ADULTERY
  vs. De la Torre and Gregorio 25 Phil.
- ACQUITTAL OF ONE ACCUSED. — Where a man and a
woman are charged in the same complaint with
adultery, and on separate trial the case against the
man is dismissed, the acquittal of the man does not
necessarily carry with it the acquittal of the woman. (U.
S. v. Topino and Guzman [1916], 35 Phil., 901.)
In order to constitute adultery in either
instance, there must be a joint physical act. Both
bodies — that of the man and the woman — must
concur in the act. Must there also be in every case
a joint criminal intent? We think not. While the
criminal intent may exist in the mind of one of the
parties to the physical act, there may be no such
intent in the mind of the other party. One may be
guilty of the criminal intent, the other innocent,
and yet the joint physical act necessary to
constitute adultery may be complete. Thus, if one
of the parties was, at the time of committing the
physical act, insane, certainly such party has
committed no crime; but it certainly cannot be
contended that the other party who was sane,
committed no crime. So, if the man had no
knowledge that the woman was married, he would
be innocent, in so far as the crime of adultery is
concerned, and the woman guilty. The one would
have to be acquitted and the other found guilty,
although they were tried together. Or in other
words, the act of sexual intercourse with a married
or an unmarried man, other than her husband, is
adultery in the woman without regard to the guilt
of the man. (U. S. v. Topino and Guzman [1916], 35
Phil., 901.)
  The husband cannot institute a
prosecution for the crime of adultery without
including therein both of the guilty parties, if they
are both living (article 434, supra), but the statute
does not require that both must necessarily be
tried together. The force of the article is spent
when the husband institutes the prosecution
against both or includes both in his complaint. It is
not for the husband to determine the question of
the guilt or innocence of the paramour of the
crime of adultery. That question must be left to the
court. (U. S. vs.  Asuncion, 22 Phil. Rep., 358.)
When the complaint is filed by the offended
husband against both of the guilty parties, the
proceedings then pass into the hands of the
prosecuting officer, who may move for a dismissal
of the complaint as to the paramour, if he is
satisfied that he cannot establish guilty knowledge
on the part of the man of the fact that the woman
was married, and such dismissal would not of itself
require the court to acquit the woman. Nor would
the death of the woman during the pendency of
the action defeat the trial and conviction of the
man. (U. S.
Rep., 36.) Nor would the fact that the man had left
the country and could not be apprehended defeat
the trial and conviction of the woman. Again, if
both were brought before the court to be tried
jointly and one should claim a separate trial, which
the court would have to grant (section 33, General
Orders No. 58), the acquittal of the one would not
necessarily bar a prosecution and conviction of the
other. 
- The husband can testify against the wife in an adultery
case because adultery comes within the exceptions of
section 383, paragraph 3, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended, as an action for a crime
committed by the wife against the husband. (U.S. v.
Feliciano, G.R. No. 12724, Aug. 10, 1917)
- The defense of the fact that the husband abandoned
the woman does not exempt the latter from criminal
liability. Abandonment by the woman’s spouse only
lessens the penalty.
- There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars
the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there
were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one
crime. (People v. Zapata, G.R. No. L-3047, 1951)
- Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency. It
is an instantaneous crime which is consummated
and exhausted or completed at the moment of the
carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a
crime of adultery (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal,
Vol. II, p. 569). (People v. Zapata, G.R. No. L-3047,
1951)
- A second complaint charging the commission of
adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does
not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause
of the constitution - The defense set up by him
(paramour) against the first charge upon which he was
acquitted would no longer be available, because at the
time of the commission of the crime charged in the
second complaint, he already knew that this defendant
was a married woman and he continued to have carnal
knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardon
his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the
wife and her paramour from criminal liability for
adulterous acts committed after the pardon was
granted because the pardon refers to previous and not
to subsequent adulterous acts. (People v. Zapata, G.R.
No. L-3047, 1951)
- CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. — Strong circumstantial
and corroborative evidence such as will lead the
guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to the
conclusion that the alleged act has been committed is
sufficient to sustain a conviction for adultery. (U.S. v.
Feliciano, G.R. No. 12724, Aug. 10, 1917)
- Owing to the nature of the crime of adultery,
direct proof of carnal knowledge is not necessary
to sustain a conviction; hence, circumstantial and
corroborative evidence may establish the
accused’s carnal knowledge. (U.S. v. Legaspi, G.R.
No. L-5110, August 19, 1909, En Banc)