Election Law Cases | As discussed by Judge M.
Paredes
1. Francisco vs. COMELEC and Nieto (G.R. No. 230249. April 24,
2018)
Facts: Nieto, who was elected as Mayor of Cainta, Rizal in 2013, filed a COC
in his bid for re-election in the 2016 elections. Francisco, a registered voter
in the municipality, filed a petition for disqualification against Nieto. It was
alleged that respondent made financial contributions out of the government
coffers for the asphalt-paving of the road entrance of Cainta Green Park
Village. According to petitioner, this amounted to the expending of public
funds within 45 days before the 2016 polls and to illegal contributions for
road repairs, respectively punishable under Secs. 261 (v) and 104 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
Nieto countered that the questioned asphalting project was subjected to
public bidding on March 15, 2016, with a Notice of Award issued on March
21, 2016. Thus, the asphalting project falls within the excepted public works
mentioned in Sec. 261 (v) (1) (b) of the OEC.
The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for disqualification
against Nieto. Citing the case of Poe vs. COMELEC, it ruled that Insofar as
the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are
flipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are
not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification
of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a
prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction.
The COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the Second Division.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for Disqualification should be granted.
RULING: No. Petitioner is correct in his contention that a prior judgment is
not a precondition to filing a Petition for Disqualification. Nevertheless, the
petition must necessarily fail for lack of substantial evidence to establish that
private respondent committed an election offense.
The COMELEC's adjudicative function over election contests is quasi-judicial
in character since the COMELEC is a governmental body, other than a court,
that is vested with jurisdiction to decide the specific class of controversies it
is charged with resolving. The COMELEC is, thus, fully-clothed with authority
to make factual determinations in relation to the election contests before it.
Considering the historical evolution of the COMELEC, the Court now declares
that the polling body has full adjudicatory powers to resolve election
contests outside the jurisdiction of the electoral tribunals.
A predicate judgment is not required in Petition for Disqualification. The
Commission gravely abused its discretion when it failed to appreciate the
characteristics that distinguish Poe from the case at bar. What is involved
herein is a Petition for Disqualification under Sec. 68 of the OEC, whereas
Poe was initiated by multiple Petitions to Deny Due Course or Cancel COC
under Sec. 78 of the OEC.
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest
in which he is a party is declared by 􀀵nal decision of a competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of having
xxx xxx xxx
d. solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
e. violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e,
k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as
a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time
not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
days before the election.
The essence of a disqualification proceeding that invokes Sec. 68 of the OEC
is to bar an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a
candidate for public office based not on the candidate's lack of qualification,
but on his possession of a disqualification as declared by a final decision of a
competent court, or as found by the Commission. The jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section
68 of the OEC. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC
jurisdiction.
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Election Law Cases | As discussed by Judge M. Paredes
Meanwhile, for a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC under Sec.
78 of the OEC to prosper, the candidate must have made a material
misrepresentation involving his eligibility or qualification for the office to
which he seeks election, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or
any other legal qualification necessary to run for elective office enumerated
under Sec. 74 of the OEC. Moreover, the false representation under Sec. 78
must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. The relief is granted not
because of the candidate's lack of eligibility per se, but because of his or her
false misrepresentation of possessing the statutory qualifications.
The doctrine in Poe was never meant to apply to Petitions for
Disqualification. A prior court judgment is not required before the remedy
under Sec. 68 of the OEC can prosper. This is highlighted by the provision
itself, which contemplates of two scenarios: first , there is a final
decision by a competent court that the candidate is guilty of an
election offense and second , it is the Commission itself that found
that the candidate committed any of the enumerated prohibited
acts. Noteworthy is that in the second scenario, it is not required that there
be a prior final judgment; it is sufficient that the Commission itself made the
determination. The conjunction "or" separating "competent court" and "the
Commission" could only mean that the legislative intent was for both bodies
to be clothed with authority to ascertain whether or not there is evidence
that the respondent candidate ought to be disqualified.
Furthermore, the quantum of proof necessary in election cases is, as in all
administrative cases, substantial evidence. This is defined as such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a
conclusion (administrative aspect). To impose prior conviction of an
election offense as a condition sine qua non before a Petition for
Disqualification can be launched would be tantamount to requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt (criminal aspect), which is significantly beyond
what our laws require.
Neither a prior conviction nor even a determination of probable cause is then
a requirement before a Petition for Disqualification can be lodged. We are,
therefore, constrained to rule that the COMELEC erred when, relying on Poe,
it imposed the requirement of a prior court judgment before resolving the
current controversy.
Notwithstanding the COMELEC's error in applying Poe, the petition must
nevertheless fail. Though the COMELEC can properly take cognizance of the
Petition for Disqualification without issue, petitioner miserably failed to
tender evidence that respondent committed the election offenses imputed.
respondent Nieto sufficiently parried the alleged commission of the election
offenses by proving that the asphalting project squarely falls under the
exception in Sec. 261 (v) (1) (b). Hence, petition is dismissed.
2. Luis Villafuerte vs. COMELEC and Miguel Villafuerte (G.R. No.
206698. February 25, 2014)
Facts: Petitioner and respondent are both candidates for the gubernatorial
position in Camarines in the 2013 elections. petitioner filed with the
COMELEC a Verified Petition to deny due course to or cancel the COC of
respondent, alleging that respondent intentionally and materially
misrepresented a false and deceptive name/nickname that would mislead the
voters when he declared under oath in his COC that "L-RAY JR.-MIGZ" was
his nickname or stage name and that the name he intended to appear on the
official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, L-RAY JR.-MIGZ NP; that respondent
deliberately omitted his first name "MIGUEL" and inserted, instead "LRAY
JR.," which is the nickname of his father, the incumbent Governor of
Camarines Sur, "LRay Villafuerte, Jr."
Respondent denied the commission of any material misrepresentation and
asserted, among others, that he had been using the nickname "LRAY JR.
MIGZ" and not only "MIGZ"; that the choice of name/word to appear on the
ballot was solely his choice or preference; and that the presumption that the
voters would be confused on the simple fact that his name would be placed
first in the ballot was misplaced.
The COMELEC's First Division denied the petition for lack of merit. The
COMELEC en banc affirmed the ruling of the COMELEC First Division.
Issue: Whether respondent committed a material misrepresentation under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code so as to justify the cancellation of
his COC.
Ruling: No. Section 78 states that the false representation in the contents of
the COC required under Section 74 must refer to material matters in order to
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Election Law Cases | As discussed by Judge M. Paredes
justify the cancellation of the COC. What then constitutes a material
misrepresentation?
In Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, it was held that the material
misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer to
qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact
that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a
false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave — to prevent the
candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for
violation of the election laws. Aside from the requirement of materiality, a
false representation under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt
to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be made with an intention to
deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office.
Clearly, for the petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of one
candidate to prosper, the candidate must have made a material
misrepresentation involving his eligibility or qualification for the office to
which he seeks election, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or
any other legal qualification necessary to run for local elective office as
provided in the Local Government Code. Hence, petitioner's allegation that
respondent's nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" written in his COC is a material
misrepresentation is devoid of merit. Respondent's nickname written in the
COC cannot be considered a material fact which pertains to his eligibility and
thus qualification to run for public office.
Moreover, the false representation under Section 78 must consist of a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. As we said, respondent's nickname is
not considered a material fact, and there is no substantial evidence showing
that in writing the nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" in his COC, respondent had
the intention to deceive the voters as to his identity which has an effect on
his eligibility or qualification for the office he seeks to assume.
Notably, respondent is known to the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur
as the son of the then incumbent Governor of the province, popularly known
as "LRay." Their relationship is shown by the posters, streamers and
billboards displayed in the province with the faces of both the father and son
on them. Thus, the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur know who
respondent is. Hence, petition is denied.
3. Maliksi vs. COMELEC and Saquilayan (G.R. No. 203302.
March 12, 2013)
Facts: Maliksi and Saquilayan were both mayoralty candidates in Imus,
Cavite during the 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Saquilayan
was proclaimed as the winner. based on the Municipal Board of Canvasser’s
canvass, Saquilayan won over Maliksi by 8,499 votes.
Maliksi filed an election protest before the RTC of Imus Cavite, which
declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor. Based on the trial court's recount,
Maliksi won over Saquilayan by a margin of 665 votes.
Saquilayan filed an appeal before the COMELEC. The COMELEC First Division,
after inspecting the ballot boxes, ruled that it was apparent that the integrity
of the ballots had been compromised. To determine the true will of the
electorate, and since there was an allegation of ballot tampering, the
COMELEC First Division examined the digital images of the contested ballots
stored in the Compact Flash (CF) cards. The COMELEC First Division found
Saquilayan
won over Maliksi by 8,429 votes, thus, it nullified the earlier decision of the
RTC and declared Saquilayan as the duly-elected Mayor. The COMELEC First
Division noted that Maliksi attached a photocopy of an official ballot to his
election protest. The COMELEC First Division stated that unless one of the
clustered precincts had a photocopying machine, it could only mean that an
official ballot was taken out of the polling place to be photocopied, in
violation of Section 30 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8786.
On appeal, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the First Division.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Maliksi was deprived of due process when the COMELEC First
Division ordered on appeal the decryption, printing, and examination of the
ballot images in the CF cards. (NO)
2. Whether the ballot images in the CF cards are mere secondary evidence
that should only be used when the physical ballots are not available. (NO)
RULING:
First Issue: Maliksi was not denied due process. He received notices of the
decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the COMELEC
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Election Law Cases | As discussed by Judge M. Paredes
First Division. In addition, Maliksi raised his objections to the decryption in
his motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. There is no
denial of due process where there is opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings. It is settled that "opportunity to be heard" does
not only mean oral arguments in court but also written arguments through
pleadings. Thus, the fact that a party was heard on his motion for
reconsideration negates any violation of the right to due process.
Second Issue: No. The ballot images in the CF cards, as well as the printouts
of such images, are the functional equivalent of the official physical ballots
filled up by the voters, and may be used in an election protest. In the recent
consolidated cases of Vinzons-Chato v. HRET and Panotes v. HRET and
Vinzons-Chato, the Court ruled that "the picture images of the ballots, as
scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise 'official ballots' that
faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by
Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369." The Court declared that the printouts of the
ballot images in the CF cards "are the functional equivalent of the paper
ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of
revision of votes in an electoral protest." In short, both the ballot images in
the CF cards and the printouts of such images have the same evidentiary
value as the official physical ballots filled up by the voters. As explained by
the SC in the abovementioned case:
Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369 defines "official ballot" where AES is
utilized as the "paper ballot, whether printed or generated by the
technology applied, that faithfully captures or represents the votes
cast by a voter recorded or to be recorded in electronic form."
An automated election system, or AES, is a system using appropriate
technology which has been demonstrated in the voting, counting,
consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of election result, and
other electoral process. There are two types of AES identified under
R.A. No. 9369: (1) paper-based election system; and (2) direct
recording electronic system. A paper-based election system,
such as the one adopted during the May 10, 2010 elections, is the
type of AES that "use paper ballots, records and counts votes,
tabulates, consolidates/canvasses and transmits electronically the
results of the vote count. On the other hand, direct recording
electronic election system "uses electronic ballots, records, votes
by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electro-
optical component that can be activated by the voter, processes data
by means of computer programs, record voting data and ballot
images, and transmits voting results electronically.
As earlier stated, the May 10, 2010 elections used a paper-based
technology that allowed voters to fill out an official paper ballot by
shading the oval opposite the names of their chosen candidates. Each
voter was then required to personally feed his ballot into the Precinct
Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machine which scanned both sides of the
ballots simultaneously, meaning, in just one pass. As established
during the required demo tests, the system captured the images of the
ballots in encrypted format which, when decrypted for verification,
were found to be digitized representations of the ballots cast.
We agree, therefore, with both the HRET and Panotes that the picture
images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are
likewise "official ballots" that faithfully captures (sic) in electronic form
the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No.
9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of
the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for
purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.
It bears stressing that the digital images of the ballots captured by the
PCOS machine are stored in an encrypted format in the CF cards.
"Encryption is the process of encoding messages (or information) in
such a way that eavesdroppers or hackers cannot read it, but that
authorized parties can. In an encryption scheme, the message or
information (referred to as plaintext) is encrypted using an encryption
algorithm, turning it into an unreadable ciphertext. This is usually done
with the use of an encryption key, which specifies how the message is
to be encoded. Any adversary that can see the ciphertext, should not
be able to determine anything about the original message. An
authorized party, however, is able to decode the ciphertext using a
decryption algorithm, that usually requires a secret decryption key,
that adversaries do not have access to."
Hence, the COMELEC First Division did not gravely abuse its discretion in
using the ballot images in the CF cards. The ballot images are not secondary
evidence. The official physical ballots and the ballot images in the CF cards
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Election Law Cases | As discussed by Judge M. Paredes
are both original documents. The ballot images in the CF cards have the
same evidentiary weight as the official physical ballots.
4. Tagolino vs. HRET and Lucy Torres-Gomez (G.R. No. 202202,
March 19, 2003)
Facts: On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez filed his COC with the
COMELEC, seeking congressional office as Representative for the 4 th
Legislative District of Leyte under the Liberal Party (LP). One of the opposing
candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla, filed a Verified Petition to deny and/or
cancel Richard’s COC, alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of
San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his COC that he resided in
Ormoc City. Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the 1 year residency
requirement under the Constitution and thus should be declared
disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office.
The COMELEC First Division granted Juntilla’s petition without qualification.
This was accepted by Richard "in order to enable his substitute to facilitate
the filing of the necessary documents for substitution." Subsequently, his
wife Lucy, filed her COC together with a Certificate of Nomination and
Acceptance from the LP endorsing her as the party’s official substitute
candidate for the same congressional post. This substitution was approved
by COMELEC en banc.
The next day, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
of the above-mentioned COMELEC En Banc resolution. Pending resolution of
his motion, the elections were conducted. During the elections, Richard,
whose name remained on the ballots, garnered 101,250 votes while his
opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner Silverio
Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes, respectively. In view of the
substitution, Richard’s votes were credited in favor of Lucy and as a result,
she was proclaimed as the winner.
Juntilla once again filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve his earlier MR
but this remained unacted.
Tagolino (petitioner) filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET in
order to oust private respondent from her congressional seat. He asserts that
the substitution was void ab initio. HRET dismissed the quo warranto petition
and declared that Lucy was a qualified candidate for the position of Leyte
Representative 4th District.
Issue: W/N the HRET gravely abused its discretion in finding that Richard
was validly substituted by private respondent in view of the former’s failure
to meet the one (1) year residency requirement provided under the
Constitution.
Ruling: Yes.
Difference between Sec. 68 and Sec. 78 of the OEC:
The Omnibus Election Code provides for certain remedies to assail a
candidate’s bid for public office. Among these which obtain particular
significance to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under Section
68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78.
A disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a
candidate’s possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign
country;24 or (b) his or her commission of certain acts of disqualification.
Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election
offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws. In
particular, these are: (1) giving money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy; (3)
spending in one’s election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by
the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80,26
83,27 85,28 8629 and 261, paragraphs d,30 e,31 k,32 v,33 and cc, sub-
paragraph 634 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision (Section 68)
states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is a
party, is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by
the COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing acts shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public office, or disallowed
from holding the same, if he or she had already been elected.
It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still
technically considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to
continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not,
however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the
candidate’s compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law,
such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is,
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Election Law Cases | As discussed by Judge M. Paredes
however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction
brought by the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses.
On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC
proceeding under Section 78 is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of
any of the material qualifications required for the elective office aspired for.
It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must
have also made a false representation of the same in the CoC.
It must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less
one’s intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is
enough that the person’s declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be
false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the
person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in
the determination of whether one’s CoC should be deemed cancelled or not.
What remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to deny due
course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of one’s ineligibility and that
the same be granted without any qualification.
Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered
to have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a
person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under
Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason being
is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise
to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes.
Valid COC is a condition sine qua non for candidate substitution:
Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a
person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a COC
to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. Evidently,
Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate
substitution proceeds. Thus, whether the ground for substitution is death,
withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, the said section unequivocally
states that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may
be substituted.
As defined under Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term "candidate" refers to
any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office who has filed a
certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party,
aggroupment, or coalition of parties. Clearly, the law requires that one must
have validly filed a COC in order to be considered a candidate.
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the
whole world of the candidate’s political creed or lack of political creed. It is a
statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he
announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and the be is eligible for
the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs
to any, and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well
stated.
Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for
substitution to take place, as well as the precept that a person without a
valid CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that if
a person’s CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she
cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid
CoC is therefore a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be
validly substituted.
Divergent effects of disqualification and denial of due course to
and/or cancellation of CoC cases vis-à-vis candidate substitution:
It is evident that there lies a clear-cut distinction between a disqualification
case under Section 68 and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of
COC case under Section 78 vis-à-vis their respective effects on candidate
substitution under Section 77. A candidate who is disqualified under Section
68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a
candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due
course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because
he is not considered a candidate.
Application to case at bar:
In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May
10, 2010 elections due to his failure to comply with the 1 year residency
requirement. The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word
"disqualified" in the COMELEC First Division’s resolution which was adopted
by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private respondent,
and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto
petition.
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Election Law Cases | As discussed by Judge M. Paredes

Accordingly, given Richard’s non-compliance with the one year residency independence is not without limitation. As earlier mentioned, the Court
requirement, it cannot be mistaken that the COMELEC First Division’s retains certiorari jurisdiction over the HRET if only to check whether or not it
unqualified grant of Juntilla’s Verified Petition to Disqualify Candidate for has gravely abused its discretion. Hence, petition was granted.
Lack of Qualification" – which prayed that the COMELEC declare Richard
"DISQUALIFIED and INELIGIBLE from seeking the office of Member of the
House of Representatives" and "x x x that his Certificate of Candidacy x x x
be DENIED DUE COURSE and/or CANCELLED" – carried with it the denial of
due course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC pursuant to Section 78.
Case law dictates that if a petition prays for the denial of due course to
and/or cancellation of CoC and the same is granted by the COMELEC without
any qualification, the cancellation of the candidate’s CoC in in order.

In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued

the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution when it adopted the Law
Department’s finding that Richard was only "disqualified" and that his CoC
was not denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the way for the
approval of private respondent’s substitution. It overlooked the fact that the
COMELEC First Division’s ruling encompassed the cancellation of Richard’s
CoC and in consequence, disallowed the substitution of private respondent.
It was therefore grave and serious error on the part of the COMELEC En
Banc to have approved private respondent’s substitution.

Consequently, in perpetuating the COMELEC En Banc’s error as above-

discussed, the HRET committed a grave abuse of discretion, warranting the
grant of the instant petition.

While it is well-recognized that the HRET has been empowered by the

Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the House, the Court maintains
jurisdiction over it to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the
latter. In other words, when the HRET utterly disregards the law and settled
precedents on the matter before it, it commits a grave abuse of discretion.

Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC

pronouncements relative to the qualifications of the Members of the House.
Being the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of its respective members, the HRET cannot be tied down by
COMELEC resolutions, else its constitutional mandate58 be circumvented and
rendered nugatory. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the HRET’s
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