(Non-Governmental Public Action) Helen Yanacopulos (Auth.) - International NGO Engagement, Advocacy, Activism - The Faces and Spaces of Change-Palgrave Macmillan UK (2015)

Non-Governmental Public Action
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Non-governmental public action (NGPA) by and for disadvantaged and margin-
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This book series is designed to make a fresh and original contribution to the
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FAITH IN THE TIME OF AIDS
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THE POLITICS OF AUTONOMY IN LATIN AMERICA
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NGOS UNDER PRESSURE IN PARTIAL DEMOCRACIES
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ENVIRONMENTALISM, RESISTANCE AND SOLIDARITY
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PENTECOSTALISM AND DEVELOPMENT
Churches, NGOs and Social Change in Africa
David Herbert
CREATING COMMUNITY COHESION
Religion, Media and Multiculturalism
Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind
COUNTER-TERRORISM, AID AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Before and After the War on Terror
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GLOBAL MATTERS FOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL PUBLIC ACTION
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NON-GOVERNMENTAL PUBLIC ACTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
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PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Tim Pringle and Simon Clarke
THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSITION
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CIVIL SOCIETY NETWORKS IN CHINA AND VIETNAM
Informal Pathbreakers in Health and the Environment
Thomas Yarrow
DEVELOPMENT BEYOND POLITICS
Aid, Activism and NGOs in Ghana
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International NGO
Engagement, Advocacy,
Activism
The Faces and Spaces of Change
Helen Yanacopulos
Senior Lecturer in International Politics and Development,
Open University, UK
© Helen Yanacopulos 2015
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-0-230-28456-2
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Yanacopulos, Helen.
International NGO Engagement, Advocacy, Activism: The Faces and Spaces
of Change / Helen Yanacopulos, Senior Lecturer in International Politics and
Development, Open University, UK.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Non-governmental organizations. 2. International cooperation. I. Title.
JZ4841.Y36 2015
341.2—dc23 2015026344
Contents
Preface and Acknowledgements vi
List of Abbreviations viii
1 The Current State of INGOs 1
2 Political Spaces of INGOs 21
3 Cosmopolitan Spaces of INGOs 35
4 INGO Spaces of Engagement 60
5 INGO Organisation and Strategy 86
6 Networked Spaces of INGOs 106
7 Digital Spaces of INGOs 132
8 Conclusions 154
Notes 159
References 163
Index 177
v
Preface and Acknowledgements
Watching the news footage of the Ethiopia famine in 1984 touched me

in a profound way. I had never seen that level of suffering on television
and, months later, the Live Aid concert filled me with hope and the
promise that we could change the world. Needless to say, many decades,
concerts, fundraisers and campaigns later, I now write more about the
limitations of such types of engagement than of their hope and promise.
And yet, the questions that continue to resonate for me are: How do we
move beyond such events, such sporadic spikes in public consciousness,
to engender the changes in vast global inequalities and poverty that are
needed to make a better world? What can we do to help?
Through having researched and taught at the interface of International
Politics and Development Studies for almost two decades, as well as
having worked in the International Non-Government Organisation
(INGO) sector, I see the role of INGOs as paramount to the ways many
forms of development occur. I am a long-standing supporter of develop-
ment INGOs, having volunteered for them in the 1980s, studied and
worked for them in the 1990s, and researched and written about them
since the 2000s. Additionally, I have worked on numerous international
development-related projects for television during the past decade, a key
form of development engagement both within the UK and internation-
ally. Thus, I have been involved and have contributed to the ways that
international development is constructed, mediated and represented to
publics, and this has allowed me to understand the production processes
of television and other media as well as to understand the challenges of
relaying complex issues of poverty and inequality to large audiences.
Effectively relaying the complex issues of international development to
publics in an accessible and interesting way is the holy grail of those
working in the public-facing aspects of development. As a consequence
of having worked in the public engagement of development as an INGO
practitioner and an academic, my aims in writing this book have been
both analytical and, hopefully, constructive. Throughout the book I am
frequently critical of development INGOs, but my aim is not to tarnish
or dismiss them, but to help improve the work that they do, and the
potential work that they are capable of. Thus, my aim in this book is to
be a ‘critical friend’.
vi
Preface vii
The purpose of this book is to first look at the politics of INGO public
engagement in a holistic way, through their use of media, their values
and frames, their organisational structures, as well as their different
uses of space in that engagement. The second purpose of this book is
to instigate a debate around the ways that INGOs operate and how this
contributes to constructions, mediations and representations of devel-
opment. The final purpose of this book is to provide insights and reflec-
tions from key informants from within the INGO sector on the future
of the INGOs, given the somewhat dramatic changes in their operating
environments.
I would like to thank those who agreed to be interviewed for this book.
I appreciate the demands my interviewees have on their time, making
their generosity even more impressive. A number of colleagues have
commented on drafts of the book, including Kate Wright, Jim Whitman,
Wendy Wong, Melissa Butcher and Martin Scott. I thank them for their
extremely useful comments, although any errors within the book can
only be attributed to myself.
List of Abbreviations
BOAG British Overseas Aid Group

BOND British Overseas NGOs for Development
CSOs civil society organisations
INGO International Non-Governmental Organization
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OCOs Online Campaigning Organizations
ODA Overseas Development Assistance
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
TAN Transnational Advocacy Network
UGC user-generated content
UIA Union of International Associations
WDM World Development Movement
WSF World Social Forum
viii
1
The Current State of INGOs
Suffering, disease, and famines: these are the stories of humanitarian

appeals and one of the primary means by which many people contribute
to international development. When the urge to help is ignited, people
tend to turn to international non-governmental organisations (INGOs)
to make their donations, such as Oxfam, Save the Children, Action Aid,
CARE or faith-based organisations such as CAFOD, World Vision or
Christian Aid, to name but a few. Such organisations are international
‘charities’ that work in international development and humanitarian
relief in most continents where there is extreme poverty, primarily
in Africa, Asia and Latin America. While the term non-governmental
organisation (NGO) describes a vast range of different types of organi-
sations working on issues of development and humanitarian relief,
human rights or the environment, and can refer to a ‘one man in an
office’ operation, or to an internationally based organisation such as
Oxfam, the focus here is specifically on INGOs working in the field of
international development and humanitarian assistance. 1
Through these organisations, people living in the global north not
only have the ability to ‘help’ those in need, but also to receive a great
deal of information about the problems of poverty, how their dona-
tions can help, and what it means to be involved in development.2
With few exceptions, INGOs are the intermediaries between concerned
northern publics and the recipients or beneficiaries of development
work, primarily in the global south. INGOs have also become involved
in large-scale campaigns such as Live Aid in the 1980s, the debt cancel-
lation campaigns of Jubilee 2000 in the 1990s, and the Make Poverty
History campaigns of the mid-2000s. Such large-scale campaigns as well
as the campaigns of individual INGOs raise awareness of the suffering,
disease and famines, and without INGOs, many people would neither
1
2 International NGO Engagement, Advocacy, Activism
know that such situations existed, nor would they have the ability to
somehow take part in helping. But one of the questions that have long
been important within the INGO community is how they can move
beyond emergency appeals and sporadic spikes in public consciousness,
to engender the changes in vast global inequalities and poverty that are
needed to make a better world? 3
There is no shortage of either practitioner or academic writings on
the nature of INGOs, their accountability and legitimacy, the imagery
they use, their relation to governments and the private sector and the
effects of their day-to-day work. However, a more in-depth analysis is
required to situate INGOs within contemporary shifting landscapes.
Michael Edwards (2008: 48–49) succinctly outlines a key problem with
INGOs that he calls ‘the elephant in the room’, claiming that they, ‘will
never achieve the impact they say they want to achieve, because their
leverage over the drivers of long-term change will continue to be weak.’
In exploring INGO engagement, strategies and structures, the hope is
to foster a further discussion and examination of Edwards’ elephant in
the room.
Why INGOs?
To say that the world of INGOs has dramatically changed during the last
two decades is an understatement. We have witnessed the civil society
sector rapidly increasing in size and visibility at unheard-of rates. One
indicator of this increase can be seen in the statistics of the Union of
International Associations (UIA); while the statistics do not reliably
capture all of the different types of organisations in operation, the trend
of increase in the statistic of INGOs is reflective of the growth of the
sector. According to the UIA, the number of non-governmental organi-
sations (including both international NGOs and NGOs operating in one
country) rose from 22,334 in 1990 to 58,588 in 2013.4
Within the international development and humanitarian relief sector,
the total aid disbursed through INGOs increased ten times between
1970 and 1985 and Keane (2003: 5) states that close to 90 per cent of all
non-governmental organisations have been formed since 1970. At their
core, INGOs are set up to act as an interface, where we – the public –
give them money, and they – the INGOs – feed a child, build a school
or provide mosquito nets, for example. By the mid-1990s, the Union of
International Associations recognised over 15,000 INGOs operating in
three or more countries and drawing their finance from more than one
country. Whilst there was a comparatively low volume of funding being
The Current State of INGOs 3
directed through non-governmental organisations in the 1960s and

1970s, there was a surge within the sector during the 1980s and 1990s.
Again, according to the Union of International Associations, three quar-
ters of the entire 27,472 international NGOs active in 2005 had been
created since the mid-1970s (UIA figures quoted in Turner, 2010: 3).
Within the development sector, by the end of the 20th century, an
estimated US$7 billion of official aid and foundation funding was being
channelled through INGOs, surpassing the volume of the combined
UN system of US$6 billion (Reimann, 2005: 38). There are many sets of
statistics attempting to quantify the number of INGOs, but as no formal
international organisation overseeing the INGOs sector exists, it is diffi-
cult to calculate the exact number of INGOs in operation. However,
there is little disagreement that the sector has expanded dramatically
during the last three decades. Epstein and Gang (2006) state that all offi-
cial development assistance (ODA) to INGOs increased by 34 per cent
between 1991/92 and 2002, from US$928 million to US$1,246 million,
and that the number of INGOs grew by 19.3 per cent over the same
decade. The publication 100 Top NGOs (2013) states that according to
their calculations, many of the largest INGOs are now operating with
larger aid budgets than the budgets of many developing countries, and
they go on to cite the example of World Vision (the largest develop-
ment INGO), whose budget is greater than the aid budgets of Italy and
Australia combined, while Save the Children’s budget is greater than
that of Austria (100 Top NGOs, 2013: 35).
Both UK and American INGOs are well funded; UK INGOs have a large
private donor base and according to the Johns Hopkins Comparative
Non-profit Sector project, the UK ‘international affairs’ INGO sector is
three times that of the Western European average. According to Kendal
and Almond, (1999: 193–194, in Stroup and Murdie, 2012: 429), the
UK INGO sector that focuses on what they call ‘international activities’
is significantly larger, compared to other fields, than that of any other
country on which data is available.
As INGOs’ funding and profile in international politics has risen, they
have in turn become higher-profile political actors. First, most INGOs
have been forming their own federations; where there were eight rela-
tively unconnected sister Oxfam organisations in the mid-1990s, there
is now a much more co-ordinated and centrally structured Oxfam
International with 17 sister Oxfams sitting under the Oxfam umbrella.
Oxfam is not unique in this sense, as many other INGOs have followed
this international strategy. Second, there has been an increase in large-
scale transnational advocacy campaigns, bringing together many
influential actors, and some have had a great deal of success, and INGOs
have played a significant role within such campaigns. Increasingly,
development INGOs have become one of the primary ways that people
in the global north engage with development. In the special issue of
the Journal of International Development, Smith and Yanacopulos (2004)
outlined how NGOs construct, mediate and represent development to
their constituents as well as to the public at large. For many people in
Europe and North America, INGOs are the primary interface between
themselves and people in the south.
Definitions of NGOs have been contested, but at least some consensus
exists that NGOs consist of durable, bounded, voluntary relationships
amongst individuals to produce a particular product, using specific tech-
niques. NGOs tend to be not-for-profit, voluntary and to work with a
public purpose for the interests of an issue or a group. When NGOs
operate in more than one country, they are classed as INGOs. Weiss
and Gordenker (1996: 18) claim that the broad term NGO has a host
of alternative uses, namely: the independent sector; volunteer sector;
civic society; grassroots organisations; private voluntary organisations;
transnational social movement organisations; grassroots social change
organisations; and non-state actors.
Certain key similarities exist between NGOs, as outlined by Alan
Fowler (1997: 39), who claims that NGOs differ from government and
businesses in that:
● they are not established for and cannot distribute any surplus they
generate as a profit to owners or staff;
● they are not required nor prevented from existing by law, but result
from people’s self-chosen voluntary initiative to pursue a shared
interest or concern;
● they are formed by private initiative and are independent, in that
they are not part of government nor controlled by a public body;
● within the terms of whatever legislation they choose to register them-
selves, they also govern themselves;
● registration means that the founders wish to have social recogni-
tion – this calls for some degree of formalisation and acceptance of
the principle of social accountability.
NGOs form a part of civil society and frequently the terms ‘NGO’
and ‘civil society’ are used synonymously. In this messy terrain of
civil society, distinctions are often drawn between ‘local’ NGOs
(those working within the countries they have been set up in) and
‘international’ NGOs (those working in more than one country).

While such distinctions remain problematic, as do the terms ‘north’
and ‘south’ when referring to NGOs, they do at least provide a sche-
matic difference between different types of NGOs. The INGOs exam-
ined in this book originated in Europe, and more specifically in the
UK. While they would be considered northern INGOs, they all have
strong connections to the south, either by employing people from
the south, having their head offices in southern countries or working
closely with southern partners. While broad terms such as ‘south’ and
‘north’ may be somewhat misleading, the INGOs in question all have
their heritage and loci of power in the north, which is also where their
funders and supporters are based. The work of INGOs is also diverse in
its focus, with some development and humanitarian INGOs focusing
on education, health or gender. Most of the large INGOs, however,
have programmes that cut across many of the sectors identified in
addressing poverty. Most development INGOs work on service delivery,
humanitarian relief and advocacy, and all are part of what is frequently
termed the ‘NGO industry’ (100 Top NGOs: 2013: 39).
Thus, to define the exact nature and role of INGOs is difficult, as
the term is used for a wide variety of organisations all of which have
different historical trajectories, fulfil different identified needs and have
different institutional abilities and mandates. There are INGOs, for
example, which are relief and welfare agencies, those that provide tech-
nical innovation, and those which are contracted to carry out public
service contracts. There are also development organisations, grassroots
development organisations or advocacy and lobbying groups advocating
for change. However, as Farrington and Bebbington argue (1993: 3), part
of the problem in discussing INGOs as a broad category is that such clas-
sifications do not fully differentiate between the function, ownership
and scale of operation of the organisations. To overcome this, later chap-
ters in the book will explore the various functional ways that INGOs are
organised and consequently engage with their publics.
NGOs were more or less spared searching critiques in the 1980s, but
since the 1990s – specifically starting with the work of Edwards and
Hulme (Hulme and Edwards 1992; Edwards and Hulme, 1995; Hulme
and Edwards, 1996) – they have been criticised about their accountability
and legitimacy, about their professionalisation and perceived depolitici-
sation. More recently, pejorative terms such as ‘NGOisation’ (Choudry
and Kapoor, 2013) have entered the contemporary civil society lexicon.
There have been accusations, too, that many of the INGOs in the devel-
opment sector have lost sight of their values and mission (Banks and
Hulme, 2012). While all these critiques need to be considered, and some
may indeed be valid, it is important to consider where such critiques
are originating and whether they are politically motivated. Frequently,
when INGOs – and specifically the larger INGOs – are criticised, little
distinction is made between the different political visions, strategies,
constituencies and organisational structures within the sector. These
critiques come from not only outside of the sector, but also within it.
One Director of a UK based INGO interviewed stated that ‘they (INGO)
are out of touch ... they are afraid of being criticised as they see it as a
negative thing rather than it being helpful, something that jeopardises
their brand and fundraising’ (NGO133).
We have seen INGO involvement in global campaigns such as Make
Poverty History with its millions of supporters worldwide. And we
have observed the development INGO sector becoming highly profes-
sionalised, not only in fundraising, branding and marketing, but also
in supporter communications. However, despite, or perhaps partly in
response to, the large-scale global campaigns, the growing public profile
of INGOs, the changing dynamics of global advocacy, and diverse initia-
tives to raise the public understanding of development, our compre-
hension of the ways that INGOs engage and mobilise northern publics
requires further thought. Additionally, following Stroup and Murdie
(2012: 427) while the north–south divide amongst INGOs has been well
examined, what require further examination are the differences amongst
northern INGOs.
Evaluating the terrain of INGO operations is timely. They have now
had adequate time to adjust to technologically driven shifts in commu-
nications. As funding sources have started to decrease, some INGOs have
reverted to using emotive and ‘negative’ images in their fundraising.
The justification for well-off countries giving aid to poorer countries is
currently being debated, including challenging the conventional wisdom
of the aid paradigm, with a ‘growing scepticism about the effectiveness
[of development aid] ... with calls to refocus the development debate on
the quality of results rather than the quantity of money spent’. (Glennie
et al., 2012: 2) Wendy Harcourt (2012: 2), too, states that a major struc-
tural change is occurring in the development industry that ‘Civil society
activities, the bread and butter of progressive advocacy NGOs and social
movements formed in the last 20 years, is now being swept up in very
different forms of mobilisation with vastly new ideas and methodolo-
gies on how to connect and work together.”
Thus, INGOs are at a turning point. One useful way of thinking about
INGOs is provided in Sabine Lang’s 2013 book NGOs, Civil Society and
the Public Sphere, where Lang lays out two characterisations of INGOs. In
the first characterisation, she uses the analogy of ‘David and Goliath’,
in which INGOs are portrayed as poor and marginalised, but are seen
as defenders of human rights, democracy and social justice (as opposed
to governments who are seen as powerful). Together with most who
have worked in the INGO sector, Lang actually sees the reality of
INGO/government relations as being more complicated, calling them a
‘co-dependency between unequals’. The second characterisation is what
Lang terms ‘counter public’, in which INGOs are portrayed as catalysts
for civil society, organising concerned citizens and providing an alterna-
tive voice to that of governments. Again, however, INGOs frequently do
not provide much of an alternative perspective to that of governments.
For INGOs, the arenas are large and the stakes are high. As INGOs
work in many countries, they are frequently federations or alliances of
national organisations, and have their constituencies and donors from
the global north. They are complex and highly strategic organisations
in an extremely competitive environment. INGOs, such as those exam-
ined in this book, are multi-national and multifaceted organisations
that both work on the ground running programmes, operating within
their own national contexts and political structures, as well as advocate
internationally in issue based transnational networks.
Changing political landscapes
During the 2000s, and despite eminent figures such as Kofi Annan
claiming that the 21st century is ‘the era of NGOs’, the development
NGO sector has come under increasing critical scrutiny. INGOs in partic-
ular have been influenced by global paradigms such as the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) and the measurement of development
impacts, leading development organisations to reconsider and realign
their goals to conform to broadly agreed programmes of action with
a view to measurable outcomes. Many (such as Ferguson, 1994; Banks
and Hulme, 2012; Choudry and Kapoor, 2013) have argued that this
has depoliticised development, leading NGOs to become more engaged
with delivering development programmes than with becoming agents
of social change. An alternative perspective would argue that the INGOs
have not been depoliticised per se, but have become engaged in different
political paradigms, driven by other international development actors –
which itself is a type of politics. A further challenge has arisen from
the increased importance of the relationship between INGOs and the
media, as there is increasing competition for public attention in relation
not only to INGO fundraising, but also in how INGOs brand them-
selves, thus differentiating themselves from other INGOs (see Cottle
and Nolan, 2007; Fenton 2008; Chouliaraki, 2012; Boltanski, 1999). And
yet, there are still expectations that INGOs will spearhead large-scale
sociopolitical and socio-economic changes (frequently expressed and
amplified by INGOs themselves) such as Christian Aid’s desire to put ‘an
end to poverty – and we believe that vision can become a reality’5; and
Action Aid’s ambition to ‘defeat poverty, for all’,6 while high-profile but
more diffuse campaigns have proposed to ‘make poverty history’. Such
ambitious claims are even more challenging for INGOs, given that the
environments in which they operate are constantly changing.
That we are in the midst of a technological and communicative trans-
formation is beyond dispute, and INGOs of every kind and size seek
to further their work through such means, even while they cope with
media impacts that they neither initiate nor control. The majority of
the INGOs examined in this book have existed for anywhere between
50 and 100 years and most of them originated in the UK. As we have
seen, during the 1980s, the INGO sector dramatically increased in size
and importance due to increases in funding from donor governments,
foundations and individuals. During the 1990s, this increase continued
and INGOs in both the global north and the global south were seen as a
way to improve the work of development as they were seen to be closer
to the grassroots and to the beneficiaries of development.
Some of the changes in the rise of the INGO sector can – at least
in part – be attributed to decades of economic growth in the global
north, as outlined by Wendy Harcourt (2012: 3). However, this has all
changed since the financial crises that started in 2008, to which INGOs
and the development sector more broadly have not been immune.
Internationally, the large national development donors of the past are
being challenged by the so-called ‘emerging economies’ of the BRICS
that are now influencing the different development approaches and
priorities.7 The economic situation since the economic crisis in Europe
in 2009 has impacted on the environment of INGOs in various ways,
such as the reduced ability to raise monies from individuals through
fundraising campaigns, as well as the increasing number of agencies
competing for funding from other sources such as governments and
international organisations. Additionally, the increase in the number of
INGOs over the last few decades has meant that there is more competi-
tion for funding, resulting in a shrinking pie that is being cut into more
pieces. This has impacted on INGOs in a variety of ways, from a shift in
the images they use in fundraising, to a focus on short-term gains and
the relationships between some INGOs and governments and corpora-

tions, many of which will be discussed throughout the book.
The rise of southern-based INGOs, too, is significant, and they are
now numerous and influential; the biggest development NGO in the
world, for example, is now BRAC from Bangladesh with over 100,000
employees. Not only has this led to an increase in the capacity of
southern-based NGOs, but to an increased requirement (whether from
donors or from within the INGOs themselves) for INGOs to work
with southern partners. A programme manager for Save the Children
Denmark outlines the value-added of northern INGOs working with
southern NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs), where: ‘donors
are beginning to fund southern CSOs directly, bypassing northern NGOs
altogether and putting these organisations under pressure to reposition
themselves’ (quoted in Smedley, 2014).
Additionally, INGOs such as Every Child have restructured their
organisation where the INGO is no longer delivering programmes, but
raising funds for partners to do so. The Every Child CEO explains the
position of the organisation: ‘When we asked ourselves what we thought
our most effective contribution to change might be we realised that our
structure was upside down’ (quoted in Smedley, 2014). The driving force
behind such shifts has been a raised concern about the role INGOs are
to play in development; if northern INGOs are not as close to the grass-
roots as their southern partners are, then what exactly is their role in
the development process? In an attempt to answer this question, INGOs
have been reassessing their roles and trying to strike a balance between
advocacy and service provision, an exploration that is still in process.
There have also been calls within and outside the INGO sector for
increasing accountability and legitimacy. In the 1990s, INGOs were
primarily seen as a means of getting to the grassroots, a way of bypassing
national governments, as well as a means of scaling-up from the local
to the global levels of politics (Uvin, Jain and Brown, 2000). However,
question marks around the accountability and legitimacy of INGOs have
been in the air since the turn of the century. In a provocative article in
the Economist, the author questions the increasing prevalence and clout
of INGOs, and asks the question:
Who elected Oxfam? ... They may claim to be acting in the interests of
the people – but then so do the objects of their criticism, governments
and the despised international institutions. In the West, governments
and their agencies are, in the end, accountable to voters. Who holds
the activists accountable? (The Economist, 2000)
The impact of ICTs on the political landscapes of international devel-

opment and on INGOs requires further analysis. In his 2009 book Here
Comes Everybody, Clay Shirky claims that, with the reduction of time,
effort and cost, the ease with which organisations and individuals
communicate with each other has become ‘ridiculously easy’. This in
turn has resulted in an increased ability for individuals to take collec-
tive action and mobilise around an issue, something that INGOs had
more of a role in facilitating in the past (Shirky, 2009: 21). Shifts such
as this have influenced the politics of development INGOs in various
ways – how they organise themselves, how they engage with their
northern constituencies, and how they do the work to achieve their
stated goals. Dencik (2013) outlines these shifts in political and social
activity, which have not only gained popularity amongst academics, but
also in more public discourses. Dencik (2013: 1220) argues that we have
been moving towards what he calls a ‘global space of politics’, where the
global discourses are a result of the ways that rapid changes are being
interpreted and where new media technologies are changing, expanding
and enlarging political community.
The ways that technology has opened up political spaces has enabled
arguably new forms of public engagement. These include deliberative
spaces such as the Occupy movement and the World Social Forum;
media spaces – beyond television and radio – which blur with those of
the internet; networked campaigning spaces such as those of the Jubilee
2000, Make Poverty History and IF campaigns; and digital spaces such
as those inhabited by Online Campaigning Organisations (OCOs), for
example Avaaz, The Rules, Get Up! and Move On.
What is needed at this juncture, then, is a critical analysis of the ways in
which INGOs engage northern publics on issues of international devel-
opment in a shifting landscape. There is a need for a stronger academic
dialogue on this topic as it feeds into other broader concerns about
where international society is heading and what the role of INGOs will
be during and after these transformations. Any critical analysis of this
changing political environment must capture the new forms of polit-
ical organisation, and the new deliberative and digital political spaces.
These new forms of engagement represent a complex, contradictory and
politically important set of activities that are intimately connected to
the fight against global poverty. They are central to the patterns and
possibilities of global political action, and play an increasingly central
role in the politics of international development and in international
politics surrounding development politics. The tensions and contradic-
tions of the construction, mediation and representation of development
to northern publics are extremely important to our understanding of

the changes in the development practices of INGOs.
The faces and places of change
Technological advancements in communications have fuelled the quan-

titative and qualitative increase of international civic action, and have
led to INGOs interacting on a global scale. This interaction suits both
their cosmopolitan values and also their organisational restructuring into
networked organisations. In their facilitation of development, INGOs have
become one of the primary constructors, mediators and representatives
of the global south. Arguably, these global goals and the project focus of
INGOs have simultaneously led to their becoming increasingly depoliti-
cised. Given that political change occurs in political spaces (spaces where
political actions take place), these are the very spaces in which INGOs
should be working. But are they? This book sets out to answer this question
by exploring the spatiality of INGO engagement, advocacy and activism.
Development INGOs have been important in contributing to bursts
of public consciousness around issues of preventable human suffering
through campaigning, fundraising, and other forms of public engage-
ment. However, whilst INGOs have been active in forming and joining
networks of networks in large-scale campaigns such as the Jubilee 2000
debt cancellation campaigns and the MPH campaigns – very much
temporary spikes in public consciousness – they have struggled to main-
tain public support at those levels. If INGOs are indeed the agents of
change they frequently claim to be, then it is necessary for them to
engage publics in more consistent and deeper ways.
Many of the large American and European development INGOs,
such as Oxfam and CARE, had their roots in relief work during the First
and Second World Wars, when they provided humanitarian assistance
for famine relief. Many INGOs were also influential in promoting the
Human Rights agenda in the creation of the United Nations. Since the
Second World War, development INGOs have delivered significant serv-
ices, aid and programmes to many living in the global south through
their roles in humanitarian assistance as well as through their roles in
longer-term development assistance. Yet, as Kirk (2012: 246–247) high-
lights, as impressive as the INGOs’ successes have been, they are still not
achieving their overarching aims of ‘overcoming poverty and suffering’
(Oxfam), ensuring that ‘every child, even those caught up in disaster or
war, can expect a basic education’ (Save the Children), or to put an ‘end
to poverty’ (Christian Aid).
What is needed is a clearer way to join the engagement INGOs have

with publics around humanitarian situations and large-scale campaigns
with the mobilisation of publics around longer-term social change.
Consequently, the driving question motivating this book is: How are
INGOs engaging northern publics in order to affect change? And three
related sub-questions are:
● What values, frames and strategies are INGOs using to engage

northern publics?
● How do organisational factors influence the strategies of INGOs in
political spaces?
● How are INGOs involved in activism, advocacy and mobilisation in
evolving political spaces?
The argument of this book is that development INGOs need to utilise

political values and political spaces more strategically if they are to be
better agents of change. There are great expectations of INGOs to enable
change, expectations that have been extended and strengthened by
INGOs themselves. But how will INGOs be able to achieve these large
ambitions and how important are their relationships with northern
publics in such normative projects? This book suggests that they need
to re-examine the ways they engage with publics, to re-evaluate their
strategies, and to further explore their utilisation of political spaces.
This book aims to offer an analysis of INGOs, via three primary themes,
presented as contentions. The first of these is that INGOs’ organisa-
tional values and strategies frequently come into conflict, both within
the INGO sector as a whole and within each individual organisation.
Second is the fact that INGOs operate within shifting and sometimes
volatile political spaces and – albeit to varying degrees – have to adjust
to these domains, both strategically and at times, operationally. Third,
INGOs have different conceptions of how change occurs, that is to say
they have different ‘theories of change’, and this shapes and conditions
the ways that they operate.
The approach taken in this book attempts to be holistic. While there
are many studies of NGOs in developing countries, the focus here is
on northern INGOs and their relationships within the global north.
Although these relationships have been investigated by others (but not
to the same degree as INGOs’ work in the global south), typically they
have only been examined from a single perspective, such as media-
tion or fundraising. Thus, this book is intended to be both practical
and academic – an intellectual examination of how political values,
strategies and spaces are utilised can be helpful in how we look at the
problem and how we change the debate, giving a new perspective on
the goals of INGOs and how they pursue them. INGOs are currently at
a crossroads. At a time when both their roles and the funding environ-
ments are changing, increased efficacy in how they carry out their work
and an increase in their potential to be agents of change is essential.
In addressing the question ‘How are development INGOs engaging
northern publics to in order to affect change?’ a number of methods
have been utilised. As a culmination of many years of working in, as
well as of external observations of, the sector, this research is based on
interviews of key people in the sector, evaluation and analysis of INGO
documents and large-scale public awareness studies. Semi-structured
interviews were primarily conducted between 2011 and 2013, but some
INGO interviews used also took place prior to this time period. The
interviews were primarily conducted with key people who were either
employed by INGOs or who had been previously employed by INGOs
and worked in senior management, as well as in the communications,
fundraising, press, and advocacy or policy functions of the INGOs. The
interviewees were from the following INGOs: Action Aid, Christian Aid,
Oxfam, CAFOD, Save the Children, World Development Movement,
and War on Want, Health Poverty Network, Avaaz, The Rules and the
International Broadcast Trust. Additional interviews were conducted
outside the INGO sector, with key employees from BOND, Jubilee
2000 and Make Poverty History. All interviews have been anonymised
to allow the respondents more freedom in their responses. While the
INGOs interviewed and quoted in the following chapters are primarily
UK-based, the issues that they address and their relevance transcend the
UK and would be insightful to many northern INGOs in general.
The BOAG INGOs
In order to explore the INGO sector in the global north, the British
Overseas Aid Group (BOAG) of INGOs is an excellent entry point.
As the focus of this book is on INGOs working in development, the
BOAG also offers a good opening into some of the biggest and most
high-profile INGOs not only in the UK, but also across the world. The
BOAG is composed of five of the largest UK (and international) devel-
opment INGOs: Oxfam, Save the Children, Christian Aid, Action Aid
and CAFOD, and the combined income of these five INGOs accounts
for over half the income of all British INGOs put together (Stroup and
Murdie, 2012: 439).
The BOAG is an informal group that was started in 1980, yet very
little has been written about it. The status of the BOAG group is one of
informal and formal. They are an informal group in that there are no
formal agreements between the five member INGOs and the UK govern-
ment. However, the BOAG group – primarily the CEOs of each of the
five INGOs – meets formally with different ministries of the UK govern-
ment. In fact, one of its primary functions is for its five members to meet
with the UK government and to liaise between the government and the
development INGO sector. Focusing on the BOAG INGOs has allowed
for some interesting insights into the sector, such as: how INGOs work
with government; how they work with each other; how they work in
emerging, invited and claimed political spaces; and how some of the
largest INGOs balance professionalisation with activism. Focusing on the
BOAGs also encompasses questions of legitimacy, provenance and cred-
ibility within the development INGO sector in the UK. In this context,
the BOAG INGOs will be used as a means to show the tensions and
challenges of the development NGO sector more broadly throughout
the book.
The BOAGs are not necessarily the largest of all the INGOs working in
development (although Oxfam and Save the Children are giants within
the sector), but the five INGOs broadly have a similar purpose as well
as similar sets of values. The primary reasoning behind the existence
of the BOAG group is to provide a forum for the larger INGOs working
in development, ‘to speak with one voice in promoting the interests of
the world’s poor and to combine efforts when appropriate in ... advo-
cacy and campaigning work in the North’ (Charlish et al., 2003: 11). A
senior employee of one of the BOAG INGOs outlined one of primary
reasons behind the origins of the BOAG group ‘To challenge some of
the images used – that was one of the first things BOAG was set up to
do. How we should portray people that we are representing from the
south. That was a common cause of BOAG, and they agreed the first
guidelines’ (NGO119). Given the tensions that currently exist within
the Development INGO sector concerning campaigning imagery, the
BOAG’s origins are particularly pertinent.
The directors of the five BOAG INGOs meet regularly and the
organisations frequently undertake joint actions. An INGO Director
of Campaigns (working for a BOAG INGO) described the BOAG group
as follows: ‘[it] lives in this netherworld of being something incredibly
understood and powerful in the sector, yet it’s not constituted in any
way. It’s essentially just a peer group for the five CEOs, and they reach
agreements and direct their organisations together, but there is nothing
formal about it. ... They come in there to support each other so there is
very little hard bargaining that goes on in there’ (NGO122). Another
BOAG INGO Director of Campaigns interviewed said of the BOAG
group: ‘The BOAGs – as they become bigger, become increasingly less
radical’ (NGO121). While a Director of Advocacy (NGO119) described
the changes in the BOAG group: ‘People had an understanding of what
the BOAG did and what it brought to the table. And there was a common
understanding that these five big representative agencies were able to
have conversations with the government, and therefore they’re able to
take the lead on certain things, and then the sector can follow them. I
think that was clear’. He continues ‘It would be interesting to ask people
in other agencies now what they think the BOAGs do? What’s the role of
BOAG? ... What do they think BOAG brings to the sector? I don’t think
they would be very complimentary’.
Of the five INGOs, Oxfam and Save the Children are by far the largest.
Oxfam was founded in 1942 initially to provide relief to people in war
torn Belgium and Greece. It is now a confederation of 17 national sister
Oxfams (UK being the largest) called Oxfam International, and between
all of the organisations, they work in over 100 countries. Oxfam’s work
ranges from urgent humanitarian relief work, to longer-term capacity
building development work, to fundraising, campaigning and advocacy
work in the global north. This largest BOAG INGO outlines its vision,
which is ‘a just world without poverty: a world in which people can
influence decisions that affect their lives ... The ultimate goal of Oxfam is
to end the injustice of poverty’ (Oxfam Strategic Plan, 2013–2019: 6).
Save the Children, the other large BOAG INGO, was founded in 1919,
is focused on alleviating child poverty and concentrates on childrens’
rights. Save the Children UK is a member of the Save the Children
International, working in 120 countries. Involved in both humanitarian
relief work and longer-term development, Save the Children focuses on
education, child poverty, health, hunger and child protection, and their
vision is that ‘All children are protected from abuse, neglect, violence
and exploitation’ (Save the Children, 2013).
Christian Aid, which is the third largest of the BOAG INGOs, was
founded in 1945, works with over 550 partners in 45 countries, and is
involved in both long-term development programmes and emergency
relief. Christian Aid was formed by 40 British and Irish churches in the
UK and works with people of all faiths and none. Christian Aid’s vision
is stated as ‘an end to poverty – and we believe that vision can become
a reality ... . Created and perpetuated by human systems and struc-
tures, poverty can be ended by human action’ (Christian Aid, Strategic
Framework, 4). The organisation maintains close links with numerous

ecumenical development agencies.
Action Aid was founded in 1972 and is one of the smaller BOAG
INGOs. Action Aid UK has sister organisations in France, Ireland, Spain
and Greece and works in over 43 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin
America. Action Aid was one of the first development INGOs to move
their headquarters from London to South Africa, resulting in a new feder-
ation aimed at giving increased power to each of their country offices
(Action Aid UK Strategy 2012–2017: 3). The organisation outlines its
vision as: ‘a world without poverty and injustice in which every person
enjoys their right to a life of dignity. Our mission is to work with poor
and excluded people to eradicate poverty and injustice’ (Action Aid UK
Strategy 2012–2017: 9).
The smallest BOAG INGO is the Catholic Agency for Overseas
Development (CAFOD). CAFOD was founded in 1962, works with part-
ners in 62 countries and is the Catholic Aid Agency for England and
Wales.8 CAFOD is part of the Caritas Internationalis, which is a global
network of 154 Catholic development agencies. The organisation
campaigns on behalf of the world’s poor and carries out extensive analysis
of the causes of underdevelopment (Charlish et al., 2003: 11). CAFOD
emphasises that it works with people of all faiths and none, currently
in 40 countries. Their primary foci are sustainable development, disaster
response, and advocacy and campaigning (Cooper, 2011).
Table 1.1 BOAG INGO statistics
International
Income Spending Period Staff Volunteers headquarters
Oxfam £368 million £385 million 31 March 2013 5,046 22,000 Oxford
Save the £284 million £317 million 31 December 2012 4,025 N/A London
Children
Christian Aid £95.5 million £96.5 million 31 March 2013 854 275 London
Action Aid £59.5 million £61.5 million 31 December 2013 145 N/A London and
Johannesburg
CAFOD £49 million £51 million 31 March 2013 444 2,200 London
Note: BOAG INGO statistics, including income, spending staff and volunteers for the UK branches. All figures
taken from the UK Charity Commission.
All figures refer to the income of the UK elements of the INGOs and not
the overall international federations. Figures taken from the UK Charity
Commission.9
Each of the five BOAG INGOs has its own distinct approach. Kirk,
for example, uses a medical metaphor to describe their different
organisational approaches, whereby Save the Children’s focus on imme-

diate assistance is akin to an ambulance, while organisations such as
Oxfam work toward systemic change, under a more radical social justice
banner, more like a public health agency (Kirk, 2012: 258). Others,
having worked for BOAG INGOs, are critical of the lack of accountability
of the BOAG group as a whole (NGO121). The BOAG INGOs then, while
not representative of the whole sector, are a diverse group of organisa-
tions that offer interesting insights into some of the key challenges of
INGOs working in development.
Structure
Chapter 2 explores the concepts and the practicalities of political

space – what it means and why it is useful for an analysis of INGOs.
Examining the political spaces that INGOs inhabit, at least with respect
to engaging with northern publics, allows us to look at these organisa-
tions in a variety of different ways. The chapter argues that if we explore
where change happens, we find that there is potential in spaces where
values are utilised, in spaces of mediation and public engagement, and
in spaces where organisations operate.10 Additionally, change may also
occur in the relatively new political spaces of networks, as well as in
digital spaces.
Chapter 3 analyses the different values and frames of INGOs.
Development INGOs are frequently presented as organisations that
embody many of the values of good people – those of charity, fairness
and justice. INGOs are inherently cosmopolitan organisations in their
values (Yanacopulos and Baillie Smith, 2007), and these cosmopolitan
ideals, as outlined by Pogge (2002) – the importance of the individual
as the unit of analysis, the universality of human rights, and that all
individuals count equally regardless of their location – are key to many
notions of cosmopolitanism we see within the INGO sector. These
notions are synonymous with most development thinking, and it is
generally assumed that development – particularly with its connection
to the needs of ‘distant strangers’ (O’Neill, 1986) – is a cosmopolitan
project. The chapter disaggregates different cosmopolitan perspectives,
as well as cosmopolitan actors, dispositions, and normative ambitions of
international development actors. Additionally, the chapter references
studies commissioned by Oxfam and the World Wildlife Fund exploring
how values are key in designing frames for not only campaigns, but also
development engagement more broadly. This will lay the foundation for
analysing and conceptualising the debates around charity and justice
that underline INGO strategies for engaging northern publics.
Chapter 4 explores the spaces of mediation and engagement of

INGOs, elaborating on the idea of the ‘public faces of development’
(Smith and Yanacopulos, 2004) as a starting point of INGO engage-
ment with publics. The growth of the number of organisations and
individuals involved in development, together with shifting ideas of
development and new communications possibilities have presented
increasingly complex forms of engagement between INGOs and
northern publics. INGOs act as brokers of relationships between indi-
viduals and communities in the north, and poor individuals and
communities in the south, and the mediation of these relationships
produced by diverse organisations, interests and contexts. Whilst
different forms of engagement, such as development education, advo-
cacy and fundraising have been examined in the past, there are still
very few strategic-level perspectives on the multiple challenges faced
by INGOs, alone and in partnerships.
To understand the factors that affect INGO behaviours, it is impor-
tant to recognise INGOs as highly strategic organisational entities, as
is explored in Chapter 5. INGOs are organisations that are strategically
oriented but functionally organised and that operate within, influ-
ence – and are influenced by – their environments (Yanacopulos, 2005,
Hudock, 1999). Yet at the same time INGOs are also value-driven organi-
sations. This chapter focuses on the ways in which INGO values relate
to their organisational functionality and how this plays out in their
engagement with northern publics. Specifically, the chapter explores the
different forms of engagement that different organisations adopt and
enact, as well as examining the diverse forms of engagement used by
different functional departments of INGOs in engaging with northern
publics. The chapter also looks at the formation of networks within the
INGO sector and how this is impacting on the operation and strategy of
INGOs, as well as how INGO networks are in turn creating and joining
larger global campaigns / social movements.
Advances in ICTs have enabled networked and mobilisation spaces
that are frequently utilised by INGOs and these will be assessed in
Chapter 6. The call for justice formed the basis both of the highly
visible and publicly successful Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History
campaigns. However, tensions arose within both campaigns: between
charity and justice; between mass involvement and in-depth under-
standing; and, between different organisational theories of change. To
give just one example, whilst some INGOs might belong to an interna-
tional coalition advocating global justice and structural changes in the
international financial and aid systems, the very same INGOs might also
be using images of the poor to invoke impulses of pity and charity in

order to fundraise.
Technological advancements have also enabled different platforms
for engaging and mobilising publics, which is the focus of Chapter 7.
Since the 1990s, the rise in mobile phone and internet usage has been
exponential, as has the rise of User Generated Content (UGC). It is these
digital or virtual spaces, and the different technological platforms used
in them, where deliberation and mobilisation take place that are partic-
ularly of interest. The internet has acted both as an enabler for infor-
mation transmission and as a key tool for social movement organisers
to communicate with supporters about demonstrations and political
actions (Yanacopulos, 2002; 2004), but since 2004 the rise in the popu-
larity of interactive web platforms has been dramatic. This interactivity
means that there is now a different social element to space-based inter-
actions, one that provides platforms of expression for users as well as a
possible new way of engaging publics to become active around polit-
ical issues. Users are able to generate and to upload content onto their
own websites, join groups and extend their social/political networks,
voice alternative views and opinions and even interact and protest in
virtual worlds. Chapter 7 explores the take-up of these new technologies
amongst INGOs, and investigates how INGO engagement around devel-
opment issues differs within the context of virtual spaces.
My contention is that INGOs are limited in how they engage northern
publics, how they conduct advocacy and how they are politically active
around issues of international development. They are doing all of these
in a shifting landscape and their use of political spaces may not be as
effective as it could be. They are limited by many factors that will be
discussed in the following chapters, such as their forms of engagement,
their business models, and their self-sustaining ambitions. These factors
are greatly limiting them as agents of change. Until they overcome some
of these tensions and issues, their positions will be ambivalent and their
role in development will remain problematic.
This book aims to contribute to both the conceptualisation and the
practice of NGOs on a number of levels. INGO political communication
takes place in political spaces, and utilising a spatial approach enables a
clearer analysis of the ways in which the organisations mediate develop-
ment to northern publics. The later chapters explore the INGOs’ utilisa-
tion of new spaces, revealing how they are politically engaging within
such spaces. The multi-perspective view taken throughout this book
allows a critical analysis of INGOs and their relationships with northern
publics, but the book also has some normative ambitions. First, if INGOs
are accepted as one of the primary mediators of development, then they

need to reinforce healthy and positive images of the south, both for
moral and practical reasons, as explored in Chapters 3 to 5. There are
also new political spaces that INGOs are not fully utilising, and the
second normative aim of the book is to encourage INGOs to engage in
these political spaces in new and innovative ways. Finally, the third aim
is to encourage INGOs to become more political – political in the sense
that along with their service delivery work, they should also define the
issues of development as global and structural, and therefore take the
required political actions that address the root causes of inequalities and
social injustices, thus living up to their stated mission statements.
2
Political Spaces of INGOs
‘There is a politics of space because space is political.’(Lefebvre

in Brenner and Elden, 2009: 168)
‘Space is a social product ... it is not simply “there”, a neutral
container waiting to be filled, but is a dynamic, humanly
constructed means of control, and hence of domination, of
power.’ (Lefebvre, 1991: 24)
In many ways, using a spatial approach to examine INGOs seems obvious.

Spatiality has always been a fundamental element of international poli-
tics, from the conceptualisation of the multilateral and international
system through to geopolitics and transnational networks. Yet until
recently, the idea of ‘political space’ itself has been under-researched.
But why is the examination of political space important to practitioners
and to academics who study civil society organisations such as INGOs?
I would suggest it is primarily because, as Foucault argues, power and
space are integrally connected. Foucault brings to light the continuously
moving terrain where power struggles occur, outlining how ‘power
permeates and courses through spaces, sparking a multiplicity of points
of resistance as well as producing and embedding particular institutional
forms, patterns and practices’ (quoted in Cornwall, 2002: 8). Through
the study of political space, we are able to see who initiates, who partici-
pates and how others are allowed to take part in both everyday and
formal political processes.
Using a spatial approach to examine the political state of affairs of
INGOs is vital as INGOs are inherently political organisations. Almost
by definition, INGOs that work in development are first and fore-
most trying to change a given situation. Whether they are providing
basic services, setting up a school, or empowering women to become
21
entrepreneurs, all are arguably inherently political acts. In addition,

INGOs work across borders and at different scales, from the ‘local’ grass-
roots level, to those of global governance. This is captured by Lang
(2013: 12) who claims that the INGO sector has been ‘credited with
playing a central part in establishing new geographies of political power
at the intersection of civil society and institutional politics’. In Ulrich
Beck’s (2006) Cosmopolitan Vision, he argues that there are ‘other spaces’
produced as a result of such global changes. Both of these factors, taken
in the context of the shifting landscapes enabled by the globalisation of
information and communication technologies, from the Internet to the
global media sphere, have produced the impression of space ‘shrinking’
and a rapid shifting of INGOs’ operating environments.
Given these significant shifts, it is vital to look at the different polit-
ical spaces that INGOs inhabit, and how they have utilised a range of
different political terrains. Smith and Smythe (2009: 794) ask, ‘[W]hat
will be the new vocabulary and spaces of politics?’ Attempting to suggest
some answers to their question will provide the focus of the following
five chapters. The idea of ‘opening up’ political spaces has become preva-
lent; it is an idea that has been used by political activists from the streets
of the Arab Spring (Salih, 2014) to the contagious Occupy movement,1
and to the various regional and World Social Forums (Sen, 2010). Terms
such as ‘deliberative space’, ‘mediascapes’, ‘transnational spaces’ and
‘virtual – or digital – space’ are now widespread in the academic litera-
ture, as well as in the discourses of activists. Before we can start to under-
stand their meanings, however, it is necessary to examine first the terms
‘political space’ and ‘open space’.
The first section of the chapter will outline the advantages of using
a spatial approach, while sections two and three will highlight some of
the current thinking around political space and what it means to say
that certain forms of activity ‘open up’ political space. Section four will
focus specifically on INGO spatialities – how INGOs exist and operate
with certain spaces.
Why political space?
The language of space has entered the academic, policy and practical
domains of politics, yet the ways that INGOs are negotiating such spaces
remains under-analysed. Within academic writing, there has been a
‘spatial turn’ in the social sciences (Warf and Arias, 2009); specifically, at
the core of this turn has been the rise of literature on networks, digital
spaces and spaces of deliberation. In what Castells (2000; 2012) has called
Political Spaces of INGOs 23
the Networked Society and Networks of Outrage and Hope, we see the globali-
sation of communication technologies, primarily the Internet, have
resulted in what Kirsch (1995) has called a feeling of ‘space shrinking’.
Dencik (2013:1220) attributes the discourses of global space as being
based on peoples’ interpretations of dramatically rapid changing condi-
tions, particularly with respect to media, and ‘that suggest that new
media technologies are expanding and enlarging political community,
significantly reducing the role of territory in communicative exchange’.
For our purposes in this chapter, a spatial analysis of INGOs – specifi-
cally examining how INGOs operate within certain spaces – opens up
avenues for exploration and allows us to look at INGOs through different
lenses. One such lens, for example, allows us to look at various academic
explanations of space, from the ‘invited’/‘claimed’ spaces to the crea-
tion of political spaces. Both of these concepts revolve around the idea
of power and how groups/organisations enable the changes that they
want to make. Something that is under-explored in the INGO literature
is how INGOs are utilising, creating and negotiating spaces in order to
achieve their aims, specifically through engaging with northern publics.
By looking at how INGOs are operating or how they could be operating
in different spaces allows us to look at the work of INGOs through a
different perspective and therefore garner different insights, teasing out
the politics of INGOs.
So what is political space? Stuart Elden (2007: 101) asserts that ‘There
is a politics of space because space is political’, citing the work of Henri
Lefebvre. Webster and Engberg-Pedersen (2002: 11), meanwhile, define
political space as being ‘about the outcome of contexts ... rooted in
specific political histories. It will vary considerably from arena to arena
within a political system and from country to country.’ And Riker (1998:
68) refers to political space as the ‘arena in which non-state actors may
undertake initiatives independently of the state’. However, while the
term ‘political space’ is used in many fields, it does remain under-uti-
lised with respect to INGOs. Riker (1998: 68), for example, claims that
while the term political space has been used by political scientists, ‘as a
concept it has generally lacked rigor’. Since he wrote this though, polit-
ical geographers and other social scientists have been developing the
concept.
Political geographers, such as Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey and Doreen
Massey have written seminal works on political space, all of which have
a material and urban focus. Additionally interesting is the work of Julie-
Anne Boudreau (2007), who explores how new, effective and significant
political spaces are created. Within the field of International Relations,
Harvey Starr argues that time-space is a relative idea based on the amount
of time it takes to go from one location to another; most of the key ques-
tions posed by International Relations regarding security, conflict, inter-
national political economy, or cooperation are based on time-space. He
continues by adding that technology has an important impact on how
the meaning of space can change and is linked to the idea of a ‘shrinking
world’ (Starr, 2013: 437). Yet others such as Scott Kirsch (1995) caution
against ‘resorting to the rather cartoonish shrinking world metaphor’,
arguing that as Lefebvre’s analysis states, ‘In addition to its significance
to production in space, technology also plays a mediating role in the
production of space’. The shrinking world metaphor fails to take into
account the relations between capital, technology and space and thus,
Kirsch argues, space is not ‘shrinking’ but must rather be perpetually
recast (Kirsch, 1995). Technology has certainly changed the speed at
which spaces can be produced. Kirsch (1995) highlights what he claims
is a neglected element of Lefebvre’s work which is that technology is
significant not only in production in space, technology also plays a
mediating role in the production of space.
In analysing the World Social Forum, Jai Sen (2010) notes the concept
of open space. He states that the term ‘open space’ is used in many
fields, among them urban planning and landscape architecture, office
and workspace planning, education and knowledge systems, social
management, conflict resolution and transformation initiatives, and
social and political practice. As the cluster of fields he mentions makes
clear, the concept of open space is closely related to a host of other
concepts. However, along with related concepts such as horizontality
and networking, ‘open space’ has come into increasingly intensive use –
perhaps especially in social and political practice – in recent years, and
has gained special currency by virtue of its use since 2001 in connec-
tion with the World Social Forum (Sen, 2010). Thus, because of the
networking practices in WSF, as well as those of transnational advo-
cacy networks and the boom in social networking practices of all types,
the idea of opening space has gained more currency. Although, at the
same time, and depending on national or transnational context, many
southern NGOs and CSOs interviewed in the ACT Alliance study (2011:
2) see a world of ‘shrinking political space’, one which has diminishing
possibilities for the organisations to take public actions.2
Julie-Anne Boudreau claims that the term ‘political space’ is commonly
used to describe a bound territory where politics occurs and she argues
that the term ‘opening a political space’ is reminiscent of the language
used by the feminist movement of the 1960s (Boudreau, 2007: 2593).
Boudreau’s constructivist approach to space is especially useful in that

(following Taylor, 1995) the idea of political space does not presuppose
mutually exclusive ‘containers’, such as states, within which politics
unfolds; political spaces are not limited by national boundaries.
Following Hannah Arendt’s conceptions of space, there is no limit to
the number of political spaces that can be created – so political spaces
can overlap, interact and evolve rather than being seen as self-sufficient
and sovereign units (Boudreau, 2007: 2594). Additionally, Boudreau
highlights how the idea of political space presupposes that a space carries
agentic power, but without assuming that this agency is derived from a
well-bound geographical territory. New political spaces, therefore, are the
result of power struggles for constituting coherence and common objec-
tives, rather than being the derivative of pre-existing sovereignty. It is
thus necessary to highlight the interplay between state institutions and
other political actors, such as social movements and economic elites, as
well as the intensity of political interactions (Boudreau, 2007: 2594). For
Boudreau, the concept of political space implies a process of contestation
and conflict between state and non-state actors, which is why it is vital for
‘a new political space to build on spatial imaginaries that are mobilised by
various social movements and state actors’ (Boudreau, 2007: 2601).
Consequently, Boudreau argues, such political spaces utilise spatial
tools such as boundaries, nodes and zones. Unlike the allegiances that
are determined by and within bounded territories, Boudreau argues that
instead, shifting boundaries and a nodal network logic are more adept
at fostering allegiance. As such a ‘conception of a changing and fluid
political space works well if it instrumentalises elements of the local
political culture, by making existing spatial practices more visible and
valorised’. (Boudreau, 2007: 2601)
New political spaces do not arise spontaneously, but through a process
of people actively seeking and creating them – revealing the interests
behind these political restructuring processes. Boudreau argues that these
translations of interests into actions require strategising and that the
instruments of the strategy are chosen to enable the implementation of
a goal (Boudreau 2007: 2607). For her, space itself is frequently the very
object of political mobilisation, as the new space ‘temporarily creates
the conditions for political exchange because it provides meaning and
relevance to the political process through spatial imaginaries, because
it is incorporated in everyday practices and is in continuity with the
political culture, and because it positions the various actors in recognis-
able (yet temporary) roles’. (Boudreau, 2007: 2608) Boudreau’s concep-
tion of political space – one in which different political actors, be they
the state, civil society or others, battle for their political interests – is
compelling. Looking at political space as a ‘field of action’ allows us to
examine the ways that INGOs engage publics, advocate on behalf of
their constituents, and mobilise and activate publics for change. And it
is why political space offers such a useful lens through which to explore
INGO sites of engagement, advocacy and action.
For Jurgen Habermas (1989), what he calls the public sphere is seen
as an accessible and open space of communication in which individuals
come together to deliberate and discuss common issues. Habermas’s
conception of the public sphere is fundamental to the idea of democ-
racy and to democratic engagement not only between citizens, but also
between the state and civil society actors such as INGOs. The key func-
tion of these spaces of deliberation is to mediate between state and civil
society by subjecting state authority to the scrutiny of public opinion,
and by requiring decisions to be made on the basis of an unrestricted
rational deliberation in which all citizens can partake (Stephansen, 2011).
Agreeing with this deliberative conception of political space, Tkacheva
et al (2013: 4) see it as an arena ‘in which input from citizens is continu-
ally being received and taken into account by the governing authorities’.
The term political space, then, is used in a multitude of academic
fields, although geography has been the discipline most concerned with
its implications. Within the social movement literature, the term polit-
ical opportunity structures emphasises a space for protest and collective
actions (Tarrow, 1994) of non-state actors. It also shows the ways that
they vie for political influence, bringing about change from outside the
formal political structures of the state, thereby ‘creating’ political space.
However, INGOs and other civil society organisations are not the only
actors trying to influence and create these political spaces.
Invited, claimed, and created political space
The work of Henri Lefebvre speaks directly to the production of space.

He argued that an opposition exists between our ‘conception of space –
abstract, mental and geometric – and our perception of space – concrete,
material and physical’ (cited in Elden, 2004: 189). Elden (2004:190)
outlines Lefebvre’s three different conceptions of space, the first of
which is in how spaces take a physical form that is generated and used.
The second conception of space is that of knowledge or ‘savoir’, which
is that of maps, mathematics, or the instrumental space of urban plan-
ners, where space is seen as a mental construct. The third of Lefebvre’s
conceptions of space is that it is something produced and modified over
time through its use. Space is invested with symbolism and meaning,
being both real and imagined.
Lefebvre (1991) sees the production of space as a highly political
process composed of social and power relations. Cornwall (2002: 7) high-
lights Lefebvre’s argument that within every space there are traces of its
production, what Lefebvre (1991: 110) calls its ‘generative past’, where
spaces are both the outcome of past actions and that which permits new
actions to occur, enabling some and blocking others. Consequently, as
Gilson (2011: 7) emphasises, Lefebvre’s work makes clear that the action
within a given space creates that very space, while the space itself will
shape action, and the use of pre-existing spaces may influence the shape
of new spaces.
From a development INGO perspective, much of the literature
concerning the opening of political space has fallen under the heading
of participation. Andrea Cornwall (2002:2) describes the act of partici-
pation: ‘as bringing spaces to life as well as carving out new spaces and
creating new social forms with their own momentum and impetus.
Spaces for participation can be thought of, then, in abstract terms as
the ways in which opportunities for engagement might be conceived
or perceived, and more concretely, in terms of the actual sites that are
entered and animated by citizens’ (Cornwall, 2002: 2).
Cornwall (2002) goes on to distinguish between invited spaces and
claimed spaces, a distinction that is helpful to our understanding
of how INGOs negotiate space. Cornwall describes invited spaces as
those that are either institutionalised (for example, the BOAG group
of INGOs in the UK) or are one-off consultations. As she describes,
with the move to increased participation becoming the norm at every
level of government and governance, the number of invited spaces has
increased. Invited spaces, then, are spaces for engagement; they can
be seen as sites of opportunities that are entered into and animated
by citizens (Cornwall, 2002: 2). The relationship between the inviters
(those in power, generally governments) and the invitees (in the case of
the BOAG, INGOs) is not always oppositional in character, but rather,
as Kaldor (2003: 94) comments, state/INGO relations can be seen as
‘an expression of the blurred boundaries between state and non-state,
public and private’.
This process of participation within invited spaces is rightfully not
without its critics (Cornwall, 2002; Hickey and Mohan, 2004) as it can
easily mask power relations between the inviting and invited. Also, when
governments or other organisations limit or decrease the number of
invited spaces, INGOs and other civil society organisations perceive this
as a ‘shrinking political space’, in which there are reduced opportunities

to undertake a wide range of public actions (ACT Alliance 2011: 2).
Meanwhile, claimed spaces are outlined by Cornwall (2002) as the
spaces that the excluded powerless create, or demand, for themselves.
These claimed spaces are more organic and are not given, but demanded
by those involved in protests or social movements, as well as by
others who want to discuss and resist change outside institutionalised
policy arenas (Cornwall, 2002; 2007). They are spaces that are claimed
by those with a common set of grievances and as a result of popular
mobilisation.
The reality of invited and claimed spaces, however, is that they are
neither as clearly delineated as Cornwall’s definitions might suggest,
nor are they mutually exclusive. As Cornwall (2002: 7) herself outlines,
invited spaces ‘exist alongside those claimed and shaped by a range
of other actors ... what happens in one impinges on what happens in
others, as relations of power within and across them are constantly
reconfigured’. Cornwall (2007) sees invited and claimed spaces
frequently working in unison, and suggests that ‘when well-crafted,
institutional spaces for participation come together with champions
for change on the inside, and well-organised, mobilised social groups
on the outside, positive changes for previously excluded groups may
be seen’. Gaventa (2006: 27) highlights the potential of utilising both
invited and claimed spaces, pointing out that ‘new skills, capacity and
experiences, can be used to enter and affect other spaces’ to attain the
desired changes’.
In the context of INGOs, John Gaventa and Andrea Cornwall’s defi-
nitions of claimed and invited spaces are particularly useful, as they
argue that the large INGOs are more comfortable in invited rather than
claimed spaces. While INGOs, such as those that are part of the BOAG,
are invited into political spaces, at the same time INGOs are being
constrained by three factors. First, the ways in which INGOs frame their
development interventions can be constraining because it involves
trying to straddle both claimed and invited spaces. The second factor
is that INGOs are constrained by their business models, as they tend to
depend on government funding and funds raised from individuals. And
the third is that many INGOs are reluctant to work with other actors,
such as social movements and protest movements (within the global
north) who work primarily in claimed spaces. What, then, do these three
factors have to do with opening up political spaces? I would argue that
despite a digital and virtual revolution, and even though this revolu-
tion may offer opportunities for further deliberation and for networked
actions, INGOs are organisationally and operationally limited in how

they can utilise the opportunities.
Why is political space important for INGOs?
Arguably, civil society organisations and INGOs have benefited from

neo-liberal governance during the last few decades in that they have
occupied the spaces that were previously the domain of states, particu-
larly in their social welfare and service provision roles (Chandhoke, 2002:
43; Kaldor: 2003: 9). As previously outlined, the numbers of INGOs have
increased significantly during these same decades, but this has led to
an odd predicament. Whilst INGOs have undoubtedly benefited from
the changing spaces in which they operate, the fact that they are now
in effect sustaining this very system of governance makes it difficult for
them to challenge the neo-liberal structures that lie at the root of global
poverty and inequality. This paradox poses a challenge both for how
INGOs operate and how they can become the agents of change they
hope to be in their mission statements, challenges that are brought out
most clearly in how INGOs utilise invited and claimed political spaces.
Many INGOs attempt to inhabit both the invited and claimed spaces,
both working with governments in invited spaces, and challenging
governments in claimed spaces. Invited, claimed and produced spaces
are where political change takes place. As Rodan (1997: 158) has argued,
‘civil society is the form of political space that affords the most substan-
tive opposition capacity and potential capacity within which social forces
can both resist and co-operate with the state in their own interests’.
However, some of the largest of the UK’s INGOs, who together form the
BOAG, have spent a great deal of their time in invited spaces. Since the
inception of the BOAG group in the early 1980s, the five BOAG INGOs
have had an invited and special relationship with the UK government,
primarily with the Department for International Development. Because
of this invited relationship with the UK government and their receipt
of government funding, one would point out the tensions that exist for
these INGOs to utilise what Cornwall calls claimed spaces.
Although there are tensions in inhabiting both invited and claimed
political spaces, it must be said that not all of the five BOAG INGOs work
with government in the same ways, and not all five INGOs have the same
approach to inhabiting claimed spaces, and criticising government. There
are other organisations with explicit social structural change mandates,
such as some UK advocacy INGOs, social movements and OCOs,3 that
are more likely to work in claimed spaces (a topic which will be further
discussed in Chapter 7). This may mean that INGOs with strong links to
invited spaces are actually less likely than other organisations to chal-
lenge the international structures that are causing the very problems
they are trying to fix. One director of a (non-BOAG) INGO described
the dilemmas and costs of trying to work in both claimed and invited
spaces. He stated: ‘Do you exert influence by being this pure fringe group
or do you exert influence by supping with the devil and using a not so
long spoon? It was always said by everybody [in the INGO community]
that we can all do both – that we can be both insiders and outsiders’.
(NGO117) He later stated that doing both was ‘extremely difficult’.
Thus, it is essential to interrogate why INGOs find it difficult to create,
open or claim political spaces and to explore what elements of their
operations, ideologies and contexts might make doing so more chal-
lenging. Here, John Gaventa’s work on power relations within invited
and claimed spaces is particularly useful, especially when related to
engaging publics, a primary role for INGOs. Gaventa (2006: 3) states: ‘If
we want to change power relationships, e.g. to make them more inclu-
sive, just or pro-poor, we must understand more about where and how
to engage.’ Gaventa created what he calls ‘the power cube’, which is an
analytical device prompting the analyst to examine the scales, levels
and forms of power, and describes political spaces as opportunities,
moments and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect poli-
cies, discourses, decisions and relationships that affect their lives and
interests (Gaventa, 2006: 26). He uses the different dimensions of the
power cube to analyse the challenges for INGOs and other civil society
actors who are trying to challenge power relations, and goes on to
emphasise the most effective approach, notwithstanding the different
kinds of groups working within invited or claimed space. Specifically,
advocacy and change strategies for not only influencing policies, but
also in changing the more fundamental power relations, must simulta-
neously mobilise to ‘broaden’ the public space, as well as build aware-
ness of those that are excluded (Gaventa, 2006:30).
So how well are INGOs navigating these political spaces? What empir-
ical data exists and what are some of the key political domains where
INGOs are – or could be more – engaged? What are the elements of the
‘new’ political spaces and how are potential political spaces claimed for
engagement, deliberation, mobilisation and communication to affect
the social changes that INGOs desire? Such questions support the asser-
tion at the start of this book that this is a key moment for INGO practi-
tioners to engage in some self-reflection and some self-criticism – as well
as some business as usual.
The politics of INGOs
As far back as 1994, James Ferguson spoke about the depoliticisation of

development and the ‘anti-politics machine’ that is the development
industry. Although Ferguson was writing prior to the significant and
dramatic increase in the INGO sector, his point about the development
industry can be used to explain the ways that INGOs have to operate in
a world where funding – either from large national and international
donors, or from large public fundraising campaigns – is a major driver.
But if INGOs have become depoliticised, then how can we talk about
them within a political space context?
One perspective, that INGOs are depoliticised, is not the same as saying
that they do not operate within political spaces. ’Politicised’ in this context
refers to a challenging of the status quo and to systemic problems. The
proximity of states and INGOs through their funding is an issue that has
garnered a great deal of attention in the past (Hulme and Edwards, 1996),
and is argued to be one factor contributing to INGO depoliticisation. To
return to the questions driving the research behind this book, if INGOs
are to become agents of change, questions as to what kind of change
and what kind of politics they adopt are key. Nicola Banks and David
Hulme (2012) have written that INGOs are now so closely connected with
donors (rather than with the ‘subjects’ of development) that we can no
longer see them as the grassroots-oriented and innovative organisations
that they may have once been, which raises some questions about both
their legitimacy and sustainability. The donor-driven agendas, service
provision and business models of INGOs has meant that in practice, they
have moved away from their aims to ‘transform the structural causes of
poverty.’ (Spratt, 2012)
INGO depoliticisation is also frequently referred to as ‘professionalisa-
tion’, and while this may not appear like a negative shift, many would
argue that it is this very shift that has prevented INGOs from becoming
the agents of change they lay claim to be. Some INGO critics, such as
Tran (2012) argue that UK INGOs are particularly guilty of their own
success of being efficient and professional, yet lacking the political drive;
he suggests that INGOs ‘need to learn from grassroots movements and
embrace a far more radical vision of change.’ (Tran 2012)
Change and the possibilities of space
The following chapter will explore the value basis of development and
how normative cosmopolitan values and spaces are the basis of INGO
northern public engagement and fundraising, while Chapter 4 will

focus on spaces of engagement and will highlight INGOs’ engagement
with publics, supporters and constituents. Such spaces of engagement,
which have been analysed in a variety of ways in the past, are just some
of the ways in which INGOs are contributing to the construction of the
‘development project’ – both the discourses of development and ideas
around how to fix the ‘problem’ of development. Equally as impor-
tant are the ways in which INGOs negotiate organisational spaces, the
focus of Chapter 5. INGOs are multinational, networked, sometimes
conflicting and complex organisations and this influences how they
are able to work towards their goals. Their negotiations not only with
other organisations within the development sector, but also internally,
between different operations and departments, are pivotal in their abili-
ties to achieve their missions.
Networked campaigning spaces, the transnational links that have been
technologically enabled and are now widely utilised by INGOs and other
civil society actors, are the focus of Chapter 6. There is also considera-
tion on the fact that many INGOs have their own internal networks of
member organisations or are structured using different network models.
At the other end of the spectrum, Chapter 6 also investigates the mega-
campaigns such as the Jubilee 2000 debt campaigns and Make Poverty
History on which INGOs have worked together with others to mobilise
millions. Finally, the digital spaces utilised by INGOs are explored in
Chapter 7, asking how they are utilised, whether they are changing the
ways that INGOs engage with publics and other actors, and whether
they are creating spaces of INGO deliberation.
The possibilities of space in the contexts listed above involve delib-
eration, networking and digital enablement. In order to examine these
spaces of potential for INGOs, Chapters 3 and 4 will focus on key spatial
elements and explore how INGOs are (or are not) utilising them. Political
space – both real and imagined – is negotiated and such sites are sche-
matic in the sense that they overlap and are not definitive. If change will
occur anywhere, it will be within these sites. These sites include polit-
ical deliberative spaces, for example such as those created or opened up
by the Occupy movement and the World Social Forum. Media spaces,
beyond television and radio, and which blur with those of the Internet,
also hold potential for INGO change. Global campaigning spaces, such
as those of the Jubilee 2000, Make Poverty History and the IF campaigns
are also political sites of change opportunities. And digital spaces such
as those utilised by Online Campaigning Organisations (OCOs) hold
potential.
As we have seen through the World Social Forum, the Occupy move-
ment and the Arab Spring uprisings, deliberation is a key element in
change. Whilst some have called such events the ‘Twitter revolutions’ or
‘Facebook activism’, these are not the only sites of deliberation related
to key events that have occurred in the first part of the 21st century.
Although it is clear that both the numbers and the size of sites of deliber-
ation have expanded through technological enabling, the sites of delib-
eration we see in all of these movements would not have been possible
without the existence of the physical face-to-face sites of deliberation too.
The World Social Forum is a site of deliberation for thousands of INGOs
and CSOs. The Occupy movement spread from New York to hundreds
of cities across the globe, yet all of the different Occupy movements
involved a model based on deliberation, discussion and education. The
Arab Spring uprisings involved online deliberation through Facebook,
YouTube and Twitter, but again relied on the idea of continued face-to-
face deliberations in physical spaces of town squares.
Within international development, Cornwall (2002: 4) refers to the
Habermasian ideals of space-making, where Habermas’s ‘evocation
of spaces which are open to all and in which there is an open debate
is a normative conception of the conduct of politics’. Although such
deliberative spaces are not always easily claimed, created or opened up,
INGOs are frequently in a position where they can be influential in
doing just that either at home in the global north or with their global
south partners.
Additional sites of further potential for INGOs are network spaces.
Networks are certainly not a new concept – transnational networks
were captured as early as 1998 in Keck and Sikkink’s highly influential
book, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics,
a work which was fuelled by observations of activists and Transnational
Advocacy Networks (TANs) that have developed historically. Starting
from the anti-slavery movement of the 19th century, Keck and Sikkink
highlight the characteristics and strategies of TANs, as well as exploring
the ideas of sites of networking across scales. Myles Kahler’s (2009) book
explores different types of networks through an International Relations
analytical lens highlighting how they are extremely important sites of
international politics. When we think of such sites of networking, it
is important to acknowledge the competition between various actors
in these transnational network sites of political space. With respect to
engaging northern publics, the BOAG INGOs specifically have been
criticised in their recent campaigns for not being inclusive and for
closing down political space (Hilary, 2013a).
That technology has been a great enabler for opening (and closing)
political space is clear. In his 2012 book, Networks of Outrage and Hope,
Castell links social media and political spaces to emotions such as fear,
anger and collective actions, looking at the mental processes of polit-
ical activists. Castells (2012:11) outlines how ‘the public space of the
social movements is constructed as a hybrid space between the Internet
social networks and the occupied urban space: connecting cyberspace
and urban space in relentless interaction, constituting, technologi-
cally and culturally, instant communities of transformative practice’.
When applied to INGOs, the potential of the digital spaces can change
the type of engagement that INGOs have with their constituents and
publics – such sites are full of possibilities for engagement, and allow
for a multi-directional conversation between publics and organisations.
The field, however, is still new and evolving and as Charlie Beckett
(2012: 12) outlines, we are still searching for the right terms to capture
these processes, terms such as ‘“Digital Ecology” or “Landscape”’. But
Beckett warns that the danger of such terms is that they imply that
we are describing something ordered and stable, in what are a series of
‘contested and evolving political and material spaces.’
Conclusion
The idea of political space is a compelling lens through which to

examine not only how INGOs are operating, but also their possibilities.
Specifically in this chapter, we have looked at the political spaces within
which INGOs operate as spaces of engagement. In the next chapter, we
will see that INGO engagement is ambivalent, with a great deal of focus
on INGO sustainability, branding and prestige. Each INGO is interested
in political change, but all have different interpretations of what that
means and how to achieve it. In other words, they all have different
theories of change.
3
Cosmopolitan Spaces of INGOs
What values are INGOs enacting when they engage with and commu-
nicate about development? The different forms of INGO public engage-
ment, ranging from fundraising and marketing, through to advocacy,
development education and volunteering, not only rely on different
organisational dynamics, but also are predicated on different aims and,
I would argue, on different values. The aim of this chapter is to provide
a conceptual framework to better understand the norms and values
of development INGOs that lead to the ways they engage with their
publics.
Cosmopolitanism is a value-based theory and is both an explana-
tory framework and a normative ambition. Development INGOs are
generally value-based, and their forms of public engagement reflect an
assumed cosmopolitan politics – a politics that is primarily motivated by
a connection beyond the country of each INGO’s supporters, to distant
others in the global south. To fully understand the different forms of
public engagement of INGOs, we have to understand the framework
they operate in; cosmopolitan theories provide a useful way to think
about linking key INGO values that relate to helping ‘distant others’;
they allow an examination of normative, value-driven forms of engage-
ment of INGOs which guide us in locating their practices.
These northern-based development INGOs have what has been called
an assumed cosmopolitanism. Yanacopulos and Baillie Smith (2007:
298) have argued that ‘the notion of a “citizen of the world” would
seem to fit rather well with the image of the globetrotting humanitarian
worker, addressing need regardless of ethnicity, gender and nationality,
and perhaps personal safety. Supporters of development INGOs would
seem to be moving beyond national affiliation and transcending differ-
ence in response to distant suffering.’ The driving features of INGOs
35
are that they are voluntary associations speaking for distant others who
are represented as innocent, oppressed, deprived, neglected, underrep-
resented, excluded, disenfranchised and forgotten (Heins, 2008: 19).
And while many INGOs would be adamant that they do not ‘speak on
behalf’ of the disenfranchised and forgotten in the global south, INGOs
must represent them to northern publics in their various forms of public
engagement practices.
To understand the different types of public engagement that result
from INGO cosmopolitan values, we need to understand how different
values are implemented into development actions, as well as the under-
lying principles being adhered to. There are three interdependent
dimensions of cosmopolitanism with which INGOs can be identified:
forms of political authority beyond the nation state; the evolution of
global democracy; and the development of and adherence to universal
values. Whilst needing to be cautious about the global political roles
sometimes ascribed to INGOs, not least in terms of their purported
capacity to supplant aspects of the state, it is nonetheless the case that
INGOs have become significant global players whose agendas, interests
and actions are not primarily defined by the nation state. This chapter
will provide a theoretical framework in order to explore the cosmo-
politan values inherent to development INGOs engaged with northern
publics. The first part will explore different forms of cosmopolitanism
and how they relate to INGO ideals and practices. Cosmopolitan ideals,
however, along with INGOs, have come under criticism, and this will
be the focus of the second section. Finally, I will examine the different
ways forward for a cosmopolitan public engagement of development
INGOs.
Cosmopolitan frameworks
INGOs are inherently cosmopolitan organisations, engaging with their

constituents about distant others. Many of the authors discussed in
more detail in the following chapter have pointed out how mediation
of humanitarianism, and I would argue, the mediation of development,
is conducted through a cosmopolitan lens. Development practice, too,
is inherently cosmopolitan, and arguably developments INGOs are the
most cosmopolitan of all development actors. Development theory and
practice, as well as the INGOs involved in development, have an assumed
cosmopolitanism that is inherent in the north–south connections and
the redistributive ethos of care for distant strangers. Development INGOs
with their global presence and experts, their proclaimed commitments
Cosmopolitan Spaces of INGOs 37
to universal justice and rights and concern for the distant other, exem-
plify cosmopolitanism.
But what is this cosmopolitanism? Whilst the term has entered
common parlance during the last 15 years, it is not a new concept. The
idea of cosmopolitanism as philosophy or worldview draws on political
theory dating back to the Stoic thinkers, where it is commonly referred
to as the notion of a single world community. In the 18th century
Immanuel Kant took this to mean that all human beings are members
of a single moral community, regardless of social or political affilia-
tion. One term that seems to capture the essence of cosmopolitanism is
the relationship and connection with distant strangers (O’Neill, 1986).
Thomas Pogge (2002: 169) outlines three elements that are essential in
the universalism that cosmopolitans embrace. Individualism: the unit of
analysis is the human being rather than a group, community or country.
Universality: where concern is focused on every human being equally.
Generality: this special status has a global force – people are ultimately
units of concern for everyone, not only for their own compatriots.
If, as Lu argues, cosmopolitanism is fundamentally concerned with
humanity, justice and tolerance (Lu, 2000: 265), cosmopolitanism
requires its adherents to confront profound and complex challenges –
in particular, finding ethical ways to negotiate the universal and the
particular, the local and the global, the nearby and the distant. This
requires the development of capacities for deciding between multiple
affiliations and identities in which the local and familiar may not take
precedence. It also requires the establishment of the means for a demo-
cratic voice that goes beyond national political systems. So if we are
to explore the degree to which INGOs’ particular practices exemplify
cosmopolitanism, we need to identify the connections between INGOs
and the broader characteristics of cosmopolitanism.
Since the early 1990s there has been a resurgence in cosmopolitan
thought. Alongside this resurgence, there has also been significant crit-
icism of cosmopolitanism, some of which I will explore later in this
chapter. The increasing academic engagement with cosmopolitanism
can be illustrated by the vast array of prefixes and suffixes attached to
the word. For our purposes here, a cosmopolitan framework is helpful
when looking at the ways that INGOs engage with publics and position
themselves as agents of change. It enables INGO analysts to critically
assess the value basis of the politics that INGOs are utilising to engage
with their publics. Exploring INGO engagement through a cosmopolitan
lens makes evident certain tensions in which sometimes conflicting and
contradictory INGO practices take place, resulting in uncertainty and
ambivalence in the cosmopolitan visions of development (Yanacopulos

and Baillie Smith, 2007).
Cosmopolitans value all human beings equally. As one human does not
count any more than another, regardless of their nationality or geograph-
ical locale, a cosmopolitan has the same obligation to their next-door
neighbour as to someone they have never met who is living in a distant
place. Two fundamental questions arise in cosmopolitan discussions: can
we live peacefully with one another? and what do we share collectively
as human beings? (Vertovec and Cohen, 2002: 1) Both questions imply
potential obligations to the ‘distant stranger’ – which is a defining char-
acteristic of cosmopolitan ideals. But a challenge to this perspective is
focused on these moral obligations and distance – does an individual
have similar or different obligations to a family member, citizen of the
same country, or a person in a distant place? These are the fundamental
debates occurring around cosmopolitanism, generally with respect to
development, and more broadly around issues of global justice.
Cosmopolitanism frequently carries different meanings. Vertovec
and Cohen (2002: 8–22) outline six ways in which cosmopolitanism
is discussed as: a) a socio-cultural condition; b) a kind of philosophy or
worldview; c) a political project towards building transnational insti-
tutions; d) a political project for recognising multiple identities; e) an
attitudinal or dispositional orientation; and/or f) a mode of practice or
competence. Since the mid-1990s, prefaces to the term cosmopolitanism
have proliferated. These different cosmopolitan perspectives tend to
share Pogge’s three points of individualism, universality and generality.
Cosmopolitan perspectives can help us think about INGOs and the ways
these organisations engage with their publics on development issues,
particularly emphasising elements such as universalism, individuals’
responsibility beyond the territorially bound state to distant others.
There have been two prevailing and somewhat conflicting norms
of world politics since 1945, one based on the sanctity of the sover-
eignty of states and the other on individual human rights. Going back
to Vertovec and Cohen’s cosmopolitan typologies and Pogge’s elements
of cosmopolitanism, one can easily see that cosmopolitan-based organi-
sations such as INGOs favour a view based more on human rights.
Many INGOs, such as Oxfam and Action Aid adopted a ‘rights-based
approach’ to development, shifting away from a welfare model to one
where the INGO aims to empower the rights holder. Yet this approach is
not without its tensions and critics. For our purposes here, a rights-based
approach impacts on how INGOs relay messages to northern publics,
the focus of the following two chapters.
One useful element of cosmopolitanism is its emphasis on the

concept of responsibility. Those with more communitarian worldviews
would argue that their primary responsibility is to fellow citizens within
their state, and that they have a different and highly diminished level
of responsibility to those living outside it. However, a cosmopolitan
perspective emphasises responsibilities to all humans, regardless of
where they live – hence the concept of O’Neill’s distant stranger. A
cosmopolitan would recognise the needs of ‘distant strangers’ – as we
have repeatedly seen in most large INGO campaigns around droughts,
famines, and natural disasters – beyond their own national bounda-
ries. The calls for funding and action by development INGOs places the
responsibility to ‘do something’ on northern publics. Calling for some
form of intervention is a key emotional and practical element of most
INGO engagement appeals.
INGOs’ roles in shaping a global democracy are seen by some as signifying
their cosmopolitanism (Carey, 2003; Linklater, 2002). When set in opposi-
tion to the top-down nature of state governance and in terms of their early
support of participatory methodologies, INGOs, as part of civil society, have
often been considered as enhancing or deepening democracy. Although
INGOs’ democratic legitimacy and authority are also under considerable
scrutiny (Anderson and Rieff, 2004) they can be seen as relating to cosmo-
politan and global democracy in diverse ways, frequently associated with
ideas and ideals of global citizenship.1 Whilst acknowledging the prob-
lems of a responsibility, rather than a rights-based approach, due to the
lack of political community and common culture, Linklater suggests that
cosmopolitan citizenship is an important weapon in critiques of ‘exclu-
sionary forms of political community’, critiques which reject the assump-
tion that the welfare of co-nationals matters more than the welfare of more
geographically distant members of the human race. Judged by these criteria,
he argues, many INGOs can be regarded as the latter-day custodians of the
ideal of world citizenship (Linklater, 2002: 265).
Cosmopolitan values and INGOs
What are the key cosmopolitan values of INGOs? Or more specifically,

what are the various cosmopolitan values utilised by INGOs in their
constructions, mediations and representations of development? Before
beginning this discussion, it is important to briefly outline what is meant
by values in this context.
Values are guiding principles or standards of behaviour; they are
fundamental beliefs that shape and govern behaviour and action. In this
context, INGO values are the grounding for the organisation’s existence,
its communications and its operation. States have often tried to define
national values, such as ‘the American Dream’ or the idea of ‘freedom’,
that it believes its citizens should adhere to. However, although the
values are generated within historical contexts – in the American
context, for example, ‘freedom’ stems from a historical resistance to
being colonised – repetition creates a dominant discourse that remains
when the historical event or context has faded. Religious groups, too,
have deep sets of values, and we can see how these are clearly aligned
with those that have been influential in modern INGOs. For example,
charity is enshrined within Islam’s five pillars. The third pillar, zakat,
makes it compulsory to give 2.5 per cent of one’s annual income to
charity and to benefit the poor. This is seen as part of one’s worship and
self-purification, and does not refer to charitable gifts given out of kind-
ness and generosity. Rather it is systematic giving.2
Christian religions also share strong charity values, and a high propor-
tion of the most prominent development INGOs have clear and evident
religious backgrounds. Some INGOs have explicitly retained their reli-
gious focus, even as far as in their names – such as Christian Aid and
CAFOD. Others are very clearly and plainly Christian in their missions,
such as World Vision and CARE International. Even organisations that
are clearly secular now, such as Oxfam, were set up and supported by
Christian organisations, particularly the Quakers, who have influenced
the mores of household name INGOs.
Values, therefore, are regarded by their adherents as something of funda-
mental worth that are normally ‘good’ and are sustained as part of a domi-
nant cultural discourse. They are part of the ‘shared, learned, meaning
of culture that glues a collective together’. Two significant studies have
been conducted on values and frames in International Development. The
first was the ‘Common Cause’ study (Compton, 2010) and the second is
the ‘Finding Frames’ study (Darnton and Kirk, 2011). Both studies were
funded by INGOs interested in questions of better and deeper engage-
ment, and both studies are extremely relevant and will be discussed
throughout this chapter, as they are pivotal in analysing the role that
values play on the framing and operations of INGOs.
In both the Common Cause and the Finding Frames studies, there
were discussions about bigger-than-self problems, such as poverty. In
Common Cause, the writers highlight that the study builds on bigger-
than-self problems through understandings of the ways cultural values
affect peoples’ motivations and behaviours in demanding political
change. The study also explores a range of factors that activate and
strengthen some values over others, as well as how certain institu-

tions, such as business, governments and INGOs have strengthened
particular values in their campaigning, policies and communications
(Compton, 2010: 11).
But prior to addressing how values are used and framed, it is impor-
tant to understand and distinguish these values. Some (although not
all) of the specific values relating to INGOs and how they engage with
publics on issues of poverty and development are: pity, charity, justice
and solidarity.
Charity and pity

Charity and beneficence are both seen as admirable secular and religious
mores. Both are morally demanded by most major religions, and are
based on the principle of actions that can benefit or do well for others. In
some religions there is a moral obligation for charity. For many INGOs,
the idea of charity is driven by a sense of duty. The general awareness
of structural injustices within the (cosmopolitan) INGO community is
precisely what keeps them from a simple appreciation of hunger and
poverty as mere misfortune. However, in the communications of some
INGOs (discussed in later chapters), charity is conveyed on an emotional
level with no explanation as to the causes of the suffering. The poor
suffering children are not put into a context, leading the viewer to see
their situation as one caused by misfortune. This problem is outlined
by Lu, who suggests that charity results from the mistaken conception
of distant injustice as ‘misfortune’ (Lu, 2000: 262), thereby removing a
connection to the poor.
We can see this taking place in what Harrison (2010) calls the
‘Africanisation of poverty’. Africa has been constructed as the place
where charity takes place. Young (2012: 21) agrees and states that
charity campaigns representing Africa are frequently motivated by
short-term needs, and are emotive if not sensationalist. At worst, some
INGO campaigns not only suit the self-perpetuating fundraising of
INGOs (Desforges, 2004: 558), but also tie into the charity values which
have been perpetuated by the African ‘othering’ messages dating back
to colonialism. This is not to say that people working within these
INGOs and the INGOs themselves are not driven by a sense of duty and
responsibility to end the suffering, but that the messages the INGOs are
communicating to northern publics are very much based on inciting
an emotional response. As we will see later, INGOs get caught in using
approaches to northern publics that are likely to be quick and effec-
tive, particularly when a large-scale humanitarian disaster is looming. It
could be argued that in such instances, there is a clash of fundamental

values and that INGOs understandably tend to favour saving lives at the
expense of their enduring values and longer-term goals.
But what, many have asked, is wrong with charity? It is obviously
virtuous behaviour to want to help those in need; and the aim here
is not to diminish those admirable and generous acts. The critique of
charity is not that it does not help specific individuals, but that the
use of charity as a value – one which is at the core of INGO engage-
ment – fails to deal with the fundamental root causes of poverty and
inequality. One interviewee put it as: ‘charity is like putting a plaster
on a cancer’ (NGO112), as it does not address the underlying causes of
the problem. Additionally, charity not only establishes a relationship
between northern publics and the subjects of poverty that is paternal-
istic, it also perpetuates a paradigm where these subjects are looked upon
with pity. Martin Kirk describes the frame of charity as operating within
a comprehension of the world as it currently is, and he argues that this
understanding does not expand to radical or systemic change. He posits
that ‘“charity” is too small a frame; it fundamentally restricts the scale
of action offered or demanded to a scale incommensurate with the job
of alleviating poverty’ (Kirk, 2012: 248).
As Kirk (2012: 247–248) outlines, this prevailing charity paradigm
means that the agency in the relationship is located with the powerful
givers, where the receivers are seen as poor and powerless, where “the
poor” are understood as an undifferentiated group without intrinsic
strength, often referred to through the shorthand of “Africa,” where
nothing ever changes.’
One emotional response that lies behind the reaction and impulse of
charity is pity (Arendt, 1963; Chouliaraki, 2010; Schwittay and Boocock,
2015). Historically, in the context of development INGOs, victimhood
has inspired a sense of empathy and pity, and this has frequently been
deployed by many development INGOs as a fundraising mechanism.
While the majority of INGOs are well aware that the use of such images
is not benign and that the invocation of pity is detrimental in the long-
term, the images remain very effective at rising funds quickly. These
types of images are still used by a number of INGOs in their fundraising
and marketing, and we frequently see them during humanitarian emer-
gencies that demand funds to be raised rapidly.
Political philosophers have historically been interested in the concept
of pity. Durham Peters (2011: 443) outlines how Kant’s view of pity was
that it ‘was not an ethical virtue; it was a tactic of persuasion’; it over-
values the particular where a single face can captivate the news, which
ignores less dramatic yet systematic suffering.’ Hannah Arendt was also
concerned with the politics of pity, which according to her ‘distin-
guishes between those who suffer and those who do not. It encourages
one to focus on the spectacle of suffering, substituting action with
observation of the unfortunate’. Boltanski (1999: 13) outlines how
Arendt’s conceptualisation of the politics of pity draws attention to
the inherent problem of how we deal with suffering at a distance and
the ‘massification of a collection of unfortunates who are not there in
person’.
Following Arendt, Boltanski (1999: 33–34), too, differentiates between
a politics of pity and a politics of justice. Arendt (1963) refers to the
French Revolution in her book On Revolution, where people were divided
into the fortunate and unfortunate, whereby the spectator or onlooker
sees their misfortune as luck, or lack of luck, allowing them to feel an
emotional response of pity for those less fortunate. Arendt’s distinc-
tion between the politics of pity and the politics of justice is that the
politics of justice seek justification for an injustice. ‘People must be
positioned as victims to earn justice, while a politics of pity does not
question whether the misery of the unfortunate is justified’ (Boltanski,
1999: 5). By using Arendt’s distinction, Boltanski argues that the poli-
tics of justice are the ‘most potent way of relating and responding to
distant suffering in modern society. A politics of justice is meritocratic,
in that it is based on judging the merits of individuals, on separating the
deserving and the undeserving’ (Boltanski, 1999). Boltanski asks that we
introduce compassion into our politics. Unlike pity, compassion allows
us to engage with the person suffering (Boltanski, 1999).
Chouliaraki speaks of pity and irony as being the two tenets of human-
itarian communication, where both ‘fail to sustain a legitimate appeal
to action on vulnerable others’ and neither achieves proper distance, as
pity involves ‘arrogant proximity’ and irony ‘narcissistic self-distance’
(Chouliaraki, 2011: 373). Pity is the force behind the ‘negative’ imagery
we see in some INGO communications, relying on what Hoijer (2004)
describes as the construction of ‘ideal victims’ where some victims are
more worthy of our pity. Thus, in order for humanitarian communications
to generate the strongest response, victims must be seen as both innocent
and helpless (Hoijer, 2004). According to Cameron and Haanstra (2008:
1476), by relying on a victim-focused narrative, INGO campaigns ‘aim to
provoke feelings of guilt and pity in Western audiences through portrayals
of extreme material poverty and suffering’. This victim-focused approach
relies solely on the conditions of the victim or the sufferer, rather than
on the causes of that suffering, or the structural conditions leading to
the poverty. In other words, according to Scott (2014), in such ‘devel-

opment pornography’ approaches, documenting the reality of suffering
is given precedence over attempts to explain the complex, longer-term,
structural causes of suffering.3 These images of innocence and helpless-
ness are part of the prevailing infantilisation and feminisation of much
communication, which ties into this idea of pity within the development
and humanitarian sectors. Such images rely on guilt and pity by focusing
on the ‘raw reality’ of poverty; thus, images of powerless children appeal
to ‘parenting instincts of care and protection’ (Manzo, 2008: 650).
Guilt is related to pity, stemming from what Chouliaraki (2010:
111) calls a ‘logic of complicity’, where not acting in response to suffering
(such as that seen in an INGO advert) makes the viewer complicit in the
perpetuation of the suffering. Guilt arises from not taking action when
you know the suffering is taking place. Yet these guilt-driven appeals
may in fact have a different effect. Research conducted by Basil et al.
(2008: 3), which examined the guilt impulse used in charity appeals,
showed that the impact of guilt on donations was contingent on a
feeling of responsibility. However, as they went on to point out, high
levels of guilt may have the opposite reaction, leading to a reluctance to
donate because of feelings of being manipulated.
Appeals to empathy are frequently used along with guilt to make a
connection to the ‘sufferer’ and thereby increase donations. Empathy
involves putting oneself in the shoes of the sufferer, and ‘understanding
how the situation appears to that person and how that person is reacting
cognitively and emotionally to the situation’ (Granzin and Olsen, 1991).
When humanitarian organisations, such as INGOs, utilise empathy, guilt
and pity, they personalise the ‘sufferer’ thereby humanising the situa-
tion through relaying the experiences of those suffering. Young (2012:
17) states that donations double when people are asked to contribute to
an individual and are given personal details of their situation. He goes
on to outline that this finding is supported by Small and Verochi’s work,
in that ‘people “catch” the emotions displayed on a victim’s face and
they are particularly sympathetic and likely to donate when they see sad
expressions versus happy or neutral expressions.’
So why are INGO appeals to these emotions problematic? What is
wrong with pity, guilt and empathy if they mean that money is donated
to those suffering, thereby alleviating their poverty? How can such
reactions to donating to charity not help, let alone be a negative force
in the work of INGOs? As we have seen, victimhood inspires a sense
of empathy and pity, something that has been used as a fundraising
mechanism for decades, and as Lu (2000: 262) suggests, charity results
from the mistaken conception of distant injustice as ‘misfortune’. But

can the urge or impulse to alleviate poverty and suffering be a nega-
tive response? The answer is that such impulses and responses are prob-
lematic in many ways. By giving the personal information of the sad
and dirty child, we are objectifying that child – her life is interpreted
by an international agency. Also, the relationship that is constructed
and perpetuated through the INGO between the suffering child and the
generous giver is one that is paternalistic, where the child is grateful to
the viewer. And, perhaps most damagingly, the key problem is not dealt
with at all – why is the child poor? Why do such conditions exist? Why
is there such disparity between ‘us’ and ‘them’? Behind the individual’s
story, what are the structural problems at the root of such poverty and
inequality? Marza (in Young, 2012: 20) captures this in the following
statement: ‘dominant media images of the majority world promote
emotion without understanding, charity without structural change’.
Justice
In his description of the difference between charity and justice,
Lichtenberg (2004: 79) claims ‘charity is optional, justice is an obliga-
tion’. Whilst the value of justice has been fundamental to the work
of INGOs, it is only since the late 1990s that the term has been used
in INGO campaigning and advocacy. Ideas about distributive justice
date back to the 18th century and involve the notion that economic
inequalities require justifications, that justice is concerned with the allo-
cation of economic resources in a community, and that it is the respon-
sibility of government to reallocate those resources. Since the 1990s, the
academic discussions on justice, and the increased focus and framing
by social movements around justice, have led to a burgeoning literature
and debates in the field of global justice. Many elements of these debates
speak to the key issues of international development, such as equity,
fairness, the distribution of resources and thinking about justice beyond
the boundaries of individual states.
The key justice theorist of the 20th century is John Rawls. The funda-
mental elements of Rawls’ theory have great appeal to cosmopolitans as
it they are based on the idea of fairness. During the last decade, develop-
ment INGOs, social movements such as the Global Justice Movement,
and large-scale campaigns such as Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History,
have all loosely used a Rawlsian idea of justice. Whilst Rawls was writing
about justice within a state, other writers such as Pogge, Beitz and Nagel
dispute Rawls’ confinement of the theory to the domestic domain and
globalise his theory. Rawls’ theory of justice concerns itself with the
fundamental rights and duties within – as well as the determination of

advantages from – social cooperation. It is meant to equip existing forms
of social cooperation with principles for institutional design and is based
on the idea of justice as fairness, primarily with respect to distributive
justice – or the ways goods are distributed amongst the population. His
theory is founded on the assumption that human beings are rational,
and that given a hypothetical situation where individuals have to
choose the type of society they live in without knowing where in that
society they would be placed (what Rawls refers to as the ‘veil of igno-
rance’), most rational people would choose an equal and ‘fair’ society.
Rawls calls this the ‘original position’ where people would ensure that a
society was free and equal.
In ‘globalising’ Rawls’ theory of justice, contemporary cosmopolitan
thinkers ‘scale up’ the idea of all people counting equally – no one
person is worth more than any other, regardless of their nationality
or geography. Key to this is that proximity to or distance from others
should not influence the level of one’s responsibilities. Rather, we have
the same connections to distant others that we do to our family and
community, leading to a ‘shrinking of distance’ between ourselves and
the distant other. Additionally, cosmopolitanism and the increased
ability of people to travel has led to those in the affluent north being
more likely to witness poverty around the world, as well as allowing the
poor to see their own relative (and real) material conditions (Lichtenberg
2004: 76). This reduction of distance from the (increasingly less) ‘distant
stranger’ has been further helped by the work of development INGOs in
engaging with northern publics by recounting personal stories of poor
people in fundraising campaigns. The effect has been to remind people
of the closeness of the south to northern publics.
One of the fundamental challenges for development INGOs is to
create a bridge between those in the south to those in the north and the
way the problem of poverty is defined affects the type of engagement
they foster. For development INGOs, the fundamental issue is poverty,
why the poor are poor, and how this can be alleviated or eliminated.
As Lu (2000: 262) has argued, some see poverty as a distant injustice
and a ‘misfortune’, inspiring a reaction of charity. An alternative expla-
nation of poverty would be that international structures have caused
and continue to perpetuate poverty, and that it is difficult for devel-
oping countries and the people who live in them to break out of poverty.
Thomas Pogge (2004: 262) argues that the poor are at ‘their present levels
of social, economic, and cultural development through an historical
process that was pervaded by colonialism, even genocide.’ Whilst these
monumental crimes are historical, he claims that they ‘have left a legacy
of great inequalities which would be unacceptable even if peoples were
now masters of their own development’ (Pogge, 2004: 262).
Pogge’s argument is based on statistics that show that the level of
global inequality has more than doubled during the last ‘development
decades’, and that rich countries have benefited greatly from these rela-
tionships. If we follow Pogge’s argument, the logical outcome would be
that wealthy countries have a responsibility to poorer ones. Pogge’s argu-
ment is a moral one in which justice is fundamental. His conception of
justice and poverty is that it is important that international and global
structures change to rectify the unjust relations that currently exist.
During the last decade, we have seen an increased level of networking
amongst INGOs and civil society actors for the purpose of political mobi-
lisation around global justice (Yanacopulos, 2004). Not only have we
seen campaigns such as the Jubilee 2000 debt cancellation and Make
Poverty History campaigns adopting a ‘justice’ frame, but also individual
INGOs positioning issues and campaigns in terms of justice (Yanacopulos,
2009). Concurrently, there has been the development of a ‘global justice
movement’ springing out of various initiatives, such as the World Social
Forums. As I will explore in the following chapters, INGO advocacy,
lobbying and some forms of broad campaigning frequently use cosmo-
politan justice as the basis of their engagement with northern publics.
If we look at INGOs operating from an ethic of justice, and specifically
linking this to a sense of responsibility, then this responsibility – based
on the obligation to relieve a preventable or rectifiable injustice – leads
to ‘cosmopolitan emotions [which] are most likely to develop when
actors believe that they are causally responsible for harming others and
their physical environment’ (Linklater, 2006: 3). Causal responsibility
produces a stronger connection between people than do appeals to
membership of a common humanity, and it also takes us out of the
territory of beneficence and into the realm of justice. If I cause someone
harm, then I am required as a matter of justice to rectify that harm. If,
on the other hand, I bear no responsibility for the harm, justice requires
nothing of me – and although beneficence might be desirable I cannot
be held to account for not exercising it.
In addition to a lack of responsibility to those outside of the state
in question, Pogge identifies four common misconceptions of what he
terms a ‘purely domestic poverty thesis’, where the poor are exclusively
blamed for their own poverty. The domestic thesis appeals to people of
rich countries because: it is comfortable; the big differences between
individual countries in the developing world allow people to believe
the ‘failures’ can ‘pull up their socks’ like the ‘successes’; the obsession
with each individual country’s development trajectory obscures global
factors; and the prevalence of brutal and corrupt governments in poor
countries (Pogge, 2004: 266–268).
In the World Development Movement’s trade campaigns, the INGOs’
conception of ‘justice’ is linked to signifiers such as ‘people before
profits’, and a system that is ‘transparent, democratic and truly repre-
sentative’ (WDM, 2009). What exactly injustice entails in this respect is
not specified beyond unfair. Another example is War on Want’s use of
justice, which is primarily qualified through what it is not. In their view,
justice entails a system that is ‘not devastating to’, or does not func-
tion ‘at the expense of’ poor people, or foster ‘inequality’. Both of these
INGOs are thus similarly unclear in their explanations of what ‘justice’
means to them. (Uldam, 2010: 223)
Ideas around justice date back to Aristotle, yet debates on global
justice, as opposed to domestic justice (that within a state), have gained
academic interest relatively recently. Contemporary cosmopolitan
thinkers are concerned with three questions: who should be governed
by a global theory of distributive justice? What should be fairly distrib-
uted? How should goods be distributed? (Papaioannou et al., 2009).
Rawls’ conceptualisation of justice on a national level, his ideas of the
‘original position’ and the ‘veil of ignorance’ tie in closely with the
ways justice is broadly discussed within Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty
History. Crudely, ‘justice’ is presented as the opposite of unfairness; and
in globalising Rawls’ theory of justice, many justice thinkers scale up
the idea of all people counting equally – no one more than any other,
regardless of their nationality or geography.4
Many campaigns have started to use the terminology of justice, partic-
ularly after the Jubilee 2000 debt cancellation campaigns at the end of
the 1990s and the Make Poverty History / One campaigns in 2005. As
we will see in Chapter 6, these campaigns reframed issues of poverty and
inequality in terms of justice. They attempted to provide an alternative
explanation of poverty, highlighting how international structures have
caused and perpetuate poverty, and how it is difficult for developing
countries and the people who live in them to break out of this poverty.
It is an ‘injustice’ that there is poverty in the world and the way to
deal with the injustice is to bring justice back through campaigning.
These campaigns will be discussed in further detail, but what is evident
is that INGOs, whilst utilising the discourse of justice, have not been
very effective at translating their business model to one of justice. When
campaigns such as Make Poverty History shifted from a ‘justice not

charity’ cry, the result was lacklustre and ‘the transformative potential
offered by the rallying cry of “justice not charity” went unheard, in part
because it was unfamiliar and hard to comprehend, and also because it
was drowned out by the noise of celebrities, white wristbands and pop
concerts.’ (Darnton and Kirk, 2011: 6)
Yet not all practitioners and activists agree with the reviews of
the Make Poverty History campaigns. As the Director of Advocacy
from one of the BOAG INGOs stated of the Make Poverty History
campaign, ‘the words should have been, this isn’t about charity it’s
about charity and justice. That would have been a better formulation,
but to polarise it into suggesting that acts of charity are somehow
to be denigrated was in the end, not helpful and very confusing to
people’ (NGO111).
Ambivalent cosmopolitanism
Utilising a cosmopolitan framework enables us to investigate INGOs’

engagement with their constituents as well as to look at future alter-
natives they might offer and the future of INGOs themselves. One
source of ambivalence for INGOs is in defining the very nature of
‘the problem’, highlighted by Pogge (2004: 262) when he claims that
a fundamental moral error in analysing world poverty is that citizens
of the rich countries should be potential helpers of the poor. As we
have seen, this impulse implies that the causes of poverty are either
domestic or due to an unfortunate bad luck situation. The identifica-
tion of the problem – the causes of poverty – is problematic when the
‘the problem’ is outlined or framed as being internal to those coun-
tries themselves. Generally, causes such as war, corruption, overpopula-
tion and bad leaders are identified as the reasons why poverty exists.
Darnton and Kirk’s (2011: 6) Finding Frames study outlined this para-
digm as being the ‘Live Aid Legacy, characterised by the relationship
of “Powerful Giver” and “Grateful Receiver” ... and Public perceptions
have been stuck in this frame for 25 years.’
Whilst many may agree with Pogge’s analysis, it is still all too easy to
block out suffering – to turn over from a channel when it is exposed to
us. This is an easy reaction to have, particularly as we do not necessarily
feel we have much in common with the people whose suffering we turn
away from. Add to this a myriad of ways to escape responsibility – such
as a distorted perception of how much is actually spent on bilateral
foreign aid – and we find that distance can reduce our level of connec-
tion to a distant stranger, particularly when it comes to long-term devel-
opment as opposed to chronic crises such as earthquakes and famines
(Lichtenberg, 2004: 86–87). Instead responsibility is diffused and we can
tell ourselves that others will take care of it.
Some (for example Lupel, 2003: 27) argue that part of the problem is
that INGOs lack a clear constituency with whom to engage in dialogue:
‘NGOs at the global level can be very large organisations highly removed
from any basic social or political community.’ As a result, their policies
are a ‘product of specialized professionals and not public deliberation’.
This indicates a degree of ambivalence in relation to what could be seen
as a foundational element of cosmopolitanism – the democratic establish-
ment of universal values. It also undermines INGOs’ capacity to counter
criticisms of elitism. If cosmopolitanism remains in the realm of ‘abstract
universal obligations at the expense of concrete particular loyalties and
affiliations’ (Lu, 2000: 249), then it is only likely to exist amongst ‘persons
whom fortune has relieved from the immediate struggle for existence
and from pressing social responsibility and who can afford to indulge
their fads and enthusiasms’ (Boehm cited in Lu, 2000: 250).
And yet a cosmopolitan ethic, where distance does not negate a
responsibility to become involved, still offers some hope. This hope, even
though it is ambivalent when adopted by INGOs, relates to the ways
that connections are constructed, mediated and represented between the
minority and majority world. The normative hope is that such connec-
tions are made on the basis of human compassion and solidarity.
Cosmopolitan INGO critiques
We have seen that a cosmopolitan engagement is based on moral imper-

atives. However, the colloquial use of the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ can
mean ‘worldly’, ‘foreign’, or at worst ‘ethnic’ (meaning the ethnicity of
the ‘other’). Given the increased border crossings of people, the rich-
ness of cultures in many large urban centres, and the availability of
goods from across the world, this type of cosmopolitanism has been
described by Ulrich Beck (2006) as banal. Banal cosmopolitanism,
made increasingly possible through electronic communication, global
trade, and migration, is described by Beck as being based on cultural
consumption and media representation. We find world music, exotic
foods and ‘ethnic’ clothing in our day-to-day lives. According to Beck
(2006: 19) this banal cosmopolitanism is passive and is a side effect of
globalisation.
Banal cosmopolitanism has also entered INGO practices and we can

find numerous illustrations of this. One example is fairly traded goods.
First – to start with a caveat – this is not intended as a criticism of the
idea of fair trade, the benefits of fair trade, or the organisations that
support and enable fairly traded goods. Of particular interest here are
the ways in which INGOs engage with publics over fairly traded goods.
In her article on the public face of fairly traded coffee, Caroline Wright
(2004) explores the ways that fair trade coffee is presented to northern
consumers. She argues that whilst there is a focus on the ethical nature
of fair trade in advertising for Café Direct coffee, there is also a focus
on ‘perpetuating consumer lifestyles prioritising self-gratification.
Moreover, that the lives and landscapes of the majority world are
consumables in their own right, alongside cash crops.’ She argues that
whilst ‘the campaign may encourage respect for difference, in the name
of fairness or through invoking common human concerns, it simultane-
ously invites a consumption of difference confirming the “superiority”
of the minority world consumer.’ (Wright 2004: 678–679) This is what
Lidchi (cited in Cohen, 2001: 179) has called ‘consumer aid’.
Another critique of the ways in which INGOs are cosmopolitan
through their obligation to intervene is termed colonial cosmopoli-
tanism. Van der Veer (2002: 166) describes cosmopolitanism as western
colonial engagement with the rest of the world that simultaneously tran-
scends national boundaries and is tied to them. Critics of this type of
colonial cosmopolitanism argue that far from being from nowhere and
expressing universal values, cosmopolitanism is a western liberal idea.
If this is the case, then interventions can be characterised as colonial in
their imposing of external value systems as part of a process of domina-
tion and appropriation. Cosmopolitanism, then, has roots in modernity
and colonialism and engages with the ‘other’ in order to shape it in the
image of the ‘self’ (van der Veer, 2002: 168). Arguably, this means that
cosmopolitanism cannot be an ethical project.
This criticism mirrors some of the debates currently taking place
amongst academics and some INGOs, where some of the large INGOs are
accused of being colonial. Colonial cosmopolitanism also captures key
tensions in how INGOs engage with publics, bringing out the opposition
between the universal and the particular of development in the ways it
is represented. The ‘distant stranger’, therefore, is defined through first-
world eyes. Hannerz (1996: 103) proposes that whilst cosmopolitanism
is ‘an orientation (with) a willingness to engage with the other’, it is the
assumed subjectivity of the other that is the problem. Within develop-
ment, what and who is identified as different or the same is often located
within, and articulated from, particular (Western/colonial) subject posi-

tions (Kothari, 2005). Hall captures this perspective in his request for
what he calls a ‘vernacular cosmopolitanism’, ‘that is aware of the limi-
tations of any one culture or any one identity and that is radically aware
of its insufficiency in governing a wider society’ (Hall, 2002: 30).
Another criticism of cosmopolitanism is based on its commodifica-
tion, which is closely tied to the principle of charity. INGO develop-
ment engagement with northern publics could be seen as perpetuating
a relationship between northern publics and people who are the devel-
opment subjects. The risk is that the values of cosmopolitanism link
to values of individualism and consumerism. There are many examples
of development practices where ‘poor’ and ‘sad-looking’ individuals
are both objectified and commodified through child sponsorship in a
pornographic way. Such commodification fits well with the perspective
of giving someone a chance through no action other than sending a
cheque. If the child / community / school / famine can have a human
face, all the better for raising funds. Whilst many INGOs are well aware
of fostering such problematic relationships between their constituents
in the north and people in the south, and have stopped using such
images (although not all have), images of sad children are only the tip
of the engagement iceberg.
In a sense, one of the biggest dilemmas for some INGOs is how to raise
large amounts of funds without offering undignified images of people
in the south, but also not just asking for money as the only response to
their plight, and how to use positive images and yet still inspire people
to donate to their cause. One approach during the last few years has
been for INGOs to commodify elements of development – not the poor,
but animals and goods. Thus ‘buying a goat’ for Christmas has become
increasingly popular and an effective method of INGO fundraising. The
big UK INGOs all have either animals such as goats, yaks and chickens,
or tangible goods such as a latrine, a well or a school that they offer to
northern publics in a catalogue at Christmas. This very clever approach
to a commodified cosmopolitanism addresses the criticism of objecti-
fying the poor by instead commodifying elements of development to
raise funds.
This points to a fundamental dilemma for both INGOs and cosmo-
politanism relating to the balance between expressing and supporting
universal values and providing space for their identification and devel-
opment. On a functional level, INGOs are faced with very practical
tensions, one of which is funding. Even the most aspirationally cosmo-
politan INGO will have to obtain funding for its operations, and this can
present different challenges in how the INGO engages with the varied
needs and interests of its different constituencies. INGO attempts to artic-
ulate alternatives are strongly circumscribed by their being embedded
within a neoliberal aid system and by needing to draw support from
constituencies in the north whose lives are defined by highly commodi-
fied forms of consumption.
Solidaristic cosmopolitanism
Whilst development INGOs are inherently cosmopolitan, we have seen
that cosmopolitanism is ambivalent in the form it takes, and subse-
quently how it is relayed to northern publics. The Make Poverty History
campaign, which is explored in Chapter 6, is a good example of this
ambivalence at work. On one level, the campaign emphasises the
capacity of civil society and INGOs to exert political power beyond the
nation state, targeting the G8 when they met in Scotland. It also made
it impossible, through the media and political pressure, to ignore the
‘other’. By explicitly rejecting fundraising and emphasising the need for
justice, the campaign went some way towards challenging distance and
the idea that the poor are poor due to misfortune. On the other hand,
it has been suggested that many of the supporters understood very little
of the campaign objectives (Baggini, 2005), with additional criticism of
the associated wearing of a white band as a fashion statement rather
than a political one. We could view this as an uneasy mix between
democratic and banal cosmopolitanism. It would seem to underline
Calhoun’s argument that INGOs rely on ‘categorical identification’ –
‘cultural framings of similarity among people’ (Calhoun, 2001: 25) – to
engender solidarity. He argues that within international civil society,
few of these identities are linked to ‘strong organizations of either
power or community at a transnational level’, meaning that interna-
tional civil society ‘offers a weak counterweight to a systemic integra-
tion and power’ (Calhoun, 2001: 29). Make Poverty History could also
be seen more dynamically, exemplifying Tomlinson’s (2002: 253) argu-
ment that the cultural openness engendered by a global consumer
culture needs to be built and shaped ‘in the direction of consensually
emergent global solidarities.’
Paulo Freire (1970) wrote about solidarity in his book, Pedagogy of the
Oppressed. In this book, he outlines that any attempts to change the
situation of the oppressed for the better must address the unjust social
order of that situation. He argued: ‘true generosity consists precisely in
fighting to destroy the causes that nourish false charity. False charity
constrains the fearful and subdued’, and preserves the existing order
(Freire, 2001: 45). In relating this comment to the work of INGOs, a

more sceptical analyst could argue that their lack of full engagement
with northern publics has in some situations led to a system of ‘false
charity’ where the reasons for the unjust social order are not examined.
While these might seem harsh criticisms, Freire’s analysis provides a
strong argument for development agencies to create deeper northern
engagement around the reasons behind poverty and to foster more soli-
daristic relationships between the north and the south.
In emphasising solidarity, Calhoun (2002: 92) argues that a cosmo-
politanism that pays attention to peoples’ commitment to each other is
articulated with locality, community and tradition, and not simply as a
matter of common denominators. He claims that it will depend to a very
large extent on local and particularistic border crossings and pluralisms,
not universalism. In his view, to further the cosmopolitan project there
is a need to look at the ways in which cosmopolitan values, commit-
ments and aspirations can be and are rooted in local institutions, groups
and networks (Calhoun, 2002: 107).
The establishment of new transnational political communities, the
formation of what Carey (2003) describes as the ‘formation of transna-
tional bonds among humankind through the construct of NGOs’ can
be seen in terms of the extension of global citizenship rights to INGOs.
One way of examining the work of INGOs and their position within
international politics is by seeing them as being key in cosmopolitan
democratic structures (Calhoun, 2002: 94). Notwithstanding difficul-
ties around notions of global political communities and the viability of
citizenship outside the confines of the nation state, one dimension of
INGOs’ connections to cosmopolitan democracy comes through their
association with forms and ideas of global citizenship. A second way
in which INGOs are aligned with cosmopolitan democracy is through
their role as ‘key players in the development of a worldwide public
sphere’ (Linklater, 2002: 265). By their very existence, and as part of
an emergent global civil society, INGOs are contributing to the forma-
tion of political spaces that go beyond the nation state. This is signifi-
cant, as Carey (2003) highlights for two reasons. First, a commitment to
spread and promote democratic values (as also discussed in Halpin and
McLaverty (2010)), and second, ‘NGOs are also indirectly responsible for
propounding democratic ideals by virtue of the process of giving voice
to ordinary citizens of the world, thus facilitating the construction of a
more cosmopolitan and democratic world order’ Carey (2003).
The ‘Finding Frames’ study was pivotal in exploring the relationship
between values and frames and how they relate to INGOs. In this study,
Darnton and Kirk (2011) do not suggest individuals require a new set of
values, but that ‘transformational change’ can be achieved by reinforcing

positive values already held. A senior employee of one the BOAG INGOs
highlights the role of values in relation to change: ‘All of us are always
going to hold lots of different contradictory values, but it’s which ones
we feel represent who we want to be in that struggle for self-realisation
that are profoundly important. And that’s how we eventually make
long-term change happen because we have to create political space for
our leaders and our elites to move into and we also have to push and
challenge those same groups to move into that space’ (NGO111).
Darnton and Kirk’s analysis is in line with this perspective; they
propose that transformational change can occur by increasing the level
of importance of some values over others. In addition they highlight
a number of studies that show that there are different types of values,
including values related to self-interest, as well as values that are more
self-transcendent. They cite evidence that if self-enhancing values such
as power, achievement and hedonism are encouraged, other values such
as universalism and benevolence are suppressed. The result is that the
‘social and political scales are tipped significantly against the emergence
of the systemic changes NGOs are interested in’ (Darnton and Kirk, 2011:
9). Thus their argument is that the INGO sector’s public engagement
should appeal to people’s self-transcendent motivations rather than their
self-interest. If INGOs appeal to people’s motivations of self-interest,
then people will become more self-interested and not support pro-social
campaigns in the future (Darnton and Kirk, 2011: 6). This idea chimes
well with a solidaristic cosmopolitanism that develops solidarity between
people in the global north and those in the global south.
There is another perspective on the reasons behind why such cosmo-
politan tendencies have evolved in modern societies. Authors such as
Tomlinson (1999: 204) claim that in modern societies, cosmopolitanism
is individualistic in the sense that the development of a self-identity is
contingent on reflexive relationships with others. Thus for Tomlinson,
to act in one’s own self-interest is not necessarily to do so in a narrowly
utilitarian way, but instead involves the self-justification that comes
from acts of mutuality. Moral engagement thus becomes less a case of
the formal rational commitment to a set of abstract ideals and responsi-
bilities, than an act of self-fulfilment (Vestergaard, 2011: 30).
Frames and values
Frames are dynamic and continuously negotiated and they must be

broad and inclusive to allow for mass mobilisation (Goffman, 1986;
Benford and Snow, 2000). More precisely, Klandermans (1997: 45)
describes the construction of collective action frames as involving

‘public discourse – the interface of media discourse and interpersonal
interaction; persuasive communication during mobilisation campaigns
by movement organizations, their opponents and countermovement
organizations; and consciousness raising during episodes of collective
action.’5 The collective action frame which is typical in social move-
ments requires the identification of a clear injustice, as well as the
distinction between those who are concerned about the injustice, ‘us’,
and those whose views differ from ours, the ‘them’ (Gamson, 1992).
According to Gamson, frames are constructed, and the shared mean-
ings arising from them are negotiated and renegotiated. Some frames
may work at a particular point in time and in different spaces, and
frames are used to construct boundaries for certain issues, as well as
interrelationships among actors in discursive communities (Guo et al.,
2012: 1920).
A multitude of studies, documented by Benford and Snow, have
focused on different elements of framing, many utilising an ‘injustice
frame’, which supports Gamson et al.’s idea of the use of the injustice
frame ‘as a mode of interpretation – prefatory to collective noncompli-
ance, protest, and/or rebellion – generated and adopted by those who
come to define the actions of an authority as unjust’ (Benford and Snow,
2000: 615). In the case of the Jubilee 2000 campaign, the justice frame
played a pivotal role in the creation of the highly effective network-of-
networks structure of the campaign (Yanacopulos, 2004; 2009). Similarly,
the Make Poverty History campaigners learned from the debt campaigns
as well as from the trade justice campaigns that the justice frame was an
exceptionally effective mobilisation tool.
The term ‘framing’ is used by practitioners as well as by academics
and two seminal reports were produced on the subject. The first,
‘Common Cause’ (Compton, 2010), was funded by a number of envi-
ronment and development INGOs, with WWF leading the process. The
other, previously mentioned, is ‘Finding Frames’ (Darnton and Kirk,
2011), which also involved a number of INGOs, with Oxfam leading
the process. Both reports examined the process of framing and how
it linked to values, engagement and messaging, and how in turn this
was relevant to INGOs, utilising the work of the cognitive linguist
George Lakoff. The Common Cause report explains that framing is not
necessarily about getting the message right, but that the message is an
activator of particular, already existing deep frames. The authors distin-
guish between the process of the activation of the frames, which can
be done by simply using a few words, and the process that strengthens
the frames, pointing out that the more the frame is activated, the easier
it becomes to strengthen (Compton, 2010: 12). Lakoff (2006) distin-
guishes between different types of frames. Deep frames are the most
basic frames and constitute a worldview or a political philosophy, and
define one’s ‘common sense’. Other frames, such as ‘surface’ or ‘cogni-
tive’ frames activate and depend on deep frames, and without deep
frames, there is ‘nothing for surface frames to hang onto. Slogans [such
as “war on terror”] do not make sense without the appropriate deep
frames in place’ (Lakoff, 2006: 29).
The role of INGOs here is key. INGOs, as we have seen in this chapter,
utilise spaces of engagement to communicate with their constituents,
both their supporters and the general public. The ways that INGOs frame
their messages, the ways that these frames resonate with values, and the
linking between such values and actions are core to the work of most
development INGOs. Frames make events meaningful and function to
organise experiences and direct actions; ‘frames are action-oriented sets
of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and
campaigns’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: 614).
Yet as the Finding Frames (Darnton and Kirk, 2011: 8) report outlines,
there are fundamental problems involved in how many INGOs utilise
particular surface frames that activate the deep frames around global
poverty:
Applying frames theory, it is striking that some of the words that

should be avoided are found right at the heart of how the develop-
ment sector describes itself – words such as development, aid and
charity. To take just the first of these, ‘development’ is a problem
because it activates the ‘moral order’ deep frame in which ‘unde-
veloped’ nations are like backward children who can only grow up
(develop) by following the lessons given by ‘adult’ nations higher
up the moral order. Getting the surface framing right is part of this
transformational process of change.
A number of the INGOs interviewed mentioned the findings from the

Finding Frames study. One Director of Campaigns from a BOAG INGO
stated:
This isn’t about trying to change peoples’ values, it’s about stressing a
set of values that we think in the end are absolutely vital to the long-
term prosperity of everybody on this planet. It’s about activating and
strengthening those values rather than changing people’s values. All
of us are always going to hold lots of different contradictory values,

but it’s which ones we feel represent who we want to be in that
struggle that is profoundly important. (NGO111)
The disappointment around the lack of take-up of recommenda-

tions amongst a number of INGO employees interviewed was notable
(NGO111, NGO117, NGO119, NGO121and ING133). John Hilary (2013:
16), the Director of an NGO, expresses this dissatisfaction when stating,
‘frustrated at the unwillingness of the larger NGOs to follow through on
the recommendations of Finding Frames, a group of senior representa-
tives from campaigning NGOs and trade unions formed the Progressive
Development Forum in 2012 so as to create a space to challenge the
dominant discourse on global justice issues in the British context.’
What is clear is that many working in the INGO sector see the imple-
mentation of the finding from the Finding Frames study as being a
herculean task. As one INGO key employee stated, ‘The Finding Frames
argument is fighting all 1,000 charity shops in the UK – that’s the force
of the opposite argument, and 90 per cent of TV adverts are pushing in
the opposite direction with an existing opposite frame. So they are so
outgunning progressive voices.’ (NGO122) This same interviewee also
emphasised their frustrations with the ways that their organisation and
other BOAG INGOs were confusing the two frames – the charity frame
and the justice frame – in their engagement with publics in the global
north. They stated that:
What I object to is when you confuse the two. When you say on
the one hand, we’re going to promote a charity- focused message
about saving one life and being a sticking plaster in a humanitarian
response, and confusing that, with big structural systemic change.
Because the two are just different. As long as the public mind is
bombarded with a charity approach, the justice approach will not be
heard. ... [the charity frame] is obscuring the true horror of the system
because [INGOs are saying] it can be solved with a 2 pound a month
donation. (NGO122)
Conclusion
We started our discussion with cosmopolitanism, which requires

the confronting of profound and complex challenges. As outlined,
cosmopolitanism is concerned with finding ethical ways to negotiate
the universal and the particular, local and global, nearby and distant.
INGOs, meanwhile, work in sometimes contradictory and frequently

tensioned ways, expressing a range of values, working across and within
different national boundaries and expressing varying commitments to
diverse forms of democracy. Thus, the purpose of this chapter has been
to explore the relationship between cosmopolitanism and development
INGOs and, more specifically, the ambivalent relationships that INGOs
have in engaging their publics and the different forms of cosmopoli-
tanism that they relate to. It is important to understand these ambivalent
relationships with respect to the ways INGOs communicate and engage
northern publics on development issues. As discussed, in utilising a
cosmopolitan framework, this enables us to investigate INGOs’ engage-
ment with their constituents as well as looking at future alternatives
INGOs can offer and the future of INGOs themselves. Whilst there is
a strong degree of ambivalence in INGOs’ cosmopolitanism, as we will
see in the following chapters, the different elements of INGOs’ work
strongly resonate with different cosmopolitan ideals at the same time as
they unsettle other aspects. The contradictions within and between the
different areas of work add to the complexity.
When these values are used to enact frames, we start to see the prob-
lems with charity frames and the ways that they construct relation-
ships between the global north and the global south. Frequently, as is
captured by Owen Tudor from the Trade Union Congress, the issue of
development is framed in a way that denotes that the industrial world
can solve the problems of global poverty, but the victims cannot solve
their own problems. The charity frame he is describing is an ‘only mildly
updated version of the 19th century imperialist “white man’s burden”
that ignores the political dimensions of global poverty’ (Tudor, 2013).
This charity frame is pivotal in how INGOs engage publics, the focus
of the next chapter. The frame and the consequent forms of engaging
northern publics is outlined by Martin Kirk, formerly of Oxfam:
So long as people are saved, does the motivation of the donor really
matter? When placed in a longer-term context, however, the ques-
tion looks very different. If, as the mounting evidence suggests, one
of the barriers to systemic change is the ubiquity of the charity frame
and the values of individualist power and achievement that underpin
it, then anything that validates and strengthens that frame and those
values becomes profoundly problematic. (Kirk, 2012: 256)
4
INGO Spaces of Engagement
How are development INGOs connecting and engaging with their

publics? To some, such questions may appear extraneous to the ‘real
work’ of INGOs. Shouldn’t we be more concerned about how develop-
ment INGOs help those in need, whether at home or abroad? Shouldn’t
we be concerned about providing water and food in humanitarian crises?
Shouldn’t we be concerned about making sure that ‘the poor’ are able
to participate in their own futures and have access to health, education
and other basic services? I would propose that the answer to all these
questions should be ‘yes’, yet to do these things development INGOs
need to tell the story about ‘the poor’ to individuals, other organisa-
tions and government agencies. And they need to do so for a variety of
reasons, including fundraising, awareness raising, development educa-
tion, organisational branding and advocacy.
The ways that NGOs engage with northern publics lies at the heart of
their future, and it is because of the ambiguous relationships between
the public and INGOs that INGOs have been struggling to carry out
their work (Yanacopulos and Baillie Smith, 2007; Darnton and Kirk,
2011; Scott, 2014). That engagement with publics is vital to the core
work of INGOs has become increasingly evident as challenges have
arisen not only around legitimacy and accountability, but also around
issues such as the ‘aid debate’ and ‘compassion fatigue’. Many are
asking ‘if we didn’t succeed in making poverty history, why should
we keep on trying?’, which has increased the challenges to the inter-
national aid paradigm (Sorensen, 2010; Moyo, 2010). Simultaneously,
some INGOs have reverted to the ‘traditional’ depictions of poor people
in the south, causing division within the sector itself. In response,
calls within the sector (for example on the Progressive Development
blog, or at the BOND 2013 AGM) demanding the re-politicisation of
60
INGO Spaces of Engagement 61
development INGOs have become more common. It seems to be a key

moment amongst INGO practitioners to carry out some self-reflection
and some criticism as well as some business as usual. For those of us
studying NGOs, meanwhile, it is a key opportunity to rethink the role,
efficacy and impact of the sector; a time to rethink how INGOs can be
agents of change.
Following on from this, it is crucial to identify the relationships that
INGOs have with northern publics for three reasons. First, INGOs are
one of the primary sources of the construction, mediation and represen-
tation of the global south for most people in the global north, through
fundraising, development education and advocacy.1 Second, INGOs
are organisations that depend on engaging with publics if they are to
do their jobs. Third, INGOs have new political spaces at their disposal
where they can engage publics to achieve their aims of being ‘agents
of change’. As Andrew Darnton and Martin Kirk outline in their well-
researched report, Finding Frames, ‘Public engagement matters because
the UK public has a vital role to play in tackling global poverty.’ The UK
public allows INGOs and governments to take action on global poverty
because individuals make a difference through everyday actions such as
volunteering or purchasing choices, and because public support opens
up a debate that then allows governments to make systemic changes.
(Kirk and Darnton, 2011: 5)
Engagement is pivotal in the functioning of INGOs, which are outward-
looking organisations based on certain values. In the case of develop-
ment INGOs, the values are focused around inequality, suffering, justice,
care, helping, and changing situations – invariably somewhere ‘over
there’. The point of these INGOs is to help people, and the differences
within the INGO sector are based on how that help happens. Whether
it is through raising funds to feed a starving baby or through inciting
people to lobby their MP, generally it involves speaking to and engaging
with publics.
There are, however, questions around levels of public engagement in
development. As Darnton and Kirk (2011: 5) argue, the UK public has no
better an understanding and is no more engaged than it was in the 1980s.
This is shocking given the global campaigns of the 1990s and 2000s, the
focus on the MDGs, and the large amounts that INGOs have invested in
engaging and educating the public. In addition it has been shown that
following a large spike in consciousness during a global event such as
the Make Poverty History campaign, engagement around development
quickly drops back to its former levels. Many, including Darnton and
Kirk, have argued for a deeper public understanding of development
issues. Yet, even though money has been invested in engaging with
publics in a multitude of ways, if the depth of public knowledge of devel-
opment issues remains at the same level as it was in the 1980s, then
INGOs are not getting engagement right. As Darnton and Kirk (2011:
9) state, ‘The development sector will need to come together if we are
to find a way to break the current lock-in of public engagement.’ Or as
Sabine Lang (2013: 4) states, ‘If we assume that NGOs speak for broader
public interests, then they must draw legitimacy from communicating
in the public sphere ... NGO legitimacy rests on the sector’s capacity to
generate and sustain publics.’
Public engagement in the UK has become a hot topic within both
the donor and the INGO community. But what does the term mean
and who are the publics that need to be engaged? Within academia,
some work has been done on the issue of public engagement in both
the fields of Development Studies and International Relations. As seen
in the previous chapter, there has also been significant work done on the
subject by development practitioners.
So what do we mean by publics? Mahoney et al. (2010: 2) provide
a compelling analysis of publics starting with the assumption that
publics should not be thought of as ‘a pre-existing collective subject
that straightforwardly expresses itself or offers itself up to be repre-
sented. Rather ... how publics, in the plural, are called into existence
or summoned’. They continue to discuss how publics emerge, ‘around
particular objects of concern, that is around specific issues ... . Rather
than thinking of these as the already constituted citizens of a territo-
rial nation state, or as the idealised deliberators of rational conversa-
tion ... [they are] actors whose ongoing practices shape and sustain the
spaces and sites of publicness’ (Mahoney et al., 2010: 2–3). As consumers
of information, publics are not simply passive receivers of informa-
tion, there to be educated, but are fully aware of the aims and validity
of media content, and able to utilise their critical abilities. According
to Bakir and Barlow (2007), the increase in political and corporate
PR means that the mediated public sphere is seen more as a space for
manipulation than a space for the negotiation of public opinion. As
Vestergaard (2011: 101) highlights, the level of the publics’ distrust of
mediated messages is a key challenge for humanitarian organisations,
which must make use of the media. She claims that the results of this
mediation, the ‘agenda setting, the staging of action, commercialized
communication strategies etc. – is likely to cause scepticism as to the
sincerity of humanitarian communication and ultimately perhaps, the
humanitarian cause.’
Public engagement is thus more than simply imparting information

and knowledge to publics, rather it is a discussion between organisa-
tions (in this case development INGOs) and both their constituencies
and a broader audience. Although finding effective ways to engage
and ‘educate’ publics is key to these interactions, so too are the ways
that INGOs mediate development, and how this is interpreted by their
publics.
A further question is why all this work around public engagement
is taking place now. Why is the development sector in general, and
the INGO sector in particular, worried about how much engagement
is taking place around development? A cynical response might be that
due to the rise of the development INGO sector, and the questioning of
the role of the north in the development process, there is an existen-
tial quest for the development INGO community to reconfigure and
reframe its place in the development process. If northern INGOs should
write themselves out of a job, as Alison Van Rooy (2000) suggests, and if
we are to speak of empowerment and of ‘teaching a man to fish’ (with
a built-in assumption that the man didn’t know how to fish in the first
place!), then where does that leave the role of northern INGOs?
Within the academic International Development literature, more
work needs to be done on how INGOs engage with publics, and this
work should not be relegated to just the media and development litera-
ture, but must be seen as pivotal to conceptualisations of International
Development as whole. This chapter will examine some of the existing
understanding and interest in this area, commencing with an elabo-
ration of the ‘public faces of development’ (Smith and Yanacopulos,
2004) as a starting point of public engagement. The growth of organisa-
tions and individuals involved in development, together with shifting
ideas of development and new communications possibilities, have
presented increasingly complex forms of engagement between INGOs
and northern publics. It is the types of relationships forged between
individuals and communities in the north, and poor individuals and
communities in the south, and the ways these relationships are medi-
ated and produced by INGOs that will now be explored.
Public engagement in development
Why is it important to examine the ways that INGOs engage with their
constituents or with northern publics? At the heart of the multitude of
ways in which most development INGOs engage with their northern
publics – be these fundraising, awareness raising, campaigning,
development education or advocacy – lies a vital relationship. The

INGOs act as an intermediary between north and south, between the
‘wealthy’ and the ‘poor’, between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This is particularly
the case for those INGOs who are not exclusively service delivery organi-
sations and who thus rely on public support and public funds. As Orgad
(2012) states, their role is to reduce the spaces between ‘us’ (those in the
global north) and ‘them’ (those in the global south). To fully understand
the engagement of INGOs, we must first examine the rich field of studies
and analysis on public engagement in development more broadly.
Although large-scale public perception studies with respect to devel-
opment are nothing new, it does seem that during the 2000s there have
been many more of them. In all these studies, however, and indeed with
any examination of how public perceptions are formed, there are prob-
lems in identifying causal factors. Because public perceptions can be
shaped by so many factors, particularly in a field as complex as develop-
ment, it is extremely difficult to track changes to one particular event
or campaign. This is one of the reasons why large longitudinal studies,
such as those conducted by the UK government, are helpful in iden-
tifying trends in public perceptions. In addition, more recent studies
conducted by INGOs and government agencies which focus on public
awareness of development issues, the impact of campaigns, and the
effects of ‘old’ (specifically television and film) and ‘new’ (internet and
social networking) media will be reviewed in this section.
So what have these studies been telling us and why have there been so
many of them? Although the primary focus of this investigation is within
the UK, is this interest in public perceptions simply a UK phenomenon,
a leftover of colonial guilt, or is it a reflection of a global rethinking of
the role of the global north in development? There are many ways to
categorise studies around the relationship of publics to development.
Many of the studies originated with donor agencies, looking at ways to
garner public support in a climate of budgetary cuts. During 1997–2010,
for example, DfID invested heavily in public engagement and public
awareness, with programmes to fund development education, develop-
ment awareness, and media funding. Since 2010, however, most of these
programmes have been cancelled, as the international development
budget remained protected from cuts. INGOs, too, have become increas-
ingly concerned about their changing roles in ‘doing’ development, and
the ways they relate with publics is pivotal. As INGOs are one of the
primary sources of information about development, and this generally
translates into funding for them, it is vital for INGOs to be aware of
public perceptions around development (Desforges, 2004).
Some of the findings of the numerous studies, only a selection of which

I will have space to examine here, have been extremely informative. For
example, the series of studies ‘Public Attitudes towards Development’,
commissioned by the UK’s Department for International Development
and Office for National Statistics, took place annually from 1999–2010.
A key finding in its more recent studies has been that four in ten people
(40 per cent) agree that the government should increase overseas aid,
while three in ten think they should decrease it. Unsurprisingly, since the
financial downturn in 2009, the trend has been for support for govern-
ment overseas aid to decrease. Between 2007 and 2010, public support for
government spending on aid decreased significantly from 55 per cent to
40 per cent (UK AID, 2010: 15). UK INGOs that received most donations
were those helping children (32 per cent) and those funding medical
research (28 per cent), while INGOs providing aid for people in poor
countries received only15 per cent of donations (UK AID, 2010: 19).
Together with MORI, DfID also commissioned research for what has
been called the ‘School Omnibus’, which focused on 11–16 year-olds in
the UK. This quantitative research took place in 2006, and focused on
Development Education in schools. Interestingly, the DfID/MORI poll
of these young people found that ‘Two in three pupils (66 per cent) are
concerned about the lack of food, basic healthcare and education, with
nearly a quarter (24 per cent) feeling very concerned. Only two per cent
are not at all concerned.’ (DfID/MORI, 2006: 6).
The INGO Voluntary Service Overseas conducted a study called ‘The
Live Aid Legacy’ in 2002, which examined the ways that UK publics were
(mis)informed about the developing world. One of the key findings was
that 80 per cent of British people associated the developing world ‘with
strong negative associations – war, famine, debt, starving people, natural
disaster, poverty, corruption.’ (VSO, 2002: 5) Additionally, ‘74 per cent
of the British public believe that these countries depend on the money
and knowledge of the West to progress’ (VSO 2002: 3). Whilst the results
are from some time ago, it is difficult to see why any of the percep-
tions would have changed. As the title of the study implies, the negative
notions exist as a direct result of the global fundraising event of Live
Aid. And Live Aid, which was inspired by the Ethiopian famine of 1985,
is still framing the ways that publics are engaging with development.
A result of which, as Lader (2005: 9) suggests, is that pity and charity
continue to be the lens through which publics view development and
the global south.
One of the key public perceptions studies was the Public Perceptions
of Poverty programme, commissioned by the UK’s Comic Relief charity
and DfID, and conducted in the UK 2004–2007. It offered to ‘assess

levels of public awareness and understanding of world poverty, explore
barriers and drivers to public empathy and action; investigate the role
of the media, and of Make Poverty History’ (Darnton, 2006). Some of
these findings, particularly around the Make Poverty History campaign,
will be discussed in Chapter 6; yet a key finding relevant here is that
the spikes in public consciousness resulting from major campaigns
such as Make Poverty History do not translate into deep knowledge
about development, or into continued public support for development
(Darnton, 2006).
‘Common Cause’, the study conducted in 2010, delved deeper into
these results. The authors state that many campaigns that focus on
what they call ‘bigger than self’ problems, such as development, follow
the logic of ‘if people only knew’ they would do something about it.
However, they argue that such an analysis of people’s reactions is incom-
plete, as ‘there is mounting evidence that facts play only a partial role
in shaping people’s judgement. Emotion is often far more important.’
(Compton, 2010: 8).
This finding is challenging, particularly when so much effort and
engagement has been based on what has been termed ‘development
awareness raising’. Although the term is not precise, information about
these ‘bigger than self’ problems of development lie at the core of most
awareness raising. Also, when INGOs are involved in raising awareness
of a specific development problem, this is almost always fundamentally
coupled with raising awareness of their own organisation. One clear
example was the Make Poverty History march in Edinburgh in 2005,
when every INGO had branded their placards with their own logos.
Arguably, this in turn frequently leads to public scepticism around what
is information and what is an INGO’s attempt to raise funds.
One of the most interesting studies, ‘Finding Frames’, was commis-
sioned by Oxfam and WWF and was conducted by Andrew Darnton
and Martin Kirk in 2011. It is significant on many counts. First it was
commissioned by two large INGOs for the specific purpose of under-
standing how to engage with publics. Second, it came at a time when a
number of INGOs were concerned about how to redefine their relation-
ships to and with their constituents.
In ‘Finding Frames’, Darnton and Kirk state that the UK public’s
understanding of poverty has been stuck in the Live Aid Legacy since
1985 and that this is hindering the INGO sector from coming up with
transformational ways of not only engaging publics, but of doing their
work. They approach engagement in development using a cognitive
science framework and conclude that a ‘wholly new understanding of

global poverty and social justice’ needs to be taken on by the develop-
ment sector. The report delves into the values and frames used by the
various development-related organisations, and examines which values
are being promoted by different agencies and the effects this has. And
it asserts that public engagement matters because the public has a role
to play in dealing with global poverty. Darnton and Kirk outline that
there are three important arguments why public engagement around
international development matters. The first argument is that the public
provides the British government with the mandate to spend public funds
overseas in the form of development and humanitarian aid, particularly
pertinent given the ring fencing and increasing of the aid budget, even
during periods of public sector cuts. The second argument as to the
importance of public engagement in international development is that
of UK publics directly impacting international development through
their own actions, such as donations to development INGOs. The
third argument is that there is a perceived impact associated with UK
public’s action and discussions within the public sphere. Darnton and
Kirk (2011: 13–14) state that such interventions and discussions ‘open
up space’ for the types of political change that is necessary to tackle
global poverty. Within these deliberative spaces, the role of the public
goes beyond merely pressuring governments and making campaigning
demands. They argue that ‘it is about opening up the political and wider
societal space to the possibility of deeper change ... build[ing] new insti-
tutions and societal norms, which in turn will enable different models
of development. (Darnton and Kirk, 2011: 13–14)
Prior to the ‘Finding Frames’ report, Darnton’s 2009 report, ‘Rapid
Review’, commissioned by DfID, stressed that, ‘In terms of engagement
with global poverty, the public is on a downward trajectory’ (Darnton,
2009: 3). The ‘Rapid Review’ highlights that the UK public is stuck in
terms of how it engages with global poverty. It outlines how there have
been low levels of public understanding of global poverty for over a
decade, with the exception of the ‘Make Poverty History’ jump in engage-
ment. But this jump was limited to 2005, the year of the campaign, and
then returned to lower public levels of engagement in development. The
report concluded that when it came to increasing deeper levels of public
engagement, the public needed a ‘compelling invitation’ to take part.
While big events such as Make Poverty History were good at providing
good engagement opportunities, it is important that the event itself does
not become the message, consequently obscuring the campaign themes,
and limiting the levels of public engagement. (Darnton, 2009: 4). The
statistics around the downward trajectory of public engagement are also

alarming, but this lack of engagement in development is not altogether
new; as far back as 1999 Ian Smillie (1999: 72) described public knowl-
edge of development as ‘a mile wide and an inch deep’. Yet, given how
much money and effort has been put into public engagement, not only
by INGOs but also by governments, think tanks and academics, it is
both incongruous and discouraging that ‘even engaged people can’t
sustain a conversation about debt, trade or aid for long’ (Darnton and
Kirk, 2011: 6).
Equally concerning is the finding that the causes of poverty are seen as
being internal to the countries concerned, and the dominant paradigm
is of ‘Powerful Giver’ and ‘Grateful Receiver’ (Darnton and Kirk, 2011:
6). The identification of the root causes of poverty as being internal was
further highlighted in a DfID study in 2010 when 50 per cent of public
respondents considered the main cause of poverty to be internal corrup-
tion, with virtually no external or system causal factors being mentioned
(Glennie et al., 2012: 6).
Discouraging as these statistics and trends may be, there have been
occasional elevations of public consciousness around development.
The first and certainly the most dramatic was the ‘global moment’ of
Live Aid in 1985. Following this, although there have been many INGO
campaigns around many issues, the spikes in public consciousness
have tended to occur around global campaigns such as the Jubilee Debt
campaigns of the late 1990s and the Make Poverty History campaign
in 2005. Using DfID data, Darnton and Kirk (2011: 15) track the ‘Make
Poverty History effect’ on public attitude data, which highlights that the
level of people answering ‘very concerned’ about international develop-
ment spiked in the immediate aftermath of the campaign. However, this
percentage dropped immediately afterwards, and by 2009 the figure had
gone down to 21 per cent.
Both during and following the Live Aid event, Bob Geldof said
on camera, ‘Give us the money.’ A 2012 documentary, of the same
name, followed Geldof and later Bono’s involvement in International
Development politics. Giving money is the most common way that
northern publics engage with ‘the distant poor’, but as Beattie et al.
(1999: 233) have argued, most accounts ‘convey a dominant image of
Africa – that it is a place of “misery”, “chaos”, and “brutality”, the recur-
rence of which is almost predictably systematic.’
Sending money to people who are poor may seem an obvious and
common sense solution to what is needed: ‘we have money, they don’t;
we’ll send them some.’ And there is nothing outwardly wrong with
this impulse to help, to be charitable, which I will discuss in further

detail in the following chapter. The problem lies, however, in that this
approach seems to be the default reaction amongst northern publics,
and is frequently the only response available to them. This was clearly
illustrated during the 2005 television documentary series, African School,
which was broadcast on the BBC in the UK and internationally on BBC
World. The series followed the daily lives of young Africans and their
teachers in Uganda, and the representation of the young Ugandans was
in stark contrast to the usual images of Africans on television.
Indeed, one ambition of the African School series was to challenge
typical representations of life in Africa.2 And much of both the audience’s
and the journalists’ response concerned the fact that they were thankful
for this other picture of Africa. But, as the academic consultants on the
series asked (Yanacopulos and Mohan, 2006), ‘How successful was the
series in challenging the dominant responses to African development?’.
Although the purpose of the series was specifically not to fundraise, many
viewers felt compelled to donate money. And, as there was no telephone
number to donate to, people instead contacted the BBC – which was not
in a position to accept funds directly. What became apparent was that
the striking inequalities propelled viewers to do what, in a sense, they
had been trained to do since Live Aid (but also prior to that) – that is to
say, to ‘give the money’.
Yanacopulos and Mohan (2006: 21) outline the tensions of working
on such a series. We asked how we could see complex development proc-
esses through the experience of one child, for example. One of the aims
in taking part in the series was to ‘destabilise the forms of representa-
tion that belittle the agency of those deemed in need of “development”,
the result was that (despite our best intentions) we were feeding into a
deeply programmed response or reaction of the public giving money’.
Our reaction was reflected and supported by Andrew Darnton’s finding
(2006) in the Wave Two element of the assessment of the Make Poverty
History campaign. He found that regardless of the messages highlighted
by the Make Poverty History campaign – mainly that the answers to
poverty were not necessarily charity – a significant number of respond-
ents said that they felt that giving money was ‘all they could do to tackle
poverty’.3
Numerous studies seem to suggest that, in a neoliberal age, throwing
money at any uncomfortable and disturbing situation is an automatic
response. Neoliberal ideologies are based on individual responsibili-
ties as opposed to more solidaristic responses. Arguably, INGOs are
complicit in this reaction and behaviour, reinforcing such ideas in
fundraising. Within INGOs, charity and fundraising is what Desforges,

(2004) calls a ‘default position’, one that exists to financially sustain the
INGOs themselves. Desforges claims that many INGOs do not see the
role of the public as being that of educating supporters, instead their
language is loaded with neoliberal terms such as ‘investment returns’,
or the ‘lifetime value’ of their supporters. In Desforges’ (2004: 560) view,
‘this suggests that engagement with the public is strategically based to
ensure the sustainability of the organisation’s projects.’ But, in a more
recent study, Glennie et al. found that there is an ‘appetite for a more
nuanced understanding of the processes of development and change’
of publics. Indeed, their findings suggest that there are real opportuni-
ties for more open conversations with ‘the UK public on timeframes,
indicators for success and aid exit strategies for developing countries’
(Glennie et al., 2012: 22).
Public faces
Frequently, when we speak of public engagement, we immediately

jump straight to the ‘image debate’ of INGOs – the ways that INGOs use
images to fundraise (which I will discuss more fully later in this chapter).
However, whilst this is one of the primary ways some individuals receive
their information or form their ideas about the global south, it is only
one of the ways that INGOs engage with publics, and there are more
comprehensive ways to think about public engagement. In a special issue
of the Journal of International Development, Smith and Yanacopulos (2004)
coined the phrase ‘the public faces of development’ in an attempt to
capture the diverse ways that development was relayed to publics.
We used the ‘public faces of development’ as an umbrella term to
encompass the different ways that different organisations construct,
mediate and represent development to northern publics. Specifically,
the journal special issue focused on the ways in which different organi-
sations such as international volunteers, ethical consumer groups, news
consuming publics and international donors mediated ‘connections
between the “southern poor”, development organisations, and northern
individuals.’ (Smith and Yanacopulos, 2004: 657)
Although not exclusively so, many of the articles focused on INGOs
as they are one of the primary conduits northern publics rely on for
information about the developing world. The special issue, however,
was more than simply a study into representations, and stereotypes were
only one part of the equation. Rather INGOs’ connection to the types of
relationships forged between individuals and communities in the north,
and poor individuals and communities in the south, and the ways these
relationships are mediated and produced by diverse organisations, inter-
ests and contexts was the focus.
Since the special issue of 2004, there have been a series of high-profile
public events around development. The South Asian Tsunami Relief, the
Make Poverty History campaigns, and more recently the Enough Food
for Everyone IF campaign (generally shortened to the IF campaign).
Undeniably, since the mid-1990s, there has been a changed emphasis,
both within the UK as well as within other countries in the global north,
around INGO advocacy, and with this has come an increased awareness
and emphasis on INGO branding, and a professionalisation of INGOs in
the fields of PR, communications and marketing. At the same time both
south/south co-operation and the middle classes of the BRICS countries
have increased, China has become a significant development donor,
and technological connectivity and access has increased exponentially.
In addition, the number – and arguably the influence – of INGOs during
this period has also increased dramatically.
However, while significant study has taken place on development,
such as the politics of INGOs, the effects of technology on develop-
ment engagement, and the intersection between media and develop-
ment, these have not been brought together. With respect to development
engagement, this issue has remained on the periphery of discussions of
International Development. Since the 1970s, explorations have taken
place around representation and development imagery used by INGOs
in their fundraising, explorations that have discussed the use of patron-
ising or ‘negative’ imagery (Cohen, 2001: 178). Some have re-examined
imperial representations, with authors such as Mackenzie (1985)
demonstrating the diverse ways in which representations of the colo-
nies were embedded in UK society. Kothari’s (2005) work examines how
British colonial administrators thought about their positions, and she
compared this to contemporary UK development workers’ surprisingly
similar perspectives. Said’s (1978) Orientalism focused on the construc-
tion of the ‘other’ in the exercise of colonial power. Stuart Hall (1992)
famously coined the term ‘the west and the rest’ in describing how rela-
tions between orientalist discourses were built on notions of identity
and difference or ‘othering’. Edwards (1999: 191) has also argued that
INGOs have not always been good at producing new stories about devel-
opment, although we will see that when Oxfam attempted to do just
that, the results were disappointing.
The ‘public faces of development’ research did not occur in a vacuum,
but developed from different elements of existing research in the above
areas. Where the public faces of development differed from research

focused on media and development and the role of INGOs more
broadly was that it was not just about representation, but the relation-
ships and constructions of development in the global north (Smith and
Yanacopulos, 2004). Within the research, the varied public faces of devel-
opment highlighted that the different development agendas existed not
only between the different organisations involved with development,
but (as we will see in the following chapters) also within those organisa-
tions themselves. Different stories of development are thus received and
translated in different ways by different northern publics. According
to Crush (1995: 4), these stories are fundamental to the development
project, where: ‘for all their pedantry and pretension, the texts of devel-
opment are, of necessity, also written in a representational language –
a language of metaphor, image, allusion, fantasy and rhetoric’. Some
examples of issues that arise when we examine the public faces of devel-
opment are: How do we understand donor/INGOs’ relations in devel-
opment campaign networks? How are northern consumers involved
in the networks, or chains, of the production of goods in the south?
Whilst demarcating who is ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ development is diffi-
cult, both development as an industry and the rapidly growing groups
of development organisations do look beyond their borders to wider
publics on whose support, broadly conceived, they depend. (Smith and
Yanacopulos, 2004: 658) The relevance of the public faces of develop-
ment, therefore, is in the relationship of those constructing the narra-
tives about development and publics who support development, either
by virtue of donating funds or by virtue of being citizens of countries
who are aid donors.
Mediating development
One of the primary elements of the public faces of development is the

concept of mediation, which provides one perspective for looking at
development and humanitarianism, and specifically at the INGOs that
inhabit this media space. But although this is certainly a very impor-
tant element, mediation is about much more than looking at the ways
images are used by INGOs.
The idea of mediation comes primarily from the field of media studies,
a field that has become increasingly interested in the links between
media and international development actors. Mediation, which is the
process of seeing someone else’s version of reality, and representation
are closely related and overlap. We, the audience, are at once removed
from the subject being mediated, in this case the subjects of develop-
ment. Representation, meanwhile, refers to both the process and the
‘product’ being represented. Those doing the representation, in this case
INGOs, are always making choices when and in what ways something
is being portrayed.
Much exciting work, such as that from Luc Boltanski (1999), Distant
Suffering, Lilie Chouliaraki’s The Spectatorship of Suffering (2006) and The
Ironic Spectator (2012), and Stanley Cohen’s States of Denial (2001), has
been produced in this area. All provide excellent accounts of different
elements of how ‘distant others’ are being represented to those in the
north. However, what is missing in the majority of work originating from
Media Studies is an examination of the INGOs as organisations with struc-
ture, operational imperatives, and value-based entities. Additionally, the
focus of many of the studies has been on the relationship between INGOs
and humanitarian issues – the ‘spectacle’ to use Chouliaraki’s term. The
‘day-to-day’ development issues which take up the majority of time and
work of big development still need to be explored.
Within the INGO literature, rarely have those analysing INGOs covered
the media field with a clear media analysis. Instead, most studies exam-
ining INGOs have focused on issues of accountability, operations, and
the impact of individual INGOs and the sector. However, more recently
there has been interesting work on celebrity and INGOs (Richey and
Ponte, 2011; Brockington 2014), and the media and INGOs, primarily
from Dogra (2012) and Scott (2014). And, as the worlds of Media Studies
and International Development move closer together, they provide us
with a better understanding of the role that media and mediation play
in the ways that INGOs are engaging with northern publics.
So what do we mean by mediation?4 Roger Silverstone (2006:
58) offers a comprehensive definition of mediation, suggesting that
different media ‘actively form a space in which meanings can be created
and communicated beyond the constraints of the face-to-face.’ The rela-
tionship between northern publics and those that are the ‘subjects’ of
development is one in which – for most people at least – the roles are
mediated, mostly by INGOs. As Vestergaard (2011: 9) states, on the one
hand there is little immediate physical contact between an organisation
(such as an INGO) and its audience, just as on the other there is little
or no contact between the audience and the ‘subjects’ of development.
Mediation between an organisation and its audience about the ‘subjects’
of development, which is the specific focus here, thus occurs through
media technology. In this case the INGO is the mediating agent and the
electronic technology is the medium.
In addition, the connections to distant strangers have a spatial

element – the distant strangers are ‘over there’ whilst ‘we’ are ‘over here’.
Thus, mediation is fundamentally a communicative process, moving
meaning through space and time, and ‘involves the work of institu-
tions, groups and technologies’ (Silverstone, 1999: 15). Meaning is
constructed, interpreted and reinterpreted through symbols and images
(semiotics is the starting point of Chouliaraki’s work), and it ‘involves
the constant transformation of meanings, both large scale and small,
significant and insignificant, as media texts and texts about media circu-
late in writing, in speech and audio visual forms, and as we, individually
and collectively, directly and indirectly, contribute to their production’
(Silverstone, 1999: 13).
The spatiality of mediation is a key factor in the theory. Tomlinson
(1999) suggests two interrelated definitions of mediation: the first is the
‘overcoming of distance in the communication’ and the second is that
mediation is the process of ‘passing through the medium’ (Tomlinson
1999: 154–155). Thus, as Chouliaraki (2006: 20) states, ‘it is the role that
the medium plays in closing the distance between disparate locales.’ The
working definition of mediation used here is, therefore, the bridging
of time and space by INGO communication of development subjects
with northern publics, making this a different type of politics from
those experienced directly by publics. Although mediation is not new,
as Strombach (2008: 231) outlines, what has changed is that ‘the inten-
sity of mediated experiences has increased and that the (experienced or
actual) relevancy of institutions, events, and processes beyond people’s
own reach has increased.’
Related to this is the issue of the representation of development itself,
which has historically been ‘peripheral to the real work of develop-
ment’, as highlighted in the public faces of development work (Smith
and Yanacopulos, 2004: 658). However, with the increase in work done
within Media Studies and the ways that this has started to enter schol-
arly work within Development Studies, this has started to change. Most
of this recent work in Development Studies has looked at representation
versus mediation, and Scott (2014: 139) prefers the shift to mediation,
as the term implies that the ‘media affect the ways in which individuals
experience space and time and therefore that they can bring distant
suffering closer to audiences, whilst at the same time recognising that
the presence of the medium interferes with this process.’
Generally, it is through television (news and documentaries), films
and through INGO campaigns that the global south is mediated to
the global north. According to the Office of National Statistics Survey
conducted in 1999, 80 per cent of the UK public received information

about the developing world through television (ONS, 1999). This has
obviously changed since 1999 with increased internet usage, but it is
still a significant figure. Much of this information about the developing
world is through news. News coverage will almost always default to the
most negative situations and images, as events causing negative situ-
ations are those deemed to be newsworthy. According to Cottle and
Nolan (2007) INGOs are overstating their messages in order to appeal
to television media outlets, at the expense of not explaining the full
root causes of situations. Powers (2014: 92) argues that while many from
INGOs are critical of news coverage, they also ‘prefer to cooperate with
journalists out of fear that opposition will result in their exclusion from
the public sphere’ (Powers, 2014: 92).
Feature films and documentaries are extremely effective in engaging
audiences and portraying a common humanity, although as an
International Broadcast Trust report (Fenyoe, 2010) stated, the chal-
lenge is getting people to watch these films and documentaries in the
first place. In the UK, even good documentaries find it a challenge to
overcome the dominant images of the global south that exist because
of television news and Comic Relief (NGO118). And audience research
suggests that people think that any story on television about a devel-
oping country is difficult and depressing (NGO118).
Yet there are contradictory findings. While it seems that many people
assume that anything about the global south would be depressing,
when they do watch shows on television with a global south focus, they
find them engaging. Specifically, what engages viewers, according to a
Director of an INGO, is the drama of someone’s life and them telling their
own story in their own words (NGO118). But the question is, can this
engagement lead viewers to take action? The same Director continues
outlining the fundamental problem with the medium of television: ‘the
thing that television is good at is telling human stories. The thing it
is bad at is a detailed analysis of structures, issues or a wider context’
(NGO118).
During the filming and the broadcasting of the internationally
produced and viewed series, Why Poverty?, which was broadcast in
2012/2013, issues of engagement with the series films and with the
issue of poverty raised many questions around public perceptions of the
global south. The series was unique in that it was produced by an inter-
nationally based production team (of which I was a member) and the
eight one-hour documentaries as well as the 30 short films that made
up the series were made by both northern and southern filmmakers.5
The end result was that the series was seen by hundreds of millions of
viewers in over 70 countries; arguably, the most watched set of films
on poverty and development. But these films were watched in some
countries in different ways. For example, the films were viewed at public
events throughout Denmark and were followed by discussions around
the relevant issues in the films. By comparison, such public viewings
and discussions were sporadic in the UK. Also, the films were seen by
33 per cent of the five million Danish population and near half of the
320,000 Icelandic population.6 The viewer figures in the UK rarely rose
above 300,000 views on average, but the population in the UK is signifi-
cantly larger than these two countries (65 million). While a comparison
between Danish and Icelandic publics is not valid, proportional to the
population, the UK viewing figures were exceptionally small.
Therefore, the same films, broadcast at the same time to international
audiences, were received differently from country to country. This obser-
vation raises many issues, some of which are beyond the remit of this
book, but some are worth mentioning. The times and channels that the
films were shown at/on matters; when they were broadcast on the BBC
in the UK, they were shown on BBC4 which has a limited audience. One
of the Why Poverty? producers questioned whether the BBC (including
all of its related channels) had ‘done poverty’ by running the annual
charity fundraising event Comic Relief?7 The low viewing figures raise
numerous questions around declining public interest in programmes
on the global south (Harding, 2009). Additionally Glennie et al., in
their study of public perceptions, concluded that the majority of the
UK public has a ‘two dimensional’ conception of international develop-
ment, lacking the complex realities of developing countries. They argue
that because of the images and information publics receive, they see the
role of governments and individuals in the global north to help the poor
in the global south – the poor who have little control over their own
lives (Glennie et al., 2012: 2).
Image debates – the othering of poverty
A great deal of the discussions around mediation and representation of

development revolve around the imagery used by development agen-
cies, particularly by INGOs. Prior to discussing these debates, however,
we need to look at existing guidelines within the sector relating to
the use of images, which reflect how this debate has in many ways
been mainstreamed both within and outside the sector. As far back
as 1989, the General Assembly of European NGOs agreed on a Code
of Conduct relating to the portrayal and use of images of the ‘Third

World’. In the European NGO Confederation for relief and develop-
ment (CONCORD) document titled “Code of Conduct on Images and
Messages”, INGO signatories agree that images and messages will be
made based on the paramount principles of: Respect for the dignity of
the people concerned; Belief in the equality of all people; Acceptance of
the need to promote fairness, solidarity and justice (CONCORD, 2006).
Whilst the codes are admirable, they are also open to interpretation and
remain voluntary.
The debate around the use of negative/positive images, an area that is
sometimes referred to as the ‘pornography of poverty’, has been explored
in great detail by both academics and practitioners and so will only be
mentioned in passing here. Although useful, the debates frequently over-
simplify the issues into a straightforward negative/positive dichotomy,
whereas in practice compelling arguments exist for both types of images.
In my own experience, working for a large development INGO in the
mid-1990s, this was a debate held at the highest levels within the organi-
sation. One perspective was that in order to carry out the good work that
the organisation was capable of, it was imperative to raise the maximum
amount of funds. And, to do this, ‘provocative’ images worked. Another
example came from a BOAG Director of Communications, who
commended Save the Children on how they “got their advertising right.
They only show children under 5 in their ad campaigns, eventhough
in practice they work with children much older”; the rationale being
that children under five provoke a much stronger response in raising
personal donations (NGO134). While many would argue that such ‘nega-
tive’ images do not actually raise more money from the public than posi-
tive images, the recent experience of Save the Children in the UK lends
weight to the argument supporting the increase in the financial return of
negative images. Meanwhile, the other side of the debate counters that
more positive images from the global south allow people to maintain
their dignity and, in addition, help develop longer-term positive associa-
tions between people in the global south and the global north. In the
end, the INGO I worked for decided that positive images were prefer-
able and sacrificed the chance to raise additional money as a result. In
retrospect, however, whilst positive images seem to retain more of the
dignity of those portrayed, the negative/positive dichotomy is not so
simple. Scott, (2014: 176) outlines this, highlighting that the ‘dichotomy
is highly problematic because it grossly oversimplifies the complex and
nuanced ways in which the global south is represented and how these
representations influence public attitudes and behaviours.’
Feminisation and infantilisation
The presentation of poverty is riven with the ways that poverty and
the ‘subjects’ of development are represented. The work in this area
is primarily focused on the images used and more specifically on the
feminisation and infantilisation of poverty. In examining the poster
campaigns of Belgian INGOs, Lamers (2005) captures the phenomenon
of using children: 50 per cent of INGO posters over the last 35 years
were of a child. As Wells (2013: 277) argues, ‘the child continues to
play in representations of poverty disseminated by INGOs, notwith-
standing a putative shift in the sector from child-saving to child-
rights’. The typical images familiar to most in the global north are of
an emaciated child, frequently needing a wash, crying or looking sad,
and looking directly into the camera. Whilst such images of children
are not a new phenomenon, the Ethiopian famine of 1984 and the
following Live Aid ‘legacy’ made the use of such images much more
commonplace, particularly in representations of Africa. While such
photos evoke a sense of humanity, there is a need for the viewer to
‘save’ those portrayed. As Cohen explains, the images lack a context
and are generally invasively close up, frequently ‘just the face, neck
and shoulders of a crying “ethnic” child’ (Cohen, 2001: 183). The
response evoked by the image of a suffering child is undoubtedly more
powerful than one of a suffering adult but, as Young (2012: 19) and
others have argued, the use of children in African charity campaigns
has ‘infantilised’ Africa, sending the message that Africa needs to be
saved by the west. Young claims that these images of starving children
have contributed to the idea that Africans are ‘passive, needy, unable,
or indeed, unwilling to help themselves.’
In addition to children, women are the other focal point of INGO
campaigns. Again, Young (2012: 30), in her study ‘African Images and
their Impact on Public Perceptions’, outlines how individual and groups
of women, who are often accompanied by children, are most common
in INGO public materials. She argues that the ‘impact of this type of
imagery is to present Africa as a place apart, devoid of the accepted
Western construct of what constitutes the family unit’, and that such
images and constructions, particularly of Africa, are emasculated. As
an extension, this contributes to a narrative of men having abandoned
women and children, and thus contributing to the narrative of Africans
as somewhat unevolved and requiring ‘civilising’ (Young, 2012).
Other critics of these approaches, such as Plewes and Stuart (2007:
23), see the images as exploitative of the poor, where they are shown
as helpless, passive victims and objects. Further arguments suggest that

the negative images of children and women so embed the victim narra-
tive that, long-term, any images of, say, Africa, even positive ones, tend
to be interpreted through the ‘Africans as victims’ lens. Young (2012:
19) argues that using a child’s face in INGO fundraising campaigns has
been a requirement, yet, ‘all the while ultimately (mis)representing
or indeed stereotyping the individuals from a specific geographical
region’ – namely Africa.
These images, particularly those that have been termed ‘pornography
of poverty’, are focused on women and children and are provided as
evidence of how poor and in need they are. As I have said, this is not
new, indeed it goes back to colonialism and the start of the ‘develop-
ment project’. As the various analyses of images by those such as Cohen
show, even in the mid-1970s there were ‘images of helplessness, depend-
ency and suffering in traditional starving child appeals, which were
being denounced in terms relating them to neocolonialism by Inwell,
who described them as “an allegory of pornography”’ (quoted in Young,
2012: 16). In addition, that the images were intended to promote distress
in their audiences is well captured by Cameron and Haanstra (2008:
1476), who comment that such images were and do ‘aim to provoke
feelings of guilt and pity in Western audiences through portrayals of
extreme material poverty and suffering.’ While it would be encouraging
to find that the use of such images belongs to the past, little more than
a memory from the 1980s images of the Ethiopian famine, the truth is
that they are still being used in all too many INGO campaigns today, as
I will explore in the following chapters.
In response to such negative images, however, many other INGOs
have tried the seemingly opposite approach of providing the public with
a positive story. In 2013, Oxfam’s acting communications director Nick
Futcher pointed out that, ‘When more than 80 per cent of people feel
the media’s portrayal of issues in developing countries is too negative,
we needed to challenge those feelings of helplessness and negativity.’8
Michael Whittemore, too, of the Centre for Global Engagement, has
stated that the use of negative imagery is changing, using the 2012 IF
campaign as an example of what he means, in which ‘gone is the death
and destruction, and in its place are colourful images of healthy, happy
children’, although, it is still children that are being used in the images
(quoted in Scott, 2013). Lidchi (1999) described this turn amongst some
INGOs as ‘deliberate positivism’, where positive images of mostly chil-
dren are used in advertising that aims to tell the ‘this is what your money
can do’ story. One Director of an INGO explains how some INGOs, such
as Oxfam and others, have stood out in their attempts to fundraise using
positive images such as a child pushing a wheelbarrow holding two big
cans of water. The INGO Director posits: ‘I don’t know the thinking
behind that, whether it raised money, or it raised less. It’s a competitive
environment, so when you get Save the Children using extreme images
and getting lots of money for doing so, it makes it much harder for other
INGOs to use less extreme images’ (NGO118).
In outlining the debate, Scott (2014) captures the literature and the
essence of these positive / negative debates. Scott and others, such as
Chouliaraki, do not deem ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ forms of engagement as
being better or worse. Instead Chouliaraki (2012: 63) echoes the view of
many in the INGO world by stating that at least a deliberate positivism
approach introduces a discourse of dignity and agency. Although she
follows this by saying that the continued reliance on charitable dona-
tions as a means of action ensures that ‘they’ remain objects of ‘our’
generosity.
Lidchi (1999: 101) describes both the negative and positive images as
part of a realist impasse, in which both the negative and positive images
use realism to invoke a sense of charitable giving in INGO campaigns.
Cohen (2001: 185) argues that the premise of such campaigns is based
on the assumption of a lack of knowledge – that if faced with suffi-
cient examples of suffering, publics would do the right thing and help.
However, as Scott (2014: 153) argues, ‘given the apparent failure of both
forms of humanitarian communication to generate sustained, large-scale
public action vis-à-vis distant suffering, it appears that such assumptions
about the power of knowledge may be somewhat misguided.’
What the campaigns do not do is address the structural issues of
poverty, and the challenges and complexities of development. Instead
these campaigns focus on the small scale (Benthall, 2010: 186), focusing
on fundraising either to alleviate suffering through giving money for the
sad child, or to offer the small-scale benefits of providing an education
for the happy and grateful child. Whilst these are both commendable
actions, they are not addressing the root causes of the poverty. As we
shall see, INGOs mediating, constructing, and representing a version of
development which involves a quick fix is much easier to convey than
are the complexities of international governance, trade and the effects
of economic globalisation.
Post-humanitarianism
INGOs’ portrayals of the reality of poverty through both positive or
negative imagery result in the increasing of ‘distance’ between ‘us’
and ‘them’; and INGOs are not oblivious to the ramifications of using
both positive and negative images. Some INGOs have responded with
meta-appeals, which have been discussed by Chouliaraki (2012) and
Vestergaard (2011), who describe these meta-appeals as communica-
tions which involve the audience in the dilemma faced by the INGO
in making the appeal; the INGO conveys the difficulty of making this
communication, and with the communication ensures that the INGO
conveys awareness of the potential for manipulation that would cause
the audience to reject the communication. By acknowledging the poten-
tial for manipulation (but not manipulating), the INGO includes audi-
ences in the message – ‘you are clever enough to know when you are
being manipulated, but that is not what we are doing here’.
Chouliaraki terms the use of meta-appeals as post-humanitarianism.
She has used this term to describe campaigns that break with both
the aesthetic conventions and the moral mechanisms of conventional
humanitarian appeals (Scott, 2014), campaigns which involve what
Chouliaraki (2010: 119) has called ‘low-intensity emotional regimes’
that do not incite grand emotions such as guilt and pity, or empathy
and gratitude. These emotional regimes inspire contemplation and
what Chouliaraki (2012) has called irony. Irony is where the focus of
the response is on the self rather than on the other and where there is
an absence of the suffering distant other. Scott (2014: 154) describes this
focus as made explicit in campaign slogans such as Plan International’s
(1993) ‘She can change your life forever’, and ‘In a time of crisis, one
small act can make you a hero’. In her discussion of celebrity and the
mediation of development, Chouliaraki (2012) states that instead of
enabling us to get an insight into their lives and hear their voices, ‘it treats
distant others as voiceless props that evoke responses of self-expression,
but cannot in themselves become anything more than shadow figures in
someone else’s story.’ Post-humanitarianism, then, relies on a mediation
in which the audience is brought into the appeal or campaign, but not by
being shown the reality of the negative or positive, but through a high-
lighting of the problem of the representation of suffering itself. Thus,
the message is that the organisation running the campaign knows that
positive and negative images are problematic, and the focus of the appeal
implicitly acknowledges this knowledge, and yet still asks the viewer for
money or an action (Chouliaraki, 2010: 373). Thus, in Chouliaraki’s
(2012) book The Ironic Spectator, she argues that post-humanitarianism
is not about the suffering of the other, but about the viewer and their
relationship to the appeal, and about our lifestyle as the givers, turning
us into ironic spectators of the distant other’s suffering. When examining
post-humanitarianism with respect to the INGOs themselves (2010: 120),

she argues that when INGOs focus their campaigns in this new style of
communication that tries to position the campaign outside the moral-
ising discourses of suffering, they are again using ‘a strategy of the market
put to the service of legitimizing the humanitarian brand itself’.
Landscapes
The conundrum for Oxfam and others looks a bit like this: ‘If images
of starving babies produce a strong emotional reaction, and there-
fore strong financial and political support, how are we going to
show that we’re making progress? People won’t keep donating if
they think nothing has changed – but we know this recipe seems to
work.’ ... Oxfam has stepped up to the plate: their See Africa Differently
campaign encourages people to think again about the continent and
the people who live there. It might not seem like a big risk but those
who balance the books tell us it’s our hearts, not our minds that
control the charitable impulse. (Tanner, 2013)
At the end of 2012, instead of using people in the frames of their See
Africa Differently campaign, Oxfam decided to reframe Africa. There
were numerous reasons for this, including the positive and negative
image debates. Oxfam was aware of the positive/negative debates, and
conducted a study asking 2,000 people in the UK what they thought of
when they thought of Africa. According to Nick Futcher (2013), over
half those asked had replied ‘poverty’, ‘famine’ and ‘hunger’, and had
described the stereotypical portrayal of Africa as ‘depressing, manipula-
tive and hopeless’. Additionally, 43 per cent of respondents had claimed
that images of Africa made them feel conditions in the developing world
would never improve and 23 per cent of them stated that they turned
away when they saw images of Africa.9
In response to these findings, Oxfam launched the See Africa
Differently campaign on Boxing Day, 2012. In a blog on the Guardian
newspaper’s website, Nick Futcher (2013) outlined the rationale and the
engagement strategy behind the campaign:
So on Boxing Day we took a new approach. We put arrestingly beau-

tiful images of Africa across newspapers, outdoor and digital media.
The sweeping landscapes and waterfalls provoked a reaction, they
prompted debate, they got people talking about hunger in Africa.
The images say more than Africa is a stunning continent. We also
want people to know that there has been a marked improvement in

food supply across sub-Saharan Africa in the last 20 years. We want as
many people as possible to know that while nearly 900 million people
remain hungry, there’s enough food in the world to feed everyone.
The response to the campaign in the development industry blogo-

sphere was immediate. Owen Tudor (2013), of the UK’s Trade Union
Congress, argued that the Oxfam campaign was a:
... refreshing change from the images that have become associated in
particular with Save the Children. I’m not sure Oxfam should get top
marks though: they’re still suggesting that ‘we’ can solve the prob-
lems of ‘the poor’, without giving them the appropriate agency to
act; and there’s still no challenge to the role multinational companies
and industrialised governments play in keeping the poor that way. I
think Oxfam may simply be making use of the ‘cognitive dissonance’
strategy that fuels so many PR campaigns: the message is actually
exactly the same as the ‘starving black babies’ campaign, because that
is the ‘frame’ it evokes, albeit by juxtaposing an alternative.
Other commentators, such as Jonathan Tanner, then at the Overseas

Development Institute, commended the campaign, describing it as
brave. His rationale was that Oxfam was trying to shake off the 1980s
‘Africa on repeat’, or what has been called the Live Aid Legacy, by trying
to ‘shift the tone away from poverty and despair to one of hope’.
Others, however, were less complimentary. Tolu Ogunlesi (2013), the
Nigerian commentator and journalist, asked who ‘really cares, in 2013,
what the British public thinks about a continent from which they fled in
varying stages of undress? What’s that proverb about crying more than
the bereaved?’ Ogunlesi continued, ‘I seriously doubt that it is in Africa’s
interest for Brits to change their perception of Africa. Instead I think it is
totally in Britain’s interests to change its perceptions of Africa.’
But how did the broader public receive the campaign? Specific audi-
ence reception is always difficult to conduct, but the overall reaction
(from responses and comments to the blog) was confusion. Although
the jury is still out as to whether it was a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ campaign,
given that subsequent campaigns did not focus on landscapes, the ques-
tion remains as to whether it was perceived as successful within Oxfam
and other INGOs. What the campaign did clearly illustrate though, is
that ambiguity makes it extremely difficult for publics and audiences
to understand what is being demanded of them – what ‘the ask’ is.
Although this could be the result of audiences being so familiar with the
charity ask that they become confused when it doesn’t take place.
When speaking of public engagement, it is necessary to distinguish
between INGO engagement around humanitarian emergencies, and
that around day-to-day international development. We have reached a
point in time where the line distinguishing the two has become blurred
which, for many reasons, is no bad thing. Development and humani-
tarian emergencies, for example, can be seen as lying on a continuum
with strong connections between the two. However, when it comes to
the ways that INGOs engage publics on the two issues, the problem
occurs when there seems to be a perpetual disaster mode amongst
INGOs. For example, the EMERGENCY banner at my local Oxfam shop
or SAVE’s images of starvation, in which images of impoverishment are
put forth as images of development. Such images, in referring to safe
drinking water, improvements in education, sanitation and economic
growth, reinforce a sense of a state of crisis. Additionally, as discussed
above, the images used are mostly of children and women, and any
images of men tend to be based around corruption and conflict.
Scott (2014: 139) describes the tensions of humanitarian commu-
nications, and how they cannot be fully reconciled as follows: ‘These
[tensions] include the inherent difficulty of taking effective action to
address faraway suffering, the challenge of avoiding reproducing hier-
archies of human life when this is at the heart of NGOs’ work, the ines-
capable influence of broader political and commercial drivers of NGO
appeals’, thereby failing to overcome the distances between those in the
global north and the global south.
The problems of INGO engagement
Thus, engaging publics on issues of development is not a simple process.

Perceptions of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poverty are a major obstacle
in INGO engagement, and given that a number of DfID public percep-
tion studies strongly indicate that the UK public generally views the
underlying causes of poverty in the global south as being internal to
those countries themselves, this raises problems for INGOs (Henson and
Lindstrom, 2011: 8). As Henson and Lindstrom outline, generally the
public support for aid is higher when the causes of poverty are seen as
being external to that country.
According to one BOAG INGO Communications Director, problems
of INGO engagement with publics can be attributed to three points:
that there are mixed messages being given about the causes of poverty
within the INGO sector which create divisions within the sector; that
UK publics in particular tend to only respond to pity; and that INGOs

rely on humanitarian emergencies for their large fundraising (NGO128).
Related to this last point, another BOAG INGO Media Manager concurred
with the struggle of engaging publics in long term development issues
rather than humanitarian emergencies, stating that:
Longer-term development is much harder to see and there are greater

challenges [compared to engaging publics in humanitarian emergen-
cies]. It is hard to see the wider problems and challenges of delivering
aid. People want to see problem, consequence, and how they can
help solve that problem. With longer-term aid, it’s slower and you
are funding things which you can’t see. We have to build a school,
we have to train teachers and no one is interested in seeing a teacher
being trained. (NGO115)
The issue of public engagement and organisational support is vital to

INGOs, in their fundraising, advocacy, campaigning and public rela-
tions work. As the Head of Policy of one BOAG INGO stated, ‘we need
to get much, much better at honestly talking to people with a narrative
that takes them from being a child sponsor to understanding the bigger
issues that we are working on’ (NGO113). Yet even though many inter-
viewed in the sector for the Finding Frames study said that the negative
framing of charity, aid and philanthropy, needs to be replaced with a
positive framing of justice, movements, entitlements, it is not coming
through in the work of INGOs. It is clear that new frames are needed,
but, according to the Director of an INGO, in some of the BOAG meet-
ings the response has been that many of the BOAG INGOs have said
that the ‘Finding Frames [study] didn’t work for us’ (NGO117).
Conclusions
In this chapter, we have looked at the different ways in which INGOs

are engaging publics and the ways that they are constructing, medi-
ating and representing international development to those in the global
north. While INGO engagement is functionally driven, the larger devel-
opment enterprise is driven by values. The claim of this chapter has
been that INGOs are limited in how they engage with northern publics,
how they conduct advocacy, and how they are politically active around
issues of international development. They are limited by their organisa-
tional structures, funding, and a constructed image of development that
is restricting them becoming the ‘agents of change’ they aim to be; this
will be the focus of the following chapter.
5
INGO Organisation and Strategy
In the previous chapters, we have seen how INGOs engage with their
publics and how the cosmopolitan values they are based on lead to an
ambivalence in how they work to become agents of change. An ambiv-
alent cosmopolitanism stems from both the ways that publics view
INGOs – that is to say the ways that the relationships between ‘devel-
oped’ and ‘developing’ have been constructed (partial responsibility for
which belongs to INGOs) – and, as I will argue in this chapter, how
INGOs are organised. Thus, to some degree, how INGOs comprehend
change and change potential, together with how they are internally
structured and develop their business models, affect not only the ways
that they engage with publics, but also the work that they are capable of
carrying out to affect long-term structural change.
INGO theories of change
INGOs are primarily value-driven organisations, and whilst the values

may vary between different INGOs, there do seem to be key values
to which most would subscribe. The Toronto Declaration of NGO
core values, which was agreed and affirmed at the World Congress
of NGOs, lists these as: service beyond self; respect for human rights;
maintaining a vision; being responsible to the public; co-operating
across borders; the spirit of public mindedness; being accountable and
truthful; being non-profit; having a comprehensive viewpoint; and
maintaining the principle of voluntarism.1 Since the mid-1990s, the
overarching value of justice as a stated aim of both individual INGOs
as well as of the campaigns and networks they participate in – such as
the Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History campaigns – has become
more prevalent.
86
INGO Organisation and Strategy 87
However, it is vital not to lose sight of the fact that INGOs are
organisations, and that organisations possess a built-in momentum
to continue their existence. This means that they must accommodate
the requirements for their own survival and interests as integral to the
continuance of the value-driven work that they do (Hudock, 1999) and
that they tend towards becoming unresponsive bureaucracies (Korten,
1990). Ferguson’s (1994) critique of the development industry and
development practice, sees part of the problem as being the profes-
sionalisation of development, whereby INGO employees have become
specialists and technocrats. This in turn leads to addressing the issues
of poverty and development in terms of technocratic solutions. This
focus on organisational perpetuation has also been criticised by those
within the INGO sector: ‘People come into meeting rooms arguing for
more of the same “starving baby” pictures because that’s what pulls
in the money, and arguing against facing the wider, bigger truths
“because the public won’t respond”.’ The INGO executive continues
to argue that it is a sign that, consciously or otherwise, they are
putting their own quarterly targets or organisational growth needs at
the centre of their calculations (personal correspondence with INGO
executive, 2012).
Even more central to the ways that INGOs work is the way that they
conceptualise change. Many terms have been used to describe the
different ideological and pragmatic approaches taken by INGOs. Some
analyses of INGOs distinguish between incrementalist and structuralist
approaches to change, while others, such as Cowen and Shenton (1996),
speak of development as both an intentional practice and an immanent
process. Many working on INGO campaigning have been increasingly
using the distinction between charity and justice as a shift of narrative
within the sector. Gillian Hart (2001) made the point well when she
made the distinction between INGOs that are more driven to do ‘Big D’
development, and others that are more interested in ‘little d’ develop-
ment. In Hart’s analysis, what she sees as Big D development is based
on the approach most common to INGOs, which is project-based work
involving intentional activity with clear project outputs. Big D develop-
ment does not involve making structural changes but rather working
within the structures that already exist, whereas little d development
is a process that involves systemic and radical alternatives in the ways
that development is done. Hart (2001: 650) outlines the distinction
thus: ‘“[B]ig D” Development [is] defined as a post-second world war
project of intervention in the “third world” that emerged in the context
of decolonization and the cold war, and “little d” development or the
development of capitalism, as a geographically uneven, profoundly

contradictory set of historical processes.’
With respect to INGOs, Banks and Hulme (2012: 13) outline some of
the perils of the predominant INGO theory of change of Big D devel-
opment. To focus on measurable outputs, Banks and Hulme argue that
INGOs must ignore the systemic processes and institutions that perpet-
uate poverty. As a consequence it is difficult for INGOs to work with
social movements, and they are ‘increasingly seeking poverty reduction
through projects rather than political change and redistribution which
depoliticises the structural condition of poverty’ (Banks and Hulme,
2012: 13). What Banks and Hulme and others do not explicitly state,
however, is that this is an organisational strategy and a set of deci-
sions that are specifically made by some INGOs. Most of them inhabit
a point on the spectrum between Big D and little d development and,
ultimately, this point depends on the organisational and strategic
choice that each INGO makes, and it relates to what has been called
their theory of change.
Through the government/BOAG meetings, the five BOAG INGOs all
have a similar engagement with the UK government. They all have a
somewhat similar business model of fundraising, service delivery and
advocacy; yet, they differ in their worldviews and – consequently – in
their theory of change. A senior member of one BOAG INGO stated:
‘It has been clearly said in meetings I have been in, by the most senior
executives of some of the biggest development agencies, that they aren’t
really interested in social justice, they “just want to save lives”, as if
somehow social justice wasn’t about saving lives on a massive scale’
(NGO122).
The idea of a theory of change has become very popular in the develop-
ment industry, particularly in the current decade. And, like many terms,
it has evolved to have a very particular meaning within the develop-
ment sector. For an academic, a theory of change would be, for example,
Marx’s theory of social change, which involves conflicts between societal
groups or classes, or the economist Milton Friedman’s theory of change,
which involves free market principles. Within INGOs, however, the use
of the term ‘theory of change’ has also become much more technocratic,
frequently being driven by INGO donors as an accountability mecha-
nism, but also reflecting INGOs’ ideas about how change occurs.
The Stanford Social Innovation Review states that simply putting
boxes and lines down on paper will not guarantee that an organisation
will make better decisions. Instead, Forti (2012) outlines six questions
that must be asked when putting together a theory of change, namely:
1 Who are you seeking to influence or benefit (target population)?

2 What benefits are you seeking to achieve (results)?
3 When will you achieve them (time period)?
4 How will you and others make this happen (activities, strategies,
resources, etc.)?
5 Where and under what circumstances will you do your work
(context)?
6 Why do you believe your theory will bear out (assumptions)?
While the questions may get to the heart of an organisation’s strategy, in

the case of INGOs, they fail to get to the root of how social change occurs,
and the specific social change the organisation must make (rather than
the tactics it will use) to achieve their strategies. Critics such as Deardson
accuse INGOs of misunderstanding how social change occurs, stating
that, ‘[T]hey think it is about educating people in power [ ... which]
reflects the internal dynamics of most NGOs – they want to keep firm
control. If they can say they represent 1 [sic] million people, that gives
them weight and importance; if those 1 [sic] million people really start
speaking it removes that importance – and heaven knows what they
will say.’ (Deardson, 2006: 262) He contrasts this with southern-driven
social movements that transcend narrow social interests or ways of oper-
ating to form a global struggle. Eyben et al. (2008: 202) concur in saying
that organisations need to ‘appreciate that those in whose interests we
claim to be acting may have very different ways of understanding how
change does or does not happen’. While this may overly glorify south-
ern-driven groups, it does make an interesting observation and points to
the need for INGOs to tightly control their messages. And consequently,
the preoccupation of INGOs with northern media with respect to their
fundraising and campaigning. In a scathing review of the BOAG INGOs,
a Director of a non-BOAG INGO argued that, ‘NGOs are not vehicles for
social change. They’re too big; they’re too corporate. And for organisa-
tions that are supposed to be part of a wider movement for change, they
don’t listen to social movements, and to have any legitimacy they have
to be taking their signals from social movements’ (NGO116).
INGO business model
Given the increase in funding to INGOs since the 1990s, the marked
increase of both INGO service provision and advocacy provision since
that time is unsurprising. Banks and Hulme (2012: 10–12), however,
argue that the increase in service provision has jeopardised INGOs’
loyalty to the grassroots. Although INGO service provision and advo-

cacy are not mutually exclusive – indeed most INGOs do both – and
although a service provision model is not problematic when INGOs are
providing humanitarian relief, in situations in which services are desper-
ately needed, there are problems regarding long-term development on
two counts. First, the model encourages INGOs to lean towards Big D
rather than little d political activity; second, with respect to engage-
ment, the model focuses on individuals’ charitable giving as the remedy
for poverty. Highlighting one INGO Director’s view, there seems to be
the business model and the change model, and many of the big INGOs
are driven more by the business model rather than by the change model
(NGO122).
This is not to say that INGOs cannot utilise both models, but the
problem is that it is then extremely difficult to escape the ‘charity as
the answer’ frame and to bring supporters or constituents of the INGO
into a more solidaristic frame. Indeed the end result is that the kneejerk
reaction of supporters who see images of poverty is often either to tune
out or give money. The prevailing INGO business model thus means
that engagement with northern publics has become overly focused
on delivering service to the poor (in itself not a bad thing) instead of
challenging structures of poverty. According to one INGO Campaign
Director (NGO122), ‘INGOs have a very strong urge towards action. But
at this time, they’re still on that side of fundraising and give money and
there is a tiny little action thing, and yet they try to ride both horses and
there is an inherent contradiction’.
To appreciate the factors that affect INGO behaviours, we must see
them as highly strategic organisational entities. INGOs are structures
that must be internally managed, that are functionally organised, that
are strategic, and that operate, influence – and are influenced by – their
environments (Yanacopulos, 2005; Hudock, 1999); yet INGOs are also
value-driven organisations. There are different operational functions
within the INGO business model, and these sections or departments of
INGOs have their own aims, ways of working and priorities. For example,
the function and priorities of an INGO’s fundraising department would
be different than the function of the same INGO’s humanitarian response
department. The intra-organisational differences between INGO depart-
ments are rarely examined (Orgad, 2013; Wong, 2012) and are extremely
important in explaining what we have referred to as their ambivalence
(Yanacopulos and Baillie Smith, 2007). And INGOs as organisations
are all very different from each other in their connection to either to
specific issues – such as Save the Children’s focus on children – or to

very specific constituents – such as CAFOD’s and Christian Aid’s links
to the Catholic and Anglican churches. Yet although there are differ-
ences between INGOs, all five of the BOAG INGOs and the majority of
other INGOs possess at least some operational similarities when it comes
to both service provision and to their connection to constituents and
general publics.
For an organisation to change its business model is a dangerous
prospect. One INGO that is highly dependent on income from child
sponsorship cannot immediately move to another business model
without jeopardising the work being done by the organisation. As the
Head of Policy for a BOAG INGO stated, ‘you have got people who
are attached to the children they sponsor [ ... ] so how do we continue
to appeal to these people in terms of making sense to them, and at
the same time appealing to newer audiences as well’ (NGO113). And
even if there is momentum from within an organisation to change the
INGO’s business model, an INGO employee states that ‘ultimately the
business model pulls you back, because the NGO does have to make
money, and the business model says they need 100,000 million a year
from the public, and [changing the business model] threatens that’
(NGO122).
Fundraising
Fundraising is a vital element in the operation of almost all INGOs.
Frequently, the sole point of contact between individuals in the north
and aid agencies is through their fundraising departments. Not surpris-
ingly then, the marketing and branding of INGOs has become an essen-
tial element in their strategy – the better known the organisations are,
the deeper the brand loyalty, the more likely it is that their northern
constituents will continue to donate money to them during fundraising
campaigns.
Development INGOs, by definition, are involved in some type of
work overseas. This involvement and work is then relayed back to their
supporters and to the general public as well as to institutional donors.
Particularly when it comes to individuals, information about programme
work is frequently relayed back through a request for further funding –
in a ‘something must be done’ claim. The supporter’s charitable dona-
tion is offered as a means to address whatever need is identified by the
INGO – to ‘end the needless suffering’ – and to allow the INGOs ‘good
work’ to continue.
Table 5.1 BOAG INGO income sources
Government,
institutional
Voluntary Investment other public Other Total
income income authorities Trading income income
Oxfam GB 200.2 0.9 162.1 3.9 0.8 367.9
Save UK 121.4 0.8 150.7 8.5 2.4 283.7
Christian Aid 57.8 – 36.7 – 1.0 95.5
Action Aid 48.2 0.2 11.2 0.5 – 59.6
CAFOD 33.6 – 11.1 0.4 3.7 48.8
Note: BOAG INGO income source breakdown.

Source: figures assembled from annual financial reports.2
From the figures above, it is evident that the majority of funding

received by INGOs comes from fundraising from the public, and
that an INGO’s relationship with the public is, therefore, of ultimate
importance, as much from a perspective of legitimacy as fundraising.
Additionally, while INGOs do receive significant funds from corporate
donors, government and international organisations, unlike most dona-
tions from the public these tend to be tied, restricted or earmarked to
particular projects and have specific outcomes and outputs attached.
That most publicly raised funds are unrestricted means an INGO can use
them as it sees fit, giving the organisation flexibility.3 However, while
publicly raised funds are desirable and lucrative, an INGO is then tied
into appealing to recognisable charitable narratives.
Martin Kirk, who has worked at a number of the BOAG INGOs,
describes INGO marketing and fundraising thus:
Large development NGOs excel in two main areas that relate to their
domestic environments: using consumer marketing techniques and
retail operations to raise funds and guide mass broadcast communica-
tion; and traditional advocacy and public policy. Expertise in fund-
raising and, for some, running shops, is undeniable. Oxfam GB, for
example, raises over £300 million a year and is the largest second-
hand bookseller in Europe. It knows how to run a business. And, like
Save the Children, the Red Cross, World Vision, and many others, it
knows how to do this because it knows, among other things, how
to build brand awareness and appeal to people to get an immediate
response. There are few better at direct response marketing than the
best NGOs ... . NGO brands are some of the most widely known and
trusted. (Kirk, 2012: 252)
Although alternative fundraising models exist, for example those in

which an organisation relies primarily on donations from governments
and other large funders, these can also be highly problematic in that
the organisation is extremely vulnerable to donor demands. On the
other hand, more advocacy-focused NGOs that do not engage in service
delivery do not require the funds required by the BOAG INGOs, thereby
operating by a different business model.
Although humanitarian emergencies and longer-term development
are frequently seen as part of a continuum, many INGOs have two
separate departments to deal with each, at least within their appeals
processes. Both situations require a different type of engagement with
publics, but when we look at how the two different processes are medi-
ated, we discover that this can often be problematic and confusing for
the public. Frequently, a perpetual ‘disaster’ mode exists amongst the
mediators. One example is my local Oxfam shop which has displayed a
Humanitarian Emergency banner in its front window for at least three
years. The result of this is counterproductive as passers-by stop seeing the
banner, and if one does actually register it the assumption is that we are
in a constant state of emergency. A media manager from a BOAG INGO
said that emergencies give you that emotional reaction (NGO115), and
Powers (2014: 98) quotes the Save the Children UK Communications
Director, who said that during a humanitarian emergency, everything
else gets pushed aside, and ‘fund-raising in those moments keeps our
programmes funded for the next few years’. As the Communications
Director or another BOAG INGO stated, ‘logic makes people think,
emotion makes people act!’ (NGO128).
The images of starving children used by some INGOs, such as Save
the Children, Plan, CARE, and World Vision are also counterproductive
in many ways in the longer-term. Leaving the moral arguments against
their use aside, such images reinforce a state of ‘crisis’ when referring
to safe drinking water, education, sanitation and economic growth.
And, as discussed in the previous chapter, the images used are mostly
those of vulnerable women and children. A Director of a non-BOAG
NGO commented (in a dismayed way) that: ‘My fundraisers were just
at a seminar yesterday and they were showed the difference between
how much money you raise showing happy babies vs dying babies,
and you raise much more money showing dying babies’ (NGO116).
Another Head of Communications stated ‘there is a direct correlation
between the amount of pity shown and the money raised. You turn
down the pity even by a small degree and your income goes down. This
is particularly true for ads on daytime TV’ (NGO128). Thus, at least in
the short term these images remain extremely effective in raising funds.
The figures from Save the Children fundraising confirm this equation
of using emotionally charged imagery as seen in Table 5.1. In a Save the
Children (2012: 30) Annual Report, the organisation states that in 2011,
in ‘what continues to be a tough economic environment, income from
individuals and communities grew’.
Most people interviewed were extremely critical of some of the
existing fundraising practices and were very reflective on the effects
of these practices. But there were unclear recommendations as to how
the fundraising models of the sector should change. With respect to
decreasing INGO reliance on fundraising from humanitarian emergen-
cies, a Head of Policy from a BOAG INGO stated that, ‘as a whole, the
sector has put a lot of investment into too much short termism and
that short termism means it’s harder to build a longer-term conver-
sation’ (NGO113). With respect to using more positive images, the
Communication Director of another BOAG INGO described a fund-
raising experiment which tried to focus on the joy of giving and posi-
tive images and stories, and ‘it didn’t work and it was a massive failure.
There are lots of people within the sector who desire to “break the
mould” of that equation of impoverished child equals large donations.
So this is not a lack of imagination or desire of fundraisers. It is a
fundamental problem’ (NGO128).
Fundraising is an existential issue for NGOs and INGOs. Without
raising funds, the organisation cannot do the work that it is mandated
to do (both morally and formally). When I sat on the Oxfam Canada
National Fundraising Committee in the mid-1990s, this was a constant
pressure. And it remains one – the question ‘How can we fundraise and
yet still maintain the dignity of the people we are fundraising for?’ is still
being debated within the NGO sector today.
Marketing
Marketing, branding and fundraising are integrally linked and are key
operational elements of an INGO. The INGO’s brand is related to a
relationship of trust between the organisation and the public, making
them worthy of their supporters’ donations. Additionally, INGOs are
operating within an extremely competitive sector in which they must
stand out. Thus, within such an environment, it is essential that INGOs
not only speak to their constituents, but differentiate themselves from
other INGOs, which they do through branding themselves and their
work and developing a niche area of expertise (Desforges, 2004: 561).
There is a significant tension within INGOs – that of needing to appear
professional and consequently trustworthy, but not so professional that

supporters consider they are expensive to run and suspect that dona-
tions might go on organisational running costs rather than to relieve
poverty.
INGO use of celebrities has also become much more commonplace,
particularly since the Make Poverty History campaigns of 2005. Celebrity
endorsements well pre-date 2005, but INGOs are increasingly comple-
menting their own brand with that of the celebrity, and the opposite
is also true. The role of celebrities is twofold: first, celebrities bring
attention to a particular issue for the INGO, discussing it on television
and highlighting a particular situation that would have received little
press; second, by having celebrities discuss the key issues in different
media, more people will hear about an issue and donate to the INGO.
In Biccum’s (2011: 1333) terms, they ‘combine in a single personage the
free market development actor and advocate’.4
INGOs’ participation in large-scale issue-based campaigning networks
has increased since the mid-1990s, as we will see in the following
chapter. However, one of the challenges they face in working on large-
scale campaigns has been how to retain their identity and brand within
these networks. As will be shown in the following chapter, this was
evident during the Make Poverty History march in Edinburgh in July
2005 where there was a sea of white banners and placards and yet indi-
vidual INGO branding was also clear.
Fundraising and branding have been also very evident in the selling
of particular ‘goods’ such as those sold in charity shops and through the
INGOs’ websites. The most successful of the selling of goods through the
Oxfam website is the ‘Oxfam goat’ as part of their Unwrapped scheme.
Although such packaging of development into tangible chunks for
fundraising is not a novel idea, as we have seen it done before with
child sponsorship, where studies have clearly shown that people give
more money when they are confronted by an image of a child (Young
2012: 20). Burnell (1990: 68) said that child sponsorship ‘meets an indi-
vidual need of sponsors who wish to relate to the beneficiaries as indi-
viduals’; yet this commodification of individual children perpetuates a
paternalistic relationship, one in which the donors ‘shop’ for a child and
receive pictures and updates, perpetuating the relationships discussed in
the previous chapter. While child sponsorship has been criticised in the
past, many of the large INGOs still use it as a fundraising mechanism.
Additionally, as was well captured in the 2002 film ‘About Schmidt’, the
relationship between the rich sponsor and the poor child is frequently
more about what the sponsor gets out of the relationship. This unmasks
child sponsorship as a type of colonial or patronising cosmopolitan rela-

tionship, mediated by INGOs, between northern publics and the benefi-
ciaries of child sponsorship.
Oxfam started a more interesting progression with respect to the
commodification of development between people from the global north
and the global south with its Unwrapped scheme. Other INGOs followed,
such as Christian Aid with their Present Aid initiative. In this commodi-
fied relationship the purchase is actually a commodity, such as Oxfam’s
mascot goat, which someone in the north purchases through the INGO
and which is then given to someone in the south. The creators of the
Oxfam fundraising ‘goat’ approach were aware of the paternalistic child
sponsorship relationship and consequently constructed a campaign that
packaged development in consumable chunks. This is a different (and
certainly much less objectionable) commodifying relationship, enabling
people to buy a piece of development as a Christmas present. The INGOs
are clear about their mediating role within the relationship, but this
purchase is a comment both on our excessive consumption of goods as
on the needs of the recipients.
Compassion fatigue
Compassion fatigue is a term primarily used amongst health care profes-
sionals, and indicates a steady decrease of compassion over time. Within
the context of international development and INGOs more specifically,
compassion fatigue rests on the assumption that there is public apathy
around giving. This now overused term was brought to popular atten-
tion in Susan Moeller’s 1999 book Compassion Fatigue, which high-
lighted how the American media covers the world, and how it represents
the ‘four horsemen of the apocalypse’: disease, famine, war and death,
outlining the disaster and famine narratives used by the media.
Frequently, when this term is used within the development sector, it
places the responsibility of apathy and fatigue on the audience, rather
than on the messages that these audiences are receiving. The logic is that
audiences and potential donors resist donating for a variety of reasons,
such as a response to feelings of guilt and manipulation as a result of an
INGO’s fundraising efforts. Cohen and Seu’s (2002) study of humani-
tarian appeals shows that audiences negotiate with their own responses
to an appeal; they are cognisant of being the focus of such appeals and
state that they resent being a ‘beleaguered public audience that has to
train itself to read between the lines of these texts and to defend itself
against incessant attempts to get something out of its members’. (Cohen
and Seu, 2002: 198) That this audience reaction could potentially produce
the exact opposite of the action desired by the INGO is what Coulter and
Pinto (1995) call a ‘maladaptive response including reactance and / or
counter arguing’ (cited in Basil et al., 2008: 5). Reactance is when an indi-
vidual feels manipulated and reacts in a negative manner, and counter
arguing is a reaction in which the individual thinks of arguments that are
contrary to the presented message (Basil et al., 2008: 5).
One respondent, formerly in a senior position within one of the
BOAG INGOs, outlines their argument against particular forms of INGO
fundraising:
A picture of a starving child depicts a brutal and important truth,

what can possibly be wrong with that? Four things. One, because
in choosing to highlight the symptom it is actively obscuring the
cause. Two, because it is feeding a commonly held perception that
impoverished people are basically helpless, thereby degrading them,
shunting them to the bottom of a pyramid of social value and reas-
serting the higher position of the powerful giver. Three, it is subtly
resting responsibility for massive systemic failures of a whole culture
on individual shoulders. And four, because it is connecting a problem
of systemic injustice with a £5-a-month solution in the public mind.
(personal correspondence with INGO executive, 2012)
Glennie et al.’s (2012) study outlines two types of international devel-

opment campaigns that they found were counterproductive. The first
refers to the UK’s Department for International Development’s efforts
to reframe international development as being in the UK’s self-interest.
The study found that attempts did not resonate with publics in the
same way as approaches that focused on development as being ‘right’
or ‘fair’ (Glennie et al., 2012: 23). The second was what they call the
‘heart-string appeals’ of some INGOs. These campaigns and fundraising
appeals, they argue, may be effective in raising funds in the short term,
but in the long-term:
[T]hey tend to reinforce the sense that aid has not worked, as repeated
appeals lead to questions over the effectiveness of development in
general and aid in particular. In all four workshops, frustration was
expressed about the apparent lack of progress implied by repetitive
campaign messages since the time of the Live Aid concerts. Indeed,
there was evidence of a growing scepticism of the use of imagery
that depicts only starvation or those in desperate need. Participants
suggested that, while they understood why charities used these
pictures, it made them feel they were being manipulated or misled.

(Glennie et al., 2012: 23)
Thus, not only is it morally objectionable to use what Young (2012:

27) has called ‘poster children’ with ‘flies in their eyes’ images, which in
Cohen’s words (2001: 178) reflect a ‘pragmatic amorality’ but, in addi-
tion, by using such images INGOs are both pragmatically and strate-
gically at risk of creating a culture of complacency. On the one hand
images must become increasingly extreme or emotive to illicit support
(Young, 2012: 27) or, on the other, individuals and INGO supporters
switch off and stop contributing.
But is the answer to use positive images? Martin Scott argues that
positive images are not problem-free either: ‘[T]here is no ideal form
of humanitarian communication, only a series of similarly problem-
atic compromises in response to the intractable and often irresolvable
tensions inherent within NGO communications.’ (Scott, 2014: 138) As
Scott outlines, there are always tensions inherent to taking actions
around suffering at a distance, and even with positive imagery, we
cannot overcome these tensions. However, there is also a line that should
not be crossed when it comes to a level of dignity in the ways that we
portray human suffering. In addition, even the approaches of INGOs
who have tried to renounce the representations of suffering in meta-ap-
peals, such as Oxfam’s See Africa Differently campaign, are not without
their tensions. By including the audience in their meta-appeal and in
the dilemma of humanitarian mediation, as Oxfam did in the 2012
campaign, they have attempted to avoid arousing feelings of manipula-
tion that may cause audiences to reject their claims (Vestergaard 2011).
However, as we saw in previous chapters, campaigns such as Oxfam’s
See Africa Differently campaign can leave audiences without a clear idea
of what action to take. In Chouliaraki’s terms, the campaign feeds into
problematic post humanitarian narratives.
The aim here is not to blame INGOs for their fundraising business
model, as it has been essential to their success, and the money they have
raised has helped the lives of millions of people. The issue, rather, is
that the relationship that fundraising forges is one that is dependent on
the charity narrative and therefore perpetuates the charity relationship
between publics in the global north to people in the global south. INGOs
are well aware of this, but raising funds is fundamental to their survival,
and INGO directors listen to their fundraisers. The charity frame, even
amongst the more progressive of the BOAG INGOs and other INGOs,
seems to be here to stay.
Advocacy
The more political elements of INGO work, involving policy and research,
large-scale campaigns, lobbying governments and other institutions and
development awareness, fall under the umbrella of advocacy. All INGOs
engage in all of these to varying degrees, and in the following section we
will look at the INGO functions that involve engaging publics, donors
and relevant institutions.
Advocacy campaigns
The term advocacy is understood here (and is employed by development
INGOs themselves) as the attempt to influence change at a strategic
level. Both lobbying and campaigning make important tactical contri-
butions in the effort to effect normative, and thereby, practical change.
The term ‘advocacy’ may apply to many functional departments within
an organisation, from programming to policy.
Advocacy is an inherently political act that attempts to influence
other actors. To advocate means to promote the causes of others; Keck
and Sikkink (1998: 8) describe NGO advocacy as ‘plead[ing] the causes
of others or defend[ing] a cause or proposition ... [Advocacy groups] are
organised to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they
often involve individuals advocating policy changes.’ Advocacy can
go beyond lobbying and influencing decision-makers to encompass
development education and development awareness – that is to say,
informing the public on larger development issues. Jordan and Van Tuijl
have defined advocacy as action that attempts to rectify unequal power
relations and power imbalances. They go on to assert that a distinc-
tion has been made in classing NGOs as either ‘operational’ or ‘advo-
cacy’, and that this is a misconception ‘as all acts which create space for
the weak and powerless are political acts’ (Jordan and Van Tuijl, 1998:
6). Kirk (2012: 252) describes the function of advocacy within a BOAG
INGO thus: ‘Their remit is twofold: to provide world-class public policy
arguments to convince those in power to do what they deem neces-
sary; and to provide the advocacy expertise to take that policy and plot
an influential course through infinitely complex policy and political
debates at the national, regional, and global level.’
Advocacy campaigns are premised on the belief that an injustice
exists. To rectify this injustice, the campaign will offer a solution – a
particular action to contribute to the rectification. This type of interna-
tional advocacy campaigning is a long-established function of develop-
ment INGOs and requires co-ordinated efforts at the transnational level.
Edwards (1993: 164) makes a clear distinction between two different

forms of advocacy: the first, which attempts to influence structures and
ideologies, is a more systemic approach; the second, which attempts to
influence specific policies and programmes, is a more incremental one.
However, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive and an organi-
sation can work at both levels.
The professionalisation of lobbying is an important aspect of NGO
work, necessitated by the need for effective advocacy at the highest
levels. While the terms lobbying and advocacy are sometimes used
synonymously, lobbying is a narrowly defined process5 that describes
the practice of influencing the formal political process (Jordan and Van
Tuijl, 1998: 6). Thus, to lobby is to attempt to influence, or steer, formal
decisions being made by government officials. The term has since been
extended to include those outside the formal political process, for
example working in international institutions. Jordan and Van Tuijl
(1998: 7) explain the importance of groups lobbying on behalf of others,
stating that:
[W]hile it is true that local communities are often able to adequately

present their own interests, local leaders ... do not have daily access to
other politically important geographical spaces like national capitals
or internationally important political spaces such as Washington DC,
New York, Brussels, Hong Kong or Nairobi.
The hiring of lobbyists, network facilitators and researchers, in centres

where they are able to influence and have access to those in decision-
making positions, is the most recent move towards a professionalisation
of NGOs. An official of Oxfam International has described the skill of
advocacy as the combination of ‘art’ and ‘science’. The science aspect
refers to the ability to conduct and disseminate sound research, while
‘influencing – now that’s the art part. So you have your science and
you have your art. And that’s where [our lobbyists] are great artists’
(NGO101).
An INGO lobbyist, meanwhile, describes lobbying as working with
insiders and suggests it is about persuasion: ‘[I]t is a much more nuanced
message than the campaigning is; it is complementary but it will have
to be much simpler. You need to make people angry, you need to have
a clear villain, you need to have very clear objectives, and very simple
messages’ (NGO103).
Advocacy, however, remains difficult to evaluate as there are many
variables that can lead up to a change of policy or decision. Chapman
and Wameyo (2001) outline the six primary problems in its evaluation
as follows:
1 Causal relationships: Linking advocacy initiatives and outcomes is

complex.
2 Subjective gains: Opinions of the significance of gains vary and further
political goals can often shift depending on the circumstances.
3 Multiple approaches: Influencing can form part of many approaches,
including lobbying, advocacy or campaigning, and it may be difficult
to assess which lead(s) to most impact.
4 Time horizons: Influencing work is long-term and change can be slow
and incremental.
5 Changing circumstances: Due to the fluid environment, advocacy is
rarely repeated or replicated. As a result, there is rarely any accumula-
tion of knowledge.
6 Conflictual process: Influencing often means engaging in a process
that may have political consequences.
Not all INGOs advocate in the same manner. As Stroup and Murdie (2012:
426) outline, some INGOs focus on lobbying politicians, other NGOs
may focus their attention on protests and demonstrations, and some
may use more conciliatory language while others may take on more chal-
lenging stances. Stroup and Murdie (2012) have examined how INGOs
engage in advocacy in different countries, and the role national context
may play in INGO advocacy strategies, and how various INGOs differ in
their approaches within the same context. It makes sense that in coun-
tries where INGOs receive a smaller percentage of the entire aid budget,
such as in the UK (rather than the United States), there should be more
confrontational advocacy from the INGO sector. And while UK govern-
ment officials do meet with INGOs, frequently, through the BOAG and
through other means, it seems that INGOs are not at this point being
punished for being critical of government. As supported by Stroup and
Murdie (2012: 445), they claim that there is little evidence of UK NGOs
being punished for being critical of government, and frequently the UK
government supports INGOs’ research, which is the evidence base for
their advocacy. However, the UK’s Minister of Civil Society commented
on the 2014 UK Lobbying Act that limits INGO activities; the minister
criticised NGOs that went beyond ‘helping people’. Brooks Newmark,
the minister, commented ‘We really want to try and keep charities and
voluntary groups out of the realms of politics [ ... ] When they stray into
the realm of politics that is not what they are about and that is not
why people give them money’ (quoted in Mason, 2014). He proceeded

to tell ‘charities’ to ‘stick to their knitting’. Although the Lobbying Bill
does not just affect INGOs, UK INGOs have always been bound by the
Charity Commission which has been used to rein in an INGO that is
viewed by the government to venture beyond its humanitarian or chari-
table remit. The Oxfam ‘Perfect Storm’ example illustrates the impact of
the Lobbying Bill. In 2014, Oxfam sent a tweet linking benefit cuts to
UK poverty, and a UK Conservative MP filed a complaint to the Charity
Commission, claiming that the tweet was ‘overtly political’. The Charity
Commission exonerated Oxfam, but this one case has affected the social
media policies of numerous INGOs throughout the sector, with a number
of INGOs insisting on stricter internal social media controls.
Another element of advocacy is campaigning. Campaigns can both
provide a form of public education and mobilise people around an issue,
and they can be part of an advocacy strategy that may also support an
organisation’s lobbying programmes (Fowler, 1997: 14). Campaigning
requires a simple message and a clear objective, and its purpose is to
use media to mobilise supporters to put pressure on decision-makers. To
do this, activists will use whatever strategic tools are available to them,
and fostering international political pressure is pivotal in their arsenal
(Yanacopulos, 2005). Typically, campaigning is adversarial, requiring a
villain or an injustice. Keck and Sikkink (1998: 27) argue that a ‘causal
story’ must be established, so that responsibility for an injustice is
obvious and that ‘the causal chain needs to be sufficiently short and
clear to make the case convincing’. In identifying an injustice, advo-
cacy campaigns are not structured to foster a feeling of charity amongst
supporters, but a reaction to this injustice. However, even within a
justice-based advocacy campaign, differing views may arise between
those who want structural change, for example, and those who want
change at a more incremental pace (Yanacopulos, 2005).
Development education and awareness

Development education is not a new function of INGOs, but it is one
that made a resurgence in the late 1990s and early 2000s when most
large INGOs took on a development education function. Within the
UK, the Development Education Association was formed in 1993 by
Oxfam, CAFOD, Save the Children, Christian Aid and Action Aid (the
BOAG group), in conjunction with other Development Education
Centres throughout the country. In the UK, the role of development
education has since diminished as a result of cuts in government
funding after 2010.
Development education is related to, and focused on, the wider contexts
and causes of inequality. It does not emphasise singular messages but
rather, in the UK at least, it focuses on developing peoples’ capacity for
critical reflection about the world they live in and on empowering them
to act in response to this. Thus, development education is about the
content of what development is and what the issues are, but also about
the process of developing critical thinking of those same issues. There
are, too, different ways of conceptualising development education.
Some, such as Bourn (2003: 4), state that it is ‘rooted in two distinct
but interlinked theories: development theory and Freirean liberation
education’, while others, such as Huckle (2004: 29), argue that develop-
ment education lost its Marxist focus. Concomitant with the increase in
government funding between 1997–2010 in the UK, there were ongoing
debates during this time about the role of development education within
NGOs, its promotion within formal settings and the relationship and
links between development education and other NGO functions such as
campaigning, advocacy and fundraising (Smith, 2004).
The Development Education Association, which has been renamed
Think Global, has a remit not only to promote development issues (such
as economic globalisation, environmental issues and human rights)
and northern publics’ understanding of them, but also to promote the
ways that education can lead to a better understanding of global learn-
ing.6 The work of development education involves making the connec-
tions between those living in the global north and the global south.
Although the BOAG INGOs helped to create the Development Education
Association, and had in-house development education departments
themselves, these seem to have vanished or have assumed a secondary
role in the organisations.
The protest business

INGOs are complex – on the one hand they are value-driven, on the other
they operate in a highly competitive environment and generally engage
with other more powerful political actors. We have seen that public
engagement does not exist in a vacuum, but is largely produced through
particular types of organisations working to particular constraints. Critics
of INGOs, such as Choudry and Kapoor (2013), talk about the process
of NGOisation, which describes how NGOs and INGOs have become
part of the problems of development. Choudry and Kapoor argue that
NGOs have backed away from challenging governments in favour of
having partnerships with them, thus making their actual involvement
in public protests measured and minimal. One of the social movement
interviewees they spoke to recounts: ‘They show up to our meetings and

our own rallies but they disappear when we call them to stand with us
when we are fighting.’ (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013: 64)
Within the social movement literature, INGOs are described as being
part of the protest business, yet there are distinctions made between
INGOs and social movements. Darnton and Kirk (2011: 6) describe
INGO models of public engagement and protest as ‘cheap participation’,
typified by low barriers to entry, engagement and exit. An employee of
one of the BOAG INGOs described his relationship with more radical
protest groups specifically targeting the World Bank and the IMF. When
asked how he worked with the more radical groups within a particular
campaign, he responded that he chose to work with these activists
behind the scenes. He also said that he managed the relationship very
carefully, and that next to some of these radical groups, he could come
into discussions sounding like the very rational and reasonable voice.
He saw the need for their work, but he also saw how he could use the
situation so that his INGO appeared like the voice of reason amongst the
protest (NGO101).
Conclusion
Public engagement does not exist in a vacuum, but is largely produced

through particular types of organisations working to particular
constraints. INGOs are complex, value-driven, and competitive, but
they are also extremely well organised and strategic. Their operational
structures, combined with their functional distinctions, mean that they
produce different types of engagement with their constituents. In addi-
tion, the different operational parts of each INGO may have not only
different objectives, but also different timescales to one another. Then
there is the fact that the fundraisers and those working on the develop-
ment awareness and advocacy elements might have differing priorities.
Some areas employ professions or specialists (such as communication
or fundraising professionals), who have joined the INGO because of
the type of work they – the professional – are doing, as opposed to the
INGO’s organisational mission, a fact which ties into the ambivalent
cosmopolitanism argument of the previous chapter.
Looking at INGOs as organisations, with structures, strategies and their
organisational logics, is vital when looking at their engagement with
northern publics. Desforge (2004: 565) argues that ‘it is the ability of
organisations [INGOs] to reproduce themselves as actors over time that
legitimates their agenda, rather than legitimation provided by support

for the justice of a particular cause.’
So where does this leave INGOs? Bebbington suggests that INGOs need
to rediscover the normative meaning of development, to return to a
conception that is not about development projects but about redistribu-
tion and transformation (quoted in Banks and Hulme, 2012: 22). Michael
Edwards has argued that one of the areas of focus of INGOs should be
for them to build constituencies for change in the global north. While
Martin Kirk (2012: 249) speaks of a new discourse ‘grounded in ideas of
justice and equality ... [for] a worldview based on shared prosperity, in
which basic standards of fairness are a common good and mass poverty
a moral and practical wrong’. The Finding Frames study (Darnton and
Kirk, 2011: 10) argues that there needs to be a shift of public engage-
ment activities away from transaction and towards transformations. The
following two chapters will examine two new spaces of possibility for
INGOs, where they can (and to some degree, have done already) explore
forging different types of relationships with northern publics in order
to move forward on the goals stated by Bebbington, Darnton and Kirk,
and Edwards.
6
Networked Spaces of INGOs
For INGOs, working within networked spaces is not a recent idea.

They have been building their own networks both internally, with
their southern partners, and externally, with other INGOs and devel-
opment actors, since their inception. And, with respect to engage-
ment, advocacy and activism, working with others makes a great deal
of sense – the higher the number of partners, the greater the reach of
their message. Information and communication technologies have
dramatically impacted the work of INGOs; they have transformed INGO
campaigning, opening up new political spaces to engage with publics, as
well as new spaces for collaborations with other groups. Such networked
spaces offer all organisations vast opportunities, but with these come
vast problems, too.
This chapter will examine INGO networked spaces, with a specific
focus on major campaigning ‘moments’ such as Jubilee 2000, Make
Poverty History and the IF campaigns. The BOAG group of INGOs all
formed part of these campaigns and is testament to the ways that INGOs
can work with each other. In addition, not only do they informally come
together as the BOAG, but these INGOs have formally come together in
the past to form the New Internationalist magazine, and the Development
Education Association. However, there have also been many problems
associated with the way in which INGOs have worked within networked
spaces. These include competition for funding and consequently for
their brand, the fact that different views and ideologies lie behind each
INGO’s ideas of social change and justice, their ability and capacity to
work with social movement organisations and grassroots groups, and
their timelines and operational campaign approaches. The chapter
argues that these three campaigns – Jubilee 2000, Make Poverty History
and the IF campaign – used cosmopolitan frames and these should have
106
Networked Spaces of INGOs 107
resulted in greater outcomes than were achieved. Arguably, although the

campaigns were successful (to varying degrees), they failed to deliver the
changes they were aiming for, because of their lack of deliberation, their
positioning within the sector and their abilities to collaborate.
Networked campaigning spaces
The enabling elements of ICT networks helped both to construct and to

complement the organisational networks that were pivotal to both the
Jubilee 2000 and the Make Poverty History campaigns. Information and
communication technologies facilitate and enable networks; such struc-
tures of connectivity link organisations together electronically, enabling
social networks to flourish. As in social networks, there are a number
of highly connected nodes or hubs within each technology network.
For example, specific websites act as focal points for individuals and
groups – the websites might be search engines such as Google, or they
might be hyperlinked websites, such as oneworld.org where groups go
to find information – and these structural nodes operate very much like
social networks (both between individuals and organisations).
The ability of any organisation to influence its environment and
control its resources is vital to its survival. The ability to influence
its environment, however, is of even greater importance to develop-
ment INGOs, whose principal aims are service delivery, engagement
and advocacy. Strategies to continue operating within each organisa-
tion’s environment require ‘interlocking activities with others, and
such interlocking produces concentrated power. Those organisations
not involved in the resultant structure, are less powerful and less able
to cope with their problems of interdependence’ (Pfeffer and Salancik,
1984: 158). Mann calls this ‘organisational outflanking’ – a strategic
process whereby organisations increase their influence through forging
alliances with other organisations. To be effective, organisations such as
development INGOs must operate at various strategic levels – on both
the individual organisational level, and also on the inter-organisational
level.
When individuals and organisations work together, they can do so to
varying degrees. Himmelman (1996: 28) has outlined some of the ways
that non-state organisations work together, and his typologies range
from them forming networks, which are less formal, to collaborations
which he sees as being a more formal relationship. In Himmelman’s
view, when organisations collaborate, this includes the aspects of other
forms of working together, such as networking, inter-organisational
co-ordination and organisational co-operation. He argues that when

organisations collaborate, this involves them changing their activi-
ties and also sharing their resources, in order to increase their overall
capacity. Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink constructed their own typology
for organisations working together in an advocacy capacity. They argue
that transnational networks are the most informal type of configuration,
bringing together non-state actors with shared values and involving
dense exchanges of information and services across country boundaries
with the primary aim of information exchange (Khagram et al., 2002: 7).
Transnational coalitions link members across boundaries to co-ordinate
or share strategies, in order publicly to influence social change, and for
this they require a greater degree of formal contact among members to
strategise their campaigns and to achieve their aims. They mobilise their
constituents for collective action through the use of protest or disrup-
tive action and have a high-level of transnational collective identity
(Khagram et al., 2002: 7–8).
In his typology of organisational formations, Fowler (1997:
111) focused specifically on development NGOs and identified the
perceived organisational costs and benefits involved in joining a group.
In his view, the primary cost is the loss of autonomy, and ‘the greater
the perceived benefit, the more likely an NGDO [non-governmental
development organisation] will be to give up autonomy of action and/
or take on additional responsibility for its action with others.’ According
to Johanson and Mattson (1988), what they call strategic alliances are
a particular mode of inter-organisational relationship in which the
partners make substantial investments in developing common opera-
tions over a long-term period. This type of coalition involves substantial
commitment of resources, mutually acceptable objectives and a sharing
of risk from environmental pressures (Egan, 1995: 147).
The network is the most common inter-organisational form. Manuel
Castells is a key figure in discussions around what he calls the network
society. For Castells, the network society is both about the social
networks which have always existed, and about the technology that
has enabled them to flourish – for both individuals and organisations,
thus making networks the fundamental units of operation in modern
society (Castells, 2000). In his book Networks of Outrage and Hope (2012),
Castells focuses on social movements and networks of resistance, made
up of both individuals and organisations. As outlined by Biccum (2011:
1335–1336), other scholars, such as Hardt and Negri and Arturo Escobar,
are interested in the role of networks in large-scale social change and
refer to horizontal, self-organising, ‘meshworked’ political movements
with a wide set of political actors. It is within the context of this type
of networked society that we will explore the ways that INGOs come
together to utilise networked political space, and engage and potentially
mobilise publics in the global north.
Networking of INGOs
One of the most remarkable shifts in the NGO sector over the last few
decades has been the increase in INGOs’ transnational networking.
INGOs form networks for two primary reasons: to streamline their work
and reduce costs; and to advocate on behalf of those they hope to assist.
Although advocacy-related networks are not a new phenomenon, the
increase in them is. As Keck and Sikkink (1998: 10) report, there are
‘examples [of advocacy-related networks] as far back as the nineteenth
century, campaigning for the abolition of slavery. But their numbers,
size, and professionalism, and the speed, density, and complexity of
international linkages among them has grown dramatically in the last
three decades.’
Development NGO networks were defined by Fowler (1997: 115) as
either short or long-term, and national, continental and/or global asso-
ciations of NGOs. The NGOs come together to promote mutual interests,
creating a distinct entity for such a purpose, which may or may not be
formally registered as a separate legal body. Each network is established
around specific development issues rather than the concerns of the NGO
sector as a whole. The advocacy capacity provided by a network through
its membership is vast, building a momentum of many voices coming
together. Although networks, mandated as they are by their members
to adopt and voice positions on their behalf, thus serve as platforms for
the articulation of these members’ interests, they do not exercise any
formal authority or sanction over each member individually. There is
also no joint liability for operational performance beyond the shared
risk of losing credibility. A crucial benefit of such networks is the active
control of the new organisation by the members. The cost involved in
this for members is the time, human capacity, information and invest-
ment in the processes needed to reach collective decisions on issues, and
then in mandating the secretariat and office bearers accordingly. One
benefit of a network is greater strength when voicing shared positions,
together with enhanced informal access to information through trusted
relations.
The organisational reconfigurations of INGOs have been attributed
to the changing global environment with which they interact. In the
1980s and 1990s, the large-scale UN conferences encouraged INGOs to

work together, and by 1999 it had become commonplace for them to
belong to many networks. For example, the Head of Policy from one of
the BOAG INGOs stated that her organisation was connected to at least
25 networks, whereas it had belonged to only a handful five years before
(NGO135). A similar finding has been documented in management
studies, where for-profit organisations have formed coalitions with other
organisations, and created collaborative groupings with significantly
increased influence (Eden, 1996; Savage et al., 2010; Stroup and Murdie,
2012). The logic is that a group representing twenty organisations is less
likely to be ignored when it makes demands or speaks out on an issue,
particularly if the network is involved in advocacy. A similar logic has
developed behind the growing incidence of strategic alliances between
corporations (Hill et al., 2013). Belonging to a network increases each
individual organisation’s legitimacy in that it allows them to become
involved in important issues that they did not have the capacity to
address individually. This was highlighted by an employee from a
southern NGO who stated: ‘our participation [in the network] is for the
exchanging of information ... and to advance the voice of civil society
to make some kind of impact on reducing the negative consequences of
globalisation, particularly on the poor, around the world’ (NGO137).
Jordan and van Tuijl (1998: 9) observe that such a bridging of geograph-
ical space and institutional gaps is precisely what INGO networks are
capable of achieving. They propose that this type of representation
could be considered a new form of the democratic process. Nyamugasira
(1998: 301) emphasises that ‘the real strength of INGOs lies in their
simultaneous access to grassroots experience in the south and to the
decision-makers in the north.’ Jordan and van Tuijl (1998: 7) explain
the importance of groups lobbying on behalf of others, stating that,
‘[W]hile it is true that local communities are often able to adequately
present their own interests ... [they] do not have daily access to other
politically important geographical spaces like national capitals or inter-
nationally important political spaces.’ Thus the logic is that for INGOs
to address global-level issues, they need to have become more global
themselves. Additionally, since the mid-1990s, a discourse has existed
within the INGO community of the importance of belonging to such
networks, in what Phillips and Hardy (1997) have called a ‘discourse of
collaboration’ within the sector.
Frequently missing from these INGO discourses of collaboration, is the
competitive environment of the INGO sector. The levels of competition
between INGOs may not be on par with those of the corporate sector,
but it would be naïve to think that competition did not exist amongst
INGOs. Cosgrave et al. (2012: 8), in their analysis of British humani-
tarian agencies argue that ‘competition rather than collaboration is the
primary ethos. NGOs compete for market share, and compete to promote
their own brands. Within agencies, marketing departments have become
increasingly important in this competitive struggle’. They outline how
within the sector, marketing managers are generally part of the senior
management of an INGO, whereas humanitarian directors are not. Some
of these intra-organisational politics have been already outlined (Orgad,
2013; Yanacopulos and Baillie Smith, 2007; Wong, 2012) but again both
within INGOs, and within the INGO sector, there continues to be a
discourse of collaboration. Orgad (2013: 304–305) describes this from one
Fundraising Director’s perspective as the vague notion of ‘competing for
people’s time, attention, and wallets’ and a Communication Director’s
comments, ‘We would use the word “competitor” in a nice, in a small “c”
kind of way’. And yet, given the tensions that have arisen within network
campaigning in Jubilee 2000, Make Poverty History and the IF campaign,
as well as the frequent scathing views of some interviewees about other
INGOs, the public discourses of collaboration do not correspond to the
private discourses of competition within the INGO sector.
With respect to engaging publics, negotiating the ways that INGOs
engage with publics within these networks is a struggle, and overcoming
both the internal and external contradictions for network members
can be a challenge that is then played out in international campaigns.
During the campaigns of the late 1990s and 2000s, large-scale interna-
tional networks formed around the banning of landmines, opposition
to the Sardar Sarovar dam (Narmada dam campaign), NAFTA and the
WTO, as well as networks that focused on joining together to influence
the international financial institutions, which were all effective in influ-
encing the debates around their respective issues.
In addition to joining issue-based networks, most large INGOs have
also brought together their national chapters or sister organisations to
co-ordinate service delivery on the ground – not always an easy task – as
well as advocacy. Oxfam was one of the first organisations to do this
when in 1995 they created Oxfam International. Although not much
might have changed for people living in, say, Canada, whose relation-
ship with Oxfam Canada remained much the same, integration occurred
in the co-ordination of service delivery in countries in the global south,
in the increased consistency in messaging and branding across all the
Oxfams, as well as in more co-ordinated campaigning and advocacy.
Additionally, Oxfam International opened an office in Washington DC
in 1996 that lobbied the US government, the World Bank and the IMF.
This established a structure that allowed each national Oxfam to engage
with its constituents in its own country’s context, while simultaneously
lobbying in Washington was done on behalf of all Oxfams.
Within networks, however, it is vital that the goals of each organi-
sation are clearly understood if the meta-goals or shared vision of
the group are to be realised. Only when meta-goals can be identified
is it possible to conceive of potential collaborative advantage for the
members of the group (Eden, 1996: 55). Gray (1996: 59) outlines how the
outcomes of non-profit organisations working together may vary from
the exchange of information through to the generation of agreements
among the parties involved, so ‘appreciative planning involves informa-
tion exchange in the interest of advancing a shared vision ... Collective
strategies involve reaching agreement about how to implement a shared
vision.’ However, each organisation’s different perspective of that vision
remains an immense challenge for INGO networks.
INGO theories of change, as discussed in the previous chapter, vary
in how they view the role of the state, the market, and the INGO’s own
role in addressing poverty. While common ground on an issue may be
achievable, INGOs do not always have similar political views. Keck and
Sikkink (1998), for example, point out some of the different percep-
tions around the tropical timber campaign in Sarawak. Malaysian NGOs
blamed the over-exploitation of timber on the importers rather than
on the exporters, whereas some of the northern activists focused on
the exporters. Differences between network members also became very
evident within debt cancellation campaigns, as will be explored later in
the chapter.
Belonging to a network, then, can sometimes challenge the autonomy
of member organisations. While NGOs are managed differently from
corporations, it is still problematic for managers to relinquish control
and ‘alliances mean sharing control’ (Ohmae in Bleeke and Ernst, 1993:
35). Power asymmetries, where one member is more powerful than the
others, can be problematic – particularly in the more informal group-
ings. There can be no formal authority hierarchies between the organi-
sations in networks and coalitions, as the relationships between them
have been formed on a goodwill basis. Huxham (1996: 6) has argued
that this lack of authority costs time – it takes time to create goodwill
between members of a coalition, even more so if the members give
coalition activities a low priority. In many ways, forming and belonging
to a collaborative group is more time-consuming and costly than not
belonging.
But if it is problematic to form INGO networks, why then do INGOs

keep forming them? One answer is that there is an inherent added
value, whether real or perceived, in working with others. Egan (1995:
179) explains that in networks what ‘both partners ultimately deem
successful involves collaboration (creating new value together) rather
than mere exchange (getting something back for what you put in)’.
Huxham (1996: 141) describes this in the following statement: ‘an
objective is met, that no organisation could have produced on its own
and that each organisation, through the collaboration, is able to achieve
its own objectives better than it could alone.’
Thus, as Huxham (1996: 3–4) argues, there are two reasons why organ-
isations collaborate. The first is self-interest – an organisation may create
or join a coalition in order to achieve a goal that it could not achieve
alone. The second is moral – the important issues in society such as
poverty, crime and conflict, cannot be dealt with by any one organi-
sation alone. In discussing the moral imperative, Huxham states ‘that
collaboration aimed at tackling these kinds of issues should also aim to
empower those most affected by the problem to be centrally involved in
initiatives aimed at addressing them.’
Campaign moments
Large civil-society-based campaigns are not new either, as Keck and

Sikkink’s analysis of the anti-slavery campaigns, the women’s movement
and the environmental movement illustrates. What is new, however,
and what I will discuss in the following chapter, is the technological
enablement that has allowed activists to find each other, share informa-
tion, and work together to influence change in a co-ordinated and near
global way.
The increase in poverty and inequality-related campaigns since the
mid-1990s have been called the Global Justice Movement. Saunders
and Rootes (2006) outline their views on these campaigns, claiming
that identifying what is part of the movement is difficult as it embraces
various strands. One of these is made up of trade and development
INGOs, supporters of aid, and human rights and environment organisa-
tions; while another consists of more radical groups, such as the anar-
chist left; and a third is formed by a more socialist set of activists. Whilst
there are some convergent interests between the three strands, there are
also divergent ones.
Although frequently referred to (incorrectly) as the anti-globalisa-
tion movement, what is also termed the Global Justice Movement is in
many ways pro-globalisation – demanding the ‘globalisation of equity’

or an alternative globalisation (Saunders and Rootes, 2006: 2). As the
Global Justice Movement suggests, the idea of justice is fundamental
to bringing people together. This ‘movement of movements’ (Hintjens,
2006) is a loose configuration of organisations, campaigns, and connec-
tions between organisations and individuals. Arguably, the two most
successful Global Justice campaigns have been Jubilee 2000 and Make
Poverty History, in which most of the large northern NGOs took part.
Both were focused on engaging publics and motivating change, and
both were extremely successful at mobilising individuals and drawing
attention to key issues in development. It is for this reason that I will
use them to examine the ways that INGOs engage with a networked
political space and to understand the new forms and mechanisms that
INGOs are using to engage publics in development. Although the IF
campaign was not anywhere near the scale of Jubilee 2000 and Make
Poverty History, it is also worth examining INGOs’ roles in the way that
it was organised.
Jubilee 2000
Jubilee 2000 started in the UK in the mid-1990s and advocated the
cancellation of all the unpayable debts of southern countries. The inter-
national Jubilee 2000 Coalition was represented on every continent and
staged a very public campaign with a broad and vast level of public
support, as well as having highly professional analytical and lobbying
strategies. The aim of the Jubilee campaigns was to put pressure on the
G7 leaders to cancel all unpayable debts of the poorest countries by
the year 2000, under a fair and transparent process. By the year 2000, the
UK network of Jubilee 2000 had a membership of over 70 organisational
members comprised of NGOs, trade unions, church groups and other
networks focused on global justice. The timing of Jubilee was pivotal
to the campaign’s success – the millennium provided the opportunity
to remind people of the Judeo-Christian principle of jubilee, whereby
every fifty years all slaves were freed and all debts forgiven. The prin-
ciple provided an effective campaigning tool that galvanised the varied
groups throughout the course of the campaign, and also acted as the
unifying force which brought together the disparate groups. The injus-
tice of the repayment of developing country debt acted as the catalyst
to bring all the groups and networks together under the debt cancel-
lation transnational umbrella. The campaigns strategy was twofold,
the first being public education around the issue, and the second was
mass public mobilisation (Cox, 2011: 18). While the campaign officially
ended in 2000, and many of the national Jubilee groups have dissolved,
others continue or have been re-formed.
But how successful were the Jubilee 2000 campaigns? There was disa-
greement, even within the network of Jubilee groups, as to whether the
campaign was a success or failure. If we measure success by the raising of
awareness around the debt issue, and its inclusion in high-level political
discussions, it is indisputable that the campaign was a success, resulting,
as it did, in a global petition of over 25 million signatures and the inclu-
sion of debt cancellation on most G8 meeting agendas throughout the
late 1990s and early 2000s (Busby, 2007; Mayo, 2005). As a result of the
work done by the Jubilee campaigns, debt cancellation not only entered
the agenda of the G8 and the international financial institution meet-
ings, but the mainstream media too. Another sign of success was also
evident during the G7 meeting in Cologne in 1999, where governments
seemed to be in competition to outdo each other in the cancellation of
over 100 billion dollars of highly indebted poor country debt. Whilst
many have been disappointed with the amount of debt actually written
off since the G7 pledge, it is undeniable that the campaigns have been
successful in raising awareness around debt cancellation at all levels.
Whilst the original Jubilee network and campaign may have started
in the UK, the network quickly became international, coalescing around
the idea of the injustice of debt repayment and the classification of debt
cancellation as a justice issue. However, the interpretation of justice
and unpayable debt, and even the language used – ‘debt relief’ vs ‘debt
cancellation’, for example – created a chasm within the international
coalition (Nelson, 1997; Collins et al., 2001; Keet, 2000) as some national
Jubilee networks put forward conflicting interpretations of the direction
campaigns should take. Whilst the call for economic justice provided
the glue that held together the network, ideological differences in inter-
preting exactly what this justice might mean in practice perpetuated
divisions.
Make Poverty History

The INGOs Comic Relief and Oxfam together with the Trade Union
Congress instigated the Make Poverty History network and campaign
in the UK. It was launched in January 2005 by Nelson Mandela, and
aimed to secure changes to key policies. As the UK was both hosting the
G8 meeting in July 2005 and holding the European Union presidency
for part of the year, it was believed that the UK government could play
a more influential role in world politics. The white wristband became
the symbol of the groups belonging to this anti-poverty network and, in
January 2005, ‘a Global Call to Action against Poverty was launched at

the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre ... whose organisations together
represent more than 150 million people globally, with campaign actions
in more than 80 countries.’1
Make Poverty History had a loose organisational structure, similar to
that of the Jubilee 2000 network, which attracted individuals, organi-
sations and other networks, thus forming a ‘network of networks’
and extending the reach of the campaign. Each national network and
campaign had the right to decide on its own priorities, but the aims of
the overall network were ‘to pressure government to eliminate poverty
and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. We want Trade
Justice, Debt Cancellation, and a major increase in the quantity and
quality of aid.’2 National-level campaigns were able to add to this list.
The Canadian Make Poverty History campaign, for example, included
ending child poverty in Canada, while the American campaign called
ONE added fighting the emergence of global AIDS and extreme poverty
to its focus.
The Make Poverty History campaign website stated that:
Jubilee 2000 saw groups and networks from all over the world coming
together to campaign on debt. There was a loose international co-or-
dination, but the campaigns were planned and implemented at the
national level with focus on relevant specific issues. These groups and
networks may have had different detailed policies, but everyone came
together and rallied around the call to ‘drop the debt’. Similarly this
alliance [Make Poverty History] is backed by a wide range of global
organisations which may have different priorities and policies, but
we are all united in our belief that progress on debt, aid and trade is
necessary to lift millions out of poverty.3
In the UK, there were more than 540 organisational members (made up
of NGOs and INGOs, religious groups and trade unions) in the Make
Poverty History network.4 In April 2005, 25,000 people attended an all-
night vigil in Westminster, and 250,000 people marched in Edinburgh
on 2 July before the G8 meeting (Martin et al., 2006). Over 500,000
people signed up to the Make Poverty History website and millions of
white wristbands were given away or sold during 2005 in the UK. The
march in Edinburgh on 2 July corresponded to the Live8 concerts that
were viewed by over 3 billion people.5 The focus of the Make Poverty
History campaigns was to raise awareness around trade, aid and debt,
and to pressure governments to take action against poverty. The phrase,
‘It’s not about charity, it’s about justice’ became the mantra at the inter-
national concerts, and this rhetoric tapped into a frame of cosmopolitan
justice.
The co-ordinated efforts of the Make Poverty History-related groups
during 2005 have led the Guinness book of world records to class the
campaign as ‘the largest single co-ordinated movement in the history
of the Guinness World Records’. The subsequent ‘Stand Up Against
Poverty’ long-standing campaign, organised by the Global Call to Action
against Poverty (the parent organisation of the Make Poverty History
campaigns) and the UN Millennium Campaign holds the record since
2007 when 38.7 million people in 110 ten countries ‘stood up’ in 24
hours.6 The Stand Up Against Poverty event demanded that:
The rights of every human being must be respected. Women must

have equal rights with men, everywhere; the rights of children, youth
and indigenous and other excluded groups must be upheld – and
their equal participation in society must be seen as critical in fighting
poverty.7
IF Campaign
Unlike Jubilee 2000 or Make Poverty History, the ‘Enough Food for
Everyone IF’ campaign (generally referred to as the IF campaign), which
took place in the UK in 2013, was not a large-scale internationally
based campaign. Instead, it was more or less restricted to the UK and
was INGO-driven. I have, however, included it here because it illustrates
similar points to the previous two campaigns, showing how INGOs
worked together, how the campaign was framed, how it engaged with
publics, and also how the process of the campaign can provide food for
thought about INGOs in general.
The IF campaign was set up to make progress in ending global hunger,
which it aimed to move towards by addressing four key policy areas: tax,
transparency, aid and land. The three campaigning moments in 2013
were the launch of the campaign, the UK government’s budget and the
G8 summit. The campaign was supported by a coalition of 200 charities
and organisations, and was ‘an attempt to shore up the development
sector’s influence, protect political support for international develop-
ment and revitalise the sector’s activist and campaigns’ supporter base, as
well as achieve policy change in key areas’ (Tibbett and Stalker, 2013: 2).
Key lessons were taken on board from previous campaigns and, unlike
earlier large-scale campaigns, the IF campaign was operating in times of
economic austerity in the UK. According to Wild and Mulley (2013), the
framing of the IF campaign emphasised agency and change, with the

campaign stating ‘IF we come together, and IF we pressure our govern-
ments, change is possible’. The focus of the IF campaign was somewhat
amorphous and it failed to capture the public’s imagination in the ways
that Jubilee and Make Poverty History managed to do. Although Wild
and Mulley (2013) argue that one focus of the campaign was on the role
of big business in land grabbing and tax, and was what the public was
interested in at this time, as these issues are particularly interesting to
them during times of austerity. The IF campaign ended in the autumn
of 2013 to mixed reviews.
INGOs and networked campaigns
As so much has already been written evaluating Jubilee 2000 and Make
Poverty History, my aim here is rather to look specifically at INGOs
and how they used these networked campaigning spaces. Of partic-
ular interest are the connections between the campaign frame and the
INGOs; the forms of engagement and action of such campaigns; and,
the ways INGOs worked with others within the campaigns.
Framing
Jubilee 2000’s reframing of the complicated issue of debt cancellation
as an issue of justice was key to the campaign’s success (NGO130). The
Make Poverty History campaign(s) also utilised a justice frame. So why
was it necessary to reframe poverty reduction using a justice frame in
both campaigns? The process of framing has been well utilised in the
transnational advocacy network literature and dates back to the work
of Goffman (1974). Framing is a system of interpreting, understanding
and responding to events. A collective action frame encompasses a diag-
nosis and prognosis of a problem and a call to action for its resolution
(Cress and Snow, 2000; Benford and Snow, 2000), and is large enough
for supporters to see their own values and interests reflected in it. The
elements of advocacy network framing include the definition of a prob-
lematic issue, the articulation of a blame story, suggesting a solution,
and the organisation of a moral appeal around this problem. Keck and
Sikkink (1998: 27) argue that a causal story must be established so that
responsibility for an injustice to be obvious; ‘the causal chain needs to be
sufficiently short and clear to make the case convincing’. Frames are not
stagnant, rather they are continuously negotiated. In the case of Jubilee
2000 and Make Poverty History, the importance of framing as a funda-
mental strategy in building the network-of-networks campaign structure
cannot be overstated. That the use of the justice frame was no coincidence
was captured in Ann Pettifor’s description of ‘cutting the diamond’. She
describes this process of ‘cutting the diamond as the framing of an issue
so that each campaign supporter could see a reflection of their values
in the frame. This thereby helped build a coalition of organisations
who saw their values and interests in the frame (Yanacopulos, 2009;
NGO109). Jubilee 2000’s successful reframing of debt thus contributed
to its success in attracting members and supporters (Yanacopulos, 2004:
723). Subsequently, Make Poverty History was able to learn from the
debt campaign as well as from the trade justice campaigners that the
message of justice spoke to more people.
Collins et al. (2001: 136) write that, ‘as a global issue, unpayable debt
presents more complex challenges than, for example, the banning of
landmines. The suffering of those wounded by landmines is vividly
clear ... . As a global public policy issue, debt has proved more difficult.’
The complexity of debt reflects the fundamentally unequal economic
and power relations between north and south, it is about structural issues
that are difficult to convey and challenge (Collins et al., 2001: 137). In
order to shift government policies, therefore, the campaign needed solid
arguments and research around debt in addition to a mass campaign to
pressure governments into taking action.
Amongst the Jubilee 2000 national groups, ideological differences,
based around how justice was defined, developed fairly quickly; these
played themselves out in the debt relief vs debt cancellation split within
the coalition. The distinction was particularly important to Jubilee
South, a faction that split from Jubilee 2000 in 1999. A key member of
Jubilee South argued that ‘the distinctions between “relief” and “cancel-
lation” seem to play a key element in how the discourse affected the
chasms between the groups’ (J2K-1). Dot Keet, examining this split
within Jubilee 2000, credits the ideological difference to northern activ-
ists still being motivated by ‘charity’ and the desire of
... people in rich countries to alleviate the suffering of the ‘helpless

poor’ elsewhere. This may be sincere but it will not end the suffering
of the poor as long as it does not tackle the multiplicity of causes of
that suffering, which include the roles of their own governments,
banks, and other lenders, as part of the sources, and not only the
‘solvers’, of the crisis. (Keet, 2000: 466)
The different ways that justice could be interpreted with respect to the
language of ‘debt relief’ vs ‘debt cancellation’ illustrated one split in the
coalition. Subsequently, many other conflicting views emerged in the

Jubilee 2000 campaigns. One example was after the G7 announced $100
billion promised in debt ‘relief’ at the G7 summit in Cologne. While one
part of the network issued a press release stating that this was a good
thing, another proclaimed it as a defeat as not all the debt was being
cancelled (NGO133).
There were three reasons behind this division. The first revolved
around the end date of the campaign – critics pointed out that debt
was not a ‘campaign’ but something that people had to live with in
poor countries. Their point was that at the end of the campaign, having
‘done debt’, the ‘north’ would move on to another issue, whereas debt
remained a long-term problem. The second reason for the division is
highlighted by the relief / cancellation distinction and comes down to
different conceptions of justice. Jubilee South members claimed that as
‘relief’ was seen as enough by J2K UK members, they believed asking
for cancellation was too much. The third division within the interna-
tional coalition was around who ‘owned’ the campaign, with criticisms
being made of its being a northern campaign imposed on the south
(NGO133).
A key member of the Tanzanian debt cancellation saw the reason for
divisions in the international campaigns stemming from the diversity of
organisational members. The campaigns attracted many different types
of members – lobbyists, activists, practitioners and some opportunist
NGOs – most of whom held different worldviews, aims and ways of
operationalising ‘justice’ (NGO136). In addition, all the organisations
had different relationships with governments, international institutions
and publics, meaning differences were bound to occur.
The Make Poverty History campaign built on the justice frame of
the Jubilee 2000 campaign – a natural progression given that similar
activists and organisations were involved in both. In many ways, the
Make Poverty History campaigners built on what was learnt about
framing from the Jubilee 2000 campaigners. Where the Jubilee 2000
campaigners succeeded was in their emphasis on the oppressive
nature of debt as well as on its effects on the development of people
in the countries that owed it. Both the debt cancellation campaign
and the subsequent Make Poverty History campaign were expertly
and successfully designed to attract and mobilise large numbers of
supporters around the issue of justice. And yet the justice frame and
the messages coming from different members of the Make Poverty
History coalition deviated from the agreed policy demands. As Sireau
(2008) outlines, messaging and communications around the focus of
the campaign caused a great deal of strain on the network. As a result,

Hilary (2013: 13) summarises one key lesson to take away from the
Make Poverty History experience, which is ‘that a campaign’s policy
demands have minimal relevance to its broader impact unless carried
through into the outward facing communications encountered by the
public at large’.
The Live8 concerts, which were the culmination of the mass rallies
that took place prior to the G8 meeting, were primarily organised by
Bob Geldof, who had organised the Live Aid concerts twenty years
before. The original Live Aid concerts, which were a series of concerts
held simultaneously around the world, were aimed at bringing atten-
tion to and raising money for the Ethiopian famine in 1985, and Live8
may have suffered because of this association with the previous event.
Despite Live8 being linked to Make Poverty History, which was not
about fundraising but about taking actions against injustices,8 viewers
were subjected to images of Africa as a helpless continent, rather than
explanations of the reasons why it was getting poorer (Glennie, 2006:
260). Whilst charity might sometimes be an appropriate response to
particular situations, the aim of Make Poverty History was justice. As we
saw in Chapter 3, however, the Live8 concerts provide another illustra-
tion of how the idea of charity is embedded in the socio-economic fabric
of northern campaigning.
Although the mantra of the Make Poverty History campaigns was
‘justice, not charity’, the imagery used during the Live8 concerts, some
of the imagery used by member organisations, and some very ambig-
uous messages from celebrities, moved the representation of develop-
ment ‘back twenty years by reactivating and validating the old and
limiting charity frame’ (Kirk, 2012: 254). Kirk, one of the authors of the
Finding Frames report, explains that one reason for this was ‘because
the campaign relied on consumer marketing techniques, it chose to
employ many of the same visual, linguistic, and experiential cues as
Live Aid ... additionally all the other usual NGO “charity” activity went
on around it largely unchanged’ (Kirk, 2012: 254). It follows from this,
as the Finding Frames report makes clear, that the ‘Live Aid’ campaign
has had long-term impacts on attitudes and beliefs around charity. In
reflecting back on the Make Poverty History campaigns, a senior member
of a BOAG INGO outlined how, despite the campaigners’ focus on the
justice frame, the public still heard ‘charity’:
[I]t was found that the vast majority of the public thought that it
[Make Poverty History] was a charity fundraising exercise. Even when
Bob Geldof, Bono and the massed ranks of the charity sector tried
to say, ‘it’s not about money just now, it’s about politics’ the public
heard, ‘give more money to charity’. (personal correspondence with
INGO executive, 2012)
What, then, does this tell us about the justice frame? First, that while
being very good at bringing people and organisations together, it can
also be divisive – a ‘justice paradox’ that we first saw during both the
Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History campaigns. Additionally, as
Biccum (2007) outlines, the fact that the UK government and corpora-
tions started using the same terminology as the Make Poverty History
campaign diluted the meaning of the frame. Biccum (2007: 1121) details
some of the vested interests in the Live8 concerts:
As a piece of digital broadcasting history, Live8 helped to put AOL

on the broadcasting map; it also ensured a substantial profit for AOL
and co-sponsor Nokia, as 26.4 million fans texted their names to be
included in the scrolling petition throughout the concerts. Live 8 was
intended to be a participatory and performative mass commodity
spectacle, yet its real beneficiaries were its big business partners and
sponsors. In the words of Billboard magazine, ‘AOL emerged as one
of the day’s stars’.
Engagement and action

Have new forms of public engagement emerged from these campaigns,
or are we simply seeing more of the same? Whilst there were large-scale
international campaigns in the past, Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty
History differed in a number of ways. Both defined the ‘problem’ in
their respective campaigns not as one that required actions of charity,
but one that called for the rectification of an injustice. Additionally, an
essential component of both campaigns was the networks-of-networks
form (Della Porta, 2005; Hintjens 2006; Yanacopulos 2009) as, indeed,
was the broad collective action frame.
Jubilee 2000’s broad collective action frame effectively helped mobilise
millions of people internationally. The campaign demanded only a few
‘justice’ actions of its supporters: to sign a petition which would be sent
to G8 governments during the millennium year, to write to their political
representative, and to show their support by demonstrating in the years
running up to the year 2000. As this was a single-issue campaign, the
message was clear and succinct. Even though Jubilee 2000 was started in
the UK by key activists from BOAG INGOs such as Christian Aid, one of
the factors in its success was the grassroots support it received from not
only church groups, but also from the trade union movement (Greenhill
et al., 2003; Pettifor, 2010). Although the message was interpreted in
different ways, it was clear that the campaign and the actions associated
with it were dedicated to the cancellation of all upayable debt.
Despite the clear aims, however, the problem with a four-year campaign
is that the divisions between different organisational members of the
campaign become more evident. Although divisions based on person-
alities and approaches did exist, the main division on an organisational
level was around the interpretation of ‘unpayable’ and ‘illegitimate’
debt. Additional points of dispute within the campaign were: that the
campaign should not have an end date of 2000 (the argument being
that the north would move on to something else, will have ‘done debt’,
whereas debt remains a long-term problem in the south); the distinction
between debt relief and debt cancellation; and, that this should have
been a southern-driven campaign (NGO133). Some (not all) members
from southern countries split from the coalition to form Jubilee South
in the middle of the campaign.
Make Poverty History was seen as a success, at least as regards numbers
of people mobilised. Over 25,000 people took part in an overnight vigil
for trade justice in Westminster in April 2005; 250,000 people marched
in Edinburgh in July 2005; and 375 MPs were lobbied in one day in
November 2005 (WDM, 2006: 11). However, the campaign struggled to
move beyond the broad messages of ‘justice’ vs ‘charity’. Although Make
Poverty History’s message appeared straightforward through their use
of the justice frame – that charity in and of itself is not the answer – an
ambivalence arose amongst the campaign’s development INGO member-
ship base. On one level, the campaign emphasised the capacity of civil
society to exert political power beyond the nation-state, targeting the
G8 when it met in Scotland, but the predominant frame of the INGOs
involved in the campaign remained one of charity.
The Make Poverty History organisers wanted to broaden out the
campaign focus to include trade, aid and debt, and this made a single
causal story of global poverty and inequality more difficult to tell. The
choice of different actions was offered to supporters such as wearing the
symbolic white wristband, writing to politicians, demonstrating or helping
to organise events. Of all the actions available, buying or wearing the white
wristband was by far the most popular form of involvement, yet wearing
the wristband was the least engaged supporter action. The Head of Policy
for a BOAG INGO, who was directly involved in the Make Poverty History
campaign, reflected that there was a problem in the actions requested of
campaign supporters and what was being asked of them, ‘didn’t resonate
as an action in my opinion in terms of people knowing what they were
doing and what they really needed to do’ (NGO113).
For those who actively wanted to know more about the campaign,
there was a clear supporter journey on the website intended to educate
supporters on the key issues of the campaign. However, evaluations of
the campaign clearly revealed that a high percentage of the Make Poverty
History supporters had very little understanding of the campaign objec-
tives (Baggini, 2005), with the white wristband becoming more of a
fashion statement than an indication of knowledge about campaign
issues (Darnton, 2006). This somewhat superficial engagement led a key
person working on the Make Poverty History campaign to state that
the campaign was, ‘a moment, rather than it being about engaging the
public in a way that you are engaging them enough to think that this is
unjust’ (NGO113).
In the 2006 evaluation of the campaign, Make Poverty History
supporters were asked ‘How have you been involved in the MPH
campaigns?’. Over 61 per cent of respondents said that they wore the
white wristband, 29 per cent said they watched the Live8 concerts on
television, 15 per cent registered on the Make Poverty History website,
13 per cent sent an email to a politician, 10 per cent joined in an event, 8
per cent sent a postcard to a politician, and 2 per cent joined the pre-G8
Make Poverty History rally in Edinburgh in June 2005 (Darnton, 2006). As
Darnton (2006: 2) highlights, the majority of the campaign’s supporters
saw their involvement as wearing the white wristband and little else.
Here we see a type of commodified cosmopolitanism where an object –
the white wristband – becomes a symbolic connection to the campaign
without actually possessing a deep meaning or value basis.
An even more disheartening figure is the 29 per cent of self-pro-
claimed Make Poverty History supporters who said that they had
been involved with the campaign because they had watched the Live8
concert, particularly as the Live8 concerts, as discussed above, were
even more ambiguous in the messages they gave to supporters, using
images that inspired a ‘charity’ and ‘pity’ response whilst at the same
time telling viewers that the issues were about ‘justice’ (Darnton, 2006).
For example, viewers were told that 50,000 people die each day, but not
why they die. The only action Live8 asked people to take was to send a
text message to a specific number, and all the texts would then be sent
to the heads of government of the G8.
The Live8 concerts were held in various locations, with the biggest
taking place in London. The artists performing in London were
specifically told by the organisers not to criticise the UK government

during their acts (NGO104). If the aim of the concerts was to make
sure that everyone (albeit at a superficial level) had heard of the G8,
then Live8 and Make Poverty History were successful (Darnton, 2006:
10). However, the evaluation of the campaign concluded that the mass
learning promoted by Make Poverty History was shallow, and the quali-
tative research suggests that the public’s understanding of the three core
campaigning areas – debt, trade and aid – was not advanced during 2005
(Darnton, 2006: 7). As captured in the Finding Frames report (Darnton
and Kirk, 2011: 6), ‘the transformative potential offered by the rallying
cry of “justice not charity” went unheard, in part because it was unfa-
miliar and hard to comprehend, and also because it was drowned out by
the noise of celebrities, white wristbands and pop concerts.’
The IF campaign has not had the level of review and evaluation of
the other two campaigns, probably because the scale and impact of the
campaign was restricted to the UK. In an article in the Guardian news-
paper, Larry Elliot (2013) called the IF campaign a ‘mere shadow of MPH
and Jubilee 2000’, stating that the campaign:
[Was] lacking clarity, cohesion or energy. It has sunk pretty much

without trace since its launch three months ago. The G8 leaders are
under zero pressure to deliver on any of the four demands of the
campaign and are, therefore, unlikely to do so. And, should you be
unaware of what the demands are, you are not alone.’
Network relations
One of the most discussed elements of INGO engagement within such
large-scale campaigns has been the ways that network members have
related to each other. A great deal has been written about the internal
politics of both Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History, between member
social movement groups, other INGOs, other actors, or governments.
Although INGOs played a part within the Jubilee 2000 network, with
the exception of a few of the faith-based INGOs they were not leading
players. Instead, the campaign brought together different sectors of
civil society – not just NGOs, but churches and trade unions. Jubilee
2000 bridged different organisations through various means, including
using the idea of a ‘network of networks’, having coalition members
with a broad constituency base, attracting individuals through a mass
campaign, working on the ground mobilising people, and lobbying at
the highest levels of national and international politics. Although the
Jubilee 2000 campaigns were by no means problem-free, as discussed
earlier in this chapter, with very public and heated disputes taking place
between factions within the international coalition, INGOs were some-
what outside the disputes. The disputes seemed to be more on north–
south divisions within the network.
Within Make Poverty History, the divisions within the network were
mostly between the INGOs. Make Poverty History had a similar member-
ship base to Jubilee 2000, bringing together organisations such as the
Trade Justice Movement, Jubilee Debt Campaign, UK Aid Network, Stop
AIDS coalition, British Organisation of Development NGOs (BOND)
and the Trade Union Congress. Again like Jubilee 2000, Make Poverty
History also had deep divisions, although because the campaign lasted
only a year, these were less evident and public. Some of the criticisms of
Make Poverty History have centred on the absence of southern voices in
the campaign, the lack of criticism of UK politicians and their actions,
and an excessive use of celebrities that tended to override the political
bite of the campaigns. In addition, some groups (specifically the Stop
the War coalition) were not allowed to join the UK Make Poverty History
network. The reasons given for this were that the Stop the War coalition
was not specifically involved in issues of poverty and because the coali-
tion had affiliations to a political party that was against the UK govern-
ment’s actions in Afghanistan and Iraq (Hodkinson, 2005).
The criticism of the northern bias of both Jubilee 2000 and Make
Poverty History is a little unfair, given that both campaigns had their
origins in the UK, and both focused on influencing donor governments
and international institutions primarily based in the global north.
While Jubilee South argued that Jubilee 2000 UK took ownership of the
international campaign, given the historical evolution of the network,
it is difficult to see how this could have been done differently. Similarly,
Make Poverty History started as a UK-based coalition and the lack of
southern voices becomes understandable. Having said that, ensuring
that the coalition secretariat or running group engaged with the south
in true dialogue would not only have been ethically appropriate, but
also strategically important for the campaign.
Democratic dialogue, however, does not necessarily fit easily with
INGO commitments to targets around income generation, or to their
need to focus political pressure in response to particular political oppor-
tunities. In addition, many INGOs frequently lack a clear constituency
with whom to engage in dialogue: ‘NGOs at the global level can be very
large organisations highly removed from any basic social or political
community.’ As a result, their policies are a ‘product of specialised
professionals and not public deliberation’ (Lupel, 2003: 27). The most
common criticism of both INGOs and the international networks such

as Jubilee 2000, Make Poverty History, or the IF campaign, is that the
professional campaigners who run them are not those who have to live
with the consequences of their actions. For many, theirs is a political
commitment, but it is not directly related to their own livelihood strug-
gles (Yanacopulos and Mohan, 2004).
Hodkinson (2005) argues that ‘on paper at least, Make Poverty History’s
policy demands on the UK government are fairly radical ... the problem,
however, is that when these policies are relayed to a public audience,
they become virtually indistinguishable from those of the UK govern-
ment.’ He goes on to quote John Hilary, campaigns director of the UK
development NGO War on Want, who argued that:
[T]his was brought home back in March this year [2005] when
Blair’s Commission for Africa set out its own very different proposals
on Africa but under the identical headlines used by Make Poverty
History’s ‘trade justice’, ‘drop the debt’ and ‘more and better aid’.
In return, most campaign members, led by Oxfam and the TUC,
warmly welcomed the report’s recommendations. African activists
and many Make Poverty History members have a different view.
(Hodkinson, 2005)
Other critics, such as Nash argued that the Make Poverty History
campaign stood no chance of success, ‘precisely because it tried to work
through existing international institutions which are structured to
benefit the rich and powerful states’ (Nash, 2008: 177). In his analysis,
Jonathan Glennie outlined that inside the campaign there were two
different assessments of the actions taken in 2005. One group, comprised
of politicians and those close to them, were pleased with the progress
made in 2005. Bob Geldof, for example, was quoted as giving ‘the G8
agreement “On aid, ten out of ten. On debt, eight out of ten” while
characterising the G8’s language on liberalisation as “a serious, excel-
lent result on trade”’ (Glennie, 2006: 258). However, Glennie reported
that another group was disappointed and frustrated with the lack of
progress made by such a high-profile and well-supported campaign: ‘[T]
he policy experts advising the Make Poverty History coalition unani-
mously agreed that the G8 deal had not met the minimum demands on
aid or debt and even Gordon Brown agreed that the non-outcome of the
World Trade Organisation talks in Hong Kong, held in December 2005,
were [sic] “depressing”. Both groups have been furious with each other’
(Glennie 2006: 258). The result was that while the Make Poverty History
campaign continued to operate for the remainder of 2005, there were

deep divisions. Confirming this is the fact that a number of campaign
members stated that further work on the campaign was difficult due
to the existence of these splits and member organisations, primarily
INGOS, were ‘reluctant to work together’ (NGO104; NGO113).
INGOs ‘can construct campaigns that generate large numbers of imme-
diate actions; and when they work together they can promote a brand
extremely well. Make Poverty History, in many respects a mass-marketing
exercise, was audaciously successful in this regard’ (Kirk, 2012: 252). As
Kirk outlines, the branding of the Make Poverty History campaign was
very successful, but there were wider issues around branding within the
campaign. During the march in Edinburgh in 2005, the Make Poverty
History banners carried by the protesters were very visible, but many of
the BOAG INGOs in particular had created their own banners that also
included their own names, thus promoting their own brand. Additionally,
during the course of the campaign, instead of promoting the white wrist-
bands that had the name and logo of Make Poverty History, many INGOs
created their own wristbands that included the Make Poverty History
logo as well as their own. As one Head of Campaigns of a BOAG INGO,
who had also worked on the Make Poverty History campaign, outlined,
it only took one INGO to start this co-branding process. He outlines how
one of the BOAG INGOs, ‘turned up one day with wristbands that said
[the name of the INGO] on them. And everyone else thought if you’re
doing it we’ll all do it. And because that [INGO] brand is so much more
powerful than MPH, the human mind ... the dominant and familiar will
always outride or outshout the new’ (NGO122).
Looking at intra-network relations from another perspective, Brendan
Cox (2011) has analysed the Make Poverty History campaign, specifically
addressing why the issue of trade was particularly unsuccessful within the
campaign. Cox attributes the failure of the issue of trade on a number
of factors that relate to the network dynamics of the campaign. The first
factor is that the INGOs involved in Make Poverty History had different
objectives on trade and they viewed the issue differently. Second, the
campaign didn’t articulate the trade issue well to publics, and because aid
and debt were more understandable, the media focused on these. Finally,
at least with respect to network dynamics and engagement, ‘in the
wake of recriminations within the coalition post-Gleneagles, campaign
momentum was lost’ (Cox, 2011: 15). These recriminations ended up
devastating the campaign and the network as a whole.
Unlike Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History, the IF campaign
was organised solely by INGOs, specifically the five BOAG INGOs, in
conjunction with the UK government. Indeed, the campaign caused

and continues to cause divisions within the development INGO world
because, to maintain control of both the message and the way the
campaign was organised, it was shrouded under a veil of secrecy during
the development stages and other UK INGOs were only invited to take
part after the campaign was organised during the autumn of 2012. This
process proved to be divisive.
Although the IF campaign was a smaller UK-based campaign, it had
a great deal of momentum amongst the BOAG INGOs. The secrecy
surrounding the campaign prior to its start is a counterintuitive strategy
for any type of campaigning that requires wide-scale support. Yet this
secrecy, according to Hilary (2013: 17) is related to the conceptualisa-
tion of the campaign by the BOAG INGOs and the UK government
starting in 2011, two years before the campaign started. The secrecy
and the BOAG/government relationship was not well received by many,
leading some to argue that the result was that ‘the progressive side of the
INGO sector, which might be more than 50 per cent, was divided down
the middle, and was therefore a minority voice on the IF campaign. I
think that was really damaging’ (NGO121). Within the IF campaign,
the difference of perspectives between the BOAG groups has also been
noted, leading one ex BOAG INGO employee to state that, ‘because of
the BOAG relationship, Christian Aid is going to have to campaign with
Save the Children, which is like Ed Miliband campaigning with David
Cameron’ (NGO121).
INGOs in networked space
Do these new types of campaigns move us closer to the transformative

politics of development? On one level, the shifting of the frame from
charity to justice, the utilisation of the networks-of-networks form, and
the excellent use of media might lead us to think that these campaigns
have indeed taken us down a ‘transformative politics’ path. However, in
reality we are not seeing the transformation that these campaigns should
offer. The campaigns also reveal that the cosmopolitan connections are
full of tensions, both on a national scale between organisations, and
in the global networks within the campaigns. Additionally, in the final
evaluation, the type of engagement that the campaigns cultivate can be
seen as shallow.
The Make Poverty History campaign also highlighted levels of
ambivalence within the network. On one level, the campaign empha-
sised the capacity of civil society to exert political power beyond the
nation-state, targeting international organisations and world political

leaders. Calhoun argues that within international civil society, few
identities are linked to ‘strong organisations of either power or commu-
nity at a transnational level’, meaning that international civil society
‘offers a weak counterweight to a systemic integration and power’
(Calhoun, 2001: 29). The Make Poverty History campaign can also
been seen as exemplifying Tomlinson’s (2002: 253) argument that the
cultural openness engendered by a global consumer culture needs to
be built and shaped ‘in the direction of consensually emergent global
solidarities’.
Tomlinson (2002: 251) also argues that dialogue needs to form the
basis of such solidarities. A number of other authors (Calhoun, 2002;
Linklater, 2002; Habermas, 1989) also emphasise the need for dialogue
as the basis for establishing cosmopolitan values that have relevance to
people’s daily lives, and that will avoid what Calhoun (2001: 31) refers
to as an ‘attenuated’ cosmopolitanism which is not grounded in ‘mutual
commitment and responsibility’.
The question remains whether the network-of-networks form of organi-
sation and campaigning will continue. The Global Justice Movement, to
which Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History broadly belong, provides
an interesting perspective on issues around the public engagement of
INGOs and the direction of future campaigning. In this chapter, the two
campaigns have acted as snapshots of a much larger process of INGOs’
engagement of publics in development. Exploring them leads to questions
about how INGOs engage with publics through large ‘global’ networks and
campaigns, as well as questions around forms and depth of engagement
and the possibility of this leading to a more transformative politics.
Conclusion
The campaigning networks explored in this chapter formed as a result of

the combination of technological advances in ICTs, an opening of polit-
ical space, and the identification of shared values around a perceived
sense of inequality and the issue of justice. INGOs take part in many
networks, and as one INGO Communications Director stated, ‘there
are very few things, except for hard nose fundraising, that we actu-
ally do alone’ (NGO112). Brendan Cox (2011: 4) states that the main
lesson to learn about INGOs is that ‘coalition is king’. However, Cox
also highlights some of the problems of INGO networks, such as high
transaction costs, the need for organisational differentiation, and that
many INGOs are now coalitions themselves. To supplement this list,
additional issues with INGOs and networks involve differing perspec-

tives of issues and theories of change, organisational competition for
funding which sometimes manifests itself through branding disputes,
and power asymmetries within the sector. The inter-organisational
tension in the three campaigns examined in this chapter are not encour-
aging for future actions in networking spaces. A Director of an INGO
stated that ‘networks now, as opposed to 10 years ago, are not func-
tioning’ (NGO116). If INGO networks are to offer political opportunities
for change on an international scale, factors such as those outlined must
be addressed in order for them to be a force for change.
7
Digital Spaces of INGOs
There has been both a generational shift and a technology shift in the
last years as what Akshay Khanna calls ‘unruly politics’ is emerging
virtually and in reality. Horizontal, multilevel connections allow
partially unplanned events to mushroom with spontaneous protests,
mobbing and even viral politics making change happen. There are
now millions of people engaged in all sorts of new political behav-
iour, which perhaps overtakes the old organizations – the NGOs,
trade unions and organized social movements – in the wake of huge
mobilizations that could never have been imagined even five years
ago. (Harcourt, 2012: 2)
During the last few decades, advances in information and communica-

tion technologies have shifted most things in daily life, at least in the
global north. As discussed in the previous chapter, such technologies
have acted as an enabler to increased communication and networking
between not only individuals but also organisations. Terms and events
such as the ‘Twitter Revolutions’ of Iran in 2009 and Egypt in early 2011,
the use of ICTs in elections and governance, such as e-gov, and the rise
of Online Campaigning Organisations, such as Avaaz and MoveOn, are
all challenging the ways that politics is happening in most corners of
the globe.
Specifically, since the early 2000s, the second generation of web tech-
nologies have become embedded into the everyday lives of people in
both the global north as well as the global south. Shifts in the actual and
potential utility of the interactiveness of information and communica-
tion technologies make them more compelling and transformative. The
interactivity is created by the ways that platforms have been designed
in order to make information and user-generated content easy to share
132
Digital Spaces of INGOs 133
and distribute. The interactive communication capability has meant

that individuals can now not only create content, but that the move-
ment of information is no longer monodirectional from organisation
(such as INGOs) to supporter; supporters can now also comment and
load content online. The digital landscape provides both an information
source and a platform for expression for its users. Having a variety of
internet-enabled devices at their disposal, users can generate and upload
content to various platforms, extend their social networks, voice their
views and opinions, and even interact and protest in virtual worlds.
With respect to INGOs, the new digital spaces that have been created
by such technologies and the ways that INGOs are negotiating and
utilising these spaces in order to engage, advocate and facilitate activism
amongst northern publics is worth exploring. This chapter aims to
provide insights into the following: the various platforms used by
INGOs; the ways in which INGOs use digital spaces in their fundraising,
engagement, advocacy and activism work; and the enablement of new
types of technologically assisted social justice organisations, such as
Online Campaigning Organisations (OCOs), to emerge.
Digital spaces
It is well documented that the internet has enabled transnational advo-

cacy, and has become a key tool for social movement organisers to
mobilise and communicate with supporters regarding demonstrations
and political actions. But many perspectives on the effects of these tech-
nology shifts on the politics of change exist. This section will explore two
very different perspectives, broadly categorised as the cyberenthusiasts
and the cybercritics. The ways that technology and space interact will
then be re-examined, picking up on the idea of ‘creating’ or ‘opening up’
space discussed in Chapter 2. These political spaces, enabled by techno-
logical shifts, could also be enabling what Habermas (1989) called ‘delib-
erative’ politics, spaces where dialogue and multi-directional discussions
take place.
There are many debates revolving around the intersection of digital
technologies and political action. Cybersceptics such as Gladwell (2010)
claimed that the ‘revolution will not be tweeted’ and argued that a tech-
nological determinism, the assumption that technology drives a society’s
social structures, is influencing our perspectives on the role of tech-
nology. Other cybersceptics argue that digital technologies are having
a marked effect on the way politics is carried out. One of Gladwell’s
critiques involves the types of connections that are developed through
social media technologies. Arguing that weak online ties are not the
same as the offline relations between people who belong to a network,
he goes on to contend that this affects the mobilisation of people around
an issue. According to Gladwell (2010), online activism, with its weak
ties that produce low engagement activity results in a low-effort form of
participation.
Social media refers to online media such as texts, photos, messages,
videos, blogs,1 tweets2 and other platforms. The point of social media
is that it is interactive, that it enables people to share information and
it helps to foster conversations. A study conducted by Idealware (2013:
14) outlines how nonprofits are finding value in different social media
platforms, particularly in reaching out to new audiences. Yet the jury is still
out with respect to how INGOs are utilising social media beyond supple-
menting old practices such as sending out a press release, a request for
funding or information about a recent campaign to existing supporters.
Within such discussions, pejorative terms such as slacktivism are used
to imply that online actions such as signing a petition, tweeting, or liking
a webpage are weak political actions. Christensen (2011: no page number)
summarises the slacktivist critique, arguing that ‘slacktivism ... [is] activi-
ties that may make the active individual feel good, but have little impact
on political decisions and may even distract citizens from other, more
effective, forms of engagement’. He continues in outlining two of the
critiques concerning slacktivism which are that it involves low-effort
forms of activism that is not as effective as real world activism, and that
such online activism is taking the place of more established and effective
forms of activism. Karpf (2010: 9) explains that, because of the ease of
using online methods, the fear is that ‘minimal-effort engagement holds
long-term costs for the public sphere, either by further dispiriting the
issue publics who find their online petitions and e-comments ignored,
or by crowding out more substantive participatory efforts’. Others argue
that while online activism may attract a great deal of attention and a
large number of supporters, it ‘can only provide limited deeper engage-
ment. Their [online campaigning organisations’] account of the world is
inevitably partial and some would say simplistic. Their appeal is inevi-
tably more instinctive and emotional’ (Beckett, 2012: 31).
In contrast, cyberenthusiasts promote the benefits of digital spaces,
stating that they facilitate political action, engage vast numbers of
supporters, and increase the speed at which supporters and publics
can be mobilised. In short, the digital sphere is full of promise to bring
people together and to act as a quick and inexpensive mobilising tool for
activists. Clay Shirky, a cyberenthusiast, in his (2008) seminal book, Here
Comes Everybody, focused on how social media affects political partici-

pation in a vast array of spheres, enabling new collective actions to be
organised across boundaries in unprecedented ways.
Cyberenthusiasts have responded to the slacktivism arguments in
a number of ways, one being that organisations utilising social media
platforms do not solely operate online. Even online campaigning
organisations such as Avaaz, which will be discussed more fully later in
this chapter, encourage and partake in non-online activity, and online
activity is typically part of a repertoire of actions. David Karpf (2010:
9) argues that the pejorative implications of slacktivism are flawed in a
number of ways. He states that email actions are merely an extension of
actions such as writing letters and signing petitions – the mainstays of
traditional campaigning. Additionally, there is the frequent assumption
that online activism will flood the public sphere, and deter organisations
from utilising other forms of engagement, but this does not match the
reality. In fact, the ‘Dynamics of Cause Engagement’, a study conducted
at Georgetown University (Ogilvy Public Relations, 2011), shows that
those who engage in digital activism are actually more likely to engage in
other forms of activism than those who engage in non-online activism.
An action such as sending an email or signing an online petition means
that this person is more likely to engage in other online and face-to-face
advocacy actions. This would lead one to conclude that there is a poten-
tial ‘activation’ effect of online media (see table 7.1 below).
Table 7.1 Social media/ non-social media political engagement
‘Most often’ ways of Social media Non-social media

getting involved cause promoters cause promoters
Donating money 41% 41%

Volunteering time (i.e. helplines, 30% 15%
mentoring)
Taking part in an event or walk 25% 11%
Requesting that others contact their 22% 5%
political representatives by email,
letter or phone
Recruiting others to sign a petition for 20% 4%
the cause
Requesting donations to support your 11% 3%
work or involvement in a cause
Mean number of activities 6.7 2.9
Note: Social media/non-social media political engagement – ‘Most often’ ways of getting
involved.
Source: Taken from Ogilvie Public Relations, 2011: 6.
Thus, the criticism concerning the depth of public engagement

through using online media is worthy of further investigation.
Digital space has been seen as opening new doors for organisations
concerned with social change. Butsch (2011: 162) summarises that such
spaces ‘disaggregate audiences, integrate media use into everyday life, and
reconceive users’ relation to media ... and new media have dissolved the
dichotomy between public and private space, a social distinction under-
lying traditional concepts of public spheres’. Where publics before were
conceived as interacting face to face, which for campaigning purposes
required assemblies in public spaces, new media has ‘uncoupled’ public
conversations from physical spaces to virtual ones. The idea that space
can be created or opened up returns us to the discussion in Chapter 2,
and follows Lefebvre’s (1991) argument that space can be both emer-
gent or made, and real. Many metaphors exist to describe digital space –
be it the information superhighway, cyberspace or virtual space – and
Mitra and Schwartz (2001) outline how these metaphors utilise tradi-
tional ways of thinking about space and how the language allows us to
imagine such spaces. This follows De Certeau’s (1993: 157) view that the
language used has shaped the ways the space itself has developed, where
‘spatial practices in fact secretly structure the determining conditions of
social life’.
Frequently, a distinction is made between online and offline
actions amongst activists. Bennett (2005: 217) dispels this distinction:
‘Technology is often aimed at getting people together offline, and one
purpose of offline associations is often to clarify and motivate online
relations.’ The breaking down of the distinction between ‘digital’ and
‘real’ space was first seen during protests in 1999 in Seattle at the World
Trade Organisation meeting, where activists utilised online platforms,
and also physically claimed the space of the streets. This was also the
case for the Occupy movement, which initially occupied physical spaces
while utilising online platforms.
The dichotomy between the definitions of what is virtual and what is
‘real’ space has been challenged by a group of evolutionary psychologists,
one of whom is Jeri Fink. Fink argues that it really does not matter whether
something is real or virtual because human beings are ‘programmed to
assume that what appears real is real. It is a powerful and automatic
assumption. Consequently, simulations of people and environments
easily deceive our Stone Age brains ... We can’t and don’t overcome the
assumption that what appears real is real, because we don’t want to,
don’t need to, or don’t gain anything by it’ (Fink, 1999: 128–129). Thus
we are constantly experiencing the virtual because ‘virtual reality is just

another technology that enables interaction and engagement that we
experience as real, even if it may not be tangible, because it elicits a
response from our brain and our bodies. Virtual reality is not entirely
good or bad, but one of many virtualities in our lives’ (Jones, 2007: 10).
In many ways it is helpful to think of other historical ‘virtual’ spaces
created by technological innovations, such as the printing press, which
revolutionised and opened up political spaces by expanding political
ideas to vast numbers of people (who could read).
The concept of opening up space has been popularised since 2001
through the World Social Forum3. Jai Sen (2010: 999–1000) outlined
how the idea of the open space of the World Social Forum ‘represents a
new form of politics, based on principles of self-organisation, open-end-
edness, indeterminacy, and organic learning and reproduction. In short,
the articulation and practice of what can be termed an emergent poli-
tics.’ Sen argues that the World Social Forum goes beyond the offering
of physical space to individuals and organisations to converge and is,
rather, where ‘space becomes open precisely as a function of the fact
that large numbers of humans are converging with this open-ended,
primal purpose of exchanging information and thus giving order to
their lives’ (Sen, 2010: 1010).
INGOs in digital spaces
So how have technologically enabled digital spaces affected INGOs? As

the creation of networking spaces has increased, so too has the poten-
tial for increasing the opportunity to run large-scale campaigns. In addi-
tion to networking, digital platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube,
Instagram and Google+, to mention but a few, have enabled the crea-
tion of a more deliberative space, one allowing multi way communi-
cations. While states are still important in policing the boundaries of
digital communication, access to the deliberative digital spaces is almost
boundary-free.
In a report commissioned by the International Broadcast Trust,
Charlie Beckett (2012: 28) outlined the advantages of digital technolo-
gies for the INGO sector. He states that: ‘compared to analogue tech-
nologies, networked communications offer low-cost but highly efficient
ways to target more accurately, respond more personally, motivate more
creatively and inform more thoroughly.’ Shirky (2008), also a propo-
nent of the power of social media, sees such digital spaces as offering
a key opening up of political deliberative spaces. The opportunity for

publics to upload user-generated content onto sites such as Facebook,
Twitter and YouTube has meant that individuals are able to ‘privately
and publicly articulate and debate a welter of conflicting views’. As Scott
(2014: 61) puts it, such digital technologies provide both greater access
to information, compared to other media, as well as far greater ‘access
to conversation’. And users of social media do not merely upload and
re-post information – they comment, change, and incorporate other
comments and blogs into their own, and find each other to form what
Bennett and Segerberg (2013) have called ‘connective action’.
Fenton (2012: 130) captures this: ‘An emphasis on communication
and the multiple ways in which this can now take place with a variety
of people through social media is suggestive of the pluralisation of social
relationships’. Additionally, Mitra and Schwartz (2001: no page provided)
outline the discursive element of such changes: ‘... when cyberspace is
conceptualized as a discursive space where the key defining element of
the space are the [sic] texts and discourses [are] distributed in the rhizo-
matic computer network. Within such a discursive space the notion
of boundary becomes irrelevant. ... [and] makes the discourses on the
internet available to anyone who has redesigned real space to gain net
access’. The increasing focus on deliberative spaces speaks to the work of
the social theorist Jurgen Habermas (1984), for whom in such delibera-
tive, albeit virtual, spaces individuals can share their values, opinions
and interests.
Where, then, does this leave the work of INGOs? As far back as 2001,
Craig Warkentin offered us a helpful list of the different ways that
NGOs, and particularly northern INGOs, have made use of the internet.
He argued that they used the internet in the following ways: facili-
tating internal communication; shaping public perceptions; enhancing
member services; disseminating informational resources; encouraging
political participation; and realising innovative ideas (Warkentin, 2001:
36). The list demonstrates the important links between INGOs, public
engagement in development, and communications technologies. Such
technologies shape and intersect with an organisation’s capacities to
frame particular issues and develop particular financial, political or
other links with their publics.
INGOs are not shy of using digital technologies. In fact, all five of
the BOAG INGOs display links to the main social networking sites and
most have Twitter feeds on their homepages. There are, however, mixed
feelings within the INGO world about the utility of social media given
that they are not able to control or moderate the messages. There are
also mixed feelings within the sector as to whether people within an
organisation should have their tweets or postings moderated so as to
stay on message, as is the case with other messages that originate within
the organisation. One BOAG INGO Communications Manager said that
‘it’s a question of risk and reputation management. We would probably
trust the people who were out there, whether they are humanitarian
workers or media officers, to understand enough about the organisation
to be empowered and to be qualified to go and directly communicate
on Twitter or Facebook or on a blog without any editorial sign off here.
But we are generally speaking as an organisation quite obsessed with
sign off’ (NGO112).
While most INGOs are active on different online platforms, they still
expressed some ambiguity around the effectiveness of using social media.
And while some INGOs interviewed were enthusiastic about different
ways of engaging publics, there were still questions and concerns around
the effects of social media on an INGO’s long-term influence on their
constituent publics. It seems that some INGOs are investing on a long-
term digital communication strategy, while other INGOs are just tagging
on Facebook and Twitter to their conventional methods of communi-
cating with publics. The Head of Media at a BOAG INGO stated ‘as far as
the organisation’s media strategy, we use them (social media platforms)
as different carriers of the same message, so from a media perspective,
we’re being quite old fashioned’ (NGO120). Oxfam’s Communications
Director, Karina Brisby, in an interview for the Guardian, discussed
Oxfam’s use of social media: ‘For charities digital tools and platforms
are becoming (and for many already are) the key channel to the public
to encourage fundraising, action taking or general awareness, as well as
providing opportunities to facilitate deeper interaction’.4 Most INGOs
inverviewed were clear that they should be involved and active on social
media platforms, but there were questions about what social media plat-
forms added to communicating to supporters and publics. One Director
of an INGO summarised their views on INGO use of digital spaces and
social media platforms: ‘I don’t think the large NGOs know how to work
informal spaces and I think social movements are much better because
they’re subversive, they’re cheeky, and the big NGOs can’t be subversive
and cheeky’ (NGO116).
It is not an option for INGOs to not fully engage with digital spaces,
yet some key questions being asked within the sector are: how can
digital technologies be best utlised, and what is to be gained by their
use? Although it is true that such spaces offer great potential for organi-
sations such as INGOs, they also offer great potential for the disruption
of the INGO business model. The rest of this chapter, therefore, will
examine how digital technologies are affecting fundraising, engage-
ment, advocacy and activism.
Fundraising and engagement

INGO fundraising has had mixed results on digital media. While it is
true that some INGOs have claimed success in raising funds by sending
out Twitter alerts during humanitarian emergencies, it is still uncertain
whether INGOs have been successful at raising funds for longer-term
development work through their use of social media.
Many INGOs have been experimenting with different social media
platforms and a few of the larger INGOs have experimented with fund-
raising in virtual worlds such as Second Life. In 2007, Save the Children
set up a ‘YakShack’ in Second Life to sell virtual yaks for 1,000 Lindens
(the Second Life currency, where four US dollars converts to 1,000
Lindens). The YakShack built on the idea of buying an Oxfam goat,
only in this case it was a yak, and not only acted as a fundraising tool
for Save the Children, but told people about the work the organisation
was doing. World Vision also set up an ‘Alternative Gift Catalogue’ in
Second Life and War Child has an information kiosk there on its work.
Although other INGOs have had a presence in Second Life, this was
usually because supporters had set up groups to meet other supporters
within the virtual world. Given that World Vision or Save the Children –
or, indeed, any of the large INGOs – are no longer fundraising in Second
Life, we can only assume that this was not a successful fundraising
strategy. One study, conducted by Idealware (2013: 8), shows that social
media platforms are not a good tool for direct fundraising, but are good
for brand recognition, distributing the organisation’s message and
starting conversations.
With respect to broader INGO engagement, digital technologies offer
some potential. Digital media may give those in the global south, or
the beneficiaries of development aid, the opportunity to speak in their
own voices, and to tell their own stories. However, as Fenyoe (2010:
3) outlines, there are four key challenges organisations such as INGOs,
involved in the communication of development issues online, must
face. The first is that as internet use is driven by personal need and
interest, unless development issues are personally relevant to users,
supporters will respond with a lack of interest. Second, an audience’s
relationship with the internet differs greatly from that they maintain
with other media sources – as audiences choose what they want to

know, and the internet makes the avoidance of development issues
easier than other media. This is particularly relevant if we take into
account the International Broadcast Trust study (Fenyoe, 2010) that
found that viewers were less likely to watch something they perceive to
be depressing. Third, the dependence on search engines such as Google
makes it more difficult for INGOs and other development brands to
cut through the plethora of information. And, fourth, Fenyoe argues
that audiences are either ‘news interested’ or ‘internet savvy’ and few
are both (Fenyoe, 2010: 3). Older audiences are more interested in the
news, whereas younger audiences are happy to look at news headlines,
and only read anything news related that they find interesting or rele-
vant. Younger internet users are more internet savvy and access a wide
range of sites and read more blogs and forums, thereby getting their
information from a wider range of sources (Fenyoe, 2010: 7). Thus, the
internet savvy are behaving in a somewhat consumerist way in their
relationship to news.
But, as Beckett has argued, INGOs have a great deal to learn about
how best to navigate social media, where ‘the cliché about “having a
conversation online” is still understood by most NGOs as talking at
people rather than with them’ (Beckett, 2012: 29). Beckett continues
to posit that engagement through social media requires a new under-
standing of audience, attention and trust, and online engagement is
not just about building a Facebook page and sending out a Twitter
feed. There may be great potential for INGOs to use social media to
inspire dialogue and deliberation amongst their constituents and
northern publics.
Activism
What does political activism mean in a digital environment? Does
the medium change the nature of the protest, its depth, or the type of
engagement? Does it change the actions taken or the speed with which
change takes place? Are there issues that are more conducive to digital
action? And who are these digital activists anyway? A good place to start
is the Digital Activism Survey (Brodock et al., 2009), one of the largest
international surveys examining the profile and behaviour of digital
activism. Its profile of digital activists revealed that:
● Over 90 per cent were aged between 21–50, and the largest group,
made up of 26–30 year olds, amount to 34 per cent of digital
activists.
● Activists were heavy internet users, going online multiple times each
day.
● Social network platforms acted as a ‘gateway drug’ (being the first
tool used).
● The appeal for those who responded lay in the interactivity as well as
in the collapsing of the barriers to broadcasting.
Most of the people calling themselves ‘digital activists’ saw themselves

as activists who were also digital. Indeed, the distinction between
an activist and a digital activist has decreased, as seen in the Digital
Activism Survey (Brodock et al., 2009) and Fenyoe’s (2010) ‘The World
Online’ study. Within the development sector, the importance of the
website is paramount (Fenyoe, 2010) and activists and digital activists
(and the aim here is not to draw a false dichotomy between the two) are
becoming ‘blended activism’ which includes digital platforms and the
website, together with more conventional tools. Such distinctions are
quickly changing with more people now accessing the internet through
their mobile phones instead of computers.
Thus, it is important not to overlook the importance of mobile teleph-
ony, both in the global north and the global south. The relationship
between mobile telephony and SMS, digital and social media platforms
such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as physical political mobilisation
were clearly evident and were well studied during the ‘Arab Spring’
and the various Occupy mobilisations, both in 2011. The dividing
line between mobile phone and internet access has diminished with
mobile phones now acting as mini-computers which allow their users
to be constantly online. In a study titled ‘A Mobile Voice: The Use of
Mobile Phones in Citizen Media’, the author states that, ‘mobile phones
are changing the way people consume and produce media throughout
the world. They have become the most widely used form of informa-
tion communication technology in human history’ (Verclas, quoted in
Brodock et al., 2009: 15).
Learning from others: politics in digital spaces
This is an exciting time with both digital and political changes occurring at
a rapid pace. There have been many analyses of the Arab Spring as well as
the anti-austerity campaigns in Europe. Some INGOs are learning lessons
around the use of social media from other political activists. First, people
are becoming accustomed to crowdsourcing, and the change of fund-
raising method and ethos will challenge the fundraising environments
of the future. Second, supporters are going to expect deliberation and

multiway conversations and information, and not the frequently mono-
directional conversations that are currently being had between INGOs
and their constituents. Third, the justice frame is here to stay and injus-
tice will continue to be a key public motivator in campaigning and online
engagement. Lastly, the distinction between online / offline will become
increasingly irrelevant, and many INGOs will need to think beyond these
distinctions. For the remainder of this section, three different organisa-
tions will be examined in how they have approached such changes in
the current political landscape, and potentially providing some valuable
lessons for INGOs through their experiences.
Occupy
To be sure, the Occupy Wall Street movement has distinctly different
ambitions from those of INGOs. The Occupy movement, which had
its roots in the anti-austerity protest events and occupations that took
place in Spain and Greece prior to 2011, focused on the injustice of the
growing income inequality between the 1 per cent and the 99 per cent
in the US, with a specific focus on the banking sector. The slogan for the
movement was, ‘We are the 99 per cent.’
The movement quickly spread beyond Wall Street, spurring further
Occupy actions in other cities and countries. The emphasis within
Occupy was on creating a deliberative space and a general assembly
approach to decision-making. The use of social media was key, with
most of the early protesters being young and connected to social media
networks, and the movement itself received extensive global television
and press media attention (Clark, 2012: 4). According to the Guardian
newspaper, connections were made between different individuals and
groups in occupations and demonstrations in different parts of the
world, with some estimates of between 750–950 cities with some form
of occupation identifying with the Occupy movement.5
Because of Occupy’s non-hierarchical structure – no formal leadership,
no top-down organisation and very little communication infrastructure
(Harcourt, 2012: 2) – organisational demands such as marketing, fund-
raising and branding did not come into play. Although many different
types of organisations joined and took part in the Occupy movement;
the Occupy movement was not about the brands of those who joined, in
contrast to the experience of the Make Poverty History campaigns. The
focus was always kept on the Occupy movement as a whole. Deliberation
and a multiway dialogue were built into the movement and the focus
was on the injustice of the financial system; their demands were systemic
and clearly political, speaking to a wide range of people. INGO involve-

ment in Occupy, however, was limited. For example, one BOAG INGO
employee stated that ‘there were internal debates within the organisa-
tion as well as other NGOs. We asked if it would be a space where our
organisation has legitimacy? But a decision was made not to participate
as we didn’t feel we had legitimacy campaigning and commenting on
inequality in the UK’ (NGO 128). While the demands of the Occupy
movement were not specifically those of development-focused INGOs,
one could easily argue that the causes of poverty and inequality in the
global north (the focus of Occupy), were the same forces contributing to
poverty in the global south.
But the Occupy movement did inspire some INGOs and it raised
numerous questions. A Director of Advocacy for a BOAG INGO reflects
on the Occupy movement and what can be learnt:
When Occupy happened, there was lots that was great about it. But
I thought what was really good about it was that it said that it was
ok to just ask questions. And I think that’s one of the things that
as NGOs we have been hamstrung by. With different theories of
change from Save the Children on one end (where whatever govern-
ment does is fantastic), to WDM speaking from the side-lines [with
a more systemic and challenging approach]. And as the BOAGs,
we’ve kinda huddled in the middle. Whereas you had Occupy, and
it was a breath of fresh air. And the public took to them, even if they
disagreed with them – they were asking the right questions. I think
we’ve become too corporate in the way that we [BOAG INGOs]
present ourselves. I think we can’t just ask the questions, we have to
provide good solutions. Maybe we just have to say, these questions
are really difficult and we have no idea how we’re going to do it.
(NGO119)
In addition to asking questions, and being more open to delibera-

tion, there are also further lessons INGOs can learn from the Occupy
movement. First, at least in the beginning, given the average age of
Occupy supporters, people of that age can be mobilised and are willing
to be politically active. Second, social media was a key determinant to
bringing people together and publicising the occupation, demonstra-
tions and events. And third, the ability to be heard and to have an input
into the message through the various social media platforms was a key
factor of the ways supporters came together, engaged with the issue, and
took political action.
The World Social Forum

The World Social Forum (WSF) originated as the civil society, social
movement and NGO response to the World Economic Forum in Davos,
and the first forum was held in 2001 in Porto Alegre, Brazil. The WSF
describes itself as an open space that is plural, diverse, non-govern-
mental and non-partisan, where debates can occur. The forums, which
pronounce ‘another world is possible’, are comprised of diverse actors
that include many INGOs. The WSF has been referred to as the ‘move-
ment of movements’ (Hintjens, 2006), and forums are seen as offering a
deliberative space for civil society actors to discuss social justice issues.
Other social forums have emerged out of the WSF, including regional
ones such as the European Social Forum, and national and city-based
social forums. The WSF has a Charter of Principles which is premised on
an open, horizontal and inclusive space, and which embodies the ethos
of the software-inspired open source movement. Smith and Smythe
(2009: 793) outline how the WSF, which challenges corporate power as
part of the global justice movement, ‘must do so using networks within
a digitally divided neo-liberal system, which itself must be overcome if
networked politics are to be fully democratic and inclusive’.
Smith and Smythe continue by explaining that to fully understand the
WSF, it is essential to understand two fundamental points. The first is that,
‘analogous to the open source metaphor, it is an open space’. This is written
into the first principle in the WSF Charter which states that, ‘The WSF is
an open meeting place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas,
formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and interlinking
for effective action, by groups and movements of civil society that are
opposed to neoliberalism and domination of the world by capital and any
form of imperialism.’6 The second point is that organisationally it is based
on a networks of networks structure (Smith and Smythe, 2009: 801).
The world and regional social forums offer another opening of polit-
ical space, with the potential for INGOs to work with other types of
organisations in order to engage publics around development issues.
And whilst there is some overlap between actors who engage in the
WSF and INGOs, there are also clear tensions as to what and how this
engagement looks like. Smith (2004: 419) argues that there is antago-
nism between different groups within the forums, and that, in partic-
ular, tensions exist between the ‘first and second generations’ of global
civil society, due to the fact that the first generation developed through
co-operative relationships with global institutions, whereas the second
has adopted more confrontational approaches.
Although INGOs have been, and continue to be involved in the WSF,

their relationships to other WSF participants have not been problem-free.
Specifically, between 2002 and 2006, INGOs were very active in the WSF.
However, during the 2007 WSF in Nairobi, the BOAG INGO Action Aid,
that has always had close relationships with social movement groups
from the global south, organised and funded a number of workshops
for their partners and registered them under their partners’ names. But
when the WSF programme was sent out, the workshops were listed by
funders and it appeared that Action Aid was attempting to dominate the
WSF. And as an attendee to the 2007 Forum stated, ‘it looked like Action
Aid had taken over the entire WSF, despite their desperate attempt not
to’ (NGO117). Action Aid was criticised for trying to ‘swarm’ the social
forum, and arguably as a result, the influence of INGOs has declined
considerably in subsequent forums (Pleyers, 2012: 176).
There are mixed views on the utility of social forums, and on how
INGOs can use such deliberative spaces. One Director of an INGO was crit-
ical of INGO practices, stating that ‘when NGOs try to infiltrate the delib-
erative spaces, that’s when the deliberative spaces fall apart’ (NGO116).
The Head of Policy from another BOAG INGO asked the question, ‘how
do we take a deliberative space of people who know a lot about these
things and translate that into a conversation with the broader society at
large? I think we as NGOs missed a golden opportunity around the finan-
cial crisis to start saying, “what kind of economic models work for all of
those and for poor people and are more equitable?”’ (NGO113). Even
though there have been problems in how INGOs have acted and have
been perceived within the WSF, spaces of deliberation such as the social
forum spaces could be an avenue for INGOs to further engage, deliberate
and make connections with their supporters and other activists.
OCOs
Since the mid-2000s, a type of political organisation has emerged that

is enabled by digital technologies, and has been attracting vast numbers
of supporters. These OCOs have managed to attract a great deal of
attention, and in some national contexts (such as in Australia), public
support for OCOs has exceeded that which traditional political parties
and NGOs have been able to achieve. OCOs – such as Avaaz, Lead Now,
38 Degrees, Move On, Get Up and The Rules – are addressing global
justice issues both within, and also across, state boundaries.
OCOs challenge not only the ways that we conceptualise social change,
but also the ways in which political organisation and mobilisation can
be transformative. The ‘sprawling, loosely interconnected network webs’

of what Bennett (2005: 213) calls ‘second generation activism’ describes
the OCOs and their ability to innovate technological changes in real life
politics. That the ‘internet aids the process of building and maintaining
the social bases of global civil society’ (Warkentin, 2001: 33) is not a
recent idea; however, it is the merging of the digital technologies of the
internet and mobile telephony with the strategic foresight of activists
that has made OCOs emerge and succeed in their varied campaigns.
As with the NGO sector, not all OCOs are the same and they differ
not only in the issues that they address, but also the tactics that they
adopt. The genesis of OCOs is a result of like-minded individuals coming
together with some broadly overlapping aims. OCOs utilise digital tech-
nologies to instigate prompt collective action that would not have been
possible without the internet and the large-scale take up of social media.
Most of the OCOs examined are sister organisations, having their roots
in a set of like-minded activists. The activists frequently overlap between
organisations and they learn from one another’s experience.
Each OCO runs campaigns with a very specific focus; each campaign
has a clear explanation that is sent to OCO members, and a very clear
campaigning action for members to take up. As discussed in Chapter 5,
effective campaigning requires a clear message and objective and is
typically adversarial, requiring a villain or an injustice. Just like other
campaigning organisations, OCOs therefore establish what Keck and
Sikkink (1998: 27) call a ‘causal story’ so that responsibility for an injus-
tice is obvious, making sure that in addition ‘the causal chain needs to
be sufficiently short and clear to make the case convincing’. Baringhorst
(2009) outlines ways of determining how successfully organisations
have achieved their aims, stating that there are three minimal goals
which all campaigns share: ‘gaining public awareness for a cause, devel-
oping credibility for the organization and affecting behavioural change
in a group of people.’ Additionally, as Bennett (2005: 212) highlights,
second generation activism is driven from below: ‘from an organisa-
tion’s members – and is multi-issue, that is to say the members engage
in a diverse range of campaigns, but have less clear goals and political
relationships with targets’.
Avaaz, for example, sets its priorities through a weekly poll of various
ideas on a random 10,000 member sample. The initiatives with the
strongest support are taken to scale to become Avaaz campaigns and,
because the polling is done electronically, a campaign can be rolled
out within days. This approach differs markedly from the long and
protracted process of organisational strategy of other types of civil society
organisations. A key member of The Rules states: ‘we had to invent new
organizational forms that look different to traditional NGOs in order to
make these movements work. They’re made up of small crack teams of
people who have a lot of freedom to experiment, who can really take
risks with tactics’ (NGO123).
However, this is not to say that OCOs are completely driven by their
members. In the case of Avaaz, a lean professional campaigning team,
based in different countries, defines the organisation’s different priori-
ties and develops its messages through the use of advisors. This means
that ‘Avaaz is more centrally controlled than other types of campaign
networks of “second generation” transnational activism. At the same
time, it is flexible and multi-issue, advocating for a variety of “perma-
nent” campaigns with the main focus changing quickly according to
unfolding events’ (Kavada, 2009: 2–3). Ricken Patel, Executive Director
of Avaaz, outlined that campaigns are initiated only after polling the
network’s membership on specific issues and campaign objectives, as well
as after analysing public opinion data from a variety of sources in order
to establish whether Avaaz.org will be able to effect a desired change on a
particular global political issue (Balasubramanian, 2009: 20).
The OCOs discussed so far have a great deal in common, yet it is
important to highlight that each organisation also has a specific history,
set of goals and distinct focus. Avaaz’s membership and focus, for
example, is international (even though some national issues are priori-
tised), whereas other OCOs, such as GetUp, campaign on issues specific
to one country, in this case Australia. The Rules, meanwhile, focuses on
global justice and international development issues, with a particular
emphasis on the global south – not only in its membership but also in
its issue priorities.
The participatory element of OCOs, where members decide which
issues to address, is a highly innovative mechanism of this type of
organisation. Issues are first put forward by members (and not all issues
are accepted, only the ones which are politically viable) and as an issue
needs enough support to become a campaign, the process indicates at
least some existing degree of support. OCOs also link online action to
traditional forms of protest, which are adapted by the OCO for different
groups, issues and contexts. As Peck, who has worked for a number of
OCOs, states: ‘[T]his is an exciting time to be a digital organiser ... . The
most exciting developments in digital organising today are mobile and
they’re happening in the developing world’ (Peck, 2012).
OCOs have expanded dramatically since they were first set up and a
number of people interviewed for this research that have been based
in large INGOs have since migrated to work in OCOs. The reason one
interviewee gave was that compared to their advocacy role they had in
an INGO, they felt that they could be more instrumental in influencing
change by working within OCOs (NGO123).
Not all in the NGO sector see the utility of OCOs. There does tend
to be an assumption that OCOs are exclusively online organisations.
Yet, OCOs do not see their role as being solely online. Although Avaaz
has used highly effective YouTube video links, commanding millions
of views, it has also supplied real world communications equipment to
Syrian activists, and has teamed up with local organisations, NGOs and
lobby groups. All of which is helping OCOs ‘to forge the new networked
public sphere’ (Beckett, 2012: 31). Other OCOs frequently utilise televi-
sion commercials in their campaigning, such as Australian Get Up. The
UK-based 38 Degrees has local groups that meet around campaigning
issues and The Rules has been examining the potential of using mobile
phones and crowdringing not only as a mechanism for petition-signing,
but also to discover where clusters of supporters are based, and then to
organise real world actions in these clusters.
The primary aim of OCOs is to advocate for change through their
members. The political space that is created, or ‘opened’, gives OCOs the
opportunity to take actions that previously might not have been taken,
or would not have been taken at the current rate. Ricken Patel from
Avaaz claims that many of its members were not previously engaged
in political actions, and estimates that one third of members ‘tell a
common story that, before learning about Avaaz, they didn’t believe
the world could change and didn’t believe they could change the world’
(quoted in Welaratna, 2009: 5).
Andrew Chadwick (2007: 283) argues that the American OCO
MoveOn.org is a type of hybrid organisation that is neither a political
party, nor an interest group nor a social movement. Welaratna (2009:
4–5) relates OCOs to Benedict Anderson’s imagined communities, where
they are: ‘imagined because the members of even the smallest nation
will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even
hear of them, yet in the minds [sic] of each lives the image of their
communion.’ Welaratna (2009: 4–5) extends Anderson’s idea to Avaaz,
which she argues is a site of just such a communion on a global scale,
as the majority of members will not meet each other in person or even
have any kind of direct online exchange.
Beckett (2012) captures Avaaz’s ambition as being to ‘foster a delibera-
tive democracy that does not rely on mainstream media or conventional
politics’. The single-issue approach that OCOs adopt attracts supporters
into the network, and then the OCOs contact them about other issues
and campaigns. Beckett (2012: 31) stresses that OCOs like Avaaz differ
from NGOs in that they are able to campaign aggressively and claims
that ‘Avaaz says it is not just a petition site. It claims to have agency built
into its design. People sign a petition, but they are then only another
click away from more information and other routes to action.’ Thus it is
what politicians such as Canada’s ex-Liberal party leader Stéphane Dion,
who was one of the influential political actors in the Bali climate change
negotiations, personally attributed the reversal of the Canadian position
to Avaaz, whose campaign methods in Bali he applauded as ‘democracy
at work’ ( Dion, 2007, quoted in Balasubramanian, 2009: 17).
OCOs, then, are sites of innovation enabled by new technologies.
Getting people to sign an online petition may not represent a new
political strategy, but getting two million people to sign one in a matter
of weeks is novel. To give one example, the campaign ‘Stopping the
Amazon Chainsaw’ in 2012 resulted in over two million Avaaz members
putting pressure on Brazil’s President to reject a bill which would have
freed loggers from any quota restrictions.7
One criticism of OCOs, outlined by Karpf (2009: 15) and referring to
MoveOn.org, is the low entry barrier for membership, which ‘yields a
large-but-questionable base of recipients’. Kavada (2009: 4), too, agrees
that OCOs such as Avaaz demand very little commitment from their
members, and such arguments fall in line with the critiques of online
activism as ‘clicktivism’.8 Charlie Beckett, for example, argues that while
OCOs may be efficient and flexible, they can only act as catalysts for a
digital challenge rather than offering a long-term solution. He goes on to
state that they ‘can attract attention but in themselves can only provide
limited deeper engagement. Their account of the world is inevitably
partial and some would say simplistic’ (Beckett, 2012: 31). Additionally,
he critiques OCOs for their decision-making structure, one that allows
them to act quickly, but in the process means they lose the ability to
attempt difficult campaigns or to engage supporters in any deep way.
In his view, ‘their appeal is inevitably more instinctive and emotional’
(Beckett, 2012: 31).
OCOs thus illustrate a number of changes that have taken place in
campaigning, with organisations such as Avaaz, Lead Now, 38 Degrees,
Move On, Get Up and The Rules attracting unprecedented numbers of
supporters internationally. OCOs are not only challenging the ways in
which we conceptualise social change, but also the ways that people
mobilise, engage with issues and take part in politically transformative
action. While some BOAG INGOs – for example, Oxfam and Action
Aid – have already been involved with OCOs on specific petitions, many
more opportunities for co-ordinated action remain. Yet, given that online
publics are more sceptical about fundraising demands and a top-down
approach (Fenyoe, 2010), a warning must be made that INGOs need to
make clear that their involvement is not an attempt to fundraise.
Unlike most NGOs, which focus on a particular topic or area, people
do not tend to think only in single issues. By offering a variety of topical
campaigns, Avaaz is therefore able to connect with its community across
different subjects. As Beckett (2012: 31) stated, getting people to sign a
petition is the first step for supporters as they are only another click away
from more information and other routes to action. Some key employees
such as Media Managers, Campaigns Directors and Communications
Directors of INGOs are extremely positive about OCOs. For example one
Campaign Director stated that ‘Avaaz for me is at the forefront of what
we are trying to create’ (NGO111), while others stated that OCO are
just clicktivism (NGO113, NGO116). One of the critiques, as captured
by a Communications Director of a BOAG INGO, is that even though
their INGO also has petitions on their main webpage, the organisation
finds that ‘they [the petitions] don’t necessarily deepen the quality of
the conversation’ (NGO112).
The INGO sector as a whole needs to reflect on the potential utility
of OCOs and what INGOs can learn from them; as one interviewee
stated, the sector needs ‘cross-organisational conversations about
where we want to go in the digital world’ (NGO113). People in the
global north who do support OCOs support a number of them, and
most NGO supporters also support OCOs such as Avaaz and 38 Degrees
(NGO122). However, OCOs make decisions much quicker than INGOs
and appear more timely. Also, their decision-making is much quicker
than that of INGOs, and as one INGO Campaign Director stated, ‘So
if we’re talking about living in the digital world, with media cycles at
the speed they’re at, and public engagement being increasingly digitally
orientated, I think we [the INGO sector] have an inherent disadavan-
tage’ (NGO122). As Beckett (2012: 29) warns, ‘the absolute, high moral
claims that INGOs like to make in the analogue sphere may not carry
the same weight, indeed will often feel alien and inappropriate, in the
more personal online space’.
Conclusion – what can we learn?
The internet has acted as an enabler for broader-based transnational

advocacy, and has been a key tool in allowing social movement
organisers to mobilise and communicate with their supporters about

demonstrations and political actions. Given the increasing use of social
media, users are not only able to generate and upload content onto
their own websites and extend their social / political networks, but also
to interact with others across national boundaries. As Beckett (2012:
30) argues, “[I]t will be new campaigning groups that can best exploit
the potential of the networked public sphere, rather than expecting
“legacy” INGOs to adapt.’
The Finding Frames (Darnton and Kirk, 2011: 10) report states that
INGO models of engagement should be based on genuine dialogue
between supporters and practitioners to deliberate together. Given
this recommendation, it is disheartening to see that a survey of 75
American transnational NGOs saw the promoting of the organisa-
tion’s image and fundraising were the two most important functions
of NGO use of social media (Seo et al., 2009: 123). Digital spaces offer
INGOs an opportunity to deliberate with their constituents and with
publics through social media platforms. As Beckett (2012: 29) outlines,
‘engagement through social media is about more than pretty websites
or a Facebook page. The cliché about “having a conversation online”
is still understood by most NGOs as talking at people rather than with
them ... [and] engagement through social media requires a new under-
standing of audience, attention and trust’. Put another way, the Head
of Policy at a BOAG INGO says: ‘there is a real opportunity with digital
technology to have a deeper conversation and potentially use [digital]
tools to get people feeling empowered over campaigning actions. Like
“this is mine, it’s my issue I own it, I want to talk to someone over here
about it” and we want to share our thoughts and to build up a network
of people’ (NGO113).
So given that northern publics are unlikely to be proactive about
exploring development issues online on their own (Fenyoe, 2010: 12),
INGOs will need to be creative and innovative in how they engage with
publics in these more deliberative digital spaces. And, as all the emerging
organisational forms – even the OCOs – illustrate, making the links
between digital and ‘real’ spaces is key. Above all it is vital that INGOs
treat digital spaces as opportunities for bridging other media spaces such
as radio, news and films. While many INGOs have adapted to the new
digital technologies, there are still problems in how they are navigating
the digital terrain. New digital spaces such as the WSF are opening up
sites of deliberation for diverse civil society actors. Occupy, too, offered
a space for deliberation and one in which people could protest and
challenge the status quo. OCOs have shown that it is possible to mobi-
lise people on a grand scale in innovative and new ways, revealing that
publics are no longer passive consumers of information, but are busy
creating it themselves. Dialogue is vital in engaging with such publics.
8
Conclusions
INGOs are key actors in international development and, through their

fundraising, awareness raising and campaigning, they are a primary
mediator of international development for the majority of people in
the global north. This is an extremely powerful position to be in and in
many ways they are the face of the development industry, constructing,
mediating and representing meanings of development. And yet, as we
have seen in the preceding chapters, there are challenges and problems
in the ways that development INGOs specifically, and the NGO sector
more broadly, are constructing, mediating and representing develop-
ment – how they are engaging publics and how they can be the agents of
social change. As Wendy Harcourt (2012: 3) states, development organi-
sations such as INGOs must renegotiate their political positions as well
as the ways that they work. There are increasing horizontal and multi-
level connections as a result of technological changes, where people are
engaging in new political behaviours (Harcourt, 2012: 2).
The driving question throughout the book has been: “How are INGOs
engaging northern publics to affect change?” This question has required
us to look at the values, frames and strategies used by INGOs to engage
northern publics. The question has also required an examination of
INGOs as organisations with strategies, tensions and different theories
of change. And the question also demanded the exploration of political
spaces inhabited by, and utilised, by INGOs.
The preceding chapters have explored different elements of this ques-
tion. First, INGO cosmopolitan values and frames, specifically charity,
justice and solidarity, were examined with respect to key values of many
of the BOAG INGOs. These INGOs were set up to be ‘charities’, and have
utilised the value of charity at their very core. However, what we see is
154
Conclusions 155
that many of these organisations, as well as much of the NGO sector as a

whole, are trying to move away from a frame of charity to one of justice.
This is not an easy transition, particularly as northern publics under-
stand the idea of charity, but INGOs have a long way to go to reframe
international development with a justice frame.
INGOs have been a major player in constructing, mediating and
representing development in the global south to northern publics. Yet
these mediated relationships and means of brokering the engagement
of northern publics with development in the global south have resulted
in particular modes of mediated relationships. When northern publics
see images – be they positive or negative – of those living in the global
south, there are ingrained negative connotations that these ‘subjects’
are destitute and that they require our help to save them. The result
is that so often images of the global south are seen as depressing and
hopeless.
The INGOs themselves are caught in the cycles of charity framing.
In their use of the charity frame, they perpetuate the idea that there is
overwhelming suffering, and financial donations will fix the problem.
Despite attempts to mitigate or shift the charity and fundraising para-
digm, INGOs rely to a large degree on donations from the public to
continue their service delivery work in the global south, or to fund their
southern partners’ work. INGOs are certainly not naïve that this busi-
ness model is both effective in sustaining their organisation, as well as
delivering useful and helpful basic services to those in the global south.
But their business model rather than their change model is frequently
driving their ways of operating.
In order to affect change, INGOs have been forming networks,
working together and opening network spaces. Some have formed intra-
organisational networks with their own sister organisations, and most
have been forming inter-organisational networks in the form of large-
scale campaigns, such as Jubilee 2000, Make Poverty History and the
IF campaign. These networked campaigns have not been problem free,
with issues around the framing of the campaign message, the presence
and branding of members, and the overall efficacy of the campaigns
raising many questions around the utility of large-scale campaigning.
The ways that INGOs use social media and the potential of digital
spaces are a timely topic for INGOs. The take up of digital media has
been notable, and INGOs have followed this rise in its take up. The
interactive digital spaces offer great potential, and yet there are ques-
tions around the best use of this media. Are INGOs using social media as
an an add-on, a fundraising tool, or are they exploring the potential of

social media platforms for new types of deeper public engagement.
Exploring these different elements of INGOs, and specifically BOAG
INGOs, within various political spaces has provided a clearer analysis
of the ways in which these organisations mediate development to
northern publics. The different entry points into ways that INGOs
engage northern publics have enabled us to see how INGOs engage with
publics, what values they rely on, how they conceive of change, the
limitations and challenges they face, and the possibilities of networked
and digital spaces.
A number of interviewees offered suggestions and comments on the
future of INGOs. One INGO Director stated: ‘Is their [INGOs’] defining
purpose to sustain their organisation and to grow their organisations
into multi-million pound behemoths, or is it to serve another purpose
which they were set up for? That is the critical issue at the moment’
(NGO117). Another INGO Director commented: ‘are they relevant to
my vision of social change? Certainly not. Do they protect their own
interests? Yes. For the project of service delivery, they’re pretty relevant.
But for social change? No, because social change needs to come from
below and they’re coming from above’ (NGO116).
The argument of this book is that development INGOs need to utilise
political values and political spaces more strategically if they are to be
better agents of change. There are great expectations of INGOs to make
change, expectations that have been exacerbated by INGOs themselves.
Christian Aid wants ‘an end to poverty – and [they] believe that vision
can become a reality’1 and Action Aid wants to ‘defeat poverty, for all’2,
while large-scale campaigns set up and supported by INGOs propose
to ‘make poverty history’. How will INGOs be able to achieve these
large ambitions and how are their relationships with northern publics
important in order to achieve such normative aims? I would suggest
that they need to look at the ways they engage with publics, they need
to look at their strategies and business models, and they need to look
at their utilisation of political spaces.
Thus, some key conclusions are:
● INGOs have done excellent work in providing for certain needs for
certain places and situations in the global south;
● INGOs have a duty of care and a duty of dignity for others in the ways
they represent people in the global south, and that certain images
have a long-term negative impact on relations between north and
south;
Conclusions 157
● INGO engagement with northern publics is complex and requires

less of a charity focus and more of a justice and solidarity based
relationship;
● INGO business models, where fundraising frequently drives the prac-
tices of the organisation (vs its stated values), requires rethinking;
● INGOs will need to engage and fundraise potentially in different
ways in the future, given: what is typically called compassion fatigue
from individuals, a shrinking pot of funding from donors and new
burgeoning ways of fundraising such as crowdsourcing;
● INGOs need to find ways to work with other INGOs, social move-
ments, and partners to develop more solidaristic relationships, to
form an international movement for change; and
● INGOs need to find new ways to engage northern publics in the
deliberative spaces offered through social media.
At the beginning of this book, we noted Michael Edwards’s concern

about the ‘elephant in the room’, specifically that ‘NGOs will never
achieve the impact they say they want to achieve, because their leverage
over the drivers of long-term change will continue to be weak.’ This
difficult problem is one that INGOs do not necessarily want to talk
about. It is also something that Wild and Mulley (2013) highlight: ‘Too
often, people hear a lot about need, and some stories of success (children
vaccinated, schools built), but are given very little information about
how change happens or how aid works.’ Wild and Mulley recommended
that a new public conversation on what aid and development means in
the 21st century is urgently needed. In addition to this conversation,
a public conversation on the role of INGOs within this debate is also
needed. Do they continue with their existing models, or do they need to
rethink their roles within development and consequently their relation-
ships with northern publics.
There is no theory of INGO public engagement, but if there was such
a theory, what would it be a theory of? Such a theory should encom-
pass certain elements of INGO mediation, values and frames, strategic
organisation, business models, large-scale collaborations with other
organisations, as well as digital environments where increasing public
engagement is taking place. All of these elements would need to be
thought about in the context of political space.
When writing a book such as this, people frequently have asked
me many questions, such as: “so what is wrong with wanting to give
to charity?”, “why do I feel emotionally manipulated when asked to
contribute?”, and “are any of these donations actually doing any good,
if they are, why are they still asking me to donate?”. The hope is that
this book has addressed some of these questions, and also that these
questions will provoke further dialogue for improvement. Our critical
engagement with such issues is paramount, and no one person or organ-
isation has the answers for how to fix a situation – whether it is ‘making
poverty history’ or being a quick fix for the INGO sector itself.
Notes
1 The Current State of INGOs

1. Frequently the term NGO is used as shorthand by authors quoted or by inter-
viewees. Generally, they are actually referring to International NGOs, but I
have not changed the quotes to reflect this.
2. Countries in what has been termed the global north are the economically
developed societies of Europe, North America, Australia, amongst others.
Countries in what has been termed the global south are less economically
affluent, such as those in Africa, Latin America and some parts of Asia. Where
global north countries are wealthy, technologically advanced, politically
stable and aging as their societies tend towards zero population growth the
opposite is the case with global south countries. (Ekedegwa Odeh, 2010:338).
Whilst these are somewhat crude terms, they are less problematic than
‘developed/developing’ and ‘first world/third world’.
3. I would like to thank Michael Edwards for posing this question to the
Transnational Advocacy workshop at the University of Birmingham in
2010.
4. ( http://www.uia.org/sites/uia.org/files/misc_pdfs/stats/Historical_over-
view_of_number_of_international_organizations_by_type_1909–2013.pdf),
accessed 4 April 2015.
5. (http://www.christianaid.org.uk/aboutus/), accessed 21 August 2014.
6. (http://www.actionaid.org.uk/about-us), accessed 21 August 2014.
7. The BRICS countries are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
8. CAFOD is generally seen as an INGO; however, CAFOD is hired by the
Catholic church, and is technically not an NGO, at least not by the defi-
nition given by Fowler above. Generally though, CAFOD is accepted as an
INGO in the literature and discourses and its behaviour seems to conform to
expectations of what counts as an INGO.
9. (http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/about-charities/sector-facts-and-fig-
ures/), accessed 30 August 2014.
10. The most comprehensive definition of mediation comes from Roger
Silverstone (2006: 58) who defines mediation as such: ‘Mediation refers to
what media do, and to what we do with media. It is a term that includes
both the media of mass communication (radio, television and the World
Wide Web, as well as the press) and the media of interpersonal communica-
tion (fixed and mobile telephony, and email, as well as the letter). It suggests
that these media actively form a space in which meanings can be created
and communicated beyond the constraints of the face-to-face, and which
is becoming increasingly significant for the conduct of public, institutional
and private life. Audiences are part of this process of mediation, because they
continue the work of the media in the ways in which they respond to, extend
and further communicate what they see and hear via the world’s multitude
of screens and speakers’.
159
160 Notes
2 Political Spaces of INGOs

1. For the spread of the Occupy movement, see (http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2011/10/occupy-wall-street-protest-map) accessed 30 August 2014.
2. A useful distinction between southern NGO and CSO is made by UNDP.
Southern NGOs are frequently called ‘local’ NGOs, and are officially registered
in the country they operate in. CSO is a much broader category of organisa-
tion, and includes community-based organisations and village associations,
environmental groups, women’s rights groups, farmers’ associations, faith-
based organizations, labour unions, co-operatives, professional associations,
chambers of commerce, independent research institutes and the not-for-profit
media. ( http://www.cn.undp.org/content/dam/china/docs/Publications/
UNDP- CH03%20Annexes.pdf) accessed 30 August 2014.
3. OCOs are interactive online driven campaigning organisations. The term was
coined by Yanacopulos (2013) to describe organisations such as Avaaz, 38
Degrees and The Rules. Whilst other INGOs may do some of their campaigning
online, OCOs are specifically designed to campaign online and have different
business models than INGOs.
3 Cosmopolitan Spaces of INGOs

1. Not all cosmopolitan theorists see NGOs as a positive element of cosmopoli-
tanism. For example, Onora O’Neill (in Erskine, 2002) considers them to be
unaccountable actors in world politics.
2. (http://www.islamreligion.com/articles/46/), accessed 30 August 2014.
3. Lissner (1981) refers to the term the ‘pornography of poverty’, and Arnold
(1988) refers to ‘development pornography’. For more on the ‘pornography of
poverty’ debates, see Scott (2014).
4. For a detailed outline of the relationship between global justice and interna-
tional development, see Papaioannou et al. (2009)
5. There has been a great deal written on framing (Ayers, 2004; Benford and
Snow, 2000; Boykoff, 2006; Gillan, 2008) and more specifically on Jubilee
2000 (Busby 2007; Josselin, 2007; Keet, 2000) and Make Poverty History (Fain,
2008; Nash, 2008; Saunders and Rootes, 2006; Sireau, 2008).
4 INGO Spaces of Engagement

1. Television news is another source – see Scott (2014); Chouliaraki (2006);
Robertson (2009). NGOs are frequently asked to comment on news stories in
the news programme itself.
2. The production team was very aware that the series was not looking at
the entire African continent, but only at two schools in Masindi, Uganda.
However, as the series was made to fit into the BBC’s ‘Africa Season’, it was
decided to use the series title ‘African School’.
3. The ‘give us the money’ approach is not without its merits in certain instances,
such as extreme humanitarian crises. In such situations, when INGOs and
other organisations need funds to send food aid, and to set up clean water,
sanitation and temporary housing for refugee camps, charitable funding is
valuable to alleviate human suffering. But humanitarian situations are only
Notes 161
one element of the work that INGOs are engaged in; the majority of the work
of INGOs is in development.
4. Mediation differs from mediatisation, which is a process-oriented concept. As
noted by Schulz (2004: 88), ‘mediatisation relates to changes associated with
communication media and their development.’ Similarly, Hjarvard (2004:
48) writes that ‘mediatization implies a process through which core elements
of a social or cultural activity (like work, leisure, play etc) assume media form’,
whereas Jansson (2002: 14–15) writes that ‘mediatization of culture is the
process that reinforces and expands the realm of media culture.’ The definition
of Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999: 249) is also process-oriented: ‘Mediatisation
denotes problematic concomitants or consequences of the development of
modern mass media. (quoted in Strombach, 2008: 232)
5. (http:www.whypoverty.net), accessed 30 August, 2014.
6. (http://www3.ebu.ch/contents/news/2013/05/media-summit-focus-day--the-
best.html), accessed 10 August 2015.
7. A discussion evaluating the reception of the Why Poverty? series can be found at:
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JOs45Es24xs), accessed 30 August 2014.
8. Quoted in (http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-
network/2013/feb/05/development-campaign-messaging-debate), accessed 10
August 2015.
9. (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/10/oxfam-africa-aid-
campaign), accessed 10 August 2015.
5 INGO Organisation and Strategy

1. The Toronto Declaration of NGO Core Values was drafted, and affirmed on
11 November 2007 by the participants of the World Congress of NGOs, held
in Toronto, Canada (www.wango.org/download/doc/Toronto-Declaration-of-
NGO-Core-Values.doc) accessed 30 August 2014.
2. Figures were calculated from the Oxfam Annual Report & Accounts 2013–
2014; The Save the Children Annual Report 2012; The Christian Aid Annual
Report and Accounts 2011–2012; The ActionAid Trustees Report & Accounts
2012; and the CAFOD Report of the Trustees and Financial Statements for the
year ended 31 March 2013.
3. Additionally, as Wright (2014) states, unrestricted funding has been a key
driver in changing NGO’s organisational structure and priorities vis-à-vis their
engagement with the mainstream media.
4. For a further analysis of the relationship between celebrities and INGOs, see
Kapoor (2012) and Brockington (2014).
5. The term ‘lobby’ originated in the United States to refer to those who attempted
to influence policy makers in the ‘lobby’ of the House of Representatives in
the American Congress and other policy-making bodies.
6. http://think-global.org.uk/pages/3866, accessed 30 August 2014.
6 Networked Spaces of INGOs

1. (http://www.whiteband.org), accessed 30 August 2014.
2. ( http://www.whiteband.org/Lib/take_action/get_involved/Lib/docs/en_
actionguide.pdf), accessed 25 April 2006.
162 Notes
3. ( http://www.whiteband.org/Lib/take_action/get_involved/Lib/docs/en_
actionguide.pdf), accessed 25 April 2006.
4. Martin, A, C Culey, S Evans (2006) ‘Make Poverty History 2005 Campaign
Evaluation’, (http://www.firetail.co.uk/MPH_2005_Evaluation.pdf), accessed
30 August 2014.
5. The Live8 organisers claimed that ‘three billion people watched on TV, an esti-
mated 1.5 million attended the concerts in person and more than 30 million
signed up to the text and web petition, the Live 8 List’. (http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/5128344.stm), accessed 30 August 2014.
6. (http://www.worldrecordacademy.com/mass/largest_number_of_people_to_
stand_up_against_poverty_record_set_by_GCAP_70881.htm), accessed 30
August 2014.
7. (http://www.whiteband.org), 15 August 2007.
8. Whilst officially MPH messaging was focused on justice, there were some MPH
members who still relied on portraying Africa as a helpless continent (Glennie,
2006: 260).
7 Digital Spaces of INGOs

1. A blog is an online site where people post updates from a personal perspec-
tive. Writing a blog is generally less time-consuming than writing an article
or report and blogs are written in an informal, conversational tone. A blog
can engage constituents by telling a story about the organisation’s work, the
difference their volunteers have made, or just a behind-the-scenes look at the
organisation (Idealware, 2013: 16).
2. Twitter is an internet-based service that lets you create a profile and send out
a short messages called ‘tweets’ – updates, conversation starters, requests for
help, or links to resources of interest. If those reading the tweets like one, they
can retweet it – post it again so their own followers see it. It’s in retweeting
that much of the power of Twitter lies (Idealware, 2013: 14).
3. The Social Forum process is a term used here to capture not only what happens
in the World Social Forum, which started in 2001, but all its offshoots – such
as the European Social Forum and the US Social Forum.
4. ‘Interview: Karina Brisby (Head of Interactive Campaigns, Oxfam)’ The
Guardian, 4 July 2011(http://untanglingtheweb.tumblr.com/post/7229296913/
interview-karina-brisby-head-of-interactive), accessed 30 August 2014.
5. (http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/oct/17/occupy-protests-
world-list-map#data), accessed 30 August 2014.
6. ( http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?id_menu=19&cd_
language=2), accessed 30 August 2014.
7. (http://www.avaaz.org/en/highlights.php), accessed 28 March 2013.
8. The terms ‘clicktivism’ and ‘slacktivism’ are sometimes used interchangeably.
However, clicktivism can also just been seen as a descriptive term for online
activism, and may not always be used in a pejorative way. Slacktivism, on the
other hand, is generally a pejorative term.
8 Conclusions
1. (http://www.christianaid.org.uk/aboutus/), accessed 21 August 2014.
2. (http://www.actionaid.org.uk/about-us), accessed 21 August 2014.
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Index
accountability, 5, 9, 60, 73 Catholic Agency for Overseas

Action Aid, 1, 8, 13, 16, 92 Development (CAFOD), 1, 13, 16,
advocacy, 5, 90, 99–104, 108 40, 92
campaigns, 3–4, 99–102 celebrities, 81, 95
networks, 109–13 Chadwick, Andrew, 148
Africa, 41, 42, 69, 78, 79, 82–3 change
African School, 69 theories of, 86–9, 112
agency, 42 transformational, 55
aid debate, 60 values and, 55
ambivalent cosmpolitanism, 49–50 change agents, 12, 61
anti-globalisation movement, 113–14 Chapman, J., 100–1
Arab Spring, 22, 33 charity, 40–5, 49, 52–4, 68–70, 87, 90,
Arendt, Hannah, 25, 43 98, 121
Avaaz, 10, 132, 147–9 children, images of, 77–80, 93–4, 98
awareness raising, 1–2, 102–3 child sponsorship, 52, 95–6
Choudry, A., 103–4
banal cosmopolitanism, 50–1 Chouliaraki, Lilie, 43, 44, 73, 74,
Banks, Nicola, 31, 88, 89–90 80–1, 98
Bebbington, T., 105 Christian Aid, 1, 8, 11, 13, 15–16, 40,
Beck, Ulrich, 22, 50 92, 96, 156
Beckett, Charlie, 34, 137, 141, 148–9, Christianity, 40
151 citizenship, global, 39
Bennett, L.W., 136 civil society, 2–5, 26, 29, 39
Boltanski, Luc, 43, 73 civil society organisations (CSOs), 9,
Boudreau, Julie-Anne, 23, 24–6 29
branding, 8, 94–6 claimed spaces, 27–30
British Overseas Aid Group (BOAG), Code of Conduct on Images and
13–17, 29, 33, 88, 106 Messages, 76–7
business models, 28, 89–98, 157 cognitive frames, 57
Butsch, R., 136 Cohen, Stanley, 38, 73, 80, 96
collaboration, 107–8, 110, 112, 113
CAFOD, see Catholic Agency for collective action, 55–6, 108, 118,
Overseas Development (CAFOD) 122–5
Calhoun, C., 53, 54 colonial cosmopolitanism, 51–2
campaigns/campaigning, 102, 106–9 colonialism, 79, 96
INGOs and networked, 118–29 commodification, 52, 95–6
networks, 95, 113–18 Common Cause study, 40–1, 56–7, 66
CARE, 1, 11, 38, 40 communication technologies, 8, 10,
Carey, D., 54 18–19, 23, 107, 132–53
Caritas Internationalis, 16 compassion fatigue, 60, 96–8, 157
Castells, Manuel, 22–3, 34, 108 competition, 8–9, 106, 110–11
177
178 Index
Compton, T., 56–7 ‘distant strangers’, 36–8, 39, 46, 50,

Cornwall, Andrea, 27, 28, 33 51, 74
cosmopolitanism, 17, 31–2, 35–59, distributive justice, 45, 46, 48
106–7 documentaries, 75–6
ambivalent, 49–50 donors, 8, 31
assumed, 35
banal, 50–1 Edwards, Michael, 2, 5, 71, 105, 157
colonial, 51–2 Elden, Stuart, 23, 26
commodified, 52 emotional appeals, 44–5
concept of, 35, 37–9 empathy, 42, 44
critiques, 50–5 Engberg-Pedersen, L., 23
frames, 55–8 Enough Food For Everyone (IF)
frameworks, 36–9 campaign, 10, 32, 71
resurgence of, 37–8 Ethiopian famine, vi, 65, 78
solidaristic, 53–5 Europe, economic crisis in, 8
values, 38, 39–49, 55–8 Every Child, 9
counter public, 7 Eyben, R., 89
Cox, Brendan, 128, 130
crowdsourcing, 157 Facebook activism, 33, 142
cyberspace, 32, 33, 34 fair trade, 51
faith-based organisations, 1
Darnton, Andrew, 54, 55, 61–2, 66–7 feminisation, 77–80
Deardson, 89 Fenton, N., 138
debt cancellation campaigns, 1, 11, Ferguson, James, 31, 87
47, 48, 56, 68, 114–15, 118–20 films, 74–6
De Certeau, M., 136 Finding Frames study, 40–1, 49, 54–8,
deliberation, 33 66–7, 85, 105, 125, 152
democracy, 39, 54 Forti, M., 88–9
Dencik, L., 10 Foucault, M., 21
depoliticalisation, 31 Fowler, Alan, 4
Desforges, L., 70 frames/framing, 55–8, 82, 85, 106–7,
development 118–22
Big D vs. little d, 87–8 Freire, Paulo, 53–4
mediation of, 72–6 Friedman, Milton, 88
public faces of, 18, 70–2 funding
representation of, 74 challenges, 52–3
development aid, effectiveness of, 6 competition for, 8–9, 106, 110–11
development education, 102–3 sources of, 92
Development Education Association, fundraising, 6, 8–9, 52, 70, 91–4, 157
103 charity and, 44–5
development issues, public knowledge media and, 8
of, 61–2 online, 140–1
development project, 32, 79 Futcher, Nick, 82
development sector, 3, 11, 62
public engagement in, 63–70 Gamson, W., 56
development studies, 62, 74 Gaventa, John, 28, 30
digital activism, 141–2 Geldof, Bob, 68, 121, 127
digital spaces, 32, 33, 34, 132–53 generality, 37, 38
Get Up!, 10
Index 179
Gilson, J., 27 international non-governmental

Gladwell, M., 133–4 organisations (INGOs), 32
Glennie, Jonathan, 97, 127 as agents of change, 12, 61
global campaigns, 6, 11, 18, 32 aid dispersed through, 2–3
global citizenship, 39 BOAGs, 13–17, 29, 33, 88, 106
global democracy, 39 business models, 89–98, 157
globalisation, 22, 23, 50, 113–14 changing political landscapes for,
global justice, 45, 47, 48, 58 7–11
Global Justice Movement, 45, 113–14, characterisations of, 7
130 competition among, 110–11
global north, 5, 8, 46 cosmopolitan spaces of, 35–59
global south, 5, 8, 11, 20, 36, 46 critiques of, 5–6, 103–4
images of, 52, 71, 76–7 current state of, 1–20
representation of, 61, 74–6 depoliticalisation, 31
government relations, 7, 9, 88 digital spaces of, 132–53
guilt, 44, 79 government relations, 7, 9, 88
growth of sector, 2–3, 8, 29
Habermas, Jurgen, 26, 33, 138 vs. local NGOs, 5
Hall, Stuart, 52, 71 media and, 7–8
Hannerz, U., 51 networked campaigns and, 118–29
Harcourt, Wendy, 8, 154 networked spaces of, 11, 18, 106–31
Harrison, G., 41 as political actors, 3–4
Hart, Gillian, 87 political spaces of, 12, 17, 20, 21–34
Harvey, David, 23 public engagement by. see public
Hilary, John, 127 engagement
Himmelman, A., 107–8 as public faces of development,
Hodkinson, S., 127 70–2
Hoijer, B., 43 role of, 1–2, 5–7, 22, 57, 64, 154–8,
Hulme, David, 5, 31, 88, 89–90 vi
humanitarian assistance, 1, 5, 11 strategies of, 18, 90–1, 107
humanitarian emergencies, 83–5, theories of change for, 86–9, 112
93–4 values of, 17, 18, 39–49, 86
human rights, 11, 38 work of, 5
Huxham, C., 113 international relations, 23–4, 33, 62
internet, 19, 23, 107, 133, 142, 151–2
IF campaign, 10, 32, 71, 106, 117–18, see also digital spaces
125, 128–9 invited spaces, 27–30
image debate, 70–2 irony, 81
imagery, 71, 76–80, 82, 93–4, 98
individualism, 37, 38, 52 Jubilee 2000, 1, 11, 18, 32, 45–8, 56,
inequality, 48 68, 86, 106, 107, 114–15, 118–20,
infantilisation, 77–80 122–3, 125–6, 130, 155
information and communication justice, 43, 45–9, 56, 87, 88, 119–22
technology (ICT), 10, 18–19, 107,
132–53 Kahler, Myles, 33
injustice, 48–9, 54, 56, 102 Kaldor, M., 27
interactivity, 132–3 Kapoor, I., 103–4
international development, 1, 40, 63, Karpf, David, 134, 135, 149
71, 83–4 Kavada, A., 149
180 Index
Keck, M., 33, 102 of INGOs, 109–13

Keet, Dot, 119 social movements and, 108–9
Khanna, Akshay, 132 network society, 108
Kirk, Martin, 11, 42, 54, 55, 61–2, new media, 10
66–7, 92, 105 non-governmental organisations
Kirsch, Scott, 24 (NGOs), 1
Klandermans, B., 55–6 see also international
Kothari, U., 71 non-governmental organisations
(INGOs)
Lakoff, G., 57 aid dispersed through, 2–3
Lamers, M., 78 characteristics of, 4
Lang, Sabine, 6–7, 22 critiques of, 5–6
Lefebvre, Henri, 23, 26–7, 136 definitions of, 4
legitimacy, 5, 9, 60 growth of sector, 2–3, 8
Lichtenberg, J., 45 local, 4
Lidchi, H., 80 values, 86
Live8, 121, 124–5 norms, 35, 38
Live Aid, 1, 65, 68, 69, 121, vi northern publics
Live Aid Legacy study, 65, 66 charitable donations by, 68–70
lobbying, 100, 101 engagement with, 18, 19, 32, 36, 52,
Lu, C., 37, 46 54, 60–85, 157
role of, 63
Mackenzie, J. M., 71 north-south divide, 6
Mahoney, N., 62
Make Poverty History campaigns, 1, Occupy movement, 10, 22, 32, 33,
6, 8, 10, 11, 18, 32, 45–9, 53, 56, 136, 143–4
61, 66–9, 71, 86, 95, 106, 107, Ogunlesi, Tolu, 83
115–17, 119–24, 126–30, 155 online activism, 134–5, 141–2
Mandela, Nelson, 115 Online Campaigning Organisations
marketing, 94–6 (OCOs), 10, 32, 132, 133, 146–51
Massey, Doreen, 23 open space, 22, 24
media, 7–8, 10, 32, 73, 74–5 ‘othering’, 71, 76–7
see also social media Oxfam, 1, 3, 9, 11, 13, 17, 40, 79
mediation, 18, 72–6, 81 funding sources, 92
meta-appeals, 81 landscapes campaign, 98
Millennium Development Goals mission of, 15
(MDGs), 7 networking by, 111–12
mobile phones, 19, 142 ‘Perfect Storm’ example, 102
Moeller, Susan, 96 See Africa Differently campaign,
Mohan, G., 69 82–3
Move On, 10, 132 selling of goods by, 95–6
Oxfam International, 111–12
Nash, K., 127
negative imagery, 71, 76–7, 79, 82, participation, 27–8
93–4, 98 Peck, J., 148
neo-liberalism, 29, 53, 69–70 Peters, Durham, 42–3
networked spaces, 33, 106–31 pity, 41–5, 79, 85
network relations, 125–9 Pogge, Thomas, 37, 38, 46–9
networks, 11, 18, 24, 32, 95, 155 political activism, 22, 141–2
Index 181
political landscapes, 7–11 importance of, 61

political spaces, 12, 17, 20, 21–34, 61 levels of, 61–2
claimed, 27–30 online, 140–1
concept of, 23–7 problems of, 84–5
importance of, 29–30 spaces of, 60–85
invited, 27–30 studies on, 64–70
new, 25–6 technology and, 71
opening of, 27 in UK, 62
participation in, 27–8 public faces of development, 18, 70–2
production of, 27 public opinion, 26, 62
shrinking, 24, 28 public perceptions, 64–70
technology and, 34 Public Perceptions of Poverty
transnational, 54 programme, 65–6
politics public sphere, 26
cosmopolitan, 35
in digital spaces, 142–6 Rapid Review report, 67
emergent, 137 Rawls, John, 45–6, 48
global space of, 10 responsibility, 39, 47, 49–50
of INGOs, 31 rights-based approach, 38, 39
of justice, 43 Riker, J., 23
of pity, 43 Rodan, G., 29
positive imagery, 79–80, 82–3, 98
post-humanitarianism, 80–1 Said, E., 71
poverty, 1, 41, 43–4, 46–7, 61, 90 Save the Children, 1, 3, 9, 11, 13, 17,
depictions of, 60, 71, 76–80 77, 79–80, 93–4
domestic thesis of, 47–8 funding sources, 92
feminisation of, 77–80 mission of, 15
framing, 57 School Omnibus, 65
infantilisation of, 77–80 Scott, A., 44, 74, 80, 81, 84, 98
injustice and, 48–9 See Africa Differently campaign, 82–3
othering of, 76–7 self-interest, 55, 113
pornography of, 79 Sen, Jai, 24, 137
public perceptions of, 65–6, 68 service delivery, 5, 11, 29, 89–90
roots of, 45, 49, 54, 68, 84 Seu, I.B., 96
power, 21, 23 Shirky, Clay, 10, 134–5, 137–8
power asymmetries, 112 ‘shrinking world’ concept, 24, 46
power relations, 27, 30 Sikkink, K., 33, 102
professionalisation, 5, 6, 100 Silverstone, Roger, 73
Progressive Development Forum, 58 slacktivism, 134–5
protest business, 103–4 Smillie, Ian, 68
public consciousness, 1–2, 11 Smith, M., 22
public engagement, 6, 10–13, 18–19, Smythe, E., 22
32, 36, 52, 157 social activism, 141–2
action and, 122–5 social media, 19, 33, 34, 134, 135,
in development, 63–70 137–8, 152, 155–6
downward trajectory of, 67–8 social movements, 19, 33, 88, 89,
forms of, 35, 36 103–4, 108–9
framing and, 57 social networking, 24, 107
fundraising and, 91–4 solidaristic cosmopolitanism, 53–5
182 Index
South Asian Tsunami Relief, 71 Twitter, 142

southern-based INGOs, 9 Twitter revolutions, 33, 132
space(s)
conceptions of, 26–7 Union of International Associations
cosmopolitan, 35–59 (UIA), 2, 3
deliberative, 33 United Kingdom
digital, 32, 33, 34, 132–53 INGO sector in, 3
of engagement, 32, 60–85 public engagement in, 62
making, 33 universalism, 37, 38
network, 33 user generated content (UGC), 19,
networked, 106–31 132–3, 137–8
open, 22, 24
political. see political spaces value-driven organisations, 90
production of, 27 values, 17, 18, 35, 86
urban, 34 change and, 55
spatial analysis, 21–34 cosmopolitan, 38, 39–49
spatial turn, 22–3 defined, 39–40
Stand Up Against Poverty campaign, frames and, 55–8
117 national, 40
Stanford Social Innovation Review, 88 religious, 40
Starr, Harvey, 24 Van der Veer, P., 51
strategic alliances, 108, 110 Van Rooy, Alison, 63
surface frames, 57 vernacular cosmopolitanism, 52
Vertovec, S., 38
Tanner, Jonathan, 82, 83 Vestergaard, A., 62, 73
technological innovations, 8, 10, 11, victim-focused approach, 43–5
18–19, 34 Voluntary Service Overseas, 65
engagement and, 71
time-space and, 24 Wameyo, A., 101
television, 74–5 Webster, N., 23
theories of change, 112 Whittemore, Michael, 79
The Rules, 10 Why Poverty?, 75–6
Think Global, 103 women, 78–80
Tkacheva, O., 26 World Congress of NGOs, 86
Tomlinson, J., 55, 74 World Development Movement, 48
Toronto Declaration, 86 World Social Forum, 10, 22, 24, 32,
transformational change, 55 33, 137, 145–6
transnational advocacy campaigns, World Vision, 1, 3, 40
3–4, 99–102 Wright, Caroline, 51
transnational advocacy networks
(TANs), 24, 32, 33, 109–13 Young, O., 41, 44, 78

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Non-Governmental Public Action

Series Editor: Jude Howell, Professor of International Development, London

Non-Governmental Public Action Series

Preface and Acknowledgements vi

List of Abbreviations viii

1 The Current State of INGOs 1

2 Political Spaces of INGOs 21

3 Cosmopolitan Spaces of INGOs 35

4 INGO Spaces of Engagement 60

5 INGO Organisation and Strategy 86

6 Networked Spaces of INGOs 106

7 Digital Spaces of INGOs 132

Watching the news footage of the Ethiopia famine in 1984 touched me

BOAG British Overseas Aid Group

Suffering, disease, and famines: these are the stories of humanitarian

directed through non-governmental organisations in the 1960s and

‘international’ NGOs (those working in more than one country).

Changing political landscapes

the relationships between some INGOs and governments and corpora-

The impact of ICTs on the political landscapes of international devel-

to northern publics are extremely important to our understanding of

The faces and places of change

Technological advancements in communications have fuelled the quan-

What is needed is a clearer way to join the engagement INGOs have

● What values, frames and strategies are INGOs using to engage

The argument of this book is that development INGOs need to utilise

The BOAG INGOs

Framework, 4). The organisation maintains close links with numerous

Table 1.1 BOAG INGO statistics

organisational approaches, whereby Save the Children’s focus on imme-

Chapter 2 explores the concepts and the practicalities of political

Chapter 4 explores the spaces of mediation and engagement of

be using images of the poor to invoke impulses of pity and charity in

are accepted as one of the primary mediators of development, then they

‘There is a politics of space because space is political.’(Lefebvre

In many ways, using a spatial approach to examine INGOs seems obvious.

entrepreneurs, all are arguably inherently political acts. In addition,

Why political space?

Boudreau’s constructivist approach to space is especially useful in that

Invited, claimed, and created political space

The work of Henri Lefebvre speaks directly to the production of space.

as a ‘shrinking political space’, in which there are reduced opportunities

actions, INGOs are organisationally and operationally limited in how

Why is political space important for INGOs?

Arguably, civil society organisations and INGOs have benefited from

The politics of INGOs

As far back as 1994, James Ferguson spoke about the depoliticisation of

Change and the possibilities of space

northern public engagement and fundraising, while Chapter 4 will

The idea of political space is a compelling lens through which to

INGOs are inherently cosmopolitan organisations, engaging with their

ambivalence in the cosmopolitan visions of development (Yanacopulos

One useful element of cosmopolitanism is its emphasis on the

Cosmopolitan values and INGOs

What are the key cosmopolitan values of INGOs? Or more specifically,

strengthen some values over others, as well as how certain institu-

Charity and pity

could be argued that in such instances, there is a clash of fundamental

the poverty. In other words, according to Scott (2014), in such ‘devel-

from the mistaken conception of distant injustice as ‘misfortune’. But

fundamental rights and duties within – as well as the determination of

campaigns such as Make Poverty History shifted from a ‘justice not

Utilising a cosmopolitan framework enables us to investigate INGOs’