C.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

SECTION 2

27) People vs. Delgado (G.R. No. 93419-32, September 18, 1990)
From the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside
from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and
administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to
conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code
before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts
the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause,
files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court.
The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless
so ordered by the court. 

28) People vs. Basilia (G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989)

There is nothing in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a pinched and
niggardly interpretation of the authority of the Comelec to appoint as its deputies, officials or employees of
other agencies and instrumentalities of the government. The investigation and prosecution of election
offenses are, in an important sense, more important than the maintenance of physical order in election
precincts. Without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants and staff members, and
of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of
election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would simply not be possible,
unless, perhaps, the Comelec had a bureaucracy many times larger than what it actually has. Moreover,
the prosecution officers designated by the Comelec become deputies or agents of the Comelec and pro
tanto subject to the authority, control and supervision of the Comelec in respect of the particular functions
covered by such deputation. The acts of such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority
are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the Comelec itself. The only limitation the Constitution itself places
upon the Comelec’s authority over its deputies relates to the enforcement of such authority through
administrative sanctions. Such sanctions—e.g., suspension or removal- may be recommended by the
Comelec to the President (Sec. 2 [8], Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution) rather than directly imposed by the
Comelec, evidently, to pre-empt and avoid potential difficulties with the executive department of the
Government where the prosecution and other officers deputized are ordinarily located.

There is no dispute that the Comelec is vested with power and authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code and to prosecute such
offenses in court. The only limitation the Constitution itself places upon the Comelec’s authority over its
deputies relates to the enforcement of such authority through administrative sanctions. Such sanctions -
e.g., suspension or removal - may be recommended by the Comelec to the President (Sec. 2 [8], Article
IX-C, 1987 Constitution) rather than directly imposed by the Comelec, evidently, to predempt and avoid
potential difficulties with the executive department of the Government where the prosecution and other
officers deputized are ordinarily located.

29) COMELEC vs. Silva (G.R. No. 129417, February 10, 1998)
The trial courts held the view that the Chief State Prosecutor’s decision not to appeal the dismissal of the
cases, consistent with his earlier decision to leave the determination of the existence of probable cause to
the trial courts, was binding on them. We think this view to be mistaken. The authority to decide whether
or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC. Art. IX-C, §2(6) of the Constitution expressly
vests in it the power and function to “investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.”

Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They derive their
authority from it and not from their offices. Consequently, it was beyond the power of Chief State
Prosecutor Zuño to oppose the appeal of the COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his power, as
COMELEC-designated prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the determination of whether there was
probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether the cases should be dismissed.

This is not the first time the COMELEC has come to this Court in its own name in regard to an action
taken against it in cases filed by it in the lower courts. In Commission on Elections v. Court of Appeals the
COME-LEC’s right to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing a criminal case filed by
it was sustained. This Court said: The COMELEC has sufficient interest in filing the petition [for certiorari]
to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals having sustained the demurrer to evidence in the
criminal case against private respondent for violation of the Election Laws. This is so, for it is not only
entrusted with the duty to enforce the said law but also to prosecute all election offenses.

Section 3

30) Sarmiento vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 105628, August 6, 1992)

Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

The 1973 Constitution prescribed another rule. Its Section 3, subdivision C of Article XII provided as
follows:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be
heard and decided by divisions, except contests involving Members of the Batasang Pambansa, which
shall be heard and decided en banc.

It is clear from the above quoted provision of the 1987 Constitution that election cases include pre-
proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the
Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the same
at the first instance. In the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, pre-proclamation cases are classified
as Special Cases 1 and, in compliance with the above provision of the Constitution, the two (2) Divisions
of the Commission are vested with the authority to hear and decide these Special Cases.

31) Reyes vs. RTC of Oriental Mindoro (G.R. No. 108886, May 5, 1995)
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the COMELEC, raises a fundamental question. He contends that the
filing of the present petition, without petitioner first filing a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc, violates Art. IX, A, of the Constitution because under this provision only decisions of
the COMELEC en banc may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. This is correct. It is now
settled that in providing that the decisions, orders and rulings of COMELEC “may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari” the Constitution in its Art. IX, A, §7 means the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65.

Since a basic condition for bringing such action is that the petitioner first file a motion for reconsideration,
it follows that petitioner’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the First Division of
the COMELEC is fatal to his present action. Petitioner argues that this requirement may be dispensed
with because the only question raised in his petition is a question of law. This is not correct. The
questions raised by petitioner involve the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions in light of
the facts of this case. The questions tendered are, therefore, not pure questions of law.
Section 4

32) Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils. vs. GMA Network, Inc. (G.R. No.
132922, April 21, 1998)
A citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action. Members of petitioner have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the operation.

Section 92 of BP 881, insofar as it requires radio and television stations to provide Comelec with radio
and television time free of charge is a flagrant violation of the constitutional mandate that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. While it is inherent in the State, the sovereign
right to appropriate property has never been understood to include taking property for public purposes
without the duty and responsibility of ordering compensation to the individual whose property has been
sacrificed for the good of the community. Hence, Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads
“No private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation,” gives us two limitations on
the power of eminent domain: (1) the purpose of taking must be for public use and (2) just compensation
must be given to the owner of the private property.

33) Adiong vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992)
The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or
private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional
grounds.

The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches
in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether public or private
except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers
should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property, which in this case is
a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private
except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be
justified by the Constitution.

34) National Press Club vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992)
The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and
information. The fundamental purpose of such “supervision or regulation” has been spelled out in the
Constitution as the ensuring of “equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,” as well as
uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with “public
information campaigns and forums among candidates.”

The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be that no presumption of
invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec
for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such
supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. For
supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely conceivable without such
accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the general, time-honored one—that a statute is
presumed to be constitutional and that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the
burden of clearly and convincingly proving that assertion.