Physics and Metaphysics in Descartes and Galileo: Objections Reponses, M Ditations

Physics and Metaphysics
in Descartes and Galileo

BLAKE D. DUTTON
IN HIS CLASSIC BIOGRAPHY o f D e s c a r t e s , C h a r l e s A d a m p a s s e s t h i s j u d g m e n t o n

the influence of Galileo's condemnation on the development of Cartesian
metaphysics:
Sans la c o n d e m n a t i o n de Galil6e, nous aurions eu tout de m~me la m6taphysique de

Descartes. Mais nous ne l'aurions p r o b l e m e n t pas eue sous la f o r m e volumineuse
qu'elle a prise avec toutes ces Objections et Reponses, qui font plus que q u i n t u p l e r les
M~ditations primitives. 1 (AT XII, 3o6)
While not charging Descartes with dissimulation, Adam argues that the meta-
p h y s i c s was d e v e l o p e d to d e f l e c t a t t e n t i o n f r o m t h e h e a r t o f t h e C a r t e s i a n
s y s t e m - - i t s m e c h a n i s t i c p h y s i c s - - w h i c h p o s e d a d i r e c t c h a l l e n g e to t h e r e i g n -
i n g A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m . I n his w o r d s , it s e r v e d p r i m a r i l y as a " t e n t . . . to c o v e r t h e
m e r c h a n d i s e (le p a v i U o n . . . c o u v r i r la m a r c h a n d i s e ) " ( A T X I I , 3 o 6 ) . 2
A d a m is c e r t a i n l y n o t a l o n e i n p o i n t i n g to t h e G a l i l e o a f f a i r as g r o u n d s f o r
r a i s i n g s u s p i c i o n s a b o u t t h e r o l e o f t h e m e t a p h y s i c s in D e s c a r t e s ' l a r g e r w o r k . I n
a r e c e n t b i o g r a p h y , i t s e l f d e s t i n e d to b e c o m e a classic, S t e p h e n G a u k r o g e r t a k e s
a s i m i l a r l i n e , a r g u i n g t h a t it w a s G a l i l e o ' s f a i l u r e to c o n v i n c e h i s o p p o n e n t s
t h r o u g h a r g u m e n t s d r a w n f r o m n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y t h a t p r o m p t e d D e s c a r t e s to
s e e k a c c e p t a n c e o f his o w n n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y t h o u g h m e t a p h y s i c a l l e g i t i m a -
tion. Had Galileo not been silenced there would have been no impetus for
D e s c a r t e s to h a v e d e v e l o p e d a m e t a p h y s i c a l a r g u m e n t ; n a t u r a l - p h i l o s o p h i c a l
' Charles Adam, Vie et Oeuvres de Descartes, in Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, eds., Oeuvres de
Descartes (Paris: Cerf, 1897-1913), vol. 12. This edition will hereafter be cited as AT.
2Adam writes: "Sa philosophie en sera g6n6e dans ses libres d~marches; elle s'embarrassera
peut-~tre d'un bagage m6taphysique dont elle se fllt volontiers alleg~e, et elle s'engagera, pour la
physique, dans un dfitour qui n'est plus le grand chemin ofl elle allait d'abord droit devant soi"
(AT XII, ~79).
[49]
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a r g u m e n t s w o u l d h a v e sufficed.3 T h u s , i n the w o r d s o f G a u k r o g e r , Descartes'

p r o j e c t o f m e t a p h y s i c a l l e g i t i m a t i o n was "a task w h i c h h e n e v e r e v e n c o n t e m -
p l a t e d b e f o r e t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n o f G a l i l e o i n 1633, a n d . . , was a d i r e c t re-
s p o n s e to t h a t c o n d e m n a t i o n . " 4 I f we are to b e l i e v e A d a m a n d G a u k r o g e r , t h e n ,
D e s c a r t e s was first a n d f o r e m o s t a n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h e r w h o s e e x t e n d e d v e n t u r e
i n t o m e t a p h y s i c s was p r i m a r i l y a s t r a t e g i c r e s p o n s e to t h e e v e n t s o f 1633.
D e s p i t e the m a n y m e r i t s o f this l i n e o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , I b e l i e v e it is t r o u b l e -
s o m e i n s o f a r as it isolates D e s c a r t e s ' r e a c t i o n to t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n f r o m b o t h
his criticisms o f G a l i l e o ' s s c i e n c e a n d his views o n t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n science
a n d t h e o l o g y . I n d o i n g so, it o v e r s t a t e s the d e g r e e to w h i c h C a r t e s i a n science
c a n itself b e i s o l a t e d f r o m C a r t e s i a n m e t a p h y s i c s . I n w h a t follows, t h e n , I will
c o n t e x t u a l i z e D e s c a r t e s ' r e a c t i o n to t h e G a l i l e o a f f a i r b y e x a m i n i n g his c o m -
m e n t s o n G a l i l e o ' s scientific w o r k a n d t h e r e l a t i o n o f his o w n views o n science
a n d t h e o l o g y to t h o s e o f G a l i l e o . T w o r e s u l t s will e m e r g e . First, we will see t h a t
if we fail to take D e s c a r t e s ' s e a r c h f o r m e t a p h y s i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s as h a v i n g a
g e n u i n e l y scientific m o t i v a t i o n , n o t o n l y will we r e n d e r his criticisms o f Gali-
leo's s c i e n c e u n i n t e l l i g i b l e , b u t we will fail to u n d e r s t a n d the d i s t i n c t i v e n a t u r e
o f his s c i e n c e vis-fi-vis G a l i l e o ' s . T h i s will b e c o m e c l e a r as we e x a m i n e t h e w o r k
o f e a c h o n m o t i o n a n d the fall o f b o d i e s . S e c o n d , we will see t h a t it is o n l y by
t a k i n g D e s c a r t e s ' m e t a p h y s i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s as i n t e g r a l to his s c i e n c e t h a t we
c a n m a k e s e n s e o f t h e d i v e r g e n t ways in w h i c h h e a n d G a l i l e o r e s o l v e d the
q u e s t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f s c i e n c e to t h e o l o g y . B o t h , it is clear, s o u g h t to
g u a r a n t e e the a u t o n o m y o f science, y e t each d i d so i n a way w h i c h m i r r o r e d
his u n i q u e c o n c e p t i o n o f s c i e n c e a n d its r e l a t i o n to m e t a p h y s i c s . All o f this, I
c o n c l u d e , deflates t h e u t i l i t y o f a p p e a l i n g to D e s c a r t e s ' c o n c e r n o v e r t h e Gali-
leo affair as a m e a n s o f a s s i g n i n g a p r i m a r i l y strategic o r e x t r a - s c i e n t i f i c role to
his m e t a p h y s i c s .
3According to Gaukroger, Descartes' scientific work effectively came to an end after the
condemnation of Galileo as he turned his attention to the task of legitimation largely through the
development of metaphysical arguments in favor of mechanism and the recasting of his natural
philosophy in the language of metaphysics. Gaukroger writes: "The question of metaphysical
legitimation arose principally because Descartes took heliocentrism to be a direct consequence of
the mechanistic cosmology of Le Monde, and the condemnations of 1616 and especially 1633 had
indicated that no purely natural-philosophical argument was going to be decisive. The Meditations,
without completely revealing the aim of the exercise, provide a [metaphysical] argument [for
mechanism] that Descartes hopes will be decisive." Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual
Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, x995), 352. In other words, since Galileo had been con-
demned for his Copernicanism despite impressive arguments developed within a purely natural-
philosophical framework, Descartes, seeing his own Copernicanism as a necessary consequence of
his mechanical physics, sought to shift his arguments for mechanism from the realm of natural
philosophy to that of metaphysics.
4Gaukroger, Descartes, t 1 - 1 2 .
P H Y S I C S AND M E T A P H Y S I C S IN D E S C A R T E S AND G A L I L E O 51
1. D E S C A R T E S ON G A L I L E A N S C I E N C E
Although they were contemporaries, t h e r e is n o e v i d e n c e t h a t D e s c a r t e s a n d
Galileo ever met or corresponded. There is a l s o n o s t r o n g e v i d e n c e that the
work of either had any significant influence on the work of the other, despite
the fact that Descartes reports having leafed through t h e Dialogue Concerning
the Two Chief World Systems a n d h a v i n g o b t a i n e d a c o p y o f t h e Two New Sciences.5
However, we do find several references to Galileo in Descartes' correspon-
dence from which a general attitude toward the Italian scientist becomes
reasonably clear. While occasionally being complimentary, Descartes appears
to h a v e b e e n l a r g e l y u n i m p r e s s e d a n d e v e n c l a i m s t o h a v e a r r i v e d at s e v e r a l
of Galileo's more interesting conclusions before Galileo did. 6
We find Descartes' most sustained discussion in a well known l e t t e r to
Mersenne i n w h i c h h e lists h i s c r i t i c i s m s o f t h e Two New Sciences. T h e letter
opens with the following remarks:
I find [that Galileo] p h i l o s o p h i z e s m u c h m o r e ably t h a n is usual, in that, so far as h e

can, he a b a n d o n s the errors o f the Schools a n d tries to use m a t h e m a t i c a l m e t h o d s in
the investigation o f physical questions. O n that score, I a m c o m p l e t e l y at o n e with h i m ,
for I h o l d that t h e r e is n o o t h e r way to discover the truth. B u t h e c o n t i n u a l l y digresses,
and h e does n o t take time to e x p l a i n matters fully. This, in m y view, is a mistake: it
shows that he has n o t investigated m a t t e r s in an o r d e r l y way, a n d has m e r e l y s o u g h t
e x p l a n a t i o n s for s o m e p a r t i c u l a r effects, w i t h o u t g o i n g into the p r i m a r y causes o f
n a t u r e ; h e n c e his b u i l d i n g lacks a f o u n d a t i o n . (Letter to M e r s e n n e 1638, A T II, 38o)
These comments, though quite general, reveal much about the two great
scientists. First we see a general agreement on the necessity of mathematical
methods in science. Both philosophers s a w t h e m s e l v e s as o p p o s i n g the qualita-
t i v e f e a t u r e s o f A r i s t o t e l i a n p h y s i c s , t u r n i n g i n s t e a d to a g e o m e t r i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n
o f n a t u r e a n d its o p e r a t i o n s . 7 I n d o i n g so e a c h e x t e n d e d the mathematization of
5See Descartes' letter to Mersenne of 1634 (AT I, 3o3-3o4) for an account of his reading of
the DialogueConcerningthe Two ChiefWorldSystemsand his letter to Mersenne of 1638 (AT II, 336) for
an account of his reading of the Two New Sciences.
6For instance, in 1638 Descartes wrote to Mersenne asserting the originality of his own
thought: "Concerning Galileo, let me say that I have never met him, and have had no communica-
tion with him, and consequently could not have borrowed anything from him. Moreover, I can see
nothing in his books that gives me cause to be envious . . . . The best part is what he has to say on
music; but those who know me would rather believe that he got that from me than that I got it
from him; for I wrote practically the same thing nineteen years ago, at which time I had not yet
visited Italy" (Letter to Mersenne 1638, AT II, 388). All citations from the works of Descartes are
taken from John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, Anthony Kenny (trs.), The
Philosophical Writings ofDescartes, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985 & 1991 ). I
will follow the Adam and Tannery pagination throughout.
7While it is true that Aristotle recognized the existence of such intermediate sciences as optics
which apply mathematical principles to physical things and demonstrate physical conclusions by
means of mathematics, he nevertheless differentiated such sciences from natural philosophy or
52 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 37: i JANUARY 1999
t h e p h y s i c a l sciences w h i c h h a d b e e n g a i n i n g g r o u n d s i n c e the f o u r t e e n t h cen-
t u r y . 8 D e s p i t e this s u b s t a n t i a l a g r e e m e n t , h o w e v e r , D e s c a r t e s h a d p r o b l e m s
with Galileo's m e t h o d .
T h e m o s t s e r i o u s c h a r g e s i n t h e l e t t e r s e e m to b e t h a t G a l i l e o d o e s n o t
p h i l o s o p h i z e i n a n o r d e r l y m a n n e r a n d seeks s o l u t i o n s to p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m s
w i t h o u t s e a r c h i n g f o r m o r e g e n e r a l o r p r i m a r y causes. H i s science, D e s c a r t e s
b e l i e v e d , is n e i t h e r p r o p e r l y o r d e r e d n o r s u f f i c i e n t l y g r o u n d e d . A n d since
D e s c a r t e s t h o u g h t t h a t to p h i l o s o p h i z e i n a n o r d e r l y m a n n e r is to b e g i n with
an investigation of the p r i m a r y a n d most general causes from which more
p a r t i c u l a r effects c a n b e d e d u c e d , t h e s e c h a r g e s r e a l l y c o m e to t h e s a m e t h i n g .
T h i s is c l e a r i n t h e sixth p a r t o f the Discourse i n w h i c h D e s c a r t e s discusses the
o r d e r o f his o w n w o r k , at least as h e c a r r i e d it o u t i n L e Monde:.
T h e order I have adopted [in my scientific labors] is the following. First I tried to
discover in general the principles or first causes of everything that exists or can exist in
the world. To this e n d I considered n o t h i n g but God alone, who created the world; and
I derived these principles only from certain seeds of truth which are naturally in our
souls. Next I examined the first a n d most ordinary effects deducible from these causes
[e.g., the heavens, the stars, the earth, air, fire, water, etc.]. T h e n , when I sought to
descend to more particular things, I e n c o u n t e r e d such a variety that I did n o t think the
h u m a n m i n d could possibly distinguish the forms or species of bodies that are on the
earth from an infinity of others [which could have been created]. Consequently I
t h o u g h t the only way of making these bodies useful to us was to progress to the causes
by way of the effects and to make use of many special observations. (AT VI, 63-64)
As s t r a n g e as it m a y s o u n d to c o n t e m p o r a r y ears, a n o r d e r l y s c i e n c e b e g i n s
w i t h G o d , the p r i m a r y a n d m o s t g e n e r a l cause, w h o s e b e i n g c o n t a i n s w i t h i n
itself t h e first p r i n c i p l e s o f all n a t u r e . I t is o n l y f r o m this m e t a p h y s i c a l s t a r t i n g
p o i n t t h a t o n e c a n d e s c e n d i n t o a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f n a t u r e , first b y d e d u c i n g
the m o s t basic laws o f m o t i o n f r o m t h e i m m u t a b i l i t y o f G o d ' s a c t i o n u p o n the
w o r l d , a n d t h e n b y s h o w i n g h o w it is t h a t t h e b r o a d s t r u c t u r e o f t h e u n i v e r s e
(e.g., t h e vortices, stars a n d p l a n e t a r y systems) c o m e s to be f r o m a n initial
c h a o t i c state o f m a t t e r u p o n w h i c h t h e s e laws are i m p o s e d .
physics proper in which demonstration through a mathematical middle term was prohibited. As a
pure (non-mixed) science physics would follow the requirement that all terms within the demon-
stration belong to the same genus. But Aristotle treated quantity, both discrete and continuous, as
accidental to the subject which physics investigates, i.e., bodies subject to motion. Therefore,
investigation into or explanation by way of mathematical or geometrical properties was excluded.
For the relevant requirements of demonstration, see Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 74b:5-76a:31.
8The relation of Descartes and Galileo to the tradition of medieval science, particularly medi-
eval impetus theory and the work of the Oxford Calculators, is enormously complicated and still
not fully understood. A classic work which still is a valuable starting point is A. C. Crombie,
Medieval and Early Modern Science, 2 vols. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959). For developments in the
application of mathematical methods in physics from the fourteenth through the seventeenth
centuries, see vol. II, 85-1o3, 131-166.
PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS IN DESCARTES AND GALILEO 53
Does this m e a n that w h e n Descartes c h a r g e d Galileo's science with lacking
f o u n d a t i o n s he was c h a r g i n g it with lacking the necessary metaphysical f o u n d a -
tions? I n large measure, I believe, it does, even t h o u g h Descartes did n o t write
the Mediations, the full expression o f his metaphysics, for some nine years after
he h a d set out a c o m p r e h e n s i v e a c c o u n t o f his own natural p h i l o s o p h y in Le
Monde.9 This b e c o m e s clear as we examine Descartes' a n d Galileo's derivations
o f what m i g h t anachronistically be called the principle o f inertia as well as their
analyses o f the fall o f bodies.
2. GALILEO AND DESCARTES ON INERTIAL PHYSICS
T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f inertial physics in the s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y grew o u t o f an

a t t e m p t n o t only to solve intractable p r o b l e m s which h a d p l a g u e d Aristotelian
n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y (e.g., the p r o b l e m o f projectile motion), b u t to provide a
physical system that could u n d e r w r i t e C o p e r n i c a n a s t r o n o m y . A l t h o u g h it was
Descartes who most closely anticipated N e w t o n ' s principle o f rectilinear iner-
tia, Galileo is generally credited with m a k i n g the g r e a t e r c o n t r i b u t i o n to b o t h
a s t r o n o m y a n d mechanics. Yet, in tying his analysis o f m o t i o n to the motions
o f terrestrial bodies, he failed to see w h a t Descartes saw, viz., that m o t i o n is
p r e s e r v e d along a rectilinear path. T o see this, we b e g i n with an e x a m i n a t i o n
o f his Two N e w Sciences.
I n the third day o f that work, Salviati, Galileo's spokesman, leads his inter-
locutors t h r o u g h a discussion o f the n a t u r e a n d p r o p e r t i e s of local motion,
b o t h u n i f o r m a n d naturally accelerated. A f t e r d e m o n s t r a t i n g the n o w f a m o u s
times-squared law a n d two o f its corollaries, he digresses into a discussion o f
the t e n d e n c y to m o t i o n in a b o d y as it travels a l o n g planes o f differing inclina-
tion. T a k i n g the t e n d e n c y to m o t i o n o f a m o v i n g b o d y to be equal to the force
o f least resistance sufficient to stop it, Salviati points o u t that this t e n d e n c y
reaches its m a x i m u m along the vertical a n d diminishes as the p l a n e o f the
b o d y ' s path a p p r o a c h e s the horizontal. At the h o r i z o n t a l it c o m p l e t e l y disap-
pears. I n this state, Salviati remarks, "the m o v e a b l e is f o u n d to be i n d i f f e r e n t
to m o t i o n a n d to rest, and has in itself n o inclination to move in any direction,
n o r yet any resistance to b e i n g m o v e d . ' 1 ~
W h a t Salviati is p o i n t i n g o u t here is obvious. A b o d y has its greatest ten-
d e n c y to move d o w n w a r d a l o n g a vertical p a t h a n d offers its greatest resistance
to m o t i o n u p w a r d along that same path. As its p a t h diverges f r o m the vertical
t o w a r d the h o r i z o n t a l its t e n d e n c y to, a n d resistance against, m o t i o n dimin-
9We do know, however, that as early as 1629 Descartes embarked on the project of working
out a metaphysics with the explicit aim of using it to provide foundations for his physics. Thus, his
metaphysical concerns predate both his Le Monde and, more importantly, Galileo's condemnation.
lOGalileo, Two New Sciences. Trans. Stillman Drake (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
x974), 172.
54 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 37:1 JANUARY 1999
ishes, reaching zero at the horizontal. As these, the natural causes of accelera-
tion and retardation, are absent along the horizontal, Salviati concludes that
motion a l o n g t h a t p a t h will b e b o t h u n i f o r m and perpetual.
In stating this conclusion Galileo must be counted as a n i m p o r t a n t forerun-
ner of Newton. Nevertheless, as h i s a n a l y s i s is i n e x t r i c a b l y t i e d t o t h e b e h a v i o r o f
t e r r e s t r i a l b o d i e s i n m o t i o n a l o n g i n c l i n e d p l a n e s , h e is n o t r e a l l y p u t t i n g f o r t h a
principle of rectilinear inertia. This becomes evident as Salviati continues:
F o r j u s t as a h e a v y b o d y . . , c a n n o t o f itself m o v e u p w a r d s , o r r e c e d e f r o m t h e
c o m m o n c e n t e r [comun centro] t o w a r d w h i c h all h e a v y t h i n g s t e n d , so it is i m p o s s i b l e f o r
a n y b o d y o f its o w n a c c o r d to a s s u m e a n y m o t i o n o t h e r t h a n o n e w h i c h c a r r i e s it n e a r e r
to t h e a f o r e s a i d c o m m o n c e n t e r . H e n c e , a l o n g t h e h o r i z o n t a l , by which we understand a
surface, every point of which is equidistant from this same common center, t h e b o d y will h a v e n o
momentum whatever. (emphasis added) H
From t h i s p a s s a g e it is c l e a r t h a t w h a t G a l i l e o h a s i n m i n d by a horizontal
p l a n e is a s u r f a c e s e c t i o n o f s p h e r e whose volume is s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e s o as t o
a l l o w t h a t s e c t i o n t o b e t r e a t e d as i f i t w e r e a h o r i z o n t a l plane. And since the
Sphere in question is c l e a r l y t h e e a r t h , t h e h o r i z o n t a l path along which a body
travels with perpetual and uniform motion turns out to be a path along either
the surface of the earth or the surface of a sphere concentric with the earth. In
a famous p a s s a g e f r o m h i s Letters on Sunspots, G a l i l e o m a k e s t h i s e x p l i c i t :
All e x t e r n a l i m p e d i m e n t s r e m o v e d , a h e a v y b o d y o n a s p h e r i c a l s u r f a c e c o n c e n t r i c
w i t h t h e e a r t h will b e i n d i f f e r e n t to r e s t a n d to m o v e m e n t s t o w a r d a n y p a r t o f t h e
h o r i z o n . A n d it will m a i n t a i n itself in t h a t state in w h i c h it h a s o n c e b e e n p l a c e d ; t h a t is,
if p l a c e d in a state o f rest, it will c o n s e r v e t h a t ; a n d if p l a c e d in m o v e m e n t . . , it will
m a i n t a i n itself in m o v e m e n t . ' 2
Clearly, in tying his analysis to the motions of terrestrial bodies, Galileo

failed to develop a principle of rectilinear inertia.13 The story, however, is
11Galileo, Two New Sciences, 181.

~ Galileo, Letters on Sunspots, in Stillman Drake, trans., Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo (New
York: Doubleday, 1957), 113.
l~The extent to which Galileo can be characterized as holding to a doctrine of circular inertia
is a matter of great debate. If this doctrine is taken to mean that all bodies have an innate impetus
or tendency either to rotate or move along a circular path, he certainly did not hold it. What I have
focused on is his view that motion along the horizontal is uniform and perpetual precisely because
it is a motion that bodies have neither a tendency towards nor a resistance to. In this sense it is a
kind of neutral motion which falls outside of the classical division of natural and violent motion.
Of course, insofar as Galileo posits bodies to have a tendency to move towards some center, this
account makes sense only when we recognize the horizontal as being a surface section of a sphere.
It is in this sense that I say that Galileo failed to develop a clear doctrine of rectilinear inertia. For
the classic defense of the attribution of a doctrine of circular inertia to Galileo, see Alexander
Koyr4, Etudes Galildennes (Paris, 1939), 2o5-238. For the most authoritative rebuttal of such a
position, see Stillman Drake, Galileo Studies: Personality, Tradition, andRevolution (Ann Arbor: Univer-
sity of Michigan Press, 197o), 257-278.
different with Descartes, since his analysis abstracts f r o m the actual conditions
in which bodies move.
Descartes' laws o f m o t i o n make their first a p p e a r a n c e in Le Monde. His first
and third laws, those most i m p o r t a n t for u n d e r s t a n d i n g the way in which he
diverges f r o m Galileo, are as follows:
The first is that each individual part of matter continues always to be in the same
state so long as collision with others does not force it to change that state . . . . If it is
brought to rest in some place, it will never leave that place unless others drive it out;
and if it has once begun to move, it will always continue with an equal force until others
stop or retard it. (AT XI, 38I)
I shall add, as a third rule, that when a body is moving, even though its motion for
the most part takes place along a circular path a n d . . , it can never make any movement
which is not in some way circular, yet each of its parts individually tends always to
continue moving along a straight line. And so the action of these parts--i.e., the
tendency they have to move--is different from their motion. (AT XI, 43-44)
T h e first law is a general law o f persistence dictating that the states o f a

body, including its state o f m o t i o n or rest, will persist u n c h a n g e d unless a
collision with a n o t h e r b o d y alters them. This, we are told, follows directly f r o m
the c o n s e r v i n g activity which G o d m u s t exercise on his creation d u e to his
immutability. T h e a r g u m e n t is simple. G o d imparts a d e t e r m i n a t e quantity o f
m o t i o n into bodies at creation a n d preserves that m o t i o n as part o f his g e n e r a l
conserving activity. T h u s , in the absence o f external forces acting u p o n it, a
body will r e m a i n indefinitely in its state o f m o t i o n or rest w i t h o u t alteration. I f
this were n o t the case, Descartes contends, G o d ' s c o n s e r v i n g activity w o u l d n o t
be immutable.
This, o f course, leaves o p e n the question as to w h a t kind o f m o t i o n it is that
G o d preserves. T h e third law specifies this as rectilinear m o t i o n , a n d the way
in which it does so is reflective of Descartes' metaphysics o f matter. As is well
known, one o f the f u n d a m e n t a l planks o f Cartesian metaphysics is the identity
o f m a t t e r with geometrical extension. A m o n g the m a n y c o n s e q u e n c e s o f this
identity is that it rules o u t the possibility o f a void t h r o u g h which bodies in
m o t i o n m i g h t travel. I f extension is simply w h a t m a t t e r is, t h e n the c o n c e p t o f
a r e g i o n o f space devoid o f m a t t e r is absurd. All m o t i o n , then, must take place
in a p l e n u m . A n d in a p l e n u m , despite the fact that G o d preserves m o t i o n
along a rectilinear path, all bodies are constantly diverted f r o m that p a t h by
collisions with o t h e r bodies. T h u s , Descartes does n o t identify the actual m o -
tion o f bodies as rectilinear (it is always 'in some way circular'), b u t posits a
rectilinear t e n d e n c y in all m o v i n g bodies instead. It is this t e n d e n c y w h i c h the
third law describes.
In all o f this it is clear that Descartes wishes to abstract f r o m the empirical
56 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : I JANUARY 1 9 9 9
situation. I n p o s i t i n g a t e n d e n c y to r e c t i l i n e a r m o t i o n h e is d e s c r i b i n g the p a t h
w h i c h a b o d y w o u l d take if it w e r e to travel u n i m p e d e d by t h e i n n u m e r a b l e
d e f l e c t i n g collisions to w h i c h it is s u b j e c t in its m o t i o n t h r o u g h the p l e n u m .
A n d t h o u g h he a p p e a l s to e m p i r i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n to c o n f i r m the law (viz., the
o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t a s t o n e , w h e n r e l e a s e d f r o m a sling, travels a l o n g a rectilinear
p a t h t a n g e n t to the circle w h i c h the m o t i o n o f the sling describes), its u l t i m a t e
j u s t i f i c a t i o n is m e t a p h y s i c a l . I n fact, it is t h e s a m e j u s t i f i c a t i o n w h i c h g r o u n d s
the first law, viz., G o d ' s i m m u t a b l e c o n s e r v i n g action.
I n his e l a b o r a t i o n o f the t h i r d law D e s c a r t e s writes t h a t it " d e p e n d s solely
o n G o d ' s p r e s e r v i n g e a c h t h i n g by a c o n t i n u o u s action, a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y o n
his p r e s e r v i n g it n o t as it m a y have b e e n s o m e time earlier b u t precisely as it is
at the v e r y i n s t a n t t h a t h e p r e s e r v e s it" ( A T XI, 44). A m o v i n g b o d y , like e v e r y
e n t i t y in t h e C a r t e s i a n universe, d e p e n d s u p o n the causal p o w e r o f G o d a n d
c a n n o t exist f r o m o n e m o m e n t to the n e x t w i t h o u t G o d , as it were, c o n t i n u a l l y
r e c r e a t i n g it. B u t at e a c h instant, D e s c a r t e s argues, a b o d y , c o n s i d e r e d in itself,
can o n l y h a v e a t e n d e n c y to m o v e in a r e c t i l i n e a r p a t h , f o r rectilinear m o t i o n is
the o n l y k i n d o f m o t i o n t h a t can be d e t e r m i n e d in an instant. H e explains:
Of all motions, only motion in a straight line is entirely simple and has a nature
which may be wholly grasped in an instant. For in order to conceive such motion it
suffices to think that a body is in the process of moving in a certain direction, and that this
is the case at each determinable instant during the time that it is moving. (AT XI, 45)
If, o n the o t h e r h a n d , we are to c o n c e i v e o f circular m o t i o n - - a c o m p l e x

m o t i o n i n v o l v i n g c o n t i n u o u s c h a n g e in d i r e c t i o n - - w e m u s t c o n c e i v e o f at least
two o f its instants a n d the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m . O n l y rectilinear m o t i o n ,
t h e n , can be d e t e r m i n e d in a single instant.'4 A n d this, c o u p l e d with the fact
t h a t G o d p r e s e r v e s e a c h b o d y "precisely as it is at t h e v e r y i n s t a n t t h a t he
p r e s e r v e s it," entails t h a t e v e r y m o v i n g b o d y has a t e n d e n c y to m o v e in a
rectilinear p a t h . I f a b o d y is deflected f r o m t h a t p a t h , it m u s t be d u e to
s o m e t h i n g e x t e r n a l to itself a c t i n g u p o n it.
A t this p o i n t the d i v e r g e n c e b e t w e e n D e s c a r t e s a n d Galileo b e c o m e s clear.
I n o u r e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e first law we saw t h a t Descartes believes t h a t m o t i o n
is p r e s e r v e d n o t b e c a u s e o f a n y t h i n g i n h e r e n t in the m o v i n g b o d y , b u t solely
b e c a u s e o f the i m m u t a b i l i t y o f G o d ' s c o n s e r v i n g activity. Similarly, we saw that
he d o e s n o t take the r e c t i l i n e a r t e n d e n c y o f a m o v i n g b o d y to be an i n n a t e
p r o p e r t y , b u t m e r e l y an e x p r e s s i o n o f G o d ' s p r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h a t b o d y as it is at
'4Descartes takes pains to point out that he is not asserting that a body actually moves in an
instant. He writes: "Note that I am not saying that rectilinear motion can take place in an instant,
but only that everything required to produce it [i.e., rectilinear ,notion] is present in bodies at each
instant which might be determined while they are moving, whereas not everything required to
produce circular motion is present" (AT XI, 45).
PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS IN D E S C A R T E S AND GALILEO 57
each instant without regard to how it was at previous instants. Descartes' first
and third laws, then, are not predicated upon anything innate to bodies them-
selves, but simply on the way in which God conserves them. And since the way
in which God preserves them is a f u n c t i o n of his immutability, i t is f a i r t o s a y
that for Descartes the conservation of motion is d u e t o s o m e t h i n g intrinsic to
the nature of God, rather than to anything intrinsic to the nature of bodies.~5
This, I b e l i e v e , is a b s o l u t e l y crucial, for it separates his views from those of
Galileo insofar as the latter built his inertial principle on the assumption of an
innate tendency of heavy bodies to move downward along the vertical and an
innate resistance to motion upward along that vertical? 6 Insofar as t h i s is t h e
case, he and Descartes stand radically apart.
I n l i g h t o f t h i s i t is e a s y t o s e e w h y Galileo was so harshly criticized by
Descartes. As he posited an innate tendency toward motion i n all h e a v y b o d i e s ,
Galileo had no need to appeal to God in formulating his views on motion.
Descartes, on the other hand, in divesting matter o f all i n n a t e tendencies
whatsoever, had to have recourse to God to explain both the perpetuity of the
states of a body, including its s t a t e s o f m o t i o n and rest, and the fact that a
i5 Here I am in essential agreement with Richard Blackwell who writes: "If it is legitimate to
say that Descartes' emphasis on conservation has contributed to the origins of m o d e r n physics, it
must be noted that for Descartes the word 'conservation' refers more to something present in God
(i.e., immutability) than to anything properly i n h e r e n t in the structure of the material universe. In
short, the conservation of matter and motion is fundamentally a metaphysical law in Cartesian
thought." Richard Blackwell, "Descartes' Laws of Motion," in Isis 57 (1966): ~ ~3. We should note
that this view has important implications for understanding the extent to which Descartes may or
may not be interpreted as introducing dynamical elements into his physics. Given his reduction of
the force (vis, force) to act on, or resist the action of, another body to the tendency of a body to
persevere in its state of rectilinear motion or rest (see Principles II, 43), if Descartes denies that this
tendency is intrinsic to a body, Cartesian bodies will be devoid of i n h e r e n t forces as well. And if
there are no forces in the world, his physics cannot properly be interpreted as dynamical. For a
systematic reading of Descartes' views on force which develops this line of interpretation, see Gary
H atfield, "Force (God) in Descartes' Physics," in Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Vol. 1o,
No. ~ (1979) : 113-14 o. For an alternative reading which defends the attribution of force to bodies,
see Alan Gabbey, "Force and Inertia in the Seventeenth Century: Descartes and Newton," in
Stephen Gaukroger ed., Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics (Sussex: Harvester Press,
198o), ~3o-32o.
~6For example, in his Letters on Sunspots Galileo writes: "I seem to have observed that physical
bodies have physical inclination to some motion (as heavy bodies downward), which motion is
exercised by them through an intrinsic property and without need of a particular external mover,
whenever they are not impeded by some obstacle. And to some other motion they have a repug-
nance (as the same heavy bodies to motion upward), and therefore they never move in that
m a n n e r unless thrown violently by an external mover." Galileo, Letters on Sunspots, 113. In his
Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems Galileo speculates that this tendency may be a ten-
dency on the part of all matter to unite so as to form spheres. This would account for the spherical
shape of the earth, sun and all of the celestial bodies. Furthermore, it would entail that any piece
of matter separated from its sphere would have a tendency to move back towards the center of that
sphere. See Galileo, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, 33-34.
58 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 37:1 JANUARY *999
b o d y ' s n a t u r a l p a t h (i.e., p a t h it w o u l d take if n o t deflected by o t h e r bodies) is

rectilinear. T h u s , he h a d to g r o u n d his physics in his metaphysics, particularly
in his doctrine o f God. In this o n e r e s p e c t at least, Descartes shows h i m s e l f to
be the m o r e t h o r o u g h - g o i n g m e c h a n i s t .
3" A C O N F I R M A T I O N : DESCARTES AND GALILEO ON FREE-FALL

We can find c o n f i r m a t i o n o f this analysis if we l o o k at a r e l a t e d area o f
Galilean science with which Descartes, t h o u g h voicing s o m e a g r e e m e n t ,
f o u n d serious fault as well. T h i s is Galileo's w o r k on the free fall o f bodies. In
day o n e o f the Two New Sciences a discussion is t a k e n u p a b o u t the relation o f
the resistance o f a m e d i u m to the s p e e d s o f falling bodies. Salviati a r g u e s that
the d i f f e r e n c e in the speeds at which bodies o f d i f f e r i n g weights fall varies in
p r o p o r t i o n to the resistance o f the m e d i u m t h r o u g h which t h e y fall: the
m o r e resistance the m e d i u m offers, the g r e a t e r will be the d i f f e r e n c e in
the speeds. F r o m this he c o n c l u d e s that "if o n e were to r e m o v e entirely the
resistance o f the m e d i u m , all materials w o u l d d e s c e n d with e q u a l speed."w
O f course a m e d i u m in which t h e r e is n o resistance to m o t i o n is a void. T h u s ,
we arrive at Galileo's f a m o u s conclusion that all bodies will fall with equal
s p e e d t h r o u g h a void r e g a r d l e s s o f weight.
Descartes, on r e a d i n g the Two New Sciences, could n o t let such a claim pass.
H e w r o t e to M e r s e n n e saying t h a t "all that which [Galileo] says c o n c e r n i n g the
s p e e d o f bodies falling in the void etc., is built w i t h o u t a f o u n d a t i o n ; for he
o u g h t to have first d e t e r m i n e d w h a t w e i g h t is; a n d if he h a d k n o w n the truth
o f this, he w o u l d have k n o w n that it is n o t h i n g in the void" (Letter to
M e r s e n n e 1638, A T II, 385). Galileo's p r o b l e m t u r n s o u t to be a p s e u d o
p r o b l e m in Cartesian physics since w e i g h t is n o t taken as an intrinsic p r o p e r t y
o f m a t t e r , b u t is e x p l a i n e d m e c h a n i c a l l y by the ' p u s h ' o f celestial particles on
terrestrial particles toward the c e n t e r o f the earth. T h i s p u s h c o m e s a b o u t
b e c a u s e the celestial particles in the w h i r l p o o l which causes the e a r t h ' s rotation
(as o p p o s e d to its orbit) m o v e faster than terrestrial particles, a n d h e n c e , have
g r e a t e r centrifugal force. I n s o f a r as they do, they m o v e away f r o m the earth
a n d displace any terrestrial m a t t e r which is above t h e m , f o r c i n g that matter
d o w n w a r d . 's Weight, then, is n o t an intrinsic p r o p e r t y o f a b o d y in the Carte-
sian system, b u t is e x p l a i n e d m e c h a n i c a l l y by the p r e s e n c e o f celestial m a t t e r
s u r r o u n d i n g a n d p u s h i n g u p o n terrestrial matter. Because o f this it is clear
x7Galileo, Two New Sciences, 75.

18Descartes explains: "In virtue o f the selfsame [indiscriminate] motion, w h e n the [celestial]
globules are p r e v e n t e d from moving in a straight line by e n c o u n t e r i n g the entire mass of the
earth, they propel all the earth's particles towards the centre, and this is what the 'gravity' o f
terrestrial bodies consists in" (Pr.Phil.IV.~l. A T VIIIA, ~12).
why Galileo's problem d o e s n o t a r i s e f o r D e s c a r t e s . S i n c e t h e r e is n o s u r r o u n d -
ing matter in a void, there can be no weight.19
We can easily see that this passage has implications which extend far be-
yond questions of speed, weight and void since Descartes c i t e s t h i s as a n
example of Galileo philosophizing without a foundation. Presumably t h i s is
because Galileo had not sufficiently inquired i n t o w h a t w e i g h t is, a n i n v e s t i g a -
tion which Descartes would have considered as p r e l i m i n a r y . But we may take
this a step further. From Descartes' perspective, Galileo was mislead precisely
because he had not undertaken the requisite metaphysical analysis of matter
so as to s e e t h a t it is p u r e e x t e n s i o n . I f h e h a d d o n e t h i s h e w o u l d h a v e k n o w n
t h a t w e i g h t is n o t a n i n t r i n s i c p r o p e r t y since the identification of matter with
extension excludes all a p p e a l to a c t i v e n a t u r e s and real qualities ( s u c h as
weight) in physics. Hence he would have sought, like Descartes, a properly
mechanistic explanation o f t h e f a l l o f b o d i e s . 2~
The merits of this interpretation, of course, are debatable since the subject
of Galileo's metaphysical commitments has been one of some controversy.
Following the interpretations of Burtt and Koyr6, Galileo has often been read
as a P l a t o n i s t w h o h e l d to a m a t h e m a t i c a l ontology in which the material con-
s t i t u e n t s o f r e a l i t y a r e e n t i r e l y r e d u c i b l e , i n t h e o r y i f n o t i n p r a c t i c e , to g e o m e -
try. ~1 T h i s , it is a s s u m e d , p r o v i d e d Galileo with a metaphysical justification for
the application of mathematical principles in physics. Against this, however,
more recent commentators have argued t h a t t h e r e is n o u n i f i e d m e t a p h y s i c a l
x9Descartes considers a similar case in the Principles: "Imagine that all the spaces around the
earth unoccupied by terrestrial matter were empty, [i.e., devoid of all celestial matter] . . . ; and
suppose further that the earth revolved about its axis by its own motion . . . . In this case all the
terrestrial particles which were not firmly joined together would leap off in all directions towards
the heavens . . . . Thus the earth would have to be called light rather than heavy" (Pr.Phil.IV. 21. AT
VIIIA, 212).
~~ leaving this topic we should note that while Descartes found fault with this aspect of
Galileo's work on falling bodies, he did come to embrace the times-squared law. In fact, Descartes
claims to have been its discoverer, believing himself to have formulated it prior to Galileo (see
Letter to Mersenne 1634, AT I, 3o4-3o5). As William Shea has shown, however, Descartes was
certainly mistaken in this claim, for his own analysis of the fall of bodies, developed initially in
response to a query from Isaac Beeckman, did not result in taking the distance traversed as
proportional to the square of the time fallen (though this is what Beeckman interpreted him as
saying), but in taking speed as proportional to the square of the distance. And as Shea points out,
these two results are incompatible with one another. For an analysis of the technical details of
Galileo's and Descartes' formulations of this law, see William Shea, "Descartes as a Critic of
Galileo," in Robert Butts and Joseph Pitt, eds., New Perspectives on Galileo (Boston: D. Reidel, 1978),
139-159. Much of this material appears again in Shea's The Magic of Numbers and Motion: The
Scientific Career of Ren~ Descartes (Canton: Science History Publications, 1991), 15-27, 3o9-315 .
21See E. A. Burtt, The MetaphysicalFoundations of Modern Science (New Jersey: The Humanities
Press, 1952), 72-104 and Alexandre Koyr~, l~tudes Galildeennes, 977-291.
60 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 1 JANUARY 1 9 9 9
f o u n d a t i o n , P l a t o n i c o r o t h e r w i s e , in G a l i l e o ' s w o r k . ~ A c c o r d i n g to this i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n G a l i l e o s o u g h t to j u s t i f y t h e u s e o f m a t h e m a t i c a l m o d e l s b y s h o w i n g
t h e i r u t i l i t y w h e n e x t e n d e d to n e w a r e a s o f s c i e n c e , e.g., t e r r e s t r i a l m e c h a n i c s ,
rather than justify them by metaphysical argument. The following passage
f r o m G a l i l e o ' s L e t t e r s o n S u n s p o t s s e e m s to b e a r t h i s o u t :
In our speculating we either seek to p e n e t r a t e the true and internal essence of

natural substances, or content ourselves with a knowledge of some of their properties.
T h e f o r m e r I hold to be as impossible an u n d e r t a k i n g with r e g a r d to the closest
elemental substances as with more remote celestial things . . . . But if what we wish to
fix in our minds is the a p p r e h e n s i o n of some p r o p e r t i e s of things, then it seems to me
that we n e e d not despair of our ability to acquire this.~3
U n d o u b t e d l y t h i s was i n t e n d e d as a swipe a g a i n s t t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n s , b u t it also set

G a l i l e o a p a r t f r o m D e s c a r t e s , w h o s e m a t h e m a t i z a t i o n o f p h y s i c s was itself
g r o u n d e d in t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e e s s e n c e o f m a t t e r w i t h e x t e n s i o n . I n d e e d ,
this i d e n t i f i c a t i o n is o n e o f t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t c o n c l u s i o n s o f t h e M e d i t a t i o n s a n d
it s t a n d s w i t h i n t h e C a r t e s i a n s y s t e m as a p r o p e r l y m e t a p h y s i c a l thesis. As t h e
L e t t e r m a k e s c l e a r , h o w e v e r , G a l i l e o r e f u s e d to t r o d d o w n t h i s m e t a p h y s i c a l
p a t h , b u t a d v i s e d u s i n s t e a d to s i m p l y t u r n o u r a t t e n t i o n t o w a r d t h o s e p r o p e r -
ties o f m a t t e r w h i c h c a n b e k n o w n . L i k e D e s c a r t e s , h e t o o k t h e s e to b e g e o m e t r i -
cal p r o p e r t i e s ; u n l i k e D e s c a r t e s , h e s o u g h t n o d e e p m e t a p h y s i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
I n l i g h t o f all o f this, it is s o m e w h a t i r o n i c t h a t A d a m cites D e s c a r t e s '
c o n c e r n o v e r t h e G a l i l e o a f f a i r as t h e p r i m a r y e v i d e n c e f o r t a k i n g D e s c a r t e s '
m e t a p h y s i c s as a r t i f i c i a l l y i n f l a t e d , f o r D e s c a r t e s ' o w n r e m a r k s c o n c e r n i n g t h e
l a c k o f p r o p e r o r d e r in G a l i l e o ' s w o r k , b o t h g e n e r a l l y a n d in s p e c i f i c cases, c a n
p l a u s i b l y b e r e a d as a c r i t i c i s m o f G a l i l e o ' s d i s r e g a r d f o r m e t a p h y s i c a l f o u n d a -
t i o n s . A l t h o u g h A d a m a n d G a u k r o g e r a r e c e r t a i n l y c o r r e c t in c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e
t r i a l o f 1633 c a u s e d D e s c a r t e s c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n c e r n , if w e a r e to t a k e his
c r i t i c i s m s s e r i o u s l y w e c a n h a r d l y t a k e t h a t c o n c e r n as a w a r r a n t f o r a s s i g n i n g
t h e m e t a p h y s i c s a p e r i p h e r a l s t a t u s o r t r e a t i n g it as a d e v i c e to d e f l e c t a t t e n t i o n
f r o m c o n t r o v e r s i a l p h y s i c a l h y p o t h e s e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , it is c l e a r t h a t D e s c a r t e s ,
l i k e G a l i l e o b e f o r e h i m , f e l t t h e n e e d to w o r k o u t a s t r a t e g y f o r p r o m o t i n g t h e
n e w s c i e n c e in w h a t h e p e r c e i v e d to be, at l e a s t in p a r t , a h o s t i l e t h e o l o g i c a l
e n v i r o n m e n t . I b e l i e v e , h o w e v e r , t h a t w e c a n give a r e a d i n g o f this s t r a t e g y
~2Gary Hatfield, tor example, writes: "Galileo's distinctive philosophical contribution to the
rise of the new science was to show how one can seek to establish the appropriateness of one type
of approach to natural science over its competitors without first establishing a metaphysical
framework as foundation and support." See Gary Hatfield, "Metaphysics and the New Science," in
David Lindberg and Robert Westman, eds., Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 199o), 118. Stilhnan Drake also takes this anti-metaphysical reading
throughout his Galileo at Work: His Scientific Biography (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, a978).
~ Galileo, Letters on Sunspots, 123 - 1 "24.
which bears out the characterization of Cartesian a n d Galilean science offered

a b o v e a n d d o e s n o t r e s o r t to a s s i g n i n g t h e m e t a p h y s i c s a p r i m a r i l y e x t r a -
scientific o r a p o l o g e t i c role. I t is to this t h a t we n o w t u r n .
4. D E S C A R T E S , GALILEO AND AQUINAS ON THE DIVISION OF TRUTH
Given the challenges of d o i n g science in the b r o a d e r theological context of the

early s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y we m i g h t e x p e c t t h a t G a l i l e o a n d D e s c a r t e s w o u l d
e a c h r e s o l v e t h e q u e s t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n o f t h e o l o g y to s c i e n c e i n a w a y f a v o r -
i n g t h e a u t o n o m y o f science. N o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , this is i n fact t h e case. B u t as we
shall see, e a c h resolves this p r o b l e m i n a w a y w h i c h is c o n s o n a n t w i t h his o w n
p a r t i c u l a r scientific m e t h o d o l o g y . T h i s , I believe, is b e s t s e e n w h e n we set
D e s c a r t e s ' a n d G a l i l e o ' s views a g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e p o s i t i o n w o r k e d
o u t b y T h o m a s A q u i n a s , p a r t i c u l a r l y his d o c t r i n e o f t h e p r e a m b l e s o f faith.
I n t h e q u e s t i o n w h i c h o p e n s t h e Summa Theologiae T h o m a s d i s t i n g u i s h e s
between those sciences which p r o c e e d f r o m principles k n o w n in themselves by
the n a t u r a l i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d those w h i c h p r o c e e d f r o m p r i n c i p l e s k n o w n b y t h e
l i g h t o f a h i g h e r s c i e n c e i n w h i c h t h e y s t a n d as d e m o n s t r a t e d c o n c l u s i o n s 3 4
T h o m a s t h e n c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e o l o g y , o r w h a t h e calls s a c r e d d o c t r i n e (sacra
doctrina), as a s c i e n c e o f t h e l a t t e r t y p e w h i c h " p r o c e e d s f r o m p r i n c i p l e s k n o w n
b y t h e l i g h t o f a s u p e r i o r s c i e n c e - - t h e s c i e n c e o f G o d a n d t h e b l e s s e d " (S. Th.
I.Q. 1.A.2)y5 T h i s is s i g n i f i c a n t b e c a u s e it r e n d e r s t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e o l o g y
b e y o n d t h e p o w e r s o f n a t u r a l r e a s o n to g r a s p i n t h e m s e l v e s o r d e m o n s t r a t e
f r o m t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f a n y o t h e r s c i e n c e . T h e y can, T h o m a s tells us, b e k n o w n
o n l y as t h e y are g i v e n to us b y r e v e l a t i o n . T h i s , o f c o u r s e , sets t h e o l o g y a p a r t
from the strictly p h i l o s o p h i c a l s c i e n c e s w h o s e c o n c l u s i o n s a r e u l t i m a t e l y
g r o u n d e d i n p r i n c i p l e s accessible to n a t u r a l r e a s o n . T h i s s e p a r a t i o n , h o w e v e r ,
is n o t total. O b v i o u s l y t h e r e c a n b e n o i n t e r s e c t i o n a m o n g t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f
e a c h science. ~6 Yet b e c a u s e s c i e n c e s a r e n o t d i f f e r e n t i a t e d b y w h a t t h e y s t u d y
b u t b y t h e f o r m a l i t y u n d e r w h i c h t h e y c o n s i d e r t h e i r objects, T h o m a s d o e s
allow t h a t s o m e o f w h a t is p r o p o s e d to u s i n r e v e l a t i o n c a n b e d e m o n s t r a t e d i n
p h i l o s o p h y y 7 E x a m p l e s i n c l u d e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f G o d , t h a t G o d is o n e , a n d t h a t
~4For example, the principles of optics are derived from the higher science of geometry and
stand in geometry not as principles, but as conclusions.
25All translations from the texts of Aquinas are my own.
~6This is true not only because theology proceeds from principles derived from the science of
God and blessed which are beyond the capacity of natural reason to discern, but because of the
basic Aristotelian principle that sciences are differentiated when their principles neither share a
common source nor are derived from one another. In this case the principles proper to each
science will be contained in separate subject-genera. See Aristotle, PosteriorAnalytics, 87a: 35-87b: 5.
~TAquinas writes: "A subject is related to a science just as an object is to a power or habit.
Properly speaking, however, a thing is designated an object of some power or habit under whose
aspect (ratione)all things are referred to that power or habit, just as man and stone are referred to
62 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 1 JANUARY 1 9 9 9
G o d is g o o d . S u c h t r u t h s , w h i c h T h o m a s c a l l e d t h e p r e a m b l e s o f f a i t h , co n st i -
t u t e a n i n t e r m e d i a t e class o f t r u t h s l y i n g b e t w e e n t h o s e w h i c h a r e i n a c c e s s i b l e
to n a t u r a l r e a s o n a l o n e , e.g., t r u t h s c o n c e r n i n g t h e I n c a r n a t i o n a n d t h e T r i n -
ity, a n d t h o s e w h i c h a r e a c c e s s i b l e b u t d o n o t p e r t a i n to s a l v a t i o n , e.g., t h a t t h e
e a r t h is r o u n d . I n w h a t f o l l o w s , w e shall see t h a t this d o c t r i n e o f t h e p r e a m b l e s
takes o n s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i n s o f a r as it p r o v i d e s a n i m p o r t a n t k e y to u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g t h e v i e w s o f D e s c a r t e s a n d G a l i l e o o n t h e r e l a t i o n o f s c i e n c e to t h e o l -
ogy. L e t us b e g i n w i t h D e s c a r t e s .
D e s c a r t e s was o n l y t a n g e n t i a l l y i n t e r e s t e d in t h e o l o g y p r o p e r , a n d w i t h a
f e w s i g n i f i c a n t e x c e p t i o n s , a v o i d e d all c o m m e n t a r y o n q u e s t i o n s h e c o n s i d e r e d
to b e p u r e l y t h e o l o g i c a l . F o r t u n a t e l y , t h o u g h , in t h e c o u r s e o f d i s t a n c i n g
h i m s e l f f r o m t h e w r i t i n g s o f his a p o s t a t e d i s c i p l e R e g i u s , h e f e l t t h e n e e d to
cl ari fy his o w n v ie w s o n t h e r e l a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y to t h e o l o g y . I n his C o m m e n t s
on a Certain Broadsheet we find the f o l l o w i n g :
T h r e e different sorts of questions should be distinguished. First, some things are

believed t h ro u g h faith a l o n e l s u c h as the Incarnation, the Trinity, and the like. Sec-
ondly, o t h er questions, while having to do with faith, can also be investigated by natural
reason, a m o n g the latter, o r t h o d o x theologians usually co u n t the questions of the
existence of God, and the distinction between the h u m a n soul and the body. Thirdly,
there are questions which have n o th in g whatever to do with faith, and which are the
concern solely of h u m a n reasoning, such as the p r o b l em o f squaring the circle. (AT
VIIIB, 353)
H e n r i G o u h i e r ' s c o m m e n t t h a t "il est facile d e r e c o n n a f t r e d a n s les t e x t e s

de D e s c a r t e s . . . u n e v u e t h o m i s t e d e s r a p p o r t s d e la r a i s o n e t d e la f o i ''~s is in
n o case m o r e t r u e t h a n h e r e , f o r D e s c a r t e s r e p r o d u c e s t h e T h o m i s t i c d i v i s i o n s
w i t h o u t a l t e r a t i o n a n d e v e n cites s e v e r a l o f T h o m a s ' e x a m p l e s as i l l u s t r a t i o n s .
Y e t d e s p i t e this o b v i o u s a l i g n m e n t w i t h T h o m a s , w e see s u b t l e shifts away
sight insofar as they are colored" (S. Th. I.Q. 1.A.7). And again: "Sciences are differentiated accord-
ing to the various means through which knowledge is obtained [and not through the conclusions
they demonstrate] . . . . Hence there is no reason why those things which may be learned from
philosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason, may not also be taught to us
by another science so far as they fall within revelation" (S. Th. I.Q.a.A. 1.ad.2).
~sHenri Gouhier, La Pens~e Religieuse de Descartes (Paris:J. Vrin, 1924), 272. To my knowledge,
Gouhier provides the most thorough and illuminating account of Descartes' views on the relation
of philosophy and theology. He argues that on this issue Descartes is more clearly aligned with
Thomism than with any other theological school in the Catholic world of the seventeenth century.
He does, however, point to three areas in which Descartes modified Thomas' views. According to
Gouhier, Descartes diminished the role of reason in the preparation for faith, made the act of faith
an act of will rather than an act of the intellect, and denied the use of philosophical analogies
within theology. While I do not deal specifically with these claims, my analysis owes a great debt to
Gouhier. For his discussion of the passage from the Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, see 236-238.
For his most extended comments on Descartes' Thomism, see 27o-28o.
f r o m the Thomistic doctrine. This e m e r g e s in a passage i m m e d i a t e l y following
the one just cited in which Descartes adds this w a r n i n g :
Just as it is an abuse of Scripture to presume to solve problems of the third sort on

the basis of some mistaken interpretation of the Bible, so it diminishes the authority of
Scripture to undertake to demonstrate questions of the first kind by means of argu-
ments derived solely from philosophy. (AT VIIIB, 353)
T a k e n in itself T h o m a s w o u l d n o t have h a d any p r o b l e m with such a

warning. In fact, he w o u l d have e n d o r s e d it. But we m u s t r e m e m b e r that
T h o m a s stood within a long tradition o f medieval theologians w h o viewed
p h i l o s o p h y as a h a n d m a i d e n to theology. This was n o t to d e n y the a u t o n o m y
o f the philosophical sciences, p r o c e e d i n g as they do f r o m principles which are
n o t derived f r o m theology. N o r was it to fix the status o f p h i l o s o p h y as that o f
a m e r e servant to theology. Rather, it was to see t h e o l o g y as directed to a
knowledge b e y o n d that to which the philosophical sciences can attain, a n d to
recognize that p h i l o s o p h y is able to be of service to t h e o l o g y in the pursuit o f
that knowledge.~9 Descartes' warning, I believe, w h e n r e a d in the context o f his
o t h e r statements on this matter, is a challenge to this view a n d marks a shift in
the direction o f greater s e p a r a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y f r o m theology.
Consider, for example, that a m o n g the f u n c t i o n s which T h o m a s saw phi-
losophy p e r f o r m i n g in its status as h a n d m a i d e n was the s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f the
faith o f believers t h r o u g h p r o b a b l e a r g u m e n t s and the clarification o f theologi-
cal truths t h r o u g h philosophical analogies.3o Such a r g u m e n t s a n d analogies
were n o t m e a n t for apologetic p u r p o s e s , b u t were i n t e n d e d to provide illumi-
nation a n d s u p p o r t to believers. Descartes, however, f o u n d these functions
p r o b l e m a t i c a n d s o u g h t to bar the use n o t only of strict d e m o n s t r a t i o n in
theology, b u t o f p r o b a b l e a r g u m e n t s as well. In an early letter to Mersenne,
after declining to c o m m e n t o n the compatibility o f G o d ' s g o o d n e s s a n d eternal
d a m n a t i o n , Descartes writes that "when truths d e p e n d on faith a n d c a n n o t be
p r o v e d by n a t u r a l a r g u m e n t [i.e., strict d e m o n s t r a t i o n ] , it d e g r a d e s t h e m if
29The relation of philosophy to theology in A q u i n a s is extremely complex and c a n n o t be

w o r k e d out in any detail here. It is i m p o r t a n t to note, however, that A q u i n a s treats t h e m as
standing in the same relation as do n a t u r e a n d grace. Grace, he argues, does n o t abolish nature,
b u t perfects it. A n d as w h a t is perfected is o r d e r e d to that which perfects it, p h i l o s o p h y can be said
to be o r d e r e d to theology. For a succinct discussion of this o r d e r i n g and the service which philoso-
p h y can offer to theology in its status as h a n d m a i d e n , see Aquinas, In Boeth. de Trin. Q.2.
30Two passages are w o r t h considering: "We do n o t believe those things which are above
reason except as they are revealed by God. Yet there are certain probable a r g u m e n t s which o u g h t
to be p u t forth in o r d e r to make t r u t h s o f this kind known. A n d this s h o u l d be d o n e for the
training and consolation of the faithful, b u t n o t for the p u r p o s e o f convincing adversaries."
Aquinas, SCG, 1.9.2. Again: "[We can use p h i l o s o p h y in sacred doctrine] in o r d e r to make k n o w n
the t r u t h s of the faith by certain analogies, as A u g u s t i n e . . . uses m a n y analogies taken f r o m
philosophical doctrines in o r d e r to make the trinity k n o w n . " Aquinas, In Boeth. de Trin. Q.2.A. 3.
64 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 37:1 JANUARY 199 9
one tries to support them by human reasoning and mere probabilities" (Letter
to Mersenne 1 6 3 o , A T I, 1 5 3 ). I n o t h e r w o r d s , D e s c a r t e s d e n i e d the benefits of
philosophy f o r t h e o l o g y i n its c a p a c i t y t o i l l u m i n e a n d / o r l e n d r a t i o n a l s u p p o r t
to the faith.31 And in doing so he denied philosophy its r o l e as h a n d m a i d e n .
We might ask at this point why Descartes would care about the use of
philosophy in theology. There is n o q u e s t i o n t h a t h e s a w i t as a c o r r u p t i n g
force, leading to the endless disputes which plagued scholastic theology. But
e v e n so, w h a t d i f f e r e n c e should that make to someone who took such pains to
distance himself from theological controversy? The answer comes in an early
letter in which Descartes asks Mersenne and others to review a treatise betbre
its p u b l i c a t i o n . "I w i s h t h i s m a i n l y o n a c c o u n t of theology," he writes, "which
has been so deeply in the thrall of Aristotle t h a t i t is a l m o s t impossible to
expound another philosophy without its seeming to be directly contrary to the
Faith" (Letter to Mersenne 1629, AT I, 8 5 - 8 6 ) . Descartes' concern is c l e a r .
The more that philosophy is u s e d i n t h e o l o g y , the more entangled the two
become, and the more philosophers will have to worry that innovation in
philosophy will b e i n t e r p r e t e d as innovation in theology. It seems, then, that
Descartes feared the intrusion of philosophy into theology primarily because
of the constraints it would inevitably place on philosophy, constraints which he
3, Descartes was not entirely consistent in this position. He boasts to his Jesuit friend Vatier that
"the faith has never been so strongly supported by h u m a n arguments as it may be if my principles
are adopted," and adds that "transubstantiation, in particular, which the Calvinists regard as impos-
sible to explain by the ordinary philosophy, is very easily explained by mine" (Letter to Vatier 1638 ,
AT I, 564). Gouhier argues from passages like these that Descartes had no problem with the
application of his own philosophy to theology and was only concerned to stamp out scholastic
theology which he felt to be b u r d e n e d with excessive disputes and endless bickering. Gouhier
reconstructs Descartes' thinking as follows: "La philosophie scolastique n'a pu qu'exercer des rav-
ages en t h 6 o l o g i e . . , et la philosophie nouvelle [i.e., Cartesianism] ne peut qu'6tayer solidement
une th6ologie nouvelle, celle qui, par sa simplicit6 et sa clart6, ne donnera acune pr6texte ~ la
dispute et ~ l'h6r6sie." Gouhier, L a Pens~e Religieuse, 243. We must keep in mind, however, that the
primary motivation behind statements like the one made to Vatier was not to justify or promote
Cartesian theology, but to allay Jesuit fears that innovation in philosophy would necessarily bring
innovation in theology. Recognizing this, Descartes wrote to the Jesuit Father Noel that "you have
nothing to f e a r . . , so far as my own innovations are concerned, and that I have reason to thank God
that the views which, from my reflection on natural causes, seemed to me most true in physics were
always those which are the most compatible with the mysteries of religion" (Letter to Noel 1637, AT
I, 455-456). We must also weigh Gouhier's position against Descartes' remarks to B u r m a n in which
he seems to bar all philosophical examination of theology, including the use of his own philosophy
for such a purpose: "If the author [i.e., Descartes] thought that anyone would abuse his philosophy
by taking arguments from it and applying them to theology, he would regret all the trouble he had
taken. However, we can and should prove that the truths of theology are not inconsistent with those
of philosophy, but we must not in any war subject them to critical examination. This is how the monks have
opened the way to all the sects and heresies" (AT V, 176, emphasis added). Similar sentiments are
expressed in the first book of the Discourse in which Descartes claims that "the revealed truths which
guide us [to heaven] are beyond our understanding," and declares that "I would not have dared
submit them to my weak reasonings." (AT VI, 8)
felt rather acutely, especially after the Galileo affairy Thus, he recommended
a clean separation between the two, arguing that "theology must not be sub-
j e c t e d to o u r h u m a n reasoning, which we use for mathematics and for other
t r u t h s , s i n c e it is s o m e t h i n g w e c a n n o t f u l l y g r a s p ; a n d t h e s i m p l e r w e k e e p it,
t h e b e t t e r t h e o l o g y w e s h a l l h a v e " ( A T V, 176, e m p h a s i s added).33
B u t t h i s is o n l y o n e s i d e o f t h e s t o r y . T h e r e is a n o t h e r reason which we
h a v e y e t to c o n s i d e r a n d w h i c h b r i n g s us b a c k to t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n Des-
cartes and Galileo. Looking again at Descartes' warning we see that he not only
cautioned against the intrusion of philosophy i n t o w h a t is t h e p r o p e r domain
of theology, but warned against the use of scripture in a t t e m p t i n g to s o l v e
purely philosophical problems as well.34 H e r e t h e s e p a r a t i o n is e f f e c t e d f r o m
the opposite direction. Theology is n o t to i n t r u d e i n t o t h e d o m a i n of philoso-
phy. When it d o e s , it o v e r s t e p s its b o u n d a r i e s and most likely proceeds on
some mistaken interpretation of scripture. This, of course, was the very point
that Galileo made when he warned that if interpreters, on the basis of a literal
reading of scripture, attempt to fix its m e a n i n g contrary to a p r o p o s i t i o n
which either has been demonstrated b y s c i e n c e o r m i g h t at s o m e f u t u r e p o i n t
be demonstrated, t h e y will c a u s e m u c h e m b a r r a s s m e n t to t h e c h u r c h as t r u t h
will a p p e a r to b e d e m o n s t r a t e d a g a i n s t it. I n s o m e u n p u b l i s h e d notes which he
made on Bellarmine's L e t t e r to F o s c a r i n i , G a l i l e o m a k e s t h i s c l e a r :
In r e g a r d to falsifying scripture, this is n o t a n d will n e v e r be the i n t e n t i o n o f

C a t h o l i c a s t r o n o m e r s such as ourselves; r a t h e r o u r view is that S c r i p t u r e c o r r e s p o n d s
3~Descartes repeats this complaint some twelve years later, writing that "[I have decided] to
fight with their own weapons the people who confound Aristotle with the Bible and abuse the
authority of the Church in order to vent their passions--I mean the people who had Galileo
condemned" (Letter to Mersenne 1641, AT III, 349 35o) 9 Here I am in substantial agreement
with Gary Hatfield who writes that Descartes "envisioned a firm division between philosophy and
theology, so that sacred doctrine would not be encumbered by philosophical explanation," and
concludes that "Descartes intended to show, by explicitly distinguishing metaphysics from theol-
ogy proper, that one could deny Aristotelian philosophy without contradicting articles of faith."
Gary Hatfield, "Reason, Nature, and God in Descartes," in Stephen Voss ed., Essays in the Philosophy
and Science of Rend Descartes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 968. We might also note that
Hatfield is correct in pointing out that Descartes' concerns to reconcile his thought with orthodoxy
predate the Galileo affair. We see this in the letter to Mersenne of 1629 which is cited in the body
of the text.
33As the passage continues, Descartes elaborates this ideal of a simple theology disentangled
from philosophy: "Why do we need to spend all this effort on theology, when we see that simple
country folk have just as much chance as we have of getting to heaven? This should certainly be a
warning to us that it is much more satisfactory to have a theology as simple as that of countlSr folk
than one which is plagued with countless controversies. This is how we corrupt theology and open
the way for disputes quarrels, wars and suchlike" (AT V, 176).
34This warning is also stated in a letter to Hogelande: "I think that to try to derive from the
Bible knowledge of truths which belong only to human sciences, and which are useless for our
salvation, is to apply the Holy Scripture to a purpose for which God did not give it, and so to abuse
it" (Letter to Hogelaude x638, AT II, 348).
66 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 37:1 JANUARY 199 9
v e r y well to t r u t h s d e m o n s t r a t e d a b o u t n a t u r e . M o r e o v e r , c e r t a i n t h e o l o g i a n s w h o are
n o t a s t r o n o m e r s s h o u l d b e c a r e f u l a b o u t falsifying S c r i p t u r e b y w a n t i n g to i n t e r p r e t it
as o p p o s e d to p r o p o s i t i o n s w h i c h m a y b e t r u e a n d d e m o n s t r a b l e . 3 5
Such advice was proffered ostensibly for the benefit of the church and the
safeguarding of the scriptures, but Galileo, like Descartes, also hoped to make
room for the free exercise of science unfettered by the shackles of an overex-
tended theology. Sadly his warning was to no avail, for in the end he was
condemned on suspicion of heresy for holding astronomical hypotheses
deemed contrary to the teachings of scripture.36
In all o f t h i s D e s c a r t e s and Galileo appear as k i n d r e d scientific spirits
seeking to effect a clean separation between philosophy and theology. But just
as their agreement on the mathematization of science belies deeper philosophi-
cal and methodological differences, so too does their agreement here. As I
have already indicated, these differences come into focus when we turn our
attention to the position in which each thinker stands vis-a-vis Aquinas on the
35Cited in Maurice A. Finocchiaro ed., The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1989), 83. This warning is made even more forcefully in the Letter to
CasteUi: "I should think that it would be p r u d e n t not to allow anyone to oblige scriptural passages
to have to maintain the truth of any physical conclusions whose contrary could ever be proved to
us by the senses and demonstrative and necessary reasons." Galileo, Letter to Castelli, in Finnochiaro,
The Galileo Affair, 51. We should note that Galileo seemed later to back away from this recommenda-
tion in his Letter to Christina by arguing that scripture should take precedence over science in all
cases except those in which science has already provided demonstrative certainty. W h e n science appears
to conflict with scripture literally taken and no demonstration has been provided by science,
theologians should attempt to prove science false. Galileo writes: "In the books of the sages of this
world there are contained some physical truths which are soundly demonstrated, and others that
are merely stated; as to the former, it is the office of wise divines to show that they do not
contradict the holy Scriptures. And as to the p r o p o s i t i o n s . . , which are not rigorously demon-
strated, anything contrary to the Bible involved in them must be held undoubtedly false and
should be proved so by every possible means." Galileo, Letter to Christina, in Drake, Discoveries and
Opinions, 194. The trouble is that because Galileo provided no successful demonstration of the
truth of the Copernican hypothesis, by his own criterion, the church was correct in rejecting his
theories and charging him with teaching what is in conflict with scripture. For a reading which
tries to reconcile these and other texts, see Richard J. Blackwell, Galileo, BeUarmine, and the Bible
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 5 3 - 8 5 and Maurice A. Finocchiaro, "The
Methodological Background to Galileo's Trial," in William A. Wallace ed., Reinterpreting Galileo
(Washington D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1986), z41-z72.
~ T h e p r o n o u n c e m e n t of the Inquisition against Galileo reads as follows: "We say, pro-
nounce, sentence, and declare that you, the above mentioned Galileo, because of the things
deduced in the trial and confessed by yon as above, have rendered yourself according to this Holy
Office vehemently suspected of heresy, namely of having held and believed a doctrine which is
false and contrary to the divine and Holy Scripture: that the sun is the center of the world and
does not move from east to west, and the earth moves and is not the center of the world." Sentence of
the Inquisition (1633), in Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair, 291. In so condemning Galileo, the church
was enforcing its ban on holding or defending the Copernican hypotheses of the motion of the
earth and the immobility and centrality of the sun which was issued in 1616 and personally
a n n o u n c e d to Galileo by Cardinal Bellarmine.
d i v i s i o n o f t r u t h , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t i n t e r m e d i a t e class o f t r u t h s w h i c h T h o m a s
called t h e p r e a m b l e s . L e t u s n o w see h o w this w o r k s out.
F o r A q u i n a s , t h o u g h t h e p r e a m b l e s a r e c o n t a i n e d i n p h i l o s o p h y as d e m o n -
s t r a b l e b y n a t u r a l r e a s o n , t h e i r d e m o n s t r a t i o n is t a k e n u p i n t o t h e o l o g y as p a r t
of the larger theological enterprise. A l t h o u g h m a k i n g use of philosophy, the
t h e o l o g i a n d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e m qua t h e o l o g i a n . " T h o s e w h o use t h e w o r k s o f
t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s i n s a c r e d d o c t r i n e , " T h o m a s writes, "by b r i n g i n g t h e m i n t o
the service o f t h e faith, d o n o t m i x w a t e r w i t h w i n e , b u t c o n v e r t w a t e r i n t o
wine."37 W e see this c o n v e r s i o n o f t h e w a t e r o f p h i l o s o p h y i n t o t h e w i n e o f
t h e o l o g y e v e r y w h e r e in T h o m a s ' w r i t i n g s , b u t it is n o w h e r e to b e f o u n d i n
t h o s e o f D e s c a r t e s . P a r t o f t h e r e a s o n f o r this a p p e a r s i n a l e t t e r i n w h i c h
D e s c a r t e s r e s p o n d s to a q u e r y f r o m M e r s e n n e : " Y o u r q u e s t i o n o f t h e o l o g y . . .
d o e s n o t s e e m to m e o u t s i d e m y p r o v i n c e , since it has no concern with anything
dependent on revelation, which is what I call theology, in the strict sense; it is a m e t a p h y s i -
cal q u e s t i o n w h i c h is to b e e x a m i n e d b y h u m a n r e a s o n " ( L e t t e r to M e r s e n n e
x63o, A T I, a44 e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . T h i s is e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t , f o r w h a t
D e s c a r t e s h a s d o n e h e r e is to l i m i t t h e s c o p e o f t h e o l o g y b y r e s t r i c t i n g it to
t h o s e t r u t h s a l o n e w h i c h d e p e n d o n revelation.38 T h i s , o f c o u r s e , p l a c e s t h e
p r e a m b l e s outside the d o m a i n of theology since they are d e m o n s t r a b l e by
n a t u r a l r e a s o n . So w h e n D e s c a r t e s o f f e r e d his d e m o n s t r a t i o n s f o r t h e exis-
t e n c e o f G o d to the c h u r c h , u n l i k e A q u i n a s , h e d i d so qua p h i l o s o p h e r . T h u s
h e writes to f a c u l t y o f t h e S o r b o n n e :
I have always thought that two t o p i c s - - n a m e l y God a n d the s o u l - - a r e prime exam-

ples of subjects where demonstrative proofs ought to be given with the aid of philosophy
rather than theology. For us who are believers, it is e n o u g h to accept [them] on f a i t h . . . ;
but in the case of unbelievers, it seems that there is no religion, a n d practically no moral
virtue, that they can be persuaded to adopt until these two truths are proved to them by
natural reason. (AT VII, 1-2, emphasis added)
T h e a p o l o g e t i c task o f d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e p r e a m b l e s h a s n o w f a l l e n to t h e
philosopher.39
aTAquinas, In Boeth. de Trin. Q.2.A.3.ad. 5.

aSThis view is certainly consonant with the following remarks from the first book of the
Discourse in which Descartes seems once again to extol a simple theology and warn against submit-
ting it to human reasoning (philosophy?): "I revered our theology . . . . But having learned as an
established fact that the way to heaven is open no less to the most ignorant than to the most
learned, and that the revealed truths which guide us there are beyond our understanding, I would
not have dared submit them to my weak reasonings" (AT VI, 8). Such questions as the existence of
God which Descartes did not consider beyond human reason would seem, then, to fall outside of
theology taken in the strict sense. They are properly metaphysical questions.
39It may appear here that there is a contradiction in Descartes' views, or at least in my analysis
of them. If Descartes believed that philosophy should take over the role of theology in demonstrat-
ing those truths which Aquinas called the preambles, then my contention that he denied the
68 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 7 : 1 J A N U A R Y 1 9 9 9
When we turn to Galileo we see a much more radical departure from

Thomas. We have already seen that Galileo was most concerned to fight the
tendency among theologians and church officials to confuse strictly scientific
t h e s e s , e . g . , t h a t t h e e a r t h is i m m o b i l e and at the center of the world, with
t r u t h s o f faith.4o T o this e n d h e v e n t u r e d into the rather dangerous world of
Biblical hermeneutics, advancing theories on scriptural authority and interpre-
tation designed to secure the scientist a space in which to work without the
interference of theology. Central to his argument is t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t w h a t -
ever the Bible says concerning p h y s i c a l m a t t e r s is i n c i d e n t a l t o t h e f a i t h s i n c e it
is n o t t h e B i b l e ' s a i m t o t e a c h s c i e n c e , b u t t o l e a d p e o p l e t o s a l v a t i o n . 4 1 A n d i n
benefits of philosophy for theology in its capacity to illumine and/or lend rational support to the
faith seems false. To resolve this we must keep in mind that when Aquinas spoke of the illuminat-
ing role of philosophy he was not only speaking of the use of philosophy in demonstrating the
preambles, but of its use in explicating those truths within the first class of his division as well.
Although philosophy cannot demonstrate such truths, it can be used to clarify them, provide
probable arguments on their behalf, and defend them against those who would argue for their
falsity. When philosophy acts in any of these capacities, it functions as a handmaiden to theology.
Now insofar as Descartes denied these very functions to philosophy, removing that first class of
truths from the realm of philosophical scrutiny, he in large measure denied philosophy its hand-
maiden function and further separated philosophy from theology. Nothing in Descartes' offer to
the church of his proofs of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul contradicts this
since there he is dealing with those truths falling in the second class. Furthermore, and this is tile
key point, insofar as he restricted theology proper to those truths knowable by revelation alone, he
made this offer qua philosopher rather than qua theologian. Hence, his demonstration of truths of
the second class differs from that of Aquinas since the latter worked as a theologian employing
philosophy within a larger theological enterprise. Admittedly, this is a subtle shift, but it is impor-
tant insofar as it is a shift in the direction of greater separation of philosophy from theology.
40That the essentials of the geocentric world-view were taken as truths deride is evident from
the censure of Copernicanism issued in 1616. Concerning the proposition, "The sun is the center
of the world and completely devoid of local motion," the following assessment was made by the
consultants: "All said that this proposition is foolish and absurd in philosophy, and formally
heretical since it explicitly contradicts in many places the sense of Holy Scripture, according to the
literal meaning of the words and according to the common interpretation and understanding of
the holy Fathers and the doctors of theology." The consultants also censured a proposition
denying the earth's immobility and its centrality in the universe with slightly less force, saying that
it "receives the same j u d g m e n t in philosophy and that in regard to theological truth it is at least
erroneous in faith." Consultants' Report on Copernicanism (16 x6), in Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair,
146. This weaker censure was due to the fact that the second proposition was not considered to be
in direct contradiction with the explicit teaching of scripture, but only with what can be inferred
from it. In light of these censures, scientists would be barred from defending (though not from
discussing) any other world view than some form of geocentrism, whether it be the Ptolemaic or
Tychonic system. For an analysis of the meaning of these censures, see J e r o m e Langford, Galileo,
Science and the Church (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1971 ), 88- 9 t.
41This is not to imply that Galileo believed that there is anything contained in the Bible that
can be dismissed as erroneous. He acknowledged, rather, that everything in the Bible, including
its pronouncements on physical matters, are true. Nevertheless, the problem of error does arise at
the level of interpretation and is particularly acute in the case of physical propositions since those
propositions are accommodated to the common understanding. As a result, he argues, "for the
t h e c o u r s e o f e x p o u n d i n g this p r i n c i p l e , G a l i l e o effectively e l i m i n a t e d a n y
o v e r l a p b e t w e e n t h e o l o g y a n d science. W e f i n d this i n his L e t t e r to Castelli:
I should believe that the authority of the Holy Writ has merely the aim of persuad-
ing m e n of those articles and propositions which are necessary for their salvation and
surpass all h u m a n reason, and so could n o t become credible through some other
science or any other means except the m o u t h of the Holy Spirit itself. However, I do
not think it necessary to believe that the same God who has furnished us with senses,
language, and intellect would want to bypass their use and give us by other means the
information we can obtain with them.42
H e r e we d o n o t f i n d T h o m a s ' t h r e e - p a r t d i v i s i o n o f t r u t h , b u t a t w o - p a r t
d i v i s i o n i n w h i c h t h e t r u t h s o f f a i t h l e a d i n g to s a l v a t i o n a n d t h e t r u t h s o f
r e a s o n a r e strictly s e p a r a t e d . N o t i c e , f o r e x a m p l e , h o w G a l i l e o c h a r a c t e r i z e s
the truths of f a i t h - - t h e y " s u r p a s s all h u m a n reason" and cannot "become
credible t h r o u g h some o t h e r science or any other m e a n s except the m o u t h of
t h e H o l y Spirit itself." I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e y are b e y o n d t h e c a p a c i t i e s o f n a t u -
ral r e a s o n to d i s c e r n o r d e m o n s t r a t e a n d c a n be k n o w n o n l y i n s o f a r as t h e y are
p r o p o s e d to us b y G o d . T h e t r u t h s o f r e a s o n , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , r e p r e s e n t
cases i n w h i c h G o d has " p u t r e v e l a t i o n to o n e side" a n d a r e n o t n e c e s s a r y to
believe, i.e., t h e y a r e n o t p a r t o f t h e faith. S u c h , G a l i l e o b e l i e v e d , are the t r u t h s
o f s c i e n c e w h i c h we o n l y d i s c e r n b y r e a d i n g t h e b o o k o f n a t u r e r a t h e r t h a n t h e
r e v e a l e d w o r d . W h e r e , t h e n , is t h a t i n t e r m e d i a t e class o f t r u t h s - - t h e p r e -
a m b l e s - w h i c h we f i n d i n A q u i n a s a n d D e s c a r t e s ? T h e r e is s i m p l y n o m e n t i o n
o f t h e m . I n fact, this p a s s a g e c o u l d easily b e r e a d as p o s i t i v e l y e x c l u d i n g t h e m
if we take G a l i l e o as classifying all t r u t h s n e c e s s a r y f o r s a l v a t i o n as b e i n g
b e y o n d reason.43 U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h e r e is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t e x t u a l e v i d e n c e to
e s t a b l i s h this a b s o l u t e l y , b u t s u c h a m o v e w o u l d n o d o u b t serve G a l i l e o ' s p u r -
p o s e i n a s m u c h as it w o u l d g r a n t t h e s c i e n t i s t g r e a t e r a u t o n o m y b y i n s u l a t i n g
t h e o l o g y f r o m t h e t h r e a t of a n y t h i n g b e i n g d e m o n s t r a t e d a g a i n s t it. I n short,
t h e o l o g i a n s m i g h t leave scientists a l o n e if t h e y t h o u g h t t h a t t h e y h a d n o t h i n g
to f e a r f r o m t h e m . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , it w o u l d a c c o r d s c r i p t u r e last p l a c e i n
sake of those who deserve to be separated from the herd [i.e., those with scientific understanding],
it is necessary that wise expositors produce the true senses of such passages, together with the
special reasons for which they were set down in these words." Galileo, Letter to Christina, in Drake,
Discoveries and Opinions, 18 z - 183. A wise expositor, Galileo argued, will be guided in this exposition
precisely by what has been demonstrated by science.
4=Galileo, Letter to Castelli, in Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair, 5 1.
43Richard Blackwell, for example, adopts this reading. After summarizing Galileo's views he
concludes: "The net result of this position is peace between science and revelation at the price of
a full dichotomy between them; Scripture dealing with the articles of faith and salvation which
are beyond human reason, and science with natural laws which sense experience and reason can
determine with certitude in at least some cases." Richard Blackwell, Galileo, Bellarmine, and the
Bible, 68.
7~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 1 JANUARY I 9 9 9
disputes c o n c e r n i n g n a t u r a l m a t t e r s which are subject to reason. A n d this, we
do know, was a central c o n c e r n for Galileo.
5" CONCLUSION: DESCARTES AND GALILEO ON NATURAL THEOLOGY

W h a t , then, do Descartes' a n d Galileo's t r e a t m e n t s of the division o f truth
reveal a b o u t their attitudes c o n c e r n i n g t h e o l o g y a n d the scientific enterprise?
A n d what, in particular, is the value o f this discussion for resolving o u r initial
questions a b o u t Descartes' m e t a p h y s i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s and their relation to his
physics? It is n o w obvious that b o t h m e n s o u g h t to restrict the d o m a i n of
t h e o l o g y a n d k e e p p h i l o s o p h y strictly s e p a r a t e d f r o m it so as to insure g r e a t e r
f r e e d o m for science. A n d it is equally obvious that b o t h did so in a way reflec-
tive o f their d i v e r g e n t visions o f the scientific enterprise.
I n relation to Cartesian science, with its d e e p f o u n d a t i o n s in metaphysics,
Galilean science a p p e a r s d e c i d e d l y n o n - m e t a p h y s i c a l . T h r o u g h o u t his writ-
ings Galileo consistently eschews m e t a p h y s i c a l a r g u m e n t a t i o n , a n d it is pre-
cisely on this p o i n t that Descartes criticizes him. I n particular, he faults h i m for
failing to analyze the h i g h e s t a n d m o s t p r i m a r y causes a n d j u d g e s his entire
w o r k to be disordered. In light o f this it should be clear that this difference in
scientific t e m p e r a m e n t is reflected precisely in the p a r t i c u l a r way in which
e a c h thinker d e p a r t e d f r o m the T h o m i s t i c f o r m u l a , particularly with respect
to the p r e a m b l e s . We have seen, for e x a m p l e , that Galileo, w h e t h e r by simple
omission or positive exclusion, e l i m i n a t e d this i n t e r m e d i a t e class f r o m his
division o f truth. W h e n we recall that these truths, on T h o m a s ' s c h e m e , gener-
ally c o n c e r n e d that which we can k n o w a b o u t G o d a n d divine things by the
n a t u r a l use o f reason, it b e c o m e s clear that Galileo's position provides no r o o m
for n a t u r a l t h e o l o g y a n d no g r o u n d s by which physics could m a k e use of it.
T h i s we find to be in c o m p l e t e accord with the n e a r total a b s e n c e o f discussion
o f m e t a p h y s i c s in g e n e r a l a n d G o d in p a r t i c u l a r in his scientific writings.
Descartes, on the o t h e r h a n d , a d o p t e d Aquinas' s c h e m e in its b r o a d outlines,
t h o u g h he m o d i f i e d it by shifting the i n t e r m e d i a t e truths into the d o m a i n o f
p h i l o s o p h y . T h i s e n a b l e d h i m b o t h to effect a s t r o n g e r dissociation of theology
f r o m p h i l o s o p h y t h a n was p r e s e n t in T h o m a s a n d deal with metaphysical
questions, particularly the existence a n d n a t u r e o f G o d a n d the essence o f
m a t t e r , at a f u r t h e r distance f r o m theology. H e could, in effect, p u r s u e t h e m
f o r p u r e l y philosophical a n d scientific ends.
T h u s , o u r r e a d i n g has u n c o v e r e d a p e r f e c t match, for we have f o u n d that
the distinct scientific visions o f Descartes a n d Galileo are m i r r o r e d in their
d i f f e r i n g views o f the relation o f science a n d theology despite the fact that
each h a d m u c h the same goal in m i n d while working out t h a t relation. A n d if
this r e a d i n g is c o r r e c t it deflates the utility o f a p p e a l i n g to the Galileo affair as
a m e a n s o f n e g a t i n g the integral relation b e t w e e n Cartesian m e t a p h y s i c s and
Cartesian science. In fact, it shows that the failure to posit such an integral
relation renders Descartes' views on b o t h Galileo's scientific w o r k a n d the
relation between science a n d t h e o l o g y unintelligible. F u r t h e r m o r e , it has the
a d v a n t a g e o f recognizing in Descartes' work the existence o f a careful strategy
to secure i n d e p e n d e n c e for science f r o m t h e o l o g y w i t h o u t n e g a t i n g either the
scientific i m p o r t a n c e o f a large parts o f that w o r k or the t r u t h o f Descartes'
m a n y claims to the effect that an u n d e r s t a n d i n g his metaphysics is essential to
the full u n d e r s t a n d i n g his physics. Like Aristotle who v o w e d that A t h e n s
w o u l d n o t sin twice against p h i l o s o p h y , Descartes was certainly c o n c e r n e d to
avoid the fate o f Galileo. But these c o n c e r n s should n o t lead us to p u t f o r t h
interpretations which do violence to the very features o f Cartesian science
which led Descartes to reject Galilean science.
Loyola University, Chicago

Physics and Metaphysics in Descartes and Galileo: Objections Reponses, M Ditations

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Physics and Metaphysics in Descartes and Galileo: Objections Reponses, M Ditations

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Physics and Metaphysics

in Descartes and Galileo

IN HIS CLASSIC BIOGRAPHY o f D e s c a r t e s , C h a r l e s A d a m p a s s e s t h i s j u d g m e n t o n

Sans la c o n d e m n a t i o n de Galil6e, nous aurions eu tout de m~me la m6taphysique de

a r g u m e n t s w o u l d h a v e sufficed.3 T h u s , i n the w o r d s o f G a u k r o g e r , Descartes'

I find [that Galileo] p h i l o s o p h i z e s m u c h m o r e ably t h a n is usual, in that, so far as h e

2. GALILEO AND DESCARTES ON INERTIAL PHYSICS

T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f inertial physics in the s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y grew o u t o f an

Clearly, in tying his analysis to the motions of terrestrial bodies, Galileo

11Galileo, Two New Sciences, 181.

T h e first law is a general law o f persistence dictating that the states o f a

If, o n the o t h e r h a n d , we are to c o n c e i v e o f circular m o t i o n - - a c o m p l e x

b o d y ' s n a t u r a l p a t h (i.e., p a t h it w o u l d take if n o t deflected by o t h e r bodies) is

3" A C O N F I R M A T I O N : DESCARTES AND GALILEO ON FREE-FALL

x7Galileo, Two New Sciences, 75.

In our speculating we either seek to p e n e t r a t e the true and internal essence of

U n d o u b t e d l y t h i s was i n t e n d e d as a swipe a g a i n s t t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n s , b u t it also set

which bears out the characterization of Cartesian a n d Galilean science offered

4. D E S C A R T E S , GALILEO AND AQUINAS ON THE DIVISION OF TRUTH

Given the challenges of d o i n g science in the b r o a d e r theological context of the

T h r e e different sorts of questions should be distinguished. First, some things are

H e n r i G o u h i e r ' s c o m m e n t t h a t "il est facile d e r e c o n n a f t r e d a n s les t e x t e s

Just as it is an abuse of Scripture to presume to solve problems of the third sort on

T a k e n in itself T h o m a s w o u l d n o t have h a d any p r o b l e m with such a

29The relation of philosophy to theology in A q u i n a s is extremely complex and c a n n o t be

In r e g a r d to falsifying scripture, this is n o t a n d will n e v e r be the i n t e n t i o n o f

I have always thought that two t o p i c s - - n a m e l y God a n d the s o u l - - a r e prime exam-

aTAquinas, In Boeth. de Trin. Q.2.A.3.ad. 5.

When we turn to Galileo we see a much more radical departure from

5" CONCLUSION: DESCARTES AND GALILEO ON NATURAL THEOLOGY

Loyola University, Chicago

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