Technology in Society 71 (2022) 102086

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Technology in Society
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/techsoc

Employment 5.0: The work of the future and the future of work
Oluwaseun Kolade a, *, Adebowale Owoseni b
a
Centre for Enterprise and Innovation, Leicester Castle Business School, De Montfort University, Leicester UK, LE1 9BH, UK
b
School of Computer Science and Informatics, Faculty of Computing Engineering and Media, De Montfort University, Leicester, UK

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This systematic review brings together the collection of recent scholarly outputs on the disruptive impact of
Industry 4.0 digital transformation on the work. This paper draws from a sample of 68 outputs from 2011 to 2022. We
Industry 5.0 identify three key theoretical perspectives: socio-technical systems theory, skill-biased technological change, and
Digital transformation
political economy of digital transformation. The articles provide complementary insights on cross-cutting themes
Artificial intelligence
Employment
of technological unemployment, wage inequality and job polarization. They also highlight often conflicting
Work views about technology ownership, work-less utopia, education reforms and the imperative of human-centricity
in appropriation of technology. Drawing on the findings across the whole spectrum of theoretical and analytical
perspectives, we offer critical reflections about the factors that will define the work of the future, in terms of
skills, creativity and opportunities for autonomous workers. We also discuss the political and institutional pro­
cesses that will shape the future of work. Finally, we offer recommendations for future research and policy
interventions.

1. Introduction
Over the past decade, much of the conversation about the future of
the global economy has centered around the impact of digital trans­
formation on industries, businesses, and governance. In line with this,
scholars and practitioners have argued that the trajectory of global
economic growth has transitioned from one characterized by market
economy to one defined by knowledge economy. Technology, it is
argued, is the single most important driver of the new knowledge
economy. The new era of growth has been variously described as the
fourth industrial revolution, Industry 4.0, and the Industrial Internet of
Things, among others. Digital transformation entails the integration of
the digital and physical world [1], and “the digitisation and integration
of the entire value chain of the lifecycle of products” [2]; pp. 3).
While there has been much discussion on how technology will shape
the future in terms of industrial growth and productivity [3], more
recently, scholars and practitioners have given increasing attention to
the human impact of digital transformation, including the impact on
employment. Scholars have highlighted, in particular, that occupations
with high levels of routine tasks are especially at risk of replacement by
computers [4], and that up to half of existing jobs are at risk of being
automated within the next decade [5]. These will create a new frontier
of changing employment profiles, skills instability, and the imperative
for re-skilling and up-skilling the workforce [6]. Others have noted that
digital transformation has exacerbated wage inequality by dispropor­
tionately benefitting occupations at the core of information flows. In
other words, digitalization has precipitated resource and information
asymmetry in favour of structurally powerful occupations who have the
technological competence and strategic positioning to reorganise,
aggregate and transfer data; or to translate, interpret, and manipulate
the data [7].
However, others argued that the negative impacts of digital trans­
formation on employment are overstated, because computers will not
outsmart complex knowledge networks [8]. This, it is suggested, is
partly associated with the limitations inherent in occupation-based
approach to Industry 4.0 studies. One study found that when tasks,
rather than occupations, are used as the unit of analysis, the percentage
of German employees at risk of being replaced by automation reduces
from 47% to 15% [9]. Furthermore, a number of scholars have argued
that automation should be embraced, not feared, as a channel through
which society can collectively achieve a work-less future, or altogether
abolish work in a post-work utopia [10]. More recently, stakeholders led
by policy makers and scholars in Europe and Japan, have argued for a
new paradigm shift from Industry 4.0 to Industry 5.0 (and the accom­
panying Society 5.0), defined by three key elements: human-centricity,
sustainability, and resilience [11,12]. This, it is urged, shift the focus

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: seun.kolade@dmu.ac.uk (O. Kolade).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2022.102086
Received 21 March 2022; Received in revised form 27 June 2022; Accepted 9 August 2022
Available online 21 August 2022
0160-791X/© 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
O. Kolade and A. Owoseni
from the question of what humans can do with technology, to what
technology can do for humans and the planet [13–15].
These broad range of contributions to the discussion about the future
of work, draws from different, sometimes competing theoretical and
analytical perspectives [4,16,17]. Thus, our paper seeks to bring this
body of work together in a systematic review to map the various theo­
retical perspectives and frameworks against key findings, with a view to
informing future directions for scholarly engagement and policy in­
terventions. In pursuance of this, we raise two main research questions:
1. In what ways have digital technologies transformed occupations
across sectors of the economy, in terms of changing tasks and new
skills required to accomplish tasks?
2. How will digital transformation shape the future of work under in­
dustry 4.0 and beyond?
The first research question focuses on the state of knowledge about
how digital innovations have shaped the new division of labour between
humans and machines, the technological drivers of this change, the new
skills required to work with machines, and the impact on productivity
and economic growth, among others [18]. The second question focuses
on the future, about which at least three distinct possibilities have been
suggested: 1) mass unemployment resulting from computers replacing
jobs at a much faster rate than people can acquire new skills; 2) polarised
job market resulting from replacement of white collar jobs; and 3) mass
employment in the digital future, driven by a new, revamped education
system [5]. We are mindful of potential hybrid of two or more possi­
bilities mentioned.
Given the foregoing, we proceed in the present paper as follows: first
we outline the approach for the systematic review, including a summary
of the databases consulted, a description of search words used, and an
overview of inclusion and exclusion criteria used in the iterative search.
Next we undertake a mapping of major theoretical perspectives and
analytical frameworks employed by the various authors, including a
critical reflection on the strengths and weaknesses of the frameworks-in
terms of their explanatory powers, and the range and depth of issues
covered. This is followed by a thematic outline of the emergent themes
across the selected studies, including areas of convergence, divergence,
and intersections. We then proceed with a discussion bringing all the
findings together and interrogating the gaps in knowledge to inform
recommendations for future research.
2. Methodology
We here outline the research approach by providing some justifica­
tion for the systematic literature review methodology. We then describe
the rigorous process that underpins our findings and contributions to
debates on the work of the future and the future of work.
2.1. Systematic literature review
Systematic Literature Review (SLR) is a research method that ag­
gregates and synthesizes extant knowledge by gathering, summarizing,
interpreting, explaining, and integrating literature in a specified
knowledge domain [19]. The interdisciplinary nature of our research
suggests a flexible and proven research approach that is applicable to
different knowledge domains. In our context, we adapt the
plan-execute-report procedure [16]. Firstly, we developed the literature
review procedure in alignment with [20]; which posits reproducibility,
transparency, clarity, focus, unbiased judgment, and well-defined scope
as important attributes of rigorous SLR.
Secondly, at the execution and reporting phases, we employed a
deductive approach and evaluated the literature review under two
predefined themes: theoretical perspectives and empirical findings. The
pieces of evidence and link between the predefined themes in literature
uniquely reinforced our arguments and suggest how digital
2
Technology in Society 71 (2022) 102086
transformation could shape the future of work in the industry 4.0 and
beyond. Fig. 1 and Table 1 captures the SLR procedure. The stages of the
SLR procedure annotated by numbers 1–10 in Fig. 1.0 were described in
Table 1.0.
2.2. Data sources
This study considers the scholarly outputs and reports as the “data­
set” and sourced the data from specific online platforms where literature
could be extracted [22]: p157). Having established the focus of the
problem domain and research questions, we identified 12 journal outlets
that publish empirical research (see Table 1.0, stage 2) that contributes
to the literature on industry 4,0 and its influence on work and workers.
Complementing these sources were three databases, namely, Scopus,
Science direct, and IEE explore. These databases publish interdisci­
plinary research outputs that cut across information technology and
social sciences.
Furthermore, we searched the databases and journal websites using
the following search strings: digital transformation, Fourth Industrial
Revolution, Industry 4.0, Industry 5.0, Artificial Intelligence, Robotics,
Remote working, and distance work. The search focused on Title, Abstract,
and Keywords or potential articles. Besides, we delimited the search
outcome by setting the publication year from 2011 to 2022, as well as
specifying the type of publication to include journal papers, conference
papers, and reports. The acronyms of some of the search strings such as
4IR and AI were substituted to enhance the search outcome. The liter­
ature search activities were split between the two authors and the
resulting 149 papers were harvested through Mendeley – a free refer­
encing management tool for storing and organising literature.
2.3. Data screening and analysis
According to Ref. [19]; the data screening phase established the in­
clusion or exclusion of specific articles in the final literature analysis.
Firstly, 202 papers retrieved from the search activity were screened for
duplications, English as language of publication, and predatory ten­
dencies by referencing Beall’s list [21]. The screening led to the rejection
of half of the papers, leaving us with 101 articles. Still on the preliminary
inspection, we use the “first-pass” of “three-pass” approach proposed by
Keshav (2010) to assess the suitability of the screened articles, and this
led to further rejection of 33 papers. At the end, we had 68 articles in the
final selection, and this pool of papers helped us to make sense of the
research problem. For clarity, “first-pass” is a swift reading of title, ab­
stract, introduction, sectional headlines, and conclusion of a paper to
make sense of the context, correctness and contributions of the study
reported therein. In this case, the papers that do not reasonably make
contributions to the subject of digital transformation, remote work, in­
dustry 5.0 or 4.0 and enabling technologies were excluded. The authors
exchanged their lists of excluded papers and reasons for exclusion were
independently revalidated.
Moreover, the two authors independently read through the papers to
fully understand concepts presented, virtually re-create them, and made
notes that summarized each paper along with the following headlines in
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet: citation, theoretical perspective, method­
ical approach, the primary focus, and key findings. This painstaking
“data” reduction activity and thematic analysis enabled the authors to
scrutinise the relevance and inclusion of some papers in the final liter­
ature evaluation. Conflicting opinions between the two authors were
discussed as part of the decision process to exclude 33 more papers. This
further enhances the reliability of the SLR procedure and present 68
papers for final analysis..
The spreadsheet was the secondary dataset used to precipitate the
thematic literature analysis. The authors independently and deductively
evaluated contents of a spreadsheet that has reduced data of 68 research
papers1. While making sense of the literature, additional notes were
taken, and the inputs on the spreadsheet were updated. We mainly
O. Kolade and A. Owoseni
Fig. 1. The Systematic Literature Review (SLR) process (Source: authors).
considered all the entries in the “theoretical perspectives” and “key
findings” and sub-themes that emerged from the analysis were noted.
Although, there are instances where a few papers seem to project more
than one theoretical perspective, in this situation we read the paper
again, and identified the dominant theoretical approach. Thereafter,
notes were exchanged, and the deductive perspectives of the author
were re-validated. This evaluation process revealed three sub-themes
under theoretical viewpoints and five sub-themes aligned with empir­
ical findings. The emerging thematic perspective was conceptualized
using diagrams created with draw.io. There were three iterations be­
tween evaluation and conceptualization, where we had to re-consult or
revisit the positioning and contributions of a few papers to gain more
clarity, develop reasonable concepts and arguments. We present the
distributions of analyzed papers along the themes, finding and
methodical approach in Table 2..
3. Theoretical perspectives
In this paper, we sought to grapple with the different theoretical
perspectives scholars were bringing to bear in their works. This
approach enables us to map how the theoretical and analytical frame­
works shape the contributions of scholars to cross-cutting themes. It also
provides a window to understanding relatively new issues highlighted
by some scholars. Thus, we identified three theoretical perspectives: 1)
socio-technical systems theory, 2) skill-biased technological change, and
3) political economy of automation and digital transformation. We bring
these together in an integrated conceptual framework that highlights the
distinct contributions to the overarching theme of the future of work,
which we termed Employment 5.0 (Fig. 3). With regard to socio-technical
systems theory, we highlight how technological change needs to grapple
with human factors that shape and are shaped by it. Skill-biased tech­
nological change maps the changing skills profile of current and future
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Technology in Society 71 (2022) 102086
occupations as a result of digital transformation. Finally, the political
economy of digital transformation illuminates political and policy fac­
tors that underpins the related issues of technology ownership, precarity
and the gig economy, and the prospects of a work-less future. The
summary of findings are provided in Fig. 4.
3.1. Socio-technical systems theory
One of the popular assumptions underlying the emergence of In­
dustry 4.0 is that digital transformation will precipitate increasing de­
grees of automation that would in turn lead to less and less need for
human interaction in a future of worker-less production. However,
scholars have argued that digital transformation will not remove the
need for human interactions, but rather change the way humans interact
with computers-both while accomplishing tasks or using services and
products in the future. In other words, technological advancement will
always be accompanied by impacts and consequences for human. Thus,
socio-technical systems theory was proposed as a framework to analyse
social (human–related) and technical (non-human) factors which come
together in a complex interaction to create a performance [16]. Thus,
the socio-technical systems framework has been developed as a
six-dimensional structure comprising: 1) People 2) Infrastructure 3)
Technology 4) Culture 5) Process/procedures 6) Goals [41]. It offers an
organisation-centric view of how these various components interact in a
complex system [60]. defined the socio-technical approach as “the
participative, multidisciplinary study and improvement of how jobs,
single organisations, networks, and ecosystems function internally and
in relation to their environmental context, with a special focus on the
mutual interactions of the entity’s … value-creation processes”. [60];
pp. 2).
The socio-technical systems framework is therefore an effective tool
to analyse technological innovations, not as single element, but as a part
O. Kolade and A. Owoseni Technology in Society 71 (2022) 102086

Table 1
The Systematic literature review (SLR) process description (source: fieldwork).
Stage Description
1 The study sought to answer two research questions (RQ) as follows:
RQ1: In what ways have digital technologies transformed occupations across
sectors of the economy, in terms of changing tasks and new skills required to
accomplish tasks?
RQ2: How will digital transformation shape the future of work in the
industry 5.0?
2 We selected 12 journals and 3 databases
3 Identified search criteria which include the following search strings and
other search criteria:
Search strings in title, abstract, and keywords:
⋅ “Digital transformation” OR “Digital platform”
⋅ “Industry 4.0” OR “Industry 5.0” OR “Fourth Industrial Revolution” OR
“4IR” OR “Fifth Industrial Revolution” OR “5IR”
⋅ “Artificial Intelligence” OR “AI” or “Robotics”
⋅ “Remote working”, OR “Distant work” OR “Remote work”
Date range:
⋅ Published between 2011 and 2022
Type of paper:
⋅ Journal paper, conference paper, and reports
4 Searched identified journals and databases, example of search statement is
shown below:
“TLE-ABS-KEY ((“digital platforms " OR “digital transformation ") AND
(“industry 4.0" OR “fourth industrial revolution” OR “4IR” OR “fifth industrial
revolution” OR “industry 5.0") AND (“Artificial Intelligence” OR “AI” OR
“Robotics " OR “automation”)) OR (“remote working " OR “distant work” OR
“remote work”)) AND PUBYEAR > 2010 AND PUBYEAR < 2023”
202 papers were extracted from the search exercise
5 101 papers were excluded because of our exclusion criteria that include
⋅ Language other than English
⋅ Presence on Beall’s list of predatory publications [21]
⋅ Duplications
6 The search results were validated independently validated by authors.
Conflicting opinions were pushed forward, and consensus reached. The goal
was to ensure the high reliability of the extracted literature relative to the
research goals.
33 more papers were excluded resulting from the validation activities.
7 Motivated by the research questions, we pre-identified two broad themes:
theoretical perspectives and empirical findings. We read and evaluated
abstracts and contents of the final 68 papers with this resolve in mind.
We first read through the abstract and contents of the 68 papers that made it
the final selection; in the process, we identified three sub-themes across
theoretical perspectives and Empirical findings. The categorisations that
produce these were summarized in Table 3
8 Using the deductive procedure, 3 sub-themes were identified under
theoretical perspectives and 3 sub-themes were identified under empirical
findings. Moreover, we summarized the key findings from all 68 papers (see
Table 3)
9 For clarity, we developed Figs. 2 and 3 that conceptualize the problem
domain drawing from the outcome of our thematic analysis
10 Section 5 and 6 discussed our findings, the implications, and
recommendations
of a structure of interrelated components. These include a consideration
of institutional, organisational and social innovations that should
accompany technological innovations, in order to optimise the benefits,
regulate the growth, and mitigate potential side effects [47]. For
example, while the technologies around the Internet of Things (IoT)
have undergone significant development within the past decades, there
has been comparatively little development on the equally, if not more so,
human components and implications of IoT. The socio-technical issues
associated with IoT includes standards, security, and privacy [61].
With regard to the impact of Industry 4.0 on employment, the socio-
technical systems framework enables scholars and stakeholders to cap­
ture the dynamics of human-machine interactions in the Industry 4.0
system, and the impacts of this on changing tasks and new skills profiles
required. These include new skills to use technologies to communicate
between humans, machines and products [48]; new communication
roles to support the integration of customers with digital products; and
the requirement for humans in Industry 4.0 to do more mental and less
physical work [42,43]. In other words, the socio-technical framework
provides policy makers with relevant information to prepare for
employment challenges and opportunities arising from digital
transformation.
Other variants of the socio-technical systems have sought to link
together human factors and ergonomics (HF/E approach) in the analysis
of work and cyber-systems in Industry 4.0 [46]. This framework high­
lights the importance of, and interaction between, physical, cognitive
and organisational domains. Overall, the socio-technical systems
approach highlights the intrinsic incompleteness of technical systems,
and how they must be continually open to design and re-design in
relation to human engagement [44].
3.2. Skill-biased technological change
Skill-biased theory seeks to explain how the rapid adoption of
computer technology changes the tasks performed by workers as well as
the demands for human skills. The framework is based on two related
premises: that computers substitute for workers in routine tasks that
follow explicit rules that can be fed into computer programs; and com­
plements workers in non-routine, complex tasks which has no explicit
rules and requires more flexibility and creativity [24]. This framework
has been used to explain the emergence of labour polarisations, which is
due in part to the reduced cost of automating routine tasks that can be
codified into computer programs. Among others, the framework enables
researchers to use tasks, rather than occupations themselves, as the units
of analysis in studies examining the impact of digital transformations on
the labour market [9]. This is because occupations comprise multiple,
not single, tasks. Thus, in this framework, tasks are classified into two
main categories: routine and non-routine. Within these categories they
are further sub-divided into manual and non-manual; cognitive and
interactive tasks.
Another skill-biased classification model, proposed by Ref. [4];
classified tasks into three categories: perception and manipulation tasks;
creative intelligence; and social intelligence. Perception and manipula­
tion tasks require finger and manual dexterity, and the ability to work in

Table 2
Emerging sub-themes and literature distributions across these themes (Source: authors).
Methodology Qualitative Quantitative Mixed Total

p f P f p f p f

Theme 1: Theoretical Perspectives

Socio-technical systems 22.06 15.00 0.00 0.00 7.35 5.00 29.41 20.00
Skill-biased technological change 35.29 24.00 1.47 1.00 1.47 1.00 38.24 26.00
Political economy of automation and digital transformation 26.47 18.00 2.94 2.00 2.94 2.00 32.35 22.00
Total 83.82 57.00 4.41 3.00 11.77 8.00 100.00 68.00
Theme 2: Research Outcomes
Technological Unemployment 36.76 25.00 0.00 0.00 2.94 2.00 39.70 27.00
Job Polarization 27.94 19.00 1.47 1.00 4.41 3.00 33.83 23.00
Skill-based Education 19.12 13.00 2.94 2.00 4.41 3.00 26.47 18.00
Total 83.82 57.00 4.41 3.00 11.77 8.00 100.00 68.00

*p = Percent * f = Frequency or count.

4
O. Kolade and A. Owoseni
Table 3
Thematic overview of findings.
Theoretical Key findings
perspectives
Skill-biased 1. Industry 4.0 technologies
technological comprise physical and digital
change components. These digital
technologies increasingly
substitute for low-skill routine
tasks at progressively lower
costs. As a result, over time,
human labour has re-allocated
to more complex, non-routine
occupations.
2.Digital transformation not
only make tasks substitutable
but also offers new products
and services to the market. The
industrial performance of
Industry 4.0 technologies can
be assessed using three metrics:
product, operational and side-
effects
3. Human labour has so far
prevailed due to its inventive
capacity and new skills
acquisition. While
computerization is entering
more cognitive and affective
domains, social intelligence
and communication skills will
remain predominantly human
areas, and AI will not outsmart
complex knowledge work
because “knowing” is difficult
to code.
4.The economic impact of ICT
can be understood in terms of:
structural change in existing
industries, emergence of new
industries and manufacturing
systems such as 3D printing,
the location of production, and
the effects of education, labour
policies on employment
outcomes, and new forms of
economic activities often
referred to as the gig economy
or crowdwork
5. Digital transformations has
disproportionately benefited
high wage workers while
displacing low-skilled workers.
This has created mass
unemployment, greater
inequality and has increased
the gap between returns to
labour and returns to capital.
6. The emergence of service
robots and artificial general
tasks has extended the debate
about displacement of human
workers beyond areas of
manual routine work to non-
routine tasks.
7. In developed countries,
employees with IT system
knowledge that has been
gradually acquired over the
system’s lifecycle are
increasingly at risk of
replacement through
outsourcing.
8. Strategies that can help
schools and higher education
institutions re-design their
programmes to meet Industry
Technology in Society 71 (2022) 102086
Table 3 (continued )
Theoretical Key findings Authors
Authors perspectives
5.0 needs and opportunities: a)
[23,24]; Bai et al. (2020) lifelong learning and
[25–28]; transdisciplinary education; b)
sustainability, resilience and
human-centric design modules;
c)hands-on data fluency and
management; human agent-
machine interactions; and e)
creativity-focused fluency.
9. Supporting technologies for [15,39,40]; Kolade et al.
Industry 5.0 include: edge (2015)
[3,9] computing, digital twins,
collaborative robots, Internet
of everything, blockchains,
bionics, cyber-physical
systems, virtual reality, and
6G/beyond networks. Potential
applications include intelligent
healthcare, cloud
manufacturing, circular
[4,8]; Simon (2019); economy, supply chain
Wesche & Sonderegger management and
(2019). manufacturing production.
Socio-technical 1. The socio-technical systems [16,41,42]
systems framework comprises of six
elements: goals, people,
buildings/infrastructure,
technology, culture, processes/
procedures. Socio-technical
systems theory highlights the
impact of technologies on both
organisations and employees.
It also highlights how
[29–32] consumers engage in digital
ecosystems.
2.Industry 4.0 is not a single [43,44]
technology but an integrated
sociotechnical concept
bringing together
technological, social and
organisational aspects.
3.Technology does not advance [45,46]; Bayne & Parker
independently of human (2012).
agency, and its impacts are not
unavoidable. The future of
work will be shaped by
[5,7]; Nam (2019) [30, automated and collaborative
33]; (Nam, 2019) communication between
machines, humans and systems
replacing traditional
management, planning and
control activities.
4.Socio-technical systems [1,47]; Gfrank et al.
enables a more judicious (2019).
consideration of non-
Nam (2019) [34]; technological innovations that
should accompany
technological innovations. Non
technology enablers of industry
4.0, e.g. organisational
enablers and business models
need to be jointly implemented
Trusson & Woods (2017) in order for technology to bring
about major productivity gain.
5.Soft skills seem to be the new [48];
essential for the workforce of
the future, not least because
they distinguish humans from
machines.
6. Cyberslacking is a new O’Neil et al. (2014)
[35–38] phenomenon in office
environment in which
employees are distracted by
non-work internet browsing
(continued on next page)
5
O. Kolade and A. Owoseni
Table 3 (continued )
Theoretical Key findings
perspectives
when they should be
accomplishing work tasks.
7.Automation vs
augmentation: automation
involves handing over human
tasks to machine with little or
no further human involvement,
while augmentation is
conceived as a co-evolutionary
process in which humans learn
from machine and machine
from humans. This co-
evolution relationships are
essential to high performance
of human-machine teams.
8. The three defining elements
of Industry 5.0 are: human-
centricity, sustainability and
resilience. This shifts the focus
from what humans can do with
technology, to what technology
can do for humans. It
prioritises social and planetary
challenges, and highlights
circularity as a key imperative
of technological innovations
and the need for resilient
supply and value chains. These
are critical for achieving
sustainable development goals.
9. Five major themes of
Industry 5.0 address supply
chain evaluation and
optimization, enterprise
innovation and digitisation,
smart and sustainable
manufacturing, transformation
driven by IoT, AI, and Big Data,
and Human-machine
connectivity
Political economy 1. Capitalism gives to digital
of digital technologies a particular form,
transformation different from what obtains in
collectivist societies. Digital
technologies reinforce the class
antagonisms of capitalist
production. Capitalist
production is not necessarily
conducive to the expansion of
digital technologies.
2. Automation alone cannot
solve the problems of work
unless and until the question of
ownership is resolved. Under
capitalist ownership,
technology is seen as an
instrument for expanding
production and consumption,
while at the same time
exploiting and alienating
workers.
3. Implementation of universal
basic income and automation
can ease the compulsion to
work under the present
relations of production. This
post-work prospectus (PWP)
comprise 4 key elements: full
automation, reduction of the
working week, provision of
universal basic income, and the
diminishment of the work
ethic.
4. Governance and policy
framing should not be neutral
Technology in Society 71 (2022) 102086
Table 3 (continued )
Authors Theoretical Key findings Authors
perspectives
but rather absorbs the fourth
industrial revolution concept
[49–52] according to market
conforming logics that allow
government to limit its
responsibility for shaping the
future, while continuing to
herald its potential.
5. Three simultaneous tectonic [50]
shift accounting for the
changing world of work are: 1)
a demographic shift, including
an ageing population; 2)The
economic shift of digital
globalisation that creates
[11]; European massive global commodity
Commission (2021a); markets; 3)A technological
European Commission shift, driven by the internet,
(2021b); [12,13]. internet platforms, and bio-
Grabuskas et al. (2022); algorithmic capitalism.
[15]. 6. Industry 5.0 is not only Oriova (2021) [18,59],
important in terms of
personalization of products but
also with regard to
personalization of labour
relations with employees.
Personalization of labour
relations increases human
value, labour productivity
growth and employee trust
[2,53,54]. through human-machine
interactions. While Industry
4.0 is technology-driven,
Industry 5.0 is value-driven.
cramped work-spaces and awkward positions. Creative intelligence en­
tails originality-the ability to come up with new or unusual ideas to solve
problems; and aptitude in fine arts to compose and perform works of
[17,55] music, dance, visual arts, etc. Finally, social intelligence comprises so­
cial perceptiveness, negotiation and persuasion, among others. Given
the foregoing [4], found that perception and manipulation tasks fall
within the high-risk category that will be heavily substituted. On the
other hand, tasks related to creative and social intelligence are low risk
to substitution and replacement, because they tend to be non-routine
and less amenable to computer coding. Nevertheless, the pace of tech­
nological progress indicates that these categories of tasks are not entirely
[10]
immune to substitution. Already, there are sophisticated algorithms that
use pattern recognition to perform non-routine tasks, and robots with
enhanced senses and dexterity. Other scholars, extending the skill biased
approach, have proposed a model of routine-biased technological
change. This model seeks to distinguish routines from skills [27]. The
model enables scholars to locate specific points and tasks, even within
low-skilled jobs, where incidences of computer replacement are high.
Broadly speaking, routine tasks tend to be frequent in the middle of the
task and wage continuum of occupations. However, routine is a difficult
[56]; Srineck & Willaims
concept to pin down.
(2015); A new modification of the skill-biased technological change (SBTC)
approach is the class-based technological change (CBTC). The CBTC
framework, like the SBTC approach, begins with computer-based tech­
nology as the key driver that has transformed work into more
knowledge-intensive activity. However, while the SBTC highlights the
productivity-enhancing mechanism that accounts for polarization and
wage inequality across occupations and between tasks, the CBTC model
focuses on the power-enhancing mechanism that explains the differ­
ences among occupations with respect to their access to, and control of,
[12,57,58]. information on production processes [7]. The SBTC framework is based
on three underlying assumptions: 1.) Between-occupation earnings is an
outcome of social relationships among occupations; 2.) occupational
6
O. Kolade and A. Owoseni
Fig. 2. Profile of publications accessed in the systematic literature review (Source: authors).
power partly results from the location of occupations within the eco­
nomic system and production relations; and 3.) The resource advantage
of structurally powerful occupations gives them greater bargaining
power to obtain higher wages [7]. identified two main categories of
structurally powerful occupations at the core of information flows: those
“who have the technology to re-organise aggregate and transfer (Com­
puter programmer, information systems specialists), and those who
know how to translate, interpret, and manipulate the data (managers
and engineers)” (pp.10).
3.3. The political economy of automation and digital transformation
Several scholars have approached the subject of automation and
digital transformation from a critical theory perspective. Their contri­
butions can be summarized in two distinct but related strands. The first
is a critique of existing frameworks deployed by other scholars in the
analyses of the impact and future of digital transformation. In effect,
scholars like [17] argues that, rather than being neutral, digital tech­
nologies are products of unequal power-created and harnessed under
conditions in which power resides with capital, not labour. Under the
capitalist mode of production, the primary objective of digital technol­
ogies is the enhancement of surplus value, invariably to the detriment of
7
Technology in Society 71 (2022) 102086
human workers who would either be altogether replaced or pushed
down the pecking order in terms of wages and renumerations. Thus, the
analysis of the future and impact of digital technologies will not be
complete without grappling with the question of ownership [10,55].
Under a capitalist ownership, it is argued, technology is conceived as an
instrument for expansion of production and consumption, alongside
exploitation and alienation of workers.
After identifying what they consider to be the big flaws in the
existing analytical models, the critical theorists propose a different
framework beginning with shared or collective ownership of technol­
ogy. According to this perspective, technology is presented as a “posi­
tive” force that can liberate rather than enslave human workers. Thus,
full automation should be embraced as a route to a future of less and
better work, and more leisure. However, in order to achieve this, there is
need for fundamental reform and changes in ownership. In other words,
the future of work will be shaped not so much by technological change
as it is by the ownership of technology. Technology takes on distinctly
different roles and produces different impacts under collectivist
ownership, compared with capitalist ownership [55].
Other scholars have proposed a new Post-work-Prospectus (PWP)
that analyses the future of work within the rubrics of the relationships
between social production, social forms, and social relations that
O. Kolade and A. Owoseni
Fig. 3. Overview of theoretical perspectives (Source: authors).
Fig. 4. Summary of findings (Source: authors).
underpin work [56]. Under this framework, it is argued that escape from
work may not necessarily open the path to post-capitalism but may
indeed prevent it. This runs contrary to the narrative of technological
determinism prominent in the work of other scholars [50,57].
4. Findings
In the work-sphere, digital technologies have had significant and
often disruptive impacts on activities such as buying, selling, collabo­
rating, teaching, learning, and manufacturing. Following a detailed
analysis of 68 outputs, we identified three key themes: Technological
unemployment, job polarization and skill-based education, and we
created a narrative of how these themes interplay (See Fig. 3.).
4.1. Technological unemployment
Technology unemployment refers to the process of creative
8
Technology in Society 71 (2022) 102086
destruction through which new technologies, such as robotics, artificial
intelligence and 3-D printing eliminate existing jobs than they create
new ones. Scholars and practitioners have warned that advances in
digital technologies will lead to a future of machine-driven dramatic
increase in productivity and jobless growth where more and workers are
substituted or displaced by automation (Frey and Osborne, 2017a; [50,
58]. With the emergence of driverless cars, pilotless drones and various
automated retail systems, computers are redefining the boundaries of
tasks and occupations previously thought to be unlikely or difficult to be
displaced by technology [33]. The phenomenon of technological un­
employment has been explored through the perspectives of the effects of
ICT on structural change, and digitisation and routineness.
4.1.1. Effects of ICT on structural change
Unlike other forms of technological changes before it, ICT has had
significant structural impacts on the labour market. This is due to its
high flexibility and unprecedented ways through which it has boosted
O. Kolade and A. Owoseni
the mobility of capital and labour. Drawing on the framework proposed
by Ref. [29]; these impacts can be analyzed in terms of structural
changes in existing industries, digital innovations in new and emerging
industries, and the location and production of work.
4.1.1.1. Structural changes in existing industries. ICT has had significant
impacts on the marginal productivity of capital and labour. This in turn
has made production less factor intensive, to the detriment of labour
[29]. As advances in, and reduced cost of, new technologies such as
robotics and other autonomous systems increase productivity, workers
are either made redundant, forced to accept low wages as they compete
for jobs [45], and/or compel to retrain in order to take advantage of new
job opportunities requiring human-robots cooperation [34]. Further­
more, new technologies have had disruptive impact on employment
opportunities in existing industries through the increasing proliferation
of substitute products and services. Substitute can be “delayed” or
“instant”. Delayed substitutes, exemplified by Amazon’s services
launched in 1995, give existing market players enough time to adjust
and respond through necessary technological upgrades and employee
training to mitigate the impact of disruption on jobs. In contrast, players
such as Uber and Airbnb have disrupted the market with instant sub­
stitutes that offer significantly cheaper services by bypassing high
transaction costs, but also having more drastic impacts on jobs [29].
4.1.1.2. Digital innovations in new and emerging industries. In addition to
having disruptive impacts on existing industries, digital technologies
have also enabled the creation of new industries, companies and jobs.
This is especially evident in areas such as cloud technology, data science,
security services, and online streaming services which has experienced
exponential growth in the post covid-19 landscape [29,62]. These have
the potentials both to create new jobs and have multiplier effects. For
example, the App Economy, which began when Apple launched App
Store in 2008, has had a major impact on the job market. In the US, the
employment contribution of the App Economy has grown from 466,000
in 2012 to 2.52 million as of August 2020 [63]. In the EU, the number of
jobs generated in the app economy is estimated between 1.3 and 1.7
million, accounting for a total of €187 billion in revenue generated
across all sectors of the economy [32]. App Economy jobs include core
jobs that use ICT skills to develop, support or maintain mobile appli­
cations; indirect jobs based on non-IT roles such as sales, marketing,
human resources and administrative roles that support core app econ­
omy jobs; or spillover jobs “supported either by the goods and services
purchased by the enterprise, or by the income flowing to core and in­
direct app economy workers” [64]. However, questions remain about
the actual distribution of income among employees in the app economy,
with at least one study suggesting that majority of app developers do not
earn nearly enough to make app development a full-time job. In the EU,
across the estimated 1.7 million jobs, only €5.7 billion of the total €187
billion generated – or 3% – are from paid downloads, subscriptions, and
in-app purchases [32].
4.1.1.3. Location and production of work. While outsourcing is not a
new thing, advances in ICT have significantly enhanced the mobility of
labour. In several sub-sectors of the services industry, ICT has also
altered the dynamics relating to location of production, as tech com­
panies seek to move to cities with more educated population [29].
4.1.2. Digitalization and routineness
Routineness is defined as the extent to which an occupation, or more
specifically tasks within an occupation, can be automatable or codifi­
able. It has been classified into three dimensions: abstract task intensity,
manual task intensity, and routine task intensity [25]. The profile and
levels, in decreasing order, of routine tasks in the routine task intensity
index are routine cognitive (RC), routine manual (RM), non-routine
manual (NRM), non-routine cognitive: analytical (NRCA), and
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Technology in Society 71 (2022) 102086
non-routine cognitive: interpersonal (NRCI) [26]. On the other hand,
digitalization refers rather loosely to the acquisition and deployment of
ICT technologies. More specifically, the level of digitalization is
measured by the digital use index, which captures the levels of use of ICT
hardware and software such as computers and emails; and digital task
index, which profiles occupations and organisations in terms of pro­
portion and volume of digital tasks such as software programming and
database administration. While a lot of low-skilled occupations are
increasingly routinised and highly susceptible to automation, highly
skilled occupations typically entail a lower level of routineness but
higher level of digitalization [23]. These include highly skilled profes­
sional occupations such as software developers, software or network
technicians, and designers [26].
As technology drives down wages paid for workers engaged in
routine tasks, low-skill workers have re-allocated their labour supply to
service occupations which are relatively more difficult to automate [23].
However, the emergence of service robots has extended the debate about
displacement of human workers beyond areas of manual routine work to
non-routine tasks [34]. In a model proposed by Ref. [34] to map the
evolution of automation and robotization, the authors identified three
scenarios: a)original company model based on production factors such
as work done by employees, capital, as well as knowledge and
know-how; b) a second model where human jobs reduced and auto­
mated robots working with people increased; c) the third wave of
automation (predicted for the 2030s) where approximately 90% of jobs
may be replaced by autonomous robots. Others have argued that the
future of work will not be shaped by complete displacement of human
workers by machine, but more by flexible regimes by which majority of
occupations will be dominated by the use of internet-based “intelligent
technologies”, new forms of work through digital platforms, and novel
human-machine augmentation [50]. In other words, the workers of the
future will be those who are equipped with the right digital skills to
partner with robots and machines. Whereas automation involves
handing over human tasks to machine with little or no further human
involvement, augmentation implies continued close interaction between
humans and machines. Augmentation is conceived as a co-evolutionary
process in which humans learn from machine and machine from humans
[49].
4.2. Job polarization
Job polarization refers to a phenomenon where the large-scale
computerization of routine tasks in low-skill occupations leads to fall
in wages in low-skill labour performing routine tasks relative to low-skill
labour performing manual skills, while high skill labour remains in good
production. In other jobs, occupations become highly polarised ac­
cording to levels of skills and routines [23,27]. One of the key arguments
of Skill-biased Technological Change (SBTC) is that, while computers
and digitisation have transformed work into knowledge intensive, and
more productive, activity, they have also mainly an disproportionately
benefitted highly skilled workers already in high-wage occupations [7].
The emergence of new technologies has in effect precipitated
re-bundling of tasks by employers, with the result that certain groups of
workers are disproportionately allocated the most or least rewarding
tasks [62]. Furthermore, computerization is linked to information
asymmetry and occupational structural power. Three key assumptions
underpin the analysis of job quality and wage inequality through
structural lens: 1) Between-occupation earnings is an outcome of social
relationships; 2. Occupational power partly results from the location of
occupations within the economic system and production relations; 3.
Resource asymmetry favour structurally powerful occupations [65].
Occupations differ in their access to, and control of, information on
production process. Computerization therefore accentuates the struc­
tural advantage and bargaining power of occupations at the core of in­
formation flows. These include those who have the technology to
reorganise, aggregate and transfer (computer programmer, information
O. Kolade and A. Owoseni
systems specialists), and those who know how to translate, interpret,
and manipulate the data (managers and engineers) [7].
[28] used an European Union Labour Survey to classify occupations
into high-paying, middling, and low-paying categories. The high-paying
occupations include corporate managers; physical, mathematical, and
engineering professionals; life science and health professionals; man­
agers of small enterprises; physical, mathematical, and engineering
associate professionals; other associate professionals; and life science
and health associate professionals. The “middling” occupations
comprise stationary plant and related operators; metal, machinery, and
related trade work; drivers and mobile plant operators; office and
customer service clerks; and machine operators and assemblers. Finally,
the low-paying occupations highlighted are labourers in mining, con­
struction, manufacturing, and transport; personal and protective service
workers; and sales and service elementary occupations. The study found
that technological change in western Europe precipitated increased
shares of employment for high-paid professionals and managers and
low-paid routine workers. Conversely, the authors observed a drastic
shrinking of “middling” occupations, both within industries and be­
tween industries. This pattern of job polarization could illuminate, at
least in part, recent debates about the shrinking of the middle class in
Western countries.
4.3. Education for employment 5.0
In its 2018 Future of Jobs report, the World Economic Forum noted
that at least 54% of current workers will require significant re-skilling
and up-skilling [62]. The emergence of autonomous intelligent sys­
tems disrupting the world of work poses a wide range of problems that
will create greater inequalities and an increasing gap between the
returns to labour and returns to capital. A number of scholars have
argued that, as automation expands in scope, self-employment will
become the new normal, and the knowledge worker will take the central
stage in the emergent knowledge economy. Knowledge workers are in­
dividuals who use information to develop innovative outcomes. Within
organisations, they take on boundary-spanning roles and contribute to
tacit knowledge transfer within organisations [66]. They are walking
assets with the necessary flexibility to organise how they deliver out­
comes and targets within organisations, and the autonomy to offer ser­
vices to others without compromising proprietary knowledge.
Furthermore, as workers seek to upgrade their skills in response to
Industry 4.0 requirements, there will be new questions about the rising
cost of traditional education platforms, and the disruptive prospects of
new platforms such as Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) and vir­
tual academies [33]. Scholars have proposed a new model of education
to match the dynamic changes in labour requirements in the fourth in­
dustrial revolution. This model, under the label, Education 4.0, has been
defined as a “period in the current period in which Higher Education
institutions apply new learning methods, innovative didactic and man­
agement tools, and smart and sustainable infrastructure mainly com­
plemented by new and emerging ICTs to improve knowledge generation
and in-formation transfer processes” [38]; pg 4). Other scholars have
noted that the imperative and benefits of a new model of education cut
across all tiers of education, including primary and secondary levels.
This is especially, but not exclusively relevant in science, technology and
engineering (STEM) subjects, as well as technical and vocational edu­
cation (TVET), where curricula need to be revamped and teachers need
to up-skilled to integrate digital competencies in lessons plans and de­
livery [36].
Some of the key skills needed to promote organisation’s digital
transformation are: artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, robotization,
internet of things, augmented reality, digitalization; and these skills are
acquired via learning contexts such as mobile technologies, tablets, and
smartphone applications [67]. However, as the debate about automa­
tion and augmentation rages, scholars have pointed out that the skills of
the future are not limited to those digital skills that enable the
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Technology in Society 71 (2022) 102086
knowledge worker to either use ICTs as tools or partner with robots and
AI systems [5,68]. Thus, the future of education lies in the development
of human creative capacities [5,37]. Creativity, it is argued, is key to
understanding the differences between human and machine capacities.
It is not just about making new combinations, but about making com­
binations that are “profoundly novel”. The transcendence processes of
creativity are based on the moods of enthusiasm and disturbance-one
opens up new possibilities, the other threatens existing understandings
and accustomed practices [5].
In line with this [68], identified two categories of 21st century skills,
comprising seven core skills and five contextual skills for the knowledge
worker. The core skills are technical, information management,
communication, collaboration, creativity, critical thinking and problem
solving; and the five contextual skills are ethical awareness, cultural
awareness, flexibility, self-direction and lifelong learning [37]. also
proposed a creativity-focused technology fluency (CFTF) approach to
technology education to prioritise “competencies such as managing
complexity, thinking critically, envisaging possibilities, tolerating un­
certainty, displaying self-efficacy, and communicating skillfully” (pg
186). Thus, the education sector is likely to see a shift from a focus on
development of skills, dominant in the 20th century, to the development
of unique human capacities such as judgement, will, creativity and
innovation [5]. In other words, future education will focus more on
development of those human capabilities that are less likely to be
perfectly reproduced by autonomous systems.
Fig. 5 provides a mapping of key themes dominant in the reviewed
literature across three periods: 2011–2014; 2015–2017; and 2018–2020
(see Fig. 5). As the figure shows, in the 2011–2014 period, much of the
scholarly literature focused on technological displacement of workers in
low-skilled, routine tasks that are easily automated. Scholars also
explored the theme of workers’ re-allocation of labour into service oc­
cupations, where cognitive and creative skills are more important. There
are also discussions around socio-technical approach to environmental
sustainability, and the phenomenon of cyber-slacking and its impact of
workers’ efficiency in the workplace. In the 2015–2017 period, scholars
were giving more attention to the incursion of digital technologies into
cognitive domains, beyond automation of routine tasks into robotics and
artificial intelligence. Separately, other scholars were interrogating the
political economy of technology ownership, and the power asymmetry it
precipitates relative to ordinary workers. This also feeds into the dis­
cussions about opportunities, challenges and controversies associated
with the emergence of the gig economy. In the 2018–2020, period
scholars moved forward the conversation about ownership and power to
discuss and interrogate the postwork prospectus and the prospects for a
“work-less” utopia. Further, the boom of multi-sided digital platforms
attracted the attention of researchers, in terms of how they have created
new types of jobs in the sharing economy. Finally, scholars explored the
incursion of digital technologies into more creative domains, where
digital technologies are imitating affective human functions, beyond
cognitive human capabilities explored in the 2015–2017 period. In
response, many scholars argue that affective and creative human capa­
bilities are the last frontier of human advantage over technologies, and a
new model of education should focus attention on the development of
these unique human capabilities. Table 3 provides a thematic overview
of the findings of the authors in the selected 68 papers.
5. Discussion
The work of the future and the future of work.
This review highlights wide-ranging and far-reaching impacts of
digital transformation on the future of employment. These impacts are
captured in terms of the different dimensions and ways in which tech­
nological innovations have shaped the relationship between humans
and machines. They also highlight the impacts of digital transformation
at individual, corporate and societal levels. At the individual and
corporate levels, the pace of digital transformation has accentuated the
O. Kolade and A. Owoseni
Fig. 5. Timelines of key themes (Source: authors).
increasing importance of the knowledge worker as arrowheads of in­
novations and conduits of tacit knowledge transfer within organisations.
They also raise new questions about autonomy and precarity. At the
societal level, digital transformation has raised the stakes about the
tradeoffs between efficient production and sustainable development,
and the potential social upheavals that can result as a result of large-
scale technological unemployment and job polarization.
With regards to the world of work, machines have emerged as either
job stealers, human tools, human collaborators, or even as human su­
pervisors. The emergence of “job-stealing” robots is especially pro­
nounced in jobs and occupations with a high level of routine, predictable
and often repetitive tasks-for which computers codes can be written to
perform the tasks. These include increasing number of jobs and occu­
pations in the manufacturing, transport and logistic industries. For these
occupations, the imperative of increased productivity and the drive for
better competitiveness means that the odds are stacked against human
workers as companies aim to cut costs and maximize profit.
While the advent of job-stealing, autonomous robots is a real and
present danger to human workers, a sizeable fraction of jobs in the In­
dustry 4.0 landscape will entail various forms of interaction and
collaboration between human workers and technologies. Nevertheless,
the resulting new division of labour between humans and machines
throw up different kinds of challenges for human workers. The un­
precedented pace of technological change in the 21st century implies
that, for humans to use technology as tools or collaborate with robots
and AI systems, they need to embrace the challenge to continually re-
skill and up-skill themselves. The fancy technology of today go soon
into obsolescence, leaving human workers to play catch up.
11
Technology in Society 71 (2022) 102086
Who pays for workers to be re-trained, re-skilled and up-skilled for
Industry 4.0 realities? Many employers have recognised the need to
make employee training a key part of their organisational strategy to
achieve and maintain competitive advantage [62]. This aspirational
position taken by many employers is however complicated by the reality
of increasing mobility of labour and employee turn-over rate in the In­
dustry 4.0 landscape. These present wide-ranging implications for em­
ployers’ investment in workers’ training and expected returns to
investment. In contrast, many employers are taking advantage of new
opportunities provided by the advent of the “gig economy” and the
growing popularity of the concept of open talent.
The gig economy is defined as a labour market characterised by short
term contract and tasks (“gigs”) undertaken by freelance workers on
demand, as opposed to permanent jobs. It has been driven primarily by
online platforms that use digital technologies to match workers with
clients on a per-task basis, and have been hailed as a boom to produc­
tivity spearheaded by flexible workers [69]. Other scholars have high­
lighted the implications of the gig economy for traditional labour
regulations and employment standards, arguing that the gig economy
will precipitate a race to the bottom for workers left at the mercy of a
hyper-competitive global market [70]. Among other benefits, the gig
economy offers employers to transfer the costs of re-skilling and
up-skilling to the independent, “self-employed” worker taking a gig. It
enables employers to shop freely from the vast global pool of open
talent.
A labour market left to run on the laissez faire logic of the gig eco­
nomic would arguably present big risks for workers, in terms of job se­
curity, especially older workers displaced by automation and the advent
of new technologies [71]. In one sense, it can be argued that because
skills tend to be habit forming, established, older workers may be less
likely to be receptive and adaptable to learning new digital skills. They
are however more likely to be amenable and more responsive to op­
portunities and interventions aimed at developing and enhancing those
peculiar and original human capabilities such as creativity and
judgement-unlikely to be reproduced by autonomous systems. This,
along with the reality of population ageing, accentuate the need for
targeted policy interventions funded by national governments and other
stakeholders to bridge ongoing skill-gaps precipitated by technological
change. Such interventions should be multi-faceted, focusing not only
on the imperative of bridging digital skills-gap within the economy but
also enhancing and improving original human creative skills and capa­
bilities that would continue to be required in the Employment 5.0
landscape.
These concerns about the future of work are at the heart of the call
for a shift to Industry 5.0, with its core elements of human-centricity,
sustainability, and resilience [75]. The human-centric imperative em­
phasizes the use of technology as tools to serve human needs, while
mitigating the fears of humans becoming enslaved by machines. Thus,
any technological change that precipitates or aggravates unemployment
and wage inequality invariably fails the test of human-centricity, even if
it drives increased efficiency in production. In a similar vein, the sus­
tainability imperative forces stakeholders to account for the planetary
and environmental impact of technological innovations. This therefore
creates incentives for innovations that promotes circular economy out­
comes and principles. Finally, the resilience imperative prioritises in­
novations that make the global economy more adaptive to disruption
and more responsive to new opportunities precipitated by rapid changes
in production systems and the world of work.
The education sector also needs to grapple and keep pace with the
disruption in the 21st century world of work. Curricula at the basic and
secondary levels of education need to be overhauled, with ICT featuring
not just as a separate subject but as a lynchpin of other subjects where it
should be embedded. Furthermore, with the gradual erosion of tradi­
tional forms of employment and the emergence of the gig economy,
education and training at both basic and higher levels should be oriented
more towards the production of entrepreneurial skilled worker, rather
O. Kolade and A. Owoseni
than turnout of graduate jobseekers who are more attuned to the re­
quirements of a static labour market. Universities need to re-invent
themselves by embracing a more entrepreneurial outlook and a
boundary spanning approach that enables more effective interdisci­
plinary collaboration for knowledge production and learning enrich­
ment in the contexts of application-otherwise referred to as mode 2
knowledge.
In order for the education sector to meet the challenges of Employ­
ment 5.0, there is a need for an overhaul of the system of training for
teachers. In addition to embedding digital skills throughout the training
curricula in the formal training courses, more resources in funding and
time allocation need to be injected into the programmes for continuing
staff development. Furthermore, industry stakeholders need to be more
fully integrated and actively involved, not just for curriculum delivery,
but also for curriculum design and development. Work placements and
industry experience programmes need to be approached differently, to
match the demands of the changing landscape of Employment 4.0. For
example, government procurement can be used creatively to support the
introduction of school pupils to the gig economy. In the same vein,
summative assessments need to account better for skill portfolios of
pupils, along with the existing system for testing knowledge acquired.
On the other hand, formative assessment needs to be based on more
comprehensive frameworks for evaluating and incentivising creativity
and originality-those capabilities that are less likely to be replicated by
autonomous robots.
We now address the pressing issue of technology ownership. One of
the major fears expressed by skeptics and critics is that digital trans­
formation will exacerbate joblessness and inequality by transferring
disproportionately much more power into the hands of capitalist owners
of new technologies. In effect, it is argued that capitalist owners of
technologies would appropriate the surplus value created by digital
technologies, to the severe detriment of displaced workers left at the
margins of Industry 4.0 economy. Thus, the utopian dream of a “work-
less” future with ostensibly lots of time left for leisure is a nightmare
“jobless” scenario for the low-skilled worker displaced by automation
and disadvantaged by the structure of technology ownership. There are
two key points to make about this.
The first is that national governments and multilateral institutions,
spurred on by an engaged citizenry, need to step in with the right policy
instruments and interventions to address this problem. These can
include appropriate tax regimes to harness the gains of Industry 4.0
technologies and invest back into re-skilling and up-skilling programmes
for displaced and vulnerable workers. Such funds can also be pulled back
into revamping and improving technology infrastructure in the bid to
tackle “digital poverty” and enable more citizens-including under-
served communities-to participate more actively and benefit more from
the new digital economy. These interventions are necessary, not only to
respond to productivity and growth opportunities presented by Industry
4.0, but also to forestall large-scale social upheavals driven by displaced
workers left to fend themselves on the margins. In many developed
countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, there are
currents of discontents among workers on the wrong end of disruptive
digital innovations [52]. These include large numbers of workers in
rural and sub-urban areas who are increasingly disillusioned by the
failure of governments to act quickly and adequately to tackle the
detrimental impacts of automation on workers.
The second point interrogates the notion that digital transformation
inherently benefits only rich capitalists. The trajectory of technology
development in many sectors indicate that technologies are getting as
much cheaper and more accessible by the general public, as they are
getting sophisticated. This presents increasingly greater and better op­
portunities for individual workers to become technology owners. A good
example is the advent of 3D printers for additive manufacturing, with
major disruptive impacts in the global production and supply chain in
the manufacturing sector. The cost of 3D printers has continued to go
down, with some brands available for as low as a few hundred pounds.
12
Technology in Society 71 (2022) 102086
In addition, 3D technologies provide advantages in term of their low
initial investment costs, use of low-cost materials, reduced waste in the
technique, its flexibility for use of different materials, and its relatively
high reliability [31]. Further, in terms of inventory, the technology is
oriented towards the economies of one, thereby favouring micro and
small enterprises, as opposed to the traditional economies of scale in
subtractive manufacturing. In other words, they provide ordinary
workers with the opportunity to become technology owners and man­
ufacturers. Furthermore, technologies such as 3D printing disrupt the
dominant logic of mass production and the associated advantage of
automation in the manufacturing sector. Instead, it brings human
creativity and flexibility back into play in the manufacturing sector,
where local producers can create more bespoke, customised products at
lower cost-both in terms of production and distribution logistics.
Another pertinent example in this regard is the opportunity presented by
the emergence of blockchain technologies for “ordinary” users, con­
sumers and micro-entrepreneur to be co-owners, not just users, of
multisided digital platforms [72]. Owners of traditional multi-sided
platforms, such as Amazon, capture most of their value through mone­
tization of users’ data via adverts and transfers to third parties. They also
maximize profit from these network externalities in other ways, for
example through direct or indirect fees imposed on users accessing
“additional services’ on the platform [40]. Unlike these platforms,
which are based on centralized systems, blockchains employs a decen­
tralised, open-source system by which data can be shared, verified and
monitored across multiple nodes using a consensus mechanism. This
enables platform members to capture value via sharing and monetiza­
tion of data, easier and cheaper access to new products and services with
lower transaction costs accruing from platform membership [73].
It can therefore be argued that, in many ways, the trajectory of
technological progress in many sectors of the Industry 4.0 landscape is
likely to lead to more devolution of ownership powers and opportunities
from big corporations to micro-enterprises, worker-owners, and pro­
ducer consumers (so called prosumers). In effect, technology-considered
in its physical and virtual forms-is a dynamic, double-edged contrivance
that has the capabilities to exacerbate inequalities, as well as mitigate, if
not eliminate, them. Digital technologies can be deployed to correct the
asymmetry of power and control it precipitated, if deployed appropri­
ately. Furthermore, while technology ownership is important, what
matters equally, perhaps even more so, are the technical know-hows, the
creative abilities, the right institutional and market conditions, and the
sheer force of the will, to capture value from them. Workers can use
capabilities and competencies, along with progressively lower cost of
access, to make technology work for them in the new knowledge
economy.
Thus, a key element of the nascent concept of Industry 5.0 is the
prioritization of human-centricity as a core value that should drive the
future of technology use (Gurdur et al., 2021). In other words, Industry
5.0 entails a shift in focus from the production value of technology to the
human value of technological innovations. This includes the need to
design technology around the requirements of the human worker, and
therefore necessitates limited adjustment of the human worker to
technology [74]. While the technology of the future, in effect, prioritises
the dignity of the worker over productivity of labour, stakeholders have
argued that human-centricity need not be a zero-sum game, with respect
to efficient production and competitiveness-in the long run.
The work of the future will also be dominated by increasingly
autonomous workers harnessing tacit knowledge and co-opting auto­
mated systems to create and capture value. This autonomy, however,
needs to be understood in context. For workers whose skills are
continually under threat of replacement by automation, autonomy and
independence invariably implies precarity, especially within the context
of the gig economy. In order to survive and thrive, the autonomous
worker in this context will be highly skilled and committed to a process
of continuing up-skilling in order to remain at the forefront of a fast-
changing technology landscape. Their digital competences can enable
O. Kolade and A. Owoseni
them to harness digital systems either as partners or tools under the new
division of labour between humans and automated systems. Autonomy
may hold a different meaning for highly sought knowledge workers.
Their non-technical, original human capabilities play a critical role, not
just because those can hardly be replicated by automated systems, but
also because those distinct human capabilities, such as creative and the
will, are essential for creating and capturing values through new com­
binations of technological products and services.
Finally, the future of work will arguably be shaped even more by
institutional and policy innovations than technological innovations.
This will inevitably entail new forms of political organisation and
activism by autonomous workers and micro-enterprise owners to tackle
the asymmetry of power and create a more favourable institutional
space for value creation and value capture. This will enable them to
access opportunities and capture value for themselves in a future where
surplus value will be created more by robots and technologies for the
benefit of the worker-owner. The devolution of technology ownership,
and the completion of the global transition from a market economy to
knowledge economy has the potential to shift the locus of economic
power from big corporations to highly skilled, creative autonomous
workers. In turn this can help create a more equal world of opportunities
and welfare for citizens. It can also contribute to the realisation of a
work-less, but not jobless, future where workers can have more time for
leisure. However, this will require significant policy interventions, new
political alignments and new institutional arrangements. Among others,
governments will need to invest heavily in technology infrastructures,
and also inject funds and resources for mass re-training and up-skilling
of the workforce. Furthermore, the imperative of a new kind of poli­
tics is underlined by the turbulence and disruptions precipitated by
disillusioned, left-behind workers in much of the advanced economies,
especially in Western countries. While the rising wave of nationalism,
isolationism and anti-immigrant sentiments may not represent the way
forward, they represent a clear sign that the much of the current political
arrangements are no longer fit for purpose. Workers will play a key role
in the emergence of a new political economy suited for Industry 4.0.
6. Conclusion and recommendations for future research
This paper brings together recent body of scholarly work, mostly
within the past 10 years, on digital transformation and the future of
work. Through a systematic review of 68 publications- 46 journal arti­
cles, 2 conference papers and 5 other outputs, we identified three broad
theoretical perspectives that scholars have brought to bear on the topic.
These are: socio-technical systems theory, skill-biased technological
change (with variants such as task-biased and routine-biased techno­
logical change), and the political economy of digital transformation.
Through these theoretical lenses, researchers have provided insights on
several cross-cutting themes such as technological unemployment, job
polarization and the imperative of re-skilling/up-skilling. They have
also highlighted issues underline contrasting ideological approach,
especially those relating to the debates around technological ownership
and the utopia of a work-less future.
The key contributions of this paper are in two parts. Firstly, we
highlight how the three theoretical perspectives shape the way scholars
problematize issues relating to digital transformation. The respective
theoretical frameworks thus offer the window to scholarly sense-making
and meaning construction of the challenges and prospects of Industry
4.0 and 5.0. While socio-technical theory focuses on the idea of tech­
nological change as a composite of technical and human factors that
shape it, skill-biased technological change highlights the new division of
labour and skills between humans, machines and algorithms-in the
physical, cognitive and affective domains. On the other hand, the po­
litical economy of digital transformation challenges and interrogates
assumptions that are often taken for granted about the political and
ideological underpinnings of technology ownership, the perils of mass
unemployment, and the prospects of work-less utopia in the post-
13
Technology in Society 71 (2022) 102086
industrial world. We argue that an integrated, unified theoretical
framework, bringing these three perspectives together, offer the most
promising and productive pathway to future research to elucidate the
complex challenges and multi-dimensional opportunities that lies ahead
under Employment 5.0. Secondly, and in furtherance of the first
contribution, we draw attention to the importance of value-driven pol­
icy, co-produced by the citizen-worker, to the future of technology and
the future of employment. This is exemplified by ongoing policy efforts
in Europe and Japan regarding Industry 5.0 and Employment 5.0,
respectively.
Bringing all these together, we identify three key implications and
recommendations for research, policy and practice. Firstly, we observe
that there is limited research on the impact of digital transformation in
developing countries contexts. This is a fertile ground for research about
the peculiar challenges of technological unemployment in weak insti­
tutional contexts where workers are more vulnerable. Also, against the
backdrop of technology lock-in in developed countries, there are op­
portunities for researchers to interrogate and investigate potential
growth and employment opportunities, say for technological leapfrog­
ging, presented by the advent of Industry 4.0. There is also room, in both
developed and developing countries context, to examine the impact and
future direction of new models of contracting and employment typified
by the gig economy, within the new framework of Industry 5.0 and
Society 5.0 [30]. Secondly, in terms of policy, scholars and stakeholders
need to focus attention on evidence-based interventions to tackle
worsening inequality exacerbated by disruptive digital transformation,
and how these can be implemented through the formal education sys­
tems, but also through direct training and technical support for em­
ployees, autonomous workers, and micro-enterprise owners. The direct
support can be, among others, through more creative and innovative use
of public procurement. Future research can also interrogate the inertia
and inhibiting factors that are slowing policy reforms needed to shape
the future of technology use. Furthermore, in the light of the nascent
character of industry 5.0 and Society 5.0, there is considerable scope for
scholars to interrogate alternative theoretical and analytical frameworks
that are viable and effective for policy making on the transformation of
work. Finally, from the practitioner lense, the findings in this systematic
review highlights the opportunities for informed, conscious and skilled
citizen-workers to shape the future of work. This can be achieved
through political organisation and activism to create new institutions
and market for autonomous workers to thrive.
Author statement
The authors declare that this manuscript is original, has not been
published before and is not currently being considered for publication
elsewhere.
We confirm that the manuscript has been read and approved by all
named authors and that there are no other persons who satisfied the
criteria for authorship but are not listed. We further confirm that the
order of authors listed in the manuscript has been approved by all of us.
We understand that the Corresponding Author is the sole contact for
the editorial process. He is responsible for communicating with the other
author about progress, submissions of revisions and final approval of
proofs.
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Dr Seun Kolade is an Associate Professor in Strategic Management at Leicester Castle
Business School, De Montfort University, UK. His research covers the broad areas of SMEs
innovation and strategies for growth in sub-Saharan Africa, digital transformation, spiri­
tual and social capital in turbulent environments, and entrepreneurship education. He is a
Senior Fellow of the UK Higher Education Academy and a member of the Institute for
Small Business and Entrepreneurship.He is the lead editor of The Palgrave Handbook of
African Entrepreneurship.
Dr Adebowale Owoseni is a Senior Lecturer in Information Systems at the School of
Computer Science and Informatics, De Montfort University. Prior to joining the academia,
he worked as a software developer and solution architect in the financial service sector for
13 years. He leverages significant industry experience for teaching and researching on
computing for small business, digital transformation, ICT for development and societal
impact of emerging technologies.