City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No.

118127, April 12, 2005

FACTS:
1. A petition filed by city council for declaratory relief with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order against Victoria
Court in Malate which was licensed as motel although duly accredited as a
hotel.
2. An ordinance prohibiting the establishment or operation of business providing
certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the
Ermita-Malate area. Prescribing penalties for violation thereof, and for other
purposes.
3. In the Court’s petition, MTDC argued that the ordinance was void and
unconstitutional, as the ordinance is not clear to be enforced by the
enforcers.
4. The mayor ordered the MTDC to transfer outside the Ermita-Malate Area or to
convert it into allowed business.
5. However the court determines that the ordinance contravene and runs
counter to Presidential Decree 499, as correctly argued by the MTCD.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the ordinance is unconstitutional

RULING:
Yes, the ordinance is unconstitutional, the ordinance invades fundamental
property rights and impairs personal privileges. The ordinance contravene the
code and it runs counter to the provision of PD 499, as correctly argued by
MTCD.
Philippine Health Insurance Corp. vs COA, G.R No. 220598, 18 April 2017

FACTS:
1. In October 2007, the PhilHealth BOD passed Board Resolution No. 1055
approving the entitlement of the allowance its members to cover expenses of
said BOD members performance of their official functions which they would
personally shoulder.
2. On December 2007, it allowed the unexpected balance to be carried over in the
succeeding months within the same calendar year, effective retroactively from
October 5, 2007
3. On May 24, 2011, the COA Supervising Auditor issued an Audit Observation
Memorandum (AOM) which showed that reimbursements of EME totaling ₱19.95
million in calendar year 2010,
4. The AOM noted that PhilHealth had been using IME and Committee Meeting
Expenses accounts to accommodate reimbursements of EME since charges to the
EME account already far exceeded.
5. PhilHealth commented on the AOM, and  filed an appeal before the COA-
Corporate Government Sector both were denied and considered unsatisfactory
for lack of legal basis.
6. The COA-CGS further ruled that PhilHealth cannot seek refuge on the previous
rulings of the Court with regard to the non-refund of the disallowed benefits.
7. PhilHealth filed a petition for review before the COA Proper. In its assailed
Decision, however, the COA Proper dismissed the petition for being filed out of
time and deemed lapse after 181 and 42 days.
8. PhilHealth maintains that the term "month" in the six-month reglementary period
to file an appeal under the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of COA should be
understood to mean the 30-day month and should, accordingly, not use the
equivalent of 180 days also philhealth takes its cue from the decision made from
the case Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.
positing that six month reglementary period should be determined as the entire
period from July 2012 to January 2013
9. Without legal basis the philhealth’s petition would still fail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it
be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other
such euphemism?
RULING:
Yes,  its charter does not authorize the grant of additional allowances to the BOD
beyond per diems. For one, while Section 18(d) of RA No. 7875 is entitled
"allowances and per diems," its body significantly fails to mention any other
allowances or benefits besides per diems.
It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the oft-
repeated maxim expressio unius est exlusio alterius. Elsewise stated, expressium
facit cessare taciturn-what is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Casus
omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted must have
been omitted intentionally.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 220598, April 18, 2017
FACTS:
1. the petitioners submit that the decision has effectively barred the consideration
and granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State because doing so
would amount to the re-prosecution or revival of the charge against them
despite their acquittal, and would thereby violate the constitutional proscription
against double jeopardy.
2. Petitioner Benigno B. Aguas echoes the contentions of Arroyo in urging the Com1
to deny the motion for reconsideration.
3. points out that the State miserably failed to prove the corpus delicti  of plunder;
that the Court correctly required the identification of the main plunderer as well
as personal benefit on the part of the raider of the public treasury to enable the
successful prosecution of the crime of plunder.
4. The court ruled and denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merits, and
denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before
judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without
exceptions?
RULING:
The only instance when double ,jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or
where the trial was a sham. The interests underlying these three protections arc
quite similar. When a defendant has been once convicted and punished for a
particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he not be
subjected to the possibility of further punishment by being again tried or
sentenced for the same offense.
PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its President,
GREGORY K. LOY, Petitioner,
vs.
THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, Respondent, G.R. No. 183137, April 10, 2013
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation ("Pelizloy") owns Palm Grove Resort, which
is designed for recreation and which has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and
function halls. It is located at Asin, Angalisan, Municipality of Tuba, Province of
Benguet.
2. On December 8, 2005, the Provincial Board of the Province of Benguet approved
Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 05-107, otherwise known as the Benguet Revenue
Code of 2005 ("Tax Ordinance"). Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance
levied a ten percent (10%) on resorts
3. It was Pelizloy's position that the Tax Ordinance's imposition of a 10%
amusement tax on gross receipts from admission fees for resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots is an ultra vires act on the part
of the Province of Benguet. Thus, it filed an appeal/petition before the Secretary
of Justice on January 27, 2006.
4. The appeal/petition was filed within the thirty 30-day period from the effectivity
of a tax ordinance allowed by Section 187 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code (LGC).
5. Treating the Secretary of Justice's failure to decide on its appeal/petition within
the sixty (60) days provided by Section 187 of the LGC as an implied denial of
such appeal/petition, Pelizloy filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet.
6. Aggrieved, Pelizloy filed the present petition on June 10, 2008 on pure questions
of law. It assailed the legality of Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance as
being a (supposedly) prohibited percentage tax per Section 133 of the LGC.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Section 59, Article X of Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 05-107,
otherwise known as the Benguet Revenue Code of 2005, levies a percentage tax.

2. Whether or not provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes on

admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist
spots for being "amusement places" under the Local Government Code.
RULING:
under the rule Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance, Section 59, Article X of
the Tax Ordinance. Thus, there is no reason to invalidate the first paragraph of
Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance. Any declaration as to the Province of
Benguet's lack of authority to levy amusement taxes must be limited to
admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist
spots. The power to tax "is an attribute of sovereignty and as such, inheres in
the State. Such, however, is not true for provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays as they are not the sovereign; rather, they are mere "territorial and
political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines