People v. Taneo (Castañeda)
His
G.R. No. L-37673
FACTS:
● Potenciano Taneo lives with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of
Dolores in Ormoc, Leyte. A fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and
visitors were entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner and
Luis Malinao.
● Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo went to sleep and while sleeping, he
suddenly got up, left the room with bolo in hand and upon meeting his wife
who tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen. He attacked Fred
Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he
wounded himself. His wife who was then seven months pregnant died five
days later as a result of her wound, and also the fetus which was asphyxiated
in the mother's womb.
● Taneo was then charged with parricide. From this sentence, the defendant
appealed.
● Prior to the incident, it appears from the evidence that the day before the
commission of the crime, the defendant had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba"
with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come down
to fight, and when he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and
his mother. On the day of the commission of the crime, it was noted that the
defendant was sad and weak, and early in the afternoon had a severe
stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed and fall asleep.
The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was
trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which
he got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come
down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his
wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing
his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies
seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.
ISSUE: Whether or not Potenciano Taneo is criminally liable.
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RULING: No. The Court concluded that the defendant acted while in a dream.
acts were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability. The Court took the
special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendant’s own wife
whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to
attack also his father, in whose house and under whose protection he lived, besides
attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as may be inferred
from the evidence presented, the Court found not only a lack of motive for the
defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also motives for not
committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, stated that considering the
circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the
influence of a hallucination and not in his right mind.
Moreover, nobody saw how the wound was inflicted to his wife. The defendant did not
testify that he wounded his wife. He only seemed to have heard her say that she was
wounded. What the evidence shows is that the deceased, who was in the sala,
intercepted the defendant at the door of the room as he was coming out. The
defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife but he was defending
himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in
desperation, he stabbed himself.
FALLO: The court finds that the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense
with which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be confined in the Government
insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds that his
liberty would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
People v. Bonoan (Raquel)
G.R. No. L-45130
FACTS:
- In the morning of Dec. 12, 1934, defendant Celestino Bonoan met the now
deceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop. Francisco
Beech, who was at the time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in
Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech turned around and saw the accused
withdrawing his right hand, which held a knife, from the side of Guison who
 said, also in Tagalog, "I will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he
would kill him and then stabbed Guison thrice on the left side.
- The assault was witnessed by policeman Damaso Arnoco who rushed to the
scene and arrested Bonoan and took possession of the knife. Guison was
taken to the Philippine General Hospital where he died two days later.
- Arnoco testified that upon arresting the defendant-appellant he inquired from
the latter for the reason for the assault and the defendant-appellant replied that
the deceased Guison owed him P55 and would pay; that appellant bought the
knife, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had been
watching for Guison in order to kill him.
- An information was filed charging Celestino Bonoan, the accused, with
murder. The case was called for arraignment, however the defense counsel
objected on the ground that the accused was mentally deranged and was at the
time confined in the Psychopathic Hospital. For the third time the case was
called again. However, the assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital
rendered his report stating that the accused was not in a condition to defend
himself. Hence, the case was suspended indefinitely.
- After several months of summons for doctors, production of the defendant’s
complete record of mental condition from the hospital and the defendant's
admission to the hospital for personal observation, assistant alienist Dr. Jose
Fernandez finally reported to the court that Bonoan may be discharged for
being a “recovered case”. After trial, the lower court found Bonoan guilty and
sentenced him to life imprisonment.
- The defense now appeals, claiming the lower court made errors in finding
Bonoan suffered dementia only occasionally and intermittently, did not show
any kind of abnormality, that the defense did not establish the defendant’s
insanity and found the accused guilty.
ISSUE: W/N the accused is exempted from criminal liability under Art. 12 (1) of the
RPC.
RULING: YES. The Court finds the accused demented at the time he perpetrated the
crime, which consequently exempts him from criminal liability, and orders for his
confinement in San Lazaro Hospital or other hospital for the insane. This ruling was
based on the following evidence:
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1. Uncontradicted evidence that accused was confined in the insane department
of San Lazaro Hospital and diagnosed with dementia praecox long before
the commission of the offense and recurrence of ailments were not entirely
lacking of scientific foundation
2. Persons with dementia praecox are disqualified from legal responsibility
because they have no control of their acts; dementia praecox symptoms
similar to manic depression psychosis
3. Accused had an insomnia attack, a symptom leading to dementia praecox,
four days prior to act according to Dr. Francisco
4. Accused was sent to the Psychopathic hospital on the same day of crime and
arrest, indicating the police’s doubt of his mental normalcy
5. Defendant suffered from manic depressive psychosis according to Dr. Joson
FALLO:
- In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was
demented at the time he perpetrated the serious offense charged in the information and
that consequently he is exempt from criminal liability. Accordingly, the judgment of
the lower court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with
costs de oficio in both instances. In conformity with paragraph 1 of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code, the defendant shall be kept in confinement in the San Lazaro
Hospital or such other hospital for the insane as may be designated by the Director of
the Philippine Health Service, there to remain confined until the Court of First Instance
of Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered.
*******Additional info:*******
-Defendant-appellant, during the periods from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and
from January 6 to January 10, 1926, was confined in the insane department
of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a disease diagnosed as dementia
præcox.
- According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Insular Psychopathic
Hospital, the symptoms of dementia præcox, in certain periods of excitement,
are similar to those of manic depressive psychosis . and, in either case, the
mind appears "deteriorated" because, "when a person becomes affected by
 this kind of disease, either dementia præcox or manic depressive psychosis,
during the period of excitement, he has no control whatever of his acts."
- Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of
Edinburg, said in his work on Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382),
that in the type of dementia præcox, "the crime is usually preceded by much
complaining and planning. In these people, homicidal attcks are common,
because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that their
property is being taken." In relation to the case the victim has a debt of 55.00
pesos to the petitioner.
People v. Dungo (Regis)
G.R. No. 89420
Facts:
❖ On March 16, 1987, the accused-appellant Dungo went to the place where
Mrs. Sigua was holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform in
Pampanga. After a brief talk, Dungo drew a knife he hid within an envelope
he brought and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. After his morbid act, he
went out of the office with his blood-stained clothes carrying his weapon.
❖ Dungo, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane when he
committed the act. Andrea Dungo testified about her husband:
➢ Engaged in farming and went to Lebanon, then to Saudi Arabia but
did not finish his 2-year contract because of stroke and received
medical attention upon arrival in the PH;
➢ Two weeks prior the incident, Mrs. Dungo noticed that her husband
was in deep thought always;
➢ Mr. Dungo maltreated his children when he was not used to it before;
➢ Demanded additional payment from customers of their store
although they paid already and even chased children who quarelled
with his children;
➢ There were also times that Mr. Dungo would claim that his feet and
head were on fire but in truth were not.
➢ After the incident, when asked about his reason why he killed the
victim, he answered “That is the only cure for my ailment. I have a
cancer in my heart.” Mr. Dungo went to Manila thereafter.
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❖ Mr. Sigua, the victim’s husband, stated that the accused approached him on
February 1987, inquiring as to why Mrs. Sigua is requiring many documents
from Dungo.
❖ The defense’s expert witnesses, who were doctors of the National Center for
Mental Health, concluded that the accused was suffering from psychosis or
insanity before, during and after the commission of the crime. The accused
had an impaired judgment and impulse control, impairment of memory and
disorientation, and hearing of strange voices.
Issue:
❖ Whether or not the accused-appellant was insane when he committed the
crime.
Ruling:
❖ No. Insanity is the complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act;
of reason and freedom of will, and has no discernment. The presumption is
always in favor of sanity. One who claims insanity has the burden of proof.
❖ In the case at bar, the prosecution contended that Mr. Dungo was sane
during the commission of the crime:
➢ He carried a weapon hidden in an envelope, indicating that the
accused followed a pattern to kill the victim.
➢ It is unusual for an insane person to confront someone who
might’ve wronged him. The confrontation against the victim’s
husband indicated that the accused was aware of his acts.
➢ The accused ran away from the scene after stabbing the victim
several times. He was apprehended in Metro Manila, indicating
that he took flight to evade arrest.
➢ Shouted “Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!” at that moment he was
aware of what he did. This signifies awareness of the crime.
❖ Insanity must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused
on the ground of insanity. Here, appellant has not successfully overcame the
presumption that he committed the crime freely, knowingly, and intelligently.
Fallo:
- Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment
through a general plea of insanity. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial
court’s decision is affirmed without costs.
Note: Keep the “signs of insanity” in mind that were testified for the defense, and
in contrary, the prosecution’s evidences that the accused was sane when he
committed the crime. I used a bullet form to help us with its familiarisation. Good
luck for this week! God bless!
People v. Rafanan (Rico)
G.R. No. L-54135
Facts:
· Estelita Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a
househelper by the mother of the accused.
· Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived w*ith his mother in the same barangay
with the victim.
· On the evening of march 16, 1976, the accused requested the victim to help him
close the store.
· Upon complying with the request, the accused pulled the victim and asked her to
have sexual intercourse with her and pointed a bolo at her throat to threaten her if she
resists.
· Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants and after
unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of the complainant and succeeded
having carnal knowledge of her inspite of her resistance and struggle.
· After that, the accused threatened her once again not to report to anyone,
otherwise he would kill her.
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· After 2 days, the victim reported to her mother that she was raped by policarpio.
Upon knowing, they reported it to the police.
· During the trial, the accused appealed that he was suffering from schizophrenia
at the time of the commission of the offense.
· The RTC suspended the trial and ordered Rafanan to be confined to the National
Mental Hospital for observation and treatment from December 29, 1976 until June 26,
1978.
· During his confinement, it was observed that the victim was suffering a mental
disorder called schizophrenia but was deemed fit to stand at trial after more than a year
being confined.
· The RTC convicted Policarpio Rafanan guilty of Rape.
Issue:
WON the appellant should be exempted from criminal liability under Article 12 on the
grounds of insanity.
Held/Ruling:
· NO. The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has
the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity.
· Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his
state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been
held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period
immediately before or at the very moment the act is committed.
· The court cited the case of People vs Formigones where it laid down 2 required
standard for legal insanity:
o Test of cognition – that there be a “complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act”
 o Test of volition – that there be a total deprivation of the
freedom of the will
There has been no case where the court exempted an accused on the sole ground that
he was totally deprived of freedom of the will without an accompanying complete
deprivation of intelligence.
The fact that the accused threatened the victim that if she reports it to anyone right after
the commission of the offense proves that he was aware of the reprehensible moral
quality of his assault. Hence proving that there was no deprivation of intelligence on
the part of the accused at the time of the commission of the offense making him liable
for the criminal act he committed.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the
amount of moral damages is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.
People v. Opuran (Cabanatan)
G.R. No. 147674-75
FACTS: On or about November 19, 1988, 6:30 pm at Catbalogan, Samar, the accused
Anacito Opuran stabbed Allan Dacles who was lying at the bench. At about 7:45 p.m.
of the same day, Demetrio Patrimonio was seen walking on the National Highway of
Catbalogan, Samar but was later stabbed by the accused as he emerged from where he
was hiding. The accusations were denied by the accused, claiming that he was never
out that night when the crime happened and that he was only resting in his house when
policemen came to arrest him.
Later, when the hearings resumed, an expert named Dr. Lyn Verona testified that she
examined the accused 3 times through interviews and confirmed her medical findings
that the accused was psychotic before and during the commission of the offense and
even up to the present, the accused was suffering from schizophrenia. However, when
the trial court still held Opuran guilty of murder and homicide, he contends that he was
suffering from a psychotic disorder and was therefore, completely derived of
intelligence when he stabbed the victims.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused Anacito Opuran can use the exempting
circumstance of insanity as a defense.
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RULING: No. Insanity must exist immediately before or during the moment of the
commission of the act. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity
bears the burden of proving it; however, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the earliest
opportunity. He invoked it for the first time only after he had already testified on his
defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held that the invocation of denial and alibi as
defenses indicate that the accused was in full control of his mental faculties,
Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the hearings, Anacito was attentive,
well-behaved, and responsive to the questions propounded to him. Thus, the shift in
theory from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after the appellant
realized the futility of his earlier defenses, is a clear indication that insanity is a mere
concoction or an afterthought. In any event, Anacito failed to establish by convincing
evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed Demetrio Jr. and Allan Dacles. He is
thus presumed sane.
Anacito’s psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the strict rule established by case
law. What it shows is that Anacito was prescribed thorazine and evadyne, and later an
injectable medicine to remedy "his lack of sleep and noisiness." As the trial court
noted, it was never shown that these drugs were for a mental illness that deprived
Anacito of reason. Further, Anacito was just an out-patient at the NCMH, EVRMC,
and Samar Provincial Hospital. While his sister claimed that she requested the
confinement of Anacito and that the doctors did not refuse her.
At any rate, we discarded the confinement of the accused at the NCMH prior to the
incident in question to be by itself proof of his insanity, there being no proof that he
was adjudged insane by the institute. Applying the principle in People v. Legaspi
(G.R. Nos. 136164-65) to Anacito’s case, we find another cogent reason to reject his
plea of insanity.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM, with modifications as to the damages, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, finding
appellant Anacito Opuran guilty of the crimes of murder in Criminal Case No. 4693
and homicide in Criminal Case No. 4703, and sentencing him to suffer reclusion
perpetua and an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
respectively. Apart from the ₱50,000 civil indemnity, he is ordered to pay (1) the heirs
of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., in the amounts of (a) ₱50,000 as moral damages; (b)
₱25,000 as temperate damages; and (c) ₱25,000 as exemplary damages, or a total of
₱150,000; and (2) the heirs of Allan Dacles in the amounts of (a) ₱50,000 as moral
damages; and (b) ₱10,000 as temperate damages, or a total of ₱110,000.Costs de
oficio. So ordered.

Verdadero v. People (Suarez)
G.R. No. 216021
FACTS:
● On March 12, 2009, Maynard Plata and his father Romeo, together with
Ronnie Elaydo were at the Baggao Police Station to report that Verdadero
(petitioner) had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation pump.
● After their confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the three men
made their way home on a tricycle but stopped at a drugstore as Maynard
intended to buy baby supplies. Romeo proceeded towards a store near the
drugstore while Ronnie stayed inside the tricycle.
● Verdadero, armed with a Rambo knife, feloniously attacked and stabbed
Romeo, inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different parts of his body
which caused his death.
(left side of the upper back, below the right shoulder)
● On June 3, 2011, Verdadero was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. During the
pre-trial, he invoked the defense of insanity but did not consent to a reverse
trial.
● The evidence of the defense revolved around Verdadero's alleged insanity:
(1) had been an outpatient of CVMCs Psychiatric Department (since
1999);
(2) diagnosed with depression (2001)
(3) diagnosed with schizophrenia (2003)
● The RTC finds Verdadero guilty of homicide as he failed to establish
insanity as an exempting circumstance and was unsuccessful in establishing
that he was not in a lucid interval at the time he stabbed Romeo. This decision
was then affirmed by the CA.
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ISSUE: WON the CA gravely erred in affirming the Petitioner’s conviction despite the
fact that his insanity at the time of the incident was established by clear and convincing
evidence.
RULING: YES. Under Article 12 of the RPC, an imbecile or an insane person is
exempt from criminal liability, unless the latter had acted during a lucid interval. The
defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved for there is a presumption that
the acts penalized by law are voluntary.
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that:
(1) as early as 1999, Verdadero was brought to the Psychiatric Department of
CVMC for treatment;
(2) he was diagnosed with depression in 2001;
(3) he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003;
(4) he was confined in the psychiatric ward sometime in 2009 due to a relapse;
(5) he was in and out of psychiatric care from the time of his first confinement
in 1999 until the stabbing incident; and
(6) he was diagnosed to have suffered a relapse on March 20, 2009.
Def. (for reference only)
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by the inability to
distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by
hallucinations and delusions.
In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the Court does not totally free him
from the responsibilities and consequences of his acts. Instead of incarceration,
Verdadero is to be confined in an institution where his mental condition may be
addressed so that he may again function as a member of society.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition and ACQUITS accused-appellant
Solomon Verdadero y Galera of Homicide by reason of insanity. He is also ordered
to pay the heirs of Romeo B. Plata for civil indemnity, moral damages, and stipulated
actual damages. SO ORDERED.

People v. Madarang (Sumayod)
G.R. No. 132319
FACTS:
● On September 3, 2003, at about 5:00 p.m., Madarang and his wife, Lilia, had
an argument because the defendant was jealous and accused his wife of
infidelity. In the heat of the light and in the presence of their children, the
defendant stabbed his wife, resulting in her death.
● During the trial with the RTC, the defendant claimed that he had absolutely no
recollection of stabbing his wife. He could not remember where he was on
that day and did not know about his wife's whereabouts. He then claimed that
prior to the time of the commission of stabbing his wife, he had been suffering
from schizophrenia.
● Avelina, the defendant’s mother-in-law, averred that during the time the
accused and his family stayed in her house, as the defendant could no longer
support his family, she did not notice anything peculiar in Madarang’s
behavior that would suggest that he was suffering from any mental illness.
Neither did she know of any reason why the defendant killed his wife as she
never saw the two argue.
● A doctor testified in the court that the accused was committed at their hospital
and that the accused’s mental illness may have begun even prior to his
admission at the hospital and it was highly possible that he was already
suffering from schizophrenia prior to his commission of the crime.
● The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the
presumption of sanity at the time he committed the offense.
ISSUE:
● Whether or not Madarang, invoking insanity, be exempted from criminal
liability.
RULING:
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● NO. The defendant cannot be exempted from criminal liability of parricide. In
order for insanity to be exempted, there must be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he
acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the
power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
● In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from
schizophrenia when he was committed to the NCMH months after he killed
his wife. None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he
exhibited any of the myriad symptoms associated with schizophrenia
immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident.
● Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the appellant
was already suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also
declared that schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are
capable of distinguishing right from wrong. Hence the importance of
adducing proof to show that the appellant was not in his lucid interval at the
time he committed the offense.
● The evidence adduced by the defense was insufficient to establish his claim of
insanity at the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record
to show that the appellant was completely of unsound mind prior to or
coetaneous with the commission of the crime.
FALLO: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting the
appellant of the crime of parricide is AFFIRMED in toto.
People v. Robiños (Castañeda, Aparri)
G.R. No. 138453
FACTS:
● On March 25, 1995, at around seven o'clock in the morning, 15 year-old
Lorenzo Robiños was at their home in Barangay San Isibro in Camiling,
Tarlac cooking dinner, heard his parents, appellant Melecio Robiños and
Lorenza Robiños (the victim) who were at the sala, quarreling. Lorenzo heard
his mother saying, 'Why did you come home, why don't you just leave?'
 ● After hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo saw his father, with a double-
bladed knife, stab his mother on the right shoulder. Upon witnessing
appellant's attack on his mother, Lorenzo immediately left their house and ran
to his grandmother's house where he reported the incident.
● Prior to the killing of Lorenza, Benjamin Bueno, the brother of the victim
Lorenza, actually went to his mother’s house to inform his relatives that their
uncle, Alejandro Robinos, was killed by the appellant on the evening of
March 24, 1995. However, Benjamin was more shocked when he found out
that her sister was killed by the same person, the appellant. He was already at
his mother’s house when Lorenzo arrived and reported the incident about
Lorenza. He then saw the appellant at his sister’s home, who was just 150
meters from them, who shouted at him, 'It's good you would see how your
sister died.'
● He immediately called the police station and reported the said incident. The
police, together with Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials proceeded
to the scene of the crime. When appellant failed to come out, the police and
barangay officials detached the bamboo wall from the part of the house and
SPO4 Lugo saw appellant, lying on his side and holding a bloodstained
double-bladed knife with his right hand, embracing his wife, uttering the
words, “I will kill myself, I will kill myself.”
● Lorenza appeared to be dead. The police and the barangay officials tried to
pull the appellant away from Lorenza's body. He tried to resist but was
overpowered. The police, with the help of the barangay officials present, tied
his hands and feet with a plastic rope. However, before he was pulled away
from the body of his wife and restrained by the police, the appellant admitted
to Rolando Valdez, his neighbor and a barangay kagawad, that he had killed
his wife.
● In a special report prepared by the police officer, it was stated that the victim
died with 41 stab wounds and was 6 months pregnant; appellant was
under the influence of liquor/drunk who came home and quarrelled with
his wife, until the suspect got irked and drew a double knife and delivered
those forty-one (41) stab blows; appellant also stabbed his own body and
was brought to the Provincial Hospital; and a double blade sharp knife
about eight (8) inches long including handle was recovered from the
scene.
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● Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he
indeed killed his wife, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by
interposing the defense of insanity.
● Testimonies were presented stating that the appellant saw a person who went
inside their house and wanted to kill him. This was testified by his 19-yr old
son and this same thing was said to his mother which started the heated
arguments on March 23, 1995. The nurse of the Tarlac Penal Colony also
testified that every time she visited him in his cell (May to June 1996), the
accused isolated himself, rarely talked, just stared at her and murmured alone.
The detention prisoners likewise testified that he refused to respond in the
counting of prisoners and would sometimes stay in his cell even if they were
required to fall in line in the plaza of the penal colony; and sometimes seen
lying down, sitting, looking, or staring on space and without a companion,
laughing and sometimes crying. (Version of Defense)
● The accused-appellant herein, testified that on March 25, 1995, he was in their
house and there was no unusual incident that happened on that date. He did
not know that he was charged for the crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion. He could not remember when he was informed by his children that
he killed his wife. He could not believe that he killed his wife. (Version of
Defense)
ISSUE:
WON the appellant can interpose the defense of insanity to absolve himself of criminal
liability..
RULING:
No. A perusal of the records of the case reveals that appellant's claim of insanity is
unsubstantiated and wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both prosecution and
defense witnesses show no substantial evidence that appellant was completely deprived
of reason or discernment when he perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife.
The fact that appellant admitted to responding law enforcers how he had just killed
his wife may have been a manifestation of repentance and remorse - a natural
sentiment of a husband who had realized the wrongfulness of his act. Thus, the
assault of appellant on his wife was not undertaken without his awareness of the
atrocity of his act.
Insanity must have existed at the time of the commission of the offense, or the accused
must have been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise he would still be criminally
responsible.21 Verily, his alleged insanity should have pertained to the period prior to or
at the precise moment when the criminal act was committed, not at any time thereafter.
Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have proven that he had already
been completely deprived of reason when he killed the victim. Verily, the evidence
proffered by the defense did not indicate that he had been completely deprived of
intelligence or freedom of will when he stabbed his wife to death. Insanity is a defense
in the nature of a confession or avoidance and, as such, clear and convincing proof is
required to establish its existence. Indubitably, the defense failed to meet the quantum
of proof required to overthrow the presumption of sanity.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch
68) in Criminal Case No. 95-45 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the penalty is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua. Consistent with current jurisprudence,
appellant shall pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and
P22,800 as actual damages, which were duly proven. No pronouncement as to costs.
ORDERED.
(RTC RULING WHICH WAS AFFIRMED AND MODIFIED BY THE SC)
"WHEREFORE, finding accused Melecio Robiños guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, this Court hereby renders
Issue:
judgment sentencing him to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. He is also
ordered to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim; and
liable for the rape of AAA.
P22,800.00 s actual damages.”
Ruling:
Ortega v. People (Tizon)
G.R. No. 151085
9|Page
Facts:
● The victim, AAA (name of victim and immediate family concealed due to her
being underage), 6 y/o, and her brother BBB, 10 y/o, was left in the care of
their neighbor Luzviminda Ortega for 2 nights some time in August 1996,
since their mother, MMM, had to care for her hospitalized son.
● During the first night, Joemar Ortega, son of Luzviminda, woke AAA who
was sleeping beside Luzviminda, and led her to the sala. There Joemar raped
AAA.
● The day afterwards, Joemar, noticing that no one was around, brought AAA
to the comfort room and raped her again. Joemar warned AAA not to tell
anyone or he would spank her.
● The third occasion happened on December 1, 1996. Joemar went in the house
of AAA to join her and her siblings in watching TV. Both Joemar and AAA’s
mother were conversing at the time.
● Later, Joemar called AAA into the room of her brothers and removed his and
her lower garments and, in a standing position, inserted his perins into AAA’s
vagina.
● AAA’s brother BBB saw Joemar and AAA and told Joemar to stop. The
latter, in return, hurriedly left. BBB reported the incident to his mother,
MMM, who confronted Luzviminda the next day.
● MMM demanded that AAA be brought to the doctor for examination. The
Rural Health Officer, Dr. Katalbas, found no indication of rape. Unconvinced
of the result, MMM went to Dr. Joson, Medical Officer IV of Bacolod City
Health Office 11 days later, who made a contradictory finding.
● Both parties reached an amicable settlement wherein Joemar was made to
leave their house to keep away from AAA. Joemar, however, returns every
weekend to bring his laundry home, during which he was bad-mouthed by
AAA’s father, which led to a confrontation and the filing of the case.
W/N Joemar Ortega, being aged 13 y/o at the time of the crime, is criminally
NO.
● The Supreme Court, in accordance with RTC and CA finds Joemar Ortega
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape stating that rape is
 consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips of the female
organ.
● However, RA 9344, enacted on April 28, 2006, provides for the immediate
dismissal of cases involving children in conflict with the law under (Sections
64, 65, 66, 67, and 68).
● The Supreme Court was compelled to apply the unambiguous provisions of
RA 9344, in favor of Joemar Ortega and subsequently dismissed him.
● According to the Supreme Court, however, “Any perception that the result
reached herein appears unjust or unwise should be addressed to Congress.
Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from
the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our task is constitutionally
confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and
we have done so in this case.”
Fallo:
The criminal cases filed against Joemar Ortega are DISMISSED. Ortega was
referred to the local social welfare and development office for appropriate intervention
program. Ortega was ordered to pay private complainant AAA Php 100,000 as civil
indemnity, and an additional Php 100,000 for moral damages.
People v. Mantalaba (Abong)
G.R. No. 186227
FACTS: The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in
Butuan City received a report that a 17-year-old named Allen Mantalaba was selling
shabu. A buy-bust operation was conducted in the evening of October 1, 2003. After
this, two information were filed against Mantalaba for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of
RA 9165 which were later consolidated and tried jointly. During arraignment,
Mantalaba pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued and the RTC found Mantalaba guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and was penalized of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) for selling shabu, and for illegally
possessing shabu. Mantalaba was penalized, in application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as
maximum of prision mayor and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱300,000.00). The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Thus, the present
appeal.
10 | P a g e
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the minority of the accused-appellant shall be applied for the
suspension of his sentence.
RULING: YES. The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust
operation took place or when the said offense was committed but was no longer a
minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision.
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC
promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was
no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article
192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-
18- SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the laws that were applicable
at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his
sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive
application.
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia that while Section 38 of RA
9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in
conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension
of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no
longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of
sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would
not have happened if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the
sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal
at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was
20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have
suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the
provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence
of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192
of P.D. 603.
The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can be appreciated in fixing the
penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, the
proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion
temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated.
Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum
penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor
and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion
temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.
The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been
originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is
inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence
of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper
imposable penalty.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment dated
September 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal
Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan
Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that
should be imposed on appellant's conviction of violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, is
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
People v. Doqueña (Alvarez)
G.R. No. 46539
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VALENTIN DOQUEÑA
FACTS:
● One afternoon, victim Juan Ragojos and Epifanio Rarang were playing
volleyball in the yard of an intermediate school in Pangasinan.
11 | P a g e
● Accused Valentin Doqueña, who was exactly 13 years, 9 months and 5 days
old that day, was also in said yard. He intervened by catching the ball and
tossing it at Juan, hitting him on the stomach.
● Juan chased Valentin and upon overtaking him, slapped him on the nape.
Valentin turned against Juan, assuming a threatening attitude, which caused
the latter to punch the former on the mouth. Juan returned to where Epifanio
was to continue playing.
● Offended by what he considered an abuse from Juan, who was taller and more
robust, Valentine looked around the yard for a stone to attack Juan. He found
none and instead approached his cousin Romualdo Cocal, asking for his knife.
● Epifanio overheard this and told Romualdo not to give his knife because
Valentin might attack Juan with it. However, Valentin took possession of the
knife which was in a pocket of his cousin's pants.
● Valentin approached Juan and challenged the latter to punch him again, to
which Juan answered that he did not want to because he was bigger. Ignorant
of Valentin’s intentions, Juan continued playing when the accused stabbed
him in the chest.
● Valentin was prosecuted for homicide in The Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, which held that the he acted with discernment and, proceeding in
accordance with the provisions of article 80 of the RPC, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 99, ordered him to be sent to the Training School for
Boys to remain therein until he reaches the age of majority.
● The court took into account the fact that he was a 7th grade pupil, was one of
the brightest in said school, captain of a company of the cadet corps, and
always obtained excellent marks. They believed that in committing the crime,
he acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences
of his act.
● The accused appealed, alleging that the court erred in holding that he had
acted with discernment and in not having dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused acted in discernment.
RULING:
● Yes, he acted in discernment.
● The facts convinced the Court that the appeal is absolutely unfounded because
it is error to determine discernment by the means resorted to by the defense.
They claim that to determine whether or not a minor acted with discernment,
what should be given consideration are not only the facts and circumstances
which caused the minor committing the act, but also his state of mind at the
time of commission, the time he might have had at his disposal for the
 purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of ● The accused contended that he was practicing the use of the weapon when his
reasoning he could have had at that moment. wife was hit by the arrow, claiming that the shooting was not intentional.
● The defense mistakes the discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3 of ● Although the accused sounded remorseful on their way to the hospital,
the RPC for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention which, as a
Guillermo further testified that while the victim was being attended to at
mitigating circumstance, is included among other mitigating circumstances in
article 13 of said Code. hospital, the accused stayed outside then disappeared.
● The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from ● He was later on apprehended by police authorities hiding inside the comfort
criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who room in an adjoining barangay.
commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand ● The the trial court found accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known crime of PARRICIDE and sentenced him to a penalty of RECLUSION
and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and PERPETUA and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the
P50,000.00, as moral damages.
very attitude, the very comportment and behaviour of said minor, not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during ● Accused filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals but CA denied, and
the trial (U.S. vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155). affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court to indemnify the
heirs of the victim of the same amount as civil indemnity.
FALLO: ● Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. He alleged that
the pieces of circumstantial evidence did not sufficiently establish his guilt
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. beyond reasonable doubt and that the prosecution failed to prove his motive in
killing his wife, or that they had a quarrel immediately prior to the incident.
● He also alleged that it was not established that he was the one who shot his
People v. Castillo (Alvarez)
wife. And assuming that he was the one who killed his wife, it was accidental
G.R. No. 172695
and not intentional.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISAIAS CASTILLO y COMPLETO
ISSUE: Whether or not the fatal injury sustained by the victim was accidental /
Whether or not the case constitutes an accident
FACTS:
RULING:
● In the evening of November 5, 1993, Isais, the accused, came home in a drunk
and angry mood. He kicked the door and table, and threw the electric fan
 No. There is no merit in appellant’s contention that assuming he was the one
away.
who killed his wife, it was accidental and not intentional. The exempting
● His father–in-law, Guillermo, convinced him to take a rest but the accused did
circumstance of accident is not applicable in the instant case.
not listen and instead took his sling and arrow from the house ceiling.
● In Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, accident is an affirmative
● Guillermo then transferred to the adjacent house of his daughter in-law
defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing
Yolanda, when he heard his daughter and the accused’s wife, Consorcia
evidence. The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof
Antiporta Castillo, crying and later on shouting at the accused.
through the requisites provided in the same article.
● On the way to check on the scene, Yolanda met the accused carrying the
● By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and
bloodied body of Consorcia. All three of them brought Consorcia to the
arrow be considered as performing a "lawful act." On this ground alone,
hospital but to no avail.

12 | P a g e
 appellant’s defense of accident must be struck down because he was
performing an unlawful act during the incident.
● Furthermore, mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the law.
In penalizing the act, the legislator took into consideration that the deadly
weapon was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict injury, mostly fatal, upon
other persons.
● Furthermore, by claiming that the killing was by accident, appellant has the
burden of proof of establishing the presence of any circumstance which may
relieve him of responsibility. And to prove justification he must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.
Other than his claim that the killing was accidental, appellant failed to adduce
any evidence to prove the same.
(Following ruling covers the other contention of the appellant; no longer related to the
topic of accident but I still included it for further reading)
● Direct evidence of the commission of the offense is not the only matrix where
a trial court may draw its conclusions and finding of guilt. Conviction can be
held on the basis of circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
● Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof excluding
the possibility of error and producing absolute certainty. Only moral certainty
or "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind"
is required.
● In this case, all the essential requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a
conviction are present. The previously founded pieces of circumstantial
evidence indubitably established that appellant was the perpetrator of the
crime. In addition, Consortia’s sister testified that the victim would confide to
her about the accused’s violent behavior. And the victim would be seen with
black eyes as evident proof of maltreatment.
● There is no merit in appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove
motive in killing his wife. Intent to kill and not motive is the essential element
of the offense on which his conviction rests. If the victim dies as a result of a
deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.
13 | P a g e
● In the instant case, the following circumstances satisfactorily established
appellant’s intent to kill his wife: (1) the killing was immediately preceded by
a quarrel between the appellant and his wife; (2) criminal cases are primarily
about human nature. His actions after the incident provided contrary to human
nature. Appellant took flight, which, when unexplained, is also well-
established as a competent evidence to indicate guilt; (3) the location of the
wound and its extent likewise proved appellant’s intent to kill the victim. The
autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained a punctured wound in the
neck, a vital organ, which fatally lacerated her jugular vein causing massive
haemorrhage. This manifests appellant’s intention to extinguish life; and (4)
his act of bringing the body to the hospital does not manifest innocence. It is
merely an indication of an act of repentance or contrition.
● There is likewise no merit in appellant’s contention that he was not the one
who shot the deadly arrow, considering that at the time of the incident, he and
his drinking buddies were all engaged in target shooting therefore any one of
them could have shot the victim. His father-in-law testified that appellant was
alone with his wife inside their house when the incident happened. There is no
paucity of evidence because the time when Guillermo left the appellant and
the victim up to the time Yolanda saw him carrying his wife were all
accounted for.
● Defense witness, Jose Nelson Galang, testified that he left his drinking
buddies and headed home at about 9:00 p.m. and was already in bed at about
10:00 p.m. when he saw that Consortia was being rushed to the hospital.
● Likewise, the court cannot lend credence to appellant’s contention that the
letters he wrote to his parents-in-law and sister-in-law where he asked for
forgiveness, should not be considered as an implied admission of guilt. He
claimed that he wrote the letters in order to explain that what happened was an
accident and that he was to be blamed for it because he allowed his drinking
buddies to play with the sling and arrow.
● In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by
law to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the
accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated hospital. Dr. Palma happened to be at the crime scene as he was visiting his
February 28, 2005 which affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional brother in the Philippine Constabulary. When Dr. Palma examined Balboa, he
Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, finding appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo said that it was unnecessary to bring Balboa to the hospital for he was dead.
guilty of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, massive secondary to gunshot wounds on
ordering him to pay the heirs of his victim ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and chest and abdomen
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, is AFFIRMED. With costs. ● RTC of Iloilo City found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide.
Pomoy v. People (Aparri) ● CA modified the RTC decision removing aggravating circumstances of abuse
of public position.
POMOY v. PEOPLE
ROWENO POMOY, petitioner ISSUE:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
WON the shooting of Tomas Balboa was the result of an accident in Pomoy’s
● Tomas Balboa was a master teacher of the Concepcion College of Science and
fulfillment of duty.
Fisheries in Concepcion, Iloilo
RULING:
● On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen arrived at the
Concepcion College to arrest Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery
Yes. The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time
which took place in the municipality in December 1989.
performing a lawful act with due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere
● Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct 321st Philippine
accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the
Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was detained in
injury.27 From the facts, it is clear that all these elements were present. At the time of
the jail thereat, along with Edgar Samudio, another suspect in the robbery
the incident, petitioner was a member -- specifically, one of the investigators -- of the
case.
Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
● Later that day, about a little past 2 o’clock in the afternoon, petitioner, who is
Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer
a police sergeant, went near the door of the jail where Balboa was detained
that, under the instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latter’s cell
and directed the latter to come out, purportedly for tactical interrogation at the
for a routine interrogation.
investigation room.
● At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster
As an enforcer of the law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his
which was hanging by the side of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in its
service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody. Petitioner
holster, with only the handle of the gun protruding from the holster.
cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent
● When petitioner and Balboa reached the main building and were near the
his service weapon from causing accidental harm to others.At no instance during his
investigation room, two (2) gunshots were heard.
testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased, much
● Petitioner said that he and Balboa grappled in taking controlled of his gun and
less kill him.The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim’s death was limited
that Balboa was accidentally shot.
only to acts committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an
● When the source of the shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding
enforcer of the law.
a .45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about
two (2) feet away. When the Commanding Officer of the Headquarters
FALLO:
arrived, he disarmed petitioner and directed that Balboa be brought to the
14 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED. his son's room to wake him up and returned with a gun in his hand.
Petitioner is ACQUITTED. To defend himself, he grabbed the gun from the victim and struggled
for it then the victim lost and fell on his knees, that’s where he pulled
No costs. the gun to the level of the victim’s forehead then the gun suddenly
went off, killing the victim. Then he went home to change clothes
SO ORDERED. then claimed that he placed the gun above the table and after
changing, the gun was already taken by his brother and was thrown
G.R. No. 150647 into the sea
People v. Retubado (Apostol) Issue:
G.R. No.124058 WON Jesus killed the victim in a state of necessity, a lawful act,
hence, absolving him from criminal liability.

Facts: Ruling:

● Someone pranked the brother of the accused who is mentally ill by No. The SC reiterated that an act of an accused in a state of necessity is justifying
inserting a firecracker in a cigarette pack and it happened to explode circumstance; hence, lawful. Under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
on the dining table during their dinner. They suspected Emmanuel In claiming this, the accused must prove his defense with clear and convincing
Canon Jr but when the barangay captain negate this and said that evidence. By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must
Emmanuel Jr was not the suspect then closed the case the accused rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the
was eager to confront Emmanuel Jr prosecution. It is also indispensable that the state of necessity must not be brought
● The accused happened to see Emmanuel Sr, the victim and the father about by the intentional provocation of the party invoking the same.
of Emmanuel jr. The accused confronted the victim but was ignored
Here, the accused failed to prove his claim because he was the provocateur, the
by him. He followed the latter to their house
unlawful aggressor and the author of a deliberate and malicious act of shooting the
● Shortly after Emmanuel Sr had entered his house, Jesus arrived and
victim at close range on the forehead.
tarried at the porch. Emmanuel Sr suddenly opened the door and
demanded to know why he was being followed. The appellant told Fallo:
Emmanuel Sr that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel Jr. But
Emmanuel Sr told Jesus that his son was already asleep.Norberta Wherefore, the appealed judgement is affirmed with modification. Jesus G.
went down from the balcony and placed her hand on her husband's Retubado is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
shoulder to pacify him. Emmanuel Sr entered their house and the
accused continued following him until he reached the doorstep
US v. Tañedo (Sumayod)
● Jesus forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot
G.R. No. L-5418
Emmanuel Sr on the forehead. The latter fell to the floor, Jesus
walked away from the scene. Norberta shouted for help. The
neighbors, her daughter, and her son-in-law arrived. They brought G.R. No. L-5418
Emmanuel Sr to the Tuburan District Hospital, but the victim died
shortly thereafter. THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CECILIO TAÑEDO, defendant-
The accused surrendered to the police but failed to surrender the gun appellant
used in the offense. In his defense, he claimed that the victim went to
15 | P a g e
FACTS:
● Cecilio Tanedo, a landowner, went with some workers to work on the dam on
his land, carrying with him a shotgun and a few shells to hunt wild chickens
after he had set his laborers at work
● While he was on his way to hunt, he met Sanchez and the latter’s mother and
sick uncle. He asked the victim’s uncle for a place to hunt wild chickens,
however, the latter was sick so the victim answered for him and pointed to the
general direction in the forest.
● The accused then went to the forest to continue his search for wild chickens.
When the accused saw one, he shot and simultaneously heard a human cry out
in pain. After seeing that Sanchez was shot in the heart, Tanedo ran back to
his workers and asked for Tagampa to help him hide the body. They did it by
burying the body in an old well and covering it with burnt cogon grass.
● Only one shot was heard that morning, and a chicken was killed by a gunshot
wound. Chicken feathers were found at the scene of the crime, as well, and
there is no enmity between the accused and the victim.
● Prior to the trial, the accused denied all knowledge of the crime but later
confessed during the trial that he buried the victim’s body. The lower court
found the accused guilty of homicide, and sentenced him to 14 years, 8
months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnification, and
costs. The accused appealed to the Court.
ISSUE:
● Whether or not the accused be exempted by criminal liability by accident.
RULING:
● NO. The only possible reason that the accused could have for killing the
deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden quarrel between them during
the hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact that the chicken and the man
were shot at the same time, there has been only one shot fired.
● According to Article 8 subdivision 8 of the Penal Code, “he who, while
performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident
without liability or intention of causing it.” It is uniformly held that if life is
taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance of a lawful act
executed with due care and without the intention of doing harm, there is no
16 | P a g e
criminal liability. In this case, there is absolutely no evidence of negligence on
the part of the accused. Neither is there any question that he was engaged in
the commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred? Neither is there
any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the
deceased? The only thing in the case at all suspicious on the part of the
accused are his concealment and denial, and no sufficient evidence was found
to support the judgment of conviction.
FALLO:
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and his
discharge from custody ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.
US v. Caballeros (Basiano)
G.R. No. 1352
An Appeal from a judgement of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
FACTS:
Defendants have been sentenced to a penalty of 7 years of presidio mayor as
accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the
persons of four American school teachers– Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E.
Wells, and Ernest Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime as
principals or as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the
victims in order to conceal the crime.
Roberto Baculi (one of the defendants) confessed that he indeed assisted in the burial
of the corpses, to which he did because he was compelled to do so by the murderers.
This affirmation of the defendant was corroborated by the only eyewitness to the
crime, Teodoro Sabate (a witness for the prosecution).
Teodoro Sabate was present when the four Americans were killed. He attested that
Baculi was not a member of the latter and that Baculi was in his property gathering
some bananas and that when he heard the shots he began to run; however, he was seen
by Damaso and Isidro (the leader of the band) who called him, striking him with the
butts of their guns and forced him to bury the corpses.
(Diri na related an case ni Caballeros han topic na exempting circumstances, pero
iginclude ko nala for context bangin la ig-ask)
As regards Apolonio Caballeros, he took no part in any way in the execution of the
crime, the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even at the place of the
occurrence of the crime. The confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made
before an official of the division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon,
as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal proof,
because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants
who made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of
another witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of
Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to him and to the other
defendants that nothing would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to
have been made freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of
pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine
Commission.)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the exempting circumstance of irresistible force or uncontrollable fear
for a greater injury should be appreciated in Baculi’s favor?
RULING: YES. The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs
the act by reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under
such circumstances when he executed the acts which were charged against him. The
fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the
crime, which seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and which the court
below takes into consideration in his judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code
and therefore that can not render the defendants criminally liable according to law.
FALLO:
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By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment
appealed from, we acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in
both instances. So ordered.
People v. Loreno (Abong, Basiano)
G.R. No. L-54414
G.R. NO. L-54414 JULY 9, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EUSTAQUIO
LORENO Y MALAGA AND JIMMY MARANTAL Y LONDETE, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
FACTS:
In the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay Captain Elias Monge was at his house
located at barrio Magsaysay, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. He and his two young
daughters, namely: Monica Monge, single, then 14 years old, and Cristina Monge,
married, then 22 years old, were preparing to attend the dance to be held in the barrio
proper that evening. But they had to wait for a while because his wife, Beata Monge,
was still changing the diaper of baby Rachel Baybayon, four-month-old daughter of
Cristina Monge. The other occupants present in the house that evening were his sons,
Mario, then 11 years old, and Nilo, then 13 years old, and their farm helper, also
staying with them, by the name of Francisco Fabie. Cristina was then vacationing at
her parents' house. Her husband, Raymundo Baybayon, was in Manila.
At about 7:40 o'clock that same evening, while he was at the balcony of said house,
Francisco Fabie saw at first four men with flashlights approaching. When they came
near, he heard one of them call Elias Monge saying that there was a letter from the
chief (hepe). Elias Monge asked them to come inside since he can’t read the letter
properly. When he and the man in dark sweater were inside the sala Elias Monge asked
his daughter, Monica to fetch his reading glasses. On reading the letter, Elias Monge
and Monica read the following: "Kami mga NPA", which caused Monica to run to her
mother, seized with fear, informing her just what she came to know about their visitors.
Cristina Monge attempted to run to the kitchen to get a bolo, but she was held back by
the man in dark sweater who then announced to all those inside not to make any
scandal. When Elias Monge turned to look at him, the man in dark sweater poked his
gun at him and ordered all those inside to lie on the floor.
In the meantime, outside at the balcony the man in red clothes asked Fabie for a glass
of water, and the latter asked Mario Monge to get the glass of water, but Mario did not
obey and instead went to the sala. Hence, Fabie himself went inside the house to fetch
the glass of water. But, as he went inside the sala, he noticed the man in red clothes
following him. As Fabie reached the door to the sala, the man in red clothes poked his
gun on Fabie's back and pointed a sharp instrument on his neck and then he was
pushed to go inside the sala. Once inside the sala, which was lighted, Fabie saw and
recognized the man in red clothes to be Eustaquio Loreno. Also, Elias Monge and his
two daughters, Monica and Cristina, saw and recognized Eustaquio Loreno as he
entered the sala as one of the companions of the man in dark sweater. All the occupants
of the house were ordered by the man in dark sweater and Loreno to remain lying flat
on their stomachs on the floor. Jimmy Marantal stayed as lookout outside the house.
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed Loreno to tie all their victims on the
floor. Loreno tied them with rattan. The man in dark sweater cut the baby's hammock
(duyan) and got the ropes with which he and Loreno used to reinforce in tying the
victim's hands together behind their backs.
After Loreno and Fabie returned to the sala, the man in dark sweater got hold of
Monica Monge and dragged her up to a room located above the balcony. She tried to
resist but she was then still tied. Inside the room, Monica was asked to reveal the
whereabouts of her piggy bank savings. She said there was none. He ransacked the
room but found none. The man in dark sweater then seized Monica and forcibly
removed her pants. Monica resisted and shouted at her parents for help. He boxed and
slapped her. Despite her struggle, he was able to remove her panty and successfully
raped her. After that, he dragged Monica back to the sala and proceeded to do the same
to Cristina.
While all of this was happening, the other men then proceeded to ransack the house
and found and took a lot of valuables including a kulambo and kaserola tangina nila
pati yun kinuha. Thereafter, Loreno entered the room where Cristina was still lying on
the floor and proceeded to kiss and touch her vagina. Suddenly, he was called to hurry
up because someone was approaching the house. When he went back, the dark shirt
guy warned everyone not to tell anyone, got their valuables, and left.
They managed to untie themselves eventually and after positively affirming the
identities of their malefactors, along with Elias finding out the sexual abuse his
daughters suffered, filed a report against the robbery-rape incident. After substantial
examination to his daughters and initial investigation, the accused were detained,
charged, and found guilty.
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Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal claimed that they acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury. They admitted that they were in the house of Elias Monge on
the night of January 7, 1978, but they were only forced by a man wearing black
sweater and his five companions who claimed to be members of the New People's
Army (NPA), operating in the locality, with the threat that if they did not obey,
appellants and their families would be killed.
ISSUE:
W/N the accused acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force.
RULING: NO. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like
one who acts under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is
exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. The force must
be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but
against his will. The duress, force, fear, or intimidation must be present, imminent, and
impending and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
appellee's death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is
not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to
the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
A perusal of the appellants' statement of the robbery-rape incident as summarized in
their joint brief, showed that they admitted their participation in the commission of the
crimes of robbery and rape against Elias Monge and his family on January 7, 1978.
Further established were facts inconsistent with appellant's claim of having acted under
the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of equal or greater injury.
All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the appellants.
The foregoing acts, though separately performed from those of their unidentified
companions, clearly showed their community of interest and concert of criminal design
with their unidentified companions which constituted conspiracy without the need of
direct proof of the conspiracy itself. Conspiracy may be inferred and proven by the acts
of the accused themselves and when said acts point to joint purpose and concert of
action and community of interest, which unity of purpose and concert of action serve to
establish the existence of conspiracy, and the degree of actual participation petition by
each of the conspirators is immaterial. 8 Conspiracy having been establish, all the
conspirators are liable as co-penpals regardless of the extent and character of their
participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby,
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the accused JIMMY MARANTAL is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. With costs against appellants.
People v. Del Rosario (Apostol, Cabanatan)
G.R. No. 127755
FACTS: On 13 May 1996, At around 5:30 in the afternoon Joselito was hired for 120
pesos by Boy Santos, his co-accused. Their original agreement was that he would drive
him to the cockpit at the Bias Edward Coliseum. However, despite their earlier
arrangement Boy Santos directed him to proceed to the marketplace to fetch Jun
Marquez and Dodong Bisaya. Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the parking lot
of Merced Drugstore at the public market. Subsequently, he was asked to proceed and
stop at the corner of Burgos and General Luna St. where Bisaya got off on the pretext
of buying a cigarette. A certain Alonzo, who is also a tricycle driver, was parked at a
distance of about one and a-half meters from Del Rosario's tricycle, and therefore saw
what would happen next. Bisaya then approached the victim Virginia Bernas and
grappled with her for the possession of her bag. Jun Marquez got off the tricycle to
help Dodong Bisaya. Accused del Rosario tried to leave and seek help but Boy Santos
who stayed inside the tricycle prevented him from leaving and threatened in fact to
shoot him. Meanwhile, Dodong Bisaya succeeded in taking the victims bag, but before
boarding the tricycle Jun Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while she
was lying prone on the ground. After the shooting, Dodong Bisaya boarded the sidecar
of the tricycle while Jun Marquezrode behind del Rosario and ordered him to start the
engine and drive towards Dicarma. The witness, Alonzo gave chase and was able to get
the plate number of the tricycle. While inside his tricycle, del Rosario overheard his
passengers saying that they would throw the bag at Zulueta St. where there were cogon
grasses. Upon arriving at Dicarma, the three men get off and warn del Rosario not to
inform the police authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be
harmed. Del Rosario then went home. Because of the threat, however, he did not report
the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Del Rosario can claim for exemption from criminal liability
under Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code
RULING: Yes, There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of
the gun directly pointed at him was real and imminent. Such fear rendered him
immobile and subject to the will of Boy Santos, making him for the moment an
automaton without a will of his own. In other words, in effect, he could not be any
more than a mere instrument acting involuntarily and against his will. He is therefore
exempt from criminal liability since by reason of fear of bodily harm he was compelled
against his will to transport his co-accused away from the crime scene.
FALLO: The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting
accused JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide and
sentencing him to death, is REVISED and SET ASIDE, and the accused is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate RELEASE from confinement is
ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the Director of Prisons
is directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within five days from receipt
hereof.
People v. Bandian (Raquel, Tizon)
G.R. No. 45186
Facts:
● At about 7 o’clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar saw
his neighbor, Josefina Bandian go to a thicket, apparently to respond to a call
of nature because it was usually where the people in the place go for that
purpose.
● A few minutes later, Aguilar saw Bandian emerge from the thicket bloody and
staggering, and not being able to support herself. Aguilar helped Bandian into
her house and laid her into bed. Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, another
neighbor, to take bamboo leaves to stop Bandian’s hemorrhage. On his way to
get the bamboo leaves, Comcom saw the body of a newborn child. Comcom
informed Aguilar who then told Comcom to bring the child.
● Comcom and Aguilar showed the child to Bandian, asking her if it was her
child. She affirmed.
 ● It was found out later that Bandian kept having fever during her pregnancy
and had fever during the incident, which rendered her dizzy and debilitated.
● In the afternoon of the said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the
sanitary division went to the appellant’s house and found her still lying in bed
still bleeding. In his opinion, the physician declared that the appellant gave
birth in her house, and after which, he threw the child into the thicket to kill it
for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with
whom she was married to, because the child was not his but with another man
with whom she had previously has amorous relations.
● The trial court gave credit to Dr. Nepomuceno’s rendering a conviction of
reclusion perpetua for the crime of infanticide.
Issue:
W/N Josefina Bandian is exempt from criminal liability for the death of her
child under Paragraph 7 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
YES. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be
committed willfully or consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary,
conscious and free act or omission.
The evidence does not show that the appellant, in causing her child’s death in
one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously or
imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death. A mother
who a the time of childbirth was overcome by sever dizziness and extreme debility,
and left the child in a thicket where said child died, is not liable for infanticide, because
it was physically impossible for her to take home the child. The severe dizziness and
extreme debility of the woman constitute an insuperable cause as provided by
Subsection 7, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.
By going into the thicket to defecate, she caused a wrong as that of giving
birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence
or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme
debility, she could not be blamed because it all happened by mere accident, with no
fault or intention on her part. The law exempts from liability any person who so acts
and behaves under such circumstances. As provided in Subsection 4, Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code, she falls under a person who performed a lawful act with due care
20 | P a g e
but causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. The said
appellant was under the fourth and the seventh exempting circumstances in her favour.
FALLO: Ruling Appellant is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had been
accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and as she is actually confined in jail in
connection with this case, it is ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.
Dissenting Opinion (VILLA-REAL, J., )
- Villareal concurred the acquittal of Bandian not on the grounds of being
exempt from criminal liability but because she has committed no criminal act
or omission.
- The evidence conclusively shows that on the day in question the accused
Josefina Bandian had spent a year of marital life with her lover Luis Kirol by
whom she was begotten with a child for the first time. Her said lover knew
that she was pregnant and both were waiting for the arrival of the happy day
when the fruit of their love should be born.
- Since she became pregnant she continuously had fever, was weak and dizzy.
- Unconscious, precipitate or sudden deliveries are well known in legal
medicine among young primiparæ who, by reason of their ignorance of the
symptoms of parturition and of the process of expulsion of fetus, are not
aware that they are giving birth when they are responding to an urgent call of
nature (Dr. A. Lacassagne)
- There is no doubt that the accused, in her feverish, weak and dizzy condition
when she went into the thicket to defecate and being a primipara with no
experience in childbirth, was not aware that upon defecating she was also
expelling the child she was carrying in her womb.
- Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that acts and omissions
punishable by law are felonies, which may be committed not only by means
of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa); there being deceit when the
act is performed with deliberate intent, and fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
- As the herein accused was not aware that she had delivered and that the child
had been exposed to the rough weather and to the cruelty of animals, it cannot
be held that she deceitfully committed the crime of infanticide or that of
abandonment of a minor, because according to the above-cited legal provision
 there is deceit when the act punishable by law is performed with deliberate
intent.
- We cannot apply to the accused fourth exempting circumstance of article 12
of the Revised Penal Code which reads: "Any person who, while performing a
lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it," because although the lawful act of satisfying a natural
physiological necessity accidentally provoked the delivery, the delivery itself
was not an injury, but the exposure of the child at the mercy of the elements
and of the animals which cased its death.
People v. Lua Chu (Suarez)
G.R. No. 34917
FACTS:
● Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng were convicted of the illegal importation of opium.
● Uy Se Tieng, the consignee of the opium shipments coming from Hongkong,
collaborated with Juan Samson (chief of the customs secret service of Cebu)
and Joaquin Natividad (collections officer) by paying them an amount of
P6,000 for the opium to be released safely from customs.
● The said accused informed Samson that the opium shipment consisted of
3,000 tins, and that he had agreed to pay Natividad P6,000 or a P2 a tin, and
that the opium had been in Hongkong since the beginning of October awaiting
a ship that would go directly to Cebu.
● Upon arrival of the shipment of opium in the ports of Cebu, Tieng informed
Samson that he consulted the real owners of the shipment on how to proceed
with the payment of P6,000 & will come over to Samson’s house to inform
the decision of the owners.
● On the same day, Samson informed the Constabulary and the Provincial
Fiscal requesting a stenographer to take down the conversation between
Samson & Tieng in the presence of the provincial commander, Captain
Buenconsejo.
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● Captain Buenconsejo and a stenographer hid behind the curtains in the house
of Samson to witness the conversation between Samson, Chu, and Tieng and
noted the following important facts:
1. Tieng informed Samson that Lua Chu was one of the owners of the
opium.
2. Chu informed Samson that aside from him, there were co-owners
(Tan and Amoy).
3. Chu promised to pay P6,000 upon delivery of the opium from the
warehouse of Tieng.
4. A Customs Collector had a conversation before with Chu, when
Samson was on vacation in Europe, and agreed on the business of
shipping the opium.
● The following morning Tieng and his companion went to Samson’s as he was
handing certain papers, Buenconsejo appeared and arrested the two Chinese,
taking the papers consisting of bills of lading. (receipt of freight services, a
contract between a freight carrier and shipper and a document of title.)
● Defendants Chu and Tieng appealed their conviction of illegal importation
citing that they were induced by Samson to import the opium in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can claim instigation as an exempting
circumstance to free them from liability
RULING: NO. Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein defendants-
appellants to import the opium, but pretended to have an
understanding with the collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad —
who had promised them that he would remove all the difficulties in the way of their
enterprise so far as the customhouse was concerned — not to gain the P2,000
intended for him out of the transaction, but in order to assure the seizure of the
prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. There is certainly
nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should prevent the
Government from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where
an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it
simply a trap set to catch a criminal.
FALLO:
By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
People v. Doria (Rico, Regis)
G.R. No. 125299
Facts
· In November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District, PNP Narcotics
Command received information from two 2 civilian informants that one “Jun” was
engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to
entrap and arrest “Jun” in a buy-bust operation.
· The Narcom team is composed of PO3 Celso Manlangit, as the poseur-buyer and
other police officers.
· They prepared for the buy-bust operation set up by one of the CI between
Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and “Jun” at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.
· On the morning of December 5, 1995, “Jun” appeared and the CI introduced
officer Manlangit as interested in buying 1 kilo worth of marijuana.
· Manlangit handed “jun” the marked bills worth 1,600 pesos.
· “Jun” instructed manlangit to wait for him at the corner of shaw boulevard and
jacinto street while gets the marijuana from his associate.
· After an hour, jun appeared at the agreed place where Manlangit, the CI and the
rest of the team were waiting.
· “Jun” took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to
Manlangit. Officer Manlangit forthwith arrested “Jun” as the others rushed to help in
the arrest.
· They frisked “Jun” but did not find the marked bills on him.
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· Upon inquiry, “Jun” revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate
named “Neneth.”
· Later on, it was found out that the real name of “jun” is Florencio Doria
· The RTC found Florencio Doria guilty in violation of RA 9165.
(I did not include the other half of the facts kay irrelevant na hiya. Although
connected an facts but an mga facts nga waray ko gin include is about na kan
nenet invalid warrantless arrest resulting from illegal warrantless search)
(baga kase hiya hin two different cases but magkasunod la an panhitabo. Main
point nga is irrelevant hiya ha topic)
Issue:
Whether the operation that led to the arrest of Doria was by entrapment or
instigation?
Held/Ruling:
· The SC ruled that the operation was a valid entrapment or a valid
buy-bust operation.
· The court held that there is a wide difference between entrapment
and instigation. In instigation, the accused is lured into the commission of
the offense charged in order to prosecute him. In entrapment, ways and
means are resorted to by the peace officer for the purpose of trapping and
capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan.
Entrapment is not a defense available to the accused while instigation is a
defense and considered as an absolutory clause.
· In the case at bar, Doria already has the idea to commit the crime
regardless if it was an officer poseur-buyer or not. Officer Manlangit and
the other members of the operation team merely facilitate the
apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes.
 · The SC added that even though the team of Manlangit waited for
almost one hour for the accused to give them the one kilo of marijuana
after he paid and that the exchange of money and marijuana did not
happen simultaneously, it will still be considered as a valid buy-bust
operation because of the fact that there is no law which requires that in
“buy-bust” operations there must be a simultaneous exchange of the
marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseur-buyer and the
pusher. Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the
marijuana from the accused-appellant.

Fallo:

Wherefore, the decision of the RTC is modified. Accused-appellant Florencio

Doria is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
five hundred thousand pesos.

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