BERNARDINA P.

BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC.,
Respondents.

FACTS:
John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was
enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an
accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried.
Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole
remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.
SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the
parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio
who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. According to the records, Cornelio
died during John’s minority. The petitioner appealed to ECC but the affirmed the decision of
SSS on the ground that under Article 167 (j) of Labor Code, as amended, provides that
beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the
primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents. In relation to the said law, the
dependent parents referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent of the
covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation. Therefore, the rights which previously belong to the biological
parent (Bernardina) of the adopted child shall now be upon the adopting parent (Cornelio).
The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration but the same was dismissed. Hence, the
present petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bernardina is entitled to death benefits claim? Since the law provides that
in the absence of spouse or legitimate children, the LEGITIMATE parents are entitled
thereto, in accordance with the Rule 15, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation?
HELD:
1. Yes, Bernardina are entitled to Death benefits, the SC held that under Article 167 (j) of
the Labor Code provides that: 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he
remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the
dependent parents. Consequently, the ECC issued an amended Rules on Employees
Compensation under Rule 15, Section 1 provides that beneficiaries shall pertain to
legitimate spouse, and legitimate or adopted children. The second beneficiaries are those
legitimate parents of the child.
 Upon perusal of the said provisions, the Sc held that ECC made an unauthorized
legislation when it replaced the word dependent parent with the word legitimate parent
under Rule 15 of Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. The SC held that under
Art 7 of the NCC provides that law are repealed only by subsequent ones and their
violations or non observance shall not be excused by their disuse. The SC also held that
an administrative regulation must always be held in harmony with the statutes otherwise,
in cases of conflict the former shall be abandoned.
The SC also held that the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in Article
167 of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be
unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents"
should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or
by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly,
"dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,
who are in need of support or assistance.
John is a minor at the time of adoption, and after less than 3 years from such adoption
the adoptee Cornelio died, and under RA 8552, Section 20 provides that in case of recision of
adoption such as in this case (by analogy) then the legal custody over the child shall be brought
back to the biological parents or to the institution.
Further, by analogy applying Art 190 of the NCC provides that in case of succession the
following are entitled to the inheritance, the property shall be divided one half to the parents or
ascendants and one half to the adapters.
Art. 984 of the NCC provides that: In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no
children or descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be
his legal heirs.
Hence, by the foregoing provision provides that biological parents are entitled to receive
the benefits from the adopted.
Also the facts shows that several times John declared his biological mother as his
beneficiary under RA 8282, and also both declared the same residential address reported "Brgy.
Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte".
ANGEL G. NAVAL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NELSON B. JULIA, Respondents.

FACTS:
Naval had served as member of the Sanggunian, 2nd District of CamSur. Consequently,
RA 9716 was approved, reapportioning the legislative districts of Province of CamSur. (2004-
2007; and 2007-2010)
Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present
Third District. The present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and
Milaor, merged with five towns from the old First District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian,
Third District wherein he served until 2013. In the 2013 elections, Naval ran again for the same
position and was re-elected. Hence, Julia, a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third
District in the 2013 election and filed a petition to cancel COC of Naval. In that petition he
invoked Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and posited that Naval had fully
served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the
Sanggunian. By allowing Naval to run in exces of the 3 term limit rule then the OCMELEC
would violate the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
The COMELEC 2nd Division cancelled Naval’s candidacy on the ground that when he
sweared in his COC that he is eligible to run for local position, but when in fact was not he is
guilty of false material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the OEC.
COMELEC also held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification
must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The COMELEC also held that the case of Bandillo cannot be used in this case because,
Bandillo who hailed from the 1st district were elected not by the same registered voters of the 1 st
district, in the 2nd district, 2 barangays were added, Brgy. Milaor and Gainza. In the case at bar,
Naval was elected by the very same registered voters, absent the 2 barangays Milaor and Gainza.
In Latasa vs COMELEC, as cited by Naval, the COMELEC held that in applying the
three-term limit rule, the Court pointed out that the conversion of the municipality into a city did
not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the
office of the city mayor.
Aggrieved, the petitioner, appealed the case to SC.
ISSUE:
1. WON Naval’s reelection to the 3rd district of CamSur a violation of the three-term limit
rule provided by the Constitution?
HELD:
Yes, the SC held that his re-election is a violation of the Constitution. The SC held that
upon perusal of the transcript of the Constitutional Convention it is found that only three
consecutive elections to the same position would be allowed. Thereafter, the public official
can once again run for the same post provided there be a gap of at least one term from his or
her last election. The rule answers the need to prevent the consolidation of political power in the
hands of the few, while at the same time giving to the people the freedom to call back to public
service those who are worthy to be called statesmen.
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed.
The SC cited the R.A. No. 9716 and the Reapportioned Districts of Camarines Sur
provides that the current Second (2nd) Legislative District shall be renamed as the Third
(3rd) Legislative District, composed of the 8 former municipalities of 2 nd district except
milaor and Gainza. And the Court held that in the case at bar, the words of R.A.No. 9716
plainly state that the new Second District is to be created, but the Third District is to be renamed.
Applying the principle of Verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of the law, there
must be no departure has to be kept in mind).
The verb create means to "make or produce something new."47 On the other hand, the
verb rename means to "give a new name to someone or something."48 A complete reading of
R.A. No. 9716 yields no logical conclusion other than that the lawmakers intended the old
Second District to be merely renamed as the current Third District. Hence, the registered voters
who has voted him in the 2nd district twice and the 3rd district ones are the same, and therefore he
shall not be entitled to run for another term.