G.R. No.

103302 August 12, 1993

NATALIA REALTY, INC., AND ESTATE DEVELOPERS AND INVESTORS CORP., petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SEC. BENJAMIN T. LEONG and DIR. WILFREDO LEANO, DAR REGION
IV, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
Are lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and
its precursor agencies 1 prior to 15 June 1988, 2 covered by R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988? This is the pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari assailing the Notice of Coverage 3 of the Department of Agrarian Reform over
parcels of land already reserved as townsite areas before the enactment of the law.
Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. (NATALIA, for brevity) is the owner of three (3) contiguous parcels of land located in Banaba, Antipolo,
Rizal, with areas of 120.9793 hectares, 1.3205 hectares and 2.7080 hectares, or a total of 125.0078 hectares, and embraced in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 31527 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal.
On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo
and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan
Townsite. The NATALIA properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation.
Since private landowners were allowed to develop their properties into low-cost housing subdivisions within the reservation, petitioner
Estate Developers and Investors Corporation (EDIC, for brevity), as developer of NATALIA properties, applied for and was granted
preliminary approval and locational clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. The necessary permit for Phase I of the
subdivision project, which consisted of 13.2371 hectares, was issued sometime in 1982; 4 for Phase II, with an area of 80,000 hectares, on
13 October 1983; 5 and for Phase III, which consisted of the remaining 31.7707 hectares, on 25 April 1986. 6 Petitioner were likewise issued
development permits 7 after complying with the requirements. Thus the NATALIA properties later became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.
On 15 June 1988, R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988" (CARL, for brevity), went into
effect. Conformably therewith, respondent Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity), through its Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer, issued on 22 November 1990 a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which consisted
of roughly 90.3307 hectares. NATALIA immediately registered its objection to the notice of Coverage.
EDIC also protested to respondent Director Wilfredo Leano of the DAR Region IV Office and twice wrote him requesting the cancellation
of the Notice of Coverage.
On 17 January 1991, members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA, for the brevity), filed a complaint against
NATALIA and EDIC before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA
members. 8 The Regional Adjudicator temporarily restrained petitioners from proceeding with the development of the subdivision.
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the complaint; it was denied. Instead, the Regional Adjudicator issued on 5 March 1991 a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioners NATALIA and EDIC elevated their cause to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB); however, on 16 December 1991 the
DARAB merely remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator for further proceedings. 9
In the interim, NATALIA wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request to set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither
respondent Secretary nor respondent Director took action on the protest-letters, thus compelling petitioners to institute this proceeding more
than a year thereafter.
NATALIA and EDIC both impute grave abuse of discretion to respondent DAR for including undedeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision within the coverage of the CARL. They argue that NATALIA properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were
included in the areas reserved by presidential fiat for the townsite reservation.
Public respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General dispute this contention. They maintain that the permits granted petitioners
were not valid and binding because they did not comply with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise
known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree," in that no application for conversion of the NATALIA lands
from agricultural residential was ever filed with the DAR. In other words, there was no valid conversion. Moreover, public respondents
allege that the instant petition was prematurely filed because the case instituted by SAMBA against petitioners before the DAR Regional
Adjudicator has not yet terminated. Respondents conclude, as a consequence, that petitioners failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies
available to them before coming to court.
The petition is impressed with merit. A cursory reading of the Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearances as well as the Development
Permits granted petitioners for Phases I, II and III of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision reveals that contrary to the claim of public respondents,
petitioners NATALIA and EDIC did in fact comply with all the requirements of law.
Petitioners first secured favorable recommendations from the Lungsod Silangan Development Corporation, the agency tasked to oversee
the implementation of the development of the townsite reservation, before applying for the necessary permits from the Human Settlements
Regulatory
Commission. 10 And, in all permits granted to petitioners, the Commission
stated invariably therein that the applications were in "conformance" 11 or "conformity" 12 or "conforming" 13 with the implementing
Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957. Hence, the argument of public respondents that not all of the requirements were complied
with cannot be sustained.
As a matter of fact, there was even no need for petitioners to secure a clearance or prior approval from DAR. The NATALIA properties
were within the areas set aside for the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Since Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 created the townsite
reservation for the purpose of providing additional housing to the burgeoning population of Metro Manila, it in effect converted for
residential use what were erstwhile agricultural lands provided all requisites were met. And, in the case at bar, there was compliance with
all relevant rules and requirements. Even in their applications for the development of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, the predecessor agency
of HLURB noted that petitioners NATALIA and EDIC complied with all the requirements prescribed by P.D. 957.
The implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957 applied to all subdivisions and condominiums in general. On the other
hand, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 referred only to the Lungsod Silangan Reservation, which makes it a special law. It is a basic
tenet in statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the latter prevails. 14
Interestingly, the Office of the Solicitor General does not contest the conversion of portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which have
already been developed. 15 Of course, this is contrary to its earlier position that there was no valid conversion. The applications for the
developed and undeveloped portions of subject subdivision were similarly situated. Consequently, both did not need prior DAR approval.
We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless
of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is
referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land." 16 The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands
which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands." 17
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as
"agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in
the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at
a snail's pace. This can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from
continuing with such development. The enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but
this does not detract from the fact that these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-
agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations
Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, 18 DAR itself defined "agricultural land" thus —
. . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning
ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June
1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to
include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.
Be that as it may, the Secretary of Justice, responding to a query by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, noted in an Opinion 19 that lands
covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, inter alia, of which the NATALIA lands are part, having been reserved for townsite
purposes "to be developed as human settlements by the proper land and housing agency," are "not deemed 'agricultural lands' within the
meaning and intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657. " Not being deemed "agricultural lands," they are outside the coverage of CARL.
Anent the argument that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies in the instant petition, suffice it to say that the issues raised in
the case filed by SAMBA members differ from those of petitioners. The former involve possession; the latter, the propriety of including
under the operation of CARL lands already converted for residential use prior to its effectivity.
Besides, petitioners were not supposed to wait until public respondents acted on their letter-protests, this after sitting it out for almost a year.
Given the official indifference, which under the circumstances could have continued forever, petitioners had to act to assert and protect their
interests. 20
In fine, we rule for petitioners and hold that public respondents gravely abused their discretion in issuing the assailed Notice of Coverage
of 22 November 1990 by of lands over which they no longer have jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Notice of Coverage of 22 November 1990 by virtue of which undeveloped
portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision were placed under CARL coverage is hereby SET ASIDE.

[G.R. No. 86889 : December 4, 1990.]

192 SCRA 51
LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, Respondent.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the Honorable
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure Implementing
Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in
violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner.

As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case, is as follows:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in
its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).

On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit
Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).

On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657
(Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).

Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same
business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and
Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).: rd

Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ
of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to
apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.

This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms' prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98).

Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the
injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).

The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).

On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as his Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186-187).

Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:

(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or
Agricultural Activity."

(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine
raising . . ."

(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to
be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 —

". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of
the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive:
Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper
application, determine a lower ceiling.

In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said
regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . ."

The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.:-cralaw

The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:

ARTICLE XIII

x x x

AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM

Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who
are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and
reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and
subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The
State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

x x x"

Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the correctness of the
decision of this Court in the case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R.
78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued that Congress in
enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131). Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in
this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers.
Indeed, there are many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for commercial livestock
and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other commercial livestock and
poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising of animals and birds. The use of
land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this industry. Including backyard raisers, about 80% of
those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy five hectares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo,
p. 11).

On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion
of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954),
defines the following words:

"Agriculture — the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and
management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.

It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .

Livestock — domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.

Farm — a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals." (Rollo, pp. 82-83).

The petition is impressed with merit.

The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure
Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).: rd

Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself. The words used in the
Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).

It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the
debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the
convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the
understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the
deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183
[1974]).

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that
it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.

The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth,
including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).

The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word
"ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential properties
because all of them fall under the general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not considered because
the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).
In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice), posed several questions, among others, quoted as
follows:

x x x

"Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of farmers and farmworkers. I wonder if it means that leasehold
tenancy is thereby proscribed under this provision because it speaks of the primary right of farmers and farmworkers to own directly or
collectively the lands they till. As also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers include those who work in piggeries and poultry
projects.

I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery or a poultry project and for that purpose hires
farmworkers therein, these farmworkers will automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or ultimately or collectively, the land
on which the piggeries and poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, p. 618).

x x x

The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:

x x x

"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin
inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm
worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial
activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry
lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21).

Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which
include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their
landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net
profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process (Rollo, p.
21).:-cralaw

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites
of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the
resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines,
Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R.
79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343).

However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or
act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution and God as
its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are
irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress
and Executive, the Court will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of these departments, or of any official,
betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989).

Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to
declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the
Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208
[1987]).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the
inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in
accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is
hereby MADE permanent.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27797 August 26, 1974

TRINIDAD GABRIEL, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, defendant-appellant.

This appeal from the decision, dated December 26, 1963, of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, was
certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals for the reason that the jurisdiction of an inferior court is involved.

During the pendency of this case before this Court, under date of April 29, 1972, Atty. Virgilio M. Pablo, counsel for the appellant
Eusebio Pangilinan, gave notice to this Court that said appellant died on April 3, 1964, and was survived by his children, who are his legal
heirs, namely: Salvador Pangilinan, Santos Pangilinan, Mariano Pangilinan, Carlos Pangilinan and Pilar Pangilinan de Avante. For the
purposes of this case the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan, therefore, is substituted by his heirs herein named.

Under date of November 20, 1973, Atty. Amando M. Laki filed a motion with this Court advising that appellee Trinidad Gabriel died on
June 14, 1967, and was survived by her heirs and successors-in-interest, namely: Corazon O. Gabriel, married to Lamberto Ignacio;
Ernesto O. Gabriel; Ester O. Gabriel, married to Emmanuel Padua; Generoso O. Gabriel, Marciano O. Gabriel and Pablo O. Gabriel, and
prayed that appellee Trinidad Gabriel be substituted by her heirs herein named. By order of this Court of December 4, 1973 the prayer for
substitution was granted.

In its resolution dated April 19, 1967 certifying the case to this Court, the Court of Appeals made the following findings, which We adopt:

On June 18, 1960 Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Eusebio Pangilinan alleging that
she is the owner of a fishpond situated in barrio Sta. Ursula, Betis, Pampanga and measuring about 169,507 square meters; that sometime
during the last war she entered into an oral contract of lease thereof with the defendant on a year to year basis, i.e., from January 1 to
December 31, at a rental of P1,200, plus the amount of real estate taxes, payable in advance in the month of January; that desiring to
develop and cultivate the fishpond by herself, she notified the defendant in a letter dated June 26, 1957 that she was terminating the
contract as of December 31, 1957; that upon request of the defendant, she extended the lease for another year; that on November 19, 1958
she again wrote the defendant that he should surrender possession of the fishpond on January 1, 1959, which demand he however ignored.
Plaintiff accordingly prayed that the defendant be ordered to restore the possession of the fishpond to her and to pay her P1,200, plus the
amount of real estate taxes, a year from 1959, attorney's fees and costs.

The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case which properly
pertains to the Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties. Upon
opposition by the plaintiff, the motion was denied. The defendant thereafter filed his answer with counterclaim alleging, inter alia, that the
land in question was originally leased to him, also verbally, by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano Gabriel in 1923 for as long as the
defendant wanted subject to the condition that he would convert the major portion into a fishpond and the part which was already a
fishpond be improved at his expense which would be reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the lease for
whatever cause; that when the plaintiff became the owner of the property through inheritance, she told the defendant that she would honor
her father's contract with the defendant, and likewise assured him that he could continue leasing the property, whose original rental of
P400.00 a year had been progressively increased to P1,200.00, for as long as he wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it
personally. As a special defense, the defendant reiterated the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to take cognizance of the case.

On February 12, 1962 the trial court issued an order herein below quoted in full:

The plaintiff sinks to eject the defendant from the fishpond described in the complaint which is under lease to the said defendant, who,
however, refuses to vacate. Instead, he has impugned the jurisdiction of this Court contending that the action should have been filed with
the Court of Agrarian Relations, which has original and exclusive jurisdiction, as their relationship is one of leasehold tenancy.

After the motion to dismiss was denied on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, the parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the
purpose of determining which Court shall take cognizance of the case.

It appears that the fishpond is presently in the possession of the defendant, who originally leased it from the father of the plaintiff. Upon
the death of the said father, the fishpond was inherited by the plaintiff. It is now covered by T.C.T. No. 1634 and is registered in her name.
It contains an area of 169,507.00 square meters. The rental is on a yearly basis.

It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the aid of helpers the aforecited fishpond since 1956 he became ill
and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over. She testified that she helps her father in administering the leased property,
conveying his instructions to the workers, Urbano Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The names of Ire, Juan and Aguedo
Viada have been mentioned as the laborers who were paid for the repair of the dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the defendant, acts
as the watcher. He has lived separately since he got married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan. who is residing near the fishpond, the other
children of the defendant are all professions; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in Manila. None of these persons has been
seen working on the fishpond.

The above are the material and pertinent facts upon which we enter this order.

After a study of the facts and in the light of the provisions of the Tenancy Law, Republic Act No. 1199, particularly Sections 4 and 9, as
amended. it seems clear that his case does not fall within the purview of said Act. The lease contract is manifestly a civil lease governed
by the New Civil Code. Considering the area of the fishpond, 16 hectares, more or less, the fact that neither the defendant, who is
physically incapacitated, or his daughter is Personally cultivating the fishpond or through the employment of mechanical farm
implements, and the further fact that the persons named above are not members of the immediate farm household of the defendant, the
conclusion is that no tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended.

We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold that this Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and decide this case. After this order has
become final, the plaintiff may request for the setting of the initial trial.

The defendant does not contest the findings of facts therein made by the trial court.

After the parties adduced their respective evidence on the merits, decision was rendered wherein the trial court Pursuant to Article 1197 of
the Civil Code, fixed the period of the low up to June 30, 1964, the defendant on said date to surrender possession of the fishpond to the
plaintiff and to pay the rentals due the latter. The plaintiff, on her part, was required upon surrender of on to her, to pay the defendant the
sum of P1,000.00 as reimbursement of the expenses he incurred in improving the fishpond, and upon failure by either party to pay the
amount due the other, the same would bear interest at the legal rate until full payment is made.

A reconsideration by the defendant having been denied, he appealed to this Court and assigned the following errors:

1. The lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant as that of a civil lease, in accordance with the Civil Code
of the Philippines and not a leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.

2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction, the cue being that of an agrarian relation in
nature pursuant to Rep Act. NO. 1199 as amended.

3. The lower court erred in appreciating the evidence of the appellant particularly the basis for the expenditure for the development of the
fishpond in question.

4. The lower court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the appellant in them easily amount of one thousand pesos for reimbursement
and for seven hundred pesos for the cost of the floodgate.

Anent the question of jurisdiction, it is an admitted fact that plaintiff leased the fishpond to the defendant in 1943 without a fixed term, the
annual rental payable at the end of the year (Exhibit C, Deposition of plaintiff, Dec. 13, 1962, pp. 2 and 3). It is likewise undisputed that
the work in the fishpond consisted in letting out the water so algae (lumut) would grow or if algae would not grow, getting some from the
river and putting them in the fishpond, changing the dirty water with fresh water, repairing leaks in the dikes, and planting of fingerlings
and attending to them; that these were done by defendant, with some help; that he personally attended to the fishpond until 1956 when he
became ill; that thereafter his nephew Bernardo Cayanan, who was living with him, helped in the work to be done in the fishpond and his
daughter Pilar Pangilinan helped in the management, conveying his instructions to the workers (t.s.n., pp. 4-8, Magat).

Upon the foregoing facts, the defendant insists that the relationship between the parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by
Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case is therefore within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains in effect that since defendant has
ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the members of his immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act No.
1199) the tenancy relationship between the parties has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and therefore the trial
court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.

It does appear that the controversy on the issue of jurisdiction calls for the interpretation of cultivating or working the land by the tenant
personally or with the aid of the members of his immediate farm household. 1

Those are the findings and conclusions of facts made by the Court of Appeals which, as a general rule, bind this Court. 2

1. Let Us now discuss the issues raised in this appeal. First, was the relationship between the appellee and appellant a leasehold tenancy or
a civil law lease?

There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to
agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the
leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or
work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the
purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas
leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws. 3

In order that leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act may exist, the following requisites must concur.

1. That the land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;

2. That the land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate farm household;

3. That the land must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm
household;

4. That the land belongs to another; and

5. That the use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both. 4

Were the foregoing requisites present in the instant case?

There is no doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to
"agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. Thus Section 46(c) of said Act
provides that "the consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds, salt beds and of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall be
governed by stipulation between the parties". This Court has already ruled that "land in which fish is produced is classified as agricultural
land." 5 The mere fact, however, that a person works an agricultural land does not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the
purview of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are
complied with.

Regarding the second requisite, it is to be noted that the land in question has an area of 169,507 square meters, or roughly 17 hectares of
fishpond. The question of whether such a big parcel of land is susceptible of being worked by the appellant's family or not has not been
raised, and We see no need of tarrying on this point. So, We pass to the third requisite, to wit, whether the tenant himself personally or
with the aid of his immediate family worked the land.

Assuming that appellant had previously entered in 1923 into an agreement of leasehold tenancy with Potenciano Gabriel, appellee's father,
such tenancy agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond personally because he became ill and incapacitated.
Not even did the members of appellant's immediate farm household work the land in question. Only the members of the family of the
tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him to
operate the farm enterprise are included in the term "immediate farm household" 6 The record shows who helped work the land in
question, and We quote:

It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the aid of helpers the aforecited fishpond since 1956 when he
became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan took over. She testified that she helps her father in administering the leased
property, conveying his instructions to the workers, Urbano Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The names of Ire, Juan and
Aguedo Viada have been mentioned as the laborers who were paid for the repair of the dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the
defendant, acts as the watcher. He has lived separately since he got married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan, who is residing near the fishpond,
the other children of the defendant are all professionals: a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest — all residing in Manila. None of these
persons has been seen working on the fishpond. 7

The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land. Thus Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended, defines a "tenant" as a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the
land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy
system. Section 8 of the same Act limits the relation of landholder and tenant to the person who furnishes the land and to the person who
actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available from within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the same
Act requires for the existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his immediate farm household work the land. It provides that
leasehold tenancy exists when a person, who either personally or with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm
household, undertakes to cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his
immediate farm household, belonging to, or legally possessed by, another in consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in
both.

A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm household cultivate the
land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; 8and he who hires others whom he pays for
doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5
and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the relationship between the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant
Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. 9

2. Regarding the second assignment of error, We accordingly rule that the Court of First Instance correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
case at bar, this being a case of civil law lease.

3. We deem it unnecessary to discuss the third and fourth assigned errors as these are issues involving findings of facts which have been
settled by the lower court, and unless there is grave abuse of discretion, which we do not find in the record of the case, We shall not
venture to discuss the merits of the factual findings of the court a quo.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is
affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

This decision should apply to the heirs and successors-in-interest of the original parties, as named in this decision. In consonance with the
decision of the lower court, the heirs and successors-in-interest of appellant Eusebio Pangilinan should deliver the possession of the
fishpond in question to the heirs and successors-in-interest of appellee Trinidad Gabriel; and said heirs and successors-in-interest of
appellant Eusebio Pangilinan should pay the heirs and successors-in-interest of appellee Trinidad Gabriel the accrued rentals. From
January 1, 1960, at the rate of P1,200.00 a year, until the actual delivery of the possession of the fishpond as herein ordered, with interest
at the legal rate until full payment is made.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 109093 November 20, 1995

LOPE MACHETE, NICASIO JUMAWID, SANTIAGO JUMAWID, JOHN JUMAWID, PEDRO GAMAYA, RENATO
DELGADO, FERNANDO OMBAHIN, MATIAS ROLEDA, PASIANO BARO, IGNACIO BARO, MAMERTO PLARAS
and JUSTINIANO VILLALON, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO VILLALON, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Are Regional Trial Courts' vested with jurisdiction over cases for collection of back rentals from leasehold tenants?

On 21 July 1989 private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Tagbilaran City against petitioners Lope Machete, Nicasio Jumawid, Santiago Jumawid, John Jumawid, Pedro Gamaya,
Renato Delgado, Fernando Ombahin, Matias Roleda, Pasiano Baro, Ignacio Baro, Mamerto Plaras and Justiniano Villalon. The complaint
alleged that the parties entered into a leasehold agreement with respect to private respondent's landholdings at Poblacion Norte, Carmen,
Bohol, under which petitioners were to pay private respondent a certain amount or percentage of their harvests. However, despite repeated
demands and with no valid reason, petitioners failed to pay their respective rentals. Private respondent thus prayed that petitioners be
ordered to pay him back rentals and damages.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter. They contended
that the case arose out of or was connected with agrarian relations, hence, the subject matter of the complaint fell squarely within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers under Sec. 1, pars. (a) and (b), Rule
II of the Revised Rules of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

On 22 August 1989 the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, 1 and on 28 September 1989 denied the motion for reconsideration. 2

Private respondent sought annulment of both orders before respondent Court of Appeals which on 21 May 1992 rendered judgment
reversing the trial court and directing it to assume jurisdiction over the case 3 on the basis of its finding that —

. . . The CARL (RA 6657) and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform cannot be seen to encompass a case of simple collection of back
rentals by virtue of an agreement, as the one at bar, where there is no agrarian dispute to speak of (since the allegation of failure to pay the
agreed rentals was never controverted in the motion to dismiss) nor the issue raised on application, implementation, enforcement or
interpretation of these laws. 4

On 18 January 1993 the appellate court rejected the motion for

reconsideration. 5
Petitioners maintain that the alleged cause of action of private respondent arose from an agrarian relation and that respondent appellate
court failed to consider that the agreement involved is an agricultural leasehold contract, hence, the dispute is agrarian in nature. The laws
governing its execution and the rights and obligations of the parties thereto are necessarily R.A. 3844, 6 R.A. 6657 7 and other pertinent
agrarian laws. Considering that the application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of said laws are matters which have been
vested in the DAR, this case is outside the jurisdiction of the trial court.

The petition is impressed with merit. Section 17 of E.O. 229 8 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform except
those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources in accordance with law.

Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR, created the DARAB to assume the powers and
functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. 9 Section 1, pars. (a) and (b), Rule II of the Revised Rules of the
DARAB explicitly provides —

Sec. 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both
original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Orders Nos. 229, 228 and 129-
A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following: (a) Cases
involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws, (b) Cases involving the valuation of land, and determination and payment of
just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes
concerning the functions of the Land Bank . . .

In Quismundo v. Court of Appeals, 10 this Court interpreted the effect of Sec. 17 of E.O. 229 on P.D. 946, which amended R.A. 3844, the
agrarian law then in force —

The above quoted provision (Sec. 17) should be deemed to have repealed 11 Sec. 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 which
invested the then courts of agrarian relations with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights granted and
obligations imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program.

Formerly, under Presidential Decree No. 946, amending Chapter IX of Republic Act No. 3844, the courts of agrarian relations had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over "cases involving the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land
except those cognizable by the National Labor Relations Commission" and "questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed
by laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, Instructions, Rules and Regulations issued and promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform
program," except those matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of land to the tenant-farmer under Presidential
Decree No. 27 and amendments thereto which shall be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. 12

In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian
relations were integrated into the regional trial courts and the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts. 13

However, with the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which took effect on August 29, 1987, fifteen (15) days after its release for
publication in the Official Gazette, 14 the regional trial courts were divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The
said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform.

On 15 June 1988 R.A. 6657 was passed containing provisions which evince and support the intention of the legislature to vest in the DAR
exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. 15 Section 50 thereof substantially reiterates Sec. 17 of E.O. 229 thus —

Sec. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except
those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources
(DENR) . . .

Section 3, par. (d), thereof defines the term "agrarian dispute" as referring to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers' associations
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.

However it may be mentioned in passing that the Regional Trial Courts have not been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian
reform matters. Section 56 of R.A. 6657 confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional Trial Courts
designated by this Court — at least one (1) branch within each province — to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts designated as
Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Sec. 57 of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners, and (b) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act. 16

Consequently, there exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of
petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with private respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal
competence of the trial court to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority
to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. 17

Thus, respondent appellate court erred in directing the trial court to assume jurisdiction over this case. At any rate, the present legal battle
is "not altogether lost" on the part of private respondent because as this Court was quite emphatic in Quismundo v. Court of Appeals, 18 the
resolution by the DAR is to the best advantage of the parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the
administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the proceedings therein are summary in
nature and the department is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other
issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding. 19

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals as well as its resolution denying reconsideration is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The orders of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City dated 22 August and 28 September 1989 are REINSTATED.
Consequently, let the records of this case be immediately transmitted to the appropriate Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) for proper adjudication in accordance with the ruling in Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals 20 and reiterated
in Quismundo v. Court of Appeals, 21 as well as pertinent agrarian laws.

SO ORDERED.

MODESTO T. UALAT, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE O. RAMOS, respondent.

[A.M. No. MTJ-91-588. December 6, 1996]

QUIRINO SABIO, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE O. RAMOS, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Ignorance of the law on the part of a judge is not only most ignominious, it is also prejudicial to litigants and the administration of justice
as a whole. Magistrates are well-advised to keep abreast of the latest in legislation and jurisprudence, and avoid dealing out injustice and
reaping embarrassment for themselves.

These are two (2) administrative cases[1] filed by complainants Quirino Sabio and Modesto Ualat against respondent Judge Jose O. Ramos
of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Echague, Isabela, for knowingly rendering (an) unjust judgment, ignorance of the law and serious
misconduct relative to his taking cognizance of an action docketed as Civil Case No. 827 and entitled Leonardo Coma vs. Quirino Sabio
and Modesto Ualat, which according to complainants is an agrarian dispute and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC.

The Facts

Complainant Sabio claims that he is an agricultural lessee of an agricultural land consisting of 4.7 hectares owned by Leonardo Coma.
Complainant Ualat, on the other hand, alleges that he is Sabios caretaker. It appears from the two complaints that on August 6, 1990,
complainant Sabio filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint for Recovery of
Possession[2] against the landowner and Raymundo Sabio, brother of complainant Sabio. On August 30, 1990, the landowner filed against
herein complainants a case for Illegal Detainer with respondents sala. On July 23, 1990,[3] the DARAB ruled in favor of complainant
Sabio declaring that the right of the complainant as the tenant-tiller to peaceful possession and cultivation should not be disturbed.
On November 5, 1990, however, respondent Judge rendered a decision [4] in favor of the landowner ordering the complainants, among
others, to vacate the property.

Complainants now contend that, notwithstanding knowledge of the Department Agrarian Reform (DAR) resolution, and the fact that Civil
Case No. 827 falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR, respondent Judge, using his power and authority, took cognizance of the
case because of personal interest and motive. They claim that during the pendency of the case, respondent Judge, thru his son and brother,
cultivated a portion of the land subject matter of the case.

Complainant Ualat, on the other hand, alleges that as the result of the unjust decision, his residential house which is not the subject of the
lease was levied upon by the sheriff, and argued that as mere caretaker, he could not be held jointly and severally liable to pay the
obligations of Quirino Sabio as agricultural tenant.

Respondent Judge submitted his Comments dated May 2, 1992[5] and March 7, 1992[6] to the aforesaid complaints. In denying the charges,
respondent Judge alleged that he was without knowledge or information about the complaint with the DAR, nor was he made aware of
the DAR resolution because nothing of this sort was stated by the parties in their pleadings, nor were these brought out during the
proceedings. Thus, on the basis of the evidence presented, he ruled that the relationship between the landowner and herein complainants is
that of civil lease.

Respondent judge denied that he had any personal interest in the agricultural land subject matter of the case, arguing that he did not have a
hand in the civil lease contract entered into by his son and the landowner and that if he had prior knowledge of it, he could have dissuaded
his son from entering into the lease contract to avoid any suspicions. His brother and his son allegedly entered the land in dispute with the
consent of the owner.

Respondent Judge explained that complainant Ualat was held jointly and severally liable to pay the rentals in arrears because he was a co-
defendant in the civil lease, and that execution of the decision had long been implemented but this complaint is being filed only to harass
him because of the contempt proceedings instituted by the landowner against herein complainants. Complainant Ualat, if he was not
satisfied with the ruling of the respondent, could have timely filed an appeal, but he decided to appeal only when the judgment had already
been executed.

Investigation By Executive Judge

The Court en banc in its resolution[7] dated August 13, 1992 resolved to refer the case to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Echague, Isabela, for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Joint Report and Recommendation[8] dated April 19, 1996, Judge
Henedino P. Eduarte made the following findings, the pertinent portions of which are hereby quoted as follows, to wit: [9]

1. The complainants claim that the respondent Judge rendered his decision in the illegal (should be `unlawful) detainer case inspite of his
awareness of the complaint of Quirino Sabio against Leonardo Coma and Modesto Ualat filed with the DAR and the latters resolution
dated July 23,1990.

The undersigned read carefully the record of the case particularly the answer of Quirino Sabio and Modesto Ualat, the position paper of
Quirino Sabio, the affidavit of Modesto Ualat and the affidavit of their witnesses. The undersigned found no allegation in said pleadings
and affidavits about the DAR case. Hence, respondent was not then aware of the DAR case when he rendered the decision.

2. The complainants claim that respondent Judge decided the case inspite of the fact that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the same, as
the issues are agrarian in nature.

Jurisdiction is determined by law and in determining whether a court has jurisdiction over a case, the allegation of the complaint, not the
answer, must be examined.

In this case, there is no allegation of the complaint that the case is one of agrarian dispute. There is no allegation that Leonardo Coma
instituted defendants Quirino Sabio and Modesto Ualat as his tenants on the land. What the complainant alleges is that on December 1,
1988, Leonardo Coma entered into a civil lease contract with defendant Quirino Sabio whereby for a consideration of P11,178.00,
Leonardo Coma leased his 4.7 hectares of land to Quirino Sabio for one (1) cropping only which will terminate on April 1, 1989; that this
lease contract was renewed by the parties on May 3, 1989 where the land was again leased for one (1) cropping season only to terminate
on or before September 30, 1989 for a consideration of 81 cavans of palay; that Leonardo Coma and Quirino Sabio renewed their lease
contract on January 24, 1990 for a period of one (1) cropping only to terminate on or before March 1990 for a consideration of 71 cavans
of palay; that defendant Quirino Sabio violated the lease contract by subleasing a portion of the land to defendant Modesto Ualat and by
his failure to pay the full rental of the land, that the duration of the lease contract had already expired.

There is nothing in the lease contract agreement dated December 1, 1988, May 3, 1989 and January 24, 1990 that it is the intention of the
parties to enter into a contract of tenancy. On the other hand, it is apparent from the provisions of the lease contracts stipulating that it is
for one (1) cropping only that the parties never agreed to enter into a tenancy contract

It is in the answer of the defendants Quirino Sabio and Modesto Ualat that they alleged that Leonardo Coma instituted defendant Quirino
Sabio as his tenant over the land in 1984; that Quirino Sabio took possession and cultivation of the land up to 1987 when Leonardo Coma
gave the possession and cultivation of the land to his nephew for one year and thereafter, defendant Quirino Sabio re-entered and
cultivated the land again; that on the other hand, defendant Modesto Ualat entered and cultivated a portion of 4,000 square meters and
cultivated it believing that it is not a part of the land in question.

Thus, from all the foregoing facts, respondent Judge may not be faulted when he said that he had jurisdiction over the case and then
proceeded to decide it on its merits. However, respondent Judge should have exercised prudence and caution considering the allegation of
tenancy by the defendant Quirino Ualat and his insistence that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case, by setting the case for hearing
and asking clarificatory questions. This would have elicited the DAR case and the resolution dated July 23, 1990. Respondent Judge did
not do this. He proceeded to decide the case ordering the ejectment of defendants Quirino Sabio and Modesto Ualat.

3. Complainant Modesto Ualat faults the respondent Judge for ordering him and Quirino Sabio to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff
Leonardo Coma the current rentals at the rate of P18,000.00 per cropping season until plaintiff is restored in the possession of the land
leased premises; and to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P3,000.00'.
The decision of respondent Judge does not state the reason for ordering Modesto Ualat to pay jointly and severally with defendant Quirino
Sabio P18,000.00 to the plaintiff Leonardo Coma as rentals of the land until possession is restored to the plaintiff.

From the record of the case, the available evidence on this point is the affidavit of Leonardo Coma that Quirino Sabio sublet a portion of
1.4 hectares of the land to Modesto Ualat.

On the other hand, Quirino Sabio and Modesto Ualat alleged in their answer that Modesto Ualat entered and cultivated a portion of 4,000
square meters thinking that it is not part of the land in question. This is reiterated in the affidavit of Modesto Ualat.

In his testimony, respondent Judge declared that he ordered Modesto Ualat to pay jointly and severally with Quirino Sabio the P18,000.00
to the plaintiff Leonardo Coma because they conspired to deprive the plaintiff of the rentals of his land. This is not supported by the
evidence available from the record of the case and this is not stated in the decision of respondent Judge.

Obviously, respondent Judge gave credence to the evidence of plaintiff that Quirino Sabio subleased a portion of 1.4 hectares of the land
to Modesto Ualat. However, it is not correct to hold Modesto Ualat jointly and severally liable to the lessor Leonardo Coma for the current
rentals of the land because a sublessee is only subsidiarily liable for rentals to the lessor.

Article 1652. The sublessee is subsidiarily liable to the lessor for any rent due from the lessee. However, the sub-lessee shall not be
responsible beyond the amount of rent due from him in accordance with the terms of the sublease, at the time of the extra-judicial demand
by the lessor. (Civil Code)

4. The claim of complainant Quirino Sabio that he appealed the decision of respondent Judge to the RTC is not correct. The record of the
case does not show that he appealed said decision. He admitted later in his testimony that it is only defendant Modesto Ualat who
appealed the decision of respondent Judge.

5. Complainant Modesto Ualat faults respondent Judge for denying his appeal. The denial however, is correct. Atty. Marcelo C. Cabalbag,
counsel of defendants, received copy of the decision on November 23, 1990 per Registry Return Card found on page 47 of the record of
the case. He filed his notice of appeal dated January 17, 1991 for defendant Modesto Ualat which was received by the Court on January
21, 1991. Even if it is conceded that the notice of appeal was filed on January 17, 1991, it was clearly filed out of time.

After the denial of his notice of appeal and the disqualification of his counsel, Modesto Ualat filed his own notice of appeal on April 27,
1991 which the Court received on January 17, 1991 (sic), it is obvious that the notice of appeal was filed late. Thus, the respondent Judge
is also correct in denying this appeal of defendant Modesto Ualat.

6. The complainants alleged that respondent Judge has personal interest and motive on the land in dispute because thereafter, they
discovered that the brother and son of respondent Judge intruded and cultivated portion of the land.

Respondent Judge, admitted that his brother Rey Ramos took possession of and cultivated the land because he entered into a contract of
lease with the landowner Leonardo Coma after the case was decided. After the termination of the lease with Rey Ramos, Leonardo Coma
also entered into a lease contract with respondents son, Joscar Ramos, an accountant and a part-time farmer who does not live with the
respondent Judge. According to respondent Judge, he had no hand in the contract between his son and Leonardo Coma as he has his own
life to live.

Considering the fact that there is no evidence that respondent Judge bent the facts and the law in order to decide the case in favor of the
plaintiff, that his brother and son entered into a contract of lease after the case was already decided and the decision became final, and that
as admitted by the complainants the respondent Judge has big hectares of land, the conclusion that respondent Judge has interest and
personal motive on the land in dispute is not warranted.

All told, of the several charges leveled against the respondent Judge, only one which charges him of committing an error in ordering
Modesto Ualat jointly and severally liable with Quirino Sabio for the payment of the current rentals of the land is substantiated and found
correct. This is, however, a mistake of judgment or law which every judge commits every now and then inspite of his earnest study of the
law and honest application thereof to the facts of the case. Most probably, since the lease contract had already expired, the respondent
Judge considered the act of Quirino Sabio in subleasing the portion of the land to Modesto Ualat and the latters cultivation thereof, as
quasi-delict intended, as respondent Judge declared in his testimony, to deprive the landowner of the rental of his land. This is, however,
inconsistent with his holding that Modesto Ualat is a sublessee.

In the same report, the Investigating Judge, among other things, recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent judge
with a stern warning, however, that he should be more careful especially in those cases where a defendant claims to be the tenant of the
land in question, and that he should conduct a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case.

Report of Court Administrator

In a Resolution dated June 25, 1996, this Court referred the aforesaid joint report and recommendation to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In a Memorandum[10] addressed to the Chief Justice dated July 19, 1996, the Court Administrator disagreed with Judge Eduartes
recommendation to dismiss the case, reasoning that (t)he mere fact that respondent lacks prior knowledge or notice of the previous case
before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and its resolution of July 23, 1990 does not entirely absolved (sic) him of
any administrative liability. It should be noted that in the civil case for Illegal Detainer with Damages pending before him, the separate
affidavits of herein complainants contained allegation of landlord-tenant relationship and this information could have cautioned
respondent in taking cognizance of the case at once. Prudence dictate (sic) that the proper thing to do under the circumstances is to refer
first the case to the DAR for certification to determine the existence of the agricultural tenancy relationship in accordance with existing
agrarian laws. His act of precipitately acting on the case without coursing the latter to the DAR has put into question his real motive
especially so that his personal interest on the lot is what is concerned in this case.

Additionally, the Court Administrator cited P.D. 316 [11] and P.D. 1038[12] which enjoin a fiscal or judge of any tribunal from taking
cognizance of an ejectment case or any other case designed to harass or remove a tenant of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice
and/or corn unless the Secretary of Agrarian Reform certifies that the case is one proper for such tribunal to hear and decide.

To support his recommendations, the Court Administrator cited the case of Puertollano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[13] where this
Court ruled that (i)t is mandatory for the trial court to refer the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative
for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties if it is a case of ejectment or attempt to harass or
remove a tenant in agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn. Even without a motion, the trial court may motu propio order
such referral. (Italics supplied).

The Court Administrator recommended that a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) be imposed upon respondent Judge with a
warning of graver penalty for similar acts in the future.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the Court Administrator.

The Investigating Judge may have been technically correct in averring that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint.[14] However, this is an administrative case where the issue is not whether a motion to dismiss the complaint could prosper. The
issue is whether respondent judge properly comported himself in the face of the obvious matters brought before him. As can be readily
seen from the answer filed by complainants Sabio and Ualat in the civil case, they alleged the existence of an agrarian tenancy relationship
between themselves and the landowner. Additionally, in the proceedings before respondent judge, complainants were even represented by
a lawyer from the DAR. These matters should have been sufficient to put respondent Judge on notice that complainants were claiming
protection under our agrarian laws. At that point, he ought to have realized that there existed a genuine issue involving agricultural
tenancy among the parties with respect to the subject property. Knowledge of existing agrarian legislation and prevailing jurisprudence on
the subject, together with an ordinary degree of prudence, would have prompted respondent Judge to refer the case to the DAR for
preliminary determination of the real nature of the parties relationship, as required by law. At the very least, as suggested by the
Investigating Judge, respondent could have himself conducted a clarificatory hearing to determine such relationship. The last thing he
should have done was to proceed to take cognizance of the case in the absence of such referral. In the face of these established facts, he
could not hide behind the ostrich-inspired defense of his jurisdiction being determined by the allegations in the complaint. Indeed, the
complaint was prepared by Leonardo Coma, who found it to his interest to hide the possible existence of the tenancy relationship, even
while he knew of the earlier complaint filed against him before the DARAB.

In the case of Ocier vs Court of Appeals,[15] we reiterated the ruling we made in Puertollano in this wise:

Private respondent, in her original complaint before the lower court, alleged that petitioner violated the Land Reform Code and could be
ejected under P.D. 816. Petitioner answered that he was a tenant of private respondent. There was, at that point in time, no need for
referral to the Department of Agrarian Reform as the landowner-tenant relationship was admitted.

However, when private respondents amended complaint -- where she alleged violation of a civil law lease agreement -- was admitted, the
issue of actual tenancy -- raised by petitioner in both his Answer and Amended Answer -- had to be referred to the Department of
Agrarian Reform for determination as this was now a genuine issue.

His failure to refer the case to the DAR upon receipt of the answer of complainants, despite the clear mandate of the two agrarian laws
aforementioned and our ruling in Puertollano, can in no wise be justified by respondent judge. What is even more embarrassing is his
seeming lack of awareness of the Civil Code provision making a sub-lessee merely subsidiarily liable for unpaid rentals, to the extent of
the rentals due from him under the sub-lease, at the time of the lessors extrajudicial demand.

It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and changes therein, as well as with the latest decisions of this Court.
One cannot seek refuge in having a mere cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is
bound to know, excuses no one -- certainly not judges. IGNORANTIA JURIS QUOD QUISQUE SCIRE TENETUR NON
EXCUSAT.[16] When the law is elementary, so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [17]
Finally, we note that respondent judge had previously been held liable [18] for gross ignorance of the law and dereliction of duty, and
imposed a reasonable fine of P10,000.00, it being his first infraction in his 35 years in the government service, 27 of which were in the
judiciary. This case being thus his second infraction, he is meted the maximum penalty of P20,000.00 fine, with a warning that a repetition
will be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent judge is hereby FOUND LIABLE for gross ignorance of the law and is hereby
imposed a fine in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).

Respondent is further ADMONISHED that commission of the same or similar act in in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-105586 December 15, 1993

REMIGIO ISIDRO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTH DIVISION) AND NATIVIDAD GUTIERREZ, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the respondent Court of Appeals dated 27 February 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No.
26671 ordering petitioner to vacate the land in question and surrender possession thereof to the private respondent; and its 21 May 1992
resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The facts which gave rise to this petition are as follows:

Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4.5 hectares located in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan,
Nueva Ecija. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to
occupy the swampy portion of the abovementioned land, consisting of one (1) hectare, in order to augment his (petitioner's) income to
meet his family's needs. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject top the condition that petitioner would vacate the land upon
demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond.

In 1990, private respondent through the overseer demanded from petitioner the return of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and
return possession of said land, claiming that he had spent effort and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond.

A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4120. Petitioner set up the following defenses: (a) that the complaint was triggered by
his refusal to increase his lease rental; (b) the subject land is a fishpond and therefore is agricultural land; and (c) that lack of formal
demand to vacate exposes the complaint to dismissal for insufficiency of cause of action. 1

Based on an ocular inspection of the subject land, the trial court found that the land in question is a fishpond 2 and, thus, in a decision
dated 30 May 1991, the said trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the land is agricultural and therefore the dispute over it is
agrarian which is under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of agrarian relations as provided in Sec. 12(a) of Republic Act
No. 946 (now embodied in the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board). 3

An appeal was filed by private respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, docketed as Civil Case No. 889.
In due course, the RTC rendered a decision on 5 November 1991 concurring with the findings of the MTC and affirming in toto the trial
court's decision.

The RTC decision held that:

Even conceding for the sake of argument that the defendant-appellee was allowed by the plaintiff-appellant, through her sister Aniceta
Garcia (her administratrix over the land in question) to occupy and use the landholding in question on condition that the defendant would
vacate the same upon demand of the owner or plaintiff herein, without paying any rental either in cash or produce, under these facts there
was a tenurial arrangement, within the meaning of Sec. 3(d) of RA 6657, thereby placing the dispute involved in this case within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. Perhaps, it would be different if the defendant was merely a trespasser, without any right whatsoever, when he
entered and occupied the subject landholding. The defendant, as a matter of fact, was a legal possessor of the land in question and
therefore to determine his rights and obligations over the said property, the DARAB is the proper forum for such issue. 4

Not satisfied with the decision of the RTC, private respondent appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals and the appeal was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 26671. On 27 February 1992, as earlier stated, the respondent Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC, ordering petitioner to vacate the parcel of land in question and surrender possession thereof to private respondent, and to pay
private respondent the sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. 5

The respondent Court of Appeals ruled that:

The agrarian dispute over which the DAR may have jurisdiction by virtue of its quasi-judicial power is that which involves tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture. Tenurial arrangement is concerned
with the act or manner of putting into proper order the rights of holding a piece of agricultural land between the landowner and the farmer
or farmworker.

In the case at bar, there can be no dispute that between the parties herein there is no tenurial arrangement, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over the land in dispute. Other than his bare allegation in the Answer with Counterclaim, and his affidavit,
private respondent has not shown prima facie that he is a tenant of the petitioner. The affidavits of his witnesses Antonio Samin and
Daniel Villareal attest to the fact that they acted as mediators in the dispute between the parties herein sometime in October 1990, but no
settlement was arrived at, and that the subject land is a fishpond. To the same effect is the affidavit of Feliciano Garcia. Absent any prima
facie proof that private respondent has a tenancy relationship with petitioner, the established fact is that private respondent is possessing
the property in dispute by mere tolerance, and when such possession ceased as such upon demand to vacate by the petitioner, private
respondent became a squatter in said land. We hold that the Municipal Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija has jurisdiction over the
unlawful detainer case. 6

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing decision, but, also as earlier stated, it was denied in a resolution dated 21 May
1992 7 for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner raises the following issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPAL COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE AND WHETHER THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT COULD LEGALLY EJECT THE PETITIONER CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING:

1. THAT THE SUBJECT IS A FISHPOND AND UNDER THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE FISHPONDS ARE CLASSIFIED AS
AGRICULTURAL LANDS;

2. THAT BEING AN AGRICULTURAL LAND THE SAME IS GOVERNED BY OUR TENANCY LAWS WHERE RULE 70 OF
THE RULES OF COURT CANNOT BE SIMPLY APPLIED; AND

3. THAT UNDER THE RULES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE
DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PERSON WORKING ON A FISHPOND IS A TENANT OR NOT IS CLEARLY WITHIN THE
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB. 8

The petition is devoid of merit. We hold for the private respondent.

It is basic whether or not a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is determined from the allegations of the complaint.
As held in Multinational Village Homeowners' Association, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, et al.: 9

Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein — a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of
the court be made to depend upon the defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the
question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant.

In her complaint before the court a quo, private respondent stated that she is the owner of a parcel of land situated in Barrio Sta. Cruz,
Gapan, Nueva Ecija, which petitioner is illegally occupying; that petitioner has taken advantage of the tolerance of her (private
respondent's) sister in allowing him to occupy the land on the condition that he (petitioner) would vacate the land upon demand. Because
of petitioner's refusal to vacate the land, private respondent's remedy, as owner of said land, was to file an action for unlawful detainer
with the Municipal Trial Court.

In his answer to the complainant, petitioner alleged that the land involved in the dispute is an agricultural land and hence, the case must be
filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations (not the MTC). Moreover, petitioner contended that it was his refusal to increase his lease rental
(implying tenancy) that prompted the private respondent to sue him in court. 10

It is well settled jurisprudence that a court does not lose its jurisdiction over an unlawful detainer case by the simple expedient of a party
raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. 11 The court continues to have the authority
to hear the evidence for the purpose precisely of determining whether or not it has jurisdiction. And upon such hearing, if tenancy is
shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. 12
The MTC dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint primarily on the ground that the subject land is agricultural and therefore the
question at issue is agrarian. In this connection, it is well to recall that Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure, 13 provides
that the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms and conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under Republic Act No. 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor or lessee. 14

It is irrefutable in the case at bar that the subject land which used to be an idle, swampy land was converted by the petitioner into a
fishpond. And it is settled that a fishpond is an agricultural land. An agricultural land refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in Republic Act No. 6657 15 and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. 16 Republic Act No.
6657 defines agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish,
including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such
farming operations done by persons whether natural or judicial. 17

But a case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has
jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant. The law
provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being agricultural is only one of
them. 18 The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to
agriculture. And as previously mentioned, such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship.

Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The
intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and
are not contrary to law, are even more important. 19

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural
land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a
sharing of harvests between the parties. All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The
absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a
person establishes his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of
the government under existing tenancy laws (Caballes v. DAR, et al., G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988). 20

Furthermore, an agricultural lessee as defined in Sec. 116(2) of Republic Act No. 3844, is a person who, by himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latter's consent for
purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in produce or both. An agricultural lessor, on the other hand, is a natural or
judicial person who, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or grants to another the cultivation and use of
his land for a price certain. 21

Based on the statutory definitions of a tenant or a lessee, it is clear that there is no tenancy or agricultural/leasehold relationship existing
between the petitioner and the private respondent. There was no contract or agreement entered into by the petitioner with the private
respondent nor with the overseer of the private respondent, for petitioner to cultivate the land for a price certain or to share his harvests.
Petitioner has failed to substantiate his claim that he was paying rent for the use of the land.

Whether or not private respondent knew of the conversion by petitioner of the idle, swampy land into a fishpond is immaterial in this case.
The fact remains that the existence of all the requisites of a tenancy relationship was not proven by the petitioner. And in the absence of a
tenancy relationship, the complaint for unlawful detainer is properly within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, as provided in
Sec. 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Having established that the occupancy and possession by petitioner of the land in question is by mere tolerance, private respondent had
the legal right to demand upon petitioner to vacate the land. And as correctly ruled by the respondent appellate court:

. . . . His (petitioner's) lawful possession became illegal when the petitioner (now private respondent) through her sister made a demand on
him to vacate and he refused to comply with such demand. Such is the ruling in Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136, 144, wherein it
was held:

While in possession by tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes illegal upon demand to vacate is made by the owner and the
possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand (Prieto vs. Reyes, 14 SCRA 432; Yu vs. De Lara, 6 SCRA 786, 788; Amis vs.
Aragon, L-4684, April 28, 1957). A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment
is the proper remedy against him (Yu vs. De Lara, supra)." 22

The present case should be distinguished from the recent case of Bernas vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals. 23 In the Bernas case, the
land occupant (Bernas) had a production-sharing agreement with the legal possessor (Benigno Bito-on) while the records in this case fail
to show that herein petitioner (Isidro) was sharing the harvest or paying rent for his use of the land. Moreover, the agreement between the
overseer (Garcia) and herein petitioner was for petitioner to occupy and use the land by mere tolerance of the owner. Petitioner Isidro
failed to refute that Garcia allowed him to use the land subject to the condition that petitioner would vacate it upon demand. In
the Bernas case, the petitioner (Bernas) was able to establish the existence of an agricultural tenancy or leasehold relationship between
him and the legal possessor. The evidence in this case, on the other hand, fails to prove that petitioner Isidro, was an agricultural tenant or
lessee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.

NINA M. QUISMUNDO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, FELICISIMO OCAMPO, CATALINO OCAMPO, PEDRO
MARQUEZ, ROMEO ENRIQUEZ and HERMINIO YUSON, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:p

This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
16418, 1 dated November 29, 1989 and October 9, 1990, respectively, which upheld the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch 58, in AGRA. Case No. 5174. 2

It appears that on February 19, 1988, private respondents, as tenants of petitioner, filed a complaint with the trial court praying that their
relationship with petitioner be changed from share tenancy to a leasehold system, pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended, their request therefor having been denied by petitioner. 3

On March 2, 1988, private respondents further filed a motion for the issuance of an order authorizing the supervision by the deputy sheriff
of the court of the harvesting and liquidation of the 1987-1988 sugarcane crops, which motion was granted by the trial court in an order
dated March 3, 1988. 4

On March 16, 1988, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action since the law that should allegedly govern
the relationship of the parties is Act No. 4115, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 271, and not Republic Act No. 3844, as amended.
The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit in an order dated June 2, 1988. 5

On June 18, 1988, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial order, invoking as an additional ground the lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the case under the authority and by reason of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, specifically
Executive Order No. 229 and Republic Act No. 6657. 6

Pending the resolution of said motion for reconsideration, private respondents filed another motion dated November 9, 1988, for the
supervision of harvesting. On December 6, 1988, the trial court granted the motion of private respondents and denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration. 7

Petitioner then elevated the controversy to respondent court on a petition for certiorari but, as stated at the outset, said court upheld the
jurisdiction of the court below, ruling that:

xxx xxx xxx

Second. The right of the private respondents to choose leasehold tenancy is governed by RA 3844. We find nothing in Proclamation No.
131, E.O. No. 229 and RA 6657 divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over the case. To be sure, RA 6657 was enacted on June 10, 1988
or later than the filing of the Complaint in AGRA Case No. 5174 on February 13, 1988. On the other hand, sec. 27 of E.O. 229 approved
on July 22, 1987 provides that "... the provisions of RA 3844 and other agrarian laws not inconsistent with this order shall have suppletory
effect." We see no inconsistency between RA 3844 and E.O. No. 229 with respect to the jurisdiction of the trial court over the cause of
action of the private respondent who desires to adopt a leasehold system pursuant to RA 3844. E.O. No. 229 vests quasi-judicial powers
on the DAR to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" subject of Proclamation No. 229. 8 We hold that the right of private
respondents to adopt a leasehold system under RA 3844 is distinct and separate and not affected by the enactment of E.O. No. 229 and,
hence, may be enforced pursuant to the judicial mechanism provided for by RA 3844. 9
 10
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent Court of Appeals in its resolution dated October 9, 1990. Not satisfied
therewith, petitioner is now before us raising the sole issue of jurisdiction.

It is the contention of petitioner that the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City has no jurisdiction to try the case at bar considering that the
exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate agrarian cases has already been vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) by
Executive Order No. 229, as amended by Republic Act No. 6657.

We find said contention tenable.

Executive Order No. 229, which provides for the mechanism for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
instituted by Proclamation No. 131, dated July 22, 1987, vests in the Department of Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial powers to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters. The pertinent provision of said executive order reads as follows:

SECTION 17. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture (DA).

The DAR shall have powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecumand writs to enforce its order or
decisions.

The decisions of the DAR may, in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but shall be immediately executory
notwithstanding such appeal.

The above quoted provision should be deemed to have repealed 11 Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested
the then courts of agrarian relations with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights granted and obligations
imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program.

Formerly, under Presidential Decree No. 946, amending Chapter IX of Republic Act No. 3844, the courts of agrarian relations had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over "cases involving the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land
except those cognizable by the National Labor Relations Commission" and "questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed
by laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, Instructions, Rules and Regulations issued and promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform
program," except those matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of land to the tenant-farmer under Presidential
Decree No. 27 and amendments thereto which shall be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. 12

In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian
relations were integrated into the regional trial courts and the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts. 13

However, with the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which took effect on August 29, 1987, fifteen (15) days after its release for
publication in the Official Gazette, 14 the regional trial courts were divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The
said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform.

Thus, in the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, at the time private respondents filed their complaint, was already bereft
of authority to act on the same. The allegation of private respondents that their complaint was filed on November 3, 1987, and not on
February 13, 1988 as found by the Court of Appeals, is immaterial since as of either date Executive Order No. 229 was already in effect.

The foregoing holding is further sustained by the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which
took effect on June 15, 1988. The said law contains provisions which evince and support the intention of the legislature to vest in the
Department of Agrarian Reform exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters.

Section 50 of said Act substantially reiterates Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229 vesting in the Department of Agrarian Reform
exclusive and original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, to wit:

SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).

xxx xxx xxx

In addition, Sections 56 and 57 thereof provide for the designation by the Supreme Court of at least one (1) branch of the regional trial
court within each province to act as a special agrarian court. The said special court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction only over
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of criminal offenses under said Act. Said
provisions thus delimit the jurisdiction of the regional trial court in agrarian cases only to these two instances.
It is also worth noting at this juncture that the resolution of this case by the Department of Agrarian Reform is to the best advantage of
private respondents since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency possessing the necessary
expertise on the matter. Further, the proceedings therein are summary in nature and the department is not bound by technical rules of
procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive
action or proceeding. 15

WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and another judgment is hereby
rendered declaring NULL and VOID the orders of the lower court dated March 3, 1988, June 2, 1988 and December 6, 1988. The
respondent judge, or whosoever now presides over the court a quo or to which the case is assigned, is ordered to cease and desist from
further proceeding with AGRA Case No. 5176 which is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the
refiling of the same with the Department of Agrarian Reform.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 101932 January 24, 2000

FRANCISCO H. ESCAÑO, JR. and LYDIA T. ESCAÑO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks: (1) to set aside the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP 24585,
promulgated on July 18, 1991; (2) to set aside its resolution dated September 11, 1991; and (3) to order the Special Agrarian Court of
Bohol to continue hearing Civil Case 4644.

Petitioners owned 63.6226 hectares of agricultural land in Vallehermoso, Carmen, Bohol. They offered 59.6237 hectares of the land to the
government through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to E.O. No. 229. DAR twice fixed the value, which petitioners
also twice rejected for being much lower than the actual fair value. After the second rejection, DAR stopped communicating with
petitioners. Petitioners claimed that during the hiatus, farm production fell by 80% because the farmers were allegedly advised by
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officers (PARO) to deliberately reduce their production to depress the land value.1âwphi1.nêt

On November 29, 1989, petitioners filed a petition for just compensation, docketed as Civil Case No. 4644, in the Special Agrarian Court
in Bohol. On April 10, 1990, respondent Land Bank filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: (1) that the plaintiffs had not exhausted
administrative remedies and (2) that plaintiffs were not the real parties in interest, but were merely lessees and not the registered owners.
The land, according to the Land Bank was owned by the Development Bank of the Philippines. But the motion to dismiss was denied,
upon a showing of a Confirmation of the Deed of Sale executed August 25, 1989 by the DBP in favor of petitioners.

Thereafter, pre-trial conferences were held. On October 31, 1990, Presiding Judge Pacito Yape issued a Pre-Trial Order, and with the
concurrence of the parties, the legal issue was limited to the question of the amount of just compensation. Respondents were ordered to
file responsive pleadings.1

Meanwhile, on June 14, 1990, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 405, which vested on the Land Bank primary responsibility
to determine land valuation and the compensation for all private lands suitable for agriculture under either the Voluntary Offer to Sell
(VOS) or Compulsory Acquisition (CA) arrangement as governed by Republic Act 6657, known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988."2

On December 5, 1990, Land Bank moved to suspend proceedings or dismiss the Escaños' petition. It reiterated the two aforecited grounds
stated in their April 10, 1990 motion to dismiss. Additionally, Land Bank explained that as a land reform matter, the case falls within the
primary jurisdiction of the DAR; that valuation by the PARO was not the final determination since it still was subject to the final
determination of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), which had original and appellate jurisdiction; and
that since the matter had not passed through all the required stages, there was no exhaustion of administrative remedies, hence, no cause of
action.

On January 16, 1991, the lower court issued another order, denying Land Bank's second motion to suspend proceedings and/or dismiss
despite the latter's added ground that it had not been given the opportunity to exercise its legal mandate to determine the land valuation.
The lower court found that the Land Bank had been given sufficient opportunity to sit down with petitioners to arrive at a true and proper
valuation.3

On April 2, 1991, Land Bank filed its petition before the Court of Appeals. It claimed that the lower court issued the orders dated August
17, 1990, January 16 and January 18, 1991 without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
In resolving the issue of jurisdiction in the determination of land valuation and compensation, the appellate court granted Land Bank's
petition. It disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the Orders dated August 17, 1990, January 16, 18 and February 18, 1991 are set aside.
Further, the petition before the Special Agrarian Court is hereby ordered dismissed. 4

The appellate court, accepted the argument that the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Procedure of R.A. 6657 was earlier than the date
when the Escaños filed their petition to fix just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court on December 14, 1989. Said Revised
Rules took effect on December 26, 1988. According to the Court of Appeals, the lower court could not "feign" jurisdiction because
Section 1, Rule XVII of the Transitory Provisions of the Revised Rules states:

Sec. 1. Transitory Provisions. — All agrarian cases pending before the regular courts of law at the time of the effectivity of these Rules
and shall remain with such courts until their final termination.

Cases pending in the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform before the effectivity of these Rules may be decided and finally disposed
of thereat in accordance with the principle of continuing jurisdiction. The Secretary, however, may, in his discretion sort out said cases
and refer the justiceable and adversarial ones to the Adjudication Board for Section 1, Rule 11 hereof. 5

The appellate court further explained that when an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations it "makes" a new law with the
force and effect of a valid law. It added that the Supreme Court in Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
175 SCRA 343, had emphasized the indispensable role of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank in fixing preliminary
valuation.

Now before us, petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred:

IN HOLDING THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT OF BOHOL WITHOUT JURISDICTION FROM THE BEGINNING TO
ENTERTAIN CIVIL CASE NO. 4644 WHICH CIVIL CASE IS FOR "DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION;

II

IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 59 OF R.A. 6657 IS NOT A BAR TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI (CA-G.R. S.P. 24585)
INSTITUTED BEFORE IT BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHILE CIVIL CASE NO. 4644 REMAINS PENDING BEFORE THE
SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT;

III

IN HOLDING THAT E.O. 405 HAS TO BE COMPLIED WITH BEFORE THE FILING OF CIVIL CASE NO. 4644,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT CIVIL CASE NO. 4644 WAS FILED BEFORE THE ISSUANCE OF E.O. 405 AND IN
HOLDING FURTHER THAT FAILURE TO SO COMPLY IS A GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. 4644;

IV

IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT LBP IS AN INSTRUMENTALITY OF STATE AND AS SUCH IS EXEMPT FROM
THE EFFECTS OF ESTOPPEL;

IN PASSING UPON ISSUES NOT RAISED IN THE PETITION THEREBY DENYING PETITIONERS THE OPPORTUNITY TO
TRAVERSE AND CONTROVERT THEM.

Of these assigned errors, let us focus on the first three, jointly.

Recall that on May 30, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) adopted its new Rules of Procedure.
Rule 13 Sec. 11 clearly states that in the event that a landowner is not satisfied with a decision of an agrarian adjudicator, the landowner
could bring the matter directly to the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court. Thus, DARAB recognized that jurisdiction
on just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts. 6

In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, we held:

. . . Special Agrarian Courts which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to
wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under
[R.A. No. 6657]." The provision of Section 50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases involving the
determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred
on the DAR. Indeed, there is reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over
cases of eminent domain (for such are taking under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. Thus, in EPZA v. Dulay and Sumulong
v. Gueurero we held that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in
administrative agencies, while in Scoty's Department Store v. Micaller we struck down a law granting the then Court of Industrial
Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the Industrial Peace Act.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . It would subvert the "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC [Regional Trial Court] for the Department of Agrarian Reform to
vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of
administrative decisions.

xxx xxx xxx

What [agrarian] adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to
landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide the question. 7

E.O. No. 405, issued June 14, 1990, vested in the Land Bank the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land
reform and the compensation for their taking. Thereafter, in notices sent to the landowner, the DAR makes an appropriate offer to buy the
land. If the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and afterwards the Provincial (PARAD), the
Regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid
for the land. If the landowner does not agree to said price, he may bring the matter before the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court.8

Recalling the steps taken by petitioners as earlier discussed, vis-à-vis the procedural rules, it is our view that petitioners had complied with
the procedural requirements up to its filing of the petition for just compensation before the regional trial court.

The Land Bank now avers that on December 19, 1989, a Notice of Acquisition signed by the DAR Secretary was issued to petitioners
offering a higher value of P480,137.81 for 63.6226 hectares. It allegedly gave petitioners time to reply, and for DAR to conduct summary
administrative proceedings wherein petitioners, the Land Bank, and other parties were requested to submit evidence on what should be the
just compensation to be paid for petitioners' land. The summary administrative proceedings, however, did not take place allegedly because
petitioners by then had filed Civil Case No. 4644 in the Special Agrarian Court in Bohol on November 29, 1989. 9

Land Bank further claims it had not been given the opportunity to exercise its legal mandate to fix just compensation under the land
reform law, as mandated by E.O. No. 405, pursuant to R.A. 6657, Sections 17 and 18. R.A. 6657 took effect June 15, 1988, earlier than
the filing of Civil Case No. 4644, according to the Land Bank. Thus it argues that, on the basis of guidelines provided under
Administrative Order No. 17, series of 1989, even before E.O. No. 405, the proper procedure was for DAR to make its own valuation of
the land and for the Land Bank to also conduct a separate valuation. Both would compare their valuation and if necessary both would
agree to a common valuation. The case would then be "ripe for summary proceedings." Land Bank in its Comment before us sums up
developments below as follows:

On April 3, 1988, petitioners filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) of the 59.6237
hectares of the questioned land; the smaller portion of about (6) hectares having been already covered by the operation land transfer
(OLT) under P.D. 27. After the usual processing by the DAR, including an ocular inspection of the questioned land, on March 20, 1989,
the provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) initially computed the value of the said land at P345,343.52 pursuant to Section 6 of E.O.
No. 229. Petitioners rejected the said valuation.

On July 20, 1989, the PARO made another preliminary computation of the value of the said land under Sections 17, and 18 of R.A. 6657,
for a higher amount of P429,938.15. Again, petitioners rejected the valuation.

On December 19, 1989, a Notice of Acquisition . . . was issued to petitioners offering a higher value of P480,137.81 . . . .

But the summary administrative proceedings stated in the said Notice of Acquisition did not take place because Petitioners had by then in
haste, already filed the case for just compensation with the court a quo.10

Land Bank was apparently not notified nor consulted by the DAR in fixing the amount of land value in their first and second offers to the
Escaños. Petitioners counter that a second valuation offer could not have been made if summary proceedings were not conducted. The
Notice of Acquisition was sent to petitioners, five months after DAR's second offer on July 20, 1989, which petitioners had rejected. Was
this Notice an afterthought designed to show that summary proceedings had not yet been done? Or was it issued to remedy the inter-
agency oversight concerning Land Bank's non-participation? Whatever the reason might be, it is established fact that the Notice was sent
to petitioners only after they had filed their petition for just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court in Bohol.

By that time, this special court had already acquired jurisdiction over the controversy. Land Bank had no basis to insist on dismissing or
suspending the proceedings before said court so it could first exercise its mandate to participate in fixing the land valuation. But nothing
prevents the Land Bank from participating in judicial proceedings therein. In fact, in its Pre-Trial Order dated October 31, 1990, the lower
court rightly ordered the herein respondents to submit responsive pleadings. Note, however, that in its Order dated August 17, 1990 said
court observed that the proper administrative officials were already given the opportunity to act upon the petitioners' case but failed to do
so for quite some time, so that there was unreasonable delay or official inaction. 11

Having decided the principal issue, that jurisdiction properly belongs to the Special Agrarian Court, the remaining assigned errors need
not now delay us. Suffice it to declare now that respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible errors of law in issuing its assailed
decision and resolution. Hence, both have to be set aside.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 18, 1991 in CA GR S.P. No. 24585 entitled
"Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Pacito A. Yape and Sps. Francisco and Lydia Escaño," is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Its Order
dated September 11, 1991 is likewise SET ASIDE. The Special Agrarian Court is hereby ORDERED to continue hearing Civil Case No.
4644 without further delay.

No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.