AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR

Volume 32, pages 528–539 (2006)

Social Cognition and Moral Cognition in Bullying:

What’s Wrong?
Gianluca Gini

Department of Developmental and Socialisation Psychology, University of Padova, Padova, Italy

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Two different models have been proposed that describe the bully alternatively as a child lacking in social skills [Crick and Dodge,
1994], or as a cold manipulative individual, who leads gangs to achieve personal goals [Sutton et al., 1999a]. The present study
examined the performance of 204 8–11-year-olds in a set of stories that assessed understanding of cognitions and emotions, in
relation to their Participant Role in bullying. Moreover, children’s understanding of moral emotions and proneness to moral
disengagement was assessed. Victims showed some difficulties in the social cognition task, whereas bullies did not. Aggressive
children, instead, were found to be more ready to show moral disengagement mechanisms, whereas defenders showed higher levels
of moral sensibility. Results are discussed in relation to the two models, and the need for further research into empathy and moral
cognition of children involved in bullying episodes is highlighted. Aggr. Behav. 32:528–539, 2006. r 2006 Wiley-Liss, Inc.
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Keywords: school bullying; social cognition; moral cognition; theory of mind; participant roles

INTRODUCTION than their non-aggressive peers (hostile attributional

bias) [Dodge and Frame, 1982; Dodge and Som-
Over the last 20 years, the literature about the
berg, 1987]. Another difference between aggressive
development of aggressive behavior showed an
and non-aggressive children refers to the selection of
increasing interest in the study of the relations
the behavioral response in a social situation: the
between cognition, social information processing
former, in fact, seem to have a more limited range of
and social interaction in children and adolescents
non-aggressive answers than the latter and, for this
[e.g., Crick and Dodge, 1994; Harvey et al., 2001]. In
reason, they are more inclined to choose and
particular, several authors studied how the social
perform aggressive behaviors, especially in the case
information processing strategies used by children
of interpersonal conflicts [Dodge, 1980; Dodge and
and the way in which they interpret situational cues
Newman, 1981; Dodge et al., 1990]. According to
and use their previous experiences can influence
the same approach, victims, who are shy and
their aggressive conduct [Dodge and Price, 1994;
withdrawn and lack social skills of assertiveness,
Huesmann and Guerra, 1997; Randall, 1997]. One
show high levels of anxiety and loneliness, and have
of the most important results of this field of research
less experience in social interaction and play fighting
has been the possibility to identify the presence of
(which may enhance social skills), as well as control
specific deficits and systematic biases in some
and interpretation of emotional expression [Hodges
components of the social cognition of aggressive
et al., 1997; Smith et al., 1993].
children. These results led Dodge and colleagues to
Some authors tried to apply this model to a
formulate the ‘‘Social Skills Deficit’’ model [Crick
particular kind of aggressive phenomenon: school
and Dodge, 1994; Dodge, 1980]. According to the
first formulation of this model, in which reactive and
proactive categories of aggression were not clearly Correspondence to: G. Gini, Department of Developmental and
distinguished, aggressive children show some diffi- Socialisation Psychology, University of Padova, via Venezia 8, 35131
culties in one or more phases of their social Padova, Italy. E-mail: gianluca.gini@unipd.it
information processing. For example, these authors Received 14 December 2004; Accepted 14 April 2005
found that aggressive children tend to interpret Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.
ambiguous situations in an aggressive way more com). DOI: 10.1002/ab.20153.

r 2006 Wiley-Liss, Inc.


bullying [Boulton and Smith, 1994; Slee, 1993; Smith
et al., 1993]. However, despite the popular view of
the bully as an ‘‘oaf’’ boy, that is, an intellectually
simple or backward boy [Besag, 1989], very few
studies confirmed that Dodge’s model can be
applied to bullies in exactly the same way as to
aggressive children [e.g., Hazler, 1996; Randall,
1997]. On the contrary, some other authors stressed
the role of adaptive motivation to explain bullying
behavior, arguing that bullying may be seen as an
inappropriate way to reach a socially effective goal,
such as leadership within a group. As a consequence,
these authors stated that the bully should not
necessarily be seen as an individual with specific
difficulties. On the contrary, he or she may some-
times be a skilled individual who takes advantage
of his/her high social cognitive competence to reach
personal benefits, such as interpersonal domi-
nance, through a ‘‘Machiavellian’’ conduct [Sutton
et al., 1999a].
Some data presented by Sutton et al. [1999b]
empirically support this view; in fact, they found
that 7–10-year-old bullies performed better than
other classmates in a social cognition task that
required the understanding of mental states and
emotions of the main character of a story (theory of
mind task). The relevance of these results, above all,
lies in the fact that, in a bullying situation, ‘‘having a
grasp of the mental states of those involved, along
with an ability to manipulate these thoughts and
beliefs, may be crucial for the bully in developing
and maintaining such inter-role relations’’ [Sutton
et al., 1999b, p. 437]. In previous studies, therefore,
bullies’ social cognitive skills, such as social per-
spective taking and decoding of emotional informa-
tion, may have been underestimated [Sutton et al.,
1999a,b,c]. However, some bullies may possess a
different conception of the costs and benefits of
aggression, and they may lack in empathic under-
standing of the victim’s suffering. Therefore, it
appears more adequate to regard social skills as a
neutral tool, which may be used for both
prosocial and antisocial purposes [Björkqvist et al.,
2000; Hawley, 2003]. From this perspective, the
crucial point to understand bullying behavior refers
to the kind of values that guide bullies’ conduct,
rather than their higher or lower ability in social
information processing [Arsenio and Lemerise, 2001].
Following this line of research, the present paper
focuses on cognitive and emotional understanding
of social situations in bullying, using a theory of
mind task with children who assume different
participant roles during a bullying episode. In the
above-mentioned study, however, Sutton et al.
Social Cognition in Bullying 529
[1999b] did not explicitly consider a particular kind
of emotion found to be important to account for
aggressive and antisocial behaviors: moral emotions
(in particular, guilt and shame). If bullies are cold,
manipulative experts in social contexts, their beha-
vior may be related to emotions surrounding moral
transgression. These emotions are important be-
cause, as Hoffman [1976, 2000] pointed out, they are
closely connected with empathy and they can be
considered mediators of conscience. Other authors
suggested that moral development plays a major role
in behavioral regulation [Arsenio, 1988; Nucci,
2001; Smetana, 1995; Turiel, 1998] and that guilt is
an interpersonal phenomenon aimed at avoiding the
disruption of relationships and bonds [Baumeister
et al., 1994; Tagney, 1992]. Moreover, individuals
who are more prone to guilt are less aggressive and
less likely to act out behaviors [Harpur et al., 1988;
Quiles and Bybee, 1997]. In contrast, if children had
lower feelings of guilt, this could ‘‘enable’’ them to
act aggressively without feeling guilty. However, the
reverse causal link could be true, in that children
who repeatedly commit acts of aggression may
become inured to this type of behavior, exhibiting
dulled emotional responses.
Moral Disengagement
and Aggressive Behavior
A useful contribution to the analysis of some
social cognitive components of aggressive behavior
is made by the Social Cognitive Theory of the Moral
Self [Bandura, 1986, 1990, 1991]. According to this
theory, moral reasoning is linked to moral action
through affective self-regulatory mechanisms by
which moral agency is exercised. In their develop-
ment, children need to develop standards of right
and wrong and to adopt these standards as guides
and deterrents for their conduct. This self-regulatory
process implies that individuals usually act in ways
that give them satisfaction and a sense of self-worth,
whereas, on the other side, they tend to avoid
behaviors that violate their moral standards in order
to avoid self-condemnation.
Moreover, Bandura [2002] claimed that the con-
struct of moral disengagement could be considered
as a mediator between the individual’s moral
principles and his/her real conduct, which may not
necessarily be coherent with those principles. Inter-
nal controls, in fact, are not fixed, and several
psychological and social processes can contribute
to their selective deactivation. In particular, Ban-
dura described eight different mechanisms through
which moral control can be disengaged. One set of
Aggr. Behav. DOI 10.1002/ab
530 Gini
disengagement practices operates on the reconstruc-
tion of the behavior itself. For example, an immoral
conduct is made personally and socially acceptable
by portraying it in the service of moral purposes
(moral justification) or self-deplored acts can be
made to appear righteous by contrasting them with
worse conducts (advantageous comparison). More-
over, in some circumstances, activities can take on
different appearances depending on what they are
called (euphemistic labeling). The second set of
disengagement practices operates by obscuring or
minimizing the agentive role in the harm one causes
(displacement of responsibility and diffusion of
responsibility). Other ways of weakening moral
control operate by minimizing, disregarding or
distorting the effects of one’s action; if minimization
does not work, the evidence of harm can be
discredited (minimizing or misconstruing conse-
quences). Finally, disengagement practices may
operate on the recipients of detrimental acts by
stripping them of human qualities (dehumanization)
or considering aggression as provoked by the victim
(attribution of blame). These mechanisms can lead
to aggressive behaviors through a process of moral
disengagement, that is, a partial gap between the
‘‘abstract’’ personal idea of moral behavior and
the individual’s behavior in real life. In this way, the
individual protects him/herself from negative feel-
ings, such as guilt or shame, that usually follow an
immoral conduct [Bandura, 1991].
Different studies showed a positive relation
between aggressive behavior and the activation of
one or more of these mechanisms in both adults and
children [Bandura et al., 1996; Caprara et al., 1995,
1996; Yadava et al., 2001]. In particular, Caprara
et al. [1995] confirmed the strong link between moral
disengagement and physical and verbal aggression,
both self- and peer-evaluated, especially in male
children. More recently, Bandura et al. [2001] have
replicated these results. They found a positive
relation between moral disengagement and trans-
gressive behavior, and a negative relation between
moral disengagement and self-regulatory efficacy
and prosocial behavior.
The above-mentioned studies actually referred to
aggressive individuals, but a similar pattern of data
has been found in school bullying research, as well.
Bacchini et al. [1998] and Menesini et al. [1997],
for example, found that male bullies utilized the
moral disengagement mechanisms more than
did other peers and, most of all, they seemed to
use the mechanisms of Dehumanization and Moral
Justification. A confirmation of these results
emerged in a cross-national study, involving Italy
Aggr. Behav. DOI 10.1002/ab
and Spain, conduced by Menesini et al. [2003b], who
assessed moral reasoning of bullies, victims and
children who assumed the role of the defender, using
the Scan Bullying test [Almeida et al., 2001]. These
authors confirmed the tendency of bullies to show
higher levels of moral disengagement, and the
presence of a profile of egocentric reasoning in
these pupils.
Quite recently, the ‘‘traditional’’ classification
of school children into bullies, victims and controls
has been criticized and several authors stressed the
importance of considering bullying a group
process [Sutton and Smith, 1999]. The empirical
confirmation of the importance of peer ecology
applied to bullying phenomenon derives from
several observational studies carried out during
periods of free interaction among children in
unstructured contexts, such as during recess and
outdoor play. These studies, in fact, consistently
found that peers are involved in 85% of bullying
episodes [Atlas and Pepler, 1998; Craig and Pepler,
1997; Craig et al., 2000; Pepler and Craig, 1995].
Moreover, Salmivalli et al. [1996] identified six
different participant roles taken by individual
children in the bullying process (i.e., victim, bully,
reinforcer of the bully, assistant to the bully,
defender of the victim and outsider). Another study
by Salmivalli et al. [1997] has also revealed a strong
influence of how the members of a group behave in
bullying situations on an individual child’s behavior
in such situations.
In line with this approach that considers bullying
as a group phenomenon, all distinct roles within the
class were considered in the present study. Not only
bullies and victims participated, but also those
pupils who, in different ways, act important roles
in reinforcing bullying behavior (the so-called
‘‘Followers’’: the Assistants of the bully and the
Reinforcers) or, in contrast, intervene to defend the
victim (the Defenders). Finally, Outsiders, that is,
children not directly involved in the phenomenon,
were considered.
Aims of the Study and Hypotheses
The first aim of the present study was to assess the
performance of these pupils in a social cognition
task similar to the one used by Sutton et al. [1999b].
In this task, the same two typologies of stories used
by Sutton and colleagues were used: cognitive and
emotion stories. The cognitive stories, in particular,
assessed the child’s ability to understand mental
states, beliefs and intentions of the character of the
story. The emotion stories, instead, assessed the

ability to understand emotional states of the
character and the possibility that an emotion could
be dissimulated to influence and modify others’
knowledge. Contrary to the idea of the bully as a
social ‘‘oaf’’, it is hypothesized that the Bully group
will perform better than, or at least at the same level
as, other pupils in a theory of mind task that
requires understanding the thoughts, beliefs, inten-
tions that guide others’ behavior.
Moreover, in addition to these two kinds of
stories, a third category (moral stories), not used
by Sutton et al. [1999b], was designed in order to
explore the role of moral emotions in the context of
aggressive conduct. The second aim of the present
study, therefore, was to analyze the ability to
understand moral emotions (guilt and shame) within
hypothetical social scenarios by children who
assume different roles. Considering the literature
about moral cognition in aggressive behavior [e.g.,
Hoffman, 2000; Quiles and Bybee, 1997; Tagney,
1992], it was expected that Bullies would perform
worse than non-aggressive mates in moral stories,
that is, be less likely to make the correct attribution
of moral emotions to the character of the story
owing to his/her negative behavior. In contrast,
Defenders should be particularly sensitive to this
kind of emotion as an expression of what is right
and what is wrong and, therefore, we expected this
group of children to perform better than any other
in this type of stories.
Finally, the third aim of the study was to consider
the relation between moral disengagement and
bullying behavior [e.g., Caprara et al., 1995;
Menesini et al., 1999]. The comparison among
pupils who assume different roles may lead to a
deeper understanding of the importance of these
mechanisms in bullying episodes. Specifically, we
expected that the tendency to activate moral
disengagement mechanisms would be higher in
aggressive children (the Bullies and their Followers).
In contrast, we hypothesized that Victims and those
children who frequently intervene to defend their
victimized classmates (Defenders) would show a
higher moral sensibility and, consequently, a lower
level of moral disengagement.
TABLE I. Distribution of Participant Roles (%) Within the Whole Sample
Bullies Assistants Reinforcers
Males 15.9 16.3 11.9
Females 5.9 6.3 7.7
Social Cognition in Bullying 531
METHOD
Participants
The initial sample comprised 581 Italian primary-
school children (295 boys and 286 girls) aged
between 8 and 11 years (mean age 5 9.7 years,
s.d. 5 11 months). Although socio-economic status
was not directly measured, our sample included
students from a wide range of social backgrounds
(low and working classes through upper middle
class). In terms of racial/ethnic background, the
sample was predominantly Caucasian (96%), with a
small proportion of Asian (2%) and North African
(2%) origin. All children received school and
parental permission to participate prior to the
collection of the data.
On the basis of peer nominations, children were
first assigned to one of the following Role groups:
Bully, Assistant, Reinforcer, Defender, Outsider and
Victim, based on the procedure described below.
Seventy-three children did not receive a specific role
because they did not satisfy the classification criteria
proposed by Salmivalli et al. [1996] and were not
included in the final sample. The distribution of
Participant Roles for the whole sample is reported
in Table I.
As can be seen in Table I, cell sizes are rather
unequal for both Participant Roles and gender. In
order to handle problems connected with strongly
unbalanced factorial designs [Cramer, 1998], espe-
cially with small cell numbers, we decided to balance
our Role groups for number and gender. Therefore,
a total of 204 children, divided into six Role groups
(n 5 34; 17 males and 17 females for each one), were
randomly selected and participated in the second
phase of the study. The analyses presented in the
result section have been conducted on this sample
with equalized groups.
Material
Participant Role Questionnaire (PRQ). The
Italian version [Menesini and Gini, 2000] of the
Participant Role Questionnaire–PRQ [Salmivalli
et al., 1996; Sutton and Smith, 1999] was used to
Participant roles
Defenders Outsiders Victims No role Total
11.5 12.2 17.6 14.6 100
26.2 25.5 17.8 10.6 100
Aggr. Behav. DOI 10.1002/ab
532 Gini
collect peer nominations. Children were asked to
nominate up to five boys and/or girls in their class
who fitted each of the 21 behavioral descriptions of
bullying situations that compose the questionnaire.
In the present study, self-nominations were not
considered. The items are divided into six scales,
which refer to six different Participant Roles: Bully
(4 items, e.g.: ‘‘Starts bullying’’), Assistant (2 items,
e.g.: ‘‘Helps the bully, maybe by catching or holding
the victim’’), Reinforcer (5 items, e.g.: ‘‘Laughs
at people getting bullied’’), Defender (5 items, e.g.:
‘‘Stick up for the victim’’), Outsider (4 items, e.g.:
‘‘Isn’t usually there, stays away’’) and Victim
(1 item, ‘‘Gets bullied’’). Menesini and Gini [2000]
reported a good internal reliability of these scales
for the Italian population (a 5 .78–.94). In Table II,
correlations between different role scores are
reported.
Roles1 were assigned according to the original
procedure, proposed by Salmivalli et al. [1996]:
* for each child a Role Score is calculated in each of
the six scales of the questionnaire. A nomination
for ‘‘sometimes’’ showing a behavior is scored as
1, and ‘‘often’’ is scored as 2. Then, the
nominations are summed, divided by the number
of nominators and multiplied by 100;
* a Participant Role is assigned on the basis of the
child’s highest standardized role score. No role is
assigned if the child’s score is below the mean
(Zo0) in all the six scales, or if the difference
between the two highest scores is less than .1.
Social cognition task: the stories. A set of 15
short stories was designed to test children’s under-
standing of mental states and emotions. Some of
these stories were translated from Happé [1994] and
Sutton et al. [1999b], and additional stories were
created reflecting the same structure of the pre-
existent stories. Even though some stories (e.g., the
‘‘army/war’’ story) are less relevant for children than
others, they all seemed to be understandable and
valid for primary school pupils.
The 15 stories were divided into three categories,
five stories for each category:
1
An important point raised by a reviewer refers to the possibility to
consider the bully–victim group. However, in our sample, only eight
children scored above the cutting point for both bullies and victims
(equally distributed in the bully and the victim group), which was not
enough for separate analyses. Therefore, we decided not to include
these subjects in our analyses.
Aggr. Behav. DOI 10.1002/ab
TABLE II. Role Score Correlations for the Whole Sample
Bully Assistant Reinforcer Defender Outsider
Assistant .68
Reinforcer .66 .60
Defender
.16
.11 .10
Outsider
.22
.24
.07 .30
Victim .07 .01 .12
.01 .13
Note: N 5 578.
Po.001 (Bonferroni corrected).
(a) Cognitive stories: these stories require the under-
standing of mental states, thoughts, beliefs,
intentions of characters, which determine their
behavior. Example of cognitive story [Happé,
1994]:
During the war, the Red army captures a
member of the Blue army. They want him to
tell them where his army’s tanks are; they know
they are either by the sea or in the mountains.
They know that the prisoner will not want to
tell them, he will want to save his army, and so
he will certainly lie to them. The prisoner is very
brave and very clever, he will not let them find
his tanks. The tanks are really in the mountains.
Now when the other side ask him where his
tanks are, he says, ‘‘They are in the mountains’’;
(b) Emotion stories: in these stories the understand-
ing of what kind of emotion is appropriate
within a specific situation is crucial. Moreover,
the child needs to understand that emotions can
be clearly shown or, on the contrary, dissimu-
lated, to influence and modify others’ knowl-
edge. In order to facilitate participants’ answers,
children were presented with drawings of faces
representing different emotions (happiness, sad-
ness, anger, guilt and a neutral face). An
example of an emotion story taken from Sutton
et al. [1999b] is:
Mike wants to go out with his friends, but he has
a really bad tummy ache. He knows that if his
Mum notices he is ill, she won’t let him go out to
play. Mike goes downstairs and asks his Mum,
‘‘Can I go out to play please?’’;
(c) Moral stories: in these stories the appropriate
emotion is a moral emotion because some
wrongdoing has happened. In these stories
children were also helped with the drawings.
An example of moral story (new) is as follows:
 Social Cognition in Bullying 533

Claudia has just moved to her new school. She has Therefore, higher scores in this scale indicate a
brown hair, green eyes and she is a little bit shorter higher tendency to engage in one or more of these
than her classmates. During the maths class, mechanisms. Even though the items of the scale
without being noticed by her teacher, Susan, describe different mechanisms, previous studies
who sits behind Claudia, sends her a written note using this scale with Italian samples [Caprara
like ‘‘Pigmy, dwarf’’. Claudia reads this note and et al., 1995, 1996; Menesini et al., 1997] have
starts crying in front of all her mates. demonstrated a unidimensional structure of the
scale, especially for younger children. This was also
Each story was followed by a control question confirmed in our sample. Therefore, following the
based on the content of the story to verify that the suggestions of the authors of the scale, analyses were
child understood it; then, an experimental question conducted on the total score and not on separate
assessing the understanding of mental states or subscales in the present study. The reliability of the
emotions was asked. For the cognitive stories, an scale was a 5 .69.
answer was considered correct if the child referred to
the mental state, thoughts or beliefs of the char- Procedure
acters (e.g., critical question: ‘‘Where will the Red
Stage 1: The PRQ and the Moral Disengagement
army look for the Blue army and why?’’; answer:
Scale were completed during a single classroom
‘‘They will look by the sea because they think that
session and the order of presentation of the two
the prisoner is lying to them’’). For the emotion
measures was counterbalanced. This session began
stories, a correct answer included both the identifi-
by introducing the general purpose of the study.
cation of the appropriate emotion (positive or
Then, the following definition of bullying [Whitney
negative) and the reference to the intention/wish of
and Smith, 1993] was presented and discussed with
the main character to hide his/her own real emotion
the class:
to the other characters, for example, when a
character is ‘‘sad’’ but he or she appears ‘‘happy’’
We say a child or young person is being bullied, or
(e.g., ‘‘Mike has a bad tummy ache, but he appears
picked on when another child or young person, or
happy, otherwise his Mum notices that he is feeling
a group of children or young people, say nasty and
bad and won’t let him go out’’). Finally, for the
unpleasant things to him or her. It is also bullying
moral stories, an answer was considered correct if
when a child or young person is hit, kicked,
the child recognized the fact that, in the situation
threatened, locked inside a room, sent nasty notes,
described, the character of the story should have
when no one ever talks to them and things like that.
felt a moral emotion (guilt or shame) for his/her
These things can happen frequently and it is difficult
own behavior (e.g., ‘‘She (Susan) feels guilty because
for the child or young person being bullied to defend
she shouldn’t have said bad things to her
himself or herself. It is also bullying when a child or
mate Claudia’’).
young person is teased repeatedly in a nasty way.
Moral Disengagement Scale. This scale mea-
But it is not bullying when two children or young
sures the individual’s tendency to use cognitive
people of about the same strength have the odd fight
mechanisms that can disengage self-sanctions and
or quarrel.
justify the use of violent and aggressive behaviors.
Stage 2: When the data from Stage 1 had been
This version of the scale [Caprara et al., 1995],
analyzed, children selected through the PRQ were
designed for primary-school children, consists of 14
tested individually in an area of the school that
items describing individual’s readiness to construe
afforded privacy. During this session, the stories
injurious conduct as serving righteous purposes,
were presented in a randomized order and the
masquerading censurable activities by palliative
children’s answers were audio-recorded to facilitate
language or rendering them benign by advantageous
the successive transcription and coding procedure.
comparison, minimizing the harmful effects of one’s
In order to avoid any possible influence upon their
detrimental conduct and devaluing those who are
responses, the experimenter who interviewed chil-
maltreated (example items: ‘‘Some kids deserve to be
dren did not know their Participant role.
treated like animals’’; ‘‘Kids cannot be blamed for
misbehaving if their friends pressured them to do
it’’). Children were asked to rate the strength of their
RESULTS
endorsement or rejection of moral exoneration of
detrimental conduct on a 5-point Likert-type scale Results are presented using the categorical mea-
(from 1 5 strongly disagree to 5 5 strongly agree). sure of ‘‘Participant Roles’’ to compare group

Aggr. Behav. DOI 10.1002/ab

534 Gini

means in social cognition and moral disengagement
with independent 6 (Roles)  2 (Gender) ANOVAs.
The continuous measure ‘‘Role Scores’’ is used to
test for correlations between the extent of different
types of behavior in the whole sample and the social
cognition and moral disengagement measures.
Preliminary Analysis
A preliminary one-way ANOVA was performed
to investigate the possible effect of Participant Roles
on the answers to the control questions. No
statistically significant differences emerged among
the different roles [F(5, 192) 5 .962, P 5 n.s.], thus
confirming that the level of comprehension of
the stories presented was similar for all Participant
Roles.
Moreover, in order to control for inter-rater
reliability, two independent judges coded the 30%
of all children’s answers. Their level of agreement
reached 96%. Cohen’s kappa was also calculated,
resulting in K 5 .91. Disagreements were due to
those answers in which the reference to mental states
was not completely clear. All discrepancies were
resolved by consultation between the coders.
Participant Roles and Social Cognition
As the three categories into which our stories were
divided (cognitive, emotion and moral stories) are
different from each other, three separate ANOVAs
were conducted on the mean performance in the
three sets of stories, with Role and Gender as
between factors. From the analysis, a statistically
significant main effect of Role emerged only for the
cognitive stories [F(5, 192) 5 2.376, P 5 .04,
Z2p ¼ :058]. Post hoc analyses revealed that Victims’
performance (M 5 2.88, s.d. 5 1.61) was signifi-
cantly lower than Defenders (M 5 4.03,
s.d. 5 1.38), whereas other groups did not signifi-
cantly differ from each other (Bonferroni compar-
isons). The main effect of Gender and the
Role  Gender interaction were not statistically
significant.
These data do not support the prediction of
Hypothesis 1 that bullies should perform better
than other people in the theory of mind tasks, but
they also fail to show social deficits among bullies.
In contrast to Hypothesis 2, bullies did not do worse
than the other groups in the moral stories
(Table III).
Role Scores and Social Cognition
A partial correlation analysis between social
cognition and the actual extent of different types
of behavior (the role scores) was performed.
Considering the fact that the scales are correlated
with each other, to examine the relation of each role
with the cognitive, emotion and moral information
processing skills, in the correlation analysis the
remaining PRQ scales and age were partialled out.
Moreover, considering the high number of compar-
isons, in order to avoid the increase of type 1 error,
Bonferroni’s correction was used (adjusted level of
a: .05/24 5 .002). Correlation coefficients are shown
in Table IV. In line with Hypothesis 1, Bully role is
positively correlated with the total social cognition
score and with the cognitive score (the ability
to understand thoughts, intentions, beliefs, etc.)
and the emotion score. Moreover, in accordance
with Hypothesis 2, the Defender score is positively
correlated with all social cognition scores.
Participant Roles and Moral Disengagement
As concerns the third aim, a two-way ANOVA on
the mean score in the Moral Disengagement Scale
was performed with Role and Gender as between
factors. A statistically significant main effect of Role

TABLE III. Participant Roles and Mean Score [s.d.] in Social TABLE IV. Partial Correlations of Social Cognition and
Cognition Task Individual Role Scores

Participant Cognitive Emotion Moral Total social Social cognition scores

rolesa storiesb storiesb storiesb cognition taskc
Role scores Cognitive Emotion Moral Total score
Bullies 3.06 [1.30] 2.79 [2.20] 3.18 [1.94] 9.03 [4.79]
Assistants 3.18 [1.47] 3.20 [2.04] 3.59 [1.86] 9.97 [4.85] Bully .195 .148 .129 .172
Reinforcers 3.15 [1.56] 3.26 [1.76] 3.62 [1.67] 10.03 [4.28] Assistant
.021
.026 .014
.012
Defenders 4.03 [1.38] 4.12 [1.45] 4.00 [1.67] 12.15 [4.04] Reinforcer
.074
.059
.098
.078
Outsiders 3.38 [1.76] 3.68 [1.66] 4.06 [1.63] 11.12 [4.58] Defender .214 .226 .197 .223
Victims 2.88 [1.61] 3.26 [1.81] 3.44 [1.76] 9.59 [4.73] Outsider .071 .008 .060 .050
Victim .068 .109 .112 .104
a
n 5 34 for each group.
b
Range 5 0–5. Note: N 5 204.
c Po.001 (Bonferroni corrected).
Range 5 0–15.

Aggr. Behav. DOI 10.1002/ab

 Social Cognition in Bullying 535

40 DISCUSSION
35
30 Social Cognition in Bullying
25
20
The present study is located in research about the
15 role of social cognition in the development of
10 bullying behavior among schoolmates. In particular,
5 two different models have been proposed in the
0 literature to explain the Bully’s behavior in terms
of social information processing. The first model
,a

,d
s,

s,

ts,

s,
rs

,b
er

tim

er
de

an

es
sid

rc
hypothesizes the presence of deficits in the social
en

ist
ic

lli
fo
ut

V
ef

ss

Bu
in
O
D

Re
Fig. 1. Participant roles and moral disengagement. Notes: n 5 34 for
each group, range 5 14–70, a,b,c,dMeans with different superscript
differ at Po.05.
emerged [F(5, 192) 5 9.269, Po.001, Z2p ¼ :194],
whereas neither Gender [F(1, 192) 5 .039, P 5 n.s.]
nor the Role  Gender interaction [F(5, 192) 5 .844,
P 5 n.s.] were significant. Post-hoc analyses (Bon-
ferroni comparisons) showed that all aggressive
roles share the same tendency to activate moral
disengagement mechanisms, in fact Bullies
(M 5 38.03, s.d. 5 7.58), Reinforcers (M 5 35.76,
s.d. 5 8.15) and Assistants (M 5 33.74, s.d. 5 7.80)
performed significantly higher than Defenders
(M 5 26.53, s.d. 5 7.13). Moreover, Bullies also
showed a higher level of moral disengagement than
both Outsiders (M 5 30.35, s.d. 5 7.63) and Victims
(M 5 32.41, s.d. 5 8.12). These findings support
Hypothesis 3 (Fig. 1).
Role Scores and Moral Disengagement
A partial correlation analysis, controlled for age
of participants, between the score in the Moral
Disengagement Scale and the role scores was
performed. Results showed a positive correlation
between moral disengagement and the role scores in
Bully (r(204) 5 .26, Po.001), Assistant (r(204) 5 .24,
Po.001) and Reinforcer (r(204) 5 .22, Po.001)
scales. In contrast, a negative correlation between
moral disengagement and the role score in the
Defender scale (r(204) 5
.22, Po.001) and in the
Outsider scale (r(204) 5
.12, Po.01) emerged,
whereas the correlation with the score in the Victim
scale was not significant (r(204) 5
.05, P 5 n.s.).
Therefore, these data largely support Hypothesis 3.
They are also in accordance with previous results
showing a positive relation between aggressive
behavior and the tendency to disengage self-sanc-
tions and justify the use of violent and aggressive
behaviors, and a negative relation between moral
disengagement and prosocial behavior.
information processing of bullies, similar to those
found for aggressive children [Crick and Dodge,
1994; Dodge, 1980]. This model, therefore, proposes
the idea of bullies as ‘‘oaf’’ children. They are
considered deficient in their social intelligence, that
is their ability to interpret and manage information
deriving from social interactions with peers and to
produce adequate social responses. The second
model, in contrast, states that bullies are quite
skilful in understanding social cues (e.g., others’
mental states) and that they exploit this ability
to their own advantage, acting as ‘‘skilled social
manipulators’’ [Sutton et al., 1999a,b]. However,
according to these authors, bullies may lack the
empathic reactivity towards their mates’ emotions
and, in particular, towards victim’s suffering.
In the first two hypotheses of the present study, it
was anticipated that bullies may have a good theory
of mind, but they may be deficient in moral
cognition. The analysis of variance, indeed, indi-
cated that the bully group did not show any
difficulty, compared to non-aggressive peers, in the
understanding of cognitive stories, which required
them to assume the cognitive point of view of
another person, that is to understand intentions,
beliefs and goals that guide a determinate behavior.
Moreover, correlations between the scores in each
scale of the PRQ and the performance in the social
cognition task indicated a positive relation between
bullying behavior and the ability to understand
others’ mental states. As regards the two models,
therefore, our results are closer to what would be
expected by the Skilled Manipulator model [Sutton
et al., 1999a]. The fact that our bullies did not show
particular deficits in this specific area of social
cognition does not suggest a direct application of the
Social Skills Deficit model [Crick and Dodge, 1994]
to bullying behavior. Further analyses are needed
into the social cognitive competence of children
involved in bullying episodes. This is particularly
important because theory of mind explanations per
se are not likely to be very helpful for understanding
the unique nature of bullying, in that having a
sophisticated theory of mind can lead to highly

Aggr. Behav. DOI 10.1002/ab

536 Gini
prosocial behavior or to bullying behavior. In other
words, having a ‘‘superior’’ theory of mind says
nothing about how that knowledge will be utilized in
social interactions [Arsenio and Lemerise, 2001].
As regards the two other types of stories used in
the present study, bullies’ performance in emotion
stories and also in moral stories, a category not used
by Sutton et al. [1999b], was found to be slightly, but
not significantly lower, than the performance
obtained by other groups. Contrary to our second
hypothesis about the possible difficulties of bullies in
moral cognition, our results do not completely
confirm the literature on moral development in
aggressive children and bullies [e.g., Bandura, 1991;
Hart et al., 2003]. In our sample, in fact, the bullies
and their followers did not show a significant lack of
ability in the attribution of appropriate moral emo-
tions to the characters of the stories. These emotions,
such as guilt and shame, play an important role in the
recognition of the damage suffered by another person
and are closely connected to the sense of responsi-
bility of the person who shows the harmful behavior.
Moreover, these emotions imply the need of repara-
tion as a consequence of a negative outcome
produced by one’s behavior [Bybee, 1998; Hoffman,
2000].
However, for both emotion and moral stories, it is
important to note that they actually assess the
‘‘cognitive’’ ability to process emotional information
in social interactions rather than an ‘‘emotional’’ or
‘‘empathic’’ comprehension of others’ feelings.
Therefore, the positive performance shown by
aggressive children in these kinds of stories may
misrepresent or underestimate the real deficit of
these children in emotional understanding of others.
In other words, what bullies may lack and what may
differentiate them from prosocial children is the
ability to appreciate the emotional consequences
of their behaviors on others’ feelings, and to share
in, and empathize with, the feelings of others
[Arsenio and Lemerise, 2001; Eisenberg and Fabes,
1998]. In line with this perspective, for example, Gini
et al. [2004] recently found a negative relation
between bullying behavior and empathy, measured
through Davis’ empathic reactivity index [1983], in a
sample of Italian adolescents.
Sutton et al. [1999a] also argued along these lines,
referring to the ‘‘cold cognition’’ hypothesis pro-
posed by Mealey [1995] as regards sociopathy. They
also spoke of a theory of mind formulated purely in
instrumental terms, without access to the empathic
understanding that most people rely on. As a
consequence, the individual may use aggressive
behavior in a Machiavellian way, without consider-
Aggr. Behav. DOI 10.1002/ab
ing its negative consequences on others. In contrast,
high levels of empathic responsiveness act as an im-
portant mediator in social conduct, reducing aggres-
sion and favoring prosocial behavior [Björkqvist
et al., 2000; Kaukiainen et al., 1994, 1996].
With respect to the other groups considered in the
present study, victimized children showed some
difficulties in the social cognition task. If compared
to the defender group in particular, they seem to
lack the ability to understand others’ mind, that is
their thoughts, beliefs and intentions that guide
social behavior. Our data are consistent with results
reported by Sutton et al. [1999b]. Moreover, several
authors share the idea that victims show deficits in
areas like social skills, social problem solving,
assertiveness and emotional regulation [e.g., Cham-
pion et al., 2003; Kochenderfer and Ladd, 1997;
Mahady-Wilton et al., 2000; Olweus, 1993; Perry
et al., 1988]. Finally, the results obtained in the
social cognition task by the defender group should
be noted. These children, in fact, showed high levels
of performance in all the stories, and especially in
the cognitive stories. Moreover, the score in the
defender scale of the PRQ correlated positively with
all the scores in the social cognition task, thus
suggesting that the adoption of this kind of
prosocial and helpful behavior requires a high level
of social ability and a well-developed understanding
of both cognitive and emotional states of others.
However, the fact that the bullying score also cor-
related with the social cognition task, again, con-
firms that having a good theory of mind, by itself,
does not necessarily mean that this ability will be
used to act prosocially [Arsenio and Lemerise, 2001].
Bullying and Moral Disengagement
As regards the third aim of the present study, the
analysis of variance on moral disengagement
showed higher levels of the tendency to disengage
self-sanctions and justify the use of aggressive
behaviors in all the aggressive roles and, in
particular, in bullies. These results confirmed the
role of specific cognitive mechanisms in the regula-
tion of social conduct, such as the moral disengage-
ment mechanisms that allow the assumption of
violent behaviors [Bacchini et al., 1998; Caprara
et al., 1995; Menesini et al., 1999, 2003a,b].
Regarding this aspect, as suggested by a reviewer,
it could be interesting to collect information about
the relations between bullying, familial socialization
and moral climate at home and at school.
In contrast, defenders’ high moral sensibility and
empathic reactivity, already found in other studies

[Gini and Carli, 2003; Menesini et al., 2003a,b], may
be one of the basic motivations for prosocial
behavior, frequently shown by these children to-
wards their victimized mates. These motivations are
very important and must be taken into account
in the implementation of intervention programs in
schools [Cowie, 2000; Cowie et al., 2002]. However,
the fact that the ability to help other peers requires
several interpersonal competencies that young
children do not necessarily possess needs to be
considered.
In conclusion, the results presented in this paper
have several potential implications for future re-
search. On the one hand, our results draw attention
to the importance of studying the role of social
cognitive competencies in the complex circle of
behaviors, attitudes and expectations upon which
school bullying phenomenon is based. On the other
hand, the relevance of adopting a more fine-grained
classification of roles in the study of bullying
behavior was confirmed.
A possible limitation in the interpretation of our
results was the fact that we did not consider the
bully-victim group, that is, those children who
frequently assume both kinds of role, acting as a
bully and being victimized as well [e.g., Boulton and
Smith, 1994; Olweus, 1993]. Several authors stressed
the relevance of this group of pupils, also called
aggressive victims [Perry et al., 1988; Schwartz,
2000], in the study of aggressive problems. More-
over, these children have been consistently described
as lacking social-emotional abilities, having psycho-
social impairments and a wide range of other
problems [e.g., Besag, 1989]. A methodological
difficulty in the study of these pupils is that it is
not always simple to clearly identify bully-victims as
a distinct group. Despite this complication, future
research in this field will necessarily need to study
the social cognitive and moral characteristics of this
particular group of children, and to compare their
level of cognitive and emotional understanding with
that of ‘‘pure’’ bullies and victims.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author is grateful to all schools, teachers and
pupils who participated in the study. Moreover, he
thanks Francesca Happè and Jon Sutton for their
stories, translated and utilized in this study, and
Elena Arimondo, Alessia Bortoloso, Giuseppe Carli
and Simona Pischetola for their help in data
collection. Finally, he is grateful to three anonymous
reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier
version of the manuscript.
Social Cognition in Bullying 537
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