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In this article, Palak Goes discusses the key highlights of Civil Procedure Code
(Amendment) Act, 2002.
Overview
There are two types of law on the basis of nature, substantive laws and procedural laws.
Substantive laws are the laws which define the principles related to the rights and
liabilities (for instance, Indian Penal Code, 1860 lays down the offences of punishable
nature). On the contrary, Procedural laws provide for the mechanism for the regulation
and enforcement of these rights and liabilities. They lay down the procedure for the
machinery in compliance with the enforcement of the rights and liabilities (for instance,
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908).
Law is dynamic. This means that law is subjected to the changes to meet the demanding
needs of the society to which it concerns. It is subjected to changes to redress the
balance. Though the law is subjected to changes, the paramount principle of law on
which it lies upon is based on the Latin maxim “salus populi suprema lex esto” which
means “the good of the people shall be the supreme law”.
Because of the delay in delivering justice experienced by the litigants at various levels,
the Parliament introduced the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002.
The failure of the objective of The Amendment Act of 1999, i.e., speedy and expeditious
trial resulted in The Amendment Act of 2002 which was enacted to reduce the delays
faced at the different levels of the litigation. It is one of the Parliamentary efforts at
making litigation in our country more effective and speedy. In the light of the
Amendment Act of 1999 came the Amendment Act of 2002 which became effective from
1st July, 2002. After the long wait, the Parliament made some radical changes for the
effective enforcement of the provisions of the Code.
Arun Jaitley, introduced a new amendment Bill in 2002, taking into account the
suggestions made by bar representatives, political parties and the Law Commissions.
The Parliamentary Standing Committee recommended the other changes. The new Bill
was adopted by both the Houses of Parliament in May, 2002. Following Presidential
assent, the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act,2002 was notified and came into
effect.
Section 39 lays down the conditions under which a decree can be sent.
In dealing with an application for transfer of a decree to another Court for
execution two aspects must be kept in view, first, that a decree-holder has a legal,
not merely an equitable right to have his decree transferred for execution, and
secondly, at the same time, that the section is not mandatory.
But the Court is given a judicial discretion in the matter, as is shown from the word
“may” in the section. Thus if the demand for transfer is lawful, the fact that the
motive for the application for transfer is to put pressure on one of the judgment-
debtors is no ground for refusing the application for transfer.
The Government of India requested the Law Commission to take a comprehensive
revision of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In January, 1998, the Commission
took up the subject and decided to do the exercise in two phases. In the first phase,
the Commission reviewed the amendments suggested by the Code of Civil
Procedure (Amendment) Bill, 1997. In the second phase of the work, the
Commission took up the revision of the entire Code as a comprehensive revision of
Code as the whole would take longer time.
On the recommendations of Law Commission made in 163rd Report, headed by B.P.
Jeevan Reddy, the present sub-section (4) has been added to Section 39 to clarify
that nothing in the section shall be construed as authority the Court to execute a
decree against a person or property outside the local limits of its jurisdiction.
The question of consideration was that “the Section uses the word “may” which led
to a debate whether the Court sending the decree to another Court is
discretionary?”.
It was recommended by the Law Commission that “the use of “may” in Section 39
does not mean that the Court, which passed the decree, can execute the decrees
irrespective of territorial limitations. The word “may” is meant for cases where
there are circumstances in which execution as such is considered illegal. Another
view would upset the entire scheme of the Code as to jurisdiction. It seems
desirable to clarify the position by inserting an Explanation below Section 39 to
provide that nothing in the section shall be construed as an authority in the Court
to execute a decree against a person or property outside the local limits of its
jurisdiction. We recommend accordingly”.
Sub-section (2) has been added on the recommendations of the Law Commission
made in 54th Report, pages 51-52. As a result of the amendment, a transfer made
in pursuance of a registered agreement shall override the attachment if the
agreement precedes the attachment.
The Law Commission recommended that the following exception should be added
below Section 64:
“Exception – Nothing in this section applies to any private transfer or delivery of the
property attached or of any interest therein, made in execution of any contract for such
transfer or delivery entered into and registered before the attachment”.
By the Amendment Act of 2002, the Section was renumbered as sub-section (1) and
sub-section (2) and the following shall be inserted namely :
“(2) Nothing in this section shall apply to any private transfer or delivery of the property
attached or of any interest therein, made in pursuance of any contract for such transfer
or delivery entered into and registered before the attachment”.
The legal spirit that lies behind this section is to prevent fraud on the part of the
decree-holders and secure the rights of the attaching creditor against the attached
property by prohibiting private alienations pending attachments.
It enacts the rule that a private alienation of property after attachment is void as
against claims enforceable under the attachment.
This section makes no distinction between attachment of property before judgment
is given and an attachment in execution of a decree.
The Section was substituted by the Amendment Act of 1999 for the following:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any
other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force,
where any appeal from an appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single
Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment, decision or order of
such Single Judge in such appeal or from any decree passed in such appeal”.
The present section has been substituted for the substituted Section 100A, by the
Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act,2002.
As a result of the 2002 Act, appeals to division Bench of the High Courts in writs
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution have been restored.
The net result of the 1999 and 2002 Amendment is that where any appeal from an
original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a
High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such single
Judge; appeals to Division Bench of the High Court in such cases has been
abolished.
Though this substitution raised many prenotions, it widened the scope of Section
100A so far as a restriction on the right of further appeal is concerned.
“No second appeal lies in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes,
when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed
three thousand rupees”.
Though the critics had been pointed out that it would foreclose second appeals
where a substantive question of law was involved.
The Amendment Act of 2002 has corrected this distortion and the present section
has been substituted for the following:
“No second appeal shall lie from any decree, when the subject-matter of the original suit
is for recovery of money not exceeding twenty-five thousand rupees”.
Prior to both the Amendment Acts, the second appeal in every suit of the
cognizable nature was barred by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value
of the subject-matter of the original suit did not exceed three thousand rupees.
The second appeal was abolished by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act,
1999 in all cases where the value of the subject matter in the suit does not exceed
rupees twenty-five thousand.
The Amendment Act of 2002 has changed the scenario and now no second appeal
lie in money suits where the subject matter of the suit does not exceed rupees
twenty-five thousand.
Order V of the Code provides for issue and service of summons. The Malimath
Committee looked into the problem of the shortfall of cases in the Courts and
recommended amendments to the Code intending to lay down a fixed time frame
within which pleadings can be completed.
The Amendment Act of 2002 amended Rule 1 [Summons], Rule 9 [Delivery of
summons by Court] and Rule 9A [Summons given to the plaintiff for service] of
Order V .
The effect of substituted sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 is that summons are required to be
issued to the defendant for appearance and answering the claim of the plaintiff on
institution of a suit by the plaintiff set out in the plaint by filing written statement
of his defence within 30 days from the day of the institution of the suit except in a
few situations.
The first proviso to the sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 provides that no summons are
required to be issued when the defendant has appeared at the presentation of the
plaint and admitted the plaintiff’s claim.
The second proviso to the substituted sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 provides that if the
defendant does not file the written statement within 30 days of the presentation of
the plaint, he may be allowed to file the same, for reasons to be recorded in writing,
which shall not exceed ninety days from the date of service of summons.
Rule 9 of Order V was substituted by Rules 9 and 9A of the Amendment Act of 2002.
Sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (4) of Rule 9 prescribes two different situations as to the
delivery of the summons to the defendant. Firstly, if the defendant resides within
the jurisdiction of the Courtin which the suit is instituted or his agent, the summon
shall be delivered by the proper officer or such courier services as are approved by
the Court. Secondly, if the defendant resides outside the jurisdiction of the Court in
which the suit is instituted , the Court may direct the service of summon by
delivering the copy by speed post or by such courier services as are approved by the
High Court or by any other means of transmission of documents including fax
message or electronic mail service, which shall be made at the expenses of the
plaintiff (Proviso to sub-rule (3).
Sometimes, the defendant or his agent refuses or intentionally neglects the
delivery of the summon which leads to delay in service of summons. Sub-rule (5) of
Rule 9 curbs this situation and states that if the Court receives an
acknowledgement or any other receipt purporting to be signed by the defendant or
his agent endorsed by the postal employee that defendant or his agent has refused
to take the delivery of the postal or had refused to take accept the summon when
tendered to him, the Court issuing the summons shall declare that the summons
had been duly served on the defendant.
The Registered Post Acknowledgement Due can also make the service of summon.
Rule 9 empowers the High Court or the District Court to prepare a panel of the
courier agencies for service of summons.
To avoid the delay in delivery of summons, the Court empowered the plaintiff for
the service of summons under Rule 9A. It states that the Court, in addition to Rule
9, on an application of plaintiff may allow him service of summon for the
appearance of the defendant.
Such service of summon by the plaintiff shall be effected by delivery of summon to
the defendant personally a copy signed by the Judge and sealed with the seal of the
Court or any mode of service prescribed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 9.
Rule 17 [Amendment of pleadings] and Rule 18 [Failure to amend after order] were
substituted by Code Of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002.
By the Amendment Act of 2002, the provision has been restored in Rule 17. The
provision for the amendment has been given back to the Court with certain
limitations. A new provision has been added to the rule, namely that no application
for amendment of the pleadings shall be allowed after the trial has commenced
unless the Court concludes that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have
raised the matter before the commencement of trial.
Thus, after the trial of the case has been commenced, no application for
amendment of the pleadings shall be allowed unless the Court comes to the
conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter
before the commencement of trial.
The principal object of the rule is that the Courts should get at and try the merits of
the case that comes before them and should consequently allow all the
amendments that may be necessary for determining the real question in
controversy between the parties without causing injustice to the other side.
By the Code Of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999, Rule 18 was omitted. By
Code Of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, the old Rule 18 verbatim has been
restored.
Rule 18 states that if a party who has obtained an order for leave to amend does not
amend accordingly within the time limited for the purpose by the order, or if no
time is thereby limited then within fourteen days from the date of the order, he
shall not be permitted to amend after the expiration of such limited period or of
such fourteen days, unless the time is extended by the Court.
Plaint (Order VII)
“(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9”.
The clause (f) enabled the court to reject the plaint where the plaintiff fails to
comply with the provisions of Rule 9 of Order VII.
Sub-rule (3) of Rule 14 was substituted meaning thereby that the documents may
be produced by the plaintiff which ought to be produced during the presentation of
a plaint or to be entered in the list or annexed to the plaint, with the leave of the
Court, at the time of the hearing of the suit.
The Amendment Act of 2002 omitted Rule 18.
Rule 5 [Power to amend, and strike out issues] was substituted by Code of Civil
Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002.
Rule 5 was omitted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999 which
was restored verbatim by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002.
Rule 5 lays down provisions for amending the issues, framing additional issues, and
striking out issues in the course of the trial of a suit.
It states that the Court may at any time before the passing a decree amend the
issues or frame additional issues on such terms as it thinks fit, and all such
amendments or additional issues as may be necessary for determining the matters
in controversy between the parties shall be so made or framed. It further states that
the Court may also, at any time before passing a decree, strike out any issues that
appear to it to be wrongly framed or introduced.
A court trying a civil suit has inherent power to take cognizance of questions going
to the root of the subject-matter in controversy between the parties at any stage of
the trial. But before doing so, the Court must frame and record issues on such
questions.
The power of the Court is subject to Rule 3 of this Order. Thus the rule does not
enable the re-opening of issues already closed.
Rule 1 was amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002.
Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 was substituted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 2002.
It states that the Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment in
an open Court, either at once, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable and when
the judgment is to be pronounced on some future day, the Court shall fix a day for
that purpose, of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.
The proviso to the sub-rule states that where the judgment is not pronounced at
once, every endeavor shall be made by the Court to pronounce the judgment within
thirty days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded but,
where it is not practicable so to do on the ground of the exceptional and
extraordinary circumstances of the case, the Court shall fix a future day for the
pronouncement of the judgment, and such day shall not ordinarily be a day beyond
sixty days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded, and due
notice of the day to fixed shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.
In other words, there is a definite time frame for the pronouncement of the
judgments after a case has been heard. The general rule is that a judgment is to be
pronounced at once and where it is not practicable to do so, the Court shall make
an endeavor to pronounce judgment within thirty days from the date on which the
hearing of the case was concluded.
Where it is not practicable for the Court to pronounce judgment within thirty days
because of exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of the case, the Court shall
fix a day for the pronouncement of judgment which should not be beyond sixty
days from the date on which the case was heard.
“Provided further that the deposit under this sub-rule may be made within sixty days in
all such cases where the period of thirty days, within which the deposit had to be made,
has not expired before the commencement of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 2002.
The amendment in Rule 92 has been made on the recommendations of the Law
Commission made in the 139th Report (Page No. 08) to bring harmony between
sub-rule (2) of Rule 92 and Article 127 of The Indian Limitation Act, 1963. The
period for making deposit under sub-rule (2) of Rule 92 before the present
amendment was thirty days, while under Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
the limitation period for making the application to set aside an execution sale
(which has to be accompanied by the deposit in Court of requisite amount) is sixty
days.
Conclusion
“The power of judicial discretion comes along with the action of arbitrariness”.
These judicial decisions result in the unnecessary delays. The Amendment Act of
2002 laid down several time limits that bounds the plaintiff as well as the
defendant at each stage of the litigation. These limitations resulted in speeding up
the litigation process.
The conceptualisation of the idea of evidence via affidavits as well as the
introduction of the court-appointed commissioner also resulted achieving the
objectivity of this Amendment Act, i.e., speedy and expeditious justice.
The lagging behind of the judicial system due to unnecessary adjournments now
can be dealt adequately with the limit imposed and by the provision of imposing
costs including punitive costs.
The failure on the part of courts for providing adequate and easily accessible to
justice is one of the principal causes of widespread dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice.
The concept of “access to justice’ has undergone significant transformation. The
Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002 aims to provide for speedy and
effectual justice.
Palak Goel :
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