Literature Review:

Since the present tendency in the Supreme Court is more and more to limit the scope of judicial review
of administrative action, it seems probable, barring a few sporadic exceptions, that the future policy of
the court will be to permit it on two grounds only: (i) Where there has been an improper procedure,
violating those principles of fairness and justice which satisfy the minimum of due process of law; and
(2) Where the administrative official has acted beyond the sphere of his jurisdiction.

EF Albertsworth, 'Judicial Review of Administrative Action by the Federal Supreme Court' [(Dec., 1921)]
33(2) The Harvard Law Review Association 127-153

Judicial Review of Administrative Action by the Federal Supreme Court

Footnote: E. F. Albertsworth, 'Judicial Review Of Administrative Action By The Federal Supreme Court'
(1921) 35 Harvard Law Review.

Your Bibliography: Albertsworth E, 'Judicial Review Of Administrative Action By The Federal Supreme
Court' (1921) 35 Harvard Law Review

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The employment of judicial intervention into administrative operations in socialist countries cannot be
taken to imply the vindication of judicial Supremacy over administration. Instead, judicial control should
be separated from the legitimate area of discretion of the administration and demonstrate sensitivity to
management problems and priorities.

Judicial Review and Control Over Administrative Discretion in the People's Republic of China

Footnote: Hon S. Chan, 'Judicial Review And Control Over Administrative Discretion In The People's
Republic Of China' (1992) 18(2) Review of Central and East European Law 135-163.

Your Bibliography: Chan H, 'Judicial Review And Control Over Administrative Discretion In The People's
Republic Of China' (1992) 18(2) Review of Central and East European Law 135-163.

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Reliance on law as the outstanding instrument of control over government has the necessary effect of
elevating the courts into a position of ultimate supremacy. If law is to be effective as a means of control,
there must be an agency to apply it and to invalidate or penalize governmental action which runs
counter to its precepts. This agency is at hand in the courts. Because of the impossibility of a complete
code of written laws supplied to the judges in advance to dictate their decision in every case, and in view
of the judicial maxim that the law is competent to supply a rule for all controversies which may arise, a
wide latitude is necessarily opened to the courts in shaping and developing the rules which they will
apply to determine the validity of acts of other departments of government. This judicial supremacy is
the corollary of our Anglo-American doctrine of the "rule of law."
Judicial Control of Official Discretion

Footnote: John Dickinson, 'Judicial Control Of Official Discretion' (1928) 22(2) American Political Science
Review 275-300.

Your Bibliography: Dickinson J, 'Judicial Control Of Official Discretion' (1928) 22(2) American Political
Science Review 275-300.

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Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.

ABUSE OF DISCRETION: ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERTISE VS. JUDICIAL SURVEILLANCE

Footnote: 'Abuse Of Discretion: Administrative Expertise Vs. Judicial Surveillance' (1966) 115(1)
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 40.

Your Bibliography: 'Abuse Of Discretion: Administrative Expertise Vs. Judicial Surveillance' (1966) 115(1)
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 40.

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Courts frequently review administrative ad-judicatory action taken without a hearing. Special problems
arise in the course of such review because the interested parties have had no opportunity to present
evidence and argument and there is therefore no adversary record available to the court. Cases in which
the administrative decisions have been made without a hearing are exemplified by actions to compel
issuance of a license to establish a branch bank; to compel renewal of a license to engage in the
insurance business or of a permit to sell milk; to compel approval of articles of incorporation; and to
review the retirement or discharge of civil servants. The issues raised may be solely questions of law, or
may involve disputed findings of fact which require the taking of a substantial amount of evidence. Ex-
parte administrative determinations upon which official action was based were traditionally reviewed by
a proceeding in mandamus, but the common-law writ has been replaced in some jurisdictions by
statutory review."

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATORY ACTION TAKEN WITHOUT A HEARING

Footnote: 'Judicial Review Of Administrative Adjudicatory Action Taken Without A Hearing' (1957) 70(4)
Harvard Law Review 698.

Your Bibliography: 'Judicial Review Of Administrative Adjudicatory Action Taken Without A Hearing'
(1957) 70(4) Harvard Law Review 698.

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By laying down principles of good administration and procedural fairness the courts have striven to
impose effective control of officials. In doing so they have tried to delimit the exerciseof discretionary
power so that discretion cannot be exercised in an arbitrary fashion. The rigour of the general rule
forbidding judicial interference with discretionary powers has however been gradually mitigated. The
widening of the scope of judicial review has resulted in narrowing the existing apertures which the
courts had earlier constructed cautiously on the ground that the matter related to exercise of unfettered
administrative discretion and had been unwilling to interfere. Going through the maze of authorities it is
possible to pinpoint certain grounds of review which are being prevalenty used by the courts to control
exercise of administrative discretion. They are: (I) wrong motives (2) contravention of the
reasonableness and proportionality test, and (3) lack or insufficiency of reasoning. The first ground
corresponds to the ultra vires doctrine of English law. If an authority uses its discretionary power to
achieve a purpose other than that provided by law the courts will interfere with the exercise of such
discretion. Discretionary powers must be exercised properly, in an objective manner and in accordance
with the law. Exercise of a discretionary power for a motive other than that envisaged by the enabling
law, may also come under the heading of illegality. The grounds of review sometimes overlap. The
corresponding ground in the civil law systems is known as detournement. Under this principle the courts
are entitled to control the exercise of discretionary power when that power had been exercised for an
improper purpose, or had been inspired by partisan or political motives rather than for a public purpose.

NEDJATIGIL, Z. M.

Judicial Control of Administrative Discretion: A Comparative Study

Footnote: Zaim M. Nedjatigil, 'Judicial Control Of Administrative Discretion: A Comparative Study' (1985)
14(2) Anglo-American Law Review 97-126.

Your Bibliography: Nedjatigil Z, 'Judicial Control Of Administrative Discretion: A Comparative Study'

(1985) 14(2) Anglo-American Law Review 97-126.