Professional Documents
Culture Documents
depletion. We do not see, however, how the prohibition of enforcement of the LOI to them would deprive them of
the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their prop. They, therefore, have standing to challenge the
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed validity of the LOI.
any where, w/ no less difficulty in on province than in (2) But the LOI cannot be declared void on its face.
another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in one province It has behind it the presumption of validity. The necessity
will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving for evidence to rebut such presumption is unavoidable. As
them to another province will make it easier to kill them underlying the questions of fact may condition the
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply constitutionality of legislation the presumption of validity
to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could be easily must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
circumsbcribed by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. record overthrowing the statute. The LOI is an energy
However, if the movement of the live animals for the conservation measure; it is an apporpriate response to a
purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it problem.
should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their (3) Nor does the LOI deny equal protection to the
transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat. petitioners. W/in the class to w/c the petitioner belongs the
(3) In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily LOI operate equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not
confiscated by the police station commander, were returned include others does not render it invalid. The govt is not
to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for required to adhere to a policy of "all or none."
recovery and given a supersedeas bond w/c was ordered (4) To the extent that the Land Transpo. Code does
confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when not authorize the impounding of vehicles as a penalty, to
ordered by the trial court. The EO defined the prohibition, that extent the memo. of the resps. would be ultra vires.
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed VV.
punishment, w/c was carried out forthright. The measures
struck him at once and pounced upon the petitioner w/o
giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him
elementary fair play. Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA (1983)
(4) It is there authorized that the seized prop. shall
"be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar Ordinance Prohibiting Barbershops from Rendering
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Massage Services Valid.
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of F: The ordinance was enacted for a two-fold purpose:
Animal Industry may see fit in the case of carabaos." The (1) To enable the City of Mla. to collect a fee for operating
phrase may see fit is an extremely generous and dangerous massage clinics separately from those operating barber ships
condition, if condition it is. It is laden w/ perilous and (2) To prevent immorality w/c might probably arise
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. from the construction of separate rooms.
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the
reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the HELD: The SC has been most liberal in sustaining
said officers must observe when they make their ordinances based on general welfare clause. VV.
distribution. VV.
Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)
B. Due Process and Police Power F: The petitioners are operators or nightclubs in
Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed prohibition suits to stop the
Mun. of Bocaue from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the
Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984) operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance h alls in that
mun. or the renewal of licenses to operate them. The CFI
Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s upheld the validity of the ordinance and dismissed the
Valid. petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A and EH HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the operation of
plates on week-ends and holidays in view of the energy nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented
crisis. It excepted, however, those classified as S (Service), from carrying on their business. RA 938, as orginally
T (Truck), DPL (Diplomatic), CC (Consular Corps), and TC enacted, granted municipalities the power to regulate the
(Tourist Cars). The resps., Min. of Public Works, establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs and
Transportation, issued memo. providing penalties for viol. the like. While it is true that on 5/21/54, the law was
of the LOI, namely, fine, confiscation of vehicles, and amended by RA 979 w/c purported to give municipalities
cancellation of registration. The petitioners brought suit the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the
questioning the validity of the LOI on the ground that it was operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law
discriminatory and a denial of due process. The resps. remained the same so that the power granted to
denied the petitioner's allegations and argued that the suit municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition.
amounted to a request for advisory opinion. To construe the amendatory act as granting mun.
corporations the power to prohibit the operation of
HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8 cylinder 1969 nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that it violates
Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy's Kaiser Jeep. The the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. The
thereof." Moreover, the recentyly-enacted LGC (BP 337) contract clause has never been regarded as a barrier to the
speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment, exercise of the police power and likewise eminent domain.
and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, VV.
circuses and other forms of entertainment. Certiorari
granted. VV. Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987)
F: On December 5, 1977, the National Housing
C. Due Process and Eminent Domain Authority filed a complaint for the expropriation of 25
hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD 1224
The taking by the State of private property in an authorizing the expropriation of private lands for socialized
expropriation proceeding must be: (1) for public use, (2) housing. Among those lands sought to be expropriated are
with just compensation, and (3) upon observance of due the petitioners' lands. They brought this suit in the SC
process. challenging the constitutionality of PD 1224.
Article III, Sec. 9. Private property shall not be HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized housing for the
take for public use without just compensation. purpose of condemnation proceedings is not public use since
it will benefit only a handful of people. The "public use"
Article XII, Sec. 18. The State may, in the requirement is an evolving concept influences by changing
interest of national welfare or defense, establish and conditions. Urban renewal or redevelopment and the
operate vital industries and, upon payment of just construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public
compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public
other private enterprises to be operated by the use but also because of specific provisions in the
government. Constitution. Shortage in housing is a matter of state
concern since it directly and significantly affects public
health, safety, the environment and, in sum, the general
1. Taking either for public use or public welfare. Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of lands in
purpose. Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are owned by a few
landowners only. Why should the NHA pick their small
Public Use lots? Expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The
test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands
Public use is equivalent to public purpose. It is not was the area of the land and not the number of people who
confined merely to use by the public at large (e.g. roads). It stood to be benefitted. The State acting through the NHA is
is enough that it serves a public purpose, even if it benefit a vested with broad discretion to designate the property. The
large group of people short of the public in general (e.g. property owner may not interpose objections merely because
expropriating property for the relocation of squatters). in their judgment some other property would have been
more suitable. The provisions on just compensation found in
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220 PD 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions which
were declared unconstitutional in EPZA v. Dulay (1987) for
F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought the being encroachments on judicial prerogatives. VV.
expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay Malubog and
Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit of an amount equivalent
to 10% of the value of the property, the CFI authorized the 2. Just compensation must be judicially
PTA to take immediate possession of the property. The determined
charter of the PTA authorizes it to acquire through
condemnation proceedings lands for tourist zone Just Compensation
development of a sports complex. The petitioners who are
occupants of the lands, filed a petition for certiorari in the Just compensation is the fair and reasonable
SC. They contended that (1) the taking was not for public equivalent of the loss sustained by the owner of the property
use; (2) the land was covered by the land reform program; due to the taking; it is the fair market value of the property
and (3) expropriation would impair the obligation of measured at the time of the taking, no matter how long ago
contracts. it was taken (e.g. the time of the taking was in the 1920's,
the time of payment was in the 1960's, in the Ministerio and
HELD: The concept of public use is not limited to Amigable cases, supra), and using the conversion rates at
traditional purposes for the construction of roads, bridges, the time of taking (because according to those cases, Art.
and the like. The idea that "public use" means "use by the 1250 of the Civil Code applied only to contractual
public" has been discarded. As long as the purpose of the obligations).
taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes
into play. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever
may be beneficially employed for the general welfare EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987)
satisfies the requirement of public use. The petititioners
have not shown that the area being developed is land reform F: The San Antonio Development Corporation was the
area and that the affected persons have been given owner of a piece of land in Lapu-Lapu City which the EPZA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
expropriated in 1979. The commissioners appointed by the Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The judgment at bar now learly
trial court recommended that the San Antonio Development overturns the majority ruling in JM Tuason v. LTA that the
Corp. be paid P15.00 per square meter. EPZA filed a power of Congress to designate the particular property to be
petition for certiorari, arguing that under PD 1533 the taken adn how much may be condemned thereof must be
compensation should be the fair and current market value duly recognized, leaving only as a judicial question whether
declared by the owner or the market value determined by the in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely
assessor, whichever is lower. affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. The SC
now rules that such singling out of properties does not
HELD: The method of ascertaining just compensation foreclose judicial scrutiny as to whether such expropriation
under PD 1533 constitutes impermissible encroachment on by legislative act transgresses the due process and equal
judicial prerogatives. Although the court technically would protection and just compensation guarantees of the
still have the power to determine the just compensation for Constitution. VV.
the property, following the decree, its task would be
relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as
declared either by the owner or the assessor. Just
compensation means the value of the property at the time of 3. Due process must be observed
the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660 (1980)
and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities
should be considered. In this case, the tax declarations used F: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be
as basis for the just compensation were made long before ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project,
the declaration of martial law when the land was much originally called for the expropriation of properties along
cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of those Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the
documents which are outdated would be arbitrary and Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed
confiscatory. VV. extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.
Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the
Commission on Human Settlements recommended the
Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987) reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry argued the
new route withh save the government P2 million. The
F: Petitioners are the owners of two large estates government filed expropriation proceedings against the
known as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog in Tondo, owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, among whom
Manila, both of which were declared expropriated in two was petitioner.
decrees issued by President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD 1670.
The petitioners contend that the decrees violate their HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is
constitutional right to due process and equal protection since arbitrayr and should not receive judicial aprpoval. The
by their mere passage their properties were automatically Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost
expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a
ownership and possession thereof without being given the choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality
chance to oppose such expropriation. The government on strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and
the other hand contends that the power of eminent domain is Del Pan streets, while the factor of social and economic
inherent in the State and when the legislature or the impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue.
President through his law-making powers exercises this While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice
power, the public use and public necessity of the between people, on one hand, and progress and
expropriation and the fixing of the just compensation development, on the other, it is to be remembered that
become political in nature and the courts must respect the progress and development are carried out for the benefit of
decision. the people. VV.
HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures
adopted and the powers given to the NHA. The Tambunting
subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and
directly expropriated by decree without the slightest
semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. The Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142 (1990)
expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect
immediately upon the signing of the decree. No deposit F: De Knecht was one of the owners of several
before the taking is required. There is not provision for any properties along the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets which
interest to be paid upon unpaid installments. Not only are the Government sought to expropriate to give way to the
the owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the extension of EDSA and the construction of drainage
expropriation, or question the amount of payments fixed by facilities. De Knecht filed a case to restrain the Government
the decree, but the decision of the NHA are expressly from proceeding with the expropriation. Her prayer was
declared beyond judicial review. PD 1669 and 1670 are denied by the lower court but upon certiorari, the SC
declared unconstitutional. reversed the lower court decision and granted the relief
asked for by De Knecht ruling that the expropriation was
arbitrary. The case was remanded to the lower court.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
No further action was taken despite the SC For these reasons, the owner of the property
decision until two years later, in 1983, when the expropriated is entitled to a just compensation which should
Government moved for the dismissal of the case on the neither be more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the
ground that the Legislature has since enacted BP 340 assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just
expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. The equiivalent has always been understood to be the just and
lower court denied tthe motion. Appeal. complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.
RULING: While it is true that said final judgment of this The price or value of the land and its character at the time of
Curt on the subject becomes the law of the case between the taking by the Govt. are the criteria for determining just
parties, it is equally true that the right of petitioner to take cmpensation. Charo.
private properties for public use upon payment of just
compensation is so provided in the Constitution and the
laws. Such expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by D. Equal Protection
the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the
land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of
by legislation. life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
When BP 340 was passed, it appears that it was shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
based on supervening events that occured after the 1980 laws.
decision of the SC on the De Knecht case was rendered. The
social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest
this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. priority to the enactment of measure that protect and
Moreover, the said decision is no obstacle to the enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
legislative arm of the Government in thereafter making its reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and
own independent assessment of the circumstances then remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth
pravailing as to the propriety of undertaking the and political power for the common good.
expropriation of properties in question and thereafter by To this end, the State shall regulate the
enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property
The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting and its increments.
BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of the Court must yield
to the subsequent legislative fiat. Charo.
1. Economic equality
Art. XIII, Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice
shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-
NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991) reliance.
F: For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full
transmission lines, Napocor's lines have to pass the lands protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
belonging to respondents. Unsuccessful with its negotiations unorganized, and promote full employment and equality
for the acquisition of the right of way easements, Napocor of employment opportunities for all.
was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay simple peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike
easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by in accordance with law. They shall be entitle to security
its transmissin lines. of tenure, humane conditions of work, and living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the process affecting the rights and benefits as may be
power of eminent domain results in the taking or provided by law.
appropriation of the title to, and possession of, the The State shall promote the principle of shared
expropriated property, but no cogent reason appears why responsibility between workers and employers and the
said power may not be availed of to impose only a burrden preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes
upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
title or possession. It is unquestionable that real property compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of The State shall regulate the relations between
right of way." In this case, the easement is definitely a workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to
taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the its just share in the fruits of production and the right of
nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines, enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to
the limitations imposed by the NPC against the use of the expansion and growth.
land (that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the
lines) for an indefinite period deprives private respondents
of ts ordinary use.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
Art. XII, Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon common means of livelihood, especially when they are
recommendation of the economic and planning agency, admitted to the country as immigrants.
when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least In Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Isai Po Ho, 86 SCRA 270
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such (1978), the SC invalidated a city ordinance imposing a P500
citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may permit fee for aliens who wish to engage in the pursuit of an
prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress occupation. The SC noted that this violated the uniformity
shall enact measures that will encourage the formation of taxation, and deprived aliens of the right to earn a
and operation enterprises whose capital is wholly owned common livelihood.
by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978)
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. F: An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the
The State shall regulate and exercise authority employment of aliens in any occupation or business unless
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Manila and
and in accordance with its national goals and priorities. paid a fee of P500. Respondent, an alien, employed in
Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment from the CFI
Id., Sec. 2. xxx declaring the ordinance null and void.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth
in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a flat
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment rate of P500, it failed to consider substantial differences in
exclusively to Filipino citizens. situations among aliens and for that reason violates the rule
on uniformity of taxation. It also lays down no guide for
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and granting/denying the permit and therefore permits the
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Mayor. Finally, the
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. ordinance denies aliens due process and the equal protection
of the laws. VV.
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have
the following powers: In Vera v. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 (1979), Sec. 169 of
xxx the NIRC requiring manufacturers of skimmed milk (non-
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection fat) to put on its label the warning that the milk is harmful
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, for infants, was struck down as unconstitutional on the
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to ground that it did not require the same labeling in the case of
the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal filled milk (coco-fat added)
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the At that time of the decision thought, the law was
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all already inoperative.
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rights of Vera v. Cuevas 90 SCRA 379 (1979)
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the F: Respondents are engaged in the manufacture and
Supreme Court. sale of filled milk products. They brought an action in the
CFI for a declaration of their rights in respect of section 169
of the Tax Code. This provision required that "all condensed
There are areas of economic activity which can be skimmed milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part
limited to Filipinos. The Constitution itself acknowledges has been removed totally or in part or put on sale in the
this in various places - exploitation of marine wealth (Art. Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its
XII, Sec. 2 par. 2), certain areas of investment (Art. XII, immediate containers with the words: This milk is not
Sec. 10), to name a few. suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of
age.
In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937), the
SC upheld the validity of the law which nationalized the HELD: Sec. 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by RA
retail trade. For the protection of the law can be observed 344. At any rate, Sec. 169 applied only to skimmed milk and
by the national interest. not to filled milk. Sec. 169 is being enforced only against
respondent manufacturers of filled milk but not against
manufacturers of skimmed milk, thus denying them the
equal protection of the laws. VV.
Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937) 2. Political equality
But there are areas where aliens cannot be kept away
for the simple reason that they cannot be deprived of a
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained 3. Social equality
solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
Art. IX, C, Sec. 10. Bona fide candidates to Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest
public office shall be free from any form of harassment priority to the enactment of measure that protect and
and discrimination. enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth
In Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), the SC and political power for the common good.
upheld the validity of sec. 4 of Batas Blg. 52 disqualifying To this end, the State shall regulate the
retired elective local officials who have received retirement acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property
benefits and would have been 65 years old at the start of the and its increments.
term. It does not violate equal protection, for it gives .
younger blood the opportunity to run the local government.
Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980) II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE
F: Sec. 4 of BP 52 provides in part that "any retired
elective provincial, city ot municipal official who has A. Arrests, Searches and Seizures
received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be
age at the commencement of the term of office to which he secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
elective local office from which he has retired." Petitioner, nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no
Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, sued for prohibition to enjoin search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
enforcement of the law on the ground that it was contrary to upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
the equal protection and due process guarantee of the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
Constitution. complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
HELD: Dumlao has not been injured by the application of person or things to be seized.
the provision. No petition seeking his disqualification has
been filed against him. His petition is a mere request for Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and
advisory opinion. Nevertheless, because of public interest, correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon lawful
the question should be resolved. The purpose of the law is to order of the court, or when public safety or order
allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments requires otherwise as prescribed by law. Any
and therefore, not invalid. The retired employee in effect evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
declares himself tired and unavailable for the same section, shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
government work. VV. proceeding.
In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), however, 1. Requirements for Search Warrants
the disqualification of candidates convicted or simply
charged with national security offenses was struck down as
unconstitutional, for violating the presumption of innocence Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 (1940)
and thus ultimately the equal political protection.
F: By virtue of the sworn application of Almeda, the
Igot c. Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980) Chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board, a SW was issued to
search the store and premises of the petitioner, accused of
F: Romeo Igot, as taxpayer, voter and member of the violating the Anti-Usury Law. Receipt books, PNs and other
bar, and Alfredo Salapantan Jr., as taxpayer and voter, sued articles were seized and retained in the possession of the
for prohibition to enjoin enforcement of BP 52, sec. 4 of Anti-Usury Board.
which provides for the disqualification as candidate of any
person convicted of subversion, insurrection or rebellion or ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW
similar offenses. were complied with.
HELD: Neither petitioner has been convicted nor charged RULING: YES. The applicant, Almeda, in his application,
with acts of disloyalty nor disqualified from being swore that "he made his own personal investigation and
candidates for local elective positions. They have no ascertained that petitioner is lending money without a
personal or substantial interest at stake and therefore no license, charging usurious rates." The witness he presentted
locus standi. Neither can they sue as taxpayers because the testified before the judge and swore that he knew that YEE
statute does not involve disbursement of public funds. VV. was lending without a license because he personally
investigated the victims who secured loans from the
petitioner. Their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
they could be held liable for perjury. The existence of IS THERE A WAIVER? No express waiver.
probable cause has been determined by the justice of the IS THERE AN IMPLIED WAIVER? None.
peace before issuing the warrant complained of, as shown in
the warrant itself. Charo. To constitute a waiver of constitutional right, it must
appear first that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, (1938) existence of such right; (3) that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right.
F: This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure It is true that the petitioner did not object to the
the annulment of a search warrant (SW) & 2 orders of the legality of the search when it was made. She could not
resp. judge, & the restoration of certain documents alleged have objected bec. she was sick & was not present when the
to have been illegally seized by an agent of the Anti-Usury warrant was served upon Salas. Certainly, the constitutional
Board. immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a
Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except by the
obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly
SW, commanding any officer of the law "to search the authorized to do so in his or her behalf. The failure on the
person, house or store of the petitioner for certain books, part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object
lists, chits, receipts, documents & other papers relating to to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an
her activities as userer." implied waiver of the consti. right. It is but a submission to
On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a the authority of the law. The delay in making the demand
captain of the PC, went to the office of the petitioner, and for the return of the documents seized is not such as to result
after showing the SW to the petitioner's bookeeper, Salas, & im implied. waiver. RAM.
w/o the presence of the petitioner, who was ill and confined
at that time, proceeded w/ the execution thereof. Two
packages of records & a locked filing cabinet containing Burgos v. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800 (1984)
several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a
receipt thereof issued by him to Salas. Separate criminal Illegal search of newspaper offices and press freedom
cases were filed against petitioner. Petitioner demanded the
return of the documents seized. Bu motion, pet. challenged F: On the basis of two warrants issued by the RTC of
the legality of the SW and the devolution of the documents QC, the offices of the Metropolitan Mail and the We Forum
demanded. By resolution, the resp. judge of CFI denied the were search and printing machines, paraphernalia, motor
petitioner's motion for the reason that though the SW was vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication
illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner. and distribution of the newspapers as well as papers and
The resolution of 10/5/37 & the order of 1/3/38 other literature seized on the ground that they were used in
are sought, together w/ the SW, to be nullified in these the commission of the crime of subversion. Petitioners
proceedings. brought and action to annul the warrants and compel the
return of the things seized.
HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures
is declared a popular right and for a SW to be valid, (1) it HELD: Petitioners' thesis is impressed with merit. Probable
must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances
cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
the applicant or another; (3) in the determination of believe that an offense has been committed and that the
probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the place sought to be searched. When addressed to a newspaper
latter may produce; & (4) the warrant issued must publisher or editor, the application for a warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons contain a specification stating with particularity the alleged
or things to be seized. subversive materials he has published or intending to
In the instant case, the existence of probable cause publish. Broad statement in the application is a mere
was determined not by the judge himself but by the conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirement of
applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the probable cause. Another factor that makes the search
affidavit made by agent Almeda. It does not appear that he warrants constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the
examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even nature of general warrants. In Stanford v. State of Texas, the
accepting the description of the prop. to be seized to be US SC declared this type of warrant void. VV.
sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is
sufficiently detailed w/in the meaning of the law, the prop.
seized were not delivered to the court w/c issued the Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985)
warrant, as required by law. Instead, they were turned over
to the resp. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up F: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the
cases against petitioner. Considering that at the time the seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in committing
warrant was issued, there was no case pending against the the crime of sedition. Seized were printed copies of the
petitioner, the averment that the warrant was issued Philippine Times, newspaper dummies, typewriters,
primarily for exploration purposes is not w/o basis. mimeographing machines and tape recorders, video
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
machines and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the infrmation from verified sources." The same holds true for
warrant but his motion was denied. the affidavit of Angeles.
Moreover, the judge did not examine Angeles in the
HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere form of searching questions and answers. What appears on
conclusions of law and do not satisfy the requirement of the record are leading questions answereable by yes or no.
probable cause. The language used is all embracing as to
include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner (2) As to the claim that the SW failed to particularly
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search describe the place to be searched, the SC ruled that the
warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the
warrant which is objectionable. VV. officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.
Here, the SW described the place as PUP, with its address
Bache & Co. (Phil.) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971) and specifically mentioned the offices of the "Dept. of
Military Science and Tactics on the ground floor and the
F: The Com. of Internal Revenue through Rev. Office of the President at the 2nd floor and the other rooms
Examiner de Leon filed an application for a SW against in that floor." This is deemed sufficient.
Bache & Co. and its pres., Seggerman for violation of the
provisons of the NIRC. As Judge Ruiz was then conducting (3) There was also an issue as to w/n the SW was
a hearing, the deposition of de Leon and his witness, issued for one specific offense. The warrrant was issued for
Logronio, was taken by the Dep. Clerk of Court. The violation of PD 1866 which punishes several offenses.
deposition was later read to the judge who asked the witness While there was failure to state the particular provision of
to take an oath as to the truth of his statements. The judge the law violated, the warrant itself qualified the description
then signed the SW and accordingly issued the same. of the offense as "illegal possession of firearms, etc." This
suffices to cure the defect.
ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW The fact that the word "etc." was added to refer to
were complied with. ammunitions and explosives did not violate the rule on
single offense, for notwithstanding that possession of
RULING: NO. The judge did not personally examine the firearms, explosives and ammunitions are punished in
complainant and his witnesses. The judge did not have the different sections of the PD, they are treated as belonging to
opportunity to observe tthe demeanor of the deponents and a single specie. An exception to the rule that a warant shall
to propound initial and follow-up questions which his be issued for a single offense is when existing laws
judicial mind, on account of his training, was in the best prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Charo.
position to conceive. This is important in arriving at a sound
inference on the all-importatnt question of w/n there was
probable cause. Charo. Olaes v. People, 155 SCRA 486 (1987)
F: Petitioners claim that the SW issued by resp. judge
Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1990) was invalid. They also question the extrajudicial confession
taken from them without according them the right to
F: Judge Dayrit, upon applicatin of P/Maj. assistance of a counsel. The articles seized by virtue of the
Dimagmaliw, supported by a "Deposition of Witness," SW consisting of dried marijuana were admitted as evidence
executed by P/Lt. Angeles, issued a search warrant for the for violation of RA 6425 or Dangerous Drugs Act.
search and seizure of arms, ammunitions and explosives in
the premises of the PUP which were supposed to be in RULING: While it is true that the caption of the SW states
possession of Dr. Prudente. In enforcing the warrant, 3 that it is in connection with "the violation of RA 6425," it is
fragmentation grenades were found in the bathroom of the clearly recited in the text thereof that "there is probable
office of Dr. Prudente. cause to believe that Olaes of Olongapo City has in his
possession and control, marijuana dried stalks which are
ISSUE: W/n the searrch warrant was valid. suject of the offense stated above." Although the specific
section of the law is not stated, there is no question at all
RULING: NO. that the specific offense alleged to have been committed as
(1) The warant was not issued on the basis of basis for determining probable cause is alleged.
personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness. The Furthermore, the SW specifically described the place to be
probable cause required under the Constitution for the searched and the things to be seized.
issuance of a search warrant must be in connection with one
specific offense, and the judge must, before issuing the As to the extrajudicial confessions of the accused,
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching the same are deemed inadmissible against them. In People
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the V. Galit, the Court declared that: " At the time the person is
complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
personally known to them and attach to the record their him of the reason for the arrrest and he must be shown the
sworn statements together with any affidavit submitted. warrant of arrest, if any; he shall be informed of his
However, in the case at bar, Dimagmaliw merely stated in constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that
his application that his knowledge was based "on gathered any statement he might make could be used against him.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
The person arrested shall have the right to communicate Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145
with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means - by telephone if possible - or by letter or F: Pursuant to the powers vested by PD 1920 and EO
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting 1022, POEA Administrator Achacoso ordered the closure of
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial the recruitment agency of Horty Salazar, having verified that
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence she had no license to operate a recruitment agency. He
of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on further ordered the seizure of the documents and
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of paraphernalias, being used or intended to be used as the
the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to means of commiting illegal recruitment. This order was
counsel may be waived but the wiaver shall not be valid enforced on 26 January 1988. Petitioner filed this suit for
unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement prohibition.
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall Issue: May the POEA (or the Sec. of Labor) validly issue
be inadmissible in evidence." warrants of serach and seizure (or arrest ) under Art. 38 of
the Labor Code?
These requirements were even made stricter under
the 1987 Constitution which provides that the rights of a HELD: NO.
person under custodial investigation cannot be waived The provisions of PD 1920 and EO 1022, now
except when made in writing and in the presence of embodied in Art. 38 of the Labor Code, are the dying
counsel. Charo. vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilights moments.
Under Art. III, Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is only
judges and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA, 171 search. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal
SCRA 348 (1989) and undesirable aliens, whom the President of the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following
F: The PASTF was created by virtue of PD 1936 to a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
serve as the President's arm called upon to combat the vice The Sec. of Labor , not being a judge. may no longer issue
of dollar salting or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
exchange. through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Art.
38, par. C of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no
ISSUE: W/N the PASTF is "such other officer as may be force and effect.
authorized by law" to issue warrants under the 1973
Constitition.
a. Existence of probable cause.
RULING: NO. The Court, in reviewing the powers of the
PASTF under its enabling law, sees nothing that will reveal Probable cause is such facts and circumstances as
a legislative intendement to confer upon the body, quasi- would reasonably make a prudent man believe that a crime
judicial responsiibilities relative to offenses punishable by have been committed and that the documents or things
PD 1883. Its undertaking is simply to determine w/n sought to be searched and seized are in the possession of the
probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with person against whom the warrant is sought. Without
the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry probable cause, there can be no valid search warrant.
preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action
of appropriate authorities. In Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 385
The Court agrees that PASTF exercises, or was (1967), 42 search warrants were issued for alleged violation
meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, of Central Bank Laws, the Tariff and Customs Code, the
it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached judge to NIRC, and the Revised Penal Code. The SC voided the
determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of warrants on the ground that it was impossible for the judge
arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is to have found probable cause in view of the number of laws
naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his alleged to have been violated by the petitioner. How could
office "is to see to it that justice if done and not necessarily he even know what particular provision of each law had
to secure the conviction of the accused," he stands been violated? If he did not know this, how could it be
invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To determined if the person against whom the warrant was
permit him to issue warrrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, issued was probably guilty thereof? In truth, this was a
is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when fishing expedition, which violated the sanctity of domicile
he is neither. This makes to our mind and to that extent, PD and privacy of communications. To establish the require-
1636 as amended by PD 2002, unconstitutional. ment of probable cause, the rule is: One crime, one warrant.
The "responsible officer" referred to under the
Cosntitution is one not only possessing the necessary skills b. As determined by a judge
and competence but more significantly, the neutrality and
independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a Under the 1987 Constitution, only a judge can issue
judicial officer. a warrant; the offensive and much abused phrase "and other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law" in the 1973
Constitution has been removed
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
was likewise valid. To be valid, the search must be revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. They are
"incidental" to the arrest, that is, not separated by time or now the bases of the charge against the petitioner.
place from the arrest. If the basis for allowing incidental
searches is looked into, one can see that this situation is not RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby
one involving a valid incidental search. declared null and void and accordingly set aside.
The law allows the arresting officer to search a The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken
person validly arrested (by frisking him for instance) by the resp. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the
because (a) a weapon held by the arrested person may be ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions were taken of
turned against his captor and (b) he may destroy the proof of the complainant's 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit
the crime, if the arrested officer has to first apply for a executed by them. It is correct to say, however, that the
search warrant from a judge. complainant himself was not subjected to a similar
interrogation.
If, in the Nolasco case, the search was conducted 30 By his own accounts, all that resp. judge did was
minutes after the arrest, there is no longer any danger that question Capt. Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only
the captured may turn against the captor; and if the "to ascertain among others, if he knew and understood the
documents in the apartment were 2 blocks away, the search same," and only bec. "the application was not yet subscribed
would no longer be justified since there is no way for Roque and sworn to." The suggestion is that he would not have
to go back to the apartment and destroy the documents, asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been
having been arrested already. completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he
did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself
to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the
Nolasco v. Cruz Paño 139 SCRA 152 (1985) applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the
record, together w/ the affidavit presented to him. Such
F: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may
Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group. be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence
Milagrso had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are
At noon of the same day, her premises were searched and false. (Mata v. Bayona.)
428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW
seized. Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search on the basis of mere hearsay and not of info. personally
warrant for rebellion against Milagros. On the basis of the known to him. His application, standing alone, was
documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion were insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It
filed but the fiscal's office merely charged her and Nolasco was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses themselves, by
with illegal possession of subversive materials. Milagros their own personal info., to establish the applicant's claims.
asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it Even assuming then that it would have suffied to
was illegally obtained. The search warrant described the take the deposition only of the witnesses and not of the
things to be seized as "Documents, papers and other records applicant himself, there is still the question of the
of the CPP, NPA and NDF, xxx". sufficiency of their depositions.
A study of the deposition taken from witnesess
HELD: The search warrant is void because it fails to Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be
describe with particularity the things to be seized. It does not "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a
specify what the subversive books and instructions are and mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits,
what the manuals not otherwise available to the public except that they were made in the form of answers to the
contain to make them subversive. There is absent a definite questions put to them by the resp. judge.
guideline as to what items might lawfully be seized, thus One may well wonder why it did not occur to the
giving the officers discretion regarding what articles they resp. judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even
should seize. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant. But as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the
the seizure of the articles could be justified as an incident of window, or whether it was on the first floor or second floor,
a valid arrest. It is a general rule that, as an incident of an or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts
arrest, the place of premises where the arrest was made can related were really done openly, in the full view of the
also be searched without a search warrant. witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law.
These would have been judicious questions but they were
(c) When things seized are within plain view of a injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration of the
searching party witnesses were readily accepted and the warrant sought was
issued forthwith.
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)
SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED
F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER
5/10/84. The petitioner's house was searched 2 days later VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND
but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING.
The officers conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure (d) Stop and Frisk
exerted by the military authorities, who practically coerced
the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guaranty Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990)
against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search
they were conducting. F: Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar, both members of the
INP of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned w/ the Intelligence
Malum Prohibitum.-- It does not follow that bec. Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along
an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is Magallanes, St., Davao City. While they were w/in the
necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges, they spotted
prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be petitioner carrying a "buri" bag & they noticed him to be
summarily seized simply bec. they are prohibited. A SW is acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and
still necessary. identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but was stopped by the 2. They then
Motion to Quash.-- Petitioner should have, before checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found 1
coming to the SC, filed a motion to quash the search warrant caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, w/ 2 rounds of live
by the resp. judge. But as we said and did in Burgos, "this ammunition for a .38 cal. gun, a smoke grenade, & 2 live
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this ammunition for a .22 cal. gun. Petitioner was brought to the
petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the police station for further investigation. He was prosecuted
consitutional issues raised." RAM. for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the
RTC of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty, and
trial on the merits, a decision was rendered finding
Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989) petitioner guilty. The CA affirmed the appealed decision in
toto.
F: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of Mayor Hence, the petition for review, the main thrust of
Ramon Bagatsng, policemen seized and confiscated from w/c is that there being no lawful arrest or search and seizure,
dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along the items w/c were confiscated from the possession of the
Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him.
reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic, and The Sol-Gen argues that under Sec. 12, R 136 of
indecent and later burned the seized materials in public. ROC, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
Among the publications seized and later burned was "Pinoy dangerous weapons or anything (w/c may be) used as proof
Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff of a commission of an offense, w/o a SW.
Leo Pita. After his injunctive relief was dismissed by the
RTC and his appeal rejected by CA, he seeks review with HELD: From Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, it is clear that an arrest
SC, invoking the guaranty against unreasonable searches w/o a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private
and seizure. person, among others, when in his presence the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
Issue: W/N the search and seizure was illegal attempting to commit an offense, or when an offense has in
fact, just been committed, & he has personal knowledge of
HELD: YES. the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.
It is basic that searches and seizure may be done At the time the peace officers identified themselves
only through a judicial warrant , otherwise, they become and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they
unreasonable and subject to challenge. In Burgos v Chief did not know that he had committed, or was actually
of Staff (133 SCRA 800) , the SC countermanded the orders committing, the offense. They just suspected that he was
of the RTC authorizing the serach of the premises WE hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what
Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila Dailies, by its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an
reason of a defective warrant. There is a greater reason in arrest w/o a warrant.
this case to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete However, there are many instances where a warrant
absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the & seizure can be effected w/o necessarily being preceded by
instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different an arrest, foremost of w/c is the 'stop & search' w/o a SW at
from Burgos, a political case, because speech is speech, military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of w/c
whether political or "obscene". has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte v. de Villa.
The authorities must apply for the issuance of the a As bet. a warrantless search and seizure (S & S)
search warrant from the judge , if in their opinion, an conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search
obscenity rap is in order. They must convince the court that thereof in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed,
the materials sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a the latter is more reasonable considering that, unlike in the
clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The
warrant State interference and action. The judge must probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously
determine WON the same are indeed "obscene": the and attempted to flee w/ the buri bag, there was a probable
question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag
judge's sound discretion. If probable cause exist, a search and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect
warrant will issue. the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to
search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this corporations; but the injunction was maintained as regards
(privacy of communication and correspondence) or the those found & seized in the residences of petitioners.
preceding section (unreasonable searches and seizures)
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. ISSUES: (1) With respect to those found & seized in the
offices of the corporations, w/n petitioners have cause of
One of the remedies of one who was victimized by action to assail the validity of the contested warrants.
an illegal search is to ask for the suppression of the things (2) In connection w/ those found & seized in the
seized and the evidence illegally taken. residences of petitioners, w/n the search warrants in question
and the searches and seizures made under the authority
The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of any thereof are valid.
evidence obtained in violation of secs. 2 and 3 (1) of Art. III (3) If the answer in no. 2 is no, w/n said
for "any purpose" and in "any proceeding". The evidence is documents, papers and things may be used in evidence
absolutely useless. This has not always been the case. against petitioners.
In Moncado v. People's Court (1948), the SC, HELD: (1) No. Petitioners have no cause of action to assail
following the U.S. case of Wolf V. Colorado, rules that the legality of the contested warrants and the seizure made
evidence illegally obtained is not necessarily excluded if is in pursuance thereof bec. said corporations have their
otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. In such respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
case, the evidence admitted, without prejudice to any personality of petitioners. The legality of a seizure can be
criminal, civil or administrative liability of the officer who contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
illegally seized it. In other words, the admissibility of the thereby and that the objection to an unlawful search and
evidence is not effected by the illegality of the means by seizure is purely personal and cannot be avalied of by 3rd
which it was acquired. parties.
It was in Stonehill v. Diokno, supra, following the (2) No. Two points must be stressed in connection
U.S. case of Maop v. Ohio 1969, when the exclusionary rule w/ Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Consti: (a) that no warrant shall
was first adopted in the Philippines, the SC noting that the issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge
total suppression of the thing seized is the only effective in the manner set forth therein; & (b) that the warrant shall
means of ensuring the constitutional right which it seeks to particularly describe the things to be seized.
preserve. The Court noted, the insufficiency of the other None of these requirements has been complied w/. It
remedies (e.g. action for damages, criminal punishment, was stated that the natural and juridical persons has
resistance), especially in the Philippines where violations committed a violation of CB laws, TCC, NIRC & RPC. No
were committed by those in power and were thus equipped specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
with the pardoning power to water down the gravity of the averments thereof w/ respect to the offense committed were
other penalties imposed to violators of those constitutional abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
rights. who issued the warrants to have found the existence of a
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
The victim may or may not get back the thing seized, competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
depending on whether it is contraband or not. It the thing is performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
contraband, it would not be returned, and only its violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
suppression can be asked for. But if the thing is legal, the General search warrants are outlawed bec. they place
party can ask for its return, even if no criminal prosecution the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
has yet been filed, as in the Stonehill case. communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967) The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of
the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
F: Upon application of the officers of the govt (resp. whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
prosecutors), several judges (resp. judges) issued a total of command of our Bill of Rights-- that the things to be seized
42 search warrants against petitioners &/ or the corporations be particularly described-- as well as tending to defeat its
of w/c they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
search the perons named and/ or the premises of their RAM.
offices, warehouses, and/ or residences, and to seize several
personal prop. as the "subject of the offense; stolen or 7. Civil Action for Damages
embezelled or the fruits of the offense," or "used or intended
to be used as the means of committing the offense" as A civil case for damages can also be filed pursuant
violation of CB Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC), to Article 32 of the Civil Code.
NIRC and the RPC."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants In Aberca v. Ver, the SC held that even if the
are null & void, said petitioners filed w/ the SC this orig. privilege of the writ is suspended, the court can nevertheless
action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus & injunction. entertain an action not only against the task force but even
The writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the against the top ranking officials who ordered the seizure, to
papers, documents, and things seized from the officers of the recover damages for the illegal searches and seizures made
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
in a despotic manner. By so doing, one can indirectly the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the
inquire into the validity of the suspension of the privilege. proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made the search/
inspection. Such inspection was reasonable and a SOP on
the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure bef.
8. Search and Seizure by Private Persons delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or Bureau of
Posts.
People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991) Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
F: Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of warrantless S & S proscribed by the Consti. Merely to
Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) observe and look at that w/c is plain sight is not search.
& husband of Anita Reyes, following standard operating Having observed that w/c is open, where no trespass has
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he been committed in aid thereof, is not search.
opened appellant's box, a peculiar order emitted therefrom. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Consti. is not
His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. support in the deliberations of the Con Com.: " xxx The Bill
Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane of Rights governs the relationship between the individual
wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. and the state. Its concern is not the relation between
He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and individuals, between a private individual and other
took several grams of the contents thereof. individuals. xxx" (Sponsorship speech of Commissioner
Job Reyes reported the incident to the NBI and Bernas.)
requested a laboratory examination of the samples he The constitutional proscription against unlawful S &
extracted from the cellophane wrapper. S therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana govt and its agencies tasked w/ the enforcement of the law.
flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist of the Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
Narcotics Section of the NBI. restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
Thereafter, an information was filed against power is imposed.
appellant for violation of RA 6425. It the search is made at the behest or inititiation of
the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
APPELANT CONTENDS that the evidence subject of the private purposes, as in the case at bar, and w/o the
imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his consti. intervention of police authorities, the right against
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable S & S cannot be invoked for only the act of
privacy of communication and therefore argues that the private individuals, not law enforcers, is involved. In sum,
same should be held inadmissible in evidence. the protection against unreasonable S & S cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since bring it w/in the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily govt.
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a
private capacity and w/o the intervention and participation 9. In the issuance of warrants of ARREST, as
of state authorities. distinguished from SEARCH warrants, the judge may
rely simply on fiscal's certification as to probable cause
ISSUE: May an act of a private individual, allegedly in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked Compare Rule 112, Sec. 6 (on warrants of arrest) with Rule
against the state? 126, Sec. 4 (on search warrants.)
HELD: We hold in the negative. In the absence of Rule 112, Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the issue.-- (a) By the Regional Trial Court.-- Upon the
Consti. cannot be invoked against the State. This filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may
constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's person, issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
whether citizen or alien, from interference by govt. xxx (b) By the Municipal Trial Court.-- If the
(Villanueva v. Querubin.) municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary
The contraband in the case at bar having come into investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing
possession of the govt w/o the latter transgressing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in
appellant's rights against unreasonable searches and seizures the form of searching questions and answers, that a
(S & S), the Court sees no cogent reason why the same probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of
should not be admitted against him. placing the respondent under immediate custody in
Appellant, however, would like this Court to believe order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a
that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the warrant of arrest. (Rules of Court.)
evidence later on used in prosecuting the case. The
arguments of appellant stands to fall on its own weight, or
the lack of it. Rule 126, Sec. 4. Examination of complainant;
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar record.-- The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted personally examine in the form of searching questions
an illegal S & S of the prohibited merchandise. Records of and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally have examined in writing and under oath the complainant
known to them and attach to the records their sworn and his wirtnesses by searching questions and answers; he
statements together with any affidavits submitted. must be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and there must
The requirement in the case of warrants of arrest is relaxed be a need to place the accused under immediate custody in
in that the judge can rely on the certification of the fiscal order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory,
that the latter has conducted the preliminary investigation but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to
and has found probable cause on the part of the accused. issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary
The judge can issue the warrant on the basis of the to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of
information filed by the fiscal and the certification of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion.
probable cause. The fiscal should, instead, have filed an information
immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the
The SC has allowed this practice in Amarga v.
arrest of the accused. Bam.
Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956), noting that it has been practice
long settled and that a judge can issue an order to arrest on
the basis of the certificate.
Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)
Of course, if the judge is in doubt, he can always ask
F: The Pres. of the Phils. filed a complaint for libel
the fiscal to submit the records of the preliminary
against the petitioners, who were publisher and columnist of
investigation, so he could determine for himself if, on the
the Philippine Star, based on the following statement in
basis of the affidavits, there exists probable cause. It he is
Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987 entitled "The Nervous
satisfied with the affidavits, he need not summon the
Officials of the Aquino Administration:" "If you will recall,
affiants.
during the Aug. 29 coup attempt, the Pres. hid under her
bed, while the firing was going on-- perhaps the first
Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956)
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP to have to do so."
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, Beltran
F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary moved to dismiss the complaint. The fiscal deniend his
investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a complaint for robbery motion after finding a prima facie case against the
filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale petitioners and filed the case in court w/c thereafter issued
harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining warrants of arrest against the petitioners. The petitioners
Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted the filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his
finding that “there is prima facie evidence of robbery as HELD: The addition of the word "personally" after the
charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the word "determined" (Art. III, Sec. 2) and the deletion of the
records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal grant of authority by the 1973 Consti. to issue warrants to
of the records was “premature” because Judge Samulde "other responsible officer as may be authorized by law," has
failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Consti. now
accused. Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal requires the judge to personally examine the complainant
Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for
existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested. the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against interpretation. What the Consti. underscores is the exclusive
Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. RTC and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
dismissed the petition on the ground that the fiscal had not himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
shown that he has a clear, legal right to the performance of himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance
the act to be required of the judge and that the latter had an of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
imperative duty to perform it. Neverhteless, Judge Samulde examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
112 of the 1985 Rules of Court. evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and,
on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on
ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge
the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
to issue a WA of the accused in view of his finding, after
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of
conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
the accused commited the crime charged. conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound
policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be
HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY unduly laden w/ the preliminary examination and
INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
JUDGE OR OFFICER. xxx
Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is conducted 10. When arrest may be made without a warrant
on the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is
sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine
whether a WA should issue, the investigating judge must
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
Rule 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when no such personal knowledge in this case. Hence the arrest
lawful.-- A peace officer or a private person may, of the appellant was illegal.
without a warrant, arrest a person: (2) Consequently, the incidental search and seizure
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be were likewise illegal and the firearm and document are
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is inadmissible in evidence.
attempting to commit an offense; (3) The prosecution argues that the appellant
(b) When an offense, has in fact just been admitted ownership of the gun and claims that it was he who
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts pointed to the place where the subversive documents were
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed hidden. However, as the appellant was not informed of his
it; constitutional rights at that time, his admission is
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner inadmissible under [Art. III, Sec. 12 (1).] It is true that 6
who has escaped from a penal establishment of place days later he executed a confession before the fiscal w/ the
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily assistance of counsel, but it was then already too late.
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while (4) As the remaining evidence against the appellant
being transferred from one confinement to another. is the testimony of Cesar M. and it is uncorroborated and
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) unreliable, the appellant should be acquitted, but the gun and
hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be the subversive documents must be confiscated.
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail,
and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with People v. Rodriguez, 232 SCRA 498 (April 25, 1989)
Rule 112, Section. 7. (Rules of Court.)
F: Pat. Marvin Pajilan received a phone call from the
desk officer of Sub-Station I, namely, Michael Orbeta, who
Rule 113, sec. 5 talks of "citizen arrests", cases informed him that a person named 'Alyas Allan' was selling
where an arrest can be made either by the peace officer or a marijuana at No. 8199 Constancia St., Makati, Metro Manila
private person without need of a warrant. and requested that said person be apprehended. Acting on
The key element in the first case is that the offense this phone call of desk officer Michael Orbeta, a team of
was committed "in his presence". The key element in the policemen posted themselves about 10 to 15 meters from the
second case is that he has "personal knowledge". house located at 8199 Constancia St., Makati. They saw a
tricycle with 3 persons on board, a driver and 2 passengers,
Thus, in People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986), the stop in front of the house at 8199 Constancia St. They also
arrest made by the constabulary without a warrant of a saw a male person come out of the said house and approach
farmer on the basis of information that he was a subversive and talk to the driver of the tricycle. After a while they saw
was held unconstitutional, since there was no personal the male person go back to the house and a little later come
knowledge of the offense itself. back and hand to the tricycle driver 'a suspicious stuff of a
cigarette, a marijuana cigarette', they further saw the tricycle
The gun and subversive documents found by the driver in turn give something to the male person. Pat. Pajilan
officer and admitted by the former to be his were likewise together with his companions approached the male person
held inadmissible because the admission violated the and the tricycle driver and after introducing themselves as
Miranda rule. police officers, they asked the male person, the tricycle
driver and his 2 passengers to bring out the contents of their
a. Strict enforcement of rule pockets, which the male person, the driver and the
passengers of the tricycle did. The male person brought out
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986) from his pockets 2 small plastic bags containing suspected
marijuana leaves. The tricycle driver brought out from his
F: On the basis of info. given by Cesar Masamlok, the right front pocket 3 sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes.
appellant was arrested while plowing his farm in Tiguman, Nothing illegal was found in the pockets of the 2 passengers
Davao del Sur, on May 13, 1982, on charges of illegal of the tricycle.
possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion. A .38 The appellant contends that the police officers had
caliber revolver was found buried under his house. no personal knowledge that he was indeed handing
Subversive documents were also seized from a place near marijuana to Enrico Bacod as they were 10-15 meters away
his house. Two arresting officers testified that the appellant from the alleged sale transaction. The arrest therefore was
had readily admitted ownership of the gun and the not valid as the requirements for a warrantless arrest were
documents. The appellant was found guilty of the charge not complied with.
and sentenced to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum, and the gun Issue: Was the warantless arrest valid?
and documents were ordered confiscated.
Ruling: YES.
HELD: (1) Under R 113, Sec. 5 (a), the arresting officer The warrantless arrest made by the law enforcers
must have personal knowledge that the crime has been was valid since it falls under the provisions of Rule 113,
committed, is being committed, or is about to be committed, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Court which provides:
in order to justify an arrest w/o a warrant. The offense must Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
also be committed in his presence or w/in his view. There is officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested dismissed, since the writ does not lie in favor of an accused
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to in a crim. case, who has been released on bail.
commit an offense; As to Dural, he was not arrested while in the act of
shooting the 2 soldiers. Nor was he arrested after the
Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result commission of said offense for his arrest came a day after
of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only the shooting incident. However, Dural was arrested for
authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest. The police organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the
officers were tipped off by an informer about the illegal arrest of Dural w/o warrant is justified as it can be said that
trade of the accused. The exact location where this trading in he was committing an offense when arrested.
drugs was taking place was given to them. The 'suspicious The arrest of persons involved in rebellion whether
stuff' taken from the accused were confirmed to be as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-
marijuana after tests were conducted on them. The attendant violent acts but in furtherance of rebellion, is more an act of
circumstances taking place before their eyes led the police capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell
officers to reasonably conclude that an offense was actually the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
being committed. prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses w/c requires the determination by a
b. Exceptions to strict enforcement judge of the existence of probable cause bef. the issuance of
a judicial warrant and the granting of bail if the offense is
(1) "Continuous" crimes of subversion bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no
legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons
Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990) committing overt acts of violence against govt forces, or any
other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious
These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus (HC) filed movement. xxx (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.)
bef. the Court. The Court finds that the persons detained Dural was found guilty of the charge and is now
have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court.
their constitutional right to liberty and that the Thus, the writ of HC is no longer available
circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their
release on HC. II
An arrest w/o a warrant, under Sec. 5, pars. (a) and
(b) of Rule 113, ROC, as amended is justified when the The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo
person arrested is caught in flagrante delicto, viz., in the act Buenaobra, w/o warrant is also justified.
of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been
committed and the person making the arrest has personal In view of the revelations made by Rogelio Ramos, a
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested former NPA, the Constantino house in Marikina Heights
has committed it. was placed under military surveillance and on 8/12/88,
The persons in whose behalf these petitions for HC pursuant to a search warrant , a search of the house was
have been filed had freshly committed or were actually conducted at 5 PM by CISC-NCD & CSG. In the course of
committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their the search were found several firearms, regular power
arrests, w/o warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, supply, antennae, speaker and subversive documents.
further detained by virtue of valid informations filed against When confronted, R. Constantino (RC) could not
them in court. produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms,
ammunition, radio, etc. He was brought to CIS HQ for
I investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written
statement, although he admitted that he was a staff member
In Umil v. Ramos, RIOU-CAPCOM received of the executive of the NUFC and a ranking member of the
confidential info. about a member of the NPA-Sparrow unit International Dept. of the CPP.
being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital At about 8 PM, same day, Buenaobra arrived at RC's
in Roosevelt Ave., Q.C. It was found that the wounded house. When arrested, he readily submitted to the military
person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/ NPA and that
Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong,"
liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM referring to RC and other members of the rebel group. Also
soldiers the day before. Dural was then transferred to the found in Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper
Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM. containing the jumbled tel. no. of Florida Roque, sister of
Upon positive identification by an eyewitness, Dural Amelia Roque, aka. "Ka Nelia." They went to the address
was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an on 8/13/88 and arrived at the place about 11 AM. After
inquest and thereafter filed w/ the RTC-Caloocan City an identifying themselves as military agents and after seeking
info. charging Dural w/ the crime of "Double Murder w/ permission to search the place, w/c was granted, the military
Assault upon agents of persons in authority." agents conducted a search in the presence of the occupants
The petition for HC, insofar as Umil & Villanueva of the house and the barangay captain of the place.
are concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly The military found the place to be another safehouse
of the NUFC/ CPP. They found firearms, subversive
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
documents, ledgers, journals, vouchers, among others. HELD: Vicky O. was arrested in flagrante delicto so that
Amelia admitted ownership of the documents seized. her arrest w/o warrant is justified. No. prel. inv. was
Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for conducted bec. she was arrested w/o a warrant and she
inquest after w/c an info. charging her w/ viol. of PD 1866 refused to waive the provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC,
was filed. Another info. for viol. of the Anti-Subversion Act pursuant to R112, Sec. 7, ROC.
was filed against Roque and also to Buenaobra.
A petition for HC was filed bef. this Court on behalf V
of Roque and Buenaobra. At the hearing, Buenaobra
manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade at The petitioners Ocaya, Anonuevo, Casiple and
Camp Crame, Q.C. Accordingly, the petition for HC on his Roque claim that the firearms, ammunitions and subversive
behalf is now moot and academic. documents alleged to have been found in their possession,
when arrested, did not belong to them, but were planted by
III the military to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any
Anonuevo v. Ramos. evidence to support their claim. On the other hand, no evil
motive or ill will on the part of the arresting officers that
The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo (A) and Ramon could cause the said officers in these cases to accuse the
Casiple (C) w/o warrant is justified. petitioners falsely, has been shown.
At about 7:30 PM on 8/13/88, A and C arrived at the As pointed out by the Sol-Gen, the arrest of the
house of RC w/c was still under surveillance. The military petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing
noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA
the agents found them to be loaded guns. They were asked safehouses pointed no less than by former comrades of the
to show their permit or license to possess or carry firearms petitioners.
and ammunitions but they could not produce any. Hence, VI
they were brought to PC HQ for investigation.
At the PC stockade, A was identified as "Ka Ted," Espiritu v. Lim.
and C as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP by their former comrades.
On 8/15/88, an info. charging them w/ viol. of PD Deogracias Espititu is the Gen. Sec. of PISTON.
1866 was filed bef. RTC-Pasig. On 8/24/88, a petition for Petitioner claims that at about 5 AM of 11/23/88, while he
HC was filed bef. this Court. was sleeping in his home located at Sta. Mesa, Mla., he was
awakened by his sister who told him that a group of persons
HELD: The petitioner's claim that they were unlawfully wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to
arrested bec. there was no previous warrant, is w/o merit. them, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked
The records show that they were carrying unlicensed for the warrant, the men bodily lifted him and placed him in
firearms and ammunitions in their person when their owner type jeepney. He demanded that his sister be
apprehended. allowed to accompany him, but the men did not accede to
There is also no merit in the contention that the info. his request.
filed against them are null and void for want of prel. inv. An info. charging him w/ viol. of Art. 142, RPC
The filing of an info., w/o a prel. inv., having been first (Inciting to sedition) was filed against him.
conducted, is sanctioned by Rule 112, Sec. 7, ROC. In the afternoon of 11/22/88, during a press-con at
Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of the provisions the NPC "Deogracias E. through tri-media was heard urging
of Art. 125, RPC. Nor did petitioners ask for prel. inv. after all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on
the informations had been filed against them in court. 11/23/88 xxx."
Policemen waited for petitioners outside the NPC in
IV order to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen his slip.
He was next seen at about 5 PM at a gathering of drivers and
Ocaya v. Aguirre. sympathizers, where he was heard as saying,
"Bukas tuloy and welga natin ... hanggang sa
On 5/12/88, agents of the PC Intelligence and magkagulo na."
Investigation Division of Rizal PC-INP Command, armed Since the arrest of the petitioner w/o warrant was in
w/ a search warrant, conducted a search of a house located accordance w/ the provisions of R 113, Sec. 5 (b), ROC, and
at Marikina Green Heights, believed to be occupied by the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid info. filed w/
Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the competent court, he may not be released on HC.
the search, Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera.
Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunitions VII
for a .45 cal. pistol were found in Vicky Ocaya's car. They
were brought to the PC HQ for investigation, when O. could Nazareno v. Station Commander.
not produce any permit or authorization to possess the
ammunition, an info. charging her w/ viol. of PD 1866 was At about 8:30 AM of 12/14/88, one Romulo Bunye
filed w/ RTC-Pasig. Rivera was released from custody. II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinglupa,
On 5/17/88, a petition for HC was filed on behalf of MM. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala
these 2. who was arrested by the police on 12/28/88. Upon
questioning, Regala pointed to Nazareno as one of his
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly peace officers to make the arrest, w/o warrant, at the time
perform their official duties. the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another
A few days after Dural's arrest, an info. charging him thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, w/o
w/ Double murder w/ assault against agents of persons in obviously becomes difficult at times, the court, has in this
authority was filed in RTC-Caloocan City. He was placed case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for
under judicial custody. On 8/31/88, he was convicted and purposes of the arrest (not conviction.)
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Supervening events made this case moot and
As to A. Roque., W. Buenaobra, D. Anonuevo, R.. academic. for E. had bef. arraignment asked the court a quo
Casiple & V. Ocaya, their arrests, w/o warrant, are also for re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear. Case
justified. They were searched pursuant to a warrant issued against E. has been provisionally dismissed and his bail
by a court of law and were found w/ unlicensed firearms, cancelled.
explosives and/ or ammunitions on their persons. They
were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto w/c justified NAZARENO'S ARREST.-- Although the killing of
their outright arrest w/o warrant under Sec. 5 (a), R113, Bunye II occured on 12/14/88, while Nazareno's arrest w/o
ROC. A few days after their arrests, informations were filed warrant was made only on 12/28/88 or 14 days later, teh
in court against said petitioners placing them w/in judicial arrest falls under Sec. 5 (b), R113, since it was only on
custody and disposition. Buenaobra's petition is moot bec. 12/28/88 that the police authorities came to know that
he had chosen to remain in detention. Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of
The reason which compelled the military agents to Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even w/o a
make the arrests w/o warrant was the info. given to the warrant (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse
military that 2 safehouses (one occupied by RC and the of 14 days to prevent possible flight.
other by Benito Tiamson) were being used by the CPP/ NPA Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a
for their operations, w/ info. as to their exact location and quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
the names of RC and BT as residents and occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following ADMISSIBLITY OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION.
circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), w/c confirmed the These admissions strengthen the Court's perception
belief of the military that the info. they had received was that truly the grounds upon w/c the arresting officers based
true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of their arrests w/o warrant, are supported by probable cause,
the commission of certain crimes: first, the search warrant i.e., that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the
was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantino commission of certain offenses, in compliance w/ Sec. 5, R
safehouse; second, found in the safehouse was a person 113, ROC. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is
named RC, who admitted that he was a ranking member of not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the
the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed offenses upon w/c their warrantless arrests were predicated.
firearms and communist equipment; third, at the time of The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons
their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, arrested w/o warrant is not proper in a petition for HC. It
ammunitions, and/ or subversive documents, and they pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in
the CPP/ NPA. And then shortyly after their arrests, they
were positively identified by their former comrades as CPP/ (2) Illegal Possession of guns or drugs
NPA members.
An arrest is in the nature of an administrative
measure. The power to arrest w/o warrant is w/o limitation People v. Linsangan, 195 SCRA 784
as long as the requirements of Sec. 5, R 113 are met. This
rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace F: Accused Linsangan was arrested after a “buy-bust”
and order in our community. operation. The two marked ten-peso bill were retrieved
"xxx The legality of the detention does not depend from him. He was asked to sign his name on the two
upon the fact of the crime, but xxx upon the nature of the marked bills. The ten handrolled cigarette sticks confiscated
deed, wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be from the accused were submitted for examination. After
inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at the finding these positive for marijuana, a case was filed for
moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Linsangan denied
suspending the liberty of the citizen." (US v. Sanchez.) the charge. The trial court found Linsangan guilty. Upon
appeal, one of the assertions of Linsangan was that the trial
ESPIRITU was arrested w/o warrant, not for court erred in not holding that when the policemen required
subversive or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the him to initial the marked bills, they violated his
words "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin xxx hanggang sa
constitutional right to counsel, to remain silent, and not to
magkagulo na" w/c in the perception of the arresting
incriminate himself while under custodial investigation.
officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons differ as to the validity of such ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A
perception and regard the language as falling w/in free VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL
speech guaranteed by the Consti. But, the authority of the RIGHTS WHEN HE WAS MADE TO SIGN THE
MARKED BILLS.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
of the interrogation is to evince evidence that can be used to Indeed, in the US, it is said that an "unconstitutional
prosecute the person. coercion will render inadmissible even the most
unquestionably true inculpatory statements." xxx This is
For instance, when A, a policeman, sees X running not bec. such confessions are unlikely to be true but bec. the
with a stained knife away from an apparently dead man, he methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle
can rung after X and having grabbed him, ask him for an in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an
explanation as to what he saw without reading his Miranda accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system -- a system in
rights. But once A arrests X and starts interrogating him in w/c the State must establish guilt by evidence independently
the police precinct, then his rights must now be read, for and freely secured and not by coercion prove its charge
there can only be one purpose to the questioning, and that is against an accused out of his own mouth xxx." (Rogers v.
to elicit evidence to be used to prosecute him. Richmond, J. Frankfurter.)
Mendoza, The Right to Counsel During Custodial THE MIRANDA RULE
Investigations, 2 Law Rev. No. 10, 2 (1988); 61 Phil. LJ 409
The prosecution may not use statements, whether
I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS DEVELOPED AS PART exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
OF PROTECTION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY interrogation of the def. unless it demonstrates the use of
CONFESSIONS. procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we
Since the introduction of the American accusatorial mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
system of criminal procedure in the Phils., the rule has been a person has been taken to custody or otherwise deprived of
that involuntary confessions are inadmissible in evidence his freedom of action in any significant way. xxx
against the accused.
The question is on whom the burden of proof is II. IN TURN, MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE DEVISED
placed. The early rule placed the burden of proving that the AS MEANS OF SECURING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
confession was voluntary and, therefore, admissible in
evidence, on the prosecution. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619.) It was Miranda v. Arizona requires certain warnings to be
held that a confession not shown to have been voluntarily given by police interrogators bef. a person in custody may
given could be objected to at any stage of the proceedings, be interrogated, w/c have been adopted by the Phil. SC:
even for the first time on appeal in the SC. 1. The person in custody must be informed in clear
Act No. 619 was later repealed by the Admin. code and unequivocal terms that he has a right to remain silent.
of 1916, w/c placed the burden of proof on the accused to The purpose is to apprise him of his privilege not to be
show that his confession was involuntary. Under the new compelled to incriminate himself, to overcome the inherent
rule, it was sufficient that the confession was given under pressures of the interrogation atmosphere, and to assure the
conditions w/c accredit prima facie its admissibility. individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize
In 1953, a further change took place when the SC his privilege, should he choose to exercise it.
held in Peo. v. de los Santos that "A confession, to be 2. The person in custody must be warned that
repudiated, must not only be proved to have been obtained anything he will say can and wilol be used against him.
by force and violence, but also that it is false or untrue, for This warning is intended to make him aware not only of the
the law rejects the confession when, by force or violence or privilege but also of the consequences of foregoing it.
intimidation, the accused is compelled against his will to tell 3. Since the circumstances surrounding in-custody
a falsehood, not even when such force and violence he is interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will
compelled to tell the truth. In the later case of Peo. v. of one merely made aware of his privilege by his
Villanueva, the Court stated "the admissibility of that kind interrogators, it is indispensable that he has the assistance of
of evidence depends not on the supposed illegal manner in counsel.
w/c it is obtained but on the truth or falsity of the facts or
admission contained therein.
The illegality of the means used in obtaining THE CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INTERROGATION
evidence does not affect its admissibility (Moncado v.
People's Court.) At what stage of the police interrogation must the
warnings be given? The Consti. does not state at what stage
THE EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN of the interrogation process they must be made. but in
SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES Miranda, the court specified that it is only at the custodial
phase of the interrogation that its ruling applied. As the
The adoption in 1967 of the exclusionary rule in Court indicated in Escobedo v. Illinois, it is only after the
search and seizure cases (Stonehill v. Diokno) worked a investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
parallel in the law of confession. W/o expressly overruling crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the
its decision in de los Santos and Villanueva, the Court, in suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a
Peo. v. Urro, went back to the former rule that involuntary process of interrogation that leads itself to eliciting
or coerced confessions, regardless of their truth, are null and incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
void. xxx Involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by
law, w/c proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman In Gamboa v. Cruz, the accused was arrested, w/o a
methods to secure confessions. xxx warrant, for vagrancy. He was taken to police precint no. 2
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
in Mla. The next day, he was included in a police line-up of limited but that it also embraced uncounselled statements.
5 detainees and was pointed to by the complainant as a For "if a statement made wore in fact exculpatory, it
complanion of the main suspect on the basis of w/c the could ... never be used by the prosecution, in fact, statements
accused was ordered to stay and sit in front of the merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often
complainant, while the latter was interrogated. The accused used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate
was then charged w/ robbery. The accused moved to untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus
dismiss the case against him on the ground that he had been to prove guilt by implication."
denied the assistance of counsel during the line-up. His
motion was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari. EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
HELD: The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of The phrase "for any purpose in any proceeding"
an interrogation, when the police officer starts to ask conveys the idea that the rule excluding evidence illegally
questions designed to elicit info. and/ or confessions or obtained is absolute. No similar phraseology is used in the
admissions from the accused. As the police line-up in this exclusionary rule implementing the Miranda rule. Does this
case was not part of the custodial inquest, the petitioner was mean there can be instances, where uncounselled statements
not entitled to counsel xxx. may nevertheless be admissible in evidence, albeit, for a
limited purpose?
III. WAIVER OF RIGHTS. In Harris v. US, it was held that although a
confession obtained w/o complying w/ the Miranda rule was
It is important to distinguish bet. the waiver of rights inadmissible for the purpose of establishing in chief the
and the waiver of warnings. The first can be made provided confessor's guilt, it may nevertheless be presented in
that the waiver is "voluntary, knowing and intelligent" but evidence to impeach his credit. Petitioner, as a def., in a
the second cannot. As the warnings are the means of prosecution for selling heroin, claimed that what he had sold
insuring that the suspect is apprised of his rights so that any to a police officer was baking powder, as part of the scheme
subsequent waiver of his rights can be "voluntary, knowing to defraud the purchaser xxx The shield provided by
and intelligent," it is obvious that there can be no valid Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by
waiver of the warnings. A waiver of rights will not be way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation w/
presumed. prior inconsistent utterance
1. With respect to confessions obtained bef. Jan. 17, In New York v. Quarles, the SC created a "public
1973, the rule that the suspect must be warned that he has a safety" exception to the Miranda rule. xxx. "There is public
right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings
does not apply. such confessions, even though presented in be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted in
evidence in a trial after the effectivity of the 1973 Consti., evidence." It held that the warnings were not themselves
are admissible, provided they are voluntary, using the Constitutional rights but merely "prophylactic" measures to
traditional test of voluntariness. insure the right against self-incrimination. The Court noted
the cost imposed on the public by the rule, namely, that the
2. With respect to confessions obtained after Jan. giving of warnings might deter suspects from answering
17, 1973, but before March 20, 1985, when the decision of questions and this might lead in turn to fewer convictions. It
Peo. v. Galit was handed down, the rule is that the then ruled that the social cost is higher when the giving of
voluntariness of a waiver of the rights to silence and to warnings might deter suspects from answering questions
counsel must be determined on a case-to-case basis, taking than are necessary to avert an immediate threat to public
into account the circumstances under w/c the waiver was safety. When answers are not actually coerced, this social
made. cost outweights the need for Miranda safeguards. In such
exigent circumstances, police officers must not be made to
3. With regard to confessions obtained after March choose bet. giving the warnings at the risk that public safety
20, 1985 but before Feb. 2, 1987, when the present Consti. will be endangered and withholding the warnings at the risk
took effect, the rule is that a waiver of the rights to remain that probative evidence will be excluded.
silent and to the assistance of counsel, to be valid, must be
made w/ the assistance of counsel.
People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262
4. With regard to confessions given after Feb. 2,
1987, the present Consti. requires that the waiver to be valid, F: Bolanos was convicted for Murder. The victim,
must be in writing and w/ the assistance of counsel. Pagdalian was found dead, sustaining stab wounds. When
the policemen inquired about the circumstances of the
IX. THE EXLUSIONARY RULE. incident, they were informed that the deceased was with two
companions, on the previous night. The accused was
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of apprehended. In the vehicle where the accused boarded, on
this or Sec. 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence his way to the Police Station, Bolanos allegedly admitted
against him, the Consti. says. No distinction is made bet. that he killed Pagdalian because he was abusive.
confession or admission. Although the previous Consti.
spoke of confessions only, I have argued that it was not so
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission in the jeep was naturally, spontaneously and without deliberation during the
admissible in evidence. course of an event, they leave little room for
misunderstanding/misinterpretation upon hearing by
HELD: The trial court, in admitting the extra-judicial someone else( i.e. by the witness who will later repeat the
confession of the accused in evidence, violated his statement to the court) and thus the courts believe that such
Constitutional right to be informed, to remain silent and to statements carry a high degree of credibility. Evidence
have a counsel of his choice, while already in police which can be admitted into evidence as Res gestae fall into
custody. Since the extra-judicial confession was the only three headings:
basis for the conviction of the accused, the trial coust’s
judgment was reversed. Bam. Words or phrases which either form part of, or explain a
physical act,
Exclamations which are so spontaneous as to belie
People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 concoction, and
Statements which are evidence as to someone's state of
F: After he and his wife were individually mind.
hogtied and their house ransacked, Atty. Garay was
found dead with 3 gunshot wounds . For his death 3. Not applicable to statements given in administrative
and the loss of their things on the occasion thereof, investigations
Bandula, Sidigo, Dionanao, and Ejan were charged
in court for robbery with homicide. On the basis of People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
the extrajudicial confessions (EJC) allegedly made
by Bandula and Dionanao during their custodial It should at once be apparent that there are
investigation which the court found to "have all the two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the
qualities and have complied with all the requirements section, namely:
of an admissible confession, it appearing from the
confession that acussed were informed of their rights 1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right
under the law regarding custodial investigation and of a person not to be compelled to be a witness against
were duly represented by Counsel (Atty. Zerna)", it himself set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim
disregarded the defenses interposed by the accused reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935
and convicted Bandula. The 3 other accused were Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth
acquitted for "insufficiency of evidence". Amendment of the American Constitution, and
2) the right of a person in custodial interrogation,
Issue: W/N the extrajudicial confession of Bandula i.e., the rights of every suspect "under investigation for the
conformed with the constitutional requisites for its commission of an offense."
validity, hence admissible in evidence.
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates
HELD: NO much more clearly the individuality and disparateness of
From the records, it can be gleaned that when these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The
accused Bandula and Dionanao were investigated right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be
immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel compelled to be a witness against himself," is now
present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
custodial investigation with respect to Dionanao, and The rights of a person in custodial interrogation, which have
2 weeks later with respect to Bandula. And counsel been made more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of
who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. the same Article III.
Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay, whose
interest is admittedly adverse to the accused and who Right Against Self-Incrimination
is not an independent counsel. On top of this, there
are telltale signs that violence was used against the The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned
accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of of in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is
Sec. 12, Art III of the 1987 Constitution which accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
protects the rights of the accused during custodial voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil,
investigation. Suzette. criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to
"be compelled to be a witness against himself." It prescribes
1. Miranda rule not applicable to confessions executed an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and
before January 17, 1973 not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness,
whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer
any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to
2. Not applicable to res gestae statements which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime.
However, the right can be claimed only when the specific
People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111 (1988) question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the
Res gestae (a Latin phrase meaning "things done") is an witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not
exception to the rule against Hearsay evidence. Res gestae is give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline
based on the belief that because certain statements are made to appear before the court at the time appointed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
US v. Wade, 388 US 218 (1967) doubt as to whether the defendant was properly informed of
his right.
People v. Hatton, 210 SCRA 1
People v. Tampus 96 SCRA 624 (1980)
F: Algrame was stabbed at the back while walking with
several companions including Ongue who vaguely Public trial; waiver of right to counsel
recognized the assailant, describing the latter as a
"mestizo." Two days later, Ongue was invited by the police F: Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila were prisoners at
to identify the suspect in a police line- up. Hatton was the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa, Rizal. On June 14,
pointed by Ongue as the assailant. Hatton alleges that at the 1976, they attacked and killed Celso Saminado, another
time that he was made to stand in the police line-up, he was prisoner. Afterwards, they surrendered to the prison guard,
not assisted by counsel. Hence, his identification therein by saying "surrender po kami. Gumanti lang po kami." Two
Ongue is inadmissble. days later, they gave extrajudicial confessions admitting the
killing. They were accused of murder and pleaded guilty.
RULING: When the suspect was brought to the police They took the witness stand and affirmed their confessions.
station for indentification, technically, he was not yet under Tampus was sentenced to death while Avila to reclusion
custodial investigation. Thus, the right to counsel does not temporal. Trial took place at the Penitentiary. On review, it
yet apply. was contended that Tampus was denied the right to a public
However, there is every reason to doubt the trial and to counsel.
regularity of the identification of the suspect by the witness.
During the proceedings in the police station, Ongue HELD: The record does not show that the public was
identified Hatton not because he was certain that Hatton actually excluded from the place where the trial was held or
was really the assailant but because he was the only mestizo that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial
in the station and because he was pointed by the police as there. Anyway, the right to public trial may be waived. In
the suspect. This cannot be considered as positive another case where Avila was also a defendant, the SC
identification of the accused by the witness. directed that, for security reasons, Avila's trial be held in the
National Penitentiary. The accused was warned in Tagalog
5. Tests of Validity of Waiver of Miranda Rights that he had a right to remain silent and to counsel but despite
this, he was willing to answer questions of the police. There
is no doubt that the confession was voluntarily made. The
No valid waiver. truth is that shortly after the killing, Tampus and Avila
admitted their guilt. That spontaneous statement, elicited
People v. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2 (1980) without interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the
same time was a voluntary confession of guilt. By means of
Right to counsel may be waived provided the waiver is that statement given freely on the spur of the moment
voluntary, knowing and intelligent without any urging or suggestion, the two waived their right
to remain silent and to counsel.
F: Respondent Paquito Yupo was accused of murder in
the CFI of Bulacan. The prosecution presented Corporal People v. Poyos 143 SCRA 543 (1986)
Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police who identified a
statement of the accused during a police interrogation and No valid waiver of right to counsel and to silence
his alleged waiver of the right to remain silent and to
counsel. When Roca was questioned on the incriminating F: Poyos was convicted of the murder of a 77-year-old
answers in the statement, the defense objected, contending woman and sentence to death. His conviction was based
that Yupo's statement was given without the assistance of solely on his extrajudicial confession which he disowned in
counsel. Respondent Judge sustained the objection on the court. The confession was given to the police and subscribed
ground that the right to counsel cannot be waived. before the clerk of court and contains a waiver.
HELD: The right to counsel during custodial interrogation HELD: It is doubtful, given the tenor of the question
may be waived provided the waiver is made intelligently whether there was a definite waiver by the suspect of his
and voluntarily, with full understanding of its consequences. right to counsel. His answer was categorical enough, to be
In this case, the statement made only a perfunctory opening sure, but the question itself was not since it spoke of a
question, after informing the suspect that he was under waiver only "for the moment." As worded, the question
investigation, that he had a right to counsel and that suggested a tentativeness that belied the suspect's supposed
anything he said could be used for or against him and after permanent foregoing of his right to counsel, if indeed there
asking whether he was willing to answer questions and he was any waiver at all. Moreover, he was told that he could
answered "yes." The statement was in Tagalog which the hire a lawyer but not that one could be provided for him for
defendant, a native of Samar, had not been shown to be fully free. VV.
acquainted with. The date of execution of the statement
before the municipal court was not indicated. The separate Since Royo's conviction for murder was based on a
statement signed by the defendant stating he was made to written confession showing that he was apprised of his right
read the opening statement containing the Miranda warnings not only by the police but also by the fiscal, but that he
and that they were explained to him all the more engenders
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
waived these rights, then the waiver found to be voluntary, appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
knowing and intelligent and thus admissible. himself or of anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may
be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with
the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
b. The Galit Rule (March 20, 1985 to Feb. 2, 1987) violation of this, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
It is not enough that the confession is voluntary,
knowing and intelligent. The waiver must be made in the
presence of counsel. Waiver of the right to counsel must be Whatever doubt as to the validity of the Galit rule,
made with the assistance of counsel. This rule applied from however, was laid to rest by the SC in People v. Sison, 142
March 20, 1985 to February 2, 1987. SCRA 219 (1986). The Court held that in People v. Galit,
which was decided en banc and concurred in by all the
In People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 485 (1985), the SC, Justices except one who took no part, the Court was out to
reiterating a dictum in Morales v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 rest all doubts regarding the ruling in Morales v. Enrile, and
(1983), ruled that no custodial investigation should be embraced its ruling.
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, and that
although the right to counsel may be waived, the waiver In this case, the prosecution sought to prove its
should not be valid unless made with the assistance of charge of subversion against Asis by means of her
counsel. confession given in the hospital, in which she admitted
through a leading question, that she was a member of the
In the Galit case, however, the adoption of the NPA and that she was wounded in the encounter. The SC
Morales obiter was also an obiter. The confession in this upheld the trial court's decision excluding the confession on
case was traditionally involuntary, and so the SC did not the ground that the waiver of the Miranda rights was made
need the Morales obiter in order to disallow the confession. without the assistance of counsel.
Under the facts of the case, the accused Galit was
convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis of his People v. Sison 142 SCRA 219 (1986)
confession, which was obtained through torture. The NBI
investigators covered Galit's face with a rag and then pushed F: Jocelyn de Asis was accused of subversion. At the
it into a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was only after trial, the Fiscal offered as evidence an extrajudicial
they had broken his will that he signed the confession and confession given by her in the hospital. In that confession,
posed for pictures for re-enactment as directed by the she admitted, through a leading question that she was a
investigators. member of the NPA. The trial court excluded the confession
on the ground that the waiver of Miranda rights was made
without the assistance of counsel. The prosecution contends
People v. Galit 135 SCRA 465 (1985) that the ruling in Morales v. Ponce Enrile that the right to
counsel may be waived only with the assistance of counsel,
F: Defendant was convicted of robbery with homicide was only a dictum.
by the Circuit Criminal Court. The principal prosecution
witness testified that he heard the defendant and his wife, HELD: In the case of People v. Galit, which was decided en
who was the mother of the witness' wife, quarrelling the banc and concurred in by all Justices except one who took
morning after the crime. He said the defendant wanted to no part, the SC put to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in
leave their house because he and his companions had robbed Morales v. Ponce Enrile and Moncupa v. Enrile.
"Aling Nene." The prosecution also presented the
extrajudicial confession of the defendant.
HELD: The confession of the defendant is inadmissible People v. Lim, 196 SCRA 809 (1991)
because it was obtained through torture. The NBI
investigators covered the defendant's face with a rag and In People v. Nabaluna, 142 SCRA 446 (1986),
then pushed in into a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was Nabaluna et. al. were convicted of robbery with homicide on
only after they had broken his will that the defendant signed the basis, among others, of extrajudicial confessions taken in
the confession and posed for pictures for reenactment as 1977. The confessions and the special counsel before whom
directed by the investigators. The defendant is from Samar the confessions were signed prove that the Miranda
and there is no showing that he understood Tagalog. It was warnings were given, but these were not made in the
two weeks after he executed the salaysay that his relatives presence of counsel. The SC, in allowing the confession,
were permitted to visit him. His statement does not contain ruled that the GAlit ruling could not have a retroactive
any waiver or right to counsel and yet during the effect, especially since in this case the trial court decision
investigation he was not assisted by one. These constitute was already rendered before the SC pronouncement.
gross violations of his right. The SC cited the case of
Morales v. Ponce Enrile where it laid the procedure in
custodial investigations: No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the precense of counsel engaged by People v. Lasac 148 SCRA 624 (1987)
the person arrested, or by any person on his behalf, or
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
F: Appellant was convicted of parricide on the basis of the same date of Luisa Jara while Felicisimo Jara, the
a confession and circumstantial evidence which the trial husband of the deceased, was found guilty of parricide. Two
court found substantial to establish guilt. of the appellants, Raymundo Vergara and Bernardo
Bernadas, made extrajudicial confessions implicating Jara as
HELD: The waiver by the appellant of his right to counsel the mastermind. The confessions were taken while the two
was made without the assistance of a counsel. The SC has were held incommunicado in the presence of five policemen
held in Morales v. Ponce Enrile, People v. Galit and People and after two weeks of detention.
v. Sison (1986) that this requirement is mandatory. Any
statement obtained in violation of this procedure shall be HELD: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights
inadmissible in evidence. VV. appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which
are later repudiated assumed the nature of a legal form or
c. New rule on waiver (Feb. 2, 1987) model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificial style does
not create an impression of voluntariness or even
Art. III, Sec. 12 (1): Waiver must be in writing and made in understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a
the presence of counsel spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is
missing. Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is
Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under waived by the person entitled to that protection, the
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently,
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and the prosecution must prove with strong, convincing
to have competent and independent counsel preferably evidence that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily
of his choice. If the person cannot afford the services of submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence assist him during the taking of that confession. That proof is
of counsel. missing in this case.
7. What may be waived: The right to remain silent and
Under the new Constitution, any waiver must now be to counsel, but not the right to be given "Miranda
made (1) in writing, and (2) in the presence of counsel. warnings"
6. The burden of proving voluntariness of waivers is on The right to remain silent and to counsel, which are
the prosecution the effectuations of the Miranda rights, can be waived.
The burden to prove that there was a valid waiver of What cannot be waived are:
the Miranda warning devolves upon the one seeking to
present the confession, that is, on the prosecution. This rule 1. The right to be given the Miranda warnings. (For
applies whether in the pre-Galit, Galit, or 1987 rule. how can one waive what one does not know?)
In People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986), the SC 2. The right to counsel when making the waiver of
noted that the stereotype "advice" appearing in practically the right to remain silent or to counsel.
all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has
assumed the nature of a legal form. Investigators
automatically type it together with "opo" as the answer, or 8. Exclusionary rule
ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their
handwriting. Its tired punctilious, fixed and artificially Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness (3) Any confession or admission obtained in
or even understanding on the part of the accused. violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
Whenever a Constitutional protection is waived by
one entitled to that protection, the presumption is always
against the waiver. Thus, the prosecution must prove with Note than under [Art. III, Sec. 3(2)] the exclusionary
strongly convincing evidence that indeed the accused rule reads: (any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession, and preceding section shall be inadmissible "for any purpose in
knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not any proceeding."
interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of There are two exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
that confession. One, to impeach the credibility of the accused. Two, public
safety.
People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986) Impeach the credibility
F: Appellants were found guilty of robbery with The unwarned or uncounselled confession is not
homicide for the killing and robbery of Ampara vda. de totally without use. While it is not admissible to prove the
Bantigue on June 9, 1978. In another case, two of the guilt of the accused, it may be used against him to impeach
appellants were found guilty of homicide for the killing on his credibility by showing that he is lying in court, so ruled
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
the U.S. Supreme Court in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 1. When right may be invoked
222 (1971).
The right to bail is available from the very moment
of arrest (which may be before or after the filing of formal
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) charges in court) up to the time of conviction by final
judgement (which means after appeal).
In this case, Harris was arrested for twice selling
heroin to an undercover police agent. He confessed to the No charge need be filed formally before one can file
crime during the police interrogation, but the confession was for bail, so long as one is under arrest. So ruled the SC in
uncounselled, and so it was held as inadmissible in Heras Teehankee v. Rovica. 75 Phil.634 (1945).
evidence. But when Harris took the witness stand, he
testified that what he sold was baking powder in order to The case was unique in that after the war, the
defraud the police agent. The SC allowed the prosecution to People's Court Act amended Art. 125 of the RPC to allow
introduce the uncounselled statment to show that he was for a longer time to detain persons because of the
lying. impossibility of filing charges within the reglementary
period due to the number of indictees.
In justifying the admission of the testimony, Justice
Burger said that it is one thing to say that the government Bail and Habeas Corpus
cannot make an affirmative use of the evidence unlawfully
obtained, and quite another to say that the defendant can In the case of bail, there is an implicit recognition
turn the illegal method by which the evidence in the that the arrest and detention, are valid, or that even if they
possession of the government was obtained to his own were initially illegal, such illegality was cured by the
advantage, providing himself with a shield against perjury subsequent filing of a case in court. Thus, the prayer in bail
and the contradiction of his untruths. is that one be released temporarily from such valid
detention, and this can be made anytime after arrest.
The reason, continued the Court is that the shield
provided by the Miranda rights cannot be perverted into a In habeas corpus, the assumption is precisely that
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk the arrest and detention are illegal, so that the prayer is to be
of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. released permanently from such illegal detention. When the
privilege of the writ is suspended, the arrest and detention
Public Safety remain illegal, but the remedy afforded by law to the victim
is not available. Under the 1987 Constitution, though the
Public Safety may justify the police in taking effect of the suspension has been considerably lessened to
confessions without prior warning. Thus ruled the U.S. the need to file a case within 72 hours from the illegal arrest,
Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 otherwise the detainee is to be released.
(1984).
The Constitution now provides, overruling Morales
v. Enrile, that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
does not carry with it the suspension of the right to bail.
New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). Habeas Corpus refers to illegal detention, while bail refers
to legal detention, or even detention that started as illegal
In the case, the Court excused the giving of the but was cured by the filing of a case in court.
Miranda warning because the public safety required that the
weapon had to be located before it could be used by the 2. When bail is a matter of right, when it is a matter of
accused against those in the supermarket. discretion
The criticism hurled against this ruling is that while Bail is a matter of right in all cases not punishable by
the police may be justified in forcing the assailant to say reclusion perpetua.
where the weapon is located, he is not justified to present
this in evidence in the subsequent criminal prosecution. It is a matter of discretion in case the evidence of
guilt is strong. In such a case, according to People v. San
Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1966), the court's discretion to grant
C. Right to bail bail must be exercised in the light of a summary of the
evidence presented by the prosecution. Thus, the order
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua evidence for the prosecution followed by the conclusion on
when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. the The only time bail may be denied is when (a) the
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (b) the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. evidence of guilt is strong.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
With the abolition of the death penalty (III, 20), and 9. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice
the automatic commutation of a death sentence to reclusion when arrested.
perpetua, it is contended that when the 1987 Constitution 10. If the accused is under bond for appearance at
denies the right to bail in offenses punishable by reclusion trial in other cases.
perpetua, it is meant to apply only to those crimes which
were once punishable by death. For if it includeds even Even when the accused has previously jumped bail,
those crimes which before and now are really punishable by still he cannot be denied bail. the remedy in this case is to
reclusion perpetua, it would go against the very spirit of the increase the amount of the bail (Siquiam v. Amparo).
Constitution.
5. Right to bail and right to travel abroad
People v. Donato, 196 SCRA 130 (1991)
Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of
3. Bail in courts-martial changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
Commendador v. De Villa, 200 SCRA 80 (1991) court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
4. Standards for fixing bail health, as may be provided by law.
Rule 114, Sec. 6. Amount of bail; guidelines.--
The judge who issed the warrant or granted the In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 149
application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail (1986), the SC disallowed a person released on bail to travel
considering primarily, but not limited to the following abroad for a business trip. The Court gave 2 reasons why
guidelines: bail operates only within the country.
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense; One, the accused may be placed beyond the
(c) Penalty of the offense charged; jurisdiction of the court if he were allowed to leave the
(d) Character and reputation of the accused; Philippines without sufficient reason, thus affecting one of
(e) Age and health of the accused; the conditions in the grant of bail, namely to have the
(f) The weight of the evidence against the accused available whenever the court requires his presence.
accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial; Two, implicit in the bail is the agreement between
(h) Forfeiture of other bonds; the State and the surety that the State will do nothing to
(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from make it difficult for the surety to arrest the defendant upon
justice when arrested; and order of the court. If the court thus allows his to leave, then
(j) The pendency of other cases in which the the State loses its right to order the forfeiture of the bond
accused is under bond. because it itself has breached its obligation to the surety.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
The case leaves the question of allowing an accused
under bail to go abroad for humanitarian reasons open-
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be ended. This reason was not foreclosed by the Court, which
rendered nugatory be requiring a sum that is excessive, hinted that the accused could be allowed to leave if he had
otherwise, it becomes "a promise to the ear to be broken to "sufficient reason". What the Court found insufficient was
the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a the business trip.
pauper's will" (Jackson). Thus, said the SC in De la Camara
v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971).
Manotoc v. CA, 142 SCRA 149 (1986)
In this case, a bail of P1.195 million imposed against
Mayor Camara for charges of 12 murders and 12 frustrated F: Petitioner is a principal stockholder of two
murder was found excessive. corporations, in one of which he was the president. The
firms were placed under a management committee by the
The SC laid down the following guidelines in fixing SEC and petitioner was placed "on hold" by the
the amount of bail in Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 Commission of Immigration. Petitioner was charged with
(1967), later contained in sec. 6 of Rule 114. estafa. He later asked for permission to leave the country for
business reasons, but his request was denied by the courts.
1. Ability of the accused to give the bail. He filed a petition for certiorari but his petition was also
2. Nature of the offense. dismissed for lack of merit. He appealed to the SC.
3. Penalty for the offense charged.
4. Character and reputation of the accused HELD: The condition imposed by Rule 114, sec. 1 upon the
5. Health of the accused. accused to make himself available whenever the court
6. Character and strength of the evidence. requires his presence, operates as a valid restriction on his
7. Probability of the accused appearing in trial. right to travel. The constitutional right to travel is not
8. Forfeiture of other bonds. absolute, but is subject to lawful orders of the court. VV.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty sufficient to convict and denied said motion, whereupon
years, without absolute any evidence to determine and counsel for the defense offered to present evidence for the
clarify the true facts of the case. accused. The provincial fiscal opposed the presentation of
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from evidence by the defense, contending that the present
the beginning. It is expressly provided in our rules of Court, procedural practice and laws precluded the defense in
Rule 112, section 3 (now Rule 116, Sec. 6), that: criminal cases from presenting any evidence after it had
presented a motion for dismissal with or without reservation
If the defendant appears without attorney, he must and after said motion had been denied, and citing as
be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney authority the case of United States vs. De la Cruz, 28 Phil.,
before being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the 279. His Honor Judge S. C. Moscoso sustained the
aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to opposition of the provincial fiscal and, without allowing the
defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for accused to present evidence in their defense, convicted all of
procuring attorney. them and sentenced the herein petitioner to suffer seven
years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by
the trial court. Issue: Whether the accused should be allowed to present
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by evidence after the denial of their motion to dismiss on the
our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution
for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that
all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and Ruling: The accused should be allowed to present evidence.
counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing
unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by 1. The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow the
counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it accused-petitioner to present proofs in his defense after the
does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the denial of his motion for dismissal was a palpable error
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the which resulted in denying to the said accused the due
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, process of law guaranteed in the Bill of Rights embodied in
and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is the Constitution, it being provided in Article II, section 1
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his (17), of the Constitution that in all criminal prosecutions the
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right counsel and to have compulsory process to secure the
to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has attendance of witnesses in his behalf. There is no law nor
become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that "procedural practice" under which the accused may ever be
under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to denied the right to be heard before being sentenced.
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, cases if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if jeopardy (sec. 2, Rule 118), the dismissal of the case for
he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to insufficiency of the evidence after the prosecution has rested
procure an attorney of his own. terminates the case then and there. But if the motion for
dismissal is denied, the court should proceed to hear the
evidence for the defense before entering judgment
Q: What happens if the accused files a demurrer to regardless of whether or not the defense had reserved its
the evidence of the prosecution (on the ground that the right to present evidence in the event its motion for
prosecution failed to tender a case) and this motion is denied dismissal be denied. The reason is that it is the constitutional
-- could the defense still present its own evidence? right of the accused to be heard in his defense before
sentence is pronounced on him. Of course if the accused has
In Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949), the SC no evidence to present or expressly waives the right to
ruled in the affirmative, contending that the right of the present it, the court has no alternative but to decide the case
accused to present his evidence is a constitutional right upon the evidence presented by the prosecution alone.
which cannot be defeated by the dismissal of the motion of
demurrer. 2. The main question to decide is whether the writ of
habeas corpus lies in a case like the present.
Filing of demurrer to evidence is a WAIVER of right to be We have already shown that there is no law or
heard (Rule 119, Sec. 15.) precedent which could be invoked to place in doubt the right
of the accused to be heard or to present evidence in his
Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949) defense before being sentenced. On the contrary, the
provisions of the Constitution hereinabove cited expressly
F: Fidel Abriol, together with six other persons, was and clearly guarantee to him that right. Such constitutional
accused of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. right is inviolate. No court of justice under our system of
After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested government has the power to deprive him of that right. If the
its case, counsel for the defense moved to dismiss the case accused does not waive his right to be heard but on the
on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to prove the contrary as in the instant case invokes that rough, and the
guilt of the accused. After hearing the arguments for and court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to
against the motion for dismissal, the court held the proofs proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused without
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
hearing him in his defense; and the sentence thus Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two (2) of the
pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in a basic privileges of the accused in a criminal prosecution are
habeas corpus proceeding. the right to the assistance of counsel and the right to a
Although the sentence against the petitioner is void preliminary examination. President Mckinley made the first
for the reasons hereinabove stated, he may be held under the a part of the Organic Law in his Instructions to the
custody of the law by being detained or admitted to bail Commission by imposing the inviolable rule that in all
until the case against him is finally and lawfully decided. criminal prosecutions the accused 'shall enjoy the right ... to
The process against him in criminal case No. 1472 may have assistance of counsel for the defense' ". Today said
stand should be resumed from the stage at which it was right is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for, as Judge
vitiated by the trial court's denial of his constitutional right Cooley says, this is "perhaps the privilege most important to
to be heard. Up to the point when the prosecution rested, the the person accused of crime."
proceedings were valid and should be resumed from there. "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless
the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The right to be heard would be of little meaning if it does
People v. Donesa, 49 SCRA 281 (1973) not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science
Grant of demurrer is equivalent to an acquittal of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
F: After prosecution presented its witnesses, the guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
defense moved for dismissal of the case on the ground of innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who
insufficiency of evidence. The judge granted the motion. are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right
to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
Issue: Did such dismissal operate as an acquittal of the become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that
accused? under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
Ruling: YES enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney,
A dismissal ordered after the termination of the but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has the for him if he so desires and he is poor, or grant him a
force and effect of an acquittal. Since there is a failure to reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own."
prove the guilt of the accused, the case must be dismissed, This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon
and it will be a bar to another prosecution for the same the conviction of an accused by a trial court. It continues,
offense even though it was ordered by the Court upon even during appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign
motion or with the express consent of the defendant, in a counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes an
exactly the same way as a judgment of acquittal. intent to appeal. Even in a case, such as the one at bar,
where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his
Rule 119, Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence.-- After the appeal, the court is required to inquire into the reason for the
prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the
case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) ont withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case, the court must
its own intitiative after givint the prosecution an assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the
opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists and
filed with proper leave of court. perhaps, with greater reason. After all, "those who have less
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the in life must have more in law." Justice should never be
accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the limited to those who have the means. It is for everyone,
accused files such motion to dismiss without express whether rich or poor. Its scales should always be balanced
leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor
and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the one party over another.
evidence for the prosecution. (Rules of Court.) It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks
of court of trial courts to be more circumspect with the duty
3. Right to free legal assistance imposed on them by law (Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court) so that courts will be above reproach and that
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and never (if possible) will an innocent person be sentenced for
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall a crime he has not committed nor the guilty allowed to go
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. scot-free.
In this spirit, the Court ordered the appointment of a
counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant and for said
People v. Rio, 201 SCRA 702 (1991) counsel and the Solicitor General to file their respective
briefs, upon submission of which the case would be deemed
F: On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant submitted for decision.
Ricardo Rio, in two (2) letters dated 14 December 1989,
addressed to Division Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and From the records of the case, it is established that
to Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita M. Dris, manifested the accused- appellant was charged with the crime of rape in
his intention to withdraw the appeal due to his poverty. a verified complaint filed by complainant Wilma Phua Rio,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
duly subscribed before 3rd Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. theory on appeal. If the counsel de oficio had been more
Alejandro of the province of Rizal, which reads as follows: conscientious, he would have known that the sudden shift
That on or about the 24th day of March, 1984, in would be violative of aforementioned procedural rule and
the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Philippines, detrimental to the cause of the accused-appellant (his client).
a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the The Court hereby admonishes members of the Bar to
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation be more conscious of their duties as advocates of their
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have clients' causes, whether acting de parte or de oficio, for
carnal knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua against "public interest requires that an attorney exert his best
her will. efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his
On 26 June 1985, at the arraignment, the accused- client's cause." Lawyers are an indispensable part of the
appellant, assisted by Atty. Leonido Manalo of the Makati whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction.
CLAO office, as counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not And a lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and
guilty to the offense charged. candor not only protects the interests of his client; he also
xxx serves the ends of justice, does honor to the Bar and helps
The trial court found the accused-appellant guilty maintain the respect of the community to the legal
of the crime of rape. profession. This is so because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the
The theory of the defense at the trial level was client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.
grounded on alibi. The accused claimed that at the time of While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the
the alleged commission of the crime of rape he was in laws, he is expected to take such reasonable precaution in
Romblon. This claim was corroborated by the accused's the discharge of his duty to his client and for his
brother, Amado Rio. However, this claim was, as professional guidance as will not make him, who is sworn to
aforestated, rebutted by the prosecution's submission of the uphold the law, a transgressor of its precepts.
voter's affidavit executed by the accused in Muntinlupa, The fact that he merely volunteered his services or
Metro Manila on 31 March 1984 when appellant claimed he the circumstance that he was a counsel de oficio neither
was in Romblon. diminishes nor alters the degree of professional
responsibility owed to his client. The ethics of the profession
HELD: On appeal, appellant's counsel de oficio changed require that counsel display warm zeal and great dedication
the theory of the defense. The new theory presented by to duty irrespective of the client's capacity to pay him his
counsel de oficio is that Wilma Phua consented when fees. Any attempted presentation of a case without adequate
accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her on 24 preparation distracts the administration of justice and
March 1984. It was stressed by counsel de oficio that the discredits the Bar.
rape occurred on 24 March 1984 and that, allegedly, it was
the fourth time accused had abused complainant. This 4. Right to be informed of nature and cause of
allegation as well as the fact that complainant failed to lock accusation
the door to the bathroom could only have been due to the
fact that there was consent. The charge was filed, according The arraignment in criminal prosecution is precisely
to defense counsel de oficio, only because the complainant's intended to comply with the right of the accused to be
mother caught them. informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
This theory of the defense on appeal that there had him. As noted in Vera v. People, procedural due process
been consent from the complainant, fails to generate doubt requires that the accused must be informed why he is being
as to the accused's guilt, for it would be an incredulous prosecuted and what charge he must meet.
situation indeed to believe that one, so young and as yet
uninitiated to the ways of the world, would permit the Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977)
occurrence of an incestuous relationship with an uncle, a
brother of her very own mother. The Court notes the sudden No valid trial in absentia without arraignment
swift in the theory of the defense from one of total denial of
the incident in question, by way of alibi, to one of F: Petitioner was accused of slight physical injuries in
participation, that is, with the alleged consent of the the City Court of Cebu. After one postponement due to
complainant. This new version could only be attributed by petitioner's failure to appear, the case was reset. Again,
the Court to the fact that counsel on appeal is different from petitioner failed to appear, despite notice to his bondsman.
the counsel in the trial court. Although the Solicitor General The court then allowed the prosecution to present evidence
has suggested that this sudden shift be interpreted as an despite the fact that petitioner had not been arraigned. After
afterthought by the accused or a desperate effort to get the offended party had testified and presented documentary
himself acquitted, the Court deems it more likely that this evidence, the court found petitioner guilty. The CFI
shift was caused by counsel de oficio's preparation of the affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
appellant's brief without examining the entire records of the
case. If the appointed counsel for the accused, on appeal, HELD: Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of
had read the records and transcripts of the case thoroughly, discretion and his decision is void. Because petitioner was
he would not have changed the theory of the defense for not arraigned, he was not informed of the nature and cause
such a shift can never speak well of the credibility of the of accusation against him. Arraignment is an indispensable
defense. Moreover, the rule in civil procedure, which applies requirement in any criminal proceeding.
equally in criminal cases, is that a party may not shift his
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In Olaguer v. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144
(1987), the SC held that a civilian cannot be tried by a Waiver of the right to be present implies also waiver
military court (in connection with the Light a Fire of the right to present evidence. Thus, if the accused fails to
Movement) so long as the civil courts are open and attend trial (which presupposes arraignment), without any
operating, even during Martial Law. justifiable cause, the prosecution can proceed with the
presentation of the evidence, and thereupon, the court may
6. Right to confront witness consider the case submitted for decision. The court will
decide the case on the basis only of the prosecution's
The purpose of this right is to enable the accused to evidence. This does not violate the constitutional
test the credibility of the witness. The best means of presumption of innocence because it does not mean that the
confrontation is the process of cross-examination. judgment of the trial court will result in conviction.
7. Right to secure attendance of witnesses (and the So ruled the SC in People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163
production of evidence in his behalf) (1986), which further ruled that trial in absentia applies
even to capital cases.
There are various means available to the parties to
compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of
documents and things needed in the prosecution or defense People v. Salas 143 SCRA 163 (1986)
of a case in an adversarial manner: subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum: depositions and other modes of discovery; Trial in absentia applies even to capital cases
perpetuation of testimonies.
F: Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide
8. Trial in Absentia in the CFI Cebu but before he could be arraigned, the case
was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result
Although the right to be present is not explicit in the of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed,
provision, it is inferrable from the phrase "trial may proceed with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty.
notwithstanding the absence of the accused" Trial commenced but while it was in progress, the prisoner
took advantage of the first information filed and succeeded
This right to be present may, however, be waived by in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail
the accused. Rule 115, sec, 1(c), talks of 3 ways that the and ordering his release. The respondent Judge, learning of
waiver may take place: (a) express waiver pursuant to the the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered
stipulations set forth in his bail bond, unless his presence is Abong's re-arrest. But he was gone. Nonetheless, the
specifically ordered by the court for purposes of prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance
identification; (b) implied waiver when the accused with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in
without any justifiable cause is absent at the trial on a absentia. The respondent Judge denied the motion and
particular date of which he had notice; and (c) implied suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused.
waiver when the accused under custody who had been Hence, this petition.
notified of the date of trial escapes.
In cases in which there have been a waiver of the HELD: The doctrine laid down in People v. Avanceña has
right to be present, whether expressed or implied, the trial been modified by Art. IV, sec. 19 [now Art. III, sec. 14(2) of
may be held "in absentia". The requisites of a valid trial in the 1987 Constitution] which allows trial in absentia. The
absentia are: (i) the accused has been arraigned; (ii) he prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued
was duly notified of the hearing; and (iii) his failure to prosecution and possible eventual conviction provided only
attend the trial is unjustified. that (a) he has been arraigned; (b) he has been duly notified
of the trial; and (c) his failure to appear is unjustified. The
There can be no valid trial in absentia unless the right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except
accused has been arraigned, ruled the SC in Boria v. only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present
Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), a case involving a charge witnesses who will identify the accused. The defendant's
for slight physical injuries where the accused failed to escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the
appear and so the trial court allowed the prosecution to inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent
present its evidence even if the accused has not yet been hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial.
arraigned. Arraignment is crucial because it informs the VV.
accued of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Conviction without arraignment violates due process
and ousts the court of its jurisdiction. Trial in absentia was introduced only in the 1973
Constitution to remedy a situation in which criminal
Boria v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), supra. prosecution could not move because the accused has either
escaped or jumped bail.
HELD: The subsequent trial in absentia deprived petitioner
of his right to be heard by himself and counsel. The In People v. Prieto, 84 SCRA 198 (1978), the SC
indispensable requirement for trial in absentia is that it ruled that trial in absentia does not justify the accused to
should come after arraignment. VV. jump bail. Just because th Constitution allows trial in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial the use of the mental process. [Bermudez v. Castillo, 64
compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling Phil. 485 (1937).]
confessions from prisoners implicating them in the
commission of a crime. (Harris vs. Coats [1885], 75 Ga., Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937)
415.)
F: In connection with this administrative case, said
respondent filed, six letters which, for purposes of
The accused can be made to take off her garments identification, were marked as Exhibits 32, 34, 35, 36 and
and shoes and be photographed. (People v. Otadura, 96 Phil 37. He contends that said six letters are the complainant's,
244 (1950)). but the latter denied it while she was testifying as a witness
in rebuttal.
Respondent required complainant to copy the
A woman accused of adultery can be compelled to letters in her own handwriting in the presence of the
show her body for physical investigation to see if she is investigator. The complainant, refused invoking her right
pregnant (Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)). not to incriminate herself. The investigator, upholding the
Viewed against present standards, however, it is possible complainant, did not compel her to submit to the trial
that this method of determining pregnancy would violate required, thereby denying the respondent's petition.
due process as being too barbaric.
Issue: Whether or not the complainant may be forced to
Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920) make a copy of the letters in her own handwriting
F: The facts are not dispute. In a criminal case pending Ruling: No. It would violate her right against self-
before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, incrimination.
Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with The constitution provides: "No person shall be
the crime of adultery. The court ordered the defendant compelled to be a witness against himself." It should be
Emeteria Villaflor, to submit her body to the examination of noted that before it was attempted to require the complainant
one or two competent doctors to determine if she was to copy the six documents above-stated, she had sworn to
pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on tell the truth before the investigator authorized to receive
the ground that such examination of her person was a statements under oath, and under said oath she asserted that
violation of the constitutional provision relating to self- the documents in question had not been written by her. Were
incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of she compelled to write and were it proven by means of what
court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison she might write later that said documents had really been
until she should permit the medical examination required by written by her, it would be impossible for her to evade
the court. prosecution for perjury.
The reason for the privilege appears evident. The
Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her purpose thereof is positively to avoid and prohibit thereby
body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman
pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other
Rights case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his
conviction. If such is its purpose, then the evidence must be
Ruling: The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be sought elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence in
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against the person himself, then he must be promised and assured at
himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally,
testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the or he should be asked, one for all, to furnish such evidence
proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the voluntarily without any condition. This court is of the
accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture of force opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under
shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a
rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad
decided as cases arise. interpretation favorable to the person invoking it.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination In view of the foregoing consideration and holding,
by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be as it is hereby held, that the complainant is perfectly entitled
taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any to the privilege invoked by her, the respondent's petition is
more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to denied.
the physical examination being made by the family doctor of
the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen. Also requiring the accused to reenact the crime is
not allowed, for this also involves the mental process.
The taking of footprint sample to see if it matches
the ones found in the scene of the crime is allowed (People
v. Salas and People v. Sara). People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 525
However, making the accused take dictation to get a F: Villarojo, Cademas and Sorela were convicted in the
specimen of her handwriting is not allowed, for this involves lower court of murder for the death of Bagon. Olvis, the
alleged principal by inducement, was acquitted. The three
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
accused were convicted on the basis of the extrajudicial thereof, no force or intimidation had been exercised upon
confessions executed by them in the presence of a counsel the spouses.
summoned by the NBI to handle appellants' case, and the Notwithstanding such, the accused were convicted of
reenactment done by them of the circumstances surrounding the crime charged against them.
the killing.
2. In what proceedings available
RULING: The extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible.
They were made in the presence of a counsel summoned by The privilege is available in any proceedings, even
the NBI and not of appellants' own choice. He cannot outside the court, for they may eventually lead to a criminal
therefore be said to have been acting on behalf of the prosecution.
accused when he lent his presence at the confession
proceedings. In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA
But the accused were denied their right to counsel 344 (1969), the SC held that the privilege against self-
not once but twice when they were forced to re-enact the incrimination extends to administrative proceedings which
crime. Forced re-enactments like uncounselled and coerced possess a criminal or penal aspect. In this case, it was held
confessions come within the ban against self-incrimination. that a doctor who was being investigated by a medical board
This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection for alleged malpractice and would lose his license if found
against testimonial compulsion but this has since been guilty, could not be compelled to take the witness stand
extended to any evidence communicative in nature acquired without his consent.
under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is
meant to avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344
recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling (1969)
a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the
missing evidence necessary for his conviction. F: Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on
February 1, 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila
People v. Go, 237 SCRA 73 an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now
F: After a buy-bust operation accused were arrested by respondent-appellant. It was alleged therein that at the initial
the police. Upon the presentation of a search warrant, the hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality,
house of the accused was searched, and several prohibited counsel for complainants announced that he would present
drugs were seized. They were charged with and convicted as his first witness herein petitioner- appellee, who was the
of violation of the Dangerous Drugs law. They contended respondent in such malpractice charge. Thereupon,
that they had not been shown a search warrant. In petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of record his
concluding that a search warrant had been presented to the objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt
accused prior to the search, the trial court relied on a from being a witness against himself. Respondent-appellant,
document entitiled “Certificate of Re-conduct of Search”, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the
signed by the accused. same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on
February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon
ISSUE: Whether or not such document is admissible in to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could
evidence. secure a restraining order from a competent authority.
A decision was rendered by the lower court on
RULING: IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED IN ITS August 2, 1965, finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to
ENTIRETY. be well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board "from
The second paragraph of the Certification amounts to compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for
an implied admission that shabu, the marked money, and the complainant in said investigation without his consent
shabu papaphernalia had been found by the police and against himself."
authorities at the residence of the Go spouses and therefore,
subject to the control and custody of the accused (the HELD: Petitioner could suffer the revocation of his license
spouses) and necessarily in their possession. To this extent, as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater
the “Certification” is a declaration against the interest and deprivation.
tacit admission of the crime charged. The second paragraph Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The
of the Certification is a self-incriminatory statment made at constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an
a time when the spouses were not assisted by counsel and accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go
under circumstances (in the course of or immediately after unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such
the search of the residence and seizure of quantities of desirable objectives should not be accomplished according
shabu) which render intelligent waiver of their right against to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect
self-incrimination open to serious doubt. accorded the human personality. More and more in line with
The Court considers that there is nothing to prevent the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual
admission of the “Certification” to substantiate the fact that even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given
a search warrant issued by a judge had been brought to the due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the
attention of the spouses in the course of the raid or buy-bust constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the
operation carried out at their residence and that in the course respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him against himself. And so he took the witness stand and was
as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to convicted by qualified theft. He appealed but the lawyer
prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to failed to file the appellant's brief and so the appeal was
forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take dismissed, the judgment became final and executory, and he
the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his served his sentence. Years later, Chavez went to the SC on
own free, genuine will. habeas corpus, contending that his convictioin was void
Compulsion as it is understood here does not because it was rendered on the basis of evidence obtained in
necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the the violation of his right against self- incrimination. The SC
product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates granted the petition and released him.
to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and Habeas Corpus, as shown by this case, is an
rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment extraordinary post-conviction, mid-sentence, remedy. The
would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion petition for habeas corpus is such that it inquires into all
"tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the questions of illegal detention. When the judge compelled
defendant." the accused to take the witness stand, he was ousted of his
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of jurisdiction and all subsequent proceedings became void.
protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary Ultimately, the judgment of conviction and even the
witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and sentence were likewise void, thus making the detention of
claim the privilege as each question requiring an Chavez illegal, and thus actionable by habeas corpus.
incriminating answer is shot at him, and accused may The case also illustrates the difference between the
altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to ordinary witness and the accused. A witness can be
answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the purpose of conmpelled to take the stand; he can only object to the
calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to questions as they come, invoking his right against self-
incriminate him. incrimination.
But in the case of the accused, he cannot even be
xxx With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying made to take the witness stand, for the only purpose of such
that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in is to incriminate him.
full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It Of course, the moment the accused agrees to take the
cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not stand, he is deemed to have waived his right, and must now
volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did thus submit himself to cross-examination.
not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed
the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner E. Right to an impartial tribunal and trial of civilians by
nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of military courts
being accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this
circumstance cannot be counted against him. His testimony Animas v. Minister of National Defense, 146 SCRA 406
is not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled (1986)
submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings
before a judge who possessed the power to put him under F: This petition challenges the jurisdiction of a
contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he military tribunal to try twelve accused persons, only one of
escape testifying. The court made it abundantly clear that his whom is in the military, for the offense devoid of any
testimony at least on direct examination would be taken national security or political complexion and committed
right then and thereon the first day of the trial. long before the proclamation of martial law,
The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas The petitioners were charged with murder in
corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally connection with the alleged killing of Yanson, a political
considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person leader,during the November 11 elections.
whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the The accused were arrested almost a year later, on
accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect September 21, 1972 after martial law was proclaimed. It was
results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore only in 1974 that a "summary preliminary investigation"
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the was conducted by a PC captain belonging to the Judge
accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void Advocate General Service. The petitioners were
judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral recommended for prosecution before the Military Tribunal,
attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. considering that one of them, petitioner Sgt. Rodolfo
Habeas corpus is proper to challenge a conviction where the Animas is a military personnel. Thereafter, the Judge
consitutional rights of the accused were violated. Advocate General filed the corresponding charge sheet, but
A court which denies the accused of his he modified the crime charged from "Murder" to "Violation
constitutional rights is ousted of its jurisdiction. The of Section 878 of the Revised Administrative Code" in
judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without Relation to Section 2692 of the same Code and Presidential
jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may Decree No. 9, " Illegal Possession of Firearms with
obtain release of habeas corpus. Murder."
On February 16, 1978, the Minister of National
Notes on the case: In this case, the accused Chavez Defense referred the case to the Military Tribunal's Branch
was compelled by the judge with the threat of being held in of the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) which in
contempt to take the witness stand, in spite of his objection turn assigned the same to respondent Military Commission
that he had the right to remain silent and not to be a witness No. 27.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
imposed on certain persons regardless of their property or ISSUE: W/N it is an ex post facto law.
business. The prohibition does not apply to non-payment of
property taxes and taxes on privilege. HELD: NO
An ex post facto law is one which:
1. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of
Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986) the law which was innocent when done, and punishes such
an act;
F: BP 22 punishes any person "who makes or 2. Aggravates a crime , or makes it greater than it
draws and issues any check on account or for value, was, when committed;
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have 3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
the payment of said check in full upon presentment, committed;
which check is subsequently dishonored by the 4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds xxx" conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of BP 22 required at the time of the commission of the offense;
on the following grounds: 1) It offends the 5. Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
constitutional provision prohibiting imprisonment for only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
debt; 2) it impairs freedom of contract; 3) it something which when done was lawful; and
contravenes the equal protection clause; 4) it unduly 6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some
delegates legislative and executive powers; and 5) its lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as
enactment is flawed because the Interim Batasan the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
prohibited amendment of the bill on 3rd reading. proclamation of amnesty. [Quoting Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil.
74 (1902)]
HELD: The gravamen of the offense punished in BP This constitutional prohibition refers only to
22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check criminal laws which are given retroactive effect.
or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of
payment. It is not the non- payment of an obligation any provisin of RA 6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the
which the law punishes. The law punishes the act penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the
not as an offense against property but as an offense approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto.
against public order. Recent statistics show that one There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that its
third of the entire money supply of the country provisions shall apply to acts carried out prior to its
consists of currency in circulation. These demand approval.
deposits in the banks constitute the funds against
which commercial papers are drawn. The amount B. What punishments cannot be imposed
concerned justifies the legitimate concern of the state
in preserving the integrity of the banking system. 1. Involuntary servitude
3. Acts which when done were innocent Art. III, Sec. 18 (2) No involuntary sevitudes in
any form shall exist, except as a punishment for a crime
Art. III, Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of whereof the party shall have been convicted.
attainder shall be enacted.
Ex Post Facto Law 2. Excessive fines
An "ex post facto law" is a law that seeks to punish an Art. III, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be
act which, when committed, was not yet a crime or was not imposed. nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
as heavily punished. It is a law that retroacts to the day of inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed,
the act so as to cause prejudice to the person performing the unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
act. Its unfairness consists in the fact that the person could the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
not have known the act was criminal, and thus could not penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
have avoided the crime. When a law is more favorable to perpetua.
the accused, however, it is allowed to retroact.
In re Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 428 3. Cruel, degrading and inhuman punishments
F: This petition for declaratory was filed by Kay Art. III, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be
Villegas Kami Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized non- imposed. nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed,
the land, and praying for the detremination of the validity of unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
Sec. 8, RA 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's right s and the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
duties thereunder. Petitioner claims that the challenged penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
provision constitutes an ex post facto law. perpetua.
Id., Sec. 12. xxx
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free reduced to reclusion perpetua."
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of HELD: Art. III, section 19 does not change the periods of
detention are prohibited. the penalty prescribed by Art. 248 of the RPC except insofar
as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty adn
reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of medium and
Assuming that judgment has been rendered and the minimum penalties remain the same. VV.
accused has been convicted the Constitution now further
prescribes certain standards as to the punishment that can be
meted out. After all, due process prohibits barbaric and People v. Lubreo, 200 SCRA 11 (1991)
disproportionate penalties.
F: A complaint for homicide was filed with MTC of
The employment of physical, psychological or Del Carmen, Surigao del Norte, charging Remelito Lubreo
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee, or along with crime of Homicide in connection with the killing
the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under of Mamerto Sanico. Judge Gorgolon of said court
subhuman conditions, shall be dealt with by law. [Art. III, conducted both the preliminary investigation and
Sec. 19 (2).] preliminary examination. Thereafter, he forwarded the
records of the case to the Office of Provincial Fiscal. The
In 1935, the prohibition was against "cruel and fiscal conducted his own PI and on the basis thereof, he filed
unusual" penalty, in 1973; it was against "cruel or unusual " an information for murder not only against remelito but also
penalty; in 1987, the prohibition is against "cruel, degrading against Lucresio Lubreo. Trial Court find them guilty of the
or inhuman" punishment. The purpose in changing the crime charged.
phraseology is to allow for experimentation, and not to fix
the concept of what is cruel to the standards of the present ISSUE: W/N the constituional presumption of innocence in
civilization, or those of antiquity. This notion is supposed to favor of Lucrecio has been overturned by the prosecution
expand and grow, so that what today is considered as
acceptable may in the next generation be deemed as cruel HELD: NO.
penalty. An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved. The burden of proof is upon the prosecution and
Whether the cruelty of a punishment depends on its until such burden is sufficiently discharged , the accused
form or whether it depends on its severity has been continues to enjoy the presumption of innocence. In the
ambivalently answered by the SC: instant case, the lower court convicted Lucrecio on the basis
of its conclusion that he was positively identified by
In People v. dela Cruz, 92 Phil. 900 (1953) the SC witnesses Nenita Monter and Epifanio Pangatungan as one
ruled that it was the form of punishment as fixed in antiquity of the assailants, and that therefore, his defense of alibi
(pillory desembowelment, etc.) and not its severity, that would not prosper. Unfortunately, the testimonies of the
constituted "cruel and unusual" penalty under the 1935 abovementioned witnesses did not categorically stated or
Constitution. Thus a disproportionate penalty (10 years proved that Lucrecio took part in hacking the victim.
imprisonment for theft) is not cruel or unusual because it is Though Monter categorically stated in her direct
only a matter of severity of an acceptable form of examination that she saw the accused Lucresio hacking the
punishment (imprisonment). victim, in the "re-enactmment", she however candidly
informed the court Lucresio was just standing by and she
The SC spoke in a different way in People v. Borja could not remmenber as to who actually hacked the victim.
91 SCRA 340 (1979), Borja was sentenced and he served at From her version, the participation of Lucrecio is at one
the national penitentiary for 20 years before the case came enveloped inserious doubt. It is worse in the case of
to the SC. The Court said that Borja had been living in the Pangatungan. While he stated that "Lucrecio abetted in
shadow of death. Although the sentence was initially valid, hacking as if they will come one after the other in hacking
it had become cruel by the lapse of time. And yet, this was his mind (sic) and the neck", he never elaborated as to what
a form of penalty that was neither cruel nor unusual. "abetted in hacking " means. He could not even specify the
part of the body of Mamerto which was hit by Lucrecio.
There is evidently insufficient evidence to show the
People v. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107 (1989) actual participation of Lucresio in teh crime. There being no
evidence of conspiracy, he cannot be held for the acts of his
F: The accused are four of the 11 bodyguards of a co- appellant.
mayor who killed three persons on suspicion that they were
cattle rustlers. They were found guilty of murder. Three 4. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado and
appealed to the SC which found them equally liable for the other forms of detention and the use of substandard or
killing. The penalty for murder under the RPC is reclusion inadequate penal facilities
temporal to death. The question concerns the penalty to be
imposed in view of Art. III, sec. 19 which provides that
"Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless for Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, This overrules People v. Yorac, where the SC
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free disallowed the amendment of the information from slight
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, physical injuries to frustrated murder after the prosecution
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of subjected the victim to another medical examination and
detention are prohibited. found a wound, that it was the fault of the prosecution if
they had an incompetent medical examination.
Id., Sec. 19. xxx
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or (3) The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee without the consent of the fiscal and the offended party.
or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities
under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. Identity of offenses and identity of act
5. Indefinite Imprisonments When an act gives rise to two or more offense which
are punished by the same authority, and an individual is
People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989), supra. convicted, acquitted, or the case dismissed without his
consent, of one of these offense (Crime A), there is no
C. The protection against double jeopardy double jeopardy if he is charged of another offfense (Crime
B) flowing from the same act. Double jeopardy arises only
Art. III, Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in when he is again charged of that same offense (Crime A).
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is Thus, this is called double jeopardy by "identity of
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or offenses".
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act. But when an act which give rise to two or more
offenses is punished by two different authorities (a law and
an ordinance), then if an individual is convicted, acquitted,
Elements of double jeopardy, (Rule 117, Sec 7; People v. or the case dismissed without his consent, of any of these
Obsania, 23 SCRA 249 (1968): offenses punished by one authority (Crime A by law), even
if he is charged of another offense which is punished by the
(1) Court of competent jurisdiction; other auhtority (Crime B by ordinance), there is double
(2) A Complaint or Information sufficient in form jeopardy, because both offenses, one punished by a law and
and substance to sustain a conviction; the other punished by an ordinance, flowed from the same
(3) Arraignment and plea by the Accused; act. Thus, this is called double jeopardy by "identity of act."
(4) Conviction, acquittal, or dismissal of the case
without the express consent, of the accused. Sum: If only a law in involved, there is double
jeopardy only when there is an identity of offenses. But is a
Subsequent prosecution is barred for the following: law and an ordinance are involved, there is double jeopardy
when there is an identity of act.
(1) Same offense
(2) Attempt of the same offense Identity of Offenses:
(3) Frustration of the same offense
(4) Offense necessarily included in the 1st offense If a married man maintains as concubine a married
(All the elements of the 2nd constitute some of the woman not his wife, the man is guilty of both concubinage
elements of the 1st offense) and adultery. From the same act (cohabiting with the
(5) Offense that necessarily includes the 1st offense married woman), two offenses arise. And yet he can be
(All the elements of the 1st constitute some of the prosecuted for both because, the two offenses coming from
elements of the 2nd offense) the same authority, there is no identity of offenses.
Exceptions to no. 5: Identity of Act:
(1) The graver offense developed die to People v. Relova, 48 SCRA 292 (1987), Relova was
"supervening facts" arising from the same act or omission prosecuted under an ordinance of Batangas City for the use
constituting the former charged. of wiring to tap electricity without permission from the local
authorities, but the case was dismissed because the crime
Thus, in Melo v. People, 85 Phils. 766 (1950), the has prescribed. So the fiscal filed a case for theft of
SC allowed the amnedment of the information from its electricity under the RPC. The SC ruled there was double
original cahrge of frustrated homicide, because after the jeopardy already, and so the second case could no longer be
filing of the information, the victim died. filed. For although the offenses were different, both flowed
from the same act. And in this case, the act was punished by
(2) The facts constituting the graver charge became a law and an ordinance.
known or were discovered only after the filing of the former
complaint or information. Loss of Jurisdiction: No double jeopardy
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
If the court has no jurisdiction, or was ousted of its charges. The other accused, Pangilinan, was not arraigned
jurisdiction beccause it violated the right to due process of as he is still at large. Gonzales filed a motion to quash the
the parties, the decision is null and void, the accused may informations in the 2 cases on the ground that said
again be charged. informations did not charge an offense. Motion denied.
Later, he again moved to quash the information in one of the
In People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166 (1985), the SC, Criminal case on the ground of duble jeopardy, as there was
held that the move by the trial court of summarily according to him, also pending aginst him another criminal
dismissing a criminal case for theft on the ground that it case, where the informatin allegedly contain the same
merely involved a question of ownership deprived the allegations as the information in the first criminal case.
prosecution of due process by denying it the chance to Court granted the motion.
introduce its evidence. This ousted the court of its
juridsiction. ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy.
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986), HELD: NO
the SC declared the criminal prosecution of the 26 accused It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double
in the Aquino-Galman double murder case a "mistrial" after jeopardy, 3 requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy
the SC commission found that the Sandiganbayan justices must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy
and the Tanodbayan prosecutors had been summoned by the must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
President and instructed on how to conduct the trial. Due jeopardy must be for teh same offense, or the second offense
process is a right not only of the accused but also of the includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
State. Once the court deprives either party, which in this the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or
case is the State, of a fighting chance, then it is ousted from a frustration thereof. All these requisites do not exist in this
its jurisdiction, and double jeopardy would not apply. Thus, case,
the accused were ordered retried. The 2 informations with which the accused was
charged , do not make only one offense, contrary to private
1. Two situations contemplated repondent's allegation. In other words, the offense defined
in Sec. 7 of the RA 3060 punishing the exhibition of
People v. Relova 148 SCRA 292 (1987) motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for
Motion Pictures does not include or is not included inthe
F: Manuel Opulencia was charged wiht violation of offense defined in Art 201 (3) of the RPC punishing the
Ordinance No. 1 series of 1974 of Batangas City prohibiting exhibition of indecent and immoral motin pictures.
the installation of electric wiring devices without authority The elements of the 2 offenses are different. The
from the city government. He admitted installing the electric gravamen of the offense defined in RA 3060 is the public
wiring devices found by the police in order to decrease the exhibition of any motion pictures which has not been
readings of electric current. The case was however previously passed by the Board of Censors for Motion
dismissed on the ground that the offense had prescribed. Pictures. The motion picture may be indecent or immoral
Fourteen days later, the City Fiscal filed another case for but if it has not been previously approved by the Board, its
theft against him. The court also dismissed this case on the public showing constitutes a crimnal offense. On the other
ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution appealed hand, the offense punished in Art 201(3) of the RPC is the
contending the offense was different. public showing os indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts,
or shows, not just motion pictures.
HELD: The contention has no merit. The first sentence of The nature of both offenses also differs. The crime
Art. III, sec. 21 states the general rule: the constitutional punished in RA 3060 is malum prohibitum in wh criminal
protection against double jeopardy is not available where the intent need not ber proved because it is presumed, while the
second prosecution is for an offense that is different from offense punished in Art. 201(3) of the RPC is malum in se,
the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, which criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient.
although both may be based from the same facts. The Suzette.
second sentence provides an exception: that the protection
against double jeopardy is available although the prior
offense charged under an ordinance be different from the 2. Rules of Court provisions
offense charged subsequently under the national statute such
as the RPC provided that both offenses spring from the same Rule 117, Sec. 7. Former conviction of acquittal;
act or set of acts. VV. double jeopardy.-- When an accused has been convicted
or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
People v. City Court of Manila, Branch VI, 154 SCRA 175 court of compentent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
(1987) or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
F: Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto Pangilinan, accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
was accused of violating Sec.7, in relation to Sec. 11 RA acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall
3060 and Art. 201(3) of the RPC, in two separate be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged,
informations filed with the City Court of Manila. Upon or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
arraignment, accused Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
is necessarily included in the offense in the former Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily
complaint of information. include or to be necessarily included in another offense, for
However, the conviction of the accused shall not the purpose of detremining the existence of double jeopardy,
be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which when both offenses were in existence during the pendency
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense
complaint or information under any of the following was then inexistent, no jeopardy could attach therefor during
instances: the first prosecution, and consequently a subsequent charge
(a) the graver offense developed due to for the same cannot constitute a second jeopardy. Suzette.
supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
consituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge People v. City Court of Manila, Branch XI, 121 SCRA 637
became known or were discovered only after the filing of (1983)
the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was F: This is a petition to review the order of the City
made without the consent of the fiscal and of the Court of Manila Branch XI, dismissing the information for
offended party. homicide thru reckless imprudence filed against Gapay, in a
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy.
satisfied or serves in whole or in part the judgement, he Respondent court held that the accused having been
shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction previously tried and convicted of serious physical injuries
for the graver offense. thru reckless imprudence for the resulting death of the
victim would place the accused in double jeopardy.
Melo v. People, 85 P 776 (1950) ISSUE: W/N a person who has been prosecuted for serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted
F: Conrado Melo was charged in the CFI, Rizal with thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru
frustrated homicide , for having allegedly inflicted upon reckless imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of
Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several the same injuries.
serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring
medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and HELD: YES
incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for Well settled is the rule that one who has been
the same period of time. On Dec. 29, 1949, at 8 am, charged with an offense cannot be charged again with the
accused pleaded not guilty to the offense chargde. At 10:15 same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or
am of the same day, Obillo died from his wounds. An greater than the former. However as held in the MELO
amended information was filed charging accused with case, the rule of identity does not apply when the second
consummated homicide. Accused filed a motion to quash offense was not in existence at the time of teh first
the amended information alleging double jeopardy. Motion prosecution , for the reason that in such case there is no
denied. possibility for the accused during the first prosecution, to be
convicted for an offense that was inexistent.
ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy. The victim Diolito de la Cruz died on the day the
information was filed , and the accused was arraigned 2 days
HELD: NO after or on October 20, 1972 . When the information for
Double jeopardy means that when a person is homicide thru reckless imprudence was, therefore, filed on
charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by October 24, 1972, the accused was already in doubly
acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the jeopardy. Suzette.
consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged
with the same or identical offense. The phrase "the same
offense" has always been construed to mean not only that People v. Yorac, 42 SCRA 230 (1971)
the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one
alleged in the first information, but also that the two F: Accused Yorac was charged with slight physical
offenses are identical. There is identity between the two injuries before the City Court of Bacolod, the offended party
offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one being Lam
offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the Hock who, according to the medical cerificate issued by Dr.
other. Rogelio Zulueta, was confined since April 8 1968 up to the
This rule of identity however does not apply, present time for head injury in Occidental Negros
however, when the second offense was not in existence at Provincial Hspital. Accused pleaded guilty on April 16,
the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer 10 days for
in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during arresto menor. On April 18, 1968, the provincial fiscal filed
the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was an information charging the same defendant with frustrated
then inesistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with murder arising from the same act against the aforesaid
physical injuries and after conviction the accused dies, the victim Lam Hock for upon further diagnosis, the healing
charge for homicide against the same accused does not put period for the injuries caused to accused was found to be
him twice in jeopardy. longer. A motion to quash was filed by the accused on the
ground of double jeopardy.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
2. Protection and enforcement of constitutional rights HELD: As a consequence of the search and seizure, the
premises of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" were
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil printing and publication of said newspapers were
sanctionsfor violations of this section as well as discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
or similar practices, and their families. guaranteed under the fundamental law and constitutes a
virtual denial of petitioner's freedom to express themselves
3. Compensation to, and rehabilitation of, victims of in print. This state of being is patenly anathematic to a
tortures democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant
press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx of the citizenry.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil
sanctions for violations of this section as well as New York Times v. Sullivan, 380 US 51 (1964)
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture
or similar practices, and their families. 3. For individual protection
B. Prior Restraints
Thus any system of prior restraints of expression
IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION comes to the Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutionality, giving the government a heavy burden to
show justification for the imposition of such restraint. (New
Art. III, Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging York v. United States (1971); also in New York Times v.
the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or Pentagon and Bantam Books v. Publication of Pentagon
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and Papers).
petition the Government for redress of grievance.
Id., Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)
solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
xxx Subsequent Punishment
A. Philosophical Basis of Guarantees And even subsequent punishment is tempered by the
greater interest of promoting free public opinion. The most
Free Market Place of Ideas significant expression is the law on libel.
1. For the discovery of political truth We consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to debate on public issues
When men have realized that time has upset many being uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it may
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that sharp attacks on government and public officials. The
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in falsity of some of the factual statements and alleged
ideas-- that the best test of truth is the power of the thought defamations do not qualify the role. And just as factual
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and error afforded no warrant for repressing speech that would
the truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely otherwise be free, the same is true of injury to official
can be carried out. (Justice Holmes, Abrams v. United reputation. (New York Times v. Sullivan, 380 U.S. 51
States, 250 U.S. 616. (1919) (1964)
The theory behind freedom of expression is the The interest of society and good government
principle that ours is a democratic society, and so the only demands a full discussion of public affairs. Whether the law
way to rule ultimately is by, means of public opinion, which is wisely or badly enforced is a fit subject for proper
is possible only when everyone can speak their minds out comment. Public policy, welfare of society, and the orderly
and compete in the free market place of ideas. administration of government have demanded protection for
public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has
2. For self government been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege. [Justice Malcom, United States v. Bustos, 731
United States v. Bustos, 37 P 731 (1918) (1918).]
While, uncer the Revised Penal Code, any
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984), defamatory statement is presumed to be malicious (malice-
supra in-law), when the defense proves that the communication is
privileged, such a presumption of malice does not arise
because of the greater public interest involved.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
This test was meant to supplant the clear and present
If the communication is absolutely privileged (as in danger. They both emphasize the circumstances of the
parliamentary freedom of speech), the prosecution cannot speech, but this latter test consider the weighing of values.
even prove malice-in-fact.
Direct Incitement Test: The consitutional guarantees
If the communication is only qualifiedly privileged of free speech and press do not permit a State to forbid or
(Art. 354 enumerates the 2 instances: fair and true reporting proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation,
of an official proceeding; legal moral or social duty), the except where such advocacy or peech is directed to inciting
burden is shifted on the prosecution to prove malice-in-fact, or producing imminent lawless action, and is likely to incite
which the defense can overcome by proving the truth of the or produce such action. [Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
defamatory statement (which in the case of public officials 444 (1969), cited in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA 438
may or may not constitute a crime, so long as related to the (1985).]
conduct of his office) and good motive.
The test emphasizes the very words uttered: (a)
C. Content-Based Restrictions What words did he utter? (b) What is the likely result of
such utterance? It criticizes the clear and present danger test
1. Test of validity of content-based restrictions for being top dependent on the circumstances. Speaker may,
when tested show no incitement but you know the speaker is
The U.S. Supreme Court and, by haphazard inciting to sedition.
imitation, the Philippine Supreme Court, have evolved
certain tests to regulate the contents of speech. Balancing of Interest Test: The court must
undertake the delicate and difficult task of weighing the
Dangerous Tendency Test: When the legislative circumstances and appraising the substantiality of the
body has determined generally, in the exercise of its reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free
discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve such enjoyment of rights. [American Communication Ass'n v.
danger of a substantive evil that they may be punished, the Douds, 339 US 383 cited in Gonzales v. COMELEC, 27
question whether any specific utterance coming within the SCRA 835 (1969A)]
prohibited class is likely, in and itself, to bring the
substantive evils, is not open to consideration. In such The test applied when two legitimate values not
cases, the general provision of the statute may be involving national secuirty crimes compete. Involves an
constitutionally applied to the specific utterance if its natural appoint of the competing interest. (Gonzales v. Comelec)
and probable effect was to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body might prohibit. [Gitlow v. New In Aver v. Capulong and Enrile, for instance, it is a
York, 268 US 652 (1925).] question of balancing the freedom of expression of the
producer and the right to privacy of Enrile.
Example: Art. 142. Inciting to sedition. When the
legislature has decided that one who advocates a certain (not in VV's revised outline)
conduct is guilty of a crime, the court cannot intrude. As it Balancing of Factors Test: The truth is theat the
evolved, this test was supposed to apply when there is a clear-and-present danger test is over- simplified judgement
statute, in contrast to the clear and present danger rule which unless it takes into account also a number of other factors:
applies when the speech is not prohibited by statute. (1) the relative seriousness of the danger in comparison
with the value of the occasion for speech or political
Clear and Present Danger Test: The question in activity, (2) the availability of more moderate controls than
every case is whether the words used are used in such those the State has imposed, and perhaps (3) the specific
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear intent with which the speech is launched. (Freund, quoted
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive in Dennis v. United States in the concurring opinion of
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of Justice Frankfurter).
proximity and degree. [Schenck v. United States, 249 US
47 (1919).]
2. Applications of tests in various contexts
The emphasis of the test is the nature of the
circumstances under which it is uttered. The speech itself a. Freedom of expression and national security
may not be dangerous. As Holmes said: "Many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its Babst v. National Intelligence Board 132 SCRA 316
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men (1984)
fight." Or saying "Fire" in a crowded movie house.
F: Petitioners are journalists and columnists. On
Grave-but-improbable danger: Whether the gravity different dates in July 1980, they were summoned by
of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such an military authorities for interrogation regarding their work,
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even private
[Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494 (1951), quoting Judge lives. In addition, one of them was charged with libel by a
Learned Hand.] General who sought to recover P10 million in damages.
They brought an action for prohibition to stop the NIB from
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
questioning them and from filing libel suits on matters that indignities and took her necklace and bracelet and her son's
had been the subject of inquiry by the NIB. wristwatch plus HK$ 70. But the agents were exonerated so
petitioner filed criminal charges of robbery. Petitioner found
HELD: The petition has become moot and academic. Be prosecutors unsympathetic so he filed a civil action for
that as it may, it is not idle to note that, while ordinarily, an damages against the agents. Later, the Bulletin Today
invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions is published a news item based on petitioner's letter to ASAC.
not illegal or constitutionally objectionable, under certain This became the basis of an action for libel brought against
circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily petitioner and his clients. Petitioner moved to quash the case
assume a different appearance as when it comes from a but his motion was denied.
powerful group composed predominantly of ranking
military officers and the designate interrogation site is a HELD: From the viewpoint of procedural and substantive
military camp. law, the charge is defective. The letter constitutes privileged
communication. It was sent by petitioner in his capacity as
b. Freedom of expression and criticism of official conduct: lawyer in the discharge of his legal duty to his clients. He
The Test of "Actual Malice" could also invke his civic duty as a private individual to
expose anomalies in the public service. The complaint was
Read Revised Penal Code, Articles 353-354 and addressed to the official who had authority over them and
361-362 could impose proper disciplinary sanctions. As an index of
good faith, the letter was sent privately, directly to the
Freedom of expression and libel addressee without any funfare nor publicity. As for the news
report, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner, an
Freedom of speech versus right to reputation. Libel ordinary citizen without known ties to newspaper, could
is the most common form of subsequent punishment. have by himself caused the publication. It does not appear
Although one cannot be prevented from saying something either that the report was paid for like an advertisement. At
before he actually says it, one can be held liable for what any rate, the news item is a true and fair report of a judicial
one has said if it causes damage to the rights of others. proceeding, made in good faith and without comments or
remarks. VV.
Soliven v. Makasiar; Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393
(1988) Newsweek Inc. v. IAC 142 SCRA 171 (1986)
F: The President of the Philippines filed a complaint for F: Petitioner was sued for libel in connection with the
libel against the petitioners, who were the publisher and publication in the Feb. 23, 1981 issue of Newsweek of the
columnist of the Philippine Star, based on the following article "An Island of Fear." The plaintiffs, sugar planters of
statement in Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987 totle "The Bacolod, complained that the article portrayed them as
Nervous Officials of the Aquino Administration": "If you exploiters of sugar workers. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
recall, during the August 29 coup attempt, the President hid complaint on the ground that the article was not libelous
under her bed while the firing was going on - perhaps the since it did not single any particular individual. The trial
first Commander-in-Chief to do so." Beltran did not submit court denied the motion and petitioner filed a petition for
a counter affidavit and instead, moved to dismiss the certiorari in the IAC which was dismissed. Thus, this appeal
complaint. The fiscal denied his motion. Thus, this petition to the SC.
for certiorari.
HELD: Where the defamation is alleged to have been
HELD: xxx directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement
(3) As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every
that he could not be held liable for libel bec. of the individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so
privileged character of the publication, the Court reiterates that each individual in the class or group can prove that the
that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he
left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the can bring the action separately if need be. The disputed
evidence of the parties. As to petitioner Beltran's claim that portion which refers to plaintiff Sola never singled out Sola.
to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling The news report merely stated that the victim had been
effect" on the press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the
stage to rule on the point. VV. area by Sola, the mayor. Hence, the report referring as it
does to an official act is within the realm of privileged and is
Manuel v. Cruz-Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989) protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
press. VV.
Libel suits based on official criticisms should be dismissed
outright unless made in bad faith Notes: Since the Newsweek artciles "Island of fear
in the Visayas" did not specify any individual, it cannot be
F: Petitioner wrote the Chairman of the Anti- libelous. An article must be sufficiently, specific or at least
Smuggling Action Center denouncing abuses allegedly sweeping as to apply to all members of a group, in order to
committed by ASAC agents against petitioner's clients. be deemed libelous.
Petitioner said the agents subjected Ng Woo Hay to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 116 (1970) mother, agreed to allow petitioner to "exploit, use and
develope the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of
The pictures of a former mayor was inadvertently producing the pictures," in consideration of P20,000.
published and mistaken for another man who was a sanitary Petitioner paid P5,000 but as he failed to pay the balance
inspector and fooled the authorities about the Babuyan agreed upon, he was sued. Judgement was rendered against
Islands, claiming of murders there, so they could go and he him by the trial court, w/c was affirmed by the CA.
could be rescued. An erratum was published by the This Petitioner appealed to the SC contending that he was forced
Week magazine. The SC, quoting Quisumbing v. Lopez, to enter into the agreement only to avoid financial loss
however, found for plaintiff, but with reduced damages, caused by delay in the showing of the movie and the
since the error in in this case could have been checked relatives of Padilla did not have a property right in the life of
consideringing that this was a weekly magazine and not a M. Padilla since Padilla was a public figure.
daily.
HELD: Petitioner's averment is not well taken. Being a
Quisumbing v. Fernando, 96 Phil 510 (1955) public figure does not automatically destroy in toto a
person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's
Newspapers should be given leeway and tolerance to privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to
enable them to courageously and effectively perform their fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter
important role in our democracy. In the preparation of how a public figure he or she may be. In the case at bar,
stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race to while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present the
their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he
reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a included a little romance in the film bec. w/o it, it would be
point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in a drab story of torture and brutality.
the choice of words. Freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred
. position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. It is not,
however, w/o limitations. In the particular circumstances
Mercado v. CFI of Rizal 116 SCRA 93 (1982) presented and considering the obligations assumed by
petitioner under the agreement, the validity of such
F: Petitioner was accused of libel on the basis of a agreement will have to be upheld particular bec. the limits of
telegram which he sent to the Secretary of Public Works freedom of expression are reached when expression touches
requesting investigation of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of the upon matters of private concern. [In the agreement signed
Public Service Commission "as we have reason to believe by him, petitioner admitted that in the picture produced, he
that she has enriched herself thru corrupt practices xxx." He had "exploited the life story of Moises Padilla for pecuniary
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his gain, and other profit motives, and (had) encroached upon
communication was privileged, but his motion was denied. the privacy of Moises Padilla's immediate family, and (had)
He filed another motion which was also denied. Thus, this in fact included, in the PICTURE's case, persons portraying
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition in the SC. some of MOISES PADILLA's kin..."]
HELD: US v. Bustos is a landmark decision antedating by
forty years a similar decision of the US Supreme Court to Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong April 29, 1988
the effect that a libel prosecution must survive the test of
whether or not the offending publication is within the F: Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an action
guarantees of free speech and free press. However, Justice in the RTC of Makati to enjoin the petitioners from
Malcolm in US v. Bustos was careful to point out that producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution," a
qualified privilege and this is one instance may be "lost by documentary of the EDSA Revolution in 1986 on the
proof of malice." What casts doubt on the good faith of ground that it violated his right to privacy. Petitioners
petitioner is his conduct, vis-à-vis private respondent. The contended that the movie would not involve his private life
tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of not that of his family. But the trial court issued a writ of
conduct on its face would seem to indicate that a doubt preliminary injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from
could reasonably be entertained as the bona fides of making the movie making reference whatsoever to Ponce
petitioner. The prosecution should be given a chance to Enrile. This, this action for certiorari.
prove malice.
HELD: Freedom of speech and expression includes
c. Freedom of expression and the right to privacy freedom to produce motion pictures and to exhibit them.
What is involved is a prior restraint by the Judge upon the
Lagunzad v. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979) exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. Because
of the preferred character of speech and of expression, a
F: Lagunzad filmed the Moises Padilla story based on weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior
a book written by Rodriguez. xxx Nelly Amane who was a restraint. The Judge should have stayed his hand considering
half-sister of Padilla objected to the movie on the ground that the movie was yet uncompleted and therefore there was
that it contained a portrayal of Padilla's private and family no "clear and present danger." The subject matter of the
life, including scenes about his mother, Maria Soto vda. de movie does not relate to the private life of Ponce Enrile. The
Gonzales, and a certain "Auring" as Padilla's girl friend. intrusion is no more than necessary to keep the film a
Subsequently, Nelly Amante, together w/ her sister and truthful historical account. He is, after all, a public figure.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant among other things, a state or national flag, and (2) defined
case between freedom of speech and of expression and the desecration as the physical mistreatment of such objects in a
right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a way which the actor knows will seriously offend one or
requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly more persons likely to observe or discover the act. A state
truthful and historical in its presentation of facts. There must court of appeals affirmed. The Court of Criminal Appeals
be no showing of a reckless disregard of truth. of Texas reversed, holding that the desecration statute as
applied violated the defendant's right to freedom of speech
Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie on the 4-day under the Federal Constitution's First Amendment, because
revolution. Enrile, who had previously been asked for the the statute (1) was too broad for First Amendment purposes
use of his character in the movie and had refused the offer, as it related to breaches of the peace, and (2) was not
sued to enjoin the filming because he did not want any adequately supported by the state's purported interest in
mention of his and his family's name. The SC lifted the preserving a symbol of unity.
injunction issued by the lower court on the ground that it
amounted to prior restraint, which is no better if imposed by ISSUE: Whether the flag desecration statute is
the courts than if imposed by administrative bodies or by unconstitutional
ecclesiatical officials.
HELD: YES. Decision Affirmed.
In Ayer, the reference to Enrile is unavoidable Johnson's conviction was inconsistent with the First
because his name is part of history and this cannot be Amendment under the particular circumstances because (1)
changed or altered; thus his name can be used so long as Johnson's conduct was sufficiently imbued with elements of
only his public life is dwelled only. But in Lagunzad, communication to implicate the First Amendment, given
although Moises Padilla was also a public figure, the movie that this flag burning was the culmination of a political
dealth with both the public and private lives of Moises demonstration and that the state conceded that the
Padilla. protester's conduct was expressive; (2) the state's interest in
preventing breaches of the peace was not implicated on the
d. Freedom of expression and administration of justice record in this case, since (a) no disturbance of the peace
(contempt of court) actually occurred or threatened to occur because of the flag
burning, (b) it cannot be presumed that an audience which
In re Ramon Tulfo, AM NO. 90-4-1545-0, April 17. 1990 takes serious offense at a particular expression is necessarily
likely to disturb the peace, and (c) the flag burning does not
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 1 (1989) fall within the small class of "fighting words" that are likely
to provoke the average person to retaliation and thereby
Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil 152 (1957) cause a breach of the peace; and (3) the state's asserted
interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and
A contempt imposed by the court on the party who national unity does not justify the conviction, since (a) the
sent a letter to the Presidential Action Committee attempted restriction on expression is content-based, and
complaining about the delay in the disposition of the thus subject to the most exacting scrutiny, given that the flag
agrarian case, was lifted by the SC. It held that although desecration statute is aimed not at protecting the physical
such a letter should have been sent to the SC and not the integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but only against
PAC, it was nevertheless a valid exercise of speech which impairments that would cause serious offenses to others and
did not significantly destroy, the orderly administration of is aimed at protecting onlookers from being offended by the
justice. ideas expressed by the prohibited activity, and (b) although
the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging proper
People v. Alarcon, 60 Phil 265 (1939) treatment of the flag, it may not foster its own view of the
flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it and by
A person can be held liable for making comments on criminally punishing a person for burning the flag as a
a pending case (sub judice) which have the tendency to means of political protest.
impair or obstruct the orderly administration of justistice.
But if the case is not pending, such comment is a valid f. Movies Censorship
exercise of the freedom of expression.
While prior restraint is the general rule, censorship in
e. Symbolic Expression-- The Flag-burning case the movies is tolerated because by the nature of the medium,
it has a greater impact on the audience and produces instant
Flag burning when done to express dissent is protected reaction for the ideas it presents, unlike newspapers which
speech. are read by people separated by walls.
F: Respondent Johnson participated in a political
demonstration where he burned an American flag while Gonzales v. Katigbak, 137 SCRA 356 (1985)
protesters chanted. No one was physically injured or
threatened with injury, although several witnesses were F: Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa
seriously offended by the flag burning. Johnson was Patalim which the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and
convicted of desecration of a venerated object in violation of Televisions allowed on condition that certain deletions were
a Texas statute which (1) prohibited the desecration of, made and that it was shown on adults only. The petitioner
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
brought an action, claiming violation of their freedom of enjoy the rights to due process according to the standards set
expression. in Ang Tibay v. CIR.
HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a method for But radio deserves greater regulation than
the communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic newspapers because it could invade the privacy of everyone
impulse. The power of the Board is limited to the for no fee, and it is such that one is likely to listen to what is
classification of films. For freedom of expression is the rule being said.
and restrictions the exception. The power to impose prior
restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is
against its validity. Censorship is allowable only under the Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) V. Dans, 137 SCRA
clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive 647 (1985)
evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any
other legitimate public interest. The Board committed an F: The petitioners filed this action to compel
abuse of discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and respondent government officials to allow the reopening of
travail before the movie was classified as "For adults only" Radio Station DYRE after it had been closed for allegedly
without deletion. However there is not enough votes to having been used to incite the people to sedition. The
consider the abuse of discretion grave as it explained that petitioner contended that it was denied due process because
there were reasons for its action because of the scenes no hearing was held and no proof was submitted to establish
showing women erotically dancing naked and kissing and a factual basis for the closure. However, before the Court
caressing each other like lesbians. VV. could promulgate its decision the petitioner filed a motion to
withdraw its action on the ground that it had sold the radio
station to Manuel Pastrana and that the National
Notes: The movie involved in this case was "Kapit Telecommunications Commission had expressed its
sa Patalim" which the censors wanted to cut in some part willingness to grant the requisite license.
and to label "For Adults". The SC rules that movies are
within the constitutional protection of freedom of HELD: The case has been moot and academic. However,
expression, so that censorship is presumed to be valid as for the guidance of the inferior courts and administrative
constituting prior restraint. The only case whe the Board of bodies, the following guidelines must be observed: 1) The
Censors can order a deletion is when there is a clear and cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings
present danger of a substantive evil against national security as laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR should be followed before
or public morals or other public interest. In all other cases, a broadcast station may be closed; 2) All forms of
the Board can only classify. communication are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, the freedom of
But a different standard must be followed in television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in
television because of the pervasive and intrusive influence scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and print
of the medium on people who watch its programs without media. This limitation derives from the fact the broadcast
having to pay anything. media have a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Filipinos; 3) The government has a right to be protected
On the issue of obscenity, the SC held that sex along against broadcasts which incite listeners to violently
is not necessarily obscenity, the test being whether, using overthrow it; and 4) Broadcast stations deserve the special
contemporary community standards, the dominant appeal us protection given to all forms of media by the due process
to the prurient interest. (Miller v. California). Thus on this and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
score, it found abuse of discretion of the part of the Board
for subjecting the producer to difficulty and for entertaining h. Freedom of Information
a narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked the votes to rules
that the abuse was grave. Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall be
Tests of obscenity: recognized. Access to official records, and to documents
(1) Whether the average person, applying and papers pertaining to, official acts, transactions, or
contemporary community standards, would find that the decisions, as well as to government research data used as
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
(2) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined law.
by the applicable law.
(3) Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 (1976)
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. (Miller
v. California, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419.) Access of official records (the docket book) for any
lawful purpose (to look into the criminal cases for a report
g. Radio Broadcast on the peace and order situation of the municipality) is
guaranteed. But it is subject to reasonable conditions by the
In Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans, 137 SCRA 647, the custodian of the records.
SC held that radio broadcast also enjoys the protection of
the freedom of expression. If closed down, the owners
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
Garcia v. BOI, 177 SCRA 374 (1989) substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a
writing instrument to be stilled.
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by
D. Content-Neutral Restrictions the prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the
political party. The regulation strikes at the freedoom of an
O'brien test: A government regulation is individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may
of the government; if it furthers an important or substantial be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is have it placed on his private vehichle, the expression
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and
incidental restriction on alleged freedom of expression is no not of anybody else.
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Morever, The restriction is so broad that it
[US v. O'brien, 391 US 367 (1968), adopted in Adiong v. encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in
COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)] this case is a privately owned vehicle. In consequence of this
prohibition, another cardinal right guaranteed under the
1. Regulation of political campaign Constitution is violated which is that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due proocess of law.
National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1 (1992)
2. Freedom of Assembly
F: Petitioners herein were representatives of mass
media which were prevented from selling and donating Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Blg. 580)
space or air time for political advertisements under RA
6646. A permit to hold a rally must be filed with the Office
of the Mayor at least, five working days before the day of
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a violation of the rally.
the constitutional right to freedom of expression.
But no permit from the mayor is required in case the
RULING: NO. The Comelec has been expressly authorized rally is going to be held in (i) freedom parks, (ii) inside a
by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or private property (provide with consent of the owner), and
utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation f (iii) campuses of state universities (which are left to
media of communication and information. The fundamental university authorities)
purposes of such power are to ensure "equal opportunity,
time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform The application must be in writing and must include:
and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media (1) names of the organizers and leaders, (2) date and time,
facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns place and street, (3) size (4)manner of the use of the street,
and forums among candidates." (5) sound system to be used (6)purpose. It must also have a
Of course, the law limits the right of free speech and statement of the duties of the rallyists.
of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The
limitation however, bears a clear and reasonable connection The written application is filed with the Office of the
with the objective set out in the Constitution. For it is Mayor. Acknowledgemet is given of its receipt. If the
precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio Mayor refuses to accept the application, then it is enough for
and television time that the resources of the financially filing purposes if a copy is posted in the premises.
affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference.
The Mayor has 2 working days to act on the
Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992) application. If he does not act, it is deemed granted.
F: Petitoner, Adiong, a 1992 senatorial candidate, But if he thinks that the rally creates a "clear and
assails Comelec Resolution No. 2347 insofar as it prohibits present danger" to public peace, order, health, etc., and he
the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or has proof of this, he should not deny the application right
private, and limits their location or publication to authorized away. He should hold a hearing during which the applicant
posting areas. can be heard. If after hearing he is still not satisfied that no
danger exists, then he can deny the application.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is constitutional.
The applicant can then go to any court other than the
RULING: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on the Supreme Court for the review of the decision of denial of
citizen's fundamental right of free speech. There is no public the mayor. The courts have 24 hours to act on the petition.
interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction If the judgment is a reversal of the denial, or in any case if
involved in this case. The posting of decals amd stickers in the applicant is satisfied with the decision, the judgment
mobile places does not endanger any substantial government becomes final and executory immediately, and no appeal
or public interest. Under the clear and present danger rule, can be taken by the local authorities anymore.
not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly
present but the evil sought to be avoided, must be so
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
But if the decision is not satisfactory to the Manila to issue a permit for the holding of a peaceful public
applicant, then he has 48 hours from receipt to appeal to the meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the
SC. government for redress of grievances. The Mayor denied the
application on the ground that passions still run high due to
During the rally, the police must be limited to the recent election, and a rally to protest election anomalies
maintaining peace and order and so must stay away by 100 might threaten breaches of the peace and disruption of
meters from the rallyists. They must be in full uniform, with public order.
their names visibly written. They can carry no firearm
except a nighstick, but they are allowed protective devices. ISSUE: W/n the Mayor can refuse to grant the permit.
If they anticipate trouble, the police must call the RULING: NO. The police power granted to the Mayor
attention of the leader of the rallyists. When trouble actually under the Ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board
erupts, the police must not disperse the crowd right away but pursuant to its authority under the Revised Administrative
first give a warning. If violence persists, they must give a Code which pertains to the use of streets and public places,
second warning. If still violence continues, only then can can be construed only to mean the power to regulate, which
they fight back. means and includes the power to control, govern, and to
restrain but cannot be construed as synonymous with
If a rally does not have a permit, the police can "suppress" or "prohibit."
disperse the crowd, but they cannot use violence. Penalty is The Court quoted with approval the decision in the
imposed only on the leaders and organizers. American case Cox v. State of New Hampshire, " a statute
requiring persons using public streets for a parade or
Among the duties of the rallyists are: (a) to inform procession to procure a special license therefor from the
the members of their duty under the law, (b) to police their local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of
own rank, and (c) to cooperate with local authorities in the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press,
maintaining peace and order. where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the
licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of
licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of
Notes: The freedom to use public places to the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the
peaceably assemble is best expressed thus: "Wherever the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to
title or steets and parks may rest, they have immemorially provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of discretion to issue or refuse license..."
time have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thought betwee citizens, and discussing
public questions." (Justice Roberts. Hague v. CIO) But under the same ordinance, the SC, in Navarro v.
Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970), upheld the mayor's refusal
Although under a "permit system", before one can to grant permit to a group during weekdays, on a finding
use a public place, one must first obtain prior permit from that everytime there was an announced rally, stores closed
the proper authorities, the principle has always been that one and business was gravely affected because of violent
has the right to a permit, subject only to reasonable incidents. It found the policy of the mayor to allow rallies
regulation. The validity of the permit system has been only during weekends to be reasonable.
upheld by the Court, provided, (a) it is concered only with
the time, place and manner of assembly ad (b) it does not
vest on the licensing authority unfettered discretion in Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970)
choosing the groups which could use the public place and
discriminate others. F: The petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement for
a Democratic Philippines (MDP), an association of students,
As held by the SC in Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. workers and peasants, applied for a permit from the Mayor
71, the City Ordinance of Manila giving authority to the of Manila to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda. Respondent
Mayor to issue permits for parades should be construed to Mayor denied the application to hold the rally on the date
be limited to the time, place, and manner of the parades and time specified by petitioners in view of the events that
socially to secure public order, convenience and welfare. transpired during the last demonstration held by them which
Thus, denying the Nacionalista Party a permit to hold a rally ended in the destruction of public and private property, loss
at the Plaza Miranda on the ground that passions raised by of a few lives, injuries to a score of other persons and the
the recent national election were still high and a rally to closing down of schools, offices and many stores. The
protest election anomalies could only exacerbate the matter, Mayor suggested that the MDP utilize the Sunken Gardens
was overturned by the court. near Intramuros for its rally and that the rally be held during
weekends and earlier during the day so that it may end
before dark.
Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 Petitioner challenged the action of the Mayor on
the ground that the same constitutes a violation of their right
F: This is an action for mandamus instituted by to freedom of assembly. Petitioner contended that the right
petitioner Primicias, campaign manager of the Coalesced of the people to peaceful assembly and to petition the
Minority Parties, to compel Mayor Fugoso of the City of government for redress of grievances may be exercised
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
chapel by the Presidential Security Command. They brought full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into
an action for mandamus. account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of
speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. xxx" The
HELD: The yellow T-shirts worn by some of the marchers, refusal of the university to enroll the students is a highly
their fists clenched and chants of anti-government investives disproportionate penalty.
support the government's claim that the petitioners purpose Notes: Note that while the permit system is not
was not really to worship at the chapel but to hold an anti- allowed in the case of publication, it is allowed in the case
government demonstration close to the residence of the of assembly. In publication, censorship is presumptively
President. The restricted use of JP Laurel Street is justified. unconstitutional. There is very little possibility or
The need to secure the safety of heads of states cannot be justification for the regulation of news. The remedy in this
overemphasized. The threat to their lives is constant and felt case is prosecution or subsequent punishment.
throughout the world. The petitioners were not restrained in But in assembly regulation is allowed because it is
their freedom of religion but only in the manner by which needed by the very nature of the expression, when people
they had attempted to translate the same into action. use streets, they may deprive other groups which want to use
In Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984) the streets too. So as long as only the incidents of speech
and Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985), the SC upheld are regulated, the measure is constitutionally acceptable.
the right to expression of students who held a rally in a
private university. But since they held it beyond the time
granted in a place other than the one allowed by the Nestle Phils. Inc. v. Sanchez 154 SCRA 541 (1987)
administration, their suspension was condoned.
F: While these cases were pending in the SC, the labor
Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984) unions involved intensified the pickets they had been
conducting in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Court and
F: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student set up picket quarters, at times obstructing access to and
Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. egress from the Court's premises. When required to show
They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the cause why they should not be held in contempt of court,
merger of two units of the university. On the scheduled date, their lawyer apologized and assured that the above incident
the students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled would not be repeated.
time and held it in a different place from that indicated in
the permit. They expressed in a vehement language their HELD: The Court will not hesitate in future similar
opposition to the merger and as a result, classes and office situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for
work was disturbed. Petitioners were placed under contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into
preventive suspension. On appeal, they were found guilt of acting one way or the other in any case pending before it.
holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation. They were Grievances must be ventilated in the proper channels, i.e.
suspended for one academic year. They filed a petition for through appropriate petitions or pleadings in keeping with
certiorari in the SC. the respect due the courts as impartial administrators of
justice. Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to
HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and academic have the causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal,
considering that the TRO issued by the SC allowed the uninfluenced by publication or public clamor xxx" The acts
students to enroll. But there is a need to pass squarely on the of respondents are not only an affront to the dignity of this
constitutional question. Respect for the constitutional rights Court but equally a violation of the above-stated right of the
of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting adverse parties and the citizenry at large.
aside of the order of suspension. Suspending them for one
year is out of proportion considering that the vigorous 3. Freedom of Association and the right to strike in the
presentation of views was expected. The excitement of the public sector
occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate and the
exuberance of the youth should be taken into consideration. Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985) contrary to law shall not be abridged.
F: Petitioners were officers and members of the Student The inclusion of the right to unionize in this article is
Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. ill-advised because while the right to unionize is an
They were refused enrollment for having led a rally on Sept. economic and labor right, the right to association in general
28, 1982. is a civil- political right.
Discussed elsewhere is the argument why public
HELD: As held in Malabanan v. Ramento: "If in the course employees cannot engage in collective bargaining and
of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience strike.
goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times
even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable.
They would be ineffective if during the rally they speak in SSS Employees Assn vs CA, 175 SCRA 686 (1989)
the guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any
rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
F: SSS filed w/ the RTC-QC a complaint for damages w/ a Garcia v. Faculty of Admission, 68 SCRA 277 (1975)
prayer for a writ of prel inj. against petitioners SSSEA,
alleging that the officers and members of the latter staged an F: The FAC of the Loyola School of Theology refused
illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS to readmit petitioner, Garcia, in its M.A. program because
building preventing non-striking employees from reporting they felt that "her frequent questions and difficulties were
to work and SSS members from transacting business w/ not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the
SSS. The Public Sector Labor-Management Council progress of the class;" that it would be "to the best interest
ordered the strikers to return to work but the strikers refused (of the petitioner) to work with a faculty that is more
to do so. The SSSEA went on strike bec. SSS failed to act compatible with her orientation. Garcia assailled her
on the union's demands. expulsion for being unreasonable; that the reasons given
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint therefor were invalid for nowhere did it appear that her
for lack of jurisdiction, w/c motion was denied. The conduct constituted a violation of the school's regulations
restraining order w/c was previously issued was converted and grave misconduct.
into an injunction after finding the strike illegal. Petitioners
appealed the case to the CA. The latter held that since the ISSUE: Whether or not the FAC can be compelled by
employees of SSS are govt employees, they are not allowed mandamus to readmit petitioner.
to strike.
RULING: NO. The Constitution recognizes the enjoyment
HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not resort to by institutions of higher learning of the right to academic
strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like freedom. The school decides for itself its aims and
workers in the private sector, in order to pressure the Govt. objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from
to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a
Exercise of the Right of Govt. EEs to Self-Organization wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice
which took effect after the initial dispute arose, the terms of the students.
and conditions of employment in the Govt, including any The collective liberty of an organization is by no
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt. means the same thing as the freedom of the individual
owned and controlled corporations with original charters, members within it. In considering the problems of academic
are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike freedom, one must distinguish between autonomy of the
for the purpose of securing changes thereof. university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the
The statement of the court in Alliance of Govt individual university teacher.
Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment (124 SCRA The personal aspect of the freedom consists of the
1) is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing right of each university teacher to seek and express the truth
bet. workers in the private sector and govt employees w/ as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his
regard to the right to strike? capacity as a private citizen. This status of the individual
teacher is as important as the status of the institution to
Since the terms and conditions of govt. which he belongs and through which he disseminates
employment are fixed by law, govt. learning.
workers cannot use the same weapons On other hand, the internal conditions for academic
employed by workers in the private sector freedom in a university are that the academic staff should
to secure concessions from their have de facto control of the following functions: (a)
employers. The principle behind labor admission and examination of students; (b) curricula for
unionism in private industry is that courses of study; (c) appointment and tenure of office of
industrial peace cannot be secured through academic staff; and (d) allocation of income among the
compulsion of law. Relations bet. private different categories of expenditure. It is the business of a
employers and their employees rest on an university to proviide that atmosphere which is most
essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an
minimum requirements of wage laws and atmosphere in which the four essential freedoms of a
other labor and welfare legislation, the university prevail - to determine for itself who may teach,
terms and conditions of employment in the what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
unionized private sector are settled admitted to study.
through the process of collective For the above reason, mandamus is not available for
bargaining. In govt employment, the petitioner. There is no duty on the part of the School to
however, it is the legislature and, where admit her to study since the School clearly has the discretion
properly given delegated power, the to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of
administrative heads of govt w/c fix the space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and
terms and conditions of employment. And component considerations. There are standards to meet and
this is effected through statutes or policies to pursue. What a student possesses is a privilege
administrative circulars, rules, and rather than a right.
regulations, not through CBA's
UP v. Ayson, 176 SCRA 647 (1989)
E. Academic Freedom
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
F: In 1972, the UP BOR approved the establishment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
the UPCB Highshool to serve, among others, "as a or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
laboratory and demonstration school for prospective shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
teachers - provided that UPCBHS must be self-supporting." rights.
However, the Dept of Professional Education in Baguio was
never organized. So, the BOR decided to phase out A. Non-Establishment Clause
UPCBHS for failing to attain the conditions for its creation.
The UPCBHS Foundation Inc. sought to restrain the The clause prohibits excessive government
University from phasing out the UPCBHS. entanglement with, endorsement or disapproval of religion
[Vicoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
ISSUE: Is secondary public education demandable in an (1974); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984) (O'Connor,
institution of higher learning such as the UP? J., concurring); Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburg
ACLU, 492 US 574 (1989).]
RULING: NO. UP invokes its exercise of academic
freedom. Private respondent invokes the right to quality The clause prohibits the State from establishing a
education and to free secondary education. religion. In assessing the validity of the law, the questions
The rights invoked by private respondent may be to be asked are:
asserted only as against the Government through the DECS. a. Is the purpose of the law religious, or is it
UP was created under its charter to provide advanced secular?
tertiary education. An institute of higher learning cannot be b. Does it or does it not inhibit or advance religion?
compelled to provide for secondary education. c. Is its effect to promote or to avoid an excessive
It is beyond cavil that UP as an institution of higher entaglement between the State and religious matters in
learning enjoys academic freedom. UPCBHS was religion?
established subject to a number of conditionalities. Failing
on such conditions, UP can order its abolition on academic The Non-Establishment clause is violated when the
grounds. Charo. State gives any manifest support to any one religion, even if
nothing is done against the individual.
UP v. CA, Feb. 9, 1993 It is likewise violated if the State favors all religions,
for there may be atheists who are not so favored.
F: Former PANAMIN Minister Manuel Elizalde and
the Tasaday representative filed a complaint for damages 1. Operation of sectarian schools
and declaratory relief against UP Professors Jerome Bailen
and Zeus Salazar who disputed the authenticity of the While the ownership, creation and management of
Tasaday find and made a proposition in various conferences educational institutions must be in the hands of Filipinos or
attended by them that Elizalde merely fabricated the 60% Filipino-owned corporations, sectarian schools and
discovery of the Tasadays. those run by religious groups and missions board are
UP intervened, aaserting its duty to protect the exempted from these requirements, provided the
respondents as faculty members for acts and utterances administration is in the hands of Filipinos, who could be
made in the exercise of academic freedom. The lower court sectarian. [Art. XIV, Sec. 4(2).]
denied UP's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action. Hence this petition.
2. Religious instruction in public schools
RULING: With respect to the prayer of the complaint for
"judgment declaring the Tasadays to be a distinct ethnic
community, the lower court is cautioned that the same is Provided it is upon the written petition of the parents
akin to a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine and it is at no cost to the State (although this is not entirely
citizenship which may not be granted in a petition for possible, because the use of classrooms and electricity are
declaratory relief. The complaint was filed mainly to costs in the State), religious instruction in public elementary
vindicate plaintiff's dignity and honor. and secondary schools during class hours, by one approved
Indeed, it is beyond the province of the court to by the authorities of the religion of the child or ward is
make pronouncements on matters beyond its ken and allowed. [Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3).] Religion can even be
expertise. To be sure, in resolving the complaint for integrated in the school curriculum. [Civ. Code, 359 (1).]
damages, the court may find congruence in what is
justiciable and what falls within the field of the sciences. 3. Anti-evolution laws
Still, it is best to keep in mind that its proper role and
function is the determination of legal issues. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the SC
held that the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution
V. FREEDOM OF RELIGION cannot be prohibited from public shools by parents whose
religions finds the theory offensive.
Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion; or prohibiting the free 4. Prayer and Bible-reading in public schools
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967), the SC reference to religious training, teaching and observance, free
disallowed the conducting of an interdenominational prayer from any compulsion from the State.
before the start of classes in public schools as, violative of The test in determining whether a legislative
the Non- Establishment clause. enactment violates the Establishment clause which
withdraws all legislative power respecting religious belief or
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967) the expression thereof, is the PURPOSE and the PRIMARY
EFFECT of the enactment. If either is the advancement or
F: The respondent Board of Education upon the inhibition of religion, then the enactment exceeds the scope
recommendation of the State Board of Regents, directed the of legislative power as circumscribed by the First
School's District principal to cause the recitation in public Amendment. To withstand the strictures of the
schools of a brief, denominationally neutral prayer. Its establishment clause, there must be a secular legislative
observance on the part of the students was voluntary. purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion.
RULING: The Court ruled that the State of New York, by The place of the Bible as an instrument of religion
using its public school system to encourage the recitation of cannot be gainsaid. This is particularly so where the State's
the Regent's prayer has adopted a practice wholly recognition of the pervading religious character of the
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. The prayer was exercise is evident from the rule's specific permission of the
composed by govt officials as part of a governmental alternative use of the Catholic Douay version of the Bible as
program to further religious beliefs. The constitutional well as from a recent amendment permitting non-attendance
prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of at the exercises, none of those factors being consistent with
religion means at least that it is not part of the business of the contention that the Bible is used either as an instrument
the government to compose official prayers for any group to for non-religious moral inspiration or as a reference for the
recite as part of a religious program carried on by the govt. teaching of secular subjects.
The clauses of the 1st Amendment which prohibit
laws respecting an establishment of religion and abridging 5. Tax exemption
the free exercise thereof, although overlapping in certain
instances, forbids two diff kinds of governmental Art. VI, Sec. 28. xxx
encroachment upon religious freedom. The stablishment (3) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages
clause, unlike the free exercise clause, does not depend upon or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and improvements,
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
religion, whether or not those laws operate directly to coerce charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from
non-observing individuals. It rests on the belief that a union taxation.
of govt and religion tends to destroy govt and to degrade
religion, and upon an awareness of the historical fact that
governmentally established religion and religious The ruling in Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial
persecutions go hand in hand. Board, 51 Phil. 352 (1927) is modified to the extent now
that the property must be "actually, directly and exclusively"
In Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. used for religious purposes to be exempt.
203 (1963), it likewise disallowed the reading of a passage
from the bible without comment in public schools as If not for religious purposes, educational purposes.
contrary to the Non- Establishment clause.
Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, 51 Phil. 352
Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (1927)
The issue was whether the establishment clause was violated F: The plaintiff, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church,
by a Pennsylvania Statute or a rule of the Board of represented by the Bishop of Nueva Segovia, is the owner
Commissioners of Baltimore adopted pursuant to statutory and occupant of a parcel of land in San Nicolas, Ilocos
authority requiring the reading without comment, at the Norte. On the south siide is a part of the church yard, the
opening of each school day, of verses from the Bible and the convent and an adjacent lot used as vegetable garden. In the
recitation of the Lord's prayer by the students in unison. The center is the remainder of the churchyard and the church. On
students and parents may refuse to participate in the school the north side is an old cemetery and the base of what was
exercises. These exercises were prescribed as part of the once a tower. The Prov. Board imposed a tax on the whole
curricular activities of students who are required by law to land.
attend school and held in school buildings under the
supervision and participation of teachers employed in those ISSUE: Whether or not the taxation is legal.
schools.
RULING: NO. The exemption in the payment of the land
RULING: YES, the establishment clause was violated. tax mandated in the Constitution in favor of the religious
The establishment clause prohibits a state from entities refers to the home of the priest who presides over
placing official support behind the tenets of one or all the church and who has to take care of himself in order to
orthodoxies and the free exercise clause guarantees the right discharge his duties. It therefore must include not only the
of every person to freely choose his own course with
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
land actually occupied by the church but also the adjacent Eucharistic Crusade." What was emphasized was not the
ground destined for the ordinary incidental uses of man. event but Manila.
Except in large cities where the density of the It was obvious that while the stamps may be said to
population and the development of commerce require the be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character,
use of large tracts of land for buildings, a vegetable garden the resulting propaganda received by the Roman Catholic
belongs to a house and, in the case of a convent, its use is Church was merely incidental and was not the aim and
limited to the necessities of the priest. Therefore, which purpose of the government.
comes under the tax exemption.
As to the lot which was formerly the cemetery, while In Ignacio v. Ela, supra, the dissenting opinion of
it is no longer used as such, neither is it used for commercial Justice Concepcion pointed out that the mayor disapproved
purposes and, accdg to the evidence, is now being used as a the application for a permit not so much because he was
lodging house by the people who participate in religious afraid that breach of peace would ensue but because he
festivities. The same constitutes an incidental use in wrongly though the kiosk should be used for public
religious functions. It also comes within the exemption. purposes only and not for religious purposes. When the
Jehovah's Witness members use the public squares, they are
6. Public aid to religion no different from ordinary pedestrians or promenaders who
use the street: that they are performing religious acts is only
The payment or use of public money or property for incidental. So long as the use of public property is only
any religious institution or clergy is not allowed; except in incidentalally and temporarilly for religious purposes and so
those cases provided in the Constitution: priests assigned in long as the use is such as to be reasonably compatible with
the AFP, penal institution, government orphanage, or the use to which other members of the community are
leprosarium. [Art. VI, Sec. 29 (2)] similarly entitled, then the non-establishment clause is not
violated. The tests then are (1) Is the use of the public
But in Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937), the SC facility compatible with general use? (2) Is the resulting
held that the stamp printed by the government showing the benefit to the religious group only incidental.
map of the Philippines with a rosary to commemorate the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress to be held in Manila B. Free Exercise Clause
did not violate the Non-Establishment clause because its
main purpose, was to call the world's attention to Manila as 1. Flag Salute
the site of an international congress, and whatever benefit it
gave the Catholic Church was only incidental. Ebranilag v. Division Superindentent of Schools of Cebu,
219 SCRA 256 (1993)
Conscientious Objectors cannot be compelled to salute the
flag.
Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937)
F: All the ptetitioners in these cases were expelled
F: The petitioner, Mons. Aglipay, Head of the Phil. Ind. from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu
Church, sought to restrain respondent Director of Posts from for refusing to salute the flag, since the national anthem and
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 and by
33rd International Eucharistic Congress. The Director issued Dept. Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the DECS making
the stamps under the provisions of Act 4052 which the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
appropriates public funds for the cost of the plates and institutions.
printing of the stamps. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of
the stamps was done in violation of the Constitutional ISSUE: W/N school children who are members of a
provision that no public money or property shall be religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be
appropriated for the use, benefit or support of any sect or expelled from school (both private and public), for refusing,
religion. on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag
ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the
ISSUE: W/N petitioner's contention is tenable. Phil. National Anthem, saluting the Phil. flag and reciting
the patriotic pledge.
RULING: NO. Act 4052 contemplated no religious purpose
in view. What it gave the Director of Posts was the HELD: NO.
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of The idea that one may be compelled to salute the
special postage stamps would be advantageous to the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotice
government. pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed
The purpose in issuing the stamps was to advertise from one's job or of being expelled from school, is alien to
the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country. The the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut
officials concerned merely took advantage of an event their teeth on the Bill of Rights w/c guarantees their rights to
considered of international importance to give publicity to free speech and the free exercise of religious profession and
the country and its people. The stamp contained a map of worship.
the Philippines and the location of Manila, and an xxx
inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
xxx Forcing a small religious group, through the of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate
iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that of the appeal of our institutions to free minds.
violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to
love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. 2. Freedom to propagate religious doctrines
xxx
The sole justification for a prior restraint or American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 P 386 (1957)
limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a character both F: Plaintiff is engaged in the distribution and sale of
grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, moral, bibles and religious articles. The City Treasurer of Manila
health or any other legitimate public interest, that the state informed the plaintiff that it was conducting the business of
has a right and duty to prevent. Absent such a threat to general merchandise without securing the necessary license
public safety, the expulsion of the pets. from the schools is and paying the requisite fee in violation of the City
not justified. ordinance. Plaintiff protested against this requirement as
xxx constituting a restraint upon the exercise of religion. It
Although petitioners do not participate in the claimed that it is not engaged in business which necessitates
compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in external the securing of a license as it never made any profit from the
acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who sale of its bibles.
believe in exercising their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance as applied to
attention during the ceremony to show their respect for the petitioner is unconstutional for being in restraint of
right of those who choose to participate in the solemn petitioner's right to free exercise of religion.
proceedings. As there is no disruption, expulsion is
unwarranted. HELD: YES. The power to tax the exercise of the privilege
However, if they should commit breaches of peace is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Those who
by action that offend the sensibilities, both religious and can tax the exercise of religious practice can make its
patriotic, of other persons, the school authorities have the exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary
power to discipline them. for its maintenance. It is true that the price asked for the
religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher
than the actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean that
Compare West V. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 US plaintiff was engaged in the business or occupation of
624 (1943) selling said "merchandise" for profit. The mark up can only
be treated as contributions by the faithfuls to the religious
F: The State Board required public school pupils to cause. The Ordinance CANNOT be applied to plaintiff
salute the flag of the United States while reciting a pledge of society, for in so doing, it would impair its free exercise and
allegiance under penalty of expulsion entailing liability of enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as
both pupil and parents to be proceeded against for unlawful its right to disseminate religious beliefs.
absence. Appellees, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses,
consider the flag as a graven image which they are 3. Exemtion from union shop
forbidden to salute under their religious beliefs. The State
asserts the power to condition access to public education. Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
(1974)
ISSUE: W/N the compulsory flag salute is valid.
F: Benjamin Victoriano is an employee of the Elizalde
RULING: NO. Rope Factory. In 1962, he resigned from the respondent
In connection with pledges, the flag salute is a form labor union on the ground that the Iglesia ni Kristo of which
of utterance. It requires an affirmation of a belief and an he is a member prohibits union membership. As the union
attitude of mind. It is now a commonplace that censorship or demanded his dismissal from employment pursuant to a
suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by the closed shop agreement, Victoriano brought this action for
Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and injunction. The CFI ruled in his favor exempting from the
present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to closed-shop contracts members of religious sects which
prevent and punish. Here the power of compulsion is prohibit affiliation of their members in any labor
invoked without any allegation that remaining passive organization. The union appealed.
during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and present danger
that would justify an effort even to muffle expression. HELD: The statute does not violate the rights of
To sustain the compulsory flag salute, we are association. It does not impair the obligation of contracts for
required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
individual's right to speak his mind left it open to public the obligation of the parties but the reservation of essential
authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind. attributes of sovereign power is also read into such
The Court applies the limitations of the Constitution contracts. Neither does the law constitute an establishment
with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually of religion. It has been held that in order to withstand
diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social objections based on this ground, the statute musr have a
organization. To believe that patriotism will not flourish if secular purpose and that purpose must not directly advance
patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead or diminish the interest of any religion. Congress acted
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZPG & ASSOCIATES
merely to relieve persons of the burden imposed by union enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar
security agreements. their return to the Philippines. The case for petitioners is
founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to
4. Disqualification from local government office return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the provisions
of the Constitution respecting one's liberty of abode and
Pamil v. Teleron 86 SCRA 413 (1978) right to travel. Respondents argue the primacy of the right of
the State to national security over individual rights.
F: In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected mayor
of Albuquerque, Bohol. A petition was filed against him on RULING: The right involved in this case is not the right to
the basis of section 2175 of the Revised Administrative travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Code providing that "in nocase shall there be elected or Philippines. Essentially, the right involved is the right to
appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
active service, persons receiving salaries from provincial international law, independent from although related to the
funds, or contractors for public works." The CFI dismissed right to travel.
the petition on the ground that the ineligibility has been The right to return to one's country is not among the
impliedly repealed by section 23 of the 1971 Election Code. rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but
HELD: The voting of the SC was inconclusive. Seven it is the Court's well considered view that the right to return
justices held that section 2175 is no longer operative. Justice may be considered as a generally accepted principle of
Fernando held that section 2175 imposed a religious test on international law, and under our Constitution, is part of the
the exercise of the right to run for public office contrary to law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the
Art. III of the 1935 Constitution. Justice Teehankee held that right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the
section 2175 had been repealed by the Election Code. Five Intl. Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e. against
justices held that section 2175 is constitutional. being arbitrarily deprived thereof.
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be
allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in
VI. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
liberty of abode and the right to travel. It must be treated as
Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
changing the same within the limits prescribed by law unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such
except in the interest of national security, public safety, request or demand should submit to the exercise of a
or public health, as may be provided by law. broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or not.
Salonga v. Hermoso 97 SCRA 121 (1980)
Right to travel
This is not the first time petitioner Jovito Salonga
came to the SC by way of a mandamus proceeding to
compel the issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to
travel. In the first case, Salonga v. Madella, the case became
moot and academic. The present petition is likewise moot
and academic. In the motion to dismiss filed by the Solicitor
General, it was stated that the certificate of eligibility to
travel had been granted petitioner.
Nonetheless, in view of the likelihood that this Court
may be faced again with the same situation, it is desirable
that respondent Travel Processing Center should exercise
the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens
desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel
could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. The
freedom to travel is one of the most cherished. xxx
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 & 178 SCRA 760
(1989)
F: This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the
Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to
Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to