G.R. No.

104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by
her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA,respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition
stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the
petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous
and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property
which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order
denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:

De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling
finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property"
against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others
that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth
Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No.
1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona,
Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one
Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still
existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in
1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January
23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia
and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail
of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign
employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed
and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence;
out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal
properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00,
which are under the possession and administration of Roberto;
sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she
further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him
about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera
as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and
refused to turn over the possession and administration of said
properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized
to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of
their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining
Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership
over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and
of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and
exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void
marriage and such properties be placed under the proper
management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a
first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and
void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA
229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v.
Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845).
Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the
second marriage contracted by respondent with herein
petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is
illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second
marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not
an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this
Court observed that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from
the previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the
aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that
petitioner has no property in his possession is an issue
that may be determined only after trial on the merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous
application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the absence of
justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On
September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for
reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt
within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil
action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition.
It explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited by petitioner and that
of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have
relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts
because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the
second wife while the instant case prays for separation of property
corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed
that the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties
acquired during the union can be had only upon proper
determination of the status of the marital relationship between
said parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is
denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication
and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may
be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and
distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52
of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised
together with other incidents of their marriage such as the
separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court
has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to
dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would
have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of
an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are
the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void
marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same
should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of
private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties
allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People
v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private
respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary and
superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article
40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of
remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no
allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said
petition should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for
purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the
separation and distribution of the properties acquired during
coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with
one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it
is from the beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the
absolute nullity of their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon
by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void,
bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex
Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former
marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still
it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage
was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. .
. . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in
subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez
v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's
order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property
acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the
nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the
application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration
thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, that "although
the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and
applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the
prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful
surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her
deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that
he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his
first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and
effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the
Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no
need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of
her first husband at the time they married each other, for then
such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a
judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the
time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity
of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. 14Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the
Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not
be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be
the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is
borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of
the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present
Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on
the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should
include not only void but also voidable marriages. He then
suggested that the above provision be modified as
follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they
say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot
determine for himself whether or not his marriage is valid
and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly
proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment annulling the marriage or
declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no
question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even if
it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce
the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be
invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage invalid,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is
declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a
marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void?
Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit
added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is
annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that
this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the
provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void
marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the
other members concurred. Judge Diy added that
annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct
action is filed to annul it, which the other members
affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the
phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in
confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what
they are referring to in the provision is the declaration
that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away
with collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice
Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that
there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage
void and a party should not declare for himself whether or
not the marriage is void, while the other members
affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore,
trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof.
Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought
on the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then
asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the
defense that he has no liability because the basis of the
liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say
that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity
of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same
proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is
a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof.
Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to
remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be
reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of
remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final
judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as
follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of establishing the
validity of a subsequent marriage only on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a
subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may only be invoked on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above
provision is too broad and will not solve the
objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that
they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent
marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such nullity, except as
provided in Article 41.
 Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the
above provision is that if one enters into a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a final
judgment declaring the nullity of a previous
marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab
initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno
suggested that they go back to the original
wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage only on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void, except as provided in
Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing
that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the
judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that
there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior
subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case
of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of
respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another
woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the
latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be
maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to
allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant
dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in
the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows
that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in
conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the
provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for
purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly
qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would
have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause
denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party
might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody
and support of their common children and the delivery of the
latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must
be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance
where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which
remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is
legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the
previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words,
for purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable
basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for
purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as
an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as
such, it "shall be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms,
the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family
life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and
peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . .
."22 As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage
for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished
merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that
their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites
of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no
legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social
institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very
shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage
would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy
could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official
state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will
satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open
and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity
of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable
through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no
impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one of the
parties may be gleaned from new information required in the
Family Code to be included in the application for a marriage
license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art.
40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his
position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition
that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the
dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art.
40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was
in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be
misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of
remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers
to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that
they say "on the basis only of a final judgment."
Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal
term "solely" instead of "only," which the
Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute
nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private
respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the
recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired during
their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be
acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with
jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In
addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate
or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were
acquired with private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded
that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may
be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as
the separation of their properties."
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other
spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance
policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad
faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by
testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad
faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in
favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate
prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the
necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order
for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to
be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to
the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to
reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a
first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to
decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.
Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in
finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated
March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the
final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated
in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:

Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal

partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated,
but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or
her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common
children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that

if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations
made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
G.R. No. 106429 June 13, 1994
JOSELITA SALITA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, in her capacity as Judge of the RTC,
Quezon City, Br. 107, and ERWIN ESPINOSA, respondents.
Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioner.
Yolanda, Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for private
respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the
Roman Catholic Church in Ermita, Manila, on 25 January 1986. A
year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact in 1988.
Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of
Joselita’s psychological incapacity.
The issue before us however is not the scope nor even the
interpretation of Art. 36 of the Family Code. 1 Rather, the issue is
the sufficiency of the allegations in the petition for annulment of
marriage and the subsequent bill of particulars filed in
amplification of the petition.
The petition for annulment was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City on 7 January 1992. Therein it is alleged that
"[s]ometime in 1987, petitioner came to realize that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at
the time of the marriage although the same became manifest only
thereafter." 2 Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition,
Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court
granted. 3 Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified
that —
. . . at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita) was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand
and accept the demands made by his profession — that of a newly
qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon petitioner’s time and efforts
so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her
even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose
his job.
Still Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She
argued that the "assertion (in the Bill of Particulars) is a statement
of legal conclusion made by petitioner’s counsel and not an
averment of ‘ultimate facts,’ as required by the Rules of Court,
from which such a conclusion may properly be inferred . . . ." 4 But
finding the questioned Bill of Particulars adequate, the trial court
issued an order upholding its sufficiency and directing Joselita to
file her responsive pleading.
Joselita was not convinced. She filed a petition for certiorari with
us. However, we referred her petition to the Court of Appeals for
resolution.
On 21 July 1992, the Court of Appeals denied due course to her
petition thus —
In the case under consideration, Espinosa has amplified Salita’s
alleged psychological incapacity in his bill of particulars . . .
In our view, the aforesaid specification more than satisfies the
Rules’ requirement that a complaint must allege the ultimate facts
constituting a plaintiff’s cause of action. To require more details
thereof, to insist on a specification of Salita’s particular conduct or
behavior with the corresponding ‘circumstances of time, place and
person’ indicating her alleged psychological incapacity would be to
ask for information on evidentiary matters. To obtain evidentiary
details, Salita may avail herself of the different modes of discovery
provided by the Rules of Court
(Rules 24 to 28).
Whether Espinosa’s averments in his bill of particulars constitute
psychological incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code is
a question that may be resolved in a motion to dismiss or after trial
on the merits of the case, not in a motion for bill of particulars.
And certainly, that matter cannot be resolved in the present
petition. 5
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by Joselita
Salita questioning the Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying
due course to her petition.
Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars
constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of facts, and fail to
point out the specific essential marital obligations she allegedly
was not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars
insufficient if not irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action. She
rationalizes that her insistence on the specification of her
particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding
circumstances of time, place and person does not call for
information on evidentiary matters because without these details
she cannot adequately and intelligently prepare her answer to the
petition.
Private respondent on the other hand believes that his allegations
in the Bill of Particulars constitute the ultimate facts which the
Rules of Court requires at this point. He defines ultimate facts as —
. . . important and substantial facts which either directly form the
basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make upon
the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does
not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence by which these material elements are to be established.
It refers to principal, determinate facts upon the existence of
which the entire cause of action rests. 6
Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and
evidentiary facts, or allegations of mixed law and fact; they are
conclusions from reflection and natural reasoning on evidentiary
fact. The ultimate facts which are to be pleaded are the issuable,
constitutive, or traversible facts essential to the statement of the
cause of action; the facts which the evidence on the trial will
prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the
existence of those facts . . . 7
Private respondent further argues that "[c]onclusions of law and
evidentiary matters need not be stated in the complaint. The rules
of pleading limit the statement of the cause of action only to such
operative facts as would give rise to the right of action of the
plaintiff to obtain relief against the wrongdoer. The details of
probative matter or particulars of evidence, statements of law,
inferences and arguments need not be stated." 8
In a nutshell, the ultimate question is whether the Bill of Particulars
submitted by herein respondent is of sufficient definiteness or
particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare her
responsive pleading or for trial.
A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff’s cause or causes of action." 9 Ultimate facts has been
defined as "those facts which the expected evidence will
support." 10 As stated by private respondent, "[t]he term does not
refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence
by which these material elements are to be established." It refers
to "the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the
evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those
facts." And a motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the
complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless already states a
sufficient cause of action. 11 A motion for bill of particulars may not
call for matters which should form part of the proof of the
complaint upon trial. Such information may be obtained by other
means. 12
We sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of
Particulars filed by private respondent is sufficient to state a cause
of action, and to require more details from private respondent
would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. Indeed,
petitioner has already been adequately apprised of private
respondent’s cause of action against her thus —
. . . . (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was
unable to understand and accept the demands made by his
profession — that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon
petitioner’s time and efforts so that she frequently complained of
his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention
caused petitioner to lose his job.
On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that
petitioner can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.
Private respondent has already alleged that "she (petitioner) was
unable to understand and accept the demands made by his
profession . . . upon his time and efforts . . . " Certainly, she can
respond to this. To demand for more details would indeed be
asking for information on evidentiary facts — facts necessary to
prove essential or ultimate facts. 13 For sure, the additional facts
called for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or omissions
would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not the
function of a motion for bill of particulars. 14
We distinguish the instant case from Tantuico, Jr. v.
Republic 15 where we said —
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of
persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts involved,
a specification of property for identification purposes, the
particular transactions involving withdrawals and
disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as
would support the conclusions and inferences in the
complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary,
those particulars are material facts that should be clearly
and definitely averred in the complaint in order that the
defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims
made against him to the end that he may be prepared to
meet the issues at the trial.
The aforementioned pronouncement cannot apply to the instant case.
That ruling involves alleged "misappropriation and theft of public
funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery,
embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust
and brazen abuse of power." The respondents therein pray for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. There,
the alleged illicit acts should be fully documented. The instant case, on
the other hand, concerns marital relationship. It would be
unreasonable, if not unfeeling, to document each and every
circumstance of marital disagreement. True, the complaining spouse
will have to prove his case, but that will not come until trial begins.
Consequently, we have no other recourse but to order the immediate
resumption of the annulment proceeding which have already been
delayed for more than two years now, even before it could reach its
trial stage. Whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated should
be immediately determined. There is no point in unreasonably
delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the
wedded couple who after coming out from a storm still have the right
to a renewed blissful life either alone or in the company of each other.
A word on Art. 36 of the Family Code. 16 We do not see the need to
define or limit the scope of the provision. Not in this case, at least. For,
we are not called upon to do so, the actual controversy being the
sufficiency of the bill of particulars. To interpret the provision at this
juncture would be to give an obiter dictum which is ill-timed. Besides,
it appears that petitioner in her memorandum has demonstrated a
good grasp of what Art. 36 actually covers. Suffice it to say that Mme.
Justice Sempio-Diy, formerly of the Court of Appeals and a member of
the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family code,
explains —
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity
for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. 17
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the instant petition is
DENIED and the questioned Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals
dated 21 July 1992 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial
provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended
by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the
instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the
above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted
by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of
Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his
attempt to have his marriage with herein private
respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared
a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later
proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20
September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial
Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the
latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18
July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened
Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was
bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family
affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a
number of other things, like when and where the couple should
start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia
would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with
his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to
work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven
months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up
Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised
to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989.
She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States,
where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August
1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch
with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed
with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a
complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros
Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through
counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been
irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of
nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly
been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit
evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the
decision of the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-
compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of
non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the
very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel
asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him)
because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all
these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife
who does not care to inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is
psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity."
The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an
insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice
(Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient
use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in
the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that
they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but
that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of
judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-
) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the
marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice
Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in
sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the essential
nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but
lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a
psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground
for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of
consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable
marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to
the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the
word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred.
Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to
psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called
selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact
that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the
Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable
marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in
Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law,
there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is
precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage
cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a
ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals,
while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if
such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read
"even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the
marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the
phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one,
there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological
incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will
encourage one who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the
obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of
providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of
incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less
than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear
that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is
the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for
the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases
when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do
with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero
inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of
consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general
is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally
a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to
the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration
and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely
different from each other, because they require a different
capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in
contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it
should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable
of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no
prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been
cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the
defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action
for annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted,
the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have
been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is
brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation
be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the
bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that
psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of
a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a
psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa,
however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in
the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of
marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid
interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there
is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes
and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological
incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time
when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to
copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes
commented that in some instances the impotence that in some
instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect
to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it
is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable"
has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated
that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa,
however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is
enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if
already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the
marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since
in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the
marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the
provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes
manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible
that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become
manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa
opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with
"although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the
clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create
the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the
basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is
not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the
minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the
phrase "psychological or mental impotence" is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it
as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental"
precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that
"psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they
have decided not to go into the classification of "psychological
incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been
annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity,
Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new
ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in
Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in
the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared
void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied
negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be
retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is
their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages,
which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice
Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of
cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the
Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for
prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and
Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period
of ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee
in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity
than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some
resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice
Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13
June 1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological
incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of
judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and
duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that
persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's
enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for
its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of
the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account
on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed,
states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt
that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict
and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential
obligations of marriage because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the
pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas
naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological
anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether
eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the
conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be
some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and
healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies
any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an
infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage,"
written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the
following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability
to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some
psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality
can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here
described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity
consists of a real inability to render what is due by the
contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a
farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops
which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere
difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be
overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute
 incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological
disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is
due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987).
However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under
this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person
is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the
defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of
giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of
being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who
opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr.
Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code
and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The
law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability
of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The
well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful
or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We
should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then
enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1
of the Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic
nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt
the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can
come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of
marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably,
neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific
answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new
ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based
on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning
of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court
of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in
applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case
and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be
sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as
the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this
Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to
lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14,
1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet,
which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration
of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April
14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O.
Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed
signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father
since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends
on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife
in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between
them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of
his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a
very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was
estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in
Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few
weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since
then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it
would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage
declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared
to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he
and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels
were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2)
Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and
handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were
stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at
the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano
Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the
petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own
testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of
Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents
marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of
Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the
phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the
facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to
establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage
between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the
Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws
on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view
psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of
how he or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his
or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed
and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the
spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed
no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case,
as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the
Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and
conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities
and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders
them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr.
Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing
to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal"
or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and
her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been
no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility,
not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on
your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit
with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity
existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part
of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary
blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely
ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code
and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and
applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely,
the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge)
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member
of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative
and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December
3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert
evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is
to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart
from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards
the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family
as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already
ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent
with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a
marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly
inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works
of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against
her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the
decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November
29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court
and reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its decision are as
follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were
preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the
defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila,
as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding
reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same
room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her
expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to
enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each
other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side
thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There
was no sexual intercourse between them during the first
night. The same thing happened on the second, third and
fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place
where they can enjoy together during their first week as
husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did
so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his
nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join
them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But,
during this period, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking
a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since
May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period,
there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between
them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her
husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the
Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is
healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband's examination was kept confidential up to this
time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was
also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For
her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he
never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a
closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said,
that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow
pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother.
And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a
Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status
here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if
their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his
wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her
very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the
relationship is still very young and if there is any
differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that
this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is
any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May
22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there
was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for
 this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he
wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts,
she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that
he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he
did not continue because she was shaking and she did not
like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant ,
why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are:
(1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the
pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband,
the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain
valid because they are still very young and there is still a
chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical
examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza,
Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent .
As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's
Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is
no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable
of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to
masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection
and he found out that from the original size of two (2)
inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza
said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is
why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of
further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a
woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there
is no collusion between the parties and that the evidence
is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as
VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the
defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral,
Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros,
Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera.
Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there
was no sexual intercourse between the parties without
making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have
sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner
and the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the
parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying
itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-
3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations
in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains
no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of
petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that
the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and
confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of
the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the
court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings.
What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage
without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified
under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath
before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony.
After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon
petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as
stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment
annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and
the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1,
Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want
their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he
and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact
with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are
reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with
magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-
Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this
Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of
whether or not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and
testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that
he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost
ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage
is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder
which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an
'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article
36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding
that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial
court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged
psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for
such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological
disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e.,
physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, —
why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse
from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10
months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and
private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other.
The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus
between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the
marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have
sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record
to show that any of the parties is suffering from phychological
incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's
refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated
above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have
discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her,
and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing
in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what
the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence
is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's
claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent
upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses
to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and
the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal
is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse
with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family
Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at
bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the
husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was
not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to
March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his
wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves
to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven
though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599,
cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were
true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the
fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the
declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her
marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it
is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to
public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her
husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order
and put to rest her marital status.
 We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the
evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention
to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological
incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the
admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to
perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to
love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is
indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious
personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within
the contemplation of the Family Code.7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68,
Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is
an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could
not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery
of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner

and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between
husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive
interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage
is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who
view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious
of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which

the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows
and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain
the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of

the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a
marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent
should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio
sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage
between the parties is hereby declared valid."2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA
Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos
and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6,
1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art.
36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved
[sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in
relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the
legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare
of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject
to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was
solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and
the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate
action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married
twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge
Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2)
on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar,
Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel
in Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five
(5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential
Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime.
Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the
Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978.
After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from
the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were
assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee
Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became
acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No.
1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which
she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she
was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service
in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did
not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for
work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the
head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to
engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and
as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force
her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also
inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was
so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times
during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992,
they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic
uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would
first make deliveries early in the morning before going to
Malacañang. When she was discharged from the military service,
she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a
trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and
Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16,
1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living
separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore.
On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry
that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical
harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The
following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the
house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical
examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and
driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for
their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After
knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after
them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were
renting a house in Camella, Parañaque, while the appellant was
residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the
children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to
them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A.
Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp.
207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of
his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude
towards appellee and their children, x x x."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had
not been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It
ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root
cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be
medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and
clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must
also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to
assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles
68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-
complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the
petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any
psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings
about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based
only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert
evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is
essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them
was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital
obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x
x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence
to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root
cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition,
nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or
sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at
all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an
incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the
extent that he could not have known the obligations he was
assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the
marriage and [was] incurable."4
Hence, this Petition.5
Issues
In her Memorandum,6 petitioner presents for this Court's
consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could
set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of
psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the
respondent did not subject himself to psychological
evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and
the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of
the determination of the merits of the Petition." 7
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or
psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality
of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various
tests that were submitted to determine respondent's psychological
incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have
been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because
respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that
the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had
no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to
determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had
refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelines governing the
application and the interpretation of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code9 were laid
down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It
decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxx xxx xxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -
not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the
time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician
may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095."10
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:11 "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the
root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence
presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of
petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social
worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently
convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to
the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion
of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of
the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact
that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a
period of more than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important,
there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi
driver.1âwphi1
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with
a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which

the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.12 At best, the evidence presented by
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.

Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law,

this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation
in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage

for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined
in Molina.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed

Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical
examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision 1 dated August 20,
2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August
28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring
as null and void the marriage contracted between herein
respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio
Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the
Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and
stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave
birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro
M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated
to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became
manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to
respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial
support. She wrote him several times but he never responded.
Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that
Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and
their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was
no longer residing at his given address. Consequently, on July 8,
1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect
service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the
motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons,
accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a
newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after
the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion
dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for
investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7,
1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a
report finding that no collusion existed between the parties. He
prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to
intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not
fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted
respondent’s motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then
testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter
offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between
petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio
Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National
Statistics Office are ordered to make proper entries into
the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this
judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s
psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent
spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the
petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent
remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs
and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind
of the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and
lack of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a
very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be
traced to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability of
entering into marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but
the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and
evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered
denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a
quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their
daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage, and
returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take
steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months,
he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite
the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he
did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand,
exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to
his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically
asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an
unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a family as
a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be
made to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is
not around and worse, left them without even helping
them cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing
of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of
the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be
equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina 8 and Santos
vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos
while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a
Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone
assignment of error:
I have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent
was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio
Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite
respondent’s failure to comply with the guidelines laid
down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family
and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute
psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple
inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of
reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe
and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in
accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent,
reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial of
the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus,
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground
of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x
x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -
not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis,
233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may
be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician
may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot
be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
 or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon
1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. 15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully
proved Toshio’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital
responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with,
care for and support his family. He abandoned them a month after
his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters
but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not
care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving
that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to
some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on
how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was
presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological
disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual
medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s
case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert
witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal
separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not
just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation.
We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that
Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of
the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that
a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological,not physical, illness.17 There
was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 18
According to the appellate court, the requirements
in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case
involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese
national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find
no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We
cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because
the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to
be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of
human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an
inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and protects.
While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage
to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The
decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad
truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any
sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is
always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the
following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale,
dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to
fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails
the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had
reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie
Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful
consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner
was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year
after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the
Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church
wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro
Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born
on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage
to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for
nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity
existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists
up to the present.8
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity,
petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself,
the people around her, her occupation, income, educational
attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an
illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as
the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about
the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from other
sources after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David,
attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident
occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician,
Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she
graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated
with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single
member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities
with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon
show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and
even presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel
that no such occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez,
and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming
to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one
moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2
million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was
the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted
the truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He likewise realized that Babes
Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination
when he discovered they were not known in or connected with
Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she
altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher
income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture
dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up
borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent
of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he
could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her
in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her
behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November
1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera
Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the
tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other
hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant
lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the
basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and
respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme
jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia
since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner
was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based
on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed
her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her
husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation
that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner
because she was afraid of losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her
because she surmised such intent from David’s act of touching her
back and ogling her from head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had
been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2)
years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an
executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3)
commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-
cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told
petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was
not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the
Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon
show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel
on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written
by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez
Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States
while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband
but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter
if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to
monitor her husband’s whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she
supported almost ten people from her monthly budget
of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a
child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by
petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was
that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a
finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr.
Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her
psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests
conducted by his assistant,33together with the screening
procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating
Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive
behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor
control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the
presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the
evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who
administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological
evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called
CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the
results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence
and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost
anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among others−had been duly established. According to
the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-
believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered
her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the
Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the
Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due
discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the pendency of the
appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s
ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only
respondent was impaired by a lack of due
discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the
Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s
judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been
completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was
insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It
declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of
psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement,
petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that
the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily
influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual
allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure
that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts
because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate
their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the
fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the
evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court
concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of
petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains
as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner
sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of
a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards
were definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v.
Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed
the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the
RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the
Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact, even
before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi
Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively
concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under
Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the
misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family
Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet
what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of
guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner
seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of
nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose
the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised
the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted
by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." 50 The
concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of
marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity
has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a
marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting
marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their
reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such
persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages
with underage parties and persons already married, among others.
A party’s mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the
Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of
unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an
"annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce
on the ground of a spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted
under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a
marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified
under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage. 56 The
mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not
among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab
initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under
Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of
unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of
consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is
one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial common
consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of
consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the
Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have
opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and
conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary
consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling
such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the
1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article
36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined
that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the
marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45
(5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for
annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino
noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to
understand the essential marital obligations, because then this
would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These
concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of
Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." 65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to
understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in
the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now
Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to
establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized
that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological
incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its
central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same
time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the
intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific
examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under
the principle ofejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the
revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision
ona case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision
was taken from Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than
in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it
is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological
incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in
intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into
account the particulars of each case, current trends in
psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is
under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that
the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been
consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably
useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in
adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At
the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear
legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each
situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary
understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at
present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily
on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first
in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law
experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but
unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had
bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity
was derived from canon law,73 and as one member admitted,
enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled
by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74 It would
be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church
doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of
Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be
emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of
influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the
concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation
into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation
occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church
thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the
trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting
psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal
guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower
courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited
Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively
state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of
state protection to marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature
to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy
and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political
influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the
qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls
on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional
provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been
accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may
appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of
nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect
marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition
of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what
marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of
Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be
taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages
contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional
protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn
serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding
interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to
promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do
not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and
family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons
independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the
present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently
recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under
Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its
promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the
general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological–
not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician
may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot
be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36
was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is
to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed
as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the
Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement
however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still,
Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously,
collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent
vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration
of nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings
before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed
binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the
opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of
Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be
considered that respondent had consistently lied about many
material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes
her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and
generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines
in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving
the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own
testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his
allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold
Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed
respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also
presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology
who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts
below considered petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even
the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally
honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of
action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the
action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between
private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family
Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the
petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion
among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity
has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent,
from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of
peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and
inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to
petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual
occupation, income, educational attainment, and family
background, among others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were
further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses
from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such
witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed
the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major
hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided
to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly
wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems
(sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of
which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the
"respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal
behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these
actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing
the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes
towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the
person, and it is also something that endangers human
relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication
between individuals and what we generally communicate are our
thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s]
their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if
you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as
this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of
the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is
then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the
marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who
is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent
has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask him (sic)
on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of
the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the
transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr.
witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is
paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect
(sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried
on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal.
We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and
then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the
husband is having an affair with another woman and if she
persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with
different women, then that is pathological and we call that
paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be
considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic
obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Ma’am.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only
the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the
psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent
"is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to
fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological
incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of
respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that
personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically
incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s
witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions.
Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s common conclusion of
respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own
acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts.
However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of
petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the
conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by
petitioner’s expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial
court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its
decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from
her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies
about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health,
her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability
to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically
lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a
position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner,
respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by
the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is
abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological
incapacity.87
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to
have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration
of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from
fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise,
she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real
parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the
truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is
sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had
shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the
exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance
speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports
the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by
the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life
was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not
adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into
marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of
respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by
the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic
on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were
revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to
distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable
to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its
psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to
marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality
cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent
allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply
exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay
extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the
essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering
that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to
adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the
marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family
Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent
of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which
enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the
previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages
between misrepresentations made by respondent and the
misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under
Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and
does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case,
the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy
to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological
incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential
marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an
inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was
annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently
deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was
made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s
efforts to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate
ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in
a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due
discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was
affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact,
respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that
a restrictive clause93was appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without
the Tribunal’s consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial
consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore
judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in
possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a
perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from
the correct appreciation of the integral significance and
implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude
required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in
Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert
Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure
of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical
to the substantive content and implications of the Marriage
Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her
matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In
other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its
practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse
action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from
eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no
sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of
grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner. 94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at
not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we
must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the
marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a
similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s
allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s
version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such
conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would
have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings
of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts,
that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement
in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score
that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court,
the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that
respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not
testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially
separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage
work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and
maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the
conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded
that respondent’s condition is incurable? It would seem, at least,
that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a
remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had
petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s condition
as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’
taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and
the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These
events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and
made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity
must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36
or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in
January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations
of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical
scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal
definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice
Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the deliberations that
"psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be
characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on
psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference
to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before
the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on
whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was incurable.
Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of
the psychological incapacity be established in an action for
declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity
at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent
promulgation of the trial court’s decision that required a medical
finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in
1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after
the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an
argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed
by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date
the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from
utterly practical considerations. The requirement that
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be
divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no
categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because
there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the
appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If
we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue
prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially
those presently on appellate review, where presumably the
respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have
seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in
those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a
spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the
trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the
interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case
perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case
an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the
parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to
that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten
(10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are
sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s
psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner.
Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the
Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability
as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were
sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to
contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of

action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing

as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first
place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological
state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her
persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate
court placed undue emphasis on respondent’s avowed
commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides
these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality.
Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization
of a desire of people in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC

dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family
Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,
vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological
incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has become a
clichéd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats
this case, however, with much ado, it having realized that current
jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective
by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally
inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated—free in
form and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867.
The petition further assails the January 19, 2004
Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the
challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of
respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized
by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was
then initially attracted to Rowena’s close friend; but, as the latter
already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena.
That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore
student and respondent, a freshman.3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood
one another and developed a certain degree of closeness towards
each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first
meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he
refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to
Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she,
purchasing the boat ticket.4
However, Edward’s ₱80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their
pension house accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted
it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go
back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and
Edward to his parents’ home. As his family was abroad, and
Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would
commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s
place.5
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to
get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.6 The two then
continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was treated
like a prisoner—he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her
uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to
leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able to call home and
talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their
parents’ home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena
who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that
they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about
this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be
disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle,
and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena
and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his
persistence that they should live with his parents, she said that it
was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity. This was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000,
ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to
investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.12 In
the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on
its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings. 13
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report
stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between
the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.14
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both
parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the following
findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult
born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He finished two
years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is
currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office for
a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of
psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon
Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and
one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the business world
by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This
said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member.
He generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly
remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he
tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being
quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His
interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or
a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during
his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its
message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy
father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her
collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her
boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner
and this became the foundation of their intimate relationship.
After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that
he is having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly
retorted that she also hates her family and that she actually
wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent
had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live together.
Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both
young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would
somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In the last week of
March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and
she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner
reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The
parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of
respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was
compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job
but could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they
should go back and seek help from petitioner’s parents. When the
parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family
was all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her
home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their
home. After a few days of separation, respondent called petitioner
by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded
immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent
confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold,
respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit
suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent
would call by phone every now and then and became angry as
petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to the
extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and
scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how
he would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,]
respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of
frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23,
1996, respondent’s uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and
on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage
Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any
Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until
after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of
petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle
showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if he
should persist in going home, they will commission their military
friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a
declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look for
him at his parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses. Sometime in June of
1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his
parents about his predicament and they forgave him and
supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however,
did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with
respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred
for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact
respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home
of petitioner’s parents while they are still studying. Respondent
refused the idea and claimed that she would only live with him if
they will have a separate home of their own and be away from his
parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get
his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so they
can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing
[that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own
family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he
chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop
harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was
disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not be
able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have
any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner
and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be
undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was
caused by both parties[’] unreadiness to commitment and their
young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting
boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sach’s Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally
immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital
vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on
marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be
still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He is
still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is
absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a
lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with other
individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds
it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship
especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously
aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of
person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn
time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the
aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat
exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is
seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage
with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a
rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force
and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed.
Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she
gladly finds her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself
and marry himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage
should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious
institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented
by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both
parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still
unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point
of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition.
She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive
so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her
strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the
grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial
Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only
manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological
incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16 declaring
the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both
parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.17 The Republic, represented by the
OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.18
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003
Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial
court’s ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist
did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the
information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell
short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina21 needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.22 The CA faulted the lower
court for rendering the decision without the required certification
of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSG’s reasons for its
agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the
petition.23 The CA later denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004
Resolution.24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition
for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.25
In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits
that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of
respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both
parties’ psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that
there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions
of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it
had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court
orders and notices.27
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28 that the
annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of
the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply
with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise
not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically
identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the
clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent.
Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina 29 were
not satisfied.30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on
Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is
null and void.31
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and
charting the development of jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision
Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:33
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision
Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code
Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the
present Article 36 in the Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought
of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new
Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by
the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members
of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the
spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de facto.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for
an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based
on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between
the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree
of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is
one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even
the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee
and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the
preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as —
‘a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment
of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by law.’
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional
concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent,
inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and
society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that
any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the
Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom
the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in
their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce
and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law.
It was thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable
alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of
church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the
civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again
prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of
invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of
provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and
those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two
Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation
of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present
provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes.
The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage
in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to
wit:
‘(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
‘Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or
pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.’
‘Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.’
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country
today may already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds
proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well
as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law
unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy
of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church
has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack
of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be
clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages;
marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous
choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person;
marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or
who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of
machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their
wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.34
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision
read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration."
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
produced the following revised provision even before the session
was over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has
dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason
or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and
to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases
refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is
not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it
should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases
when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not
refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage."
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term
"psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists,
that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code
of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the
inclusion of the phrase "and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B.
Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that
it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be
cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after
the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to
allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of
marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under
"special cases and special situations," hence, its special treatment
in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground
for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time
of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is
capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential
requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of
change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices
of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of
Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are
incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of
causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is
now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes
only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and
void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal
"annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void,
i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can
only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a
full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil
Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to
enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying
civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon
Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married
couples have found themselves in limbo—freed from the marriage
bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract
a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-
in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such
anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Code—and classified the same as a
ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent
from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code,
while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in
effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three
old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to be ‘capable
according to law’ in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082
required that persons ‘be at least not ignorant’ of the major
elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and
fear category) required that internal and external freedom be
present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation
produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called
‘lack of due discretion’ and ‘lack of due competence.’ Lack of due
discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give
valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union
is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was
incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she
made during the wedding ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s
and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and
nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.
The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the
capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably
not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly
after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of
revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of
serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly
after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at
the time of the ceremony.36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision
itself was taken from the Canon Law.37 The law is then so designed
as to allow some resiliency in its application.38
Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not
meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as expressed by Article 6840 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The
intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.41 This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in
Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual
distinction must be made between the second and third
paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of
discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential
obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference
by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a
house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable
according to positive law to enter such contract, there remains the
object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a
different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the
house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is
the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon.
The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological process
of giving consent because it has been established a priori that both
have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know well the
object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather,
C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which does
not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object.
The consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The
psychological act, however, is directed towards an object which is
not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the
third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with
positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of
positing a free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the
responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in
1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising
from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to
understand as ground of nullity different from others, the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage,
especially the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies.
Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has
studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual
anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of
intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies
that are purely so – that is to say, they arise from certain
physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect
the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so
that these persons are still capable of free human acts. The
evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are
certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person
towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect
to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the
activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these
anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher
faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to
have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the
gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely.
The question though is whether such a person can assume those
responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to
understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from the
incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity
to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually
confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by church courts
were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c.
Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect,
under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning
supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the
influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable
conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these
circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be
incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this
irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely
the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is
always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It
would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to
think that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually
hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite
maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would
be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit
the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in
a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more
correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is
juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object
that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by
fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to
have seen his way more clearly through this tangled mess,
proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the
inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill
the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that
nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and
they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have
no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent. However,
such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free
consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the
object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise
treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act
of positing the object of consent from the point of view of a person
afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction
usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and
evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the
delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent.
From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to
see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is
to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same
person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent
judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The
decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed
that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the
moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the
matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in
such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of
fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in understanding what
the obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating
of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was
not unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence or psychic
impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity
rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These
anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is
qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the
impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084.
Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of
binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the
anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential
obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long
tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or
both of the contractants are not capable of initiating or
maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those
cases where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a
narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a
union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a
relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the
spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual
consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony.
Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to
concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon
speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A
spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to the good
of the other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be
deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be the case
of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic
good and the financial security of the other, but not capable of
realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are general
strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual
description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete
circumstances of the case concerns a person diagnosed to be
suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the
respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the
essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming
them because of his "constitutional immorality."
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person
as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only
at the moment of decision but also and especially during the
moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to
constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual
fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent
consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a
person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in
the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to
assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at
matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in
facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated
the incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential
obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person,
precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and
his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had violated.
Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence
of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to
recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of
entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable
treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal
exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order
to achieve one’s ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential
matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to the communio
vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically
centered around the good of the spouses and of the children.
Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily
incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several,
or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which
interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic
features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage
include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear
under what rubric homosexuality was understood to be
invalidating of marriage – that is to say, is homosexuality
invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the responsibilities
of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations.
Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it
as incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that by
1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as
an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so
afflicted is said to be unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial
consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also
the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095
[incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage]
certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to
account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The
homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very
few exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full
sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity,
and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave
lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by
itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather,
the homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of
marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the
matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so
much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of
consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be
addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the canon:
causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion
that the clause is a reference to the personality of the contractant.
In other words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of
the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in
the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity
that one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to
the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged
incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found
to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which
impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply
engrained in one’s consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a
source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference being that
there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the
development of the habit, while one accepts as given one’s psychic
constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the
source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some
degree of freedom.42
Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-
case basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage is
psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower
court’s judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of
Appeals,43 ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and
binding on the appellate courts.44
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its
decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v.
Court of Appeals,45 explained that when private respondent
testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-
examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in
the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital
obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the
case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as
so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in
Molina,46 thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—
not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician
may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot
be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36
was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our
Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally— subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed
as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source
and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church—while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other—shall walk together in synodal cadence towards
the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and
the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.47
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s
membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice
(later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred "in the result" and another three—including, as
aforesaid, Justice Romero—took pains to compose their individual
separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according
to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all
fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much
as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court."48
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,49 the Court
has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for
the law’s clear intention that each case is to be treated differently,
as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to
impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all
cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was
then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of
marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world."50 The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has
taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended
by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to
fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of
the personality disorders of the said individuals. 51
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy
provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by the State,
through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between
the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.52 The Court should
rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital
abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s
psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It
may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no
marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the
very beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity
under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should
not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost,
because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial
declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a
lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have
become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality
disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the
psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latter’s disorder
recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment
of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by
Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6)
months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged
marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist
who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s,
that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. 56
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but,
instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. 57
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases.
Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked
to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the
time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and
tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this
area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There
was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link
between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage
from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of
this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases
that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of
marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability
to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all
kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right
of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in
its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the
right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since
1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity
for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be ‘other oriented’ since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that
the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship
because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a
true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the
strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship
and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in
isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to
the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability;
(4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to
cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions
that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual
choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses
consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who
doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other
terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional
categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting
a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the
parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due competence).
An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at
the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of
the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out
marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was
entered into."581avvphi1
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of
presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party’s
psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no
requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.61 Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis,
that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-
depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.62 Parenthetically, the Court, at this point,
finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,63 an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-
appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and
evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the
courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an
intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however,
does not dispense with the parties’ prerogative to present their own
expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which
we consider as adequate, produced the findings that both parties are
afflicted with personality disorders—to repeat, dependent personality
disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental
Health discusses personality disorders as follows—
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are
characteristic of a person’s recent and long-term functioning. Patterns
of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes
but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to
cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with
interpersonal relationships and normal functioning. Personality
disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue
through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An
individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders,
despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which the disorder
leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational adjustment.
Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as
overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an
awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble
getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of
life and often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other
individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to
work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can
lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and
dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints
propose a variety of causes of personality disorders. These include
Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave
activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of
development led to certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as
described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character
types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-
aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage.
Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were
thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic
stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in
intimate relationships.lawphil.net However, later researchers have
found little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain
stages of development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic
factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality
disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality
disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that
schizotypal personality may be related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality,
researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-
hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures
of aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal
personality has been associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase
(MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG)
have been reported in antisocial personality for many years; slow
wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline
patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG
abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.,
1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three
major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders.
Individuals who have these disorders often appear to have odd or
eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly
emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-
aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders
often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not
otherwise specified," that can be used for other specific personality
disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the
specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-
term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following
manner—
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and
submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily
hurt by others’ comments. At times they actually bring about
dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood.
Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday
decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others
to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend
to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have
difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to
do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other
people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.65 and antisocial
personality disorder described, as follows—
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is
intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a
society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard
for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal
behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, child or
spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There
is often a façade of charm and even sophistication that masks
disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to
control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also
may befit some individuals who are prominent in business or politics
whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of
others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred
to as moral insanity. The term described immoral, guiltless behavior
that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning.lawphil.net
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social
personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic" personality
disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.66
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders
considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the psychological
evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the
marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties’
psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court,
which had a first-hand view of the witnesses’ deportment, arrived at
the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality
disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice
from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions
(such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he
believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own,
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval
from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is
often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.67 As clearly shown
in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the
persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of
his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no
goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the
respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder
makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This
finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her
abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her
tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by society.68 Moreover, as shown in
this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no
qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on
certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January
19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001,
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166579 February 18, 2010
JORDAN CHAN PAZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JEANICE PAVON PAZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the 9 August 20042 and 26
November 20043 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 80473. In its 9 August 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
dismissed petitioner Jordan Chan Paz’s (Jordan) appeal of the 13
May 2003 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
69 (trial court), which granted respondent Jeanice Pavon Paz’s
(Jeanice) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. In its 26
November 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Jordan’s
motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Jordan and Jeanice met sometime in November 1996. Jeanice was
only 19 years old while Jordan was 27 years old. In January 1997,
they became a couple and, on 10 May 1997, they were formally
engaged. They had their civil wedding on 3 July 1997, and their
church wedding on 21 September 1997. They have one son, Evan
Gaubert, who was born on 12 February 1998. After a big fight,
Jeanice left their conjugal home on 23 February 1999.
On 15 September 1999, Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage against Jordan. Jeanice alleged that Jordan was
psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of
marriage. According to Jeanice, Jordan’s psychological incapacity
was manifested by his uncontrollable tendency to be self-
preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his predisposition to
become violent and abusive whenever his whims and caprices
were not satisfied.
Jeanice alleged that Jordan had a tendency to lie about his
whereabouts and had the habit of hanging out and spending a
great deal of time with his friends. Since Jordan worked in their
family business, Jordan would allegedly just stay home, tinker with
the Play Station, and ask Jeanice to lie to his brothers about his
whereabouts. Jeanice further alleged that Jordan was heavily
dependent on and attached to his mother. After giving birth to
their son, Jeanice noticed that Jordan resented their son and spent
more time with his friends rather than help her take care of their
son. Jordan also demanded from his mother a steady supply of
milk and diapers for their son.
At the early stage of their marriage, Jeanice said they had petty
fights but that the quarrels turned for the worse and Jordan
became increasingly violent toward her. At one point, Jordan
threatened to hurt her with a pair of scissors. Jeanice also alleged
that on 22 February 1999, Jordan subjected her to verbal lashing
and insults and threatened to hit her with a golf club. Jeanice
added that Jordan has not provided any financial support or visited
their son since she left their conjugal home.
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was
afflicted with "Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his
impulsive behavior, delinquency and instability."5 Gates concluded
that Jordan’s psychological maladies antedate their marriage and
are rooted in his family background. Gates added that with no
indication of reformation, Jordan’s personality disorder appears to
be grave and incorrigible.
Jordan denied Jeanice’s allegations. Jordan asserted that Jeanice
exaggerated her statements against him. Jordan said that Jeanice
has her own personal insecurities and that her actions showed her
lack of maturity, childishness and emotional inability to cope with
the struggles and challenges of maintaining a married life.
Jordan also objected to the psychological report offered by
Jeanice. Jordan pointed out that he was not subjected to any
interview or psychological tests by Gates. Jordan argued that
Gates’ conclusions were mere speculations, conjectures and
suppositions from the information supplied by Jeanice. Jordan
alleged that it was patently one-sided and is not admissible in
evidence as it was based on hearsay statements of Jeanice which
were obviously self-serving. Jordan said he wants Jeanice back and
prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 13 May 2003, the trial court granted Jeanice’s petition. The trial
court declared that Jordan’s psychological incapacity, which was
specifically identified as "Borderline Personality Disorder,"
deprived him of the capacity to fully understand his responsibilities
under the marital bond. The trial court found that Jordan was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage, particularly Articles 686 and 707 of the
Family Code. The trial court also declared that Jordan’s
psychological incapacity, being rooted in his family background,
antedates the marriage and that without any sign of reformation,
found the same to be grave and incurable.
The dispositve portion of the trial court’s 13 May 2003 Decision
reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the marriage between petitioner Jeanice Pavon Paz and
respondent Jordan Chan Paz celebrated on July 3, 1997 and
September 21, 1997 as null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code with all the effects provided by law.
The couple’s absolute community of properties [sic] shall be
dissolved in the manner herein provided. And the custody over
Evan shall remain with the petitioner, without regard to visitation
rights of the respondent as the father of the child. Furthermore,
the parties are jointly responsible for the support of their minor
child Evan Guabert Pavon Paz.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of
Quezon City and Pasig City respectively as well as the National
Statistics Office (NSO, CRP, Legal Department) EDSA, Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.8
On 6 June 2003, Jordan filed a Notice of Appeal.9 The trial court
promptly approved Jordan’s appeal.
On 10 February 2004, Jeanice filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal with
the Court of Appeals.10 In her motion, Jeanice sought the
immediate dismissal of Jordan’s appeal on the ground that Jordan
failed to comply with Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC11 which
provides:
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(1) Pre-condition. No appeal from the decision shall be allowed
unless the appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration or new
trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.
On 9 August 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jordan’s appeal.
According to the Court of Appeals, the rules state in mandatory
and categorical terms that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is a pre-condition before an appeal
from the decision is allowed. The Court of Appeals added that
when the law is clear and unambiguous, it admits no room for
interpretation but merely for application.
Jordan filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 26 November 2004
Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the motion.
Hence, this petition.
In a minute Resolution dated 22 June 2005, we denied Jordan’s
petition for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error in the challenged resolutions as to
warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate
jurisdiction.12
On 18 August 2005, Jordan filed a motion for reconsideration.
While Jordan admits that he failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s 13 May 2003 Decision, Jordan
submits that Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC should not have
been strictly applied against him because it took effect only on 15
March 2003, or less than two months prior to the rendition of the
trial court’s 13 May 2003 Decision. Moreover, Jordan enjoins the
Court to decide the case on the merits so as to preserve the
sanctity of marriage as enshrined in the Constitution.
Jeanice also filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration
on 1 September 2005.13
In a minute Resolution dated 19 September 2005, we granted
Jordan’s motion for reconsideration and reinstated the petition. 14
Jeanice filed a motion for reconsideration. In a minute Resolution
dated 5 June 2006, we denied Jeanice’s motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.15
On 7 August 2006, Jeanice filed a second motion for
reconsideration.
In a minute Resolution dated 20 September 2006, we denied
Jeanice’s second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and
reminded Jeanice that a second motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading.16
The Issue
The only issue left to be resolved is whether Jordan is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Jeanice Failed to Prove Jordan’s Psychological Incapacity
Jeanice’s petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored
on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court first declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. It must be confined "to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage."18
In Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court explained:
(a) Gravity – It must be grave and serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;
(b) Judicial Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.20
In granting Jeanice’s petition, the trial court gave credence to the
testimony of Gates to support its conclusion that Jordan was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. Gates declared that Jordan was suffering from
 "Borderline Personality Disorder" as manifested by his being a
"mama’s boy" and that such was "grave and incurable," "rooted in
his family background, [and] antedates the marriage."
Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a
physician or a psychologist, there is nevertheless a need to prove
the psychological incapacity through independent evidence
adduced by the person alleging said disorder. 21
Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. 22
In this case, the Court notes that the report and testimony of Gates
on Jordan’s psychological incapacity were based exclusively on her
interviews with Jeanice and the transcript of stenographic notes of
Jeanice’s testimony before the trial court.23 Gates only diagnosed
Jordan from the statements of Jeanice, whose bias in favor of her
cause cannot be doubted. Gates did not actually hear, see and
evaluate Jordan. Gates testified:
Q- As a last question Madam witness. So all in all your
conclusions here on page 1 to page 5 of your Report are
all based on the statement and perception of the
petitioner (Jeanice) on the respondent (Jordan)?
A- Yes Mam.24
Consequently, Gates’ report and testimony were hearsay evidence
since she had no personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was
testifying on.25 Gates’ testimony should have thus been dismissed
for being unscientific and unreliable.26
Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Jordan’s alleged
psychological incapacity was not shown to be so grave and so
permanent as to deprive him of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond. At best, Jeanice’s
allegations showed that Jordan was irresponsible, insensitive, or
emotionally immature. The incidents cited by Jeanice do not show
that Jordan suffered from grave psychological maladies that
paralyzed Jordan from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage.
What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.27 The mere showing of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" does not
constitute psychological incapacity.28
In Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris,29 we said:
As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or
isolated characteristics associated with certain personality
disorders, there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to marriage.30
Furthermore, Gates did not particularly describe the "pattern of
behavior" which showed that Jordan indeed suffers from
Borderline Personality Disorder. Gates also failed to explain how
such a personality disorder made Jordan psychologically
incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband.
Likewise, Jeanice was not able to establish with certainty that
Jordan’s alleged psychological incapacity was medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Gates’ testimony on the matter was vague
and inconclusive. Gates testified:
Q - Now is this disorder curable?
A - If it’s continuing to the present therefore its
persevererative behavior. Then the possibility of
countering the same might be nil.31
Gates did not adequately explain how she came to the conclusion
that Jordan’s condition was incurable.
In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by Jeanice failed to
show that Jordan was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations and that such incapacity was
grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of
their marriage.1avvphi1
In Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio,32 we said:
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening
the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution
protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the
parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the
burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.33
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 9 August
2004 and 26 November 2004 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
We REVERSE the 13 May 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Branch 69. The marriage of Jeanice Pavon Paz to Jordan
Chan Paz subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011
ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner,
vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October
2006 Decision2 and the 12 March 2007 Order3of the Regional Trial
Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-
01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent)
were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living
together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996,
petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14
January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of
Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged
that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and
support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the
family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting
with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further
alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times
become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent
who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in
the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons,
respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the
reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed
a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner,
which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May
2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent
married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor found that
there were no indicative facts of collusion between the parties and
the case was set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a
psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained
in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that
respondent’s disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition
on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited to
comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented,
petitioner was able to establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayag’s
psychological report, the allegations in the complaint,
substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of
psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court found
that respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed
petitioner and the rest of the family, and that respondent failed to
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her under
Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that
respondent abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce
abroad and married another man.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M.
DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14,
1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID
from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of
property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be
issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family
Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of
the Solicitor General, Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Piñas City
and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning
the dissolution of the absolute community of property and the
ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the
motion and modified its 18 October 2006 Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M.
DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14,
1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID
from the beginning; and
 2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of
property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the
Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City
and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information
and guidance.5
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it
ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article
147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to
Article 147 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that
in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void,8 such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or
her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned
in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith,
the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants,
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take
place upon termination of the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements
must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry
each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question
that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property
relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that
a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed
under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the
Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity
or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1)
of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and
(5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to
liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of
annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage
is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of
the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for
liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes
of all common children, computed as of the date of the final
judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or
sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially
approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may
ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in
no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children
accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the
value of the properties already received under the decree of
annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on
their legitime.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void
under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or
45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-
ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of
parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code.16The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
"[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by
judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with
the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision
without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of

the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab
initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the
Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply
to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of
the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for
the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a

second or bigamous marriage was contracted.1avvphilUnder
Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Thus we ruled:

x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to

be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage
void.11

Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable

marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set
aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for
annulment.12 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the
marriages are governed either by absolute community of
property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties
agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property
relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of
G.R. No. 171557 February 12, 2014 For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear
during trial, despite service of summons.18Nonetheless, she
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, informed the court that she submitted herself for psychiatric
vs. examination to Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to
RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, Respondent. Rodolfo’s claims.19 Rodolfo also underwent the same
examination.20
DECISION
In her two-page psychiatric evaluation report,21 Dr. Zalsos stated
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations,
finding that both parties suffered from "utter emotional
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior
Decision2 dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution3 dated February 3,
considered [as] deviant from persons who abide by established
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69103 which
norms of conduct."22 As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that
affirmed the Decision4 dated October 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial
she lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to
Court of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11 (RTC) in Civil Case No. S-
her two daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his
665 declaring the marriage of respondent Rodolfo O. De Gracia
obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired a son with
(Rodolfo) and Natividad N. Rosalem (Natividad) void on the ground
another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental
of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
condition of both parties already existed at the time of the
Code of the Philippines5 (Family Code).
celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after. Based
on the foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the "couple’s union
The Facts
was bereft of the mind, will and heart for the obligations of
marriage."23
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the
Parish of St. Vincent Ferrer in Salug, Zamboanga del Norte.6 They
On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two (2)
representing petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed
children, namely, Ma. Reynilda R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and
an opposition24 to the complaint, contending that the acts
Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza), who were born on August 20, committed by Natividad did not demonstrate psychological
1969 and January 15, 1972, respectively.7
incapacity as contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for legal
separation under the Family Code.25
On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage (complaint) before the RTC,
The RTC Ruling
docketed as Civil Case No. S-665, alleging that Natividad was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
In a Decision26 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC declared the
obligations. In compliance with the Order8 dated January 5, 1999
marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad void on the ground of
of the RTC, the public prosecutor conducted an investigation to
psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of
determine if collusion exists between Rodolfo and Natividad and
Dr. Zalsos, holding that Natividad’s emotional immaturity exhibited
found that there was none.9 Trial on the merits then ensued.
a behavioral pattern which in psychiatry constitutes a form of
personality disorder that existed at the time of the parties’
In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that
marriage but manifested only thereafter. It likewise concurred with
he first met Natividad when they were students at the Barangay
Dr. Zalsos’s observation that Natividad’s condition is incurable
High School of Sindangan,10 and he was forced to marry her barely
since it is deeply rooted within the make-up of her personality.
three (3) months into their courtship in light of her accidental
Accordingly, it concluded that Natividad could not have known,
pregnancy.11 At the time of their marriage, he was 21 years old,
much more comprehend the marital obligations she was assuming,
while Natividad was 18 years of age. He had no stable job and
or, knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption
merely worked in the gambling cockpits as "kristo" and "bangkero
thereof.27
sa hantak." When he decided to join and train with the
army,12 Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their house
The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that there was no
without his consent.13 Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog City
showing that Natividad’s personality traits constituted
where she lived with a certain Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore
psychological incapacity as envisaged under Article 36 of the
him a child named Julie Ann Terez.14 After cohabiting with Terez,
Family Code, and that the testimony of the expert witness was not
Natividad contracted a second marriage on January 11, 1991 with
conclusive upon the court.28
another man named Antonio Mondarez and has lived since then
with the latter in Cagayan de Oro City.15 From the time Natividad
abandoned them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. The CA Ruling
Reynilda and Ma. Rizza16 and he exerted earnest efforts to save
their marriage which, however, proved futile because of In a Decision29 dated June 2, 2005, the CA affirmed the ruling of
Natividad’s psychological incapacity that appeared to be the RTC, finding that while Natividad’s emotional immaturity,
incurable.17 irresponsibility and promiscuity by themselves do not necessarily
equate to psychological incapacity, "their degree or severity, as
duly testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has sufficiently established a case of
psychological disorder so profound as to render [Natividad]
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations." 30
The Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however,
denied in a Resolution31 dated February 3, 2006, hence, the instant
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in
sustaining the RTC’s finding of psychological incapacity.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under
Article 3632 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a
mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed in Article 6833 of the Family Code, among
others,34 include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.35 In Santos v. CA36 (Santos), the Court first declared
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity
(i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c)
incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved). 37 The
Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the
Phils. v. CA,38 whose salient points are footnoted
hereunder.39 These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements
that the Court established in Santos.40
Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA,41 held that
therein respondent’s emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make her completely unable to discharge the
essential marital obligations of the marital state, not merely due to
her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.42 In the same light,
the Court, in the case of Pesca v. Pesca43 (Pesca), ruled against a
declaration of nullity, as petitioner therein "utterly failed, both in
her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a
case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let
alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant
a declaration of nullity of the marriage," significantly noting that
the "[e]motional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her,
cannot be equated with psychological incapacity." In Pesca, the
Court upheld the appellate court’s finding that the petitioner
therein had not established that her husband "showed signs of
mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the
Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the
marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital
responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness;
that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically
or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the
incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature."44
The Court maintains a similar view in this case.1âwphi1 Based on
the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal
basis to conclude that Natividad’s emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with
psychological incapacity.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric
evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos which does not, however, explain in
reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be characterized as
grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of
psychological incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose
the types of psychological tests which she administered on Natividad,
Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of Natividad's
condition and to show that it existed at the time of the parties'
marriage. Neither was the gravity or seriousness of Natividad's
behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential marital
obligations sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsos's report. Further, the
finding contained therein on the incurability of Natividad's condition
remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and, hence,
appears to be drawn out as a bare conclusion and even self-serving. In
the same vein, Dr. Zalsos's testimony during trial, which is essentially a
reiteration of her report, also fails to convince the Court of her
conclusion that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated. Verily,
although expert opm10ns furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable
weight by the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must
still be proven by independent evidence.45 After poring over the
records, the Court, however, does not find any such evidence
sufficient enough to uphold the court a quo's nullity declaration. To
the Court's mind, Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and to
assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the
parties' marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically
incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's
duties is another. To hark back to what has been earlier discussed,
psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.46 In the final
analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of this nature to exist
in the present case. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too with the
recognition that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family,47 the instant petition is hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2,
2005 and Resolution dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 69103 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36
of the Family Code is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,1 the Court
dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage
of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in
setting aside the trial court's Decision for lack of legal and factual
basis.
xxxx
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife
(respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented
the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts
or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.
Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of
respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their
children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged
habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and
quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife,
constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or
underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not
actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence
refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played
mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent
admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she
engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as
a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations
that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was
only two to three times a week and always with the permission of
her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The
children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother
when she played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did
not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the
mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her
family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the
second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to
prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the
years when these two children were in second grade. This was not
done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played
mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on
the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged
constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and
obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof
whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons
orher frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario
(an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in
order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but
Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other
men. Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was able to prove
that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that
one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with
obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per
seis a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually
engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is
no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the
opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show
that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not
once did the children state that they were neglected by their
mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them,
was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It
appears that respondent made real efforts tosee and take care of
her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was
no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of
familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio
and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having
tutors, there is nothing to link their academic short comings to
Malyn’s actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual
basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no
error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there was
psychological incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely
summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the
respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of
these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight
of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which
can serve as bases for its legal conclusionof psychological
incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps,
infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the
best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may
be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological
incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15,
2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.2
In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the
Court to take a thorough second look into what constitutes
psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as
supported by the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and
consequently to find that the respondent, if not both parties, were
psychologically incapacitated to perform their respective essential
marital obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
I
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration
of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family Code
has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has
usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the
sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted
the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It
appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision
Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end
they decided to adopt the provision "with less specificity than
expected" in order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its
application."4Illustrative of the "less specificity than expected" has
been the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give
any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited
the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of
ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that the courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that
had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been
taken from the Canon Law.5
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of
Appeals,6 the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a ground
for the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that the term
psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family
Code"has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases
of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances," and could not be taken and construed
independently of "but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage." Thus correlated:-
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The
law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability
of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."7
In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some
guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
— not physical, althoughits manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician
may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot
be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36
was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family
Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith
of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to
our law on evidence — whatis decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, inview of the evident source
and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards
the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and
the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.9
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that
their application to every instance practically condemned the
petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection.
But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too
literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the
drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously
to enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead, every court
should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its
own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on
"all fours" with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity
as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge
must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate
court must, asmuch as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court."10
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity
as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are
concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology,
must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at
an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for
the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the
in-depth diagnosis by experts.11
II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or
non-existence of a party’s psychological incapacity should be final
and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the
testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be
clearly and manifestly erroneous.12 In every situation where the
findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts
and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should
restrain itself from substituting its own judgment. 13 It is not
enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial
court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because
the Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage as an
inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of
the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution14 only relates to a valid marriage. No
protection can be accordedto a marriage that is null and void ab
initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.15
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts
really assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as
an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is
thereby made all the more strong and solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court
deserved credence because it was in the better position to view
and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were
testifying.16 The position and role of the trial judge in the
appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity
were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due
importance and respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside
the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and Fr.
Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely
based on the petitioner’s version of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and
unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized
consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as
inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage.
Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently
described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within
the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the
conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they
were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and
should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted
the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.17
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the
petitioner’s testimony, as well as on her interviews of the
petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her
findings would seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it
was not right to disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all,
her expert opinion took into consideration other factors extant in
the records, including the own opinions of another expert who had
analyzed the issue from the side of the respondent herself.
Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must accord weight
to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the
parties in cases for the declaration of the nullityof marriages, for by
the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts,
"despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making,
must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence
the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments
of the parties."18
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to
enable the trial court to properly determine the issue of
psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the
petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal examination and
interview of the person diagnosed with personality disorder, like
the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the
experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos19 that there is
no requirement for one to bedeclared psychologically
incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because
what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately
establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to."20
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a
certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of
facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible
and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other
evidence on the causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on
psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or
speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of
other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under
such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify
their exclusion as evidence.22 This is so, considering that any ruling
that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr.
Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that
her psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties’
upbringing and psychodynamics.23 In that context, Dr. Gates’
expertopinion should be considered not in isolation but along with
the other evidence presented here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological
incapacity, the trial court was expectedto compare the expert
findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s own
witness, and those of Dr. Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that
the respondent had "compulsive and dependent tendencies" to
the extent of being "relationship dependent." Based from the
respondent’s psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:
In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and
seemingly detached in her ways. Although she likes to be around
people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her
relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her
affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult for her since she tries to
maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for rejection.
To others, Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her ways.
She can be assertive when opinions contrary to those of her own
are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a dependent person. At a
less conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her.
Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an enormous value on
having significant others would depend on most times.
xxxx
But the minute she started to care, she became a different
person— clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly
demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in
his life. She became relationship-dependent.25
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon
Clinical Multiaxial Inventory test26 conducted on the respondent,
observing that the respondent obtained high scores on
dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to wit:
Atty. Bretania
Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?
A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73
percental round and there are several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw
obtained very high score and these are on the score of
dependency, narcissism and compulsion.
Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the
acceptable score?
A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very
significant. So, if 72 and below, it will be considered as acceptable.
Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?
A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79;
under compulsiveness, it is 84.27
It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but
corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to the effect that the
respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality
Disorder as well as with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly
testified:
ATTY. GONONG
Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite
familiar with psychology terms. So, more or less, could you please
tell me in more layman’s terms how you arrived at your findings
that the respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?
A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask
about her childhood background, her fatherdied in a vehicular
accident when she was in her teens and thereafter she was
prompted to look for a job to partly assume the breadwinner’s role
in her family. I gathered that paternal grandmother partly took
care of her and her siblings against the fact that her own mother
was unable to carry out her respective duties and responsibilities
towards Elena Fernandez and her siblings considering that the
husband died prematurely. And there was an indication that Elena
Fernandez on several occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot
blame her for being negligent as a mother because she herself
never experienced the care and affection of her own mother
herself. So, there is a precedent in her background, in her
childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate a particular script, we
call it in psychology a script, the tendency to repeat somekind of
experience or the lack of care, let’s say some kind of deprivation,
there is a tendency to sustain it even on to your own life when you
have your own family. I did interview the son because I was not
satisfied with what I gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio and
even though as a young son at the age of fourteen already
expressed the he could not see, according to the child, the sincerity
of maternal care on the part of Elena and that he preferred to live
with the father actually.
Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that
respondent is self-centered and narcissistic?
A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a
deprived childhood and she is still insearch of this. In her several
boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend to
another. There is this need for attention, this need for love on
other people.
Q : And that led you to conclude?
A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point
of neglecting her duty as a wife and as a mother.28
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a
mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the
assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts
that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which
the logic of her conclusion is founded.29 Hence, we should weigh
and consider the probative value of the findings of the expert
witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence available.
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law
expert, an advocate before the Manila Archdiocese and
Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision
Committee. Regarding Father Healy’s expert testimony, we have
once declared that judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity could be informed by evolving standards, taking into
account the particulars of each case, by current trends in
psychological and even by canonical thought, and by
experience.30 It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of
psychological incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the Family
Code was derived from Canon Law.
Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the
respondent’s level of immaturity and irresponsibility with regard to
her own children and to her husband constituted psychological
incapacity, testifying thusly:
ATTY. MADRID
Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not
psychologically incapacitated. On the facts as you read it based on
the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can you
say to that claim of respondent?
A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because
of her immaturity and traumatic irresponsibility with regards to her
own children.
Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she
is not psychologically incapacitated is not true?
A : Yes. It should be rejected.
Q : Why do you say so?
A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle,
inconsistent pattern has been manifested running through their
life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility
because her family was dysfunctional and then her being a model
in her early life and being the bread winner of the family put her in
an unusual position of prominence and then begun to inflate her
own ego and she begun to concentrate her own beauty and that
became an obsession and that led to her few responsibility of
subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that she had
embraced.
Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the
impact. How about the impact on the relationship of the
respondent with her husband?
A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill
her obligation to her husband and toher children. She had her own
priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and
associating with friends. They were the priorities of her life.
Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely
secondary?
A : Secondary.
Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?
A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations
of marriage which everybody takes for granted. The concentration
on the husband and the children before everything else would be
subordinated to the marriage withher. It’s the other way around.
Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong,
they were their priorities in her life.
Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call
this?
A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is
from a myt[h]ical case in Roman history.
Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?
A : It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the
loss of a dear friend as in the case of Narcissus, the myth, and then
that became known in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a
person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and
protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her life.
xxxx
Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism.
How do you consider this narcissism afflicting respondent, it is
grave, slight or ….?
A : I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of neglect of her
family and that causes serious obligations which she has ignored
and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with
herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.
Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism
afflicting respondent was already existing at the time or marriage
or even thereafter?
xxxx
A : When you get married you don’t develop narcissism or
psychological incapacity. You bring with you into the marriage and
then it becomes manifested because in marriage you accept these
responsibilities. And now you show that you don’t accept them and
you are not capable of fulfilling them and you don’t care about
them.
Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital
or what?
A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and
still the family was depended [sic] upon her and she was a model
at Hyatt and then Rustan’s, it began to inflate her ego so much that
this became the top priority in her life. It’s her lifestyle.
Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even
expanded after the marriage?
A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after
the marriage because she was neglecting such fundamental
obligations.
Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or
clinically curable, this narcissism that you mentioned?
A : Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was
found in her family background situation. Say, almost for sure
would be incurable now.
Q : What specific background are you referring to?
A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the
breadwinner and her beauty was so important to give in her job
and money and influence and so on. But this is a very unusual
situation for a young girl and her position in the family was exalted
in a very very unusual manner and therefore she had that pressure
on her and in her accepting the pressure, in going along with it and
putting it in top priority.31
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father
Healy’s opinions and findings commanded respect. The
contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the judicial
determination of the parties’ psychological incapacity was
substantive and instructive. He could thereby inform the trial court
on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the nullity of
marriage, and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an
analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to the courts as
psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard
his opinions and findings. Appreciating them together with those
of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the cause of
justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but,
instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases.
Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked
togive professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the
time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and
tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this
area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There
was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link
between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage
from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of
this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases
that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of
marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability
to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitmentare now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all
kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right
of the spouses to each other's body for hetero sexual acts, but is,
in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e.,
the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since
1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity
for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be `other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that
the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship
because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a
true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the
strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship
and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in
isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements
necessary to the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among
the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with
its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values;
(2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who
doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any
other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological
category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was
on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of
the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out
their responsibilities and obligations as promised(lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as
promisedat the time the marriage was entered into."
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of
presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a
party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is
no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the
totalityof evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis,
that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and
in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity.33
Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended
consequences of strictly applying the standards set in Molina, 34 the
courts should consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, viz:
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the
case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as
so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,
thus:
xxxx
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s
membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice
(later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred "in the result" and another three--including, as
aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains to compose their individual
separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according
to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all
fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much
as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court."
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has
applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the
law's clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as
"courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to
impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all
cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was
then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of
marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on
people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume
little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far fromwhat was intended by the Court, Molina has
become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by
it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying
Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, tocontinuously debase
and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota
has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of
the said individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy
provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by the State,
through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between
the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather
be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse,
child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's
psychological incapacity, the Court isnot demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It
may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
and psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly. Let itbe noted that in Article 36, there is no
marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the
very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity
under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.
xxxx
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment
of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by
Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals.35
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as
follows:
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that
she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her
duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s
allegations that she played four to five times a week. She
maintained it was only two to three times a week and always
withthe permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that
theywere with their mother when she played mahjong in their
relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his
own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that
respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of
his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this
episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could
have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s
mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in
second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute
that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency
and adverse effect on the children were not proven.36 (Emphasis
supplied)
The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not
have delimited our determination of the presence or absence of
psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her
obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of
parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully
appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have
known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her
mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and
other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive
mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on
her very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures
made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw37 – the parties’ eldest son – in his
deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father that
his mother had been hooked on playing mahjong, viz:
ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parent’s separation, do
you remember any habit or activity or practice which your mother
engaged in, before the separation?
WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to
play mahjong a lot, and I can’t remember.
xxxx
ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong
frequently. How frequent, do you remember?
WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I can’t, I can’t…
ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one
session?
WITNESS : Really long cuz’we would go to my aunt’s house in
White Plains and I think we would get there by lunch then leave,
we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON:
You, you went there? She brought you?
WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers &
sisters.
ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?
WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess she’d
go out by herself.38
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her
mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental
duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a
culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the
culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was
a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for
parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist
desires. This was the observation of Father Healy himself. In that
regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the current
psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her own
childhood experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s
moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as
a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly
defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to
wit:
Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over
the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental
authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for and rearing
of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the
development of their moral, mental and physical character and
well-being.
Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority
shall have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards
the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate
and instruct them by right precept and good example, and
to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their
means;
(2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance,
inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-
reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in
civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the
duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their
physical and mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome
educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect them from
bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits
detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into
consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect that both the
petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically
incapacitated, and thus could not assume the essential obligations
of marriage. The RTC would not have found so without the
allegation to that effect by the respondent in her
answer,39 whereby she averred that it was not she but the
petitioner who had suffered from psychological incapacity.
The allegation of the petitioner’spsychological incapacity was
substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:
ATTY. BRETAÑA:
Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally
immature?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was
behaviorally immature?
A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had
noticed already some of those short temper of the petitioner but
she was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and even
the time that they were together, that they were living in, she also
had noticed some of his psychological deficits if we may say so. But
as I said, because she is also dependent and she was one who
determined to make the relationship work, she was denying even
those kinds of problems that she had seen.
Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here of the
petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to conclude that Mr. Kalaw
was behaviorally immature?
A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not
duly stable then. He was not really thinking of marriage except that
his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry her.
And even that time he was not also a monogamous person.
Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to
marry lied on the petitioner? A : I think so, Sir.
Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that
the petitioner admitted to you that in his younger years he was
often out seeking other women. I’m referring specifically to page
18. He also admitted to you that the thought of commitment
scared him, the petitioner. Now, given these admissions by
petitioner to you, my questions is, is it possible for such a person to
enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment and given his
admission that he was a womanizer? Is it possible for this person
to stop his womanizing ways during the marriage?
A : Sir, it’s difficult.
Q : It would be difficult for that person?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing
after marriage?
A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only
20%.
Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during
his marriage with the respondent?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of
the petitioner insofar as his psychological capacity to perform his
duties as a husband is concerned?
A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also
to be fully committed to the role of husband to Malyn.
Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on
whether the petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner
was behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a mistake.
Now, may I asked [sic] you that question again and request you to
answer that directly?
A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to
prove the nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the defendant
spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her husband
because she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are
justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the
respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other
as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed,
psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of
them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted
ways. By now, they must have already accepted and come to terms
with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the
eyes of the law, was already beyond repair. Both parties had
inflicted so much damage not only to themselves, but also to the
lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater
injustice should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage,
and then force them and their children to endure some more
damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero
decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to
give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel
the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical
purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the
ruling the Court makes today.1âwphi1 It is not, in effect, directly or
indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a
"habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with
another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate
children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his
wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought
from her and towhich he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a
sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not
constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny
to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life
by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife’s
psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning
because the respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity
at and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should
not hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage between the
parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to
the basic foundation of our society does not preclude striking Article 36 of the Family Code.
down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life,"
thus: No pronouncement on costs of suit.

Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common SO ORDERED.

legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration
of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in
denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and
2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that
"[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the
importance of the family and the constitutional protection
accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of

state protection to marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature
to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy
and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political
influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the
qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls
on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional
provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been
accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may
appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of
nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect
marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition
of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what
marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of
Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be
taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages
contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional
protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn
serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding
interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to
promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do
not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and
family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons
independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.42(Emphasis
supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration;

REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September
19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional
Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO
G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007
FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and
MEROPE E. BRAGANZA, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
1
This petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated August 6, 2004, which
reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan
City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage
between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza
void on the ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution 3 dated
January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on
June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan.4Thereafter, they migrated to
the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized
citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando
divorced in April 1988.5
Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando
married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.6 Contending
that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior
subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of
Dagupan City7 against Orlando and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack of
cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-
interest, but it was denied.9 Trial on the merits ensued.
On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff Felicitas
Amor Catalan and against defendants Orlando B. Catalan and
Merope E. Braganza, as follows:
1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with
Orlando B. Catalan is declared null and void ab initio;
2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay
plaintiff by way of moral damages the amount of
P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P200,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of
P50,000.00, including costs of this suit; and
3) The donation in consideration of marriage is ordered
revoked and the property donated is ordered awarded to
the heirs of Juliana Braganza.
Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. and
Atty. Nolan Evangelista.
SO ORDERED.10
Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal
and consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed decision.
We likewise DISMISS Civil Case No. D-10636, RTC, Branch 44,
Dagupan City. No costs.
SO ORDERED.11
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed
the instant petition for review raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT
TO QUESTION THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
RESPONDENTS;
II.
WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECLARE
THE QUESTIONED MARRIAGE VOID CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE
ERROR.12
Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the
respondents, which brought embarrassment to her and her
children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to
address her grievances and to protect her family from further
embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that the Court of
Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage
void despite overwhelming evidence and the state policy
discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.13
The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the
personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy. However,
this issue may not be resolved without first determining the
corollary factual issues of whether the petitioner and respondent
Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and
whether they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.
While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and
does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial of the
case,14 there are, however, exceptions to this rule, like when the
findings of facts of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are
conflicting, or when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based.15
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and
respondent Orlando were naturalized American citizens and that
they obtained a divorce decree in April 1988. However, after a
careful review of the records, we note that other than the
allegations in the complaint and the testimony during the trial, the
records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their
naturalization and divorce.
The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:
In light of the allegations of Felicitas’ complaint and the
documentary and testimonial evidence she presented, we deem it
undisputed that Orlando and Felicitas are American citizens and
had this citizenship status when they secured their divorce decree
in April 1988. We are not therefore dealing in this case with Filipino
citizens whose marital status is governed by the Family Code and
our Civil Code, but with American citizens who secured their
divorce in the U.S. and who are considered by their national law to
be free to contract another marriage. x x x16
Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of
the petitioner to refute or contest the allegation in respondents’
brief, that she and respondent Orlando were American citizens at
the time they secured their divorce in April 1988, as sufficient to
establish the fact of naturalization and divorce.17 We note that it
was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired
American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a
judicial divorce decree.18 It is settled rule that one who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.19
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two
basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.20 A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized
in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner.21 However, before it can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.22
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the
evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner has
the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition
if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the
divorce decree becomes absolute.23 In such case, the RTC would be
correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for being
bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between Eusebio
Bristol and respondent Merope,24 and the other, in Calasiao,
Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents. 25
However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and
which, following the national law of Orlando, does not restrict
remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that
petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses
no longer has any interest nor should each have the personality to
inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequently
contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no
existing interest in Orlando’s subsequent marriage since the
validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent
marriage will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and
Felicitas. x x x26
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time
the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is
no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate
"proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity
of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest 27 and must be
based on a cause of action.28 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog,29 the Court
held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their
stepmother as it affects their successional rights.1awphi1.net
Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically provides:
SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. —
(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence
of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a
remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional
evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando
was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which
granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that
a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow
respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but
reduce the amount of moral damages from ₱300,000.00 to
₱50,000.00 and exemplary damages from ₱200,000.00 to
₱25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the
trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of
marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks
legal personality to file the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED
to the trial court for its proper disposition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.