Vinoya vs.

NLRC
G.R. No. 126586, February 02, 2000
FACTS:
On May 26, 1990, Alexander Vinoya was accepted as sales representative by Regent Food
Corporation (RFC), a domestic corporation principally engaged in the manufacture and sale
of various food products. He was issued an identification card on the same day. His task was
to deliver RFC products to various supermarkets and grocery stores where he booked sales
orders and to collect payments for RFC. On 1 July 1991, he was transferred by RFC to
Peninsula Manpower Company, Inc. ("PMCI"), an agency which provides RFC with
additional contractual workers pursuant to a contract for the supply of manpower services.
After his transfer to PMCI, petitioner was reassigned to RFC as sales representative.
Subsequently, on 25 November 1991, he was informed by the personnel manager of RFC,
that his services were terminated and he was asked to surrender his ID card. He was told
that his dismissal was due to the expiration of the Contract of Service between RFC and
PMCI.
ISSUES:
Evidence
1. Can the court take judicial notice of the economic situation in the country on a certain
period?
2. Is there a particular form of proof required to prove the existence of an employer-
employee relationship?
3. Can the court take judicial notice of the practice of employers?
Labor
1. Was petitioner an employee of RFC or PMCI? 2. Was petitioner lawfully dismissed?
RULING
Evidence
1. Yes. The Court took judicial notice of the fact that in 1993 (the year Neri case was
decided) the economic situation in the country was not as adverse as when the present case
was being decided, as shown by the devaluation of the peso. With the economic atmosphere
in the country, the paid-in capitalization of PMCI amounting to P75,000.00 could not be
considered as substantial capital and, as such, PMCI cannot qualify as an independent
contractor.
2. No, there is no particular form of proof required to prove the existence of an employer-
employee relationship. Any competent and relevant evidence may show the relationship. In
the present case, petitioner presented the identification card issued to him on 26 May 1990
by RFC as proof that it was the latter who engaged his services. The ID card is enough proof
that petitioner was previously hired by RFC prior to his transfer as agency worker to PMCI.
3. Yes. The Court takes judicial notice of the practice of employers who, in order to evade
the liabilities under the Labor Code, do not issue payslips directly to

their employees. Under the such practice, a third person, usually the purported contractor
(service or manpower placement agency), assumes the act of paying the wage. For this
reason, the lowly worker is unable to show proof that it was directly paid by the true
employer. Nevertheless, for the workers, it is enough that they actually receive their pay,
oblivious of the need for payslips, unaware of its legal implications. Applying this principle to
the case at bar, even though the wages were coursed through PMCI, the funds actually
came from the pockets of RFC. Thus, in the end, RFC is still the one who paid the wages of
petitioner albeit indirectly.
Lorenzo Jose vs. The Court of Appeals and The People of the Philippines G.R. No. L-38581
March 31, 1976
FACTS:
Petitioner Lorenzo Jose was arrested on February 8, 1968 for possessing hand grenade. He
was convicted of illegal possession of explosives and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
five years. After promulgation of the judgment, petitioner, on that same day filed his notice of
appeal. Nine days thereafter, he filed a motion praying that the case be reopened to permit
him to present (1) the written permit of petitioner to possess and use handgrenade, and (2)
the written appointment of petitioner as PC agent with Code No. P-36-68 and Code Name
'Safari'. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction over the
case in view of the perfection of the appeal by the accused. The appellate court affirmed the
judgment of conviction and denied the motion for new trial because the evidence sought to
be introduced by him at the new trial is not newly discovered evidence as both documents
are dated January 31, 1968.
ISSUE:
Should the petitioner's motion for new trial be granted and that the documents which are not
newly discovered be admitted in evidence?
RULING:
Yes. In the interest of justice, the case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial. This is
an exception to the general rule that new trial may only be granted if there is newly
discovered evidence. The evidence sought to be presented by the petitioner do not fall under
the category of newly-discovered evidence because his alleged appointment as an agent of
the Philippine Constabulary and a permit to possess a handgrenade were supposed to be
known to petitioner and existing at the time of trial and not discovered only thereafter. For a
new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that
(a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the
evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it must go
to the merits as ought to produce a different result if admitted.
However, under Sec. 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which provides that upon appeal,
the appellate court may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment and increase or reduce the
penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case to the Court of First Instance for new trial
or retrial, or dismiss the case on the ground of substantial justice.
In the present case petitioner claimed that he was an agent of the Philippine Constabulary
with a permit to possess explosives such as the handgrenade in question. However, he
found himself in a situation where he had to make a choice to reveal his identity as an
undercover agent of the Philippine Constabulary assigned to perform intelligence work on
subversive activities and face possible reprisals or even liquidation at the hands of the
dissidents considering that Floridablanca, the site of the incident, was in the heart of
"Huklandia", or ride on the hope of a possible exoneration or acquittal based on insufficiency
of the evidence of the prosecution. Without revealing his identity as an agent of the
Philippine Constabulary, he claimed before the trial judge that he had a permit to possess
the handgrenade and prayed for time to present the same. The permit however could not be
produced because it would reveal his intelligence work activities. The Court held that these
circumstances justifies a
reopening of the case to afford the petitioner the opportunity of producing exculpating
evidence.