Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board

GIG WORK AND THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Author(s): Alex de Ruyter, Martyn Brown and John Burgess
Source: Journal of International Affairs , Vol. 72, No. 1, THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION (Fall 2018/Winter 2019), pp. 37-50
Published by: Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26588341

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GIG WORK AND THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION: CONCEPTUAL AND
REGULATORY CHALLENGES

Alex de Ruyter, Martyn Brown,

and John Burgess

Abstract: In terms of work and workplaces there are a number of distin-

guishing features of the predictions associated with the Fourth Industrial
Revolution (4IR). The first is the change in the composition and skillsets of the
workforce. There will not only be labor displacement, but there will also be a
shift towards new and different jobs and toward new skillsets. The challenge
for governments will be dealing with labor displacement and labor reskilling.
The second change is the very nature of work and workplaces. There will
be more work located away from designated workplaces and more work that
involves interaction with information and communication technologies. The
third change will be regulatory, as work will become “invisible” and geographi-
cally dispersed through online and subcontracting arrangements. For govern-
ments there will be challenges regulating employment, identifying employers,
collecting taxes, and supporting social protections, such as through pensions.

To illustrate the changes and challenges associated with 4IR, this article
addresses gig work. This material is new to the extent that the terminology
and its analysis have only emerged within the past five years. It captures
many of the issues and challenges associated with 4IR, which we will highlight
through an analysis of gig work. The article draws on evidence from the UK
and Australia to consider implications for the 4IR.

T he Fourth Industrial Revolution and the Future of Work

The notion of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) was coined by Prof.
Klaus Schwab from the World Economic Forum. He stated that:

The First Industrial Revolution used water and steam power to mechanize
production. The Second used electric power to create mass production.
The Third used electronics and information technology to automate
production. Now a Fourth Industrial Revolution is building on the
Third, the digital revolution that has been occurring since the middle
of the last century. It is characterized by a fusion of technologies that is
blurring the lines between the physical, digital, and biological spheres.

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 1. 37

© The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York

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Alex de Ruyter, Martyn Brown, and John Burgess

The possibilities of billions of people connected by mobile devices, with

unprecedented processing power, storage capacity, and access to knowledge,
are unlimited. And these possibilities will be multiplied by emerging tech-
nology breakthroughs in fields such as artificial intelligence, robotics, the
Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, 3-D printing, nanotechnology,
biotechnology, materials science, energy storage, and quantum computing.1

New technologies thus have the potential to transform work and workplaces,
displace jobs, create new jobs, and impact living conditions. An optimistic sce-
nario suggests that gig work can increase savings, productivity, and flexibility.2
A pessimistic scenario suggests major job losses, increased insecurity in employ-
ment, de-skilling, and growing inequalities; indeed, many of the “new” forms of
work are seen as variations of old forms of day labor and irregular employment.3
In turn there are many predictions that set out the sectors, industries, and jobs
that are most affected by the technological developments associated with 4IR. For
example, a report by McKinsey & Company suggested that automation will “...
accelerate the shift in required job skills that we have seen over the past 15 years...
the strongest growth in demand will be for technological skills, the smallest cat-
egory today which will rise by 55 percent and by 2030 will represent 17 percent
of hours worked, up from 11 percent in 2016.” In contrast, “basic cognitive skills,
which include basic data input and processing, will decline by 15 percent, falling
to 14 percent of hours worked, from 18 percent.”4
In a literature review of three emerging technologies the Chartered Institute
of Personnel and Development suggested that there was very little systematic
evidence that detailed the impact of the technologies on work and workplaces.i In
addition, it found that much of the research was based on anecdote and specula-
tion and that the available evidence suggested that “technology is augmenting
what people are doing and enabling some degree of role expansion for employees.”5
Such predictions are very dependent on access to and the application of tech-
nology; the industrial structure of the economies being examined; the policies sur-
rounding employment, investment, and research; and the infrastructure available
to support the new technologies. The many predictions and scenarios are based on
the characteristics of an advanced economy; it is doubtful that the impact of such
labor market and living standards are as significant in developing economies. Into
these futuristic discussions, gig work has emerged as an issue that manifests many
of the features of 4IR: platform-based; driven by mobile and digital technology;
containing conditions of easy entry for providers and workers; and from daily
observation, appearing to be extensive in urban environments as large numbers of
delivery agents pedal and ride across cities delivering their cargoes of pre-prepared
food. Gig work is a suitable starting point to examine the “new” economy in action
and to consider its growth, operations, and consequences.
i
The three emerging technologies were artificial intelligence, including machine learning and cognitive
computing; robotics, including service robots, robot-assisted procedures, and robotic process automation (RPA);
and automation technologies in health care and transport.

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 Gig Work and the Fourth Industrial Revolution

Hence, the purpose of the paper is to explain the nature of gig work. In so
doing we wish to examine how widespread it is and who carries it out. We also
critically examine what is “new” about gig work. As such, we discuss the discourse
about it in terms of two polar views, namely gig work as self-employed and flex-
ible employment versus gig work as a return to on-call labor found in previous
industrial epochs. Finally, we consider some of the implications of gig work from
taxation and welfare to employment regulation and health.

Gig Work and its Development

Gig work, as a form of self-employment, strictly speaking is a contemporary
labor market phenomenon analogous to the current century. However, it does
have a lengthy series of historical antecedents that can trace their emergence to
the pre-capitalist period in Europe.6 During the 1980s and 1990s, non-standard
and contingent forms of work, of which we include gig working as an example,
began to increase as a share of total employment in industrialized economies.7
The causes underpinning this growth were a mixture of supply-side and demand-
side factors. Essentially these were the feminization of the workforce—particularly
with the growth of part-time employment and service sector jobs—combined with
regulatory developments in labor and product markets that emphasized market-led
regulation, lower trade barriers, and the privatization of state assets.8
Gig work can be found across a range of sectors that involve personal services
delivered through a web-based platform.9 The owners of the platforms intermediate
between service providers and agents who deliver the services. Typically, it involves
food delivery, delivery from retail stores, accommodation, and travel services. The
platform providers are agents who charge or receive a commission from the service
provider and the consumer. Within the process, the “gig worker” is responsible for
delivering the service to the consumer. In this process, the web-based platform
intermediates between producer and consumer, between gig worker and producer,
and between gig worker and consumer. The platform brings all of the parties
together. In turn, the section of the mosaic that the gig worker occupies may be
further complicated by whether the gig worker is self-employed or employed by an
agency that is contracted to deliver services. From this, it follows that the posi-
tion of the gig worker in terms of their status, statutory entitlements, and condi-
tions of employment are ambiguous.10 The gig worker could, depending upon the
organization and configuration of the service delivery process, be a self-employed
contractor, an agency worker, or an on-call employee.
Of course, gig work is only novel in the sense that labor supply is matched to
labor demand by an online platform, and that each engagement of work is con-
sidered as a separate contract. It has been suggested that such a definition of gig

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Alex de Ruyter, Martyn Brown, and John Burgess

work is too narrow, and that other forms of non-standard work such as temporary
agency work or zero-hours contracts could also be mediated in such a fashion.11
De Stefano, for example, defines gig work as being either “crowd-work,” in which a
number of firms and workers are connected via an online platform, or “on-demand
work,” whereby a single-user firm engages an online platform to match workers
to demand for services.12 It is clear that this latter category definition of gig work
could also be coterminous with agency work. However, temporary work—or con-
tingent work as it is often referred to in the United States—has a longer historical
pedigree, while online platform work has only really emerged as a subject of aca-
demic inquiry in the last five years.13 Thus, it is to this particular form of work that
we devote the remainder of this article.

How Widespread is Gig Work?

The labor force framework that underpins labor market statistics is linked to
an epoch in which full-time jobs were the norm and labor-market activity required
only that one was involved in an active job search or employed a certain number
of hours. In addition, the estimates were produced at discrete intervals: monthly,
quarterly, or annually. The focus was toward macroeconomics, tracking the state
of the economy in terms of jobs, labor-market activity, and unemployment.
In contrast, measurement of the gig economy generally is problematic due to
difficulties in operationalizing this type of work in terms of conventional labor-
force survey nomenclatures. In addition, labor-force surveys tend to ask respon-
dents to self-identify with categories of employment in their main jobs, but do
not ask how their labor supply is matched to labor demand as it were; it would
therefore be problematic to identify such workers using aggregate data. A preoc-
cupation with main job status also excludes those who hold multiple jobs, which
could potentially underestimate the extent of gig work.14 Undertaking a labor-force
survey at discrete intervals misses the turnover and short-term jobs that occur
between each survey. There is also simply a lack of reliable data.15 In the United
States, for example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) supplement on contingent
workers was discontinued in 2005 and only revived in 2017, in turn compounding
gaps in the availability of reliable data on good proxies for gig work.16
In this context, Aloisi argues that attempts to quantify the size of the online-
platform workforce are compromised by the fact that there “is no distinction
between active and inactive accounts…and a worker—in the absence of an exclu-
sivity clause—could sign up to several platforms.”17 A final complication, and one
relevant to online work and online platforms, is that work can be international and
removed from the workplace. Working through a mobile phone or computer means
that the workers are separated from products and services, formal workplaces,

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 Gig Work and the Fourth Industrial Revolution

employers, and from the national economy. Under these circumstances, working
through the web creates not only issues with identification and classification, but
also with status, jurisdiction, and regulation. The work may be local or offshore
and, even if it is local, the platform provider or the intermediary may be offshore.
Hence, workforce estimates for online platform companies need to be inter-
preted with a high degree of caution. Stewart and Stanford, for example, suggest
that work mediated through online platforms is relatively insignificant, typically
accounting for less than 1 percent of the workforce in mature industrial econo-
mies.18 The BLS, in its contingent and alternative employment arrangements
supplement, released calculations from 30 September 2018 on “electronically
mediated employment,” and found that such workers in the United States, as of
May 2017, only accounted for about 1 percent of the workforce.19,ii However, Katz
and Krueger suggest that there has been an increase in the share of “alternative
arrangement” workers such as temporary help, on-call, contract, and freelance
workers, from approximately 10 to 15 percent of the workforce between 1995 and
2015.20 They put those workers hired through online intermediaries at 0.5 percent
in 2015, but this is from a base of zero.
Even so, it is notable that estimates of the workforce for the largest platform
providers extend to millions of workers. One example of this is the company Care.
com, which brokers or intermediates domestic services such as child care, pet
care, and household help.21 As such, Smith and Leberstein provide estimates for
the largest online platform providers in terms of workforce, reproduced in Table
1 below.22

Est. Workforce
Company Sector Country Operations
Size
Uber Transportation 160,000 International
Lyft Transportation 50,000 US
Sidecar Transportation 6,000 Major U.S. cities
Handy Home services 5,000 US
Taskrabbit Home services 30,000 International
Care.com Home services 6,600,000 International
Postmates Delivery 10,000 US
Amazon Mechanical Turk Crowdwork 500,000 International
Crowdflower Crowdwork 5,000,000 International
Crowdsource Crowdwork 8,000,000 International
Clickworker Crowdwork 700,000 International

Table 1: Major Online Platform and App Companies’ Workforce Estimates

ii
Wider measures of related forms of work reveal that in May 2017, there were 10.6 million independent
contractors (6.9 percent of total employment), 2.6 million on-call workers (1.7 percent of total employment),
1.4 million temporary help agency workers (0.9 percent of total employment), and 933,000 workers provided
by contract firms (0.6 percent of total employment). “Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements
Summary,” Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nr0.htm.
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Alex de Ruyter, Martyn Brown, and John Burgess

The Optimistic View of Gig Work

The discourse surrounding the virtues of platform work has been underpinned
by the notion of technological change as being liberating and empowering in the
creation of the so-called “network economy.”23 According to this view—labelled
as “techno-positivist” by Lauren Bridges—the internet is “a democratizing
media which has lowered the barriers to entry held by previous gatekeepers and
revolutionized personal freedom.”24 In this somewhat utopian depiction of the
gig economy, claims have been made, for example, that businesses can “enjoy
numerous benefits from working with freelancers such as a fluid workforce adaptive
to change, wider access to hyper-specialized talent, cost savings and an increase in
productivity” (our emphasis).25 Gig workers enjoy flexibility in their employment:
they can work from anywhere at any time, they possess autonomy, and they can
decide the number of hours per day and the overall duration of their employment.
As such, the optimistic view of gig work is that it can be liberating for workers
seeking to escape the strictures of organizational hierarchy and bureaucracy. This
view of gig work, more often than not associated with professionals in possession
of a university education, is that of such workers being freelancers, able to pick and
choose their job assignments with different clients.
Those at the apex of the gig economy pyramid have been described as “gig
consultants,” professionals who are “freelancing corporate advisers, often alumni
of the big professional services firms or management consultancies.”26 A wider cat-
egory of freelancing professionals are associated with primarily technology-linked
sectors like publishing and software design, but they are also to be found in other
professions such as nursing, legal services, accounting, and teaching. These people
have been referred to in academic literature as “free agents,” who can take advan-
tage of their labor-market power to secure considerable premiums working in the
gig economy over those of workers permanently employed in one organization.27,28
Indeed, for such workers, contingent work could offer a means of avoiding bureau-
cracy and “admin,” allowing them to focus on their own preferred core duties, for
example nurses who might see an opportunity to dedicate more time to primary
care than to hospital administration.29

The Critical View of Gig Work

In contrast to the somewhat rosy view painted above, other authors have
emphasized a more critical view of the utility of gig work, particularly for gig
workers themselves. These writers, generally from a Marxist labor process tradi-
tion, but also economic geographers and labor-law specialists, have critiqued the
appeal of gig work from the perspective of it as essentially being the latest develop-
ment in precarious forms of work.30 For these writers, technological change, rather

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 Gig Work and the Fourth Industrial Revolution

than necessarily being liberating for workers, can actually lead to new forms of the
control and commodification of labor.
Writings on the regressive impact of technological change have been extant
for some 40 years. Braverman argues that technological change would de-skill
the workforce because technological advancement typically serves to automate
production processes that previously had required complex mechanical knowledge
and manual procedures.31 This argument is highly relevant to the current setting
of the gig economy, as technology has been seen as a driving factor in simplifying
formerly complex processes, reducing the need for human agency as “routines can
be put in the hands of intelligent machines and then optimized.”32 For example,
it has served to automate the job matching function, through the use of online
platforms such as work-on-demand apps, which reduce job search and matching
costs to firms.33 Hence, gig work, rather than empowering workers as freelancers,
could serve to reinforce the commodification of labor and undermine existing labor
standards.34 This re-commodification is in turn reinforced by the very same apps
that allow the platform owner an enhanced degree of surveillance over the work
process.35 This reiterates Stanford’s point that “the onward march of technology is
neither neutral nor exogenous: what kinds of technologies are developed, how they
are implemented and how they affect work, all reflect the decisions and interests
of competing constituencies.”36
Thus, technological change, rather than reducing the role of intermediaries
on the internet, a process referred to in the literature as disintermediation, has
served to re-intermediate the working relationship between firms and workers. It
has also increasingly served to blur the distinction between “work,” i.e., paid, and
“labor,” i.e., unpaid.37 Platform providers such as Facebook and LinkedIn often
benefit financially, in effect, from the co-creation of content from users who are
not paid workers.38 The highly skewed nature of relative bargaining power between
these firms and gig workers is also apparent in that the largest platform providers
are among the largest companies in the world by value and turnover. Indeed, they
are also significant in employment terms if one considers gig workers dependent
contractors who could be, in effect, disguised employees.39,40
Hence, we may note that dependent contractors, who are otherwise denoted by
the category of “dependent self-employment,” are defined by being self-employed,
with usually only one client.41 Moreover, they have no autonomy at all insofar as
they “receive detailed instructions in how the work is to be done.”42 The border-
less world of online platform work has enabled the extensive use of subcontracting
and outsourcing across countries toward emerging economies, where wage rates are
lower; for example, such is the case in the publishing industry, where editing work
has been outsourced to freelancers in Malaysia and India.43

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Alex de Ruyter, Martyn Brown, and John Burgess

Gig work can be seen as a new variation of putting-out and subcontracting,

with no job security and unpredictable employment and earnings.44 It stands
alongside forms of contingent and informal work that often have ambiguous
employment statuses and eroded employment conditions.45 Many gig workers hold
multiple jobs or are employed in gig work while undertaking other activities such
as study. The nature of gig work results in it being not only difficult to measure,
but also difficult to regulate. Standard employment conditions such as minimum
pay and core non-wage benefits are absent; the ability to collectivize and bargain
collectively is difficult when employment statuses are ambiguous; and for the same
reasons, it is difficult to apply taxation, welfare, and insurance to such workers.
To be a gig worker is to be employed largely without traditionally affiliated protec-
tions or rights.46

Gig Work and Regulation: The Issues

Stanford persuasively situates gig work alongside the putting-out system, effec-
tively subcontracting to workers as contractors of the guilds, with deliveries, ser-
vices, and driving cars replacing the weaving and spinning guilds of the past.47 The
putting-out system was supported by an at-call labor supply, insecurity of tenure,
surplus labor conditions, and an absence of rights and entitlements. Stanford sug-
gests that the trend toward contingent and precarious employment is a return to
an earlier employment regime.48
While technology is central to gig work, it is also supported by surplus labor
conditions, an absence of rights and regulations, and a belief that it constitutes
a second job or supports students in their studies. As Stanford suggests, the rise
of gig work and other forms of contingent employment reflect lax enforcement
of labor regulations, outdated or ambiguous labor regulations, or the suggestion
that workers are self-employed contractors who do not qualify for employment
standards or protections.49 However, it is not only minimum employment condi-
tions that are avoided, but also a range of other regulations linked to the standard
employment model including occupational health and safety measures, taxation,
and social security. By opening up gaps in the system of employment standards
and regulation, contingent employment regulations such as those associated with
gig work also open up gaps in other systems of regulation linked to employment.
Stewart and Stanford suggest a number of alternatives to improving or
extending the regulation of gig work.50 The five alternatives they propose are: 1)
confirm and enforce existing employment laws; 2) clarify the uncertainty and
ambiguity around employment arrangements associated with gig work; 3) create
a new category of independent worker; 4) establish rights for all workers rather
than just employees; and 5) and re-conceptualize the meaning of an employer.

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 Gig Work and the Fourth Industrial Revolution

They briefly discuss the possibilities and the problems associated with each of
the potential policy developments. Despite the limitations that are present with
existing labor regulations, they suggest that there is an imperative to re-examine
existing employment legislation, clarify ambiguous employment arrangements, and
strengthen employee rights and benefits, and hence a combination of approaches
is called for.
Minter outlines a case study in Australia where an online employment platform
(AirTasker) negotiated an agreement with unions to ensure that workers employed
on the platform had access to minimum employment standards, including rates
of pay.51 This suggests that collective engagement with online platform providers
is possible. However, the evidence suggests that this is the exception and that the
vast majority of gig workers remain unprotected by virtue of their contingent and
ambiguous employment status.
One of the main areas of contention and public protest is around Uber drive-
share arrangements. There have been publicized protests across the globe, almost
on a daily basis, by the taxi industry that objects to what it sees as the deteriora-
tion in pay and profits. In addition, the taxi industry is concerned by the loss of
value of its licenses as a result of Uber and other online providers, such as Lyft,
whom they see as not complying to the regulations governing taxis.52,53,54,55 This
has, if anything, generated collective solidarity in the taxi industry and promoted
calls for minimum conditions and standard regulations across the sector, including
for Uber. In turn, Uber drivers have protested across many cities against what they
see as Uber unilaterally reducing pay and conditions.56 Similar protests have been
conducted by delivery drivers against online providers such as Deliveroo and Uber
Eats that are accused of unilaterally cutting wages and conditions.57 If anything,
the digital disruption has generated a drive for collective conditions matched by
collective action in industries that traditionally have had few collective employ-
ment standards.
Hence, the emergence of the digital economy and gig work requires a reorienta-
tion of labor laws and employment regulations that were developed in the context
of a different industrial epoch and with a different conceptualization of work,
employment, and the workplace.58 In their conclusion to the discussion of the
implications of labor regulation, Stewart and Stanford suggest that

…without adjusting and strengthening labor regulations and safety nets to

reflect new practices of gig work, the prospect of building an inclusive, fair
labor market—already challenged by the preponderance of insecure, pre-
carious employment forms—will be set back all the more. Active, innovative
strategies of labor regulation are essential if the positive potential embodied
in new digital technologies is to be reflected in improved human welfare.59

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Alex de Ruyter, Martyn Brown, and John Burgess

Gig Work, 4IR, and Future Work

On one level, gig work is a manifestation of the opportunities and challenges
generated by the platform economy. On another, as emphasized by Stanford, it
represents a variation of past working arrangements associated with an earlier
industrial epoch.60 Additionally, it also adds to the list of emerging ambiguous and
contingent employment arrangements that challenge the standard employment
norm and the associated assumptions and regulations. As Neufeind et al. suggest,
it is time for a fundamental restructuring of many of the regulations surrounding
work, workplaces, taxation, and welfare.61 As in the past, the gig economy is linked
to a large and available labor pool, with low barriers to entry, the assignment of
risks to the workers, and ambiguity over employment status that then impacts
the application of regulations across work, income, and welfare. The challenge is
that development in contingent work, not only associated with the gig economy,
but also in temporary work, agency work, zero-hours contracts, and casual work,
cumulatively generates large gaps in the regulatory system and problems across
related areas, such as taxation and welfare.
In the case of gig work and early applications of technology that impacted
work, it is not the technology per se that is the problem, but how it is applied
and how it exposes gaps in coverage of current regulatory regimes. With gig work,
the process of this involves forms of intermediation through platforms that are
remotely owned and operated. The process generates ambiguities around worker
status, employee status, the workplace, and jurisdiction, such as when it may not
be clear who the employer is. This has arisen in the case of food delivery, for
example, in which it is unclear whether the employer is the consumer, the owner
of the platform, the supplier of food, or in some cases the franchisee or the sub-
contractor of labor. At the end of the process, a delivery agent/employee/contractor
is delivering meals, but in the transaction, there may be multiple intermediaries
receiving shares of the value-added. Who is responsible if there are delays in
delivery, the order is incorrect, the agent is involved in an accident, or the customer
is dissatisfied with the quality of the food?
Addressing gig work also requires recognition of the problems and challenges
faced in transitional labor markets. Despite large investments in tertiary educa-
tion and a workforce with tertiary education across developing economies, the
problem of youth unemployment, high rates of youth underemployment, and long
transition periods from graduation to regular employment have become the norm
across economies.62 From the patchy evidence it appears that gig workers are pre-
dominantly young and engaged in study or in job search while holding multiple
part-time and temporary jobs, many linked to gig work. Does gig work lead to a
career and is it part of a sustainable career path? Once again, the available evidence

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 Gig Work and the Fourth Industrial Revolution

suggests that it is a fill-in, part of a process of irregular and insecure employment

until regular work is accessed.
The transitional labor market challenges the context of structural and tech-
nological change impacting on work and careers, suggesting that there is a need
to re-examine the relationship between education, credentials, employment, and
careers.63,64 An educated workforce that is unemployed and underemployed repre-
sents wasted resources, lost investment, and income and welfare challenges. Gig
work—represented as a new opportunity with many advantages—is another form
of employment ambiguity and insecurity.65 If gig work is to become a new norm,
then there is an argument to be made for improving the work-life trajectories of
such workers. That is, if workers are easy to dismiss, then the state should have
recourse to create a welfare net secure enough for them between periods of work
and to improve skills and employability. Thus, life-long learning, improved net-
working and constructive relationships between education and employers, and
recognition of prior learning and experience must all be considered.66,67
Finally, there is the greater challenge of dealing with multinational corpora-
tions that can cloak their activities through offshore and holding companies,
franchisees, and intermediaries to undermine local and national regulations. The
ability to shuffle funds to minimize tax payments is an obvious example that the
cloak of globalization provides. The process extends to labor regulation through
being able to construct employment arrangements that evade local regulation—
for example, offshoring and self-employment—or using ambiguous employment
arrangements that make it difficult not only to determine employment status, but
employer status as well. Gig work captures the process of regulatory subversion
that has been emerging in many developing economies over the past three decades;
it is not technologically driven, but is supported by porous and outdated regula-
tions, and flimsy systems of monitoring and enforcement.

Alex de Ruyter is a professor at Birmingham City University and serves as Director of its
Center for Brexit Studies. De Ruyter focuses his research experience and academic engage-
ment in the areas of globalization, regional economic development, labor market, and social
exclusion issues. He has published more than 60 academic outputs in leading national and
international economic journals and has been the recipient of research funding, including being
an investigator in an ESRC-funded study on the effects on subsequent employment experience
of workers from MG Rover after plant closures in 2005. He has undertaken numerous media
interviews and is currently conducting research on the likely impact of Brexit on the UK auto-
motive supply chain in addition to exploring working in the gig economy. De Ruyter is also a
board member of the Regional Studies Association.

journal of international affairs | 47

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Alex de Ruyter, Martyn Brown, and John Burgess

Martyn Brown is Senior Lecturer in Organization Studies and coordinating director of

post-graduate framework degrees at Birmingham City University. Brown has a background in
engineering consultancy and events management in the voluntary sector. He also has consider-
able experience in the music industry from which he was able to draw in co-authoring The Gig
Economy with Alex de Ruyter (forthcoming). His current lecturing activities include organi-
zation studies, research philosophy, and business ethics. His research interests center around
meaning in the workplace and the notion of meaningful work in the 21st century.

John Burgess is a professor of Human Resource Management at RMIT University in

Melbourne, Australia. His current research projects include those focusing on human-resource
development across sectors in Indonesia, the implications for the human resource profession of
the Fourth Industrial Revolution, and the transition from education to employment. He is
an associate editor of Personnel Review, an area editor for Economics and Labour Relations
Review, and an external assessor for the Irish Research Council.

NOTES

1  Klaus Schwab, “The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What It Means and How to Respond,” Foreign
Affairs (12 December 2015).
2  AI Group Workforce Development, “The Emergence of the Gig Economy” (Thought Leader Paper,
Education and Policy Team: August 2016).
3   Jim Stanford, “The Resurgence of Gig Work: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives,” The Economic

and Labour Relations Review 28, no. 3 (August 2017), 382–401.

4   Jacques Bughin et al., “Skill Shift: Automation and the Future of the Workforce” (discussion
paper, McKinsey Global Institute, McKinsey and Company: 2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/
media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/future%20of%20organizations/skill%20shift%20automa-
tion%20and%20the%20future%20of%20the%20workforce/mgi-skill-shift-automation-and-future-of-
the-workforce-may-2018.ashx.
5  Donald Hislop et al., “Impact of Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and Automation Technologies on
Work” (Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, London: 2017).
6   Stanford (2017).
7  Alex De Ruyter and Martyn Brown, “The Gig Economy: Old Wine in a New Label?” (Newcastle-
upon-Tyne: Agenda Publishing, forthcoming).
8   Gerhard Bosch, “Towards a New Standard Employment Relationship in Western Europe,” British
Journal of Industrial Relations 42, no. 4 (December 2004), 617–36.
9   De Ruyter and Brown (forthcoming).
10 Kate Minter, “Negotiating Labour Standards in the Gig Economy: Airtasker and Unions New
South Wales,” Economic and Labour Relations Review 28, no. 3 (August 2017), 438–54.
11  De Ruyter and Brown (forthcoming).
12  Valerio De Stefano, “The Rise of the ‘Just-in-Time Workforce’: On-Demand Work, Crowd-Work
and Labour Protection in the ‘Gig-Economy’” (Conditions of Work and Employment Series Report,
no. 71, International Labor Organization (ILO), Geneva: 2016).
13 Jamie Peck and Niki Theodore, “Contingent Chicago: Restructuring the Spaces of Temporary
Labor,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25, no. 3 (September 2001), 471–96.
14  Antonio Aloisi, “Commoditized Workers: Case Study Research on Labor Law Issues Arising from
a Set of ‘On-Demand/Gig Economy’ Platforms,” Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 37, no. 3 (2016),

48

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 Gig Work and the Fourth Industrial Revolution

653–90.
15 Robert Habans, “Is California’s Gig Economy Growing? Exploring Trends in Independent
Contracting” (UCLA Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Los Angeles: 2016).
16  “Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements Summary,” Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) (2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nr0.htm.
17   Aloisi (2016), 659.
18   Aloisi (2016).
19  “Electronically Mediated Employment,” BLS (2018), https://www.bls.gov/cps/electronically-
mediated-employment.htm.
20  Lawrence F. Katz and Alan B. Krueger, “The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements
in the United States, 1995-2015” (working paper, no. 603, Princeton University Industrial Relations
Section, Princeton University, Princeton NJ: 2016).
21  Care.com Official Website, https://www.care.com/en-gb/?rx=Online|CareUSSplash|General|Gen
eral.
22  Rebecca Smith and Sarah Leberstein, “Rights on Demand: Ensuring Workplace Standards and
Worker Security in the On-Demand Economy” (National Employment Law Project, New York: 2015),
3, https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/Rights-On-Demand-Report.pdf.
23 Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1999).
24 Lauren Bridges, “Flexible as Freedom? The Dynamics of Creative Industry Work and the Case
Study of the Editor in Publishing,” New Media and Society (February 2017), 5.
25  AI Group Workforce Development (2016).
26  Andrew Hill, “When McKinsey Met Uber: The Gig Economy Comes to Consulting,” Financial
Times (October 2016).
27   Daniel Pink, Free Agent Nation: How America’s New Independent Workers Are Transforming the Way We
Live (New York: Warner Books, Hachette Book Group, 2001).
28   Gideon Kunda, Stephen Barley, and James Evans, “Why Do Contractors Contract? The
Experience of Highly Skilled Technical Professionals in a Contingent Labor Market,” Industrial and
Labor Relations Review 55, no. 2 (February 2002), 234–61.
29  Ian Kirkpatrick et al., “‘Practising What They Preach?’ The Disconnect Between the State as
User and the State as Regulator of Employment Agencies,” International Journal of Human Resource
Management 22, no. 18 (November 2011), 3711–26.
30  Leah Vosko, “Precarious Employment: Towards an Improved Understanding of Labour Market
Insecurity” in Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in Canada, Leah Vosko, ed.,
(Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2006).
31  Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (New

York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).

32  Werner Eichhorst et al., “How Big is the Gig? Assessing the Preliminary Evidence on the Effects
of Digitalization on the Labor Market” (Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Policy Paper, no. 117,
IZA, Bonn: 2016).
33  De Stefano (2016).
34  Stanford (2017).
35 Miriam Cherry and Antonio Aloisi, “‘Dependent Contractors’ In the Gig Economy: A Comparative
Approach,” American University Law Review 66, no. 3 (2017), 635–89.
36   Stanford (2017), 383.
37   Lauren Bridges (2017), 1–17.
38   Ibid.
39   De Ruyter and Brown (forthcoming).

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Alex de Ruyter, Martyn Brown, and John Burgess

40  Cherry and Aloisi (2017), 635–89.

41  “Non-Standard Employment around the World: Understanding Challenges, Shaping Prospects”
(ILO, Geneva: 2016), 98.
42 Ibid.

43  Bridges (2017), 6.

44  Stanford (2017).
45  Iain Campbell and John Burgess, “Patchy Progress? Two Decades of Research on Precariousness
and Precarious Work in Australia,” Labour & Industry 28, no. 1 (January 2018), 48–67.
46  Stanford (2017).
47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Andrew Stewart and Jim Stanford, “Regulating Work in the Gig Economy: What Are the
Options?,” The Economic and Labour Relations Review 28, no. 3 (August 2017), 420–37.
51  Kate Minter (2017).
52 “Melbourne Taxis Warn of More Uber Protests at Tullamarine Airport,” ABC News, 15 August
2017.
53  “Spanish Taxis Block Roads in ‘Anti-Uber’ Protest,” BBC News, July 2018.
54 Patrick Grafton-Green, “London Taxi Protest: Black Cab Drivers Stage Demo Against TfL and
Uber,” London Standard, 15 January 2018.
55  Deborah Kyvrikosaios and Alkis Konstantinidis, “Taxi Drivers Protest Against Uber ‘Invasion’
in Greece,” Reuters News, 6 March 2018.
56  “Uber Drivers Log Off in Australia-Wide Protest Against Low Fares,” Guardian Australia, August

2018.
57 Ashleigh Raper and Lily Mayers, “Delivery Riders Protest Against Uber, Deliveroo, Foodora Pay
Cuts,” ABC News, 14 March 2018.
58  Stanford (2017).
59  Stewart and Stanford (2017), 432.
60  Stanford (2017).
61  Max Neufeind, Florian Ranft, and Jacqueline O’Reilly, “Political Realities and a Reform Agenda
for the Digital Age,” Work in the Digital Age, Max Neufeind, Florian Ranft, and Jacqueline O’Reilly,
eds., (London: Roman and Littlefield, 2018), 537–69.
62  “Global Employment Trends for Youth 2015. Scaling Up Investments in Decent Jobs for Youth”
(ILO, Geneva: 2015).
63 Ibid.

64  Alan Montague, Julia Connell, and Barbara Mumme, “Graduate Employability in Australia: Time
for a VET and HE Overhaul?,” Transitions from Education to Work: Workforce Ready Challenges in the Asia
Pacific, Roslyn Cameron, Subas Dhakal, and John Burgess, eds., (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 166–87.
65  AI Group Workforce Development (2016).
66  Montague, Connell, and Mumme (2018).
67  Miloš Kankaraš et al., eds., Skills Matter: Further Results from the Survey of Adult Skills (Paris: OECD
Skills Studies, OECD Publishing, 2016), http://www.theewf.org/uploads/pdf/OECD%20Skills%20
Studies.compressed.pdf.

50

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