T h e C o h e r e n c e of a Mind: J o h n

Locke and the Law of N a t u r e *

ALEX TUCKNESS

IT IS ALMOST thirty years since J o h n D u n n ' s book, The Political Thought ofJohn
Locke, a r g u e d t h a t a m o r e c o h e r e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Locke was possible if his
religious beliefs w e r e t a k e n to play a crucial role in his political theory. ~ Since
that t i m e m a n y scholars have e x p a n d e d o u r historical k n o w l e d g e o f the role o f
religion in Locke's political t h o u g h t y T h i s article will n o t use a historical
m e t h o d o l o g y , b u t will r a t h e r take the claim that religion is crucial to Locke's
t h o u g h t as a starting point. W h e n one c o m b i n e s this a s s u m p t i o n with a careful
r e a d i n g o f the Two Treatises of Government (Two Treatises), The Reasonableness of
Christianity as Delivered in Scripture (The Reasonableness), a n d the Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (Essay), significant p r o g r e s s in resolving m a n y o f the
long-standing difficulties in Locke's t h e o r y o f n a t u r a l law is possible.
T h e difficulties are i n d e e d serious. Prior to L o c k e t h e r e was a l o n g stand-
ing theological d e b a t e a b o u t w h e t h e r the laws of n a t u r e were b i n d i n g b e c a u s e
they w e r e the c o m m a n d o f G o d (voluntarism) or b i n d i n g because o f their
intrinsic compatibility with r e a s o n ("rationalism" or "intellectualism"). T h e r e
has b e e n m u c h dispute a b o u t w h e t h e r L o c k e was consistently a v o l u n t a r i s t or
not.3 Second, Locke a r g u e s in the Essay that the p r i n c i p l e s o f morality are

*Author's note: I would like to thank Richard Tuck, John Dunn, Jeremy Waldron, Paul
Sigmund and John Parrish for reading and commenting on this article at various stages of its
development.
1The title of this article is adapted from part four of his book. See John Dunn, The Political
Thought ofJohn Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
See for example Richard Ash craft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government
(Princeton University Press, 1986); Ian Harris, The Mind of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994) ;John Marshall,John Locke: Resistance, Religion, and Responsibilit~ (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994); and James Tully, A Discourse on Property, John Locke and His
Adversaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 198o) and An Approach to Political Philosophy:
Locke in Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
~For a helpful description of the various and contradictory positions taken by scholars here,
see A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton University Press, 1993), 39-34 .

[73]
74 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 7 : 1 J A N U A R Y 1 9 9 9

capable o f p r o o f just like principles o f g e o m e t r y , yet Locke never p r o d u c e d a

p r o o f o f the law o f nature. In the Second Treatise the laws o f n a t u r e are m o r e
asserted than d e f e n d e d , as if they were self-evident, yet in The Reasonableness
Locke says that it is exceedingly difficult to discover the m o r a l law t h r o u g h
reason alone a n d says that n o one has ever discovered the c o m p l e t e law of
n a t u r e t h r o u g h u n a i d e d reason. It a p p e a r s that Locke " . . . w e n t on believing
the a r g u m e n t s o f the Second Treatise were plainly true even after he knew he
could n o t p r o p e r l y g r o u n d t h e m in n a t u r a l law . . . . "4
T h i r d , Straussians have been quick to p o i n t out that Locke a d o p t e d a
hedonistic t h e o r y o f h u m a n motivation a n d o f g o o d a n d evil, a position which
seems to sit p o o r l y with a Christian t h e o r y o f natural law. Locke claimed that
men5 were motivated to obey the law o f n a t u r e by their p e r c e p t i o n o f f u t u r e
pleasure or pain a n d that divine sanctions in the next life were necessary for
the law o f n a t u r e to be a p r o p e r law, yet later in life Locke a d m i t t e d his
inability to p r o v e the existence o f an afterlife. 6 F o u r t h , the a c c o u n t o f moral
knowledge in the Essay seems to sit p o o r l y with Locke's a c c o u n t o f natural law
in the Two Treatises; his c o m m i t m e n t in the latter to empiricism is questionable
a n d the law o f n a t u r e is p r e s e n t e d with little a r g u m e n t as if it were obvious.
Laslett has a r g u e d that the difficulties are so severe that Locke the p h i l o s o p h e r
o f knowledge a n d Locke the political thinker should be kept very separate.7
This article will r e s p o n d to each o f these difficulties in o r d e r to show that
Locke's t h e o r y o f natural law is m o r e c o h e r e n t than his critics have allowed.

1. THE GROUND OF NATURAL LAW" RATIONALISM AND VOLUNTARISM

T h e early Essays on the Law of Nature o f Locke link morality to c o n f o r m i t y with
the rule o f a superior; it is the will o f G o d which provides the essential binding
force o f the law o f nature. (ELN 1 8 3 - 1 8 5 ) 8 In the Essay Concerning Human

4David Wootton, Introduction to Political Writings by J o h n Locke (London: Penguin Books,

a993), a 17.
5Out of historical fidelity to Locke's texts, masculine usages will be retained.
6Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (University of Chicago Press, 1953), 2o 3.
7John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press) 84-87. Ruth Grant, however, argues that the epistemology of the Essa~ is compatible with
the Two Treatises. See John Locke's Liberalism (University of Chicago Press, 1987), Chap. x.
SReferences to the following works by Locke are given parenthetically. All references to the
Two Treatises are taken from Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988 ) by treatise and section number; all references to the Essay are from AnEssay
Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) by book,
chapter, and section number; all references to The Reasonableness and Conduct of the Understandingare
from Works (lo Volumes), (London: 1823) by volume and page number; references to Locke's
journals are abbreviated as Political Essays and reprinted from Political Essays, ed. Mark Goldie
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, a997) ; all references to the E L N are taken from Essays on
theLaw of Nature, ed. W. Von Leyden (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954) and given by page number.
 THE COHERENCE OF A MIND 75
Understanding, this t h e m e continues. "I g r a n t the existence o f God, is so m a n y
ways manifest, a n d the O b e d i e n c e we owe him, so c o n g r u o u s to the L i g h t o f
Reason, that a g r e a t part o f M a n k i n d give T e s t i m o n y to the Law o f N a t u r e " :
But nonetheless m a n y affirm these principles n o t "admitting the true g r o u n d
o f Morality; which can only be the Will a n d Law o f a God, w h o sees Men in the
dark, has in his H a n d Rewards a n d P u n i s h m e n t s , a n d P o w e r e n o u g h to call to
a c c o u n t the P r o u d e s t O f f e n d e r " (Essay 1.3.6).
T h e r e are, however, passages w h i c h seem to p o i n t to a m o r e rationalist
a c c o u n t o f morality. W h e n Locke writes in the Two Treatises that " O m n i p o t e n c y
it self can be tyed" by th~ obligation to keep promises (2.x95), it seems to
suggest that there are rules o f right and w r o n g external to the will o f God,
s o m e t h i n g which runs c o u n t e r to the n o r m a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f voluntarism.
In The Reasonableness, Locke also makes a r g u m e n t s that indicate that G o d can
be j u d g e d by h u m a n standards o f justice. Dealing with i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f origi-
nal sin he argues that some w o u l d have the c o n s e q u e n c e o f the fall be "a state
o f necessary sinning, a n d p r o v o k i n g G o d in every action that m e n do": Locke
objects that such an interpretation is w r o n g because it is inconsistent with o u r
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f G o d as r i g h t e o u s (Works VII 6).9 T h e implication seems to be
that there is a criterion o t h e r than divine will relevant to o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f
natural law a n d morality.
T h e solution to this q u a n d a r y rests on a distinction between two senses in
which a t h i n k e r m a y be a voluntarist. A t h i n k e r is a " g r o u n d voluntarist" if the
will o f a s u p e r i o r (generally God) is a necessary condition for o u r being obliged
to act morally. Such thinkers w o u l d disagree with K a n t a n d Grotius that we are
still obliged to act morally even if G o d does n o t exist. Locke's c o m m e n t s in the
Essay are a s t a t e m e n t a b o u t the true ground o f morality. (1.3.6) Moreover, if the
law o f reason is to be effectual it m u s t have p u n i s h m e n t a t t a c h e d to it; G o d can
provide these while reason c a n n o t (Essay 2 . 2 8 . 5 - 6 ) . T h e hedonistic p s y c h o l o g y
that Locke adopts will be discussed below; one p r e l i m i n a r y r e m a r k can, how-
ever, be made. I f the divine sanctions which G o d adds to the e q u a t i o n are
r e m o v e d , a hedonistic u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f rationality w o u l d lead to precisely the
kind o f egoist moral t h e o r y that Locke a r g u e d in the E L N was c o m p l e t e l y
incompatible with o u r c o n s i d e r e d moral o p i n i o n s (2o 7 - 213; also Essay 1.3.13).
T h e r e a s o n that Atheists s h o u l d n o t be tolerated, in the Letter on Toleration, is
that they do n o t fear divine r e t r i b u t i o n w h e n they b r e a k p r o m i s e s ? ~

I have checked Von Leyden's translation against the more recent translation by Horwitz, Clay, and
Clay (Questions Concerning the Law of Nature, [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 199o]) and the
differences in translation do not alter the content of the argument.
9See also Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility, 415.
1~ Locke, A Letter ConcerningToleration, ed.James Tully (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1983), 51.
76 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 7 : 1 J A N U A R Y 1 9 9 9

Although h e is a " g r o u n d voluntarist," L o c k e is n o t a " c o n t e n t volun-

t a r i s t . "11 A c o n t e n t voluntarist is o n e w h o b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e c o n t e n t of our
m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s is d e t e r m i n e d simply by the will of a superior a n d t h a t its
rationality from the standpoint o f t h e i n f e r i o r is i r r e l e v a n t . H e r e we must
proceed slowly. L o c k e c l e a r l y d o e s t h i n k t h a t t h e r e is a r a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p
between human n a t u r e a n d t h e c o n t e n t o f n a t u r a l law. G o d still r e t a i n s c o n t r o l
over the content of natural l a w i n s o f a r as H e is f r e e to c r e a t e h u m a n s with
whatever n a t u r e H e p r e f e r s . 12 G i v e n t h i s c a v e a t , L o c k e m u s t a s s u m e t h a t t h e
c o n t e n t o f n a t u r a l l a w is r a t i o n a l f o r t w o r e a s o n s .
F i r s t , t h e c o n t e n t o f n a t u r a l l a w m u s t b e r a t i o n a l b e c a u s e L o c k e is a n a t u r a l
l a w t h e o r i s t w h o d o e s n o t b e l i e v e i n i n n a t e i d e a s . R e a s o n is, a f t e r all, t h e m e a n s
b y w h i c h w e k n o w t h e l a w o f n a t u r e a n d it is a c c e s s i b i l i t y b y r e a s o n t h a t d i s t i n -
g u i s h e s n a t u r a l l a w f r o m r e v e a l e d d i v i n e law. A t h e o r y o f n a t u r a l l a w in w h i c h
reason discovers the moral law by drawing inferences from nature and a con-
tent voluntarist theory are contradictory. A voluntarist theory which also holds
t h a t t h e r e is n o n e c e s s a r y c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t h u m a n r e a s o n p r o c l a i m s as
creation's purposes a n d G o d ' s r a t i o n a l will is u n a b l e to e x p l a i n h o w w e c o u l d
know the latter through reason alone. A voluntarist theory of this type which
holds that the content of that law cannot be criticized by human reason must
a s s u m e a n i n n a t e (or a t l e a s t n o n - r a t i o n a l ) m o r a l s e n s e o f s o m e s o r t . O n l y if w e
can naturally obtain a knowledge of right and wrong through a mechanism

1, Helpful discussions of the importance of the ground/content distinction can be found in

J o h n Yolton, Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 197o), 168-169 and in John Colman, John Locke's Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1983), 32. On the topic of voluntarism specifically see W. Randall Ward, "The
Voluntarism/Intellectualism Debate in Locke," History of Political Thought, Vol. XVI No. 2 (Summer
1995) : 2o9- 212, and Stephen Buckle, NaturalLaw and the Theory ofProperty: Grotius toHume (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1991) 125-149. Unfortunately space will not permit a detailed analysis
of Buckle's interesting argument since he looks almost exclusively at the early E L N and the
primary concern here is with the relationship between Locke's later works. Buckle describes the
ground and content of natural law as the formal and material elements respectively. Although his
interpretation of Locke's early work is generally supportive of the position taken here, I have two
hesitations. First, in the key passage in the E L N (113) Locke simply says that in addition to the will
of a superior, the content of that will must be specified. While the arguments below support
Buckle's claim that in natural law the content is to be understood as rationally related to a teleologi-
cally conceived creation, there is nothing in Locke's statement in the E L N which implies that
revealed divine commands must always have this tight relationship. Second, Locke does often write
as if as the sheer fact of our createdness and dependence on God were sufficient to bind us to His
will whatever its content and never explicitly makes the rightness of God's will a necessary condi-
tion. Nonetheless we will see below that Locke's theory requires that God's will be interpreted so
that it supports Locke's purposeful view of creation.
,2 Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property, 139-133; Locke's thought is similar to a strand
of late medieval voluntarism that sees God's ability to limit his own freedom through covenant as
an expression of, rather than limitation of, God's perfection. See Francis Oakley, "Locke, Natural
Law and God--Again," History of Political Thought, Vol. XVIII (1997): 643-8.
 THE COHERENCE OF A MIND 77

o t h e r t h a n r e a s o n is it p o s s i b l e to h a v e a n a t u r a l law t h e o r y w h e r e t h e r a t i o n a l i t y
o f t h e r u l e s in q u e s t i o n is n o t n e c e s s a r y f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e i r c o n t e n t .
M o r e o v e r , it is c r u c i a l f o r L o c k e t h a t all c o m m a n d s o f G o d , w h e t h e r k n o w n
t h r o u g h r e a s o n o r r e v e l a t i o n , b e r a t i o n a l in a m o r e l i m i t e d s e n s e . L o c k e ' s
t h e o r y o f n a t u r a l law, as will b e s e e n b e l o w , r e s t s o n two a s s u m p t i o n s . F i r s t , it
m u s t b e c l e a r to r e a s o n t h a t t h e c r e a t e d w o r l d is p u r p o s e f u l , o t h e r w i s e it will
b e i m p o s s i b l e to i n f e r G o d ' s p u r p o s e s t h r o u g h r e a s o n f r o m t h e r a w d a t a o f
s e n s e i m p r e s s i o n . S e c o n d , h u m a n r e a s o n a n d d i v i n e r e a s o n m u s t b e suffi-
c i e n t l y a n a l o g o u s so t h a t w e c a n r e a s o n f r o m t h e p u r p o s e s i m p l i c i t in n a t u r e to
God's actual purposes. The truths of God may be above human reason; they
c a n n o t , h o w e v e r , b e contrary to h u m a n r e a s o n b e c a u s e t h a t w o u l d m e a n t h a t
e v e n t h e r e l a t i v e l y f e w t r u t h s w e c a n o b t a i n b e a r n o n e c e s s a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p to
t h e t r u t h s o f G o d ' s will a n d t h e r e f o r e t h e t r u t h s o f h u m a n r e a s o n a r e n o t
m o r a l l y b i n d i n g (Essay 4 . 1 8 - 5 ) .
W e c a n n o w r e t u r n to t h e two t r o u b l e s o m e p a s s a g e s w i t h w h i c h w e b e g a n .
T h e e a s i e r p a s s a g e is L o c k e ' s r e j e c t i o n o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f
O r i g i n a l Sin. L o c k e b e l i e v e s t h a t c o n d e m n i n g a w h o l e r a c e f o r o n e p e r s o n ' s sin
is so c o n t r a r y to h u m a n r e a s o n t h a t i f it w e r e t r u e it w o u l d cast d o u b t o n
w h e t h e r w e c o u l d e v e r k n o w G o d ' s will o n t h e basis o f r e a s o n . L o c k e ' s i n t e r p r e -
tive a x i o m r e q u i r e s h i m to r e j e c t a n y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i t h this i m p l i c a t i o n .
L o c k e a r g u e s w i t h r e g a r d to r e v e l a t i o n t h a t w h i l e it m a y b e a b o v e r e a s o n , it
c a n n o t b e c o n t r a r y to r e a s o n (Essay 4.18. lo).
T h e h a r d e r case is G o d ' s o b l i g a t i o n to h o n o r p r o m i s e s . T a k e n l i t e r a l l y t h e r e
is i n d e e d a c o n t r a d i c t i o n at t h e level o f g r o u n d i n g s i n c e o b l i g a t i o n r e q u i r e s t h e
c o m m a n d o f a s u p e r i o r a n d G o d h a s n o s u p e r i o r . 1 3 Two Treatises 2.195 c o u l d
b e m o r e c h a r i t a b l y i n t e r p r e t e d a l o n g t h e f o l l o w i n g l i n e s . L o c k e ' s p o i n t is n o t
t h a t it is m o r a l l y w r o n g f o r G o d to b r e a k p r o m i s e s b u t r a t h e r t h a t i f t h e K i n g o f
K i n g s a l w a y s k e e p s p r o m i s e s w e h a v e n o r e a s o n to b e l i e v e t h a t h u m a n k i n g s a r e
e x e m p t f r o m t h a t o b l i g a t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , i f G o d w e r e to b r e a k p r o m i s e s a
t h e o r y o f n a t u r a l law w o u l d b e c o m e i n c o h e r e n t s i n c e a n o m n i p o t e n t a n d o m n i -
s c i e n t b e i n g w h o b r e a k s p r o m i s e s is, to o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i r r a t i o n a l . I f G o d
acts in this way, it is e v i d e n c e o f a r a d i c a l d i s c o n t i n u i t y b e t w e e n t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f
God and the rationality of man, since they yield radically different conclusions
a b o u t w h a t is r i g h t o r w r o n g in a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n ? 4

~3Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property, 136

~4It may be that for Locke, as for Aquinas, God makes man in His own image insofar as he
endows man with reason and that when man reasons about moral duty he participates in divine
reason. On this reading, when man uses reason to discover natural law he is not only able to see that
a creator has commanded him to obey certain principles, but also why those principles are right. For
Aquinas see St. Thomason Politics andEthics, trans, and ed. Paul E. Sigmund (New York and London:
W. W. Norton and Company, x988), 46.
78 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 37: ~ JANUARY 1999
L o c k e c a n n o t a l l o w a n y s c e n a r i o w h e r e n a t u r a l law o r d i v i n e r e v e l a t i o n
c o n t r a d i c t s r e a s o n b e c a u s e this w o u l d d e s t r o y t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u -
t i o n o f m a n is p u r p o s e f u l a n d i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g f a c u l t y m a n
h a s b e e n g i v e n , r e a s o n , is i n s u f f i c i e n t to c o r r e c t l y d e t e r m i n e t h e p u r p o s e s G o d
d e s i r e s f o r men.~5 A l t h o u g h L o c k e is a v o l u n t a r i s t in t e r m s o f t h e g r o u n d o f
n a t u r a l law, h e m u s t a s s u m e as a n i n t e r p r e t i v e a x i o m t h a t G o d ' s c o m m a n d s
a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h u m a n r e a s o n in t h e m a n n e r d e s c r i b e d a b o v e s i n c e to
a d m i t o t h e r w i s e w o u l d b e to d i s c r e d i t his t h e o r y o f n a t u r a l law.

2. THE ACCESSIBILITY OF N A T U R A L LAW THROUGH REASON

2.1 L o c k e ' s f a m o u s a n d c o n t r o v e r s i a l s t a t e m e n t a b o u t t h e a b i l i t y o f m a n to
k n o w t h e law o f n a t u r e a p p e a r s in B o o k I V o f t h e Essay:

T h e Idea of a s u p r e m e Being, infinite in Power, Goodness, and Wisdom, whose Work-

m a n s h i p we are, a n d on w h o m we d e p e n d ; a n d the Idea of o u r selves, as understanding,
rational Beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered, and
p u r s u e d , afford such F o u n d a t i o n s of our Duty and Rules o f Action, as might place
Morality amongst the Sciences capable of Demonstration (4-3.18).
L o c k e g o e s o n to a r g u e t h a t t h e s c i e n c e o f e t h i c s c o u l d b e as c e r t a i n as m a t h e -
m a t i c s . Y e t as critics h a v e p o i n t e d o u t s i n c e t h e t i m e o f p u b l i c a t i o n , n o s u c h
d e m o n s t r a t i o n is e v e r p r o v i d e d . N o t o n l y was t h e Essay p u b l i s h e d w i t h o u t s u c h
a d e m o n s t r a t i o n , b u t a L o c k e m a n u s c r i p t e n t i t l e d Of Ethic in General (Political
Essays 2 9 7 - 3 o 4 ) , w h i c h is a p p a r e n t l y a p r o p o s e d a d d i t i o n to t h e Essay, b r e a k s
off at precisely the point where the demonstration should begin, indicating
t h a t L o c k e t r i e d to p r o d u c e a d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f m o r a l s a n d w a s u n s u c c e s s f u t . I 6
T h e s i t u a t i o n b e c o m e s e v e n m u r k i e r w h e n L o c k e ' s c o m m e n t s in The Reason-
ableness of Christianity a r e c o n s i d e r e d . H e w r i t e s t h a t t h e full law o f n a t u r e was
never discovered by reason alone.

But natural religion, in its full extent, was no-where, that I know, taken care of, by the
force o f natural reason. It should seem, by the little that has hitherto been done in it,
that it is too hard a task for unassisted reason to establish morality in all its parts, u p o n
its true foundation, with a clear a n d convincing light (Works VII 139)-

I n s t e a d , L o c k e a r g u e d t h a t t h e full n a t u r a l law is k n o w n t h r o u g h t h e p r o c l a m a -
t i o n o f C h r i s t , t h r o u g h r e v e l a t i o n . T h i s r e v e l a t i o n is n o t c o n t r a r y to r e a s o n ,
a n d r e a s o n c o n f i r m s t h e r e v e l a t i o n o n c e it is p r o p o s e d , b u t h u m a n r e a s o n

~5Richard Ashcraft a r g u e s that this belief that the created world must be radonal is a basic
p r e m i s e of Locke's thought, see Locke's Two Treatises of Government (London: U n w i n H y m e n Ltd,
1987), 4 4 - 4 5 . This position provides the sense in which Ward's conclusion is correct that there is a
realm o f logical consistency which binds God which is nonetheless consistent with voluntarism. See
Ward, "The Voluntarism/Intellectualism Debate in Locke," 218.
~6See Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke, 268, and D u n n , The Political Thought ofJohn Locke, 187.
 THE COHERENCE OF A MIND 79
s e e m s to b e i n c a p a b l e o f d e d u c i n g t h e full law o f n a t u r e w i t h o u t t h e h e l p o f
r e v e l a t i o n (Works VII 14o ). S o m e h a v e s e e n this as a d i r e a d m i s s i o n o n L o c k e ' s
p a r t . A law o f n a t u r e t h a t c a n o n l y b e k n o w n t h r o u g h t h e h e l p o f r e v e l a t i o n is
n o t , b y d e f i n i t i o n , a law o f n a t u r e at all. I f i n d i v i d u a l s are o n l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
o b e y i n g the laws w h i c h h a v e b e e n p r o m u l g a t e d to t h e m , as L o c k e c l a i m s ( E L N
18 5 - 1 8 7 ) , t h e n t h o s e w h o h a v e n o t b e e n e x p o s e d to t h e C h r i s t i a n r e v e l a t i o n
s h o u l d n o t b e e x p e c t e d to k n o w t h e law o f n a t u r e a n d s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e b e
e x e m p t f r o m its d e m a n d s .
I t is crucial, t h e r e f o r e , to e x a m i n e i n m o r e d e t a i l t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f L o c k e ' s
o m i s s i o n i n t h e Essay as well as L o c k e ' s c o m m e n t s i n The Reasonableness. T h e
m o s t c o m m o n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r u n s as follows. W h e n L o c k e w r o t e t h e Essay, h e
b e l i e v e d a d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f t h e law o f n a t u r e to b e p o s s i b l e . W h e n i n t h e w o r k
O f Ethic in Generalhe was u n a b l e to d o so, it l e d to a sort o f i n t e l l e c t u a l crisis t h a t
was r e s o l v e d i n The Reasonableness b y r e v e l a t i o n . H e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e r e was
n o t a r a t i o n a l l y b i n d i n g law f o r all h u m a n s t h a t c o u l d b e d e m o n s t r a t e d , b u t
t h o u g h t t h a t t h r o u g h the C h r i s t i a n r e v e l a t i o n t h e o b l i g a t o r y f o r c e o f t h e m o r a l
law, at least f o r E u r o p e a n s , c o u l d b e m a i n t a i n e d . ' 7
T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n w h i c h L o c k e late i n his life a b a n d o n e d the i d e a o f a
t r u e law o f n a t u r e d i s c o v e r e d b y r e a s o n a n d t u r n e d i n s t e a d to r e v e l a t i o n to fill
t h e g a p , is e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t to s q u a r e w i t h w h a t L o c k e w r o t e l a t e r i n life. is I n
o n e o f L o c k e ' s last works, t h e u n c o m p l e t e d Conduct of the Understanding w h i c h
p o s t d a t e s the Reasonableness of Christianity, L o c k e still b e l i e v e d t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l
m o r a l law was accessible t h r o u g h both r e a s o n ( n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n a n d n a t u r a l law)
a n d revelation (Christianity).

T h e r e is, indeed, one s c i e n c e . . , theology, which, c o n t a i n i n g the knowledge of God

and his creatures, our duty to him and our fellow-creatures, a n d a view of our present
and future state, is the c o m p r e h e n s i o n of all other knowledge directed to its true end;
i.e. the h o n o u r a n d veneration of the Creator, and the happiness of m a n k i n d . This is
that noble study which is every m a n ' s duty, a n d everyone that can be called a rational
creature is capable of. The works of nature and the words of revelation display it to
m a n k i n d in characters so large a n d visible, that those who are n o t quite blind may in
them read and see the first principles a n d most necessary parts of it; a n d from thence,
as they have time and industry, may be able to go o n to the more abstruse parts of it,
a n d penetrate into those infinite depths filled with the treasures of wisdom a n d knowl-
edge. (Works III 244-5)

T h i s p a s s a g e n o t o n l y shows t h a t L o c k e still b e l i e v e d t h e laws o f n a t u r a l reli-

g i o n to b e w r i t t e n i n c h a r a c t e r s so l a r g e t h a t it was a v a i l a b l e to all r a t i o n a l

17See for example Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke, ~79 and, Wootton, ed., Political Writings, x 17.
Spellman presents a somewhat similar view. See John Locke(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 49.
1sJohn Colman takes a similar position, see John Locke's Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edin-
burgh University Press, 1983), 138-14o.
80 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 37:1 JANUARY 1999
creatures, it also shows that late in life Locke held there to be a distinction
between the core o f m o r a l law which was obvious to all rational beings, a n d the
" m o r e abstruse parts o f it" w h i c h c o u l d be discovered only by those with time
and talent to inquire into them. This type o f distinction can be f o u n d in
Locke's earlier writings as well. A passage in his j o u r n a l s written decades
earlier distinguishes between full knowledge a n d sufficient knowledge. (Politi-
calEssays 2 6 o - 2 6 5 ) Only G o d possesses the f o r m e r , b u t all h u m a n beings have
sufficient knowledge to obey those laws that are necessary for them.~9
This a r g u m e n t falls into s h a r p e r focus if Locke's position o n the extent o f
o u r rational u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f natural law is c o m p a r e d with the extent of our
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f revealed divine law. This m e t h o d o f inquiry is justified by
the fact that Locke presents natural a n d revealed law as differing primarily,
p e r h a p s only, in the m e t h o d o f their p r o m u l g a t i o n . I n particular, I will focus
on some neglected passages in Locke's Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of
Christianity which provide the clearest a c c o u n t o f this distinction between full
a n d sufficient knowledge and its implications for h u m a n accountability to
divine law. Locke himself assumes in these passages a parallel between natural
law a n d revealed law (Works VII z~9).
Locke's basic t h e o l o g y in The Reasonableness holds that there are two things
necessary to be c o u n t e d a Christian: belief that J e s u s is the Messiah and repen-
tance, which includes a sincere e n d e a v o r to obey the laws o f G o d (Works VII
1 l~). Part of that obedience involves studying Scripture, since it is here that
G o d ' s laws are revealed. T h e r e is a basic core article o f faith which the Gospel
states so often a n d so clearly that a n y o n e who sincerely studies the Scriptures
a n d believes t h e m to be the w o r d o f G o d will assent to: that J e s u s is the
Messiah. This core belief, stated so clearly in Scripture that it c a n n o t be dis-
puted, c o u p l e d with r e p e n t a n c e a n d a sincere e n d e a v o r to obey, constitute the
sufficient conditions for eternal life. W h a t e v e r o t h e r speculative doctrines a
Christian m a y hold r e g a r d i n g the trinity or Christ's satisfaction for sin, these
are acceptable if they are the result o f a sincere inquiry into the Scriptures.
Locke's a r g u m e n t in the Second Vindication thus runs as follows. First, becom-
ing a Christian is a declaration o f o u r desire to obey Christ, a n d all Christians
are necessarily obliged to study Scripture to the best o f their abilities, as their
circumstances a d m i t (Works VII 2~8). Second, h u m a n s are fallible, thus what
G o d requires o f Christians is sincere effort.

9 . . [S]ince no body says [there] is any one such as is wholly free from error, or frailty,
this obedience can only lie in a sincere disposition and purpose of mind, to obey every

19Marshall takes a somewhat similar line on this passage, seeJohn Locke:Resistance, Religion, and
Responsibility, 444-446 .
 THE COHERENCE OF A M I N D 81

one o f the laws of the Messiah, delivered in the New Testament, to the utmost of our
p o w e r (23~).

T h i r d l y , as n o t e d a b o v e , t h i s s i n c e r e o b e d i e n c e i n c l u d e s n o t o n l y p h y s i c a l
o b e d i e n c e to m o r a l laws, b u t also s i n c e r e s t u d y o f t h e B i b l e to d i s c o v e r a r t i c l e s
of faith. This means that since different people have different abilities and
c a p a c i t i e s f o r i n q u i r y i n t o S c r i p t u r e , t h e e x t e n t o f t h e i r a c c o u n t a b i l i t y will b e
relative.

9 [W]hat he u n d e r s t a n d s to be truth, delivered by our Saviour, or the apostles com-

missioned by him, and assisted by his Spirit, that he must necessarily believe: it becomes
a f u n d a m e n t a l article to him, and he cannot refuse his assent to it, without r e n o u n c i n g
his allegiance (23~).

As the individual studies Scripture, he becomes convinced that a particular

a r t i c l e o f f a i t h is p r o c l a i m e d t h e r e ; at t h a t p o i n t h e m u s t a s s e n t to t h e a r t i c l e o f
faith, otherwise he rebels against God by denying the truth of Scripture. The
r e s u l t o f t h i s is to c r e a t e a s y s t e m w h e r e all m e n a r e d i f f e r e n t i a l l y a c c o u n t a b l e
to G o d r e g a r d i n g t h e i r a r t i c l e s o f f a i t h .

So that in effect, almost every particular man in this sense has, or may have, a distinct
catalogue of fundamentals, each w h e r e o f it is necessary for him to believe, now that he
is a Christian; . . . (Works VII 232-233).

No human being ever achieves a complete knowledge of the articles of

f a i t h in t h e B i b l e . T h e r e is a c o r e o f t r u t h t h a t all r a t i o n a l c r e a t u r e s c a n
u n d e r s t a n d a n d t h a t is s u f f i c i e n t f o r s a l v a t i o n . T h e r e a r e " m o r e a b s t r u s e
p a r t s " t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s a r e r e q u i r e d to s i n c e r e l y s e e k a f t e r as t h e i r s t a t i o n in life
p e r m i t s w h i c h b e c o m e b i n d i n g as s o o n as t h e y a r e r e c o g n i z e d to b e f r o m G o d .
A s u f f i c i e n t k n o w l e d g e , r a t h e r t h a n c o m p l e t e k n o w l e d g e o f d i v i n e will, is all
t h a t is r e q u i r e d . T h e c o m p a r i s o n to n a t u r a l l a w is i n s t r u c t i v e . F o r L o c k e , a full
l a w o f n a t u r e w o u l d b e r o u g h l y e q u i v a l e n t to t h e m o r a l t e a c h i n g s o f t h e N e w
T e s t a m e n t . 2~ W h i l e it is n o t c l e a r t h a t r e a s o n c a n d i s c o v e r t h e f u l l l a w o f
n a t u r e , in this s e n s e , it m a y still b e t r u e t h a t a s u f f i c i e n t c o r e o f n a t u r a l law is
a v a i l a b l e to all r a t i o n a l c r e a t u r e s w h o i n q u i r e i m p a r t i a l l y a f t e r it. T h i s is t h e
i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h e p a s s a g e f r o m t h e Conduct of the Understanding quoted a b o v e . I
will a r g u e t h a t f o r m a i n t a i n i n g p o l i t i c a l society, o n l y a f r a c t i o n o f t h e law o f
n a t u r e is n e c e s s a r y .
Locke's omission of a demonstration of the law of nature should therefore be
s e e n in t h e f o l l o w i n g p e r s p e c t i v e : L o c k e b e l i e v e d t h a t m o r a l i d e a s w e r e c a p a b l e
o f d e m o n s t r a t i o n a n d t h a t m e n s h o u l d d e v o t e t h e m s e l v e s to this t a s k (Essay

2~ John Locke, Correspondence(8 vols.), ed. E. DeBeer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976-
1982), letter #~o59 and WorksVII, 114-1~2.
82 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 37: I JANUARY 199 9
4" I 2.1 1). Yet while Locke never declared it to be impossible, 2~ he did c o m e to see
that it was exceedingly difficult, a fact m a d e clear by his later c o r r e s p o n d e n c e . ~
Locke's claim in The Reasonableness is that d e d u c i n g the full natural law t h r o u g h
reason without the aid o f revelation is exceedingly difficult a n d p e r h a p s impos-
sible. Locke never claims, however, that none o f the law o f n a t u r e can be known
by reason. H e is so far f r o m claiming this that he feels it necessary to refute the
claim that the various p a g a n p h i l o s o p h e r s got so m u c h right that a full law o f
n a t u r e could be assembled f r o m their collected writings (Works VII 1 4 o - 1 4 2 ) .
Given the distinction Locke likes to draw between full a n d sufficient knowl-
edge,23 it remains possible that a core o f the law o f n a t u r e is still accessible to all
rational beings a n d that this is sufficient for the f u n c t i o n i n g o f h u m a n society. It
remains, then, to e x a m i n e Locke's a r g u m e n t to see if even a m o r e limited law o f
n a t u r e can be d r a w n f r o m h u m a n experience.

2.2 N a t u r a l Law a n d the Two Treatises, U n s p o k e n Justifications

In the Two Treatises, Locke does n o t provide an a r g u m e n t which explains how
reason, w i t h o u t the aid o f innate m o r a l knowledge, is able to achieve a knowl-
edge o f the law o f nature. Nonetheless, it is possible to obtain a r o u g h idea o f
how Locke believed such a d e m o n s t r a t i o n should work based o n his other
writings a n d to suggest how Locke m i g h t have justified some o f his key princi-
ples o f natural law in the Two Treatises.
In the Essay Concerning H u m a n Understanding, Locke presents a p r o o f for the
existence o f God. Locke believed his a r g u m e n t , primarily f r o m first cause, was
sufficient to show that "our R e a s o n leads us to the K n o w l e d g e o f this certain
a n d evident T r u t h , T h a t there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being"
(4- I o.6). In a passage q u o t e d earlier, Locke claimed that we u n d e r s t a n d our-
selves as b o u n d by divine law based on "The I d e a o f a s u p r e m e Being, infinite
in Power, Goodness, and Wisdom, whose W o r k m a n s h i p we are, and on w h o m
we d e p e n d ; a n d the idea o f ourselves, as u n d e r s t a n d i n g rational Beings." It is
n o t clear w h e t h e r creation alone gives sufficient g r o u n d i n g for obligation.
W h a t is crucial for Locke is the c o m p l e x o f divine attributes which G o d has
such as power, o m n i p o t e n c e , a n d wisdom, c o m b i n e d with m a n ' s relation to
him as a created a n d d e p e n d e n t being; these considerations insure that any
c o m m a n d God gives is necessarily b i n d i n g for h u m a n s as such (4.13.3).24
A m i d s t the various characteristics o f G o d a n d the various dimensions o f m a n ' s
relationship to God, Locke never differentiates which characteristics alone

~ Colman, John Locke's Moral Philosophy, 139.

"~ Correspondence, #1538.
~31n addition to those already mentioned, see Essay 4.11.8 for a similar treatment of the
knowledge attainable by the senses, Essay 4.14.'~ discussed below and Political Essays, 26o-265.
24See also Harris, The Mind ofJohn Locke, 78-81.
 THE COHERENCE OF A MIND 83
would be sufficient for moral obligation. Particularly, Locke never comments
o n w h e t h e r t h e g o o d n e s s o f G o d is a n e c e s s a r y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f o r his c o m m a n d s
to b e m o r a l l y o b l i g a t o r y . I t s h o u l d b e p o i n t e d o u t t h a t m o r a l t e r m s like g o o d -
n e s s a n d j u s t i c e a r e n o t p r o v e d in L o c k e ' s d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f
God.25 T h e f a c t t h a t L o c k e was u n a b l e to p r o v e t h a t G o d is j u s t will e x p l a i n
s o m e o f t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s L o c k e r e c o g n i z e d in his o w n t h e o r y a n d is p r o b a b l y a
m a j o r r e a s o n w h y h e b e l i e v e d his o w n p r e s e n t a t i o n , t a k e n as a w h o l e , falls
short of mathematical certainty.
T h e n e x t s t e p is to d e t e r m i n e t h e a c t u a l c o n t e n t o f t h e l a w o f n a t u r e o r a t
l e a s t a p o r t i o n o f it. L o c k e d o e s n o t in t h e Essay p r o c e e d to s h o w h o w o u r
k n o w l e d g e o f G o d ' s e x i s t e n c e , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , a n d r i g h t to c o m m a n d t r a n s l a t e s
d i r e c t l y i n t o s p e c i f i c laws o f n a t u r e . H e d o e s , h o w e v e r , g i v e u s e n o u g h i n f o r m a -
t i o n to p o i n t b a c k to his e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n in t h e Essays on the L a w of Nature. I n
a d d i t i o n to t h e a b o v e p r e m i s e s , a r a t i o n a l e x p l o r a t i o n o f m o r a l s also i n v o l v e s a
k n o w l e d g e o f o u r s e l v e s as u n d e r s t a n d i n g r a t i o n a l b e i n g s (Essay 4 . 3 . 1 8 ) . H e
a r g u e s t h a t w e h a v e g o o d r e a s o n to b e l i e v e G o d d e s i r e s u s to u t i l i z e t h o s e
t a l e n t s a n d c a p a c i t i e s h e h a s g i v e n us (4. x4-2). T h i s r e c a l l s t h e e a r l y a r g u m e n t
in t h e Essays on the L a w of N a t u r e in w h i c h L o c k e a r g u e s t h a t w e c a n , f r o m o u r
k n o w l e d g e o f t h e c r e a t e d w o r l d , n o t e t h a t it is p u r p o s e f u l .

[S]ince on the evidence o f the senses it must be concluded that there is some m a k e r of
all these things whom it is necessary to recognize as not only powerful but also wise, it
follows from this that he has not created this world for n o t h i n g and without p u r p o s e
( 1 5 7 ) . 26

God has purposefully endowed us with a decision making capacity, reason,

a n d it is a b s u r d to t h i n k w e w o u l d b e c r e a t e d w i t h r e a s o n , o n l y f o r G o d to will
t h a t w e i g n o r e its d i c t a t e s .
I t is i n s t r u c t i v e to see h o w L o c k e m i g h t h a v e t h o u g h t t h i s k i n d o f r e a s o n i n g
c o u l d s u p p o r t t h e n a t u r a l l a w t h e o r y p r e s e n t e d in t h e Two Treatises. L o c k e
r e p e a t e d l y r e f e r s to t h e f u n d a m e n t a l l a w o f n a t u r e , a t l e a s t in this work,27 as
t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t as m u c h as p o s s i b l e m a n k i n d is t o b e p r e s e r v e d (2.16, 134,
135, 159, 183). 28 W e h a v e s e e n t h a t as r a t i o n a l c r e a t u r e s w e c a n r e a l i z e t h a t w e
are the workmanship of God, His property, and that we depend on Him; we
h a v e , t h e r e f o r e , n o r i g h t to e n d o u r o w n lives. W e a r e " m a d e to l a s t d u r i n g his,
n o t o n e a n o t h e r s P l e a s u r e " (2.6). L i k e w i s e , w e r e a l i z e t h a t o t h e r h u m a n s h a v e

~5See also Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility, 384, and Harris, The Mind
ofJohn Locke, 27 ~ 272.
26On the purposefulness of creation and the content of natural law, see Ashcraft, Locke's Two
Treatises of Government, 37- 39.
27 The Conduct of the Understanding (Works, III 28~-3) and other manuscripts indicates that later
in life Locke may have come to see the Golden Rule as the Fundamental Law.
~8See A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights, 48.
84 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : a JANUARY 1 9 9 9

r e a s o n j u s t as we d o a n d we i n f e r f r o m this that, as m u c h as p o s s i b l e , G o d wills

t h e i r p r e s e r v a t i o n also. G o d w o u l d n o t h a v e m a d e a c r e a t i o n t h a t h e d i d n o t
w a n t p r e s e r v e d as m u c h as possible. T h i s r u l e , t h a t "as m u c h as possible,
m a n k i n d is to b e p r e s e r v e d " i n t u r n c a n serve as a g r o u n d i n g f o r o t h e r rights,
s u c h as l i b e r t y a n d p r o p e r t y , p r o v i d e d t h a t a l o n g w i t h t h e r i g h t o f p r o p e r t y is
recognized the duty of preserving others. Locke m i g h t plausibly have believed
t h a t f r o m basic t r u t h s like G o d ' s o w n e r s h i p o f m a n k i n d , t h e fact t h a t G o d
d e s i r e s his w o r k m a n s h i p to b e p r e s e r v e d c o u l d v a l i d l y b e i n f e r r e d 3 9 It is
r e l a t i v e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d to see h o w L o c k e w o u l d t h i n k a r i g h t to self-
p r e s e r v a t i o n , i n fact a d u t y to s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , flows f r o m this f u n d a m e n t a l
law. I t is also r e l a t i v e l y c l e a r w h y h e b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r e was also a d u t y to
p r e s e r v e o t h e r s w h e n o u r o w n p r e s e r v a t i o n is n o t t h r e a t e n e d .
T h e r i g h t o f l i b e r t y takes a s i m i l a r f o r m . As we saw a b o v e , n a t u r a l law flows
f r o m t h e c o n j u n c t i o n o f m a n ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p to G o d a n d the i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t
r e a s o n gives u s as to t h e n a t u r e a n d p u r p o s e s o f H i s c r e a t i o n . R e a s o n i n f o r m s
us t h a t

Creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages
of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another
without Subordination or Subjection, unless the Lord and Master of them all, should by
any manifest Declaration of his Will set one above a n o t h e r . . . (2.4).

L o c k e b e l i e v e d t h a t r e a s o n was s u f f i c i e n t to g e n e r a t e a k n o w l e d g e o f o u r s e l v e s
as c r e a t e d b e i n g s a n d to r e c o g n i z e t h a t all o t h e r c r e a t u r e s c r e a t e d w i t h the
s a m e c a p a c i t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y r e a s o n , w e r e for t h a t r e a s o n e q u a l a n d n o t in a
state o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n . 3 ~ T h e r i g h t to p r o p e r t y , o f c o u r s e , is f o u n d a t i o n a l i n
L o c k e ' s political t h e o r y . T h e law o f p r e s e r v a t i o n p r o v i d e s a p a r t i a l g r o u n d for
p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y s i n c e m e n m u s t take e x c l u s i v e use o f p o r t i o n s o f n a t u r e , even
if o n l y t e m p o r a r i l y , to m a k e t h e m u s e f u l f o r p r e s e r v a t i o n (2.96). T h e r i g h t o f
p r e s e r v a t i o n also g r o u n d s t h e m a j o r e x c e p t i o n to t h e r i g h t to p r o p e r t y , the
p o s i t i v e d u t y o f t h o s e w i t h p l e n t y to h e l p t h o s e w h o are s t a r v i n g (x.42). Locke's
r i g h t to p r o p e r t y , a n d t h e c o r r e l a t i v e n a t u r a l law c o n s t r a i n t to a b s t a i n f r o m the
p r o p e r t y of others, goes f u r t h e r t h a n merely justifying a p p r o p r i a t i o n of prop-

29Since Locke believed labor to be a duty, he did not believe that there was an obligation to
provide for the able-bodied who refused to work. He believed that such a principle would only
encourage sloth and would undermine God's desire that his creation be preserved.
3~ relationship between egalitarian passages like this one and the extent to which Locke
actually supported equality for the poor, women, and slaves is problematic to say the least. The
best one couId say is that Locke's practice did not always live up to his principles; less charitably,
one could argue that the principles themselves should be interpreted in the light of these prob-
lems. An exploration of these difficulties is beyond the scope of this article. Wootton discusses
these issues and a provides a bibliography on Locke's patriarchalism in his introduction to Locke's
Political Writings, t 15- t 19, J.25-1 ~6.
 THE COHERENCE OF A M I N D 85

erty as necessary for brute survival. Locke also argues that labor gives a title to
the fruits o f labor. Part o f this a r g u m e n t n o d o u b t stems f r o m the belief that
labor is a divinely i m p o s e d duty. B o t h reason a n d revelation attest to this d u t y
(2.32). But the key is the fact that Locke believes it u n d e n i a b l e that the laborer
has an exclusive right to the p r o d u c t o f his labor. While it is true that G o d
could make claims on a m a n ' s p r o p e r t y , if o n e accepts the premise o f political
equality discussed above, t h e n it does suggest that "no m a n but he can have a
right to what that [labor] is once j o i n e d to, at least w h e r e there is e n o u g h , a n d
as g o o d left for others" (2.27). Tully's suggested w o r k m a n s h i p m o d e l is also
helpful here. It claims that m e n are sufficiently in the image of G o d that their
labor gives t h e m a right over their p r o d u c t a n a l o g o u s to G o d ' s right over His
creation, a l t h o u g h o f course m e n m a y only acquire a n d use p r o p e r t y in ways
consistent with the will o f God.31
Locke also believed that since contracts were necessary for the regulation o f
p r o p e r t y a n d the a t t a i n m e n t o f happiness that there is an obligation to fulfill
contracts. H e argues that "all m e n b e i n g equally u n d e r one and the same rule,
if it be p e r m i t t e d to me to break m y w o r d for m y a d v a n t a g e it is also p e r m i t t e d
everyone e l s e . . . " (PoliticalEssays 2 6 8 - 9 ) . Locke links his idea of m o r a l equality
to the G o l d e n Rule to justify the k e e p i n g o f contracts as a necessary p a r t o f the
law o f nature.
T h e final step in Locke's a r g u m e n t is to show that G o d will r e w a r d those
who obey a n d p u n i s h those w h o disobey His laws. T h e t h e m e that Locke
b e g a n in his earlier writings, that a c o h e r e n t scheme o f natural law requires
divine sanctions, finds its most p r o n o u n c e d p r e s e n t a t i o n in the Essay. Locke
believes that a natural law t h e o r y b e c o m e s i n c o h e r e n t w i t h o u t sanctions.

For since it would be utterly in vain, to suppose a Rule set to the free Actions of Man,
without annexing to it some Enforcement of Good and Evil, to determine his Will, we
must, where-ever we suppose a Law, suppose also some Reward or Punishment an-
nexed to that Law. It would be in vain for one intelligent Being, to set a Rule to the
Actions of another, if he had it not in his Power, to reward the compliance with, and
punish the deviation from his Rule by some Good and Evil, that is not the natural
product and consequence of the Action it self. (2.98.6)

T h e r e a s o n i n g here is similar to the r e a s o n i n g described above in the discus-

sion o f Locke's voluntarism a n d rationalism. T h e divine scheme o f natural law
must be consistent with the dictates o f reason a n d an o m n i p o t e n t law-giver
who fails to reward those w h o obey a n d p u n i s h those w h o disobey His laws is a
c o n c e p t which c a n n o t be easily reconciled with h u m a n reason.
This discussion o f the sanctions o f natural law leads directly to the next
m a j o r difficulty r e g a r d i n g Locke's theoretical p r e s e n t a t i o n o f natural law, the

3~James Tully, A Discourse on Property, lO9-1 lO.

86 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 1 JANUARY 1 9 9 9

law o f n a t u r e ' s m o t i v a t i o n a l force. H e r e the q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r t h e r e is a

c o h e r e n t system o f sanctions, given h u m a n n a t u r e a n d u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t re-
w a r d s a n d p u n i s h m e n t s in t h e n e x t life.

3" SANCTIONS AND AN UNCERTAIN AFTERLIFE

W h i l e it is u n c l e a r w h e n L o c k e b e g a n to believe in a h e d o n i s t i c t h e o r y o f
h u m a n m o t i v a t i o n , it is c l e a r t h a t it c a m e to fill an i m p o r t a n t g a p in his
e p i s t e m o l o g y . L o c k e ' s e m p i r i c i s m r e q u i r e s t h a t all ideas o r i g i n a t e u l t i m a t e l y
f r o m p e r c e p t i o n . L o c k e c o m e s to the h e d o n i s t i c p o s i t i o n t h a t u l t i m a t e l y o u r
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m o r a l t e r m i n o l o g y rests on o u r ability to p e r c e i v e the s i m p l e
ideas p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n (Essay 2.2o.2). In a d d i t i o n to o c c u p y i n g the r e q u i r e d
space o f a s i m p l e i d e a t h a t c o m m u n i c a t e s m o r a l i n f o r m a t i o n , p l e a s u r e a n d
p a i n a r e "the h i n g e s on w h i c h o u r Passions t u r n " (2.2o.3). P l e a s u r e a n d p a i n do
n o t m e r e l y serve as the basic sources o f h u m a n m o t i v a t i o n ; L o c k e goes so far
as to claim t h a t f r e e d o m itself consists in r a t i o n a l p u r s u i t o f p l e a s u r e (2. e x.48).
W h i l e this t h e o r y m a y p r o v i d e a m o r e p l a u s i b l e a c c o u n t o f h u m a n action
a n d p e r h a p s even the o r i g i n o f m o r a l l a n g u a g e t h a n L o c k e ' s earliest theories,
it also seems to p o s e a r a t h e r severe p r o b l e m . H e d o n i s m , a c c o r d i n g to the
Straussians, seems to risk c o l l a p s i n g the c o n t e n t o f m o r a l d u t i e s i n t o s o m e -
t h i n g akin to w h a t H o b b e s w o u l d be willing to grant.3~ L o c k e was acutely
aware o f this p r o b l e m a n d his a w a r e n e s s c o n s t i t u t e s the r e a s o n w h y G o d ' s role
as a l a w m a k e r w h o p u n i s h e s b e c o m e s i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p o r t a n t in L o c k e ' s later
writings. I f G o d has a t t a c h e d p u n i s h m e n t s to the b r e a c h o f the n a t u r a l law in
t h e n e x t life, t h e n it s u d d e n l y b e c o m e s r a t i o n a l to fulfill positive d u t i e s to
o t h e r s in this life, even if t h e r e is s o m e cost to ourselves. I f t h e r e is an e x p e c t a -
tion o f f u t u r e r e w a r d s f o r c o m p l i a n c e to the law o f G o d , t h e n those who
d i s o b e y t h a t law act i r r a t i o n a l l y a n d in a m a n n e r t h a t is m o r a l l y r e p r e h e n s i b l e
since t h e y are n o t u s i n g t h e tool G o d has given t h e m f o r decision m a k i n g ,
r e a s o n , p r o p e r l y . A g a i n we see the r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t the t h e o r y o f n a t u r a l law
be in h a r m o n y with h u m a n r e a s o n . T h e e n t i r e p r e m i s e o f n a t u r a l law rests
u p o n the p r e m i s e t h a t the w o r l d is c r e a t e d p u r p o s e f u l l y by G o d f o r certain
ends. T h i s p u r p o s e f u l view o f G o d ' s c r e a t i o n c o m e s u n h i n g e d if G o d creates
m e n with a c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t necessarily seeks p l e a s u r e a n d t h e n sets d o w n
rules the o b s e r v a n c e o f w h i c h d o e s n o t p r o m o t e p l e a s u r e . G o d w o u l d c r e a t e
m e n in such a way t h a t t h e y n e c e s s a r i l y b r e a k his rules. T h i s w o u l d again p o i n t
to the k i n d o f decisive b r e a k b e t w e e n h u m a n a n d d i v i n e r e a s o n t h a t Locke's
t h e o r y c a n n o t allow.

32Hedonism might also be thought to contradict voluntarism. But see Ward, "The Volun-
tarism/InteIlectualism Debate in Locke," 2 13- 2 16 for the claim that this is incorrect. Also note that
if God is the one who attaches rewards and punishments to actions there is no conflict between His
will and the pain and pleasure which signify that will.
 THE COHERENCE OF A MIND 87
T h e c e n t r a l d i f f i c u l t y is t h a t w h i l e k n o w l e d g e o f r e w a r d s a n d p u n i s h m e n t s
i n t h e n e x t life c o u l d alleviate this p r o b l e m , L o c k e e x p r e s s e d d o u b t s o n m o r e
t h a n o n e o c c a s i o n a b o u t o u r ability to h a v e c e r t a i n k n o w l e d g e o f life a f t e r
d e a t h . L o c k e ' s p r o o f t h a t G o d exists d i d n o t i n c l u d e a p r o o f t h a t G o d is g o o d
or j u s t . F o r this r e a s o n , it was i m p o s s i b l e to p r o v e t h a t G o d , a l t h o u g h a b l e to
r e w a r d i n a f u t u r e life, w o u l d a c t u a l l y d o so. A p a s s a g e i n L o c k e ' s j o u r n a l s
c o n t a i n s t h e s e e d o f t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t h e e v e n t u a l l y d e v e l o p e d in the Essay to
deal w i t h this p r o b l e m .

[I]t seems probable that there should be some better state somewhere else to which m e n
might arrive since, when he hath all that this world can afford, he is still unsatisfied,
uneasy, a n d far from happiness. Tis certain, and that which all m e n must consent to,
that there is a possibility of a n o t h e r state when this scene is over; and that the happiness
and misery of that depends on the ordering of ourselves in o u r actions in this time of
our probation here. The acknowledgement of a God will easily lead any one to this and
he hath left so many footsteps of himself, so m a n y proofs of his being, in every
creature, as are sufficient to convince any who will but make use of their faculties that
way . . . . (PoliticalEssays 263) [my italics]

Locke a r g u e s i n this j o u r n a l e n t r y t h a t a l t h o u g h h u m a n b e i n g s m u s t o p e r a t e
w i t h l i m i t e d a n d i m p e r f e c t k n o w l e d g e , we h a v e s u f f i c i e n t k n o w l e d g e to p u r -
sue G o d ' s p u r p o s e s h e r e o n e a r t h . A l t h o u g h o u r k n o w l e d g e o f a n a f t e r l i f e is
o n e b a s e d o n p r o b a b i l i t y r a t h e r t h a n c e r t a i n t y , it is still s u f f i c i e n t .
L o c k e picks this a r g u m e n t u p i n t h e Essay a n d p o r t r a y s it i n t e r m s v e r y
r e m i n i s c e n t o f Pascal's wager.33

But when infinite Happiness is put in one Scale, against infinite Misery in the other; if
the worst, that comes to the pious Man, if he mistakes, be the best that the wicked can
attain to, if he be in the right, Who can without madness r u n the venture? Who in his
Wits would chuse to come within a possibility of infinite Misery, which if he miss, there
is yet n o t h i n g to be got by that hazard? (z.z a.7 o)

H e r e we see L o c k e ' s r a t h e r c r e a t i v e w a y o f t r y i n g to solve the p r o b l e m o f t h e

r a t i o n a l i t y o f n a t u r a l law. W h a t is c r u c i a l is to a v o i d a q u a n d a r y w h e r e G o d h a s
p l a c e d u s i n a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h o b e y i n g H i s law is i r r a t i o n a l . A l t h o u g h we d o
n o t h a v e full k n o w l e d g e o f a n afterlife, p r o b a b i l i t y gives us s u f f i c i e n t k n o w l -
e d g e to o b e y a n d shows u s t h a t t h o s e w h o f l o u t G o d ' s laws are g u i l t y o f
'madness. '34

33For an excellent treatment of Locke's use of probability see Tully An Approach to Political
Philosophy: Locke in Contexts, 193-199 and 3 a2- 314; Tully links the idea or probability to the idea of
sufficient knowledge for moral purposes at 216. W. M. Spellman also notes the importance of
probability as a way of coping with limited human knowledge. See John Locke (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1997), 4 ~.
34On the importance of divine sanctions for Locke's hedonism, see Dunn, The Political Thought
ofJohn Locke, L95-196.
88 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 37:1 JANUARY 1999
Some interpreters have t h o u g h t Locke inconsistent because he c o n t i n u e d
to h o l d that p e o p l e are b o u n d by natural law even t h o u g h they c a n n o t have a
certain knowledge o f its sanctions. More broadly, it could be objected that even
if we did have certain knowledge o f God, o u r obligation to obey him, a n d the
p u r p o s e f u l n a t u r e o f creation, this is insufficient. T h e r e will always be a de-
gree o f u n c e r t a i n t y as to w h e t h e r those precepts we infer f r o m the n a t u r e o f
the c r e a t e d o r d e r are precepts which G o d intends to be morally b i n d i n g on us.
T h e p r o b l e m with this line o f a r g u m e n t is that it assumes that because Locke
believed morals could be d e m o n s t r a t e d to a level o f certainty, he also believed
that in the absence o f such certain knowledge we are n o t b o u n d . This is not,
however, Locke's position in the Essay. I n his discussion o f probability a n d the
afterlife, Locke states that "he that will n o t so far be a rational Creature, as to
reflect seriously u p o n infinite H a p p i n e s s and Misery, m u s t needs condemn
himself, as not m a k i n g the use o f his U n d e r s t a n d i n g he should" (2.2 1.7o).35 T o
i g n o r e the dictates o f rational j u d g m e n t is to quit the rule o f reason a n d ignore
the faculty G o d has given us to use. G o d has set relatively few things in the
"broad day-light" o f "certain K n o w l e d g e " b u t we still have sufficient knowl-
edge because "Probability" provides i n f o r m a t i o n suitable to "that State o f Medi-
ocrity a n d Probationer-ship, he has been pleased to place us in h e r e . . . "
(4.14.2). T h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f probability, sufficient knowledge, a n d m a n ' s
" p r o b a t i o n e r s h i p " is the same as in Locke's j o u r n a l e n t r y discussed above. T h e
fact that we have only p r o b a b l e knowledge does n o t absolve us o f moral
obligation. In fact, w h e n Locke contrasts reason with faith he describes reason
as including both the "Certainty or Probability" o f propositions or truths"
(4.18.2). T o ignore reason in either f o r m is to ignore the will o f God. Locke
believed that u n c e r t a i n knowledge o f an afterlife is compatible with a c o h e r e n t
system o f sanctions a n d h u m a n motivation.36

4. TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT RECONSIDERED

As n o t e d in the introduction, m a n y o f Locke's i n t e r p r e t e r s have f o u n d it

difficult to reconcile the p r e s e n t a t i o n o f natural law in the Two Treatises with
Locke's o t h e r works. Against a consistent denial o f innate ideas in o t h e r works,
Locke makes an o f f h a n d r e f e r e n c e in the Two Treatises to the effect that the
rule that m u r d e r e r s deserve d e a t h is "writ in the Hearts o f all M a n k i n d " (2.11).
I n the First Treatise, Locke states that G o d "planted" in m a n "a strong desire of
Self-preservation, a n d f u r n i s h e d the W o r l d w i t h . . . Necessaries o f Life" lest

:35My italics.
36For an excellent discussion of the way in which Locke emphasized the sufficiency of our
knowledge for fulfilling our purposes and the way this functions as a response to skepticism see G.
A.J. Rogers, "Locke and the Sceptical Challenge," in The Philosophical Canon in the ~7th and I8th
Centuries: Essays in Honour ofJohn W. Yolton (University of Rochester Press, 1996), 49-66.
 THE COHERENCE OF A MIND 89
"so curious a n d w o n d e r f u l a piece o f W o r k m a n s h i p by its own Negligence, or
want o f Necessaries, s h o u l d perish" (1.86). B u t in some ways the m o s t t r o u -
bling aspect o f Locke's a r g u m e n t is the way he presents what we have s h o w n to
be a very c o m p l e x t h e o r y in such a way that it a p p e a r s u n c o m p l i c a t e d , possibly
even "plainer" than positive law. (2.12) Locke provides n o rational d e d u c t i o n
f r o m first principles for the p o r t i o n s o f natural law that he does use in his
political theory; they are taken for granted.37
First, it is i m p o r t a n t to be clear a b o u t w h a t Locke actually said. T h e off-
h a n d reference to a law "writ on the hearts o f m e n " s h o u l d n o t be given too
m u c h weight given the fact that in the Second Treatise Locke makes it clear that
the law o f n a t u r e must be studied to be k n o w n (2.124). This is also clearly in
line with Locke's a s s u m p t i o n that the law o f n a t u r e is discovered by the i m p a r -
tial pursuit o f t r u t h by h u m a n reason. T h e passage that speaks o f G o d "plant-
ing" a desire for self-preservation in m e n (x.86), actually s t r e n g t h e n s the claim
that the Two Treatises and Essay are consistent. T h e status o f this claim is no
different ontologically f r o m Locke's claim that the Infinite Wise M a k e r has
crafted h u m a n s in such a way that they seek to avoid pain; Locke's rejection o f
innate ideas does n o t entail a rejection o f innate instincts or inclinations. This
particular claim should n o t c o m e as a shock to Locke's readers.
More t h a n that, this passage gives one o f the clearest examples in the Two
Treatises o f the way Locke's m o r a l a r g u m e n t implicitly follows the p a t h pre-
scribed in the Essay. T h e inclination to self-preservation has been given to m a n
as "a Principle o f Action by G o d himself" so that w h e n m a n uses reason, "which
was the Voice of God in him," he realizes that this inclination a n d G o d ' s will are in
h a r m o n y . This implies that n o t all desires a n d inclinations share this character-
istic, reason is n e e d e d to infer which inclinations can legitimately be satisfied.
Locke goes on to claim that the law o f n a t u r e which this desire points to is
i n f e r r e d by "Senses a n d Reason" which is clearly in line with Locke's m o r e
sophisticated epistemology in the Essay (Two Treatises 1.86; Essay 1.3.3,13).3 s
T h e m o r e difficult question is to u n d e r s t a n d why Locke presents so little
a r g u m e n t in favor o f his u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f natural law. H e does leave u n a n -
swered m a n y objections which m o d e r n i n t e r p r e t e r s see as crucial to his a r g u -
ment. T h e obvious p o i n t to make, o f course, is that Locke was n o t writing to
convince twentieth c e n t u r y critics. T h e Two Treatises is a f u n d a m e n t a l l y politi-
cal w o r k designed to p r o m o t e a definite political end; we s h o u l d n o t be sur-
prised that the rhetorical d e m a n d s o f Locke's p u r p o s e substantially affect
which a r g u m e n t s he t h o u g h t it relevant to p u r s u e a n d which ones he did not.
Locke's o p p o n e n t s in this case were n o t religious or m o r a l skeptics; on the

37 C o l m a n , John Locke's Moral Philosophy, 179-

~8I a m i n d e b t e d t o J e r e m y W a l d r o n o n t h i s p o i n t ,
9~ JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 37: t JANUARY 1999
c o n t r a r y , they w e r e p e o p l e w h o w o u l d readily a c c e p t that N e w T e s t a m e n t
m o r a l i t y a n d the c o n t e n t o f n a t u r a l law were r o u g h l y equivalent. W i t h r e g a r d
to these o p p o n e n t s , L o c k e h a d a c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t task b e f o r e him. Since
his own t h e o r y grants the s u p r e m a c y o f Divine Law a n d since he n e v e r ques-
tioned the Bible as the r e v e a l e d W o r d of God, it was logically necessary to
refute claims t h a t G o d h a d given fathers, or kings, a n a t u r a l political a u t h o r i t y
over sons or subjects. Locke's own Christian convictions necessitated admitting
that G o d h a d a r i g h t to do so if he desired (~.4); h e h a d to show instead that
G o d had, in fact, d o n e n o such thing. It is h e r e that the relevance o f the First
Treatise b e c o m e s obvious, a n d it is this c o n s i d e r a t i o n that justifies seeing the
two as p a r t o f a single a r g u m e n t r a t h e r t h a n as two disjunct treatises.
T h e question can n o w be p u t to Locke's critics: given the p u r p o s e s for
which he was writing, w h y s h o u l d L o c k e have i n c l u d e d a c o m p l i c a t e d p r o o f o f
s o m e t h i n g his o p p o n e n t s w o u l d m o s t likely have g r a n t e d ? Writing to Chris-
tians, a d e m o n s t r a t i o n f r o m first principles that political f r e e d o m a n d equality
is the n a t u r a l condition o f m a n a n d a c o m p l i c a t e d p r o o f b e g i n n i n g with the
existence o f G o d a n d e n d i n g with, for e x a m p l e , the d u t y to p r e s e r v e m a n k i n d ,
would have a l i e n a t e d m o r e r e a d e r s t h a n it p e r s u a d e d . Professing Christians
would have b e e n h a r d p r e s s e d to d e n y that the d u t y in question was one
i n c u m b e n t u p o n t h e m . W e have seen above j u s t h o w c o m p l e x a n d involved
such an a r g u m e n t w o u l d have b e e n ; given the r a t h e r radical conclusion he was
d r a w i n g a b o u t the r i g h t o f the p e o p l e to revolt, a conclusion sufficiently radi-
cal to cost h i m his h e a d in the x68os, there was no n e e d to f u r t h e r alienate
p e o p l e by attacking i n n a t e ideas a n d p r e s e n t i n g an alternative epistemological
s t r u c t u r e f r o m which to construct a core o f the n a t u r a l law. Such a strategy
w o u l d have b e e n rhetorically a n d polemically foolish.

5. CONCLUSION

L o c k e p r e s e n t s o n e o f the m o s t intricate theistic theories o f the n a t u r a l law

tradition. Because his t h e o r y is theistic, it shares b o t h the strengths a n d weak-
nesses o f all such theories; no a t t e m p t has b e e n m a d e to a r g u e for the validity
o f theistic theories as such. W h e n Locke's t h e o r y is r e a d in this s y m p a t h e t i c
way, m a n y o f the a p p a r e n t inconsistencies in his thinking can be resolved. T h e
r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n Locke's m a t u r e works, The Reasonableness of Christianity,
the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, a n d the Two Treatises, is u n d e n i a b l y a
c o m p l e x one. It is possible, however, to see t h e m as the p r o d u c t o f a c o h e r e n t
mind.

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