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MERCADO, JEREKA ROSE B.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
PLM JD 2-2 Judge ANNE RIVERA-SIA

Regalado v. Dela Rama vda. dela Peña, et.al. (Jurisdiction over subject matter)

The petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari that seeks to reverse and set aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court for "Recovery of
Possession and Damages with Injunction." Petitioner contends that the Complaint is one for
ejectment or if the same is deemed an accion publiciana, the RTC still lacks jurisdiction as the
assessed value of the subject properties was not alleged in the Complaint. The Court held that to
ascertain the proper court that has jurisdiction, reference must be made to the averments in the
complaint, and the law in force at the commencement of the action. Since the complaint of the
respondent failed to include a jurisdictional fact required, the decision of RTC is deemed void for
lack of jurisdiction.

Union Bank of the Philippines v. The Honorable Regional Agrarian Reform Officer
(Jurisdiction over subject matter)

The petitioner filed a motion insisting the jurisdiction of DARAB on the herein case since
according to the petitioner, it involves agrarian dispute. The Court ruled that DARAB does not
have jurisdiction over the herein case since records clearly show that the petitions filed by Union
Bank with the PARAD did not involve agrarian disputes. The petitioner failed to sufficiently
allege-or even hint at-any tenurial or agrarian relations that affect the subject parcels of land.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. For the
PARAD and DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must be prima facie showing that
there is a tenurial arrangement or tenancy relationship between the parties.

Dee v. Harvest All Investment Limited, et.al. (Jurisdiction over subject matter)

Alliance Board raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground of Harvest
All, et al.' s failure to pay the correct filing fees. In determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. However, where the basic issue
is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and
are cognizable exclusively by Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). The Court held
that the RTC has a jurisdiction over the case for the main purpose of the Harvest All, et al.'s
complaint and amended complaint was to have Alliance hold its 2015 ASM on the date set in the
corporation's by- laws, which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

FE V. RAPSING, et. al. v. HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, et. al. (Jurisdiction over
subject matter)

Petitioners alleged that the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction when it transferred the criminal case filed against the respondents to the jurisdiction
of the military tribunal, as jurisdiction over the same is conferred upon the civil courts by Republic
Act No. 7055. It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective
of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.1As a
necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defences
set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. Consulting the
averment in the complaint, the Court rules that herein case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC
and not the military tribunal.

Jose Mendoza v. Narciso Geronimo and Benigno Geronimo (Jurisdiction over subject matter)

Petitioner filed a complaint with the MTC against respondent Narciso Germino for forcible
entry, claiming that they were the registered owners of a five-hectare parcel of land in Soledad,
Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija subject property. The petitioner insists that the jurisdiction lies with the
DARAB since the nature of the action and the allegations of the complaint show an agrarian
dispute. In the absence of any allegation of a tenancy relationship between the parties, the action
was for recovery of possession of real property that was within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in
the complaint. The Court denied the petition and pronounced that the MTC has the jurisdiction
over the herein case.

Loloy Unduran, et.al. v. Ramon Aberarturi, et.al. (Jurisdiction over subject matter)

Respondents filed an original complaint for accion reivindicatoria against petitioners with
the RTC wherein, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case since it should be under the NICP. In resolving the jurisdiction, the Court
reiterated the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in respondents' original complaint
make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action which involves an interest in a real property
with an assessed value of P683,760.00, while the allegations in their amended complaint make out
a case for injunction, a civil action which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The mere fact that
this case involves members of ICCs/IPs and their ancestral land is not enough to for it to fall under
the jurisdiction of the NCIP. In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe,
respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP which cause the RTC have jurisdiction over the
case.

Lasmis v. Dong-E (Effects of Estoppel on objections to jurisdiction)

Petitioners asserted that the reivindicatory action should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction in light of the enactment of the IPRA, which gives original and exclusive jurisdiction
over disputes involving ancestral lands and domains to the NCIP. Respondent insist that the
petitioners were barred by laches from attacking the trial court’s jurisdiction over the case because
they failed to raise it before the RTC or the CA. The Court held that the existence of latches, in
Tijam doctrine, will prevent a party from raising the court’s lack of jurisdiction despite the rule
that an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings. In
case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the presence of laches cannot
be ignored. If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for raising the issue of jurisdiction for the
first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in the instant case who raised the issue for the first
time in their petition before the SC.

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS before the CA, alleging
substantially that appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948
for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296
had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction
of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand
does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore
had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the
Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to dismiss the case. The Court ruled that Surety is
already barred from invoking the jurisdiction since from the time it became a quasi-party on July
31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which,
according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts
but it failed to do so. The SC frowns upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case
for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse.

Cudiamat v. Batangas Savings

Assailing the appellate court’s ruling that the Balayan RTC had no jurisdiction over their
complaint, petitioners argue that their complaint was filed earlier than PDIC’s petition for
assistance in the liquidation; and that the bank is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the Balayan RTC because it actively participated in the proceedings thereat. The Court ruled
that while it is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction on the subject matter can be raised at any time
and is not lost by estoppel by laches, the present case is an exception. To compel petitioners to re-
file and re-litigate their claims before the Nasugbu RTC when the parties had already been given
the opportunity to present their respective evidence in a full-blown trial before the Balayan RTC
which had, in fact, decided petitioners’ complaint (about two years before the appellate court
rendered the assailed decision) would be an exercise in futility and would unjustly burden
petitioners. The operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends on
whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was
tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from
assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred
by the consent of the parties or by estoppel." However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the
case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no
jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to
assume an inconsistent position – that the lower court had jurisdiction.
First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of CA (Error of Jurisdiction vs. Error of
Judgement)

This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure seeking to annul, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner evidently availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal. Although petitioner
ascribes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of both
the RTC of Quezon City and the appellate court in rendering their respective Decisions, a closer
look on the grounds relied upon by the petitioner corporation in its present Petition
for Certiorari will clearly reveal that the petitioner corporation seeks a review of the factual
findings and evidence of the instant case. Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is
merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one
which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction while an error of jurisdiction is one
where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error
is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

TGN Realty Corp. v. Villa Teresa Homeowners Association (Jurisdiction over the issue)

This case concerns the dispute between the land developer and the residents of its
subdivision development regarding the state of improvements on the subdivision. The issues being
raised by the petitioner are essentially factual in nature. Ordinarily, the appeal by petition for
review on certiorari should not involve the consideration and resolution of factual issues. Section
I, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court limits the appeal to questions of law because the Court, not being
a trier of facts, should not be expected to re-evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence introduced in
the fora below. The attention of the Court has been directed to the conflict in the findings on the
state of the development of the project. The resolution and settlement of the conflict require the
evaluation and re-evaluation of factual matters. Yet, the Court cannot itself resolve and settle the
conflict in this appeal because it is not a trier of facts.

De Joya v. Marquez

Petitioner asserts that respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause
that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused. The Court ruled
that as general rule, it does not review the factual findings of the trial court, which include the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. It is only in exceptional cases
where this Court sets aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence
of probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law
or to protect the orderly administration of justice which is not applicable with this case. The court
acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of a
non-resident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves the
personal status of the plaintiff or property in the Philippines in which the defendant claims an
interest. There is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief from the
courts without submitting to its jurisdiction.
Marcos, Jr. v. Republic (Jurisdiction over res or property in litigation)

The anti-graft court granted the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by respondent
Republic of the Philippines and declared all assets and properties of Arelma, S.A., an entity created
by the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the government. The petitioner argued that
the Sandiganbayan does not possess territorial jurisdiction over the res or the Arelma proceeds.
The Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan did not err in granting the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, despite the fact that the Arelma account and proceeds are held abroad. Jurisdiction over
the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought
into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the
power of the court is recognized and made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though
at all times within the potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court.

Supapo v. Sps. De Jesus

The Supapos filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus
with the MeTC of Caloocan City. Supapo argued that the MeTC exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction over accion publiciana where the assessed value of the property does not exceed
P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 if the property is located in Metro Manila. The Court held that under
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is plenary. RA No. 7691, however, divested the RTC of a portion of its
jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value
of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila. In view of these amendments, jurisdiction
over actions involving title to or possession of real property is now determined by its assessed
value. The assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment
level.

Diaz-Enriquez v. Director of Lands

The Saclolos filed before the Regional Trial Court a joint application for registration of
title over three (3) parcels of land. The Saclolos claimed that the CA cannot declare the subject
lands as public lands since the Director of Lands failed to appeal from the RTC decision. Hence
this issue was not raised as error on appeal and became final and executory. The Court held that
the CA is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in
the appeal. There is no doubt that the application for registration of title hinges upon the
determination of whether the subject lands are alienable and disposable, which is consistent with
the appellate court's authority to review the totality of the controversy brought on appeal.

Coombs v. Castañeda

Petitioner found that the subject real property was no longer listed under her name and it
was already sold to a third party buyer. Coombs contends that RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case since the original copy of the title was never lost. The Court held that the RTC has
no jurisdiction when the certificate sought to be reconstituted was never lost or destroyed but is in
fact in the possession of another person. The mere allegation of the petitioner that the owner's
duplicate copy was never lost and has in fact always been with her gave rise to a prima facie case
of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the proceedings.

Municipality of Tangkal et. al. v. Hon. Rasad B. Balindong

The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, filed a Complaint with the
Shari'a District Court against the petitioner for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel
of land with an area of approximately 25 hectares arguing that since the mayor of Tangkal is a
Muslim, the case "is an action involving Muslims, hence, the court has original jurisdiction
concurrently with that of regular/civil courts.". The Municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction. It argued that since
it has no religious affiliation and represents no cultural or ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as
a Muslim under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. In determining whether the Shari'a District
Court has jurisdiction over the case, the threshold question is whether both parties are Muslims.
The Court held that It is an elementary principle that a municipality has a personality that is
separate and distinct from its mayor, vice-mayor, sanggunian, and other officers composing it and
under no circumstances can this corporate veil be pierced on purely religious considerations-as the
Shari'a District Court has done-without running afoul the inviolability of the separation of Church
and State enshrined in the Constitution.

A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Mondejar (Jurisdiction over small claims)


Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims
Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of P23,111.71 which
represented her unpaid water bills wherein the latter ruled in favour of the respondent. The
petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari Rule 65 to the RTC which dismissed the Certiorari on the
ground that said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims
cases. The Court held that the petitioner properly filed the Certiorari before the RTC. The
proscription on appeals in small claims cases does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court since “the extraordinary writ of certiorari
is always available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.” Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should
be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts.

Jose v. Alfuerto, et. al.

Herein case involves an ejectment case over a property that was leased to the petitioner.
The respondents contended that MeTC has no jurisdiction over the case for the issue involves
ownership of the land and sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action and for
lack of jurisdiction. The petitioners contended that the action is one of an unlawful detainer thus,
MeTC has jurisdiction over the case. The Court ruled that the allegation of the petitioner in the
amended complaint is inconsistent to the requirements for unlawful detainer. In the absence of
these allegations of facts, an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and the
municipal trial court or the MeTC does not have jurisdiction over the case.

Republic v. Espinosa

DENR filed a Complaint for annulment of title from a cadastral decree and/or reversion of
land with the RTC, it claimed that the property sold to Caliston by Espinosa is inalienable public
land since it fell within a timberland area. The CA upheld the validity of the title of Espinosa and
Caliston as the state failed to prove that the property was classified as forest land at the time of the
grant of the cadastral decree and issuance of title to Espinosa. The Court held that since cadastral
proceedings are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence, a cadastral
decree and a certificate of title are issued only after the applicant proves all the requisite
jurisdictional facts-that they are entitled to the claimed lot, that all parties are heard, and that
evidence is considered.31 As such, the cadastral decree is a judgment which adjudicates ownership
after proving these jurisdictional facts.

Abagatnan, et. al. v. Sps. Clarito

The petitioners in the case filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages against
respondents. Notably, the Complaint alleged that prior barangay conciliation proceedings are not
required as a pre-condition for the filing of the case in court, given that not all petitioners are
residents of Roxas City. Specifically, petitioner Jimmy C. Abagatnan resided in Laguna, while
petitioner Jenalyn A. De Leon resided in Pasig City. The Court held that CA erroneously dismissed
the case when it dismissed the Complaint for failure to comply with the prior barangay conciliation
requirement under Section 412 of the LGC, despite the fact that not all real parties in interest
resided in the same city or municipality. As such, the lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute,
and prior referral of the case for barangay conciliation is not a precondition to its filing in court.

Aquino v. Aure

Aure filed an ejectment case before the MeTC against the petitioner but it was dismissed
by the said court for non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process, among other grounds.
RTC affirmed the decision of MeTC but it was reversed by the CA. Petitioner now argues that
non-compliance with the barangay conciliation proceedings is a jurisdictional defect that warrants
the dismissal of the complaint. The Court ruled that although the precise technical effect of failure
to comply with the requirement of barangay conciliation is much the same effect produced by non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies wherein the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of
pre-maturity; and the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination and become
vulnerable to motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional
requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has
otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
Miguel v. Montanez

The parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos wherein the respondent agreed to pay his
loan in instalment in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) per month, and in the event
the house and lot given as collateral is sold, the respondent would settle the balance of the loan in
full wherein the latter still failed to comply. The petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money wherein the CA
ruled that the petitioner should have followed the procedure for enforcement of the amicable
settlement as provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, instead of filing a
collection case. The petitioner points out that the cause of action did not arise from the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos but on the respondent's breach of the original loan agreement. The Court ruled that
petitioner was right and held that while failure to comply with the barangay conciliation
requirement makes the complaint vulnerable to a motion to dismiss, the conciliation process is not
a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction. It is
clear that a court may not motu proprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with the
requirement for barangay conciliation, this ground not being among those mentioned for the
dismissal by the trial court of a case on its own initiative.

Sante v. Hon. Claravall

Respondent then filed at Baguio RTC a complaint for damages against petitioners, praying
that petitioners be held liable to pay moral damages in the amount of ₱300,000.00; ₱50,000.00 as
exemplary damages; ₱50,000.00 attorney’s fees; ₱20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of suit.
The petitioner on the other hand argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the said complaint
since it is falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTCC because the claim for moral
damages, ₱300,000.00 in the complaint, is the main action. The Court ruled that RTC acquired
jurisdiction over the said case considering that the total amount of damages claimed was 420,
000.00. . It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint
since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s
causes of action. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary
damages, atty’s fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the
main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint.

Gomez v. Montalban

Petitioner filed a Complaint with the RTC for a sum of money from the loan that was
obtained by the respondent plus its interest, damages and payment of attorney's fees against
respondent. Respondent claimed that RTC had no jurisdiction as the principal amount being
claimed by petitioner was only P40,000.00, an amount falling within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
The Court ruled that RTC has a jurisdiction over the said case since the amount should include
the interest for it is not merely incidental to the said loan. Basic as a hornbook principle is that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiff's cause of action. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also
remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some
of the claims asserted therein.

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