Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1985
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THE "FACTS" OF FEDERAL SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION
William Marshall*
It is well-settled regarding contentions of law that a party cannot waive,
consent to, or agree to overcome a lack of federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Either party or the court may raise the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction at any time, including on appeal.' However, the relationship of
the foregoing rule to disputed facts is unclear. Are factual as well as legal
issues concerning jurisdiction open to determination or redetermination at
any time prior to final judgment?
The Supreme Court has never explicitly focused on the jurisdictional facts
problem, and the cases that do address the issue are inconsistent.' Two
relatively recent Supreme Court cases suggest that normal rules of adjudi-
cation are suspended when factual disputes concern the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction. 3 In these cases, the Court questioned the use of traditional
fact-finding tools, including party admissions, to establish subject matter
jurisdiction. 4 Other Supreme Court cases, however, suggest that no special
rules apply to the adjudication of jurisdictional facts.'
This issue is significant. Its answer ultimately depends on an understand-
ing of the concepts of jurisdiction and of "fact" as developed in an adver-
sary system. From a policy standpoint, the issue is equally weighty. On the
one hand is the premise that a federal court cannot exceed its jurisdictional
limitations;' on the other are the rules and principles of adjudication which
limit, and may foreclose, consideration of factual issues at points long before
final judgment.7
I. THE CASES
Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931) (party who appeared to contest court's personal
jurisdiction could not subsequently attack judgment on jurisdictional grounds).
15. Moore, supra note 12, at 534.
16. Mansfield, Ill U.S. at 383. Federal courts have limited jurisdiction. Federal courts are
only empowered to hear cases that are within the judicial power of the United States, as defined
in the Constitution and entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant by Congress. See also C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7 (4th ed. 1983).
17. 111 U.S. at 383.
18. Standing and other questions of justiciability are properly considered to be questions
of subject matter jurisdiction and may be raised at any time. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). But see Bernstine, A "Standing" Amendment to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 501 (suggesting that standing may be a prerequisite
to the invocation of subject matter jurisdiction rather than subject matter jurisdiction itself).
19. See Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3324-25 (1984) (standing questions answered by
reference to Article Ill and must be consistent with separation of powers); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974) (reaffirmation of traditional
standing and jurisdiction concepts); United States v. Richardson, 18 U.S. 166, 188-89 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring) (standing requirements cannot be relaxed without expansion of federal
judicial power). But see Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 635 (1985) (criticizing the use of standing to enforce separation of powers principles).
20. See, e.g., Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). In Mottley,
the parties apparently remained unaware that federal subject matter jurisdiction was lacking
throughout the entire litigation, including argument to the United States Supreme Court.
21. The Mansfield rule, however, is not necessary to prevent jurisdiction obtained by fraud
since other mechanisms provide a remedy for that specific abuse. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1359
(1982) (jurisdiction by collusion not allowed); FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) (allowing relief from a
judgment obtained by fraud).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 35:23
The Mansfield rule is not without its costs. For example, a claimant whose
assertion of federal jurisdiction is questioned late in appellate proceedings
may lose the cause of action due to the expiration of the statute of limita-
tions. Even when the claim is not barred, a finding that a federal court
does not have jurisdiction will result in complete relitigation of the merits
in state court at considerable expense, delay, and inconvenience to the par-
ties.22 Moreover, Mansfield's non-foreclosure principle is inconsistent with
traditional notions of fairness"3 because a party may take advantage of its
own error to the detriment of its opponent. For example, a party who ini-
tially sought jurisdiction in a federal forum may avoid losing on the merits
by bringing a belated jurisdictional attack.24
For these reasons, various commentators have severely criticized the Mans-
field rule. Professor Dobbs has suggested that because of Mansfield's in-
herent inefficiencies, the rule should be discretionary. 25 Similarly, the American
Law Institute has proposed a relaxation of the rule to promote judicial
efficiency, administration, and fairness.2 6 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court,
22. See, e.g., Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). In Mottley, the
plaintiffs refiled in state court after their original suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
only to lose on the merits before the United States Supreme Court. Louisville & Nash. R.R.
v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911).
23. This argument was first noted in a dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393, 566 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting), and later quoted in Mansfield and American Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Finn:
It is true, . . . as a general rule, that the court will not allow a party to rely on
anything as cause for reversing a judgment, which was for his advantage. In this,
we follow an ancient rule of the common law. But so careful was that law of the
preservation of the course of its courts, that it made an exception out of that
general rule, and allowed a party to assign for error that which was for his advantage,
if it were a departure by the court itself from its settled course of procedure.
III U.S. at 383; 341 U.S. 6, 18 n.17 (1951).
24. See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn., 341 U.S. 6 (1951). The Eighth Circuit stated
the point well in the Kroger opinion:
By subtle and adroit pleading the defendant has gained a substantial advantage. If
the trial goes well, he can keep the jurisdictional point hidden. If the trial seems
to be going badly or, indeed, if it loses on the merits, it asserts that it can even
then challenge jurisdiction and successfully, so it argues, since it insists that it is
clear to all that jurisdiction may be challenged by anyone at any time.
Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417, 427 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 365
(1978).
25. Dobbs, supra note II, at 526. See also P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 835-36
(2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER] (describing the rule as "fetishism").
Professor Currie wryly suggests that one "modern" view "that questions of federal juris-
diction should be foreclosed if not timely raised" may be inconsistent with another "modern"
view that state laws requiring timely presentation should not be allowed to foreclose state court
considerations of federal questions. D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 181 (3d ed. 1982). See
generally Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) (discussing whether unasserted federal rights
in state court proceeding are entitled to subsequent review by federal courts).
26. See A.L:I., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
19851 SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
despite some lower court resistance,2 7 has consistently applied the Mansfield
doctrine to prevent foreclosure of legal issues that affect the existence of
subject matter jurisdiction. The foreclosure of factual disputes, however, has
not had a similarly consistent history.28
COURTS (Official Draft, 1969). The Institute proposes that "no court of the United States shall
consider, either on its own motion or at the instance of any party, a question of jurisdiction"
after trial has begun or a decision on the merits has been reached. Id. § 1386. The A.L.I. study
argues as follows:
As many commentators have noted, e.g. I MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.60(4) (2d
ed. 1948), this fetish of federal jurisdiction is wholly inconsistent with sound judicial
administration and can only serve to diminish respect for a system that tolerates it.
Some effective limitation on the raising and consideration of jurisdictional issues
seems long overdue.
Id. at 366.
27. See Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417, 426 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'd,
437 U.S. 365 (1978) (discussed infra notes 38-52 and accompanying text); Murphy v. Kodz,
351 F.2d 163, 168 (9th Cir. 1965) (motion to remand to state court denied despite judgment
for and deletion of only party entitled to involve federal jurisdiction). See also DiFrischia v.
New York C. R.R., 279 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 1960). In DiFrischia the defendant objected to
diversity jurisdiction of the court, but subsequently withdrew his objection. After two years of
pretrial preparation and the expiration of the plaintiff's statute of limitation, the defendant
renewed his jurisdictional challenge. The trial court concluded that diversity was lacking and
dismissed the case. The Third Circuit reversed, and noted that "[a] defendant may not play
fast and loose with the judicial machinery and deceive the courts." Id. at 144.
28. Some commentators, like Professor Dobbs, argue that Mansfield does not properly
apply to the adjudication of jurisdictional facts since his interpretation of the rule requires
a court to re-open the jurisdictional issue only when "the record does not affirmatively show
jurisdiction." Mansfield, Ill U.S. at 383. Since "facts" are part of the record, they are out-
side the scope of the Mansfield rule. Professor Dobbs' argument does have some force, but
it is nonetheless true, as Dobbs admits, that the United States Supreme Court and lower federal
courts have not limited the jurisdictional inquiry, as he has suggested. Dobbs, supra note 1I,
at 510, 519. See also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978) (discussed
infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text); Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315 (1889) (discussed
infra note 29).
29. One might argue that an older case, Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315 (1889), also stands
for this proposition. In Morris, the Court allowed the defendant to belatedly challenge the
plaintiff's factual assertion of his own (the plaintiff's) citizenship. Although normal rules of
adjudication would not have allowed belated attack, the Court allowed this challenge.
As Professor Dobbs has noted, however, Morris is best explained as a party's attempt to gain
jurisdiction by fraud. Dobbs, supra note i, at 510. Belated jurisdictional attacks based on
fraudulent conduct are permissible and do not represent a deviation from normal rules of
adjudication. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
30. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
DEPA UL LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 35:23
47. For CBG to establish the insurers' contacts with Pennsylvania, the company sought
access to the insurers' business records through the use of discovery requests. CBG initially
requested "[c]opies of all business interruption insurance policies issued by Defendant during
the period from January I, 1972 to December 31, 1975." The request was later narrowed to
copies of any policies delivered in, or which covered a risk in, Pennsylvania. Id. at 698.
48. The discovery sanction was issued pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2).
The rule states:
(2) Sanctions by Court in Which Action is Pending. If a party or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6)
or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery, including an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35,
or if a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(0, the court in which
the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just,
and among others the following:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any
other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action
in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order ....
FED. R. Crv. P. 37(b)(2).
49. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
50. 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
51. Id. at 351. Hammond Packing Company, an Illinois corporation doing business in
Arkansas, challenged the constitutionality of an Arkansas statute that authorized the state to
order the production of witnesses, books, and documents located outside the state from a
foreign corporation for evidentiary use. Hammond's refusal to produce the materials resulted
in an action against it for forfeiture of its Arkansas business license. The Court upheld the
statute and found that a state's authority over foreign corporations includes the power to
compel production of documents for investigation, including documents located outside the
state.
52. 456 U.S. at 705-07.
1985] SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
53. The Eighth Circuit's decision to allow the use of discovery sanctions to establish facts
pertinent to the existence of personal jurisdiction directly conflicts with the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981).
54. 456 U.S. at 701-05.
55. The Court's discussion in Ireland is contrary to its decision in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 256 (1980), a landmark personal jurisdiction decision that construed
the doctrine to implicate federalism concerns that transcend the rights of the individual defend-
ant.
For a discussion of the relationship between federalism and personal jurisdiction, see Lewis,
The Three Deaths of "State and Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence
of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 699 (1983) (examining relationship of state
sovereignty and personal jurisdiction), and Redish, Due Process, Federalism and Personal
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REV.. 1112 (1981) (distinguishing due
process from federalism). See also Comment, Federalism, Due Process, and Minimum Contacts:
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1341 (1980) (comparing due
process with federalism).
During the 1985 term, the Supreme Court again entered the personal jurisdiction debate,
this time without implicating federalism concerns at all. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
105 S.Ct. 2174 (1985).
56. A party may consent to personal jurisdiction through appearance before the court. See
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917). Waiver of the jurisdictional defense may be given by
contract in advance of litigation. See National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311
(1964). Parties can also stipulate to personal jurisdiction. See Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security
Ins. Co., 350 U.S. 495 (1956).
57. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan R.R. v. Swan, Ill U.S. 379 (1884).
32 DEPAUL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 35:23
What the Ireland Court ignored, however, was that jurisdictional findings
based upon the existence of background facts are wholly distinct from estab-
lishing jurisdiction by waiver or consent." If the defendant does not contest
the existence of certain facts, its recourse is an admission. This factual
admission does not constitute consent or waiver of the legal defense. A defen-
dant may, for example, admit that its product injured a party in the forum
state without waiving its defense that it has insufficient contacts with the
forum state to justify the imposition of personal jurisdiction. 9 Conversely,
a defendant may waive its personal jurisdiction defense without admitting
the existence of facts which justify the imposition of personal jurisdiction."
Since the Ireland Court previously equated the discovery sanction with the
constructive admission of background facts,' the notion that a party may
waive personal jurisdiction would appear to be beside the point.
The sole question in Ireland was "when does 'due process' allow facts
to be constructively admitted?" ' 6 The Court's analysis, however, equated the
58. Older cases suggested that a defendant's contacts with a forum may indicate implied
consent to jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (non-resident motorist
in accident impliedly consented to jurisdiction). See also Kurland, The Supreme Court, The
Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to
Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 569, 578-582 (1958) (consent thesis based on state's
power to exclude permission or regulate business). The Court ultimately rejected the fiction of
implied consent in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
59. Worldwide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
60. One practical difference in this regard is the effect that a judgment has. Jurisdiction
found pursuant to the existence of background facts would be collaterally estopped in suggested
cases. Jurisdiction by consent has no such effect.
61. Ireland has also been soundly criticized on its conclusions regarding the due process
limitations on discovery sanctions issue. The Court distinguished between constitutionally per-
missible sanctions based upon presumptions of fact and punitive sanctions which are not al-
lowed to support a finding of fact. Compare Hammond Packing v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322
(1909) (presumption upheld) with Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1897) (presumption denied).
One commentator has argued, however, that discovery sanctions are punitive and have the
purpose of deterring the violation of discovery orders. Thus, according to that writer, under
the Court's own analysis the disputed fact should not be presumed. See Note, Insurance Corp.
of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea: Justifying Establishment of Jurisdiction as
a Discovery Sanction, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1446 (1982). In this respect it is notable that in some
cases the Court has acknowledged that discovery sanctions do serve a deterrent purpose. Road-
way Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639 (1976). The conclusion that non-compliance with jurisdictional
discovery indicates bad faith and willful avoidance of jurisdiction on meritless grounds is also
subject to criticism. Instances of willful non-compliance may arise from a good faith belief
that the court lacks jurisdiction. See Note, Sanctions to Enforce Jurisdictional Discovery: Con-
stitutional & Prudential Limitations, 68 VA. L. REv. 921, 936 (1982).
62. Some confusion may occur because both constructive admissions and personal jurisdic-
tion are termed "due process" issues. The two due process issues, however, are analytically
distinct. Constructive admissions concern the constitutionality of presumptions in fact finding.
See Hammond Packing v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463
(1943). The other due process issue pertains to the power of a court over the person of the
defendant. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
19851 SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
C. Opposing Authority
Other authority suggests that the adjudication of jurisdictional facts de-
serves treatment similar to the adjudication of facts generally.6 The first case,
Pacific & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Ramsey,M6 decided in 1874, appeared to
be explicitly dispositive of the issue. In that case the Supreme Court stated:
Consent of parties cannot give the courts of the United States jurisdiction
but the parties may admit the existence of facts which show jurisdiction,
and the courts may act judicially upon such an admission."
Ramsey, however, may be easily confined to its unusual circumstances.
The case arose out of the administrative problems that occurred in the
aftermath of the Chicago fire of 1871. Critical court documents were lost
during the fire, including those pertinent to the federal court's jurisdiction
over the Ramsey litigation.66 In an effort to compensate for the destroyed
documents, both parties stipulated that the requisite documents were filed
properly but were destroyed by fire. 67 The Supreme Court addressed the
validity of this stipulation.
The Court's opinion indicated that the parties' stipulation to the existence
of the documents sufficiently established the jurisdictional requisites. 6' The
Court was careful not to rely exclusively on the parties' admissions, and
found "irresistable" the conclusion that the original papers established
jurisdiction. 69 If the papers were insufficient, the Court argued:
Either party ... could have moved to remand, or the court itself, without
a motion, could have sent the case back if the jurisdiction did not appear.
As both the court and the parties accepted the transfer, it cannot for a
moment be doubted that the files did then contain conclusive evidence of
jurisdictional facts.70
In short, the Supreme Court did not rely on the parties' agreement, but
assumed that the lower federal court had already found jurisdiction established.
63. Interestingly, these opinions resemble the suggestions that Ireland and Kroger make by
implication rather than suggestion. See infra notes 70-95, 136 and accompanying text.
64. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 322 (1874).
65. Id. at 327.
66. The documents in question indicated that Ramsey, a removal case, was properly trans-
ferred from state court.
67. 89 U.S. at 324.
68. Id. at 328.
69. Id.
70. Id.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 35:23
Ramsey, therefore, cannot be read to establish a broad rule for the adjudication
of jurisdictional facts by admission or otherwise."
A second decision actually supports the proposition that proof of juris-
dictional facts will be treated more leniently than proof of non-jurisdictional
facts. In St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 7 the Supreme
Court held that the federal jurisdictional monetary amount requirement" would
be deemed satisfied absent proof to a legal certainty that the requisite amount
did not exist." Moreover, the Court indicated that a still more lenient
standard might be applied in a removal case if the plaintiff unfairly sought
to deprive a defendant of the federal forum. 7 The plaintiff in St. Paul
originally commenced a state suit and alleged an amount over the jurisdic-
tional limit. 76 After the defendant removed the case to federal court, the
plaintiff submitted a bill of particulars which indicated that the damages in
the case were less than the jurisdictional amount. 77 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court held that the federal court appropriately retained jurisdiction. The
Court stated that as long as the plaintiff had a good faith belief in the
damage amount at the institution of the suit, the court's jurisdiction should
be maintained even if it is later shown to a legal certainty that the jurisdic-
tional amount did not exist.7 s
It is difficult to reconcile St. Paul with Kroger and Ireland. In order to
bring a diversity case, both the amount of damages and the parties' diversity
of citizenship must be shown.' 9 St. Paul presumed that the jurisdictional fact
existed unless it was shown to a certainty that it did not.w° Ireland, however,
apparently presumed that jurisdiction did not exist even when there existed
a factual presumption in its favor." Second, St. Paul held that a plaintiff
need only establish a good faith belief that the amount in controversy ex-
isted at the outset of the suit.' Kroger, on the other hand, struck down
a similar good faith belief as to the existence of diversity even when the
defendant misled the plaintiff into believing that diversity existed.' Third,
St. Paul indicated that if the state court action were removed to a federal
71. But see Dobbs, supra note I1(Ramsey established that jurisdictional facts may be
admitted).
72. 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) provides in part that "the district court shall have original
jurisdiction where the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000."
74. 303 U.S. at 289.
75. Id.at 290-92.
76. Id.at 284.
77. Id.at 285.
78. Id.at 289.
79. The amount in controversy must exceed $10,000 and the parties in the action must be
citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
80. 303 U.S. at 289.
81. The presumption was created by the defendant's non-answer. See supra notes 45-53
and accompanying text.
82. 303 U.S. at 296.
83. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 383 (White, J.,dissenting).
1985] SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
fact is simply just a fact. In this sense, the Duke Power holding is clearly
96
at odds with Kroger and Ireland.
II. THE COMPETING INTERESTS
Given the contrasting results of the preceding cases and the Supreme
Court's failure to articulate a clear doctrine, it is fair to state that no cohesive
pattern has emerged regarding the adjudication of jurisdictional facts. Cer-
tainly the disarray of lower court decisions amply demonstrates this confu-
sion. 9' An independent examination of the jurisdictional facts issue, therefore,
is necessary.
To begin, it is noteworthy that some rules of adjudication, if applied to
jurisdictional issues, would clearly offend Mansfield principles. For exam-
ple, a party may admit a non-jurisdictional legal conclusion." However, in
95. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
96. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), is also inconsistent with Kroger and Ireland. In
Larson, the plaintiff, the Unification Church, attacked provisions of a Minnesota statute which
required that certain religious organizations file reporting statements with the state's department
of commerce. The defendants argued that the plaintiff lacked standing to attack this provision
since the church had not yet established that it was a religious organization. The Court responded
to this argument by noting that the state purposely used the provision against the plaintiff in
order to "compel the Unification Church to register and report under the Act." Id. at 241.
Thus, the Court held that the "attempted use of the ... rule as the State's instrument of
compulsion necessarily gives appellees standing to challenge the constitutional validity of the
rule." Id. The Court argued that since the state, in its regulatory capacity, was purportedly
treating the organization as a religious entity, the state would not be permitted in its litigation
capacity to allege that the organization was not religious for purposes of denying standing. As
the Court stated: "It is logically untenable for the State to take the position that the Church
is not [a religious] organization because that position destroys an essential premise of the
exercise of statutory authority at issue in this suit." Id. at 240. Therefore, this decision can be
construed only as an application of estoppel principles. However, the ambiguous nature of the
Court's ruling and its failure to articulate estoppel principles clearly limits Larson's precedential
value regarding the jurisdictional issues presented in the case. But see id. at 258 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
97. Compare Eisler v. Stritzler, 535 F.2d 148 (Ist Cir. 1976) (jurisdictional facts may not be
admitted) with Lackawanna Refuse Removal v. Proctor & Gamble, 86 F.R.D. 330 (M.D. Pa.
1979) (jurisdictional facts may be admitted). Before Kroger, Professor Dobbs believed that facts
could be admitted. Dobbs, supra note II. The Third Circuit apparently suggested that juris-
diction may be gained by estoppel of jurisdictional fact issues. See DiFrischia v. New York
Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960). See also Greenbaum v. United States, 360 F. Supp.
784 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (when plaintiff misled by government, jurisdiction allowed). However, the
Fifth Circuit ruled that jurisdictional fact issues may not be estopped. In re Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1976). The rule is clear that a party may not be estopped
from raising jurisdictional issues of law. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6
(1951).
98. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 allows for the admission of "any matters . . . set
forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law
to fact." This provision was added to Rule 36 in a 1970 amendment. Prior to that only matters
"of fact" were allowed. The Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 36 explain that allowing
parties to admit legal applications and conclusions aids the trial process because admissions
"even more clearly narrow the issues."
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 35:23
a jurisdictional dispute, a party who admits that "this court has jurisdic-
tion" or that "diversity exists" has admitted precisely what Mansfield pro-
hibits. 9" The admission is, in effect, a consent that jurisdiction exists. Simi-
larly, while a party generally may admit facts that are not within its per-
sonal knowledge,' 00 this admission has little, if any, probative value when
applied to jurisdictional issues. Thus, an admission without personal
knowledge again may be viewed as simply a concession of jurisdiction.'"'
For these reasons, there is justifiable resistance in finding that such admis-
sions are binding. In fact, these admissions were vulnerable to belated at-
tacks even before Kroger and Ireland.'°2
Arguably, other methods of proof are also simply waivers of the legal
issue. The theoretical basis of the conclusiveness of judicial admissions' 3
whether within or without a party's personal knowledge is that the admission
constitutes a waiver of proof."°4 To waive proof on the issue is to waive the
issue itself. As such, one could argue that the waiver is inappropriate when
the issue is subject matter jurisdiction.
99. Page v. Wright, 116 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1940). In Page, the plaintiff alleged that she
was a resident of Florida, and upon "information and belief" she also alleged that the defendant
was a resident of Kentucky. The defendant responded that "this defendant admits that this
court has jurisdiction of the parties hereto, and of the subject matter hereof." The defendant
subsequently attempted to show that he too was a resident of Florida. The trial court, however,
denied the defendant leave to amend the answer and motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the defendant's admission of the legal conclusion
that the court had jurisdiction was nothing more than consent. "ITlhe defendant admitted no
facts from which the court could say, as a matter of law, that jurisdiction existed." Id. at 451.
100. FED. R. EVID. 801 (1975).
101. In non-jurisdictional disputes, personal knowledge is arguably unnecessary for an ad-
mission to have probative value. One reason for this argument is that admissions are often
against interest, and "when a man speaks against his own interest it is to be supposed that he
has made an adequate investigation." C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
778 (3d ed. 1984). Probative value is also presumed because a litigant has incentive to be
informed on issues in which no personal knowledge exists. Neither rationale applies to admissions
of jurisdictional facts when the party making the assertion does not oppose jurisdiction. Since
the party is disinterested in the jurisdictional issue, the admission is not against the party's
interest, and is therefore unlikely to lead to an independent investigation.
102. See, e.g., Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 (1917) (plaintiff's admission of own citizen-
ship held vulnerable to belated attack); Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315 (1889) (same).
103. Judicial admissions are those voluntarily made in court by a party and, until withdrawn
or amended, are conclusive of the disputed issue. Judicial admissions should be distinguished
from extra-judicial (or evidential) admissions which are a party's words or conduct that are
offered into evidence against the party's interest. See MCCORMICK, supra note 101, at 778.
104. 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT THE COMMON LAW § 2588 (1940). Wigmore, under the heading "Theory of Judicial Admis-
sions," refers to an admission as an "express waiver," by a party or his attorney, such that
the truth of an alleged fact is conceded, and the other party need not offer any evidence to
prove it. See also 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 89, at 36.02 ("judicial admissions
expedite trial by weeding out facts over which there is no dispute").
19851 SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
112. It is also noteworthy that with some jurisdictional issues, notably citizenship, the
defendant may be the only actor in possession of the information. See supra note 108 and
accompanying text.
113. In Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. R.R., 22 F.R.D. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1958), the defendant
belatedly presented a motion to amend its answer to deny diversity jurisdiction. Two years
earlier, the defendant had admitted that diversity existed. Four days before the two-year statute
of limitations was to expire, the defendant asserted that it was a corporation and citizen of
Ohio and Pennsylvania, and that the suit should be dismissed because the plaintiff was also a
Pennsylvania resident. Id. at 254. In response, the court stated that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure favor a liberal policy toward amendments. However, the court noted that it would
"constitute a monstrous injustice to permit, in effect, a defendant to change its citizenship
immediately prior to the running of the statute of limitations and thus deprive the plaintiff of
his cause of action." Id. at 255. Consequently, the court denied the defendant's motion. Id.
See also Young v. Handwork, 179 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)
(belated attack on jurisdiction denied); accord Biggs v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 280
F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1964) (same). See generally Stephens, Estoppel to Deny Federal Jurisdiction-
Klee and Di Frischia Break Ground, 68 DICK. L. REV. 39 (1969). In Kroger, of course, the
United States Supreme Court was unconcerned with the possibility of the passage of the statute
of limitations. 437 U.S. at 376 n. 20.
114. Murphy v. Kodz, 351 F.2d 163, 168 (9th Cir. 1965) (quoted in Kroger v. Owen Equip.
& Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417, 426 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 365 (1978)). Nevertheless,
the defendant in Kroger was allowed to raise the jurisdictional infirmity despite his previous
admission of the jurisdictional fact.
115. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text; see also C. WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 24.
116. 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
1985] SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
124. The Court noted that establishing the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy required both a "distinct and palpable injury" and "a 'fairly traceable' causal
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct." Id. at 72.
125. In the actual case, Duke Power's Executive Vice-President testified that "it would be
[his] recommendation that Duke proceed even in the absence of Price-Anderson." Id. at 77
n.22. Nevertheless, the willingness of nuclear parts suppliers and utility shareholders to agree
to construction absent the limitations was doubtful. Id.
126. See supra note 124.
127. Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 431 F. Supp.
203 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
128. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 383 (White, J., dissenting).
129. If Duke Power did not complete the nuclear facility, the plaintiffs could not show a causal
connection between the injury of the power plant and the Duke Power Company. See supra
note 124.
130. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). The Kroger Court was
completely unmoved by what the court of appeals labelled "the most elementary considerations
of judicial fairness." 558 F.2d at 427. "Our holding is that the District Court lacked power to
entertain the respondent's lawsuit against the petitioner. Thus, the asserted inequity in the
respondent's alleged concealment of its citizenship is irrelevant. Federal judicial power does not
depend upon 'prior action or consent of the parties."' 437 U.S. at 377 n.21.
19851 SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 43
131. "[E]very court has jurisdiction to decide its own jurisdiction, unless the legislature has
decreed otherwise. When a court has jurisdiction to decide an issue, it has the power to decide
wrongly as well as rightly." Dobbs, supra note 1I, at 494.
132. J. FRANKE, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTHS AND REALITIES 15-16 (1949). Franke's argument
was echoed by the late Justice Harlan in In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). In Winship, Justice Harlan -commented on whether instructing a jury on different
standards of proof actually led to different results:
[l]n a judicial proceeding in which there is a dispute about the facts of some earlier
event, the factfinder cannot acquire unassailably accurate knowledge of what hap-
pened .... A second proposition, which is really nothing more than a corollary
of the first, is that the trier of fact will sometimes, despite his best efforts, be
wrong in his factual conclusions.
Id. at 370.
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these nor any other factors tend to achieve a high correlation with what is
actually true. 33
'
What the foregoing suggests is that Mansfield, if applied to factual disputes,
may only minimally accomplish its goal of protecting against improper federal
court intrusion.' 3 While a court may occasionally discover an inadvertent
factual mistake, the nature of "facts" is too variable to place much stake
in any increased certitude by reopening the factual issue. As the Court stated
in Stoll v. Gottlieb, ' retrial provides "no reason to expect that the second
decision will be more satisfactory than the first."' 3 6 There is no guarantee
of truth.
III. RESOLUTION
133. See generally I. GOLDSTEIN & F. LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE (2d ed. 1977).
134. As the authors state in MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE:
Jurisdiction represents the distribution of judicial power in our federal system as
blueprinted by the Constitution and declared by Congress; and the federal courts
ought therefore to be mindful that they stay within defined limits. These are broad
working principles and ought not to be applied destructively .... is very
[I]t
questionable whether a party who has invoked the federal court's jurisdiction should
be allowed to raise lack of federal jurisdiction after he has lost on the merits. And
only in rare cases should an appellate court on its own motion raise lack of the
district court's jurisdiction.
I MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 89, at 0.60[4]. The authors conclude by stating that
the Mansfield doctrine does not "increase respect for judicial administration, and [is] not
necessary for the preservation of the proper distribution of judicial power." Id.
135. 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
136. Id. at 172. The Court in this context was discussing the legal as well as the factual issue
at stake.
137. See, e.g., Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938), in which the Court stated., "[a]fter
a federal court has decided the question of the jurisdiction over the parties as a contested
issue, the court in which the plea of res judicata is made has not the power to inquire again
into the jurisdictional fact." See also Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina
Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691 (1982) (judgment in one state conclusive
upon merits in another state if first had jurisdiction). Some commentators suggest that applica-
tion of res judicata depends on whether the issue was actually litigated. See W. RICHMAN &
W. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAws 294-96 (1984). See also Durfee v. Duke,
375 U.S. 106 (1963) (holding that collateral attacks are precluded if jurisdictional issues have
been fully and fairly litigated in an earlier proceeding). The Supreme Court, however, recently
indicated that subject matter jurisdiction issues may not be raised in a collateral proceeding
when the party could have done so in the first action. See Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co.
v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 712 (1982);
19851 SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The process that the Supreme Court utilized, however, to decide those
cases is more significant than the actual results. In each case, the Court
weighed the related litigation policies of finality and judicial administration
against the policies behind the limited grant of federal jurisdiction., 8 The
requirement of "true" subject matter jurisdiction was not absolute and,
indeed, in the majority of cases was subordinated to the countervailing
litigation concerns.' 39 Thus, extrapolating from this framework, resolution
of the jurisdictional facts issue does not necessitate blind adherence to the
Mansfield rule.
Although the Court was unclear in this regard, this is undoubtedly what
occurred in Duke Power when the Court did not apply Mansfield literally
to resolve jurisdictional facts on appeal. Had the Court literally applied
Mansfield to issues on appeal, the violence to litigation-related policies would
have been especially obvious. One concern is the need for finality, a policy
that expressly underlies the "clearly erroneous" rule governing review of facts
on appeal. A second concern is inefficiency. If a party desires to introduce
new evidence regarding jurisdictional issues, the court must remand the case
to the trial court for further proceedings. This problem may become par-
ticularly troublesome since Mansfield does not limit the number of times
that the issue may be redetermined.'""
The more difficult issue is how the jurisdictional facts issue should be
resolved at the trial court level. An examination of the most extreme case
places this issue in perspective. After losing the jurisdictional issue at trial,
should a court permit a defendant to reopen the controversy and introduce
additional evidence?"' It is almost a virtual certainty that such tactics would
be disallowed. The question is why?
There are two potential answers. First, retrial promotes an egregious inef-
ficiency that parallels the reopening of a factual inquiry on appeal. Although
remand problems are not an issue, the trial court would still be unable to
complete the litigation effectively. A defendant could continually attempt
to introduce new evidence in a war of attrition. The second concern, however,
is not simply limited to administrative efficiency, but again relates to the
nature of "facts" in the legal system. Continual relitigation of an issue does
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Chicat County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank,
308 U.S. 371 (1940).
The Supreme Court has sustained collateral attacks for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
only in Bankruptcy Act cases, see Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940), in which Congress
"pre-empted" state court jurisdiction, or where sovereign immunity was at stake. See United
States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
138. See generally MooRE, supra note 12.
139. Of similar authority is the rule that jurisdictional facts may be collaterally estopped.
See Middlebury Assoc. Inc. v. R.E. Bean Constr. Co., 446 F. Supp. 28 (D. Vt. 1977); Napper
v. Anderson, Henley, Shields, Bradford & Pritchard, 500 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1974).
140. But see Dobbs, supra note 11.
141. Limited instances exist when factual issues may be reopened after trial. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(2).
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2
not assure a greater degree of "truth."" Thus, once a matter is determined,
there is little sense in redetermining the issue.
Once this is understood, it is apparent that retrial is not the telling point
at which the reopening of the jurisdictional fact issue should be prohibited.""
Rather, the appropriate solution is to foreclose the issue when the jurisdic-
tional fact has been "proved" rather than simply waived. The test, in short,
is whether the jurisdictional facts have been established by probative means
or established only by waiver. When the facts are established by probative
means, non-foreclosure harms fairness and finality concerns, and does so
with only limited or negligible benefits. On the other hand, requiring a fact
to have a probative basis in order to establish jurisdiction assures both that
an indication of jurisdiction will affirmatively appear in the record,"' and
also prevents consensual access to federal jurisdiction, whether framed in
a legal or factual context."'
The court so held not because the admission was improper, but because the admission stated
only that the defendant engaged in business in Utah, and not that its principal place of business
was there. In actuality, Basso and Eisler conflict over the proposition that facts admitted by a
party regarding its own jurisdictional status subsequently may not be disavowed by that party.
146. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (violation of order subject
to contempt citation even if order made without jurisdiction). See Moore, supra note 12 (if
court finds jurisdiction, collateral attack permissible only if plainly beyond jurisdiction); Dobbs,
The Validation of Void Judgments: The Bootstrap Principle, 53 VA. L. REV. 1003 (1967)
(determination that court has jurisdiction is binding, whether correct or incorrect, unless reversed
on appeal).
147. See Dobbs, supra note 11, and cases cited therein. "When a court had jurisdiction to
decide an issue, it has the power to decide wrongly as well as rightly." Id. at 494. See also
Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938) (judgment by court is controlling until reversed by
appellate court).
148. Even Page v. Wright, 116 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1940), which is normally cited to the effect
that Mansfield should be applied stringently, suggests that the harsh Mansfield requirements.
may be unnecessary when the issue is factual and not legal. In Page the defendant admitted
that "this court has jurisdiction of the parties hereto." The Seventh Circuit rejected estoppel
principles and allowed the defendant to raise a belated jurisdictional attack, but nonetheless
indicated that the result may have differed had the defendant admitted the facts of its
jurisdictional status rather than simply stated a legal conclusion.
149. Other critical fact/law distinctions occur in pleading, evidence, judge/jury findings, and
appellate procedure and jurisdiction. See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MI.LER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (1982).
150. Becher v. Contoure Laboratories Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 391 (1929).
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151. Id.
152. The court may similarly demand that the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction
justify the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. See generally McNutt v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936) (burden of proving jurisdiction on asserting
party); Backhorn v. Adlib Assoc., Inc., 345 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1965) (factual inquiry must be
conducted when question of diversity is raised); Rock Island Millwork Co. v. Hedges-Gough
Lumber Co., 337 F.2d 24 (8th Cir. 1964) (must show substantial dispute between diverse parties
to maintain action in federal court).
153. See supra note 101.
154. A matter is deemed admitted unless the party to whom the request for admission is
directed responds with a written answer or objection within 30 days after service of the request.
FED. R. Civ. P. 36.
155. After the defendant in Finn removed the case to federal court, he sought and was
allowed to avoid federal court jurisdiction. A party's request for removal is not an admission
of fact. 341 U.S. at 6.
19851 SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
CONCLUSION
156. Stoll v. Gottleib, 305 U.S. 165, 171 (1938). It is arguable that without a determination
of subject matter jurisdiction, a court is powerless to issue the sanction order. The power in-
herent within the jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, however, is not so limited. For exam-
ple, in United States. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), the Supreme Court held
that even prior to a determination that a case was properly before the court, the court is em-
powered to issue an injunction. Id. at 290. If not, a court would indeed be powerless to con-
trol the litigants before it. Not surprisingly, the power to issue orders is described as a neces-
sity. In any event, if United Mine Workers is correct and a district court may issue a contempt
citation and imprison a recalcitrant defendant, a discovery sanction is permissible a fortiori.
See generally Note, supra note 118 (orders by court are of necessity and must be obeyed).
But see Z. CHAFFEE, SOME PROBLEMS IN EQUITY 365-67 (1950).
157. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694, 705
(1982) (citing Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909)).
158. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
159. See generally Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (contemporaneous objection
rule).
160. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 25, at 836.
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161. "lilt is a grievous hardship for litigants to be led over the long course of federal justice
in the belief that they are having their rights adjudicated, only to learn at the end that the
entire proceeding is a nullity." Hill v. Walker, 167 F. 241, 247 (8th Cir. 1909). See also Morse,
Judicial Self Denial and Judicial Activism: The Personality of the Original Jurisdiction of the
District Courts, 4 CLEVE-MAR. L. REV. 7 (1955) (court's responsibility cannot be facilitated by
denying jurisdiction upon technicalities).