Comprehensive National Security and Policy Process

Kargil: The terrain of changing hands

Pakistan and Indian have disputed history from their inception over LOC. At different times,
Armies of both countries come face to face in battle grounds, notables are 1965 and 1971. After
this, both countries decides to have Shimla Agreement, to respect each other’s domain and not to
disturb that line. Later it was incident of Siachin (1985), when Indian force successfully made
Siachin under control.

According to Indian COAS, General V.P. Malik, at time of Kargil War (Fought between
Pakistan and India at Kargil) quoted in his book (Kargil: From surprise to victory) there was
hostility in Pakistan Army after Siachin, which led incident of Kargil War. Pakistan started proxy
war in late 1980 in Kashmir by intruding mujahideens with army support from lose border areas
and formation of All parties Hurriyat Conference in 1993. India was well aware of Guerrilla
warfare expertise of Pakistan Army due their exposure to security scenario in Afghanistan.

Pakistan Army made a significant impact by destroying the Srinagar-Kargil-Leh highway, which
was the major supply line to Indian Army. Pakistan Code name for the Kargil War used was
“Operation Koh paima” (Quoted by Naseem Zahra) and “Operation Badr” (Quoted by VP Malik
in his Book). Similarly code name given by India to Kargil War was “Operation Vijay”.

During all this, Indian Prime minister used “Bus Diplomacy”, He travelled to Lahore through bus
to met Prime Minister of Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif mentioned that he was not aware of the action
taken by Pakistan Army. While Pakistani COAS, General Pervaiz Musharaf, mentioned in one of
his interview that Prime Minister of that time was briefed regarding Kargil situation. United
Nations secretary General “Kofi Annan” told Indian authorities that you can do more with
diplomacy and you can do more with strong diplomacy, politics, force and Prime Minister. Visit
of Indian Prime Minister established “Lahore Declaration” for peace among hostile neighbors. In
which India wished their proposed terms must be included but finalized in general terms
regarding discontinuing the practice of internal-matter involvement and cross border issues.

It can be seen clearly that there was communication Gap between Pakistan Political and Military
highers. Kargil was a tactical success but a strategic failure. This view was also articulated by a
number of informants and has been reiterated in various articles. Shireen Mazari, for example,
has written that “the military aspect of the Kargil action was simply brilliant.” Later in the same
piece she expresses that India was able to “turn a military defeat into a diplomatic victory”, that
Pakistan was unable to translate a tremendous military success into a politico-diplomatic
victory.” Kargil like operations have high political cost, especially in terms of international
reputation. Kargil on the one hand represent political debacle and on the other hand represents a
lost victory. Both countries view the war through their perspective by describing their success
stories. To conclude, Kargil war for Pakistan was a defensive-offensive approach. A clearly won
battle on military basis ultimately was lost on diplomatic level.

Prince Muhammad Usman 1|Page

MPhil 1st – NDU Islamabad