1.

ELADIO ALONSO VS TOMAS VILLAMOR

Defect in mere form cannot be a prejudice as long as the substance is clearly evident. If the form is faulty but
the substance shows plainly through, no harm can come by making the form accurately expressive of the substance.

In Section 110 of Code of Civil Procedures, SC has full power to amend the process, pleadings, proceedings,
and decisions by substituting, as party plaintiff, the real party in interest, without need of further technicalities.
This is an action to recover the value of (1) certain articles from a Roman Catholic Church In favor of plaintiff
in Placer, (3) rental value of the church, (3) appurtenances, (4) church cemetery from for P1,581 w/
December 11, 1901 – April 1904. interest at 6% from
Tomas Villamor and others were members of the municipal board of Placer. They addressed date of judgment
a letter to Alonso (priest in charge of the church). (1) P741 for value
That the municipality received an order from the Provincial Fiscal that: of articles
“Cemeteries, convents, and other buildings erected on land belonging to the town at the (2) P840 for rental
expense of the town and preserved by it belong to the town. THUS, the municipality is under values
the obligation of administering them and of collecting revenues. THAT all of the revenues
and products therefrom must be turned into the treasury of the municipality.
THAT the image of St. Vicente which is now in the church as it is donated by its owner, is
also the property of said people, and therefore the alms given by the devotees must be turned
into the municipal treasury for the proper preservation of the church.”
Dec 13, 1901 Villamor took possession of church and all personal property contained therein.
Alonso protested against it but was summarily removed from possession of the church and said articles.
There was a separate case Roman Catholic Apostolic Church vs Municipality of Placer with Defendants’ claim
substantially the same facts presented by the defendants. was not well-
founded. Property
belonged to
Church
Villamor’s Arguments:
Court erred in allowing the action to be brought and continued in the name of Alonso instead of the name of
Bishop of the Diocese OR in the name of the church, as real party in interest.
Alonso’s Arguments:
• He is engaged in the prosecution of the case for the bishop of the diocese and not by his own right. To do for
the bishop what the bishop might do for him.
• He seeks only the welfare of the great church whose servant he is. He gladly permits his identity to be wholly
swallowed up in that of his superior.

On whether the lower court erred in allowing the action to be brought and continued in Alonso’s name
instead of the Bishop of the Dioceses or name of the church – NO; CAN BE AMENDED
Real party-in- It is undoubtedly the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic Apostolic church.
interest Alonso personally has no interest in the cause of the action.
Section 114 CCP Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest
Section 110 CCP HOWEVER PROVIDES THAT the court shall, in furtherance of justice, allow a party to
amend any pleading or proceeding and at any stage of the action, in either CFI or SC, by
adding or striking out the name of any party (plaintiff or defendant), or by correcting a
mistake in the name of a party, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be
determined, w/o regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
Section 503 CCP No judgment shall be reversed on formal or technical grounds, or such error as has not
prejudiced the real rights of the excepting party, apart from inherent power and authority
SC has full power to amend the process, pleadings, proceedings, and decision, in this case, by substituting,
as party plaintiff, the real party in interest.
Amendment The substitution of the bishop of the diocese, or Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, for Alonso,
does not is not the substitution of one identity for another, but simply to make the form express
constitute a the substance.
change in the
identity of the The form of its expression is alone defective. Substitution, then, is not substantial but formal.
parties Defect in mere form cannot possibly prejudice so long as the substantial is clearly evident.
Form is a method of speech used to express substance and make it clearly appear. It is the
means by which the substance reveals itself. If the form is faulty but the substance shows
plainly through, there is no harm in making the form expressive of the substance.
As means to an There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole
end purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties.
They were created not to hinder & delay, but to facilitate & promote, the administration of justice.
The error in this case is purely technical. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.

There should be no vested rights in technicalities. No litigant should be permitted to challenge a record of a court for
defect of form when his substantial rights have not been prejudiced thereby
DECISION OF LOWER COURT IS AFFIRMED.
Amend by substituting Roman Catholic Apostolic Church for Alonso as party plaintiff. Complaint to be considered as
though originally filed by said Church.
 2. CHARLES CU-UNJIENG VS CA & UNION BANK
Right to appeal is merely statutory and to avail of that right, one must comply with the statute or rules.

Payment of docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional, non-
compliance shall be fatal to an appeal. APPEAL NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT; BUT A MERE STATUTORY
PRIVILEGE.
Union Bank is the owner of a parcel of agricultural land (218,769sqm) in Sta. Maria, San Miguel, Bulacan,
registered under TCT No. TC-1062 of RD Bulacan.
Jan 1994, UBP posted on bulletin boards of its branches a 3-page list of acquired realty assets for sale to interested
parties. Included is said parcel of land; to be sold for 2.2M.
Charles, through a letter to Joselito Valera (manager of UBP’s Acquired Assets Department), offered to buy the
property for 2,078,305.50. Payable as follows:
• 50% down payment; balance to be paid in equal monthly installments for 2 years
Said offer is on account of 5 tenants demanding 500k to voluntarily vacate the land.
Charles tendered PCIB Check for P103k (10% of the 50% down payment) as earnest money or deposit. UBP
acknowledged by way of a Union Bank Receipt.
Aug 30, 1994, Charles wrote to UBP inquiring on the status of his offer to buy the property. Valera advised Charles
that his offer to purchase is yet to be acted because the bank was still awaiting the opinion of its legal division
regarding the sale of "CARPable" agricultural assets acquired by the bank.
Dec 19, 1994, UBP rejected Charles’s offer as sale of lands covered by CCARL without prior DAR approval
are null and void.
UBP advised Charles to get his refund of 103k from their disbursing unit.
Charles made a formal demand to UBP to comply with its obligation to transfer and deliver title of the property
by executing a proper deed of conveyance.
UBP reiterated their rejection as the land could only be disposed of either thru Voluntary Offer to Sell or compulsory
acquisition, which is outlined in Sec. 16, RA No. 6657.
Charles filed an action for specific performance and damages against UBP in RTC Malolos, RTC: No
impleading RD Bulacan as co-defendant. perfected
contract of
sale.
Charles filed a notice of appeal. RTC directed
elevation of
records of the
case to CA.
CA dismissed Charles’s appeal for non-payment of required docket and other lawful
appeal fees under Section 4, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Tardiness of 4 mos.
Dismissed the appeal pursuant to Sec 1(c) of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Charles’s Arguments:
• Failure to pay appeal docket fees on time is not a fatal lapse, or a jurisdictional defect. CA should have ignored
in order to attain substantial justice.
• Passed the blame to RTC Clerk of Court who allegedly made the erroneous computation of docket fees.

On whether the relaxation of procedural rules and the reversal and setting aside of the twin resolutions of
CA is valid - NO
Right to appeal is statutory and one seeking to avail of the right must comply with the statute or rules.
Rule 41, Sec 4, “Within the period for taking an appeal, appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which
1997 RCP rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the APPELLATE
COURT docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to
APPELLATE COURT together with the original record or the record on appeal”
Therefore, payment of docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is MANDATORY AND
JURISDICTIONAL for the perfection of an appeal, non-compliance is fatal to an appeal.

Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected and the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal, thereby rendering the decision sought to be appealed final and executory.

APPEAL IS NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT, BUT A MERE STATUTORY PRIVILEGE.

Ordinary Appeal From a decision or final order of RTC to CA must be made within 15 days from notice. Full
amount of APPELLATE COURT docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from.
Sec 1(c), Rule50 Non-payment of appellate court docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
period as provided under Rule 41, Sec 4, is a ground for the dismissal of an appeal.
The rules may be relaxed but only for persuasive and weighty reasons, to relieve a litigant of an injustice
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure
La Salette Strict application is qualified by the following:
College vs • Failure to pay those fees w/in reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic,
Victor Pilotin dismissal;
• Such power should be used with the (1) exercise of sound discretion (2) in accordance with
the tenets of justice and fair play, and (3) great deal of circumspection of the circumstances
MCIAA vs Late payment of docket fees may be admitted if party showed willingness to abide by
Mangubat the Rules by immediately paying the required fees. In that case, the appellate docket fees
were paid 6 days after the timely filing of the notice of appeal.
HOWEVER, Charles only paid 4 months following the expiration of the reglementary period to take an
appeal. THUS, RTC decision has become final and executory by operation of law.

Invocation of substantial justice is not a magical incantation that will automatically compel this Court to
suspend procedural rules. Rules of procedure are required to be followed.
 3. PACITA DAVID-CHAN VS CA & PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES
Findings of facts of CA upholding those of the Trial Court are binding upon SC. SC is not a trier of facts.
While there are exceptions to the Rule, Pacita has not convinced the Court that this case falls under one.

Equity is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.
Pacita filed with RTC a petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction to stop PRBL RTC denied
from fencing its property and depriving her of access to the highway.
• Her property (635sqm) in Del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga was completely surrounded by
various business establishments. SOUTH: Pineda Family; EAST-NORTHEAST: PRBL
• Her only access to the highway was a small opening of 2ft 4in through property of PRBL.
The property (part of 7,239sqm) was formerly owned by Singian Brothers Corporation then sold to PRBL without
the consent of Pacita. So, she was not able to exercise right of pre-emption or right of redemption.
The construction of the concrete fence on said property would deprive her of the only available right of way.
PRBL’S Arguments: CA affirmed
• Parents and relatives of Pacita were never tenants or lessees of Singian Brothers. They were
illegal occupants of the property as ruled by MTC San Fernando, Pampanga.
• Hence, Singian Brothers were not obliged to inform them of the sale

Singian Brother’s Arguments:

• The right of way, being apparent and discontinuous, cannot be acquired by prescription.
• Pacita had another access to the National Highway which she closed when she extended
the construction of her fence.

Pacita’s Arguments:
• Cited Art 649 and 650 of CC that “the owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way
only after he has established the existence of 4 requisites, namely:
o Estate is surrounded by other immovables and w/o adequate outlet to a public highway
o Proper indemnity is paid
o Isolation is not due to the proprietor’s own acts
o Right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest
• Court should apply Filipino values of pakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-tao. As an ordinary
housewife w/ meager resources, “those who have less in life should have more in law”

On whether Pacita is entitled to a right of way through PRBL’s property? - NO

Art 649 & Pacita failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy the requirements.
650 of CC She also failed to satisfy the 3rd requirement.
She is not without adequate outlet to a public highway. Instead, (1) she built a concrete fence on
SOUTH of her property to separate it from Pineda family’s property and (2) she also closed the 2ft
4in clearance.
Francisco vs An owner cannot by his own act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an
IAC easement of way through an adjacent estate.
Failed to satisfy the 2nd requirement.
There was no valid tender of the proper indemnity for the right of way. RTC decision: “requisite
regarding the payment of the proper indemnity was hardly satisfied”.
The questions of whether (1) one has another adequate outlet to the public highway, or (2) she caused her own
isolation, or (3) she made, in fact, a tender of the proper indemnity are all issues of facts which SC has no authority
to rule upon. SC is not a trier of facts. It is doctrinal that findings of facts of CA upholding those of the trial
court are binding upon this Court.
EXCEPTIONS: (Floro vs Llenado citing Remalante vs Tibe) WHEN:
• Inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible
• There is a grave abuse of discretion
• Finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures
• Judgment of CA is based on misapprehensions of facts
• Findings of fact are conflicting
• CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee
• Findings of CA are contrary to those of trial court
• Findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
• CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion
Findings of fact of CA are premised on absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record
On whether Pacita is entitled to easement through recognition and application of Filipino values? - NO
On equity Only applied IN THE ABSENCE OF, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.
As found by CA, Pacita is not legally entitled to a right of way on the property of PRBL. Thus, such
equitable arguments cannot prevail over the legal findings.
Before such inconvenience may be imposed by the Court, applicants must prove that they deserve judicial
intervention on the basis of law, and not when their isolation is caused by their own acts.
 4. DOMINGO NEYPES VS HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO
The new rule aims to make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The fresh period of 15 days is significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
A party litigant may either file his notice of appeal w/in 15 days from receipt of RTC’s decision OR file it w/n
15 days from receipt of the final order denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
The fresh 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and
executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan
filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land, reconveyance and reversion with preliminary
injunction before RTC Roxas, Oriental Mindoro against Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land
Bank, and heirs of Bernardo del Mundo.
1. PETITIONERS filed to declare BL, BFD, and heirs in RTC granted against BL/BFD for failure to file an answer
default; and RTC denied against heirs because substituted service
of summons was improper

2. RESPONDENT HEIRS AND LB filed to dismiss the RTC denied for lack of cause of action because of
motions hypothetical admissions/matters that can be determined
only after trial
Feb 12, 1998 RTC dismissed Neypes’s complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.
Neypes received copy of the order on March 3, 1998, and March 18, 1998 (15 days after), they filed a motion
for reconsideration.
July 1, 1998 RTC dismissed motion for reconsideration.
Neupes allegedly received the order July 22, 1998. On July 27, 1998 (5 days after), they filed a notice of
appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
Aug 4, 1998 RTC denied notice of appeal, as it was filed 8 days late.
Neypes received this on August 31, 1998. They also filed a motion for reconsideration which was again denied.
Neypes assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before CA via a petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• They had seasonably filed their notice of appeal.
• The 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998, since this was the day
they received the final order of RTC denying their motion for reconsideration. They filed on July 27, only
5 days after (well within the reglementary period for appeal)
CA dismissed. The 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they
received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complain.
Neypes’s Argument:
1. The order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the "final order," not
the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of
their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet
lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
2. They were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the "final order" or the order
dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
Respondent’s Argument:
1. Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the
decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not
file a notice of appeal but instead filed a motion for reconsideration.
RTC: motion for reconsideration only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. Petitioners
having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only 1 day left to file
the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR.
BP 129, as The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions shall be 15
amended days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or decision
Rule 41, Sec 3, Appeal shall be taken w/in 15 days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed
1997 RCP from. Where a record on appeal is required, appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record
on appeal w/in 30 days from the notice of judgment or final order.
Period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.
No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
What is deemed as the final order? Receipt which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal the Feb 12 order OR the July 1 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration?
Final One that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect
judgment/order to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
Quelnan vs The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order (of dismissal of a complaint) constituted
VHF Phil, Inc the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.
If July 1 was the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners file their notice of appeal
on time? - YES
Rule 41, Sec 3, Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court w/in 30
1964 RCP days from notice of order OR judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on
appeal. *BP 129 reduced this to 15 days – to enhance efficiency/dispensation of justice
SC condones late filing of notices of appeal only in very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.
To standardize the appeal periods and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, SC deems it practical
to allow a fresh period of 15 days to file the notice of appeal in RTC, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
• This shall apply to (1) Rule 40 governing appeals from MTC to RTC; (2) Rule 42 on petitions for review from
RTC to CA; (3) Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to CA (4) Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to SC.
Neypes filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (date of
receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3.
• The use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from
the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which SC already determined to
refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129.
• The original period of appeal remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period
of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
In this case, the new period of 15 days erases the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted
from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3) or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22).

A party litigant may either file his notice of appeal (1) within 15 days from receipt of the RTC's decision or (2)
file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration.

Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes
final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27 (5 days from receipt of the order denying their MR on July
22). Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days
 5. REGULUS DEVELOPMENT VS ANTONIO DELA CRUZ
GR: moot and academic = bars courts to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
XPN: if the issue is jurisdiction, courts can still try over the case even if it is moot and academic
Equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments
to the special circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a given
situation. – TO PREVENT UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND TO ENSURE RESTITUTION
Regulus Development is the owner of San Juan Apartments in San Juan Street, Pasay City.
Antonio Dela Cruz leased 2 units of the Apartments in 1993 and 1994. A contract of lease for the units provides a
lease period of 1 month, subject to automatic renewals, unless terminated by RD upon written notice.
RD sent Dela Cruz a letter to terminate the lease of the 2 units. MTC: In favor of RD and ordered Dela Cruz
Due to the Dela Cruz’s refusal to vacate the units, RD filed a to vacate and pay rentals due.
complaint for ejectment before MTC Pasay City.
Dela Cruz appealed to RTC. RTC affirmed MTC. Denied motion for
Dela Cruz consigned the monthly rentals to RTC due to RD’s reconsideration.
refusal to receive the rentals.
Dela Cruz filed a petition for review. CA reversed RTC judgments and dismissed
the ejectment case. MAR 19, 2003 BECAME
FINAL & EXECUTORY
RD filed a motion praying for the withdrawal of rentals RTC granted. Dismissal of ejectment case
consigned by Dela Cruz with RTC. means that there was no complaint filed at
all. RD entitled to amount of rentals for justice
and equity. JULY 25, 2003
RTC issued a writ of execution for
enforcement of its order. NOV 28, 2003
Dela Cruz filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail CA dismissed petition. RTC orders were
RTC orders. pursuant to equity jurisdiction, in
accordance w/ Sec 5, Rule 39, Rules 5 and 6
of Rule 135 of RoC.
Dela Cruz filed a petition for review on certiorari to assail SC denied petition for insufficiency in form
decision of CA. and failure to show reversible error by CA.
RD moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to allow it to RTC issued an Alias Writ of Execution
proceed against the supersedeas bond (appeal bond) which Dela allowing the withdrawal of the rental
Cruz posted and to withdraw the lease payment deposited by him deposits and value of supersedeas bond.
RD claimed that withdrawn deposits were insufficient to cover RTC granted.
rentals for May 2001-04. RD filed a manifestation and motion
praying levy upon DC’s property to satisfy judgment credit.
Dela Cruz then filed a petition for certiorari with application CA dismissed.
for issuance of a TRO. To nullify and set aside RTC orders
directing levy of his property.
Pursuant to RTC order granting the levy of execution, a public auction for the Dela Cruz's property was held
where RD was declared highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale in favor of RD was registered.
Dela Cruz redeemed the property with RTC.
RD filed a motion to release funds for the release of the RTC granted.
redemption price paid.
Dela Cruz filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw the petition for the reason that the redemption of the
property and release of the price paid rendered the petition moot and academic.
CA reversed and set aside RTC orders directing the levy of the property.
• While approval of RD’s motion to withdraw consigned rentals & posted supersedeas bond was w/n RTC
jurisdiction; RTC had no jurisdiction to levy on Dela Cruz’s real property.
• Approval of levy could not be considered as a case pending appeal, because MTC decision had already become
final and executory. As such, the matter of execution of the judgment lies with MTC where the complaint for
ejectment was originally filed and presented.
CA ordered RTC to remand the case to the MTC for execution.
RD’s Arguments:
1. RTC's release of the consigned rentals and levy were ordered in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
2. Dela Cruz’s petition (assail levy of his property) already moot and academic with the conduct of the auction sale
and redemption of the real property
3. Petition should have been dismissed outright for lack of signature under oath on the Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping.
Dela Cruz’s Arguments:
1. RTC had no jurisdiction to order the levy on respondent's real property as it no longer falls under the allowed
execution pending appeal.
2. Levy on execution and sale at public auction were null and void, hence CA decision is not moot and academic.
3. It was too late to raise the alleged formal defect as an issue.

Procedural issue: Lack of notarial seal on the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping is not
fatal to the petition. MANDATORY BUT NOT JURISDICTIONAL. Can be cured.
Strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served.
Non-compliance or defect in a certification against forum shopping, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by
its subsequent submission or correction. UNLESS the covering Rule is relaxed on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or based on the presence of “special circumstances or compelling reasons."
The submission of a certificate against forum shopping is deemed obligatory, but not jurisdictional.
In this case, the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping were submitted. The notary public's signature
and stamp were duly affixed. Except for the notarial seal, all the requirements for the verification and
certification documents were complied with. Courts should not be unduly strict on procedural lapses that do not
really impair the proper administration of justice.
On whether RTC had jurisdiction to levy on Dela Cruz’s real property? – YES; equity jurisdiction
An issue on jurisdiction prevents the petition from becoming "moot and academic."
Moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of supervening events,
rendering the adjudication of the case or the resolution of the issue without any practical use or value.
CA found that there is an issue on whether RTC had jurisdiction to issue the orders directing the levy → jurisdiction
(justiciable controversy that prevented the assailed CA petition from becoming moot & academic)
Jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. Even on appeal and even if
the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the
lower court had no jurisdiction over the case.
Even assuming that the case is moot due to Dela Cruz's redemption of the property, CA may still entertain
jurisdictional issues since it poses a situation capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.
Equity Jurisdiction vs Appellate Jurisdiction of RTC
Appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
matter and parties when an appeal is perfected
Equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its
judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied
to a given situation. – TO PREVENT UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND TO ENSURE RESTITUTION
RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds were issued pursuant to RTC's equity
jurisdiction. RTC's equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on the
ejectment case. Cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction since there was nothing more to execute on the dismissed
ejectment case. Hence, the RTC orders were clearly issued in the exercise of the RTC's equity jurisdiction,
not on the basis of its appellate jurisdiction.
The levy of real property was ordered by RTC in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
Levy of Dela Cruz’s property was issued to satisfy the amounts due under the lease contracts, and not as
a result of the decision in the ejectment case.
CA erred when it concluded that RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction in the ejectment case when it directed the
levy of the respondent's property.
Also, the order to levy on the real property was consistent with the first writ of execution issued by the
RTC. It states: In case sufficient personal property of defendant cannot satisfy the judgment, you are directed to
levy the real property and to sell the same or in any manner provided by law for the satisfaction of the said judgment
and to make return of your proceedings together with this Writ w/in 60 days from receipt hereof
Subsequent order of RTC to levy property was merely a reiteration and enforcement of the original writ of
execution issued.
RTC, as the court of origin, has jurisdiction to order the levy of the real property
Section 1, Rule 39 Execution shall be applied for in the court of origin. Court of origin with respect to
Rules of Court. the assailed RTC orders is the court which issued these orders.
RTC is the court with jurisdiction to order the execution of the issued RTC orders. Hence, RD correctly
moved for the issuance of the writ of execution and levy of the property before RTC as the court of origin.
 6. JULIE SUMBILLA VS MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION
GR: Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
XPN: Court has the power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their operation if and
when justice requires it.

If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former
must yield to the latter (Section 2, Rule 1 of Rules of Court).

Final and executory judgments may be reversed when the interest of substantial justice is at stake and
where special and compelling reasons called for such actions.
Julie Sumbilla obtained a cash loan from Matrix Finance. As partial payment for the loan, Sumbilla issued Philippine
Business Bank Check. The 6 checks have a uniform face value of P6,667 each.
Upon maturity, the 6 checks were presented by Matrix to the bank for payment. All were dishonored on the ground
that they were drawn against a closed account.
Sumbilla was indicted for 6 counts of violation of BP 22. MeTC: Criminally & civilly liable. For each violation
of BP 22, penalty of 80k w/ subsidiary imprisonment.
Civil liability → P40k
Sumbilla filed a motion for reconsideration. Denied, being a pleading barred under Revised
Rules on Summary Proc.
Noted that filing of MR will not suspend running of
period to perfect an appeal.
Sumbilla filed a Notice of Appeal. Denied for being beyond 15-day reglementary
period.
Sumbilla filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Also filed RTC Makati dismissed. MeTC did not act with grave
for a motion for reconsideration. abuse of discretion.
Sumbilla filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of RoC CA dismissed. Sec 2(a), Rule 41 of RoC is the
correct remedy because RTC rendered decision
in petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of RoC in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction
Sumbilla filed petition for review on Certiorari within the period of extension granted by SC resolution.

Knowing that her conviction had already attained finality, Sumbilla seeks the relaxation of the RoP so that
the alleged erroneous penalty imposed by the MeTC can be modified.
Sumbilla’s Arguments:
• Penalty is out of the range prescribed in BP 22. Subsidiary imprisonment is violative of Admin Circular 12-2000
and 13-2001, and ruling in Vaca vs CA.
• Fine that can be imposed against her in each count of violation of BP 22 is double the amount of the face value
of the dishonored check only or P13,334.00. Fine of P80,000.00 for each count is thus excessive.
• Subsidiary imprisonment contravened Sec 20, Art 3 of the Constitution which prohibits imprisonment as
punishment for not paying a debt.
Matrix Finance’s Arguments:
• Right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and can only be exercised in accordance with the rules. The lost
appeal cannot be resurrected through a petition for review on certiorari.

On whether penalty imposed in MeTC decision, which is final and executory, can still be modified? - YES
Sec 1, BP 22 Punishment is:
1. Imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than 1 year
2. Fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check, and must not
exceed 200k
3. Both fine and imprisonment
The face value of each of the 6 checks is P6,667.00. The maximum penalty of fine that can be imposed on Sumbilla
is only P13,334.00, or the amount double the face value of each check. MeTC gave a fine of P80,000.00. More
than 11x the amount of the face value of each check that was dishonored. It instead incorrectly computed using
total value of the 6 checks.

UNFORTUNATELY, MeTC decision is already final and executory after failing to timely file a Notice of Appeal.
Doctrine of finality A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer
and immutability be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions
of judgments of fact or law, and whether it will be made by any Court.
Court has the power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their operation if
and when justice requires it.
Sec 2, Rule 1 of Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
RoC obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.

For the interest of justice where special and compelling reasons called for such actions.
Barnes vs Judge Relaxed the rule in consideration of:
Padilla 1. Matters of life, liberty, honor or property
2. Existence of special or compelling circumstances
3. Merits of the case
4. Cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules
5. Lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory
6. Other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby
APPLYING THE EXCEPTION, the penalty of fine of P80,000.00 meted for each count of violation of BP 22 is
corrected to double the face value of each rubber check involved or P13,334.00 only.
Admin Circular On the issue of subsidiary liability
13-2001 1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of BP 22; and
2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused, who is found guilty of
violating BP 22, is unable to pay the fine which he is sentenced to pay
Admin Circular Not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference
12-2000 in the application of penalties for BP 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense
and the offender clearly indicate GF or a clear mistake of fact w/o negligence, the imposition
of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.
Lozano vs The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law
Martinez is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them
in circulation. Therefore, the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and
is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
 7. REPUBLIC VS PILAR ESTIPULAR
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by law.
IT CANNOT BE:
1. granted by the agreement of the parties;
2. acquired, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties; or
3. conferred by the acquiescence of the courts.

RA No. 26 lays down the special requirements and procedure that must be followed before jurisdiction may be
acquired over a petition for reconstitution of title.

The purposes of the stringent and mandatory character of the legal requirements of publication, posting and
mailing are to safeguard against spurious and unfounded land ownership claims, to apprise all interested parties of
the existence of such action, and to give them enough time to intervene in the proceeding.
Pilar, in a petition for reconstitution of title, declared that she was the only surviving legal heir of Fermin Estipular,
who died intestate.
Fermin was issued a Certificate of Title duly registered in his own name by RD La Union covering land in Barrio
Liquicia, Caba, La Union (6.1ha).
The Certificate of Title was destroyed due to the burning of RD La Union during the last world war.
However, the land was already declared and distributed to ten persons who have succeeded him.
Pilar then prayed that the CoT be reconstituted in June 15, 1994 RTC ordered:
accordance with law. 1. Publication of a Notice of Hearing for 2 successive
issues of the Official Gazette
2. To be posted at the main entrance of the Municipal
Building of Caba
3. At least 30 days from the initial hearing (Sep 8, 1994)
A Certificate of Posting was submitted, proving that Another Notice of Hearing was issued by RTC.
copies of the Petition and Notice of Hearing were posted Hearing is set to Dec 7, 1994.
at the main entrance of Municipal Building. However,
National Printing Office advised RTC to reschedule
original date of hearing as it could not meet the
schedule of publication.
A 2nd Certificate of Posting was issued
National Printing Office issued a Certificate of Publication showing that the petition for reconstitution was published
in the Official Gazette for 2 weeks on Oct 17 and 24, 1994.
Only publication in OG, no mention of posting in front of provincial and municipal hall.
OSG entered as counsel for Republic and deputized Provincial Prosecutor of La Union to appear on its behalf.
During the initial hearing, nobody registered an opposition. Due to the absence of the counsel for Pilar, Pilar was
allowed to establish jurisdictional facts at the next hearing date, Jan 24, 1995.

She presented exhibits: (1) petition (2) verification of petition (3) Certified True Copy of Certificate (4) survey plan
(5) technical description (6) certification of the provincial assessor (7) notice of hearing (8) certification of publication
by National Printing Office (9) Certificate of Posting (10) notice of appearance of SolGen.
Public Prosecutor never interposed any objection, hence, all the exhibits were admitted.
Testimony was offered to prove that Pilar caused the reconstitution of Certificate of Title. 2 witnesses testified.
1. Grandson of Pilar – claimed that the land covered by owner’s duplicate was existing and the original title
was burned in the RD
2. Mr. Juvenal Estacio – rep of RD La Union; claimed that all pre-war records in RD were burned
CA: Although Notice of Hearing not posted at (1) main entrance of the provincial building, there was substantial
compliance with the requirements for judicial reconstitution of certificates of title.as they are proceedings in rem.

Calalang v. RD QC: Notice of hearing by proper publication is sufficient to clothe court with jurisdiction.
Since there was a valid publication of the Notice of Hearing in the Official Gazette, then it is sufficient to
vest jurisdiction upon the court to hear and determine the petition.

SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW. It was more than enough to serve the purpose of notifying all the
parties concerned. Also, the government was ably represented by the Public Prosecutor so the Republic was not
in any manner deprived of the opportunity to protect its rights or interests over the land subject of the petition.
On whether the supposed substantial compliance with the requirements of RA No. 26 is sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on the trial court over the case - NO
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by law.
It cannot be:
1. granted by the agreement of the parties
2. acquired, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties
3. conferred by the acquiescence of the courts.
RA 26 Lays down the special requirements and procedure that must be followed before jurisdiction may be
acquired over a petition for reconstitution of title.
Section Before trial court can acquire jurisdiction over a reconstitution case, there must be a compliance of
13, RA 26 the following requisites:
1. Notice of the petition be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive
issues of the Official Gazette, and posted on the main entrance of the provincial building
and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least 30
days prior to the date of hearing;
2. Notice state (1) the number of the lost or destroyed certificates of title if known, (2) name of the
registered owner, (3) name of occupants or persons in possession of the property, (3) owner of
the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, (4) location, area and boundaries of the
property, and (5) date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their
claim of objection to the petition;
3. Copy of the notice also be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner,
to every person named therein whose address is known at least 30 days prior to the date of the
hearing; and
4. at the hearing, petitioner submit proof of publication, posting and service of the notice as
directed by the court.
These requirements are mandatory and compliance with them is jurisdictional.
Republic Reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes the restoration in the original form and condition of a lost
vs CA or destroyed instrument attesting to the title of a person to a piece of land.
The law requires: publication of the petition twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and its
posting at the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building at least 30 days
prior to the date of hearing. THIS IS MANDATORY. COMPLIANCE IS JURISDICTIONAL.
The Notice of Hearing of Petition for Reconstitution was not posted at the main entrance of the provincial
building. Clearly, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Calalang WRONG APPLICATION. SC merely held that the absence of personal notice to a person claiming to
vs RD have a legitimate claim on the property was not a sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings
The purposes of the stringent and mandatory character of the legal requirements of publication, posting and mailing
are to safeguard against spurious and unfounded land ownership claims, to apprise all interested parties of
the existence of such action, and to give them enough time to intervene in the proceeding
The principle of substantial compliance cannot be applied to the present case, as the RTC’s acquisition of
jurisdiction over the Petition hinged on a strict compliance with the requirements of the law.
Compare this to Regulus Development case. In that case, although the requirement of notarial seal in verification
of forum shopping is mandatory, it is not jurisdictional. Hence, it can be cured and does not render the petition null
and void.
In this case, however, requirement of publication and posting in reconstitution case is both mandatory and
jurisdictional. Absence of any of the requirements makes the RTC not qualified to handle the case for
absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
 8. ATLAS DEVELOPER VS SARMIENTO ENTERPRISES
Judge Jurado's ruling carried an overly strict and literal interpretation of the stipulation in the sales invoice. Although
City Court of Manila shall have "jurisdiction" over a legal action arising from the contract, the parties must have
intended to fix the venue only, for jurisdiction over an action is conferred by law, and may not be changed by
mere agreement of the parties.
In short, venue of action may be fixed by the parties, but not the jurisdiction of the courts. The venue of an
action in the inferior court is "the place specified by the parties by means of a written agreement, whenever the
court shall have jurisdiction to try the action by reason of its nature or the amount involved.
August 25, 1982, Sarmiento Enterprises filed in CFI Pasig, Metro Manila, a complaint for collection of P8,076
representing the cost of steel bars and MS plates purchased by Atlas Developer.
Instead of filing an answer, Atlas filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the CFI: Denied motion to dismiss;
ground of improper venue because the sales invoice, provided that: Atlas Developer's motion for
"If legal action is resorted to for enforcing collection of this account, parties reconsideration also denied.
expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the Court of the City of Manila." Such stipulation, speaking as it
does of jurisdiction and not
Atlas alleged that said stipulation is valid, binding, and enforceable venue, is void and w/o legal
effect.
Atlas Developer filed a second motion for reconsideration. CFI also denied.

Whether or not the venue of the action was properly laid in CFI Pasig, Metro Manila
Although City Court of Manila shall have "jurisdiction" over a legal action arising from the contract, the parties must
have intended to fix the venue only, for jurisdiction over an action is conferred by law, and may not be changed
by mere agreement of the parties
That CFI Pasig had jurisdiction over Sarmiento’s claim was erroneous because the claim of P8,076 did not exceed
P20,000, which was the minimum jurisdictional limit for a money claim in the CFI (now RTC).
Section 33 Jurisdiction in civil cases. – MeTC, MTC, MCTC shall exercise:
BP 129 1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, estate and
intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed 20,000 exclusive of
interest and costs but inclusive of damages of whatever kind, the amount of which must be
specifically alleged.
Section 19 Jurisdiction in Civil cases. RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
BP 129 8. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and costs or the value of the
property in controversy, amounts to more than P20,000.
Sec. 1-b, Venue of an action in inferior courts is "the place specified by the parties by means of a written
RULE 4, agreement, whenever the court shall have jurisdiction to try the action by reason of its nature or the
RoC amount involved"

Jurisdiction is the authority given to a legal body for hearing a case.

Venue is the place where a case is heard; where the suit is filed.
3 types of jurisdiction: personal (right over the person); subject matter (the subject matter of the case); territory
(over the region or territory).
In civil cases, the venue will be the principal defendant’s residence or the place where a contract was carried out. But
sometimes the parties concerned may change the venue for convenience. And in case a suit is filed in a different
venue, the defendant can readily demand for shifting the venue.
 9. SERAFIN TIJAM VS MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY
The doctrine of laches is based on public policy which the discouragement of stale claims and is not a mere
question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be asserted.

A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction the question whether
the court had jurisdiction either of subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important.
July 19, 1948, 1 month after RA 296 effectivity or Judiciary Act of 1948, Sps Court issued a writ of attachment
Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog filed a civil case in CFI Cebu against Sps against Sbnghanoy’s properties.
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover P1,908.00 with legal It was then dissolved upon filing
interest. of a counter-bond by S and
Manila Surety (July 31, 1948)
After being duly served with summons, Sibonghanoy filed their answer and Court ruled in favor of Tijam and
interposed a counterclaim. issued a writ of execution against
Sibonghanoy.
The writ was returned unsatisfied. Tijam moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution against the Surety's bond.
Surety filed a written opposition upon 2 grounds: Court denied this on the ground
1. Failure to prosecute, and that no previous demand had
2. Absence of a demand for the payment of the amount due under the been made on the Surety for the
judgment. satisfaction of the judgment.
Surety prayed to (1) deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond and
(2) "to relieve them of its liability, if any, under the bond in question”
Demand was made. Surety failed to satisfy the judgment so Tijam filed a 2nd Upon motion of Surety, Court
motion for execution against the counter-bond. granted them 5 days to answer
the motion.
Upon failure to file such answer,
Court granted the motion for
execution and issued a writ.
Surety moved to quash the writ as it was issued without the required summary Court denied the motion.
hearing provided for in Sec. 17 of Rule 59 of Rules of Court.
Surety appealed to CA. That CFI erred in: CA affirmed CFI decision
1. Issuing its order by holding the incident as submitted for resolution,
without a summary hearing and compliance with the other mandatory
requirements in Sec 17, Rule 59
2. Ordering the issuance of execution against them
3. Denying the motion to quash the writ of execution
Not one of the assignment of errors raises the question of lack of
jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.
Jan 8, 1963, after Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking CA granted the motion
for extension to file a motion for reconsideration.
2 days later (1963), Surety filed for a motion to dismiss, alleging that: CA: NOTED that complaint was
1. Action was filed in the CFI of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of filed on July 19, 1948. It has
P1,908.00 only been pending for almost 15
2. A month before that date RA 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) had already years, Surety never raised the
become effective, Section 88 placed the original exclusive jurisdiction of question of jurisdiction until after
inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject matter or receipt of this Court's adverse
the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00 decision
3. CFI therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case.

On whether surety can question jurisdiction after almost 15 years? - NO

The action commenced by Surety in CFI Cebu against Sibunghanoy was for the recovery of P1,908.00 only - an
amount w/in the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with Judiciary Act of 1948 which took
effect a month prior to when the action was commenced. Objection upon jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings.
BUT, considering the facts, SC: Surety is barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour.
Although the action was exclusively against Sibunghanoy, Surety became a quasi-party since July 31, 1948 when
it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court. Since then, it acquired certain
rights and assumed specific obligations, in accordance with Sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond: the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the
CFI was not raised.
Upon hearing of the second motion for execution against the counter-bond: Surety asked for time to file an
answer/opposition. BUT instead of an answer/opposition, Surety filed the motion to dismiss raising the question
of jurisdiction for the first time.
Estopped A party may be estopped from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons:
1. Estoppel in pais
2. Estoppel by deed or by record
3. Estoppel by laches - negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or "stale demands" is based on public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining
or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. After voluntarily submitting a cause
and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction
or power of the court.
Littleton vs. SC: It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court to secure an
Burgess affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
From the time Surety became a quasi-party, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI by
reason of the sum of money involved which was within the jurisdiction of inferior courts..BUT it failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in CFI and CA, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision
rendered by CA that it raised the question of jurisdiction.
In summary, Tijam applies to a party claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction when:
1. There was a statutory right in favor of the claimant;
2. Statutory right was not invoked
3. An unreasonable length of time lapsed before the claimant raised the issue of jurisdiction
4. Claimant actively participated in the case and sought affirmative relief from the court without jurisdiction
5. Claimant knew or had constructive knowledge of which forum possesses subject matter jurisdiction
6. Irreparable damage will be caused to the other party who relied on the forum and the claimant’s implicit waiver.
On the argument raised by Surety that CFI should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution
because it was issued w/o summary hearing required by Section 17 of Rule 59, ROC
Section 17 If the execution be returned unsatisfied, the surety/ies on any bond to secure the payment of the
of Rule 59, judgment shall become finally charged on such bond, and bound to pay to the plaintiff upon demand,
ROC which amount may be recovered from such surety/ies after notice and summary hearing in the same
action
Summary Not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted
hearings but, a procedure by which a question is resolved with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in
preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings.

Essential: defendant is notified/summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is

urged upon him, and to interpose a defense. As to the extent of the hearing, it will lie upon the
discretion of the court, depending upon the attending circumstances.
The surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution when the same would be submitted for
consideration. In fact, Surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request
that the CFI gave him a period of 4 days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without
filing an answer objection. The surety cannot now complain that it was deprived of its day in court.
It is argued that Surety did not file an answer to the motion 'for the reason that all its defenses can be set up during
the hearing of the motion even if the same are not reduced to writing'. THERE IS NO MERIT in this because the
record shows that when the motion was called, what Surety did was ask that he be given time to file an answer.
Moreover, in the order given in open court upon request of Surety that after the 4-day period within which to file an
answer, 'the incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution'; and Surety agreed, as the order was issued upon
his instance and he interposed no objection thereto.
 10. BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH VS FAITH IN CHRIST BAPTIST CHURCH
1. Allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court.
The cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint states, but what the allegations in
the body of the complaint define and describe. The designation or caption is not controlling, more than the
allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint.

2. A court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance
of and to render judgment on the action.
A contract of loan was entered into between PB and BF which BF borrowed money from PB to purchase the
property. BF then took possession of the property.
While BF was still in possession of the property, Galvan and companions attended BF's activities. Galvan was
interested on the property and formed and incorporated FC and took control of the property.
This came to the attention of Luzon Convention of Southern Baptist (LC). In a Letter, LC upheld BF's right over the
property. However, FC continued to occupy the property. BF sent a demand letter to FC to vacate the property
within 5 days from notice and to pay 10k/month.
Due to non-compliance with its demand, BF and PB filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against
FCJBC and Galvan. It sought the ejectment of FCJBC from Lot 3, Blk. 35 of PCS-2364, located at 35-3 Sarita St.,
Diamond Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City, and owned by PBSBC.
FC and Galvan’s Arguments: MTC: Feb 9, 2004, in
1. They have been in existence since 1984 known as "Faith Baptist Church" (FBC). favor of BF. Case was
2. They held services at Tacipit residence at 31-1 Dona Maria St., Diamond forcible entry and not
Subdivision, Angeles City. unlawful detainer.
3. FBC then moved to a building along MacArthur Highway in the same subdivision.
4. Mar 7, 1990, members of FBC availed of a loan from Church Loan Fund of Foreign RTC: Affirmed MTC
Mission Board (Philippine Baptist Mission) to purchase the property in a Contract decision.
of Simple Loan or Mutuum.
5. Rolando Santos was the pastor of FBC from 1993 to 2000. CA: Granted the
6. Due to a misunderstanding, he left FBC. petition and reversed
7. Feb 2001, Santos' group formed BF. While, FBC continued to occupy the property RTC decision.
and, organized themselves into FC. Complaint for
8. May 30, 2001, FC paid installments due on the property (P10,000.00), leaving a unlawful detainer is
balance of P240,615.53. Since June 2001, they were willing and able to pay the dismissed.
installments due, however, PB refused to accept any payment.
9. Prior to BF's filing of the present complaint, a Petition for Consignation of Payment
was filed on October 9, 2002 with RTC.
10. FC prayed that PB be required to accept P240,615.53 as full payment of the
Contract of Simple Loan or Mutuum.
11. Oct 29, 2002, FC filed a Motion seeking the suspension of proceedings pending
resolution of the petition for consignation.
BF and PB filed an instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of RoC to SC.

Whether the instant case is one of unlawful detainer or forcible entry? -FE
Sumulong Court differentiated the distinct causes of action in forcible entry vis-a-vis unlawful detainer.
vs CA
FE One is deprived of physical possession force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.
Possession is illegal from the beginning.
Only issue is who has the prior possession de facto.
Action to recover possession founded on illegal occupation from the beginning.
UD Possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration/termination of the right to
possess.
Issue of rightful possession is the one decisive.
Action founded on unlawful detention by a person who originally acquired possession lawfully
Allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court.
Cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint states, but what the allegations in the
body of the complaint define and describe. The designation or caption is not controlling.

It cannot be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one party, or upon the
defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendants' entry into the land.
If illegal, then cause of action to be filed is FE. (Filed w/in 1yr from illegal entry)
If entry is legal but thereafter possession became illegal, cause of action to be filed is UD. (Filed w/n 1 yr from date
of the last demand)
It is necessary that the complaint should embody such statement of facts which brings the party clearly within the
class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy.
Cabrera A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for UD if it recites the ff:
vs 1. Possession of property was by contract with or by tolerance
Getaruel 2. Such possession became illegal upon notice of the termination of the right of possession
3. Person remained in possession of the property and deprived owner of the enjoyment
4. W/in 1 year from the last demand to vacate the property, a complaint for ejectment was filed
IN THIS BF presented the ff allegations in support of its UD complaint:
CASE 4. While BF was in possession of the property, Galvan joined the religious services of BF
5. Galvan had an interest in the property. He formed/incorporated FC and took control of the property
6. The take-over of Galvan brought to the attention of the LC, and they affirmed the right of BF to
occupy the property
7. Despite the letter, Galvan ignored
8. Due to exhaustion, expense and exasperation, a demand letter was sent to FC and Galvan for
them to pay PI0,000/month beginning October 2001 for the use of the property and to vacate it
w/n 5 days upon their receipt thereof.
The allegations would show that it contradicts the requirements for unlawful detainer.
Paragraphs 5 and 6 make it clear that FC’s occupancy was unlawful from the start. (1) No allegation that BF and
PB tolerated FC’s possession of the property. (2) No averment in the complaint to show any overt act of BF and PB
indicative of permission to occupy the land.
Paragraphs 7 and 8 characterize the FC and Galvan’s occupancy as unlawful even before the formal demand
letters were written by the petitioner's counsel
Unlawful withholding of possession should not be based on the date the demand letters were sent, as the
alleged unlawful act had taken place at an earlier unspecified date. This case would have to fall under the
concept of forcible entry.
While BF sufficiently alleged that they had prior physical possession of the property, nothing has been said on how
FCJBC's entry was effected or when dispossession started. The complaint is defective even if FEas it failed to
allege how and when entry was effected.
Unfortunately, BF and PB's failure to allege when and how the dispossession took place leaves the
complaint wanting in jurisdictional ground.
Consequently, the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
A court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. BECAUSE jurisdiction
is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and render judgment.
A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the
creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void.
NOTE: In comparison to Tijam case (party can no longer assail the jurisdiction of the court because of laches when
they filed for affirmative relief and then questioned the jurisdiction of the court when they did not get the favorable
decision). They only questioned the court’s jurisdiction when its decision was unfavorable.
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction the question whether
the court had jurisdiction
 11. LOURDES DELA CRUZ VS CA
The cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint states, but what the
allegations in the body of the complaint define and describe. The designation or caption is not controlling, for
it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint.
Jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the initiatory pleading and the defenses in the answer are
irrelevant and immaterial in its determination. However, equitable justice dictates that allegations in the answer
should be considered in arriving at the real nature of the action.
Reyes family owned the lot located at No. 1332 Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Lourdes Dela Cruz was one of
their lessees, and she religiously paid rent for over 40 years.
1989, a fire struck the premises and destroyed her dwelling. After the fire, she returned to the lot and rebuilt their
respective houses. Reyes family made several verbal demands to her, to vacate the lot but she did not comply.
1994 She was served a written demand to vacate but still refused to leave. Despite it, Reyes family did not initiate
court proceedings against any lessee.
1996 The lot was sold to Melba Tan Te for residential purposes. Despite the sale, Lourdes remained in the land.
1997 Lourdes received a written demand to relinquish the premises which she ignored, prompting Tan Te to initiate
conciliation proceedings at the barangay level. Tan Te offered financial assistance, but Lourdes countered by asking
500k for her house. Tan Te rejected the unconscionable counteroffer.
Tan Te filed an ejectment complaint before MeTC Manila MeTC: Decided in favor of Tan Te,
1. That Reyeses were in possession and control of the contested lot ordered Lourdes to vacate premises.
2. On Nov 26, 1996, it was sold to Tan Te
3. Prior to the sale, Dela Cruz forcibly entered the property with strategy RTC: Set aside MeTC decision. RTC
and/or stealth and not MeTC had jurisdiction over
4. Lourdes unlawfully deprived Tan Te of physical possession of the the subject matter of the case. Since
property and continues to do so; Tan Te's predecessor-in-interest
5. Tan Te sent several written demands to vacate the premises but she learned of her intrusion into the lot as
refused early as Feb 21, 1994, ejectment suit
Lourdes filed her answer and alleged that: should have been filed w/in 1-yr
1. MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case because it falls within the prescriptive period which expired on
jurisdiction of the RTC as more than 1 year had elapsed from the 1995. Since Reyes did not file
forcible entry ejectment suit and Tan Te filed only
2. She was a rent-paying tenant protected by PD 20 on Sep 8, 1997, the suit had become
3. Her lease constituted a legal encumbrance upon the property an accion publiciana, which is
4. The lot was subject of expropriation. cognizable by RTC.

CA: In favor of Tan Te. Reinstated

MeTC decision.

GR: Findings of fact of CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal, provided they are supported
by evidence on record or substantial evidence.
XPN: CA's factual findings contradict RTC’s, and there was an assertion that CA went beyond the case’s issues.
Which court, RTC or MeTC, has jurisdiction over the Tan Te ejectment suit?
Jurisdiction is the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear and determine certain
controversies. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law
Section 33, MeTC, MTC, MCTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
Chapter 3 unlawful detainer: Provided, defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the
BP 129 question of possession cannot be resolved w/o deciding the issue of ownership.
Issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
Sec 1, Rule Exclusive, original jurisdiction over ejectment proceedings (accion interdictal) is lodged with the
70, 1997 RCP first level courts.
3 reqs in FE 1. Plaintiffs must allege prior physical possession of the property
for MTC to 2. They must assert that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat,
acquire strategy, or stealth
jurisdiction 3. Action must be filed w/in 1 year from knowledge of deprivation of physical possession
UD 1. Fact of lease by virtue of a contract express or implied
Requisites 2. Expiration or termination of the possessor's right to hold possession
3. Withholding by lessee of possession after expiration or termination of the right to possession
4. Letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and
vacate the premises
 5. Action must be filed within 1 year from date of last demand received by the defendant.
Sec 19, Chap RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve the title to, or
2, BP 129 possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings. Original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon MeTC,
MTC, MCTC.
2 Actions to Recover Possession of real property which fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC:
Accion Publiciana: complete action for the recovery of the real right of possession when dispossession lasted for
more than 1 year OR when action was filed more than 1 year from date of last demand
Accion Reivindicatoria: action for the recovery of ownership which includes the recovery of possession.
To determine whether a complaint for recovery of possession falls under the jurisdiction of the MeTC or
the RTC, go over the allegations of the complaint

GR: Allegations in the complaint determine the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over the case.
These cannot be made to depend upon the defenses in the answer/pleadings filed by defendant. Designation or
caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it is not even an
indispensable part of the complain

XPN: In special and unique circumstances, allegations in the defenses can be a substitute
Ignacio vs CFI: "while allegations in the complaint make out a case for forcible entry, where tenancy is
averred by way of defense and is proved to be the real issue, the case should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction as the case should properly be filed with the then Court of Agrarian Relations”
IN THIS Allegations in the complaint show that prior to the sale by Reyes, he was in possession and control
CASE of the subject lot but were deprived of said possession when Lourdes, by means of stealth and
strategy, entered and occupied the same lot. This implies that he had prior physical possession of
the subject lot and can make up a forcible entry complaint.

On the other hand, the allegation that Lourdes was served several demands to leave the premises
but refused indicate an action for unlawful detainer since a written demand is not necessary in
forcible entry.

The MeTC complaint was filed on Sept 8, 1997 w/n 1 year from the date of the last written demand
on Jan 14, 1997.
Jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the initiatory pleading. The defenses in the answer are deemed irrelevant
and immaterial in its determination. However, we relax the rule and consider the complaint at bar as an
exception in view of the special and unique circumstances present.
1. Defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised in the answer wherein there was an admission that Lourdes was a
lessee of Reyes prior to the sale to Tan Te.
2. Ejectment suit was filed with Manila MeTC on Sep 8, 1997 or 9 years ago. To dismiss the complaint would be
a serious blow to the effective dispensation of justice. Equitable justice dictates that allegations in the answer
should be considered to aid in arriving at the real nature of the action.
3. Section 6, Rule 1, RoC empowers the Court to construe Rule 70 and other pertinent procedural issuances "in
a liberal manner to promote just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."
Based on the complaint and answer, it is apparent that Tan Te’s ejectment complaint is a complaint for
unlawful detainer and MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint.
1. It was admitted that Lourdes was a lessee of Reyes for 4 decades. Thus, Lourdes is the legal possessor of the
subject lot by virtue of a contract of lease.
2. When fire destroyed her house, Reyes considered the lease terminated; but Lourdes persisted in returning to
the lot and occupied it by strategy and stealth w/o consent. Reyes however tolerated the continued occupancy.
3. When the lot was sold to Tan Te, the rights of Reyes was transferred to Tan Te who for a time also tolerated
the stay of Lourdes until she decided to eject her by sending several demands.
4. Since the action was filed with MeTC on Sep 8, 1997, the action was instituted well w/in the 1 year period.
Assuming that RTC that has jurisdiction for the reason that neither Tan Te nor her predecessor-in-interest filed an
ejectment suit within 1 year from February 21, 1994 when Reyes knew of the unlawful entry of Lourdes..SC deems
it fair and just to suspend its rules in order to render efficient, effective, and expeditious justice considering the 9
year pendency of the ejectment suit.
Barnes vs Rules of procedure as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
Padilla rigid application, which would result in technicalities that frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice must always be eschewed. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so
pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared
 to be final. Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override
substantial justice
Section 8, Authorizes RTC -- in case of affirmance of an order of MTC dismissing a case without trial on the
Rule 40 merits and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter -- to try the case
on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it if the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
SC, in the exercise of its rule-making power, can suspend its rules with respect to this particular case (pro hac vice),
even if MeTC did not have jurisdiction over the ejectment suit, and decide to assume jurisdiction over it in order to
promptly resolve the dispute.
W/N respondent is entitled to the ejectment of petitioner Dela Cruz from the premises - YES
At the heart of every ejectment suit is the issue of who is entitled to physical possession of the lot or possession
de facto.
IN FAVOR OF TAN TE BECAUSE:
• Lourdes admitted that she was a rent-paying tenant of Reyes. As such, she recognized the ownership of the lot
by Reyes, which includes the right of possession.
• After the fire, the contracts of lease expired. As a result, Reyes demanded that all occupants vacate the lot but
Lourdes refused to abandon the premises. During the duration of the lease, her possession was legal but it
became unlawful after the fire when the lease contracts were deemed terminated and demands were made.
• Lourdes’s possession is one by Reyes' tolerance and generosity and later by Tan Te's.
• Lourdes fully knows that her stay in the property is at the leniency and magnanimity of Reyes and Tan Te; it
carries with it an implicit and assumed commitment to leave the premises upon notice
When Tan Te made a last written demand on January 14, 1997 and petitioner breached her promise to
leave upon demand, she lost her right to the physical possession of the lot.
Lourdes raises the issue that on Mar 15, 1998, Manila City Council passed and approved Ordinance No. 7951
which authorizes the Mayor to acquire (by negotiation or expropriation) certain parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
233273, 175106 and 140471 for low cost housing and award to actual bonafide residents. This issue was not
presented before CA despite the fact that Tan Te’s petition was filed 6 months after the ordinance was passed.
Thus, this issue is denounced for the reason that it was raised for the first time (ESTOPPEL BY DEED).
Assuming that it shall be appreciated by SC, the intended expropriation of Tan Te's lot will still not affect
the resolution of this petition.
Side comment: in comparison to Baptist Church case. In that case, SC ruled that neither unlawful detainer nor
forcible entry is the correct remedy for the reason that there was no allegation of how the entry and dispossession
was made. Thus, MTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. The rule is that jurisdiction over the case is
determined in the allegations of the complaint. Since such case is void for the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, it can be assailed anytime Settled is the rule that only in the allegations in the complaint is the
determining factor and not the defense’s answer.

In this case, however, there was sufficient special compelling reason for the court to take cognizance over the
defenses’ answers. N complete tiwalag si SC in exercising their equity jurisdiction considering nga naay special
circumstances present. In this case, both the parties have sufficiently alleged how the entrance was made which
mao naka come up si SC na unlawful detainer siya and MTC has jurisdiction.