

That suspect (Melecio Robios) was under the influence of liquor/drunk [who] came home and argued/quarreled
with his wife, until the suspect got irked, [drew] a double knife and delivered forty one (41) stab blows.
Suspect also stabbed his own body and [was] brought to the Provincial Hospital.
Recovered from the crime scene is a double blade sharp knife about eight (8) inches long including handle.

10. During the trial of the case, the prosecution was not able to present the doctor who conducted the autopsy
on Lorenza Robios body. Nor, was the autopsy report presented as evidence.8

Version of the Defense

Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he indeed killed his wife, but seeks
exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the defense of insanity as follows:

Pleading exculpation, herein accused-appellant interposed insanity. The defense presented the testimonies of
the following:
FEDERICO ROBIOS, 19 years old son of Melecio Robios, testified that his parents had occasional quarrels[.
B]efore March 23, 1995, his father told him that he had seen a person went [sic] inside their house and who
wanted to kill him. On March 23, 1995, he heard his father told the same thing to his mother and because of
this, his parents quarreled and exchanged heated words.
LOURDES FAJARDO, nurse of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that she came to know Melecio Robios only
in May to June 1996. Every time she visited him in his cell, accused isolated himself, laging nakatingin sa
malayo, rarely talked, just stared at her and murmured alone.
BENEDICT REBOLLOS, a detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that he and the accused
were seeing each other everyday from 6:00 oclock in the morning up to 5:30 oclock in the afternoon. He had
observed that accused sometime[s] refused to respond in the counting of prisoners. Sometimes, he stayed in
his cell even if they were required to fall in line in the plaza of the penal colony.
DOMINGO FRANCISCO, another detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that as the accuseds
inmate, he had occasion to meet and mingle with the latter. Accused sometimes was lying down, sitting,
looking, or staring on space and without companion, laughing and sometimes crying.
MELECIO ROBIOS, herein accused-appellant, testified that on March 25, 1995, he was in their house and
there was no unusual incident that happened on that date. He did not know that he was charged for the crime
of parricide with unintentional abortion. He could not remember when he was informed by his children that he
killed his wife. He could not believe that he killed his wife.9cräläwvirtualibräry
In view of the penalty imposed by the trial court, this case was automatically elevated to this Court for review. 10
The Issues
Appellant submits for our consideration the following assignment of errors:
I

The court a quo erred in not giving probative weight to the testimony and psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Maria
Mercedita Mendoza finding the accused-appellant to be suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under
schizophrenia, paranoid type.

II
The court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellants defense of insanity.[11

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.
Main Issue

Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance

At the outset, it bears noting that appellant did not present any evidence to contravene the allegation that he
killed his wife. Clear and undisputed are the RTC findings on the identity of the culprit and the commission of
the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. Appellant, however, interposes the defense of
insanity to absolve himself of criminal liability.

Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will
at the time of the commission of the crime.12 A defendant in a criminal case who relies on the defense of mental
incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the very moment when the crime was
committed.13 Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the
crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.14cräläwvirtualibräry

The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, every person
is presumed to be of sound mind.15 Accordingly, one who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has
the burden of proving it.16 Failing this, one will be presumed to be sane when the crime was committed.

A perusal of the records of the case reveals that appellants claim of insanity is unsubstantiated and wanting in
material proof. Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial evidence that
appellant was completely deprived of reason or discernment when he perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife.

As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, a domestic altercation preceded the fatal
stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that appellant attacked his wife for no reason at all and without knowledge of
the nature of his action. To be sure, his act of stabbing her was a deliberate and conscious reaction to the
insulting remarks she had hurled at him as attested to by their 15-year-old son Lorenzo Robios. We reproduce
Lorenzos testimony in part as follows:

Q: Before your father Melecio Robios stabbed your mother, do you recall if they talked to one and the other?

A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. IBARRA:
Q: Did you hear what they talked about?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you hear?
A: Why did you come home, why dont you just leave?, Sir.
COURT:

In other words, you better go away, you should have not come back home.
ATTY. IBARRA:

Q: After your mother uttered those words, what did your father do?
A: That was the time that he stabbed my mother, sir.[17cräläwvirtualibräry

Furthermore, appellant was obviously aware of what he had done to his wife. He was even bragging to her
brother, Benjamin Bueno, how he had just killed her. Bueno testified thus:
ATTY. JOAQUIN:

Q: Now, from the house of your mother, can you see the house of your sister?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you arrived at the house of your mother, Lorenzo Robios was already there in the house of your
mother, is that right, Mr. Witness?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And he was the one who informed you about your sister already dead?

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did you go near the house of your sister upon learning that she was already dead?
A: No, sir.

ATTY. JOAQUIN:
Q: Why?

A: My brother-in-law was still amok, Sir.

COURT:
Q: Why do you know that he was amok?
A: Yes, sir, because he even shouted at me, sir.

Q: How?

A: Its good you would see how your sister died, Sir.[18cräläwvirtualibräry

Finally, the fact that appellant admitted to responding law enforcers how he had just killed his wife may have
been a manifestation of repentance and remorse -- a natural sentiment of a husband who had realized the
wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at the time of the killing and immediately thereafter is inconsistent with his
claim that he had no knowledge of what he had just done. Barangay Kagawad Rolando Valdez validated the
clarity of mind of appellant when the latter confessed to the former and to the police officers, and even showed
to them the knife used to stab the victim. Valdezs testimony proceeded as follows:
Q: And what did you discover when you went there at the house of Melecio Robios?
A: When we arrived at the house of Melecio Robios, it was closed. We waited for the police officers to arrive
and when they arrived, that was the time that we started going around the house and when we saw blood,
some of our companions removed the walling of the house and at that time, we saw the wife of Melecio Robios
lying down as if at that moment, the wife of Melecio Robios was already dead, Sir.
Q: When you were able to remove this walling, what did you do?

A: We talked to Melecio Robios, Sir.

xxx

Q: What was he doing when you talked to him?

A: When we saw them they were both lying down and when we got near, he said he killed his wife and showing
the weapon he used, sir.
Q: What is that weapon?

A: Double bladed weapon, Sir.

COURT:
What is that, knife?

A: Its a double bladed knife, sir.

xxx

COURT:
He admitted to you that he killed his wife?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did he say that, tell the court exactly how he tell you that, in tagalog, ilocano or what?
A: What I remember Sir he said, Pinatay ko ni baket ko meaning I killed my wife, Sir.[19cräläwvirtualibräry
Clearly, the assault of appellant on his wife was not undertaken without his awareness of the atrocity of his act.

Similarly, an evaluation of the testimonies of the defense witnesses hardly supports his claim of insanity. The
bulk of the defense evidence points to his allegedly unsound mental condition after the commission of the
crime. Except for appellants 19-year-old son Federico Robios,20 all the other defense witnesses testified on the
supposed manifestations of his insanity after he had already been detained in prison.

To repeat, insanity must have existed at the time of the commission of the offense, or the accused must have
been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise he would still be criminally responsible.21 Verily, his alleged
insanity should have pertained to the period prior to or at the precise moment when the criminal act was
committed, not at anytime thereafter. In People v. Villa,22 this Court incisively ratiocinated on the matter as
follows:
It could be that accused-appellant was insane at the time he was examined at the center. But, in all probability,
such insanity was contracted during the period of his detention pending trial. He was without contact with
friends and relatives most of the time. He was troubled by his conscience, the realization of the gravity of the
offenses and the thought of a bleak future for him. The confluence of these circumstances may have conspired
to disrupt his mental equilibrium. But, it must be stressed, that an inquiry into the mental state of accused-
appellant should relate to the period immediately before or at the precise moment of doing the act which is the
subject of the inquiry, and his mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for
purposes of determining his criminal liability. In fine, this Court needs more concrete evidence on the mental
condition of the person alleged to be insane at the time of the perpetration of the crimes in order that the
exempting circumstance of insanity may be appreciated in his favor. x x x.23 (Italics supplied)

Indeed, when insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal responsibility, the evidence must refer
to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. If the evidence points to
insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be acquitted. 24cräläwvirtualibräry

The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza, the psychiatrist who conducted an examination of the mental
condition of appellant, does not provide much help in determining his state of mind at the time of the killing. It
must be noted that she examined him only on September 11, 1995, or six months after the commission of the
crime.25 Moreover, she was not able to make a background study on the history of his mental condition prior to
the killing because of the failure of a certain social worker to gather data on the matter. 26cräläwvirtualibräry

Although Dr. Mendoza testified that it was possible that the accused had already been suffering from psychosis
at the time of the commission of the crime,27 she likewise admitted that her conclusion was not definite and was
merely an opinion.28 As correctly observed by the trial court, her declarations were merely conjectural and
inconclusive to support a positive finding of insanity. According to the RTC:

The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercidita Mendoza, who examined accused at the National Center for Mental
Health, Mandaluyong City, that at the time of examination accused Melecio Robios was still mentally ill; that
accused was experiencing hallucination and suffering from insanity and it is possible that the sickness have
occurred eight (8) to nine (9) months before examination; and in her opinion accused was suffering from
delusion and hallucination. And her opinion that at the time accused stabbed himself, he was not in his lucid
interval, is merely her conclusion. xxx xxx xxx Aside from being her opinion, she conducted the mental,
physical and neurological examinations on the accused seven (7) months after the commission of the offense.
That span of seven (7) months has given accused an opportunity to contrive and feign mental derangement.
Dr. Mendoza had no opportunity to observed (sic) and assessed (sic) the behavior of the accused immediately
before, during and immediately after the commission of the offense. Her finding is conjectural, inconclusive.
She did not conduct background examination of the mental condition of the accused before the incident by
interviewing persons who had the opportunity to associate with him.[29cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have proven that he had already been completely deprived of
reason when he killed the victim.30 Verily, the evidence proffered by the defense did not indicate that he had
been completely deprived of intelligence or freedom of will when he stabbed his wife to death. Insanity is a
defense in the nature of a confession or avoidance and, as such, clear and convincing proof is required to
establish its existence.31 Indubitably, the defense failed to meet the quantum of proof required to overthrow the
presumption of sanity.

Second Issue:
Proper Penalty

Although the RTC correctly rejected the defense of insanity, it nonetheless erred in imposing the death penalty
on appellant. It imposed the maximum penalty without considering the presence or the absence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. The imposition of the capital penalty was not only baseless, but contrary to the
rules on the application of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. Even the Office of the Solicitor
General concedes this error in the imposition of the death penalty.32cräläwvirtualibräry

Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, the penalty to be
imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide. This is in accordance with the mandate
of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, x x x, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, x x x.

The law on parricide, as amended by RA 7659, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. In all cases in
which the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, the court is mandated to impose one
or the other, depending on the presence or the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. 33 The
rules with respect to the application of a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties are prescribed by Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall
be observed in the application thereof:
xxx

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser
penalty shall be applied. (Italics supplied)

Hence, when the penalty provided by law is either of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating
nor aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty shall be imposed.34 Considering that neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances were established in this case, the imposable penalty should only be reclusion
perpetua.35cräläwvirtualibräry

Indeed, because the crime of parricide is not a capital crime per se, it is not always punishable with death. The
law provides for the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death -- two indivisible penalties, the application of
either one of which depends on the presence or the absence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.36cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68) in Criminal Case No.
95-45 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua.
Consistent with current jurisprudence, appellant shall pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000 as civil
indemnity and P22,800 as actual damages, which were duly proven. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De
Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 175880 July 6, 2007
[Formerly G.R. No. 153217]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RICARDO COMANDA y CAMOTE, Appellant.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

Appellant Ricardo Comanda assails the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 12 October 2006, affirming in
toto the Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 17,3 Davao City, dated 20 December 2001, finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

On 12 January 1998, appellant was charged with rape in an Information4 filed by Prosecutor Rico T. Garcia, the
text of which reads:

Criminal Case No. 40, 254-98

The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of RAPE, under Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree5 (sic) No. 7659, upon the instance of BBB6 – mother of the
complainant, whose affidavit is hereto attached and form part of this Information, committed as follows:

That on or about January 11, 1998, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully
(sic), unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) the complainant – AAA,7 nine (9) years old,
against her will.

Contrary to law.

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Before trial could proceed however, the RTC issued an
Order8 on 30 July 1998, granting appellant’s request that he undergo psychiatric examination to determine his
mental condition to withstand trial.

On 28 June 1999, Dr. Rowena Lacida, a medical officer at the Davao Medical Center, testified to confirm her
report that based on her psychiatric evaluation of appellant and the psychological test conducted by
psychologist Evangeline Castro, appellant was psychotic and was suffering from mental disorder. Thus, she
concluded that he could not understand the accusation of a serious offense against him. 9 Further proceedings
were therefore held in abeyance by the RTC in an order10 dated 22 July 1999, until such time that appellant’s
mental condition made him fit to stand trial. In the meantime, appellant was ordered to submit himself for further
treatment.

Thereafter, the continuing examination of appellant was referred to Dr. Rosemina Laud-Quirapas, likewise a
medical officer at the Davao Medical Center.11 On 12 March 2001, she submitted her mental status report
finding appellant competent to stand trial. On 13 March 2001, she affirmed, in open court, her conclusion that
appellant’s mental status examination and neurological test results show that he is already fit to stand trial. 12
Hence, trial on the merits ensued. The evidence for the prosecution establishes the following facts:

While the Talandang Elementary School in Talandang, Davao City, where AAA was a Grade IV student, was in
the midst of its "Bayanihan" project, at around 1 p.m. of 11 January 1998, AAA went with her father to the
school where he was to do some carpentry work for the project. Appellant, AAA’s paternal granduncle whom
she called Uncle Dodo, likewise went with them. At some point, AAA was instructed by her teacher to request
appellant to fetch another uncle of hers to help with the project. AAA relayed the request to appellant, who
readily agreed. He brought her along. Appellant took a shortcut to their supposed destination, justifying the
move to AAA with the ruse that her uncle, who lived with AAA’s grandmother, was on the hill fetching his
carabao. On their way, appellant suddenly laid down on a grassy area, unzipped his pants, lowered AAA’s
underwear and told her not to make any noise or to tell anybody. He forced AAA to lie on top of him, kissed her
lips and embraced her tightly, unzipping the back of her dress in the process. AAA then felt appellant’s penis
penetrate her vagina.13

After about thirty (30) minutes, AAA heard her mother, BBB, shouting. AAA grabbed her underwear, hurriedly
put it on and ran to her mother, crying. In her mother’s embrace, AAA fell unconscious. She was brought to the
house of her aunt, accompanied by her mother, grandmother, aunt and appellant. When they arrived thereat
and upon regaining her senses, AAA told them that her Uncle Dodo was "yawa" and "bastos" (devil and
uncouth).14 She was later taken to the hospital for examination. The following day, accompanied by her
parents, AAA went to the Mintal Police Station to report the incident.15

In her testimony, BBB presented AAA’s birth certificate to establish that the latter was born on 22 April 1988
and was therefore only nine (9) years old at the time of the rape. She testified that on 11 January 1998, at
around one o’clock in the afternoon, her husband, AAA and appellant went to Talandang Elementary School to
help in the "Bayanihan" project. Her husband thrice returned to their house to get slabs of lumber for use in the
school. When asked about AAA’s whereabouts, he said that the latter went with appellant to her (BBB) mother-
in-law’s house.
Worried, BBB immediately proceeded to the said house but failed to find AAA and appellant thereat. She
continued to search for them, all the while shouting and calling their names. Suddenly, AAA appeared from
behind a thick shrub, running towards her and crying. Her dress was unzipped at the back and her underwear
lowered. AAA collapsed as she embraced BBB. Appellant soon after approached them from behind while
buttoning his shirt. When asked what he did to AAA, appellant answered that she fell from the hill.

According to BBB, when the victim’s shock receded, she heard her shout at appellant, uttering "yawa ka,"
"bastos ka," "isumbong tika ni papa" (you’re a devil, uncouth, I will tell my father).16 BBB took her daughter
home and the latter complained of difficulty in urinating. AAA then told her that appellant made her lie on top
him and inserted his penis inside her vagina. BBB immediately brought AAA to the hospital. Thereafter, they
proceeded to the Mintal Police Station.17

BBB claims that following appellant’s arrest, the latter repeatedly asked for forgiveness and, after the case was
already filed, even wrote them a letter begging for forgiveness.18

Prosecution witness SPO1 Kervin Magno, a police officer of Mintal police precinct, Tugbok, Davao City,
identified appellant in open court, as well as the police blotter of AAA’s complaint dated 11 January 1998.19 The
prosecution was unable to locate and present Dr. Daruesa, the physician who personally conducted the
physical examination of the victim. Nonetheless, it submitted the doctor’s examination report of AAA.

The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. In his testimony, appellant asserted that he could not
remember having been with the victim on 11 January 1998 or any incident proximate to the date of his
arrest.20 However, appellant admitted that AAA was known to him since her birth and that she was a sickly child
who suffered from periodic convulsions.21

The trial court found appellant guilty of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the victim for damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages.22

Conformably with this Court’s decision in People v. Mateo,23 appellant’s appeal by way of automatic review was
transferred to the Court of Appeals. Finding no sufficient basis to disturb the finding and conclusions of the trial
court, the appellate court, on 12 October 2006, rendered its decision affirming in toto appellant’s conviction.24

Now, the case is with the Court again.

In his brief,25 appellant makes a lone assignment of error, maintaining that the court a quo gravely erred in
finding him guilty of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

According to appellant, AAA simply stated that she lay on top of him while he was embracing her and trying to
insert his penis into her vagina, without any showing from her narration that her legs were

ever spread apart. Thus, he concludes that it is inconceivable that he successfully inserted his penis into her
vagina in such a position.26 Moreover, appellant avers that AAA’s assertion that his penis penetrated her vagina
for thirty (30) minutes is preposterous. If this were true, he argues, then AAA should have bled profusely
considering that this was presumably her first sexual experience.27 Thus, the defense maintains that assuming
appellant was the one who molested AAA, he should only be convicted for acts of lasciviousness.28

We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Preliminarily, we note that the Information makes an erroneous designation of the statute violated and appears
to have been drafted with the old rape law in mind even though Republic Act No. 8353 was then already in
effect.29 Nonetheless, the oversight has no detrimental effect on the sufficiency of the Information. There is no
significant difference in the treatment of statutory rape of females under the old and new rape laws. 30 The
allegations of force and intimidation in the Information are mere superfluities, since they are not constitutive of
or elemental to statutory rape. The real nature of the criminal charge cannot be determined from the caption or
preamble of the Information or from the mere reference to a particular provision of law alleged to have been
violated because they are conclusions of law. On the contrary, it is determined by the actual recital of facts in
the complaint or information.31 Thus, an incorrect caption is not a fatal mistake.32
On the matter of the prosecution proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt, we find it pertinent to reiterate
the settled rule that the determination of the competence and credibility of a witness rests primarily with the trial
court,33 because it has the unique position of observing the witness’ deportment on the stand while testifying.
Absent any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the assessments and conclusions of the trial court, the
reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s findings.34

In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused, more often than not, depends almost
entirely on the credibility of the complainant’s testimony. By the very nature of this crime, it is generally
unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify for herself.35 Her testimony is most vital and must be
received with the utmost caution.36 However, when a rape victim’s testimony is straightforward, unflawed by
any material or significant inconsistency, then it deserves full faith and credit and cannot be discarded. Once
found credible, her lone testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction. 37

In scrutinizing such credibility, jurisprudence has established the following doctrinal guidelines: (1) the
reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower court unless there is a showing that it had overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that could affect the result of
the case; (2) the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect
and even finality as it had the opportunity to examine their demeanor when they testified on the witness stand;
and (3) a witness who testified in a clear, positive and convincing manner and remained consistent on cross-
examination is a credible witness.38

Applying the principles to the instant case, we find AAA’s narration of her harrowing experience trustworthy and
convincing:
xxxx
Atty. Olaguer:
Q Where were you on January 11, 1998?

A I was in school.
Q Where? What school?

A At Talandang Elementary School.

Q Who were you with in school at that time?

A I was with my father.

Q Did you not have any classes at that time?
A None.
Q Why were you in school together with your father?

A I went with him.

Q Were there any other persons in your school at that time?

A Yes, sir.

Q What time did you arrived (sic) in school at that time?

A 1:00 p.m.
Q What were you and your father doing in school together with the other people in school?
A They were doing carpentry job.

Q Why were they doing carpentry job?

A It was a school project.

Q What happened when you were there?

A I was send (sic) for an errand by my teacher.

Q Who was your teacher?
A Mrs. Ferolino.

Q Where did she send you?

A To a store.
Q Did you go to the store?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who was your companion?

A I was alone.
Q After that, you went back to the school?

A Yes, sir.
Q After that, what happened next?

A Mrs. Ferolino asked me to tell my uncle Dodo to tell my uncle Nilo to join in the bayanihan.

Q Who were the other persons present when your teacher tell (sic) you to call your uncle Dodo?

A There were.
Q Who is that uncle Dodo you are referring to?
A He is my uncle.

Q Is he present right now, in court?

A Yes, sir.
Q If he is present in court right now, can you please point him out?

A (witness pointing to a person in the courtroom, wearing white t-shirt, who identified himself as Ricardo
Comanda, the accused).
Q Why do you call him uncle Dodo? How were (sic) you related to him, if you know?

A He is the uncle of my father.

Q Do you know, why he became the uncle of your father?
A Because he is the cousin of my grandmother.
Q Are you referring to the grandmother of your paternal side or maternal side?
A Paternal side.

Q Do you know the degree of relationship when you say that he is the cousin of the mother of your father? Are
they first or second cousin (sic), if you know?
A I do not know.

Q You said that your teacher asked you to call your uncle Dodo to go to your uncle Nilo, to join the bayanihan.
Who is uncle Nilo?
A The brother of my father.
Q Where was he at that time if you know?

A Yes, at his residence.

Q You said that your uncle Nilo was at his residence. Do you know if (sic) how far was (sic) the house of your
uncle Nilo from your school?

A Yes, sir.

Q How far was it?

A I know it is far.

Q When your teacher tell (sic) you to call your uncle Dodo to fetch your uncle Nilo, were there other persons
around?

A None.
Q So, it was only you and the teacher, am I correct?
A Yes, sir.

Q After she told you to tell your uncle Dodo, you immediately told your uncle Dodo on (sic) what your teacher
told you?

A Yes, sir.
Q Where was he at that time?

A He was in school also.

Q Doing the same job, helping the bayanihan?

A Yes, sir.
Q What did you tell your uncle Dodo when you saw him?
A I told him that my teacher, Mrs. Ferolino, is asking him to fetch uncle Nilo, for him to help in the bayanihan.

Q What did your uncle Dodo answered (sic)?

A He acceeded (sic).
Q Did you go with him when he fetch (sic) your uncle Nilo?
A He made me went (sic) with him. He brought me along with him.

Q Were there any other persons around, when he told you that he is going to bring you to the house of your
uncle Nilo?
A None.
Q Where was your father at that time, if you know?

A They were working on the school project.

Q When he said that he is going to bring you with him, did you in fact go with him to the house of your uncle
Nilo?

A Yes, sir.

Q And would you please tell us, if there are houses along the way from your school to the house of your uncle
Nilo?
A None, because the road he took, was on the short cut (sic).
Q Were you able to reach the house of your uncle Nilo?

A No.

Q What happened while you were on the way, to the house of your uncle Nilo?
A He used the short cut (sic) road.
Q What else transpired?
A He told me that my uncle Nilo was on the hilly portion of the place, fetching the carabao.
Q Did you believed (sic) him?

A Yes, sir.
Q What happened after that?

A He lie (sic) down on the grassy portion.

Q Who lie (sic) down?

A Uncle Dodo.
Q Did you not asked (sic) him, why he lie (sic) down on the ground?
A No.
Q What happened after that?

A He unzipped his pants.

Q What happened after that? After unzipping his pants?

A He lowered my underwear.

Q What did you do when he lowered your underwear?

A I was shocked because he told me not to tell anybody and not to create any noise.
Q Did you not shout?
A No.

Q But were you afraid?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why? Why were you afraid of your uncle Dodo?

A I was scared that he might kill me.
Q What other words that (sic) he uttered to you at that time?

A None.

Q So, when he unzipped his pants and took off your panty, what happened next?
A He asked me to lay (sic) on top of him.
xxx

Q What transpired after that time?

xxx
A He kissed my lips.

Q What did you feel when he kissed your lips?

A I was very scared.
Q What else did he do after he kissed your lips?

A His penis and my vagina touched.

Q How did his penis and your vagina touched (sic)? How did he do it?

A He attempted his penis to penetrate my vagina.

Q What was your position at that time when he tried to insert his penis to (sic) your vagina?

A I was lying on top of him.

Q Was he embracing you when he tried to insert his penis to (sic) your vagina?
A Yes, he was embracing me.

Q Was his penis able to penetrate your vagina?

A Yes, sir.
Q Were you already undressed at that time?

A He unzipped the back of my dress.

Q Was his penis able to touch your vagina?

A Yes, his penis touched my vagina.

Q How long was he doing that?
A I think, more or less 30 minutes only, because I heard somebody shouted (sic).
xxx
Atty. Gonzales:

Q When your uncle Dodo’s penis, by the way, were you able to hold your uncle Dodo’s penis?

A I cannot remember.
Q When your uncle Dodo made you lie down on top of him, did you not resisted (sic) it?

A I was angry and I even wiggled.

Q When you were on top of your uncle Dodo, did your uncle Dodo held (sic) you?
A Yes, he held me in (sic) both arms.
Q And did your body touched (sic) his body at that time?

A Yes, sir.
Q For what your uncle have (sic) done to you, did your vagina bleed?

A No.

Q Actually, you did not see the penis of your uncle Dodo?
A I see (sic).
Q That was when (sic) the time, when he undressed himself?
A Yes, sir. At that time, he unzipped his pants.

Q When you were already on top of the body of your uncle Dodo, you did not anymore see his penis?
A No.

Q So, you did not also see your uncle Dodo’s penis touch your vagina?
A I was not able to see it but I felt it.
Q When you speak of your vagina, you are only talking on (sic) its outer part of your private part?

A Yes, sir.

Q And when you say outer part, you only refer to a portion of your vagina, which is bulging?
xxx
A On the opening, not outside.

x x x39

To be sure, a young girl’s revelation that she has been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical
examination and her willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of
an assault to her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as a mere concoction. 40 AAA, it might be noted, has not
been shown to entertain any ill-motive to impute such a grave offense against her own
granduncle.41 Considering that AAA was a child of tender years and not exposed to the ways of the world, it is
improbable that she would impute a crime as serious as rape to appellant, her paternal granduncle. 42

Appellant presents a two-fold defense to free himself of liability. One, he claims to suffer from amnesia, insanity
or some form of mental abnormality. Two, he argues that the victim’s assertions are riddled with dubious
inconsistencies.
In stark contrast to AAA’s convincing recital of facts is appellant’s unsupported and pitiful defense of insanity
before the trial court, which the latter properly rejected. We agree with the astute observations of the court a
quo:

It is incredible for accused to remember all the small details involving the complainant from the time she was
born up to the years she was studying, including her alleged sickness and confinement in the hospital, as well
as other matters relating to accused[‘s] closeness with complainant and collateral relatives of complainant, from
her maternal and paternal side: all these things, including the important fact, accused clearly remembered he
was arrested by a policeman and put inside the jail, on account of the complaint of complainant and her mother
of the offense charged yet claimed, he cannot remember what happened to complainant on the very incident of
rape testified to by complainant.43

Verily, appellant’s seeming selective amnesia makes his denial suspect.lawphi1.net During the proceedings, he
could remember distant and specific details about AAA’s history and family yet when the matter referred to the
crux of his incarceration, he could not recall a thing. All told, the series of elastic representations cast serious
pitfalls on appellant’s credibility, as an experience of this nature will, for certain, linger in one’s mind unlike the
unusual amnesia displayed by appellant before the trial court. The point is, appellant has not done much to turn
the tide, so to speak, to his side.44
The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved,45 for there is a presumption that acts penalized by
law are voluntary.46 Appellant has utterly failed to overthrow the presumption of sanity. The defense did not
present any expert witness, any psychiatric evaluation report, or any psychological findings or evidence
regarding his mental condition at the time of the commission of the offense. Appellant’s charade of amnesia is
evidently a desperate maneuver for exculpation. Yet, amnesia, in and of itself, is no defense to a criminal
charge unless it is shown by competent proof that the accused did not know the nature and quality of his action
and that it was wrong. Failure to remember is in itself no proof of the mental condition of the accused when the
crime was performed.47

There is likewise no showing that appellant had a history of any mental aberration. The report submitted by Dr.
Lacida in 1999 merely stated that it was "the opinion of the medical staff that the patient is psychotic but the
duration and onset of mental illness could not be determined due to the absence of a reliable informant." 48 No
conclusive evidence supports appellant’s assertions of insanity, more remarkably because its cause and
duration could not be determined with certainty. Moreover, by 2001, he was already found to be competent to
stand trial.49

Appellant alleges improbabilities in AAA’s accusations on two (2) points: first, that the victim failed to state that
her legs were spread apart in order for appellant to have penetrated her; and second, that appellant could not
have penetrated her for thirty (30) minutes.

Appellant’s arguments warrant scant consideration. The lapses that he highlights are but mere trivial details
which do not overthrow the weight of evidence against him. The position of the parties during sexual
intercourse is not material in the crime of rape.50 For rape to be consummated, the hymen of the victim need
not be penetrated or ruptured. It is enough that the penis reaches the pudendum, or, at the very least, the labia.
The briefest of contacts under circumstances of force, intimidation or unconsciousness, even without laceration
of the hymen, is deemed to be rape in our jurisprudence.51 The mere introduction of the penis into the aperture
of the female organ, thereby touching the labia of the pudendum, already consummates the crime of rape. 52

Likewise, we have ruled that ambulatory difficulty and pain in a woman’s genitalia are not standard
consequences after a first ever sexual intercourse.53 Moreover, whether sexual contact between appellant and
AAA lasted for thirty (30) minutes or thirty (30) seconds matters not. The essence of the offense as charged is
the deplorable sexual congress appellant had with a child under twelve (12) years of age. Notably, a child of
such tender years cannot be expected to have an accurate concept of time, especially under the circumstances
she then suffered.
All told, we rule that the finding of guilt as pronounced by the RTC and the Court of Appeals should be
sustained. AAA’s minority was alleged in the Information and proven with certainty. There is thus no
impediment in affirming the sentence of reclusion perpetua. Anent the civil liability of appellant, we modify the
award of damages in line with prevailing jurisprudence. Consequently, the court finds appellant liable to AAA in
the amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.54

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR–H.C. No. 00189-MIN is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Appellant RICARDO COMANDA y CAMOTE is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the victim AAA (to be identified through the Information in this case) the amounts of
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. No
pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

(On Official Leave)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING*
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO**
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 216021, March 02, 2016
SOLOMON VERDADERO Y GALERA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

The expectations of a person possessed with full control of his faculties differ from one who is totally deprived
thereof and is unable to exercise sufficient restraint on his. Thus, it is but reasonable that the actions made by
the latter be measured under a lesser stringent standard than that imposed on those who have complete
dominion over their mind, body and spirit.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the July 10, 2014 Decision 1 and the
December 15, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35894 which affirmed the May
30, 2013 Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 03, Tuguegarao City (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
13283, finding accused Solomon Verdadero y Galera (Verdadero) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

In an Information,4 dated September 9, 2009, Verdadero was charged with the crime of murder for killing
Romeo B. Plata (Romeo), the accusatory portion of which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about March 12, 2009, in the municipality of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused SOLOMON VERDADERO armed with a Rambo knife,
with intent to kill, evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab ROMEO B. PLATA, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds on the
different parts of his body which caused his death.

Contrary to law.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On June 3, 2011, Verdadero was arraigned and pleaded "Not Guilty." During the pre-trial, he invoked the
defense of insanity but did not consent to a reverse trial. Thereafter, trial ensued.6

Evidence of the Prosecution

The evidence of the prosecution tended to establish the following:

On March 12, 2009, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Maynard Plata (Maynard) and his father Romeo
were at the Baggao Police Station. Together with Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went there to report that
Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation pump.7

After a confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the three men made their way home on a tricycle but
stopped at a drugstore as Maynard intended to buy some baby supplies. Romeo proceeded towards a store
near the drugstore while Ronnie stayed inside the tricycle. From the drug store, Maynard saw Verdadero
stabbing Romeo, after he was alerted by the shouts of Ronnie.8

Verdadero stabbed Romeo on the left side of the latter's upper back with the use of a Rambo knife. He again
struck Romeo's upper back, just below the right shoulder. Maynard tried to help his father but Verdadero
attempted to attack him as well. He defended himself using a small stool, which he used to hit Verdadero in the
chest.9

Meanwhile, Ronnie ran towards the police station to seek assistance. The responding police officers arrested
Verdadero, while Maynard and Ronnie brought Romeo to a clinic but were advised to bring him to the Cagayan
Valley Medical Center (CVMC). Romeo, however, died upon arrival at the CVMC. Based on the Post-Mortem
Examination Report, his cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe hemorrhage
secondary to multiple stab wounds and hack wounds.10

Evidence of the Defense

The evidence for the defense did not refute the material allegations but revolved around Verdadero's alleged
insanity, to wit:

Since 1999, Verdadero had been an outpatient of CVMCs Psychiatric Department as he claimed to hear
strange voices and had difficulty in sleeping. Sometime in 2001, Miriam Verdadero (Miriam), Verdadero's sister,
again brought him to the Psychiatric Department of CVMC after he became violent and started throwing stones
at a tricycle with a child on board. Verdadero was confined for two (2) months and was diagnosed to be
suffering from mental depression.

On July 21, 2003, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia and was given medications to address his mental
illness. Verdadero would irregularly consult with his doctors as he had a lifelong chronic disease. Then, in
2009, he was again confined for the fourth (4th) time at CVMC due to a relapse.

On March 12, 2009, Miriam proceeded to CVMC, after she heard of the stabbing incident. There, she saw
Verdadero removing the IV tubes connected to his body and, thereafter, locked himself inside the comfort
room. Eventually, Verdadero was given sedatives and was transferred to an isolation room after Miriam
informed the nurses of the incident.11
On March 20, 2009, he was transferred to the Psychiatry Department after Dr. Leonor Andres-Juliana (Dr.
Andres-Juliana) had diagnosed that he was having difficulty sleeping. Dr. Andres-Juliana opined that
Verdadero suffered a relapse, as evidenced by his violent behaviour.

Acting on the January 4, 2011 Order of the RTC, Dr. Ethel Maureen Pagaddu (Dr. Pagaddu) conducted a
mental examination on Verdadero. She confirmed that as early as 1999, he was already brought to CVMC and
that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003. Dr. Pagaddu agreed with Dr. Andres-Juliana that
Verdadero had suffered a relapse on the day of the stabbing incident.12

The RTC Ruling

On May 30, 2013, the RTC rendered a decision finding Verdadero guilty for the crime of homicide. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused SOLOMON VERDADERO y Galera
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him:

1. To suffer an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor [as maximum] as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; and,

2. To pay the heirs of Romeo Plata the amounts of:

a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;

b. P50,000.00 as moral damages and
c. P30,000.00 as stipulated actual damages; and,

3. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The RTC ruled that the crime committed was only homicide, as the prosecution failed to establish the presence
of treachery and evident premeditation to qualify the killing to murder. The trial court, however, opined that
Verdadero failed to establish insanity as an exempting circumstance. The trial court posited that Verdadero was
unsuccessful in establishing that he was not in a lucid interval at the time he stabbed Romeo or that he was
completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime.

Aggrieved, Verdadero appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its July 10, 2014 Decision, the CA upheld Verdadero's conviction of homicide. The appellate court agreed
that the defense was able to establish that Verdadero had a history of schizophrenic attacks, but was unable to
prove that he was not lucid at the time of the commission of the offense. The decretal portion of the decision
states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED. The Judgment, dated May 30, 2013, rendered
by the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3 in Criminal Case No. 13283, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Verdadero moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its resolution, dated December
15, 2014.

Hence, this present petition, raising the following

ISSUE

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S

CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT WAS
ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

Verdadero insists that he was able to fully support his defense of insanity. He claims that Maynard even
admitted that he was not in the proper state of mind when they were at the police station before the stabbing
took place. Further, it appeared that Verdadero was having hallucinations after the stabbing incident as testified
to by Dr. Andres-Juliana. Verdadero notes that Dr. Pagaddu concluded that he had a relapse at the time of the
stabbing incident on March 12, 2009.

In its Comment,15 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that the present petition presented a
question of fact, which could not be addressed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, it asserted that the CA did not misapprehend the facts as the evidence presented failed to
completely establish Verdadero's insanity at the time of the stabbing.

In his Manifestation (in Lieu of Reply),16 Verdadero indicated that he would no longer file a reply as his petition
for review already contained an exhaustive discussion of the issues.
The Court's Ruling

The present petition primarily assails the conviction despite his defense of insanity. Before delving into the
merits of the case, a discussion of the procedural issue is in order.

Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45; Exceptions

The OSG argues that the Court should not entertain Verdadero's petition for review as it principally revolves
around the issue of his insanity — a question of fact which should no longer be addressed in a petition for
review. The Court disagrees.

Generally, questions of fact are beyond the ambit of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as
it is limited to reviewing only questions of law. The rule, however, admits of exceptions wherein the Court
expands the coverage of a petition for review to include a resolution of questions of fact. In Laborte v.
Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers' Cooperative et al.,17 the Court reiterated the following exceptions to the rule
that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the
same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those
of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

The present petition mainly delves into Verdadero's state of mind at the time of the stabbing incident.
Obviously, it is a question of fact, which, ordinarily is not entertained by the Court in a petition for review. As will
be discussed below, the Court, nevertheless, finds that the circumstances in the case at bench warrant the
application of the exception rather than the rule.

Insanity must be present at the time the crime had been committed

To completely evade culpability, Verdadero raises insanity as a defense claiming that he had suffered a relapse
of his schizophrenia. Under Article 12 of the RPC, an imbecile or an insane person is exempt from criminal
liability, unless the latter had acted during a lucid interval. The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly
proved for there is a presumption that the acts penalized by law are voluntary.18

In the case at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999, Verdadero was brought to the Psychiatric
Department of CVMC for treatment; (2) he was diagnosed with depression in 2001; (3) he was diagnosed with
schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (4) he was confined in the psychiatric ward sometime in 2009 due to a relapse;
(5) he was in and out of psychiatric care from the time of his first confinement in 1999 until the stabbing
incident; and (6) he was diagnosed to have suffered a relapse on March 20, 2009.

Thus, it is without question that he was suffering from schizophrenia and the only thing left to be ascertained is
whether he should be absolved from responsibility in killing Romeo because of his mental state.

Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality,
and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.19 A showing that an accused is suffering from a mental
disorder, however, does not automatically exonerate him from the consequences of his act. Mere abnormality
of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.20

In People v. Florendo,21 the Court explained the standard in upholding insanity as an exempting circumstance,
to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts without the least discernment
because of complete absence of the power to discern; or, there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance, and he must prove it
by clear and convincing evidence.

[Emphasis Supplied]

In People v. Isla,22 the Court elucidated that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged. Otherwise, he must be
adjudged guilty for the said offense. In short, in order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability
under a plea of insanity, he must categorically demonstrate that: (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence
because of his mental condition or illness; and (2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be
manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of the offense.

In raising the defense of insanity, Verdadero admits to the commission of the crime because such defense is in
the nature of a confession or avoidance.23 As such, he is duty bound to establish with certainty that he was
completely deprived, not merely diminished, of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime. Failing
which, Verdadero should be criminally punished for impliedly admitting to have stabbed Romeo to death.

Proving insanity is a tedious task for it requires an examination of the mental state of the accused. In People v.
Opuran24 the Court explained how one's insanity may be established, to wit:
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Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can know
what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and
judged by his behavior. Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means of which
we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then determine whether the acts conform to the
practice of people of sound mind.

Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language and conduct. xxx

Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who
is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on
his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.

In the earlier case of People v. Austria,25 the Court elucidated that evidence of the mental condition of the
accused during a reasonable period before and after the commission of the offense is material, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of
his mental condition during a reasonable period before and after. Direct testimony is not required nor are
specific acts of disagreement essential to establish insanity as a defense. A person's mind can only be
plumbed or fathomed by external acts. Thereby his thoughts, motives and emotions may be evaluated to
determine whether his external acts conform to those of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, clear and
convincing circumstantial evidence would suffice.

Guided by the precepts laid out by the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the Court finds that Verdadero
sufficiently proved that he was insane at the time of the stabbing. Thus, the Court takes a view different from
that of the CA as the latter concluded that Verdadero's insanity was not clearly proven.

It is true that there is no direct evidence to show Verdadero's mental state at the exact moment the crime was
committed. This, however, is not fatal to the finding that he was insane. His insanity may still be shown by
circumstances immediately before and after the incident. Further, the expert opinion of the psychiatrist Dr.
Pagaddu may also be taken into account.

Dr. Pagaddu categorically testified that Verdadero was suffering a relapse at the time of the stabbing incident.
During her testimony, she stated as follows:
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On direct examination

Atty. Tagaruma
Q: By the way what was the mental condition of the accused referred which involved your diagnosis as a life
long chronic disease?

Witness
A: The accused was diagnosed schizophrenia, sir.

Q: When for the first time Solomon Verdadero was diagnosed with schizophrenia?
A: It was on July 21, 2003, sir. xxx

Q: As an expert witness tell the Honorable Court if a person who has relapse of schizophrenia could distinguish
his act?
A: This mental disorder influence (sic) the impulse. It could at the time of the commission of the crime that the
impulse control and judgment of an individual was affected sir.

Q: Could it be accurate to state that a person who has the relapse of schizophrenia could not distinguish any
act from right or wrong?
A: There is a possibility, sir.

Court
Q: Why did you say that Solomon Verdadero has the possibility of relapse upon admission on March 19, 2009?
A: There was a period of relapse meaning the symptom was present and there must be a remission if the
symptom is abated, your Honor.

xxx

Atty. Tagaruma
Q: You have read for the record the report of Dr. Juliana on the alleged violent behavior of Solomon
Verdadero on March 12, 2009 which is the date of the incident, as an expert psychiatrist is it possible
that the violent behavior of Solomon Verdadero on March 12, 2009 was the basis of Dr. Juliana in
diagnosing that the accused was in relapse upon admission on March 12, 2009?
A: Yes sir.

Q: Following the remark of scientific conclusion of Dr. Juliana, Dr. Janet Taguinod and the conclusion
made by you, is it also your conclusion that Solomon Verdadero was in relapse on March 12, 2009 due
to violent behavior?
A: Yes, sir.

On cross examination

Prosecutor Aquino
Q: But definitely during the disorder of the patient, the relapse would somewhat be continued even when
medications is administered to him?
A: The symptom is controlled although there is a circumstances (sic) that the patient may have relapse (sic)
even with medication, sir.

Q: If a continuous medication was undertaken by the accused-patient in this case could that have a long effect
on his mental condition?
A: Continuous medication could somehow control the symptom and not absolutely eradicate the symptom.

Q: On March 12 , 2009 the accused-patient was on a lucid interval, in view of the medication undertaken as of
January 19, 2009?
A: It's haphazard, sir.

xxx

Court
Q: Madam witness what type of schizophrenia the accused was diagnosed?
A: Undifferentiated, your honor.26
[Emphases Supplied]

Dr. Paggadu, without any reservations, stated that Verdadero was suffering a relapse of his schizophrenia at
the time of the stabbing incident. In contrast, she was hesitant to opine that Verdadero might have been in a
lucid interval because of the medications taken. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude, on the basis of the
testimony of an expert witness, that Verdadero was of unsound mind at the time he stabbed Romeo.

Further, the finding of Verdadero's insanity is supported by the observations made by Maynard, a witness for
the prosecution. In his testimony, Maynard gave his opinion on Verdadero's behavior and appearance when
they met at the police station, to wit:
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On cross examination

Atty. Tagurama
Q: Having made the report against Solomon Verdadero, do I (sic) correct to say that you are familiar with
Solomon Verdadero even before March 12, 2009?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Tell us why you are familiar to him even prior to March 12, 2009?
A: We are neighbors, sir.

Q: You are immediate neighbors?

A: Yes, sir

Q: Since you are neighbors with Solomon Verdadero you see him almost a (sic) time?
A: Yes, sir. I saw him daily.

Q: When you see Solomon Verdadero daily you see his actuation?
A: Yes, sir.

xxx

Q: Sometimes he boxes when he is not in his proper mind, what aberrant behavior did you observe from him?
A: That's the only thing I observed and sometimes he steal (sic), sir.

Q: For a long time that Solomon Verdadero is your neighbor does his relapse or what you called not in his
proper mind occurred often?
A: It occurred once in a while, sir.

Q: When you said it occurred once in a while, this relapse may occur once a week?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Prior to March 12, 2009, when did you first observe that Solomon Verdadero appears not in his
proper mind?
A: He was not in his proper mind for a long time, sir.

Q: Maybe it could be 5 months before March 12, 2009?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx

Court
Q: You testified that you observed the accused not in his proper mind for the passed (sic) years before this
incident was he also violent like what happened on March 12, 2009?

Witness
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: When you went to the police station you allegedly reported the stolen fan belt do I get you right that
Solomon Verdadero was with you at the police station?
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: When he was with you at the police station what did you observe?
A: He was not again in his proper mind (sumro manen), your Honor.
Q: Can you describe his appearance?
A: His eyes was (sic) very sharp and reddish.
Q: As far as his appearance is concern (sic) do you remember his actuation or how he was reacting?
A: Yes, your honor. He was somewhat drank (sic).
Q: You said that he was not on his proper mind for the passed (sic) years?
A: Yes, your honor.27cralawred

[Emphases Supplied]

Maynard was familiar with Verdadero as the latter was his neighbor for a long time. He had observed that there
were times that Verdadero appeared to be of unsound mind as he would sometimes become violent. On the
day of the stabbing incident, Maynard perceived that Verdadero was again of unsound mind noting that he had
reddish eyes and appeared to be drunk. Moreover, he was immediately transferred to the psychiatry
department because of his impaired sleep and to control him from harming himself and others. 28

These circumstances are consistent with Dr. Paggadu's testimony that drinking wine, poor sleep and violent
behavior were among the symptoms of a relapse, the same testimony that was used as basis for his
previous diagnosis.29 The evidence on record supports the finding that Verdadero exhibited symptoms of a
relapse of schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing incident. Thus, Dr. Pagaddu reiterated Dr. Andre-Juliana's
conclusion that Verdadero was having a relapse of his illness on that fateful day.

Further, on March 22, 2009, he was officially diagnosed to have suffered a relapse of schizophrenia. Generally,
evidence of insanity after the commission of the crime is immaterial. It, however, may be appreciated and given
weight if there is also proof of abnormal behavior before or simultaneous to the crime.30

Indeed, the grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be done with utmost care and circumspection as
the State must keep its guard against murderers seeking to escape punishment through a general plea of
insanity.31 The circumstances in the case at bench, however, do not indicate that the defense of insanity was
merely used as a convenient tool to evade culpability.

The Court notes that at the very first opportunity, Verdadero already raised the defense of insanity and
remained steadfast in asserting that he was deprived of intelligence at the time of the commission of the
offense. He no longer offered any denial or alibi and, instead, consistently harped on his mental incapacity.
Unlike in previous cases32 where the Court denied the defense of insanity as it was raised only when the initial
defense of alibi failed to prosper, Verdadero's alleged insanity was not a mere afterthought.

In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the Court does not totally free him from the responsibilities
and consequences of his acts. Article 12(1) of the RPC expressly states that "[w]hen an insane person has
committed an act which the law defines as a felony, the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals
or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining
the permission of the same court." Instead of incarceration, Verdadero is to be confined in an institution where
his mental condition may be addressed so that he may again function as a member of society. He shall remain
confined therein until his attending physicians give a favorable recommendation for his release.

Verdadero still liable for damages in spite of his exoneration

In appreciating insanity in favor of Verdadero, the Court absolves him from criminal responsibility. He is,
nevertheless, responsible to indemnify the heirs of Romeo for the latter's death. An exempting circumstance,
by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is freed from the criminal liability.33

The amount of damages awarded, however, must be modified in order to conform to recent
jurisprudence.34 The P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages awarded by the RTC must
each be increased to P75,000.00. In addition, an interest at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum should be
imposed on all damages awarded computed from the finality of the decision until the same have been fully
paid.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition and ACQUITS accused-appellant Solomon Verdadero y Galera of
Homicide by reason of insanity. He is ordered confined at the National Center for Mental Health for treatment
and shall be released only upon order of the Regional Trial Court acting on a recommendation from his
attending physicians from the institution.

He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Romeo B. Plata the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as stipulated actual damages, plus interest on all damages
awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this decision until the same shall have been
fully paid.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Brion, J., on leave.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary