1. STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN B.

AMANTE

G.R. No. 112526 October 12, 2001

PARDO, ​J​.:

FACT:

Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter, SRRDC) was the
registered owner of two parcels of land, situated at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. According to
petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang
community, and that ninety (90) light industries are now located in t​he area.

Sometime in December 1985, r​espondents filed a civil case with the Regional Trial
Court, Laguna, seeking an easement of a right of way ​to and from Barangay Casile.

By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private respondents.

After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the CARP.

(MARO) of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a notice of coverage to petitioner

​petitioner filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO), Cabuyao, Laguna a
"Protest and Objection" to the compulsory acquisition of the property on the ground that the area
was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and
above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as
beneficiaries

​farmer beneficiaries together with the BARC chairman answered the protest and objection stating
that the slope of the land is not 18% but only 5-10% and that the land is suitable and economically
viable for agricultural purposes,

Secretary Abad referred the case to the DARAB for summary proceedings to determine just
compensation

On December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated a decision, dismissing the petition of Sta Rosa
Realty Dev on protest for acquisition due to lack of merit, and ordering LBP to pay 7M just
compensation

ISSUE: ​Whether  the  respondents  complied  with  the  procedural  requirement  of  the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law?A

RULING:

For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice of
coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the
representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR
A. O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16
of the CARL.

The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage and the letter of invitation to
a conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. ​They are steps designed to comply
with the requirements of administrative due process. ​The implementation of the CARL is an
exercise of the State's police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL
prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation
of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the
owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a
taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not mere limitation of the use
of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the excess
and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary.

In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However,
payment of just compensation was not in accordance with the procedural requirement. The law
required payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account as was done by DAR.

In ​Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform​, we

held that "The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt of the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either."
2. ELISEO F. SORIANO vs MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA

G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009

VELASCO, JR., ​J.:

FACT:

p​etitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, ​Gago ka talaga
Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba.

​before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie
L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC),​2 against
petitioner in connection with the above broadcast​.

Forthwith, the MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation
to the alleged use of some cuss ​words

After a ​preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August
16, 2004, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in
accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 198​6, creating the MTRCB, in relation
to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986

petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying that

Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board recuse
themselves from hearing the case.​6 Two days after, however, petitioner sought to withdraw​7
his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with this Court of a petition for certiorari and
prohibition

Decision is hereby rendered, finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances and
thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program, "Ang
Dating Daan".

Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition. It is petitioner’s threshold posture that
the preventive suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR provision authorizing it are
invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive
suspension.

ISSUE: Whether MTRCB has the power and authority to issue preventive suspension

RULING:

Petitioner’s contention is untenable.

Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative,

investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be
conferred by the Constitution or by statute.​12 They have in fine only such powers or authority
as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law.​13 And in determining whether an
agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as
existing, the authority given should be liberally construed.​1

The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB’s
authority and functions expressly set forth in ​PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d)​, which
empowers the MTRCB to "supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x
exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity
materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the
BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or
broadcast by television."

Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCB’s express
regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority
subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any other construal would render its power to regulate,
supervise, or discipline illusory.

To reiterate, preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB springs from its powers
conferred under PD 1986. The MTRCB did not, as petitioner insinuates, empower itself to
impose preventive suspension through the medium of the IRR of PD 1986. ​It is true that the
matter of imposing preventive suspension is embodied only in the IRR of PD 1986. Sec. 3, Chapter
XIII of the IRR provides:

Sec. 3. PREVENTION SUSPENSION ORDER.​––Any time during the pendency of the case, and in
order to prevent or stop further violations or for the interest and welfare of the public, the Chairman
of the Board may issue a Preventive Suspension Order mandating the preventive x x x suspension
of the permit/permits involved, and/or closure of the x x x television network, cable TV station x x x
provided that the temporary/preventive order thus issued shall have a life of not more than twenty
(20) days from the date of issuance.

But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more,
would not work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension.
Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television
programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral materials and
to impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as it investigates.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor
extended the effect of the law. Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive
suspension, outrun its authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive suspension was actually
done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCB’s duty of regulating or
supervising television programs, pending a determination of whether or not there has actually been a
violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power which
PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.

​Indeed, the power to impose preventive suspension is one of the implied powers of
MTRCB. As distinguished from express powers, implied powers are those that can be
inferred or are implicit in the wordings or conferred by necessary or fair implication of the
enabling act.​17 As we held in Angara v. Electoral Commission, when a general grant of power is
conferred or a duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of one or the
performance of the other is also conferred by necessary implication.​18 Clearly, the power to impose
preventive suspension pending investigation is one of the implied or inherent powers of MTRCB.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, imposing a penalty of
THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION on the television program, Ang Dating Daan, subject of the
instant petition.
3. VALENTIN TIO vs VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

G.R. No. L-75697 June 18, 1987

MELENCIO-HERRERA, ​J.:

FACT:

This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on
behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected. It a​ssails the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with
broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry

Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the following grounds:​1.
Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local
government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof;

2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation
of the due process clause of the Constitution;

3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred
upon him by Amendment No. 6;

4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;

ISSUE: Whether there is undue delegation of power and authority

RULING: NO

Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation of
legislative power. ​The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOAR​D to "solicit
the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and
limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions
for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or
discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation.

"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid
objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to
solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned
being ​"subject to the direction and control of the BOAR​D." That the grant of such authority might
be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should
the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to a challenged
statute. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing
Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is
hereby dismissed. No costs.SO ORDERED.
4. RESTITUTO YNOT, ​vs. ​INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

CRUZ, ​J.:

FACT:

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13,
1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for
violation of the above measure​. The petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
626-A.

SECTION 1​. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall
be transported from one province to another​. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall ​be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government​, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may
ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is
that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the
measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a
challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under
 Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. ​ 4

ISSUE: Whether the EO 626-A s unconstitutional on the ground that it is an invalid delegation
oflegislative power

RULING:

we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated
is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.​ The
conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers.​ There is, finally, also an i​nvalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken​. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive
Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission ​may see fit,​ ​ in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as
the Director of Animal Industry ​may see fit,​ in the case of carabaos." (​Emphasis supplied.) ​The
phrase ​"may see fit"​ is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden
with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption​. One searches in vain for the
usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must
observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless.
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be
chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the
grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving
commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed
above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The ​supersedeas ​bond is cancelled and the
amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs. SO ORDERED.
5. CITY ENGINEER OF BAGUIO vs ROLANDO BANIQUED

G.R. NO. 150270 : November 26, 2008

REYES, R.T., ​J.​:

FACT:

Generoso Bonifacio, acting as the attorney-in-fact of Purificacion de Joya, Milagros

Villar, Minerva Baluyut and Israel de Leon filed a complaint with the Office of the Mayor
of Baguio City seeking the demolition of a house built on a parcel of land​6 located at
Upper Quezon Hill, Baguio City.

On May 19, 1999, Domogan, the then city mayor of Baguio City, issued Notice of
Demolition No. 55, Series of 1999, against spouses Rolando and Fidela Baniqued.

Aggrieved, Rolando Baniqued filed a complaint for prohibition with TRO/injunction

before Branch 60 of the RTC in Baguio City. He argues that t​he 1991 Local
Government Code does not empower the mayor to order the demolition of
anything unless the interested party was afforded prior hearing and unless the
provisions of law pertaining to demolition are satisfied.

On June 7, 1999, the RTC enjoined the carrying out of the demolition of the house of
Baniqued. The hearing on his application for preliminary injunction was also set.​14

On June 25, 1999, petitioners moved to dismiss​15 the complaint of Baniqued on the
ground of lack of cause of action

On October 15, 1999, the RTC granted the motion of petitioners and dismissed the
complaint of Baniqued ​The RTC reasoned that petitioners "are unquestionably members
of the executive branch whose functions are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial."​1

Refusing to give up, Baniqued appealed the decision of the RTC. The CA sustained
Baniqued, ​According to the CA, it may be true that the mayor is an executive official.
However, as such, he has also been given the authority to hear controversies involving
property rights. In that regard, the Mayor exercises quasi-judicial functions.​25

The CA also held that the allegations in the complaint of Baniqued state a cause of
action. The averments in the complaint call for a determination whether court action is
needed before Baniqued can be ousted from the questioned lot.

ISSUE: Whether THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION ​IN ​RULING THAT THE ACT OF THE CITY MAYOR IN ISSUING A
NOTICE OF DEMOLITION IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION​;

RULING:
The petition is unmeritorious.

Baniqued correctly availed of the remedy of prohibition​. Prohibition or a "writ of

prohibition" is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals,
officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not
been vested by law. ​The writ is also commonly defined as one to prevent a tribunal
possessing judicial or quasi-judicial powers from exercising jurisdiction over matters not
within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance.

The Mayor, although performing executive functions, also exercises

quasi-judicial function which may be corrected by prohibition​. As a parting
argument, petitioners contend that the complaint of Baniqued is outside the scope of
the rule on ​prohibition ​which covers the proceedings of any "tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, ​quasi-judicia​l or ministerial
functions." The issuance of the notice of demolition by the City Mayor is never a
judicial, ministerial or rule-making function. It is strictly an act of law enforcement and
implementation, which is purely an executive function. Neither is the Office of the City
Mayor a quasi-judicial body.​45

Again, petitioners are mistaken. We need not belabor so much on this point. We quote
with approval the CA observations in this regard, ​viz.​:

Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only
relative to its function as the executive official of the town​. It has
also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property
rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or
resolution thereon. ​In this manner, ​it exercises ​quasi-judicial functions​.
This power is obviously a truism in the matter of issuing demolition notices
and/or orders against squatters and illegal occupants through some of its
agencies or authorized committees within its respective municipalities or
cities.

There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the

matter of issuing demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. But
then, it cannot be denied as well that in determining whether or not a
structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are involved
thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in the
constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these
functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers. ​Moreno​, in
his ​Philippine Law Dictionary, 3​rd Edition, defines quasi-judicial function
as applying to the action discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or
bodies, who are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Significantly,
 the Notice of Demolition in issue was the result of the exercise of
quasi-judicial power by the Office of the Mayor.

6. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) vs NATIONAL

TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC)

G.R. No. 93237 November 6, 1992

PADILLA, ​J.:

FACT:

Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegrams through
petitioner RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the morning of 17 March 1989 to his sister
and brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte, with the
following identical texts:

1
MANONG POLING DIED INTERMENT TUESDAY ​

Both telegrams did not reach their destinations on the expected dates. Private respondent filed a
letter-complaint against the RCPI with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for poor
service, with a request for the imposition of the appropriate punitive sanction against the company.

RCPI moved to dismiss the case on the following ground that NTC has no jurisdiction over
the case;

NTC finds respondent administratively liable for deficient and inadequate service defined under
Section 19(a) of C.A. 146 and hereby imposes the penalty of FINE payable within thirty (30) days

A motion for reconsideration by RCPI reiterating averments in its earlier motion to dismiss was
denied for lack of merit; hence, this petition for review invoking C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) to the fixing of rates​.

Petitioner cited 2 decided case:

The only power it possessed over radio companies, as noted was the (​sic ) fix rates. It could not
take to task a radio company for negligence or misfeasance. It was bereft of such competence. It
was not vested within such authority​. . . .

The Public Service Commission having been abolished by virtue of a Presidential Decree, as set
forth at the outset, and a new Board of Communications having been created to take its place,
nothing said in its decision has reference to whatever powers are now lodged in the latter body.

On the other hand, ​The Office of the Solicitor General now claims that the cited cases ​are no longer
applicable, that the power and authority of the NTC to impose fines is incidental to its power to
regulate public service utilities and to supervise telecommunications facilities, which are now clearly
defined in Section 15, Executive Order No. 546 dated 23 July 1979. ​Regulatory administrative
agencies necessarily impose sanctions, adds the Office of the Solicitor General. RCPI was fined
based on the finding of the NTC that it failed to undertake adequate service in delivering two (2) rush
telegrams. ​NTC takes the view that its power of supervision​ was broadened by E. O. No. 546,

ISSUE: ​Whether NTC has jurisdiction ​to administratively impose fines on a telegraph company
which fails to render adequate service to a consumer

RULING: NO

E. O. 546, it will be observed, is couched in general terms. The NTC stepped "into the shoes" of the
Board of Communications which exercised powers pursuant to the Public Service Act. ​The Board in
other words, did not possess the power to impose administrative fines on public services
rendering deficient service to customers, ​ergo i​ ts successor cannot arrogate unto itself such
power, in the absence of legislation.

Verily, Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public
Service Act, vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction, supervision and control over all
public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties.

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, under Section 21 of C. A. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered to impose
an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a public service to comply with the terms
and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission.
Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any
certificate issued by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation
from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied
or disregarded.

No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor
General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to
impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have
failed to render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the
supervisory and regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no alternative but to reiterate
the settled doctrine in administrative law that:

Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and
powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly
granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any
order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective . . .

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction of
the NTC to render it. The temporary restraining order issued on 18 June 1990 is made
PERMANENT without prejudice, however, to the filing by the party aggrieved by the conduct of
RCPI, of the proper action in the proper forum. No costs.
7. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

ROMERO, ​J.:

FACT:

​Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the
operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City due to its harmful effects on t​he health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the
water content of the surrounding area.

the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, they found that the City Government of Caloocan is
maintaining a dumpsite without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC​) from
DENR and without clearance from LLDA.

O​n December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order. The dumping was forced
stopped, but it was reopened after the meeting of the city government. LLDA, issued anothe cease
and desist order to City government, and enforced it with the assistance of PNP

City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction.
The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit,
pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, to determine the effects of
the operation of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained.

​ egional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from
R
enforcing its cease and desist order.

the LLDA filed a petition for ​certiorari,​ prohibition and injunction with prayer for restraining
order with the Supreme Court, but the SC remanded the case to CA for proper determination.

the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that ​the Laguna Lake Development Authority
has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act
No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order

The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of
Appeals, contending that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and
adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential
Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power and
authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of
Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides,

ISSUE: ​whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order (cease and
desist) which, in its nature and effect was injunctive,

RULING:
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.

The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan
to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in
violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, cannot be
stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms,
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983,
authorizes the LLDA to "​make,​ alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution."
(Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to ​make whatever order may
be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such
powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of
its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution
cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is,
perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical
matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power
and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws.

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the
LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to
institute "necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or
continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without
previous clearance from the LLDA."

Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the
regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the
private sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal
with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of
such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet
such contingencies, then the writs of ​mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the
LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.