1. Feati v. Bautista HELD: YES. petition dismissed.
The private respondent wrote a letter to president of petitioner informing her of the
organization of the Faculty Club into a registered labor union. President of the Faculty Club
sent another letter containing twenty-six demands that have connection with the employment
of the members of the Faculty Club by the University, and requesting an answer within ten
days from receipt thereof. The President of the University answered the two letters, requesting
that she be given at least thirty days to study thoroughly the different phases of the demands.
Meanwhile counsel for the University, to whom the demands were referred, wrote a letter to
the President of the Faculty Club demanding proof of its majority status and designation as a
bargaining representative.
President of the Faculty Club filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor alleging as reason
therefore the refusal of the University to bargain collectively.
The parties were called to conferences but efforts to conciliate them failed.
Members of the Faculty Club declared a strike and established picket lines in the premises of
the University, resulting in the disruption of classes in the University. President of the
Philippines certified to the Court of Industrial Relations the dispute between the management
of the University and the Faculty Club pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 875.
The Judge endeavored to reconcile the part and it was agreed upon that the striking faculty
members would return to work and the University would readmit them under a status quo
arrangement. On that very same day, however, the University, thru counsel filed a motion to
dismiss the case upon the ground that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the case, because (1)
the Industrial Peace Act is not applicable to the University, it being an educational institution,
nor to the members of the Faculty Club, they being independent contractors; and (2) the
presidential certification is violative of Section 10 of the Industrial Peace Act, as the University
is not an industrial establishment and there was no industrial dispute which could be certified
to the CIR.
The respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss. The University filed a motion for
reconsideration by the CIRen banc, without the motion for reconsideration having been acted
upon by the CIR en banc, respondent Judge set the case for hearing but the University moved
the cancellation of the said hearing upon the ground that the court en banc should first hear
the motion for reconsideration and resolve the issues raised therein before the case is heard on
the merits but denied.
Faculty Club filed with the CIR in Case 41-IPA a petition to declare in contempt of court certain
parties, alleging that the University refused to accept back to work the returning strikers, in
violation of the return-to-work order.
The University filed its opposition to the petition for contempt by way of special defense that
there was still the motion for reconsideration which had not yet been acted upon by the CIR en
banc. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not FEATI is an employer within the purview of the Industrial Peace Act
Section 2(c) of R.A. 875: The term employer include any person acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include any labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an
employer) or any one acting in the capacity or agent of such labor organization.
• Congress did not intend to give a complete definition of "employer", but rather that such definition
should be complementary to what is commonly understood as employer
• Act itself specifically enumerated those who are not included in the term "employer" and educational
institutions are not included; hence, they can be included in the term "employer". However, those
educational institutions that are not operated for profit are not within the purview of Republic Act
No. 875.
Feati realizes profits and parts of such earning is distributed as dividends to private stockholders or
individuals. It embraces not only those who are usually and ordinarily considered employees, but also
those who have ceased as employees as a consequence of a labor dispute. Employee must be one who
is engaged in the service of another; who performs services for another; who works for salary or
wages. "workers" limited to those performing physical labor: (1) embrace stenographers and
bookkeepers; (2) Teachers are not included. Feati controls the work of the members of its faculty:
1) prescribes the courses or subjects that professors teach, and when and where to teach
2) professors' work is characterized by regularity and continuity for a fixed duration
3) professors are compensated for their services by wages and salaries, rather than by profits
4) professors and/or instructors cannot substitute others to do their work without the consent of the
university
5) professors can be laid off if their work is found not satisfactory
Moreover, even if university professors are considered independent contractors, still they would be
covered by Rep. Act No. 875, professors, instructors or teachers of private educational institutions who
teach to earn a living are entitled to the protection of our labor laws — and one such law is Republic
Act No. 875.
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of
employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment regardless of whether
the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employees.
To certify a labor dispute to the CIR is the prerogative of the President under the law (Because the
strike declared by the members of the minority union threatens a major industry of 18,000 students
which affects the national interest), and this Court will not interfere in, much less curtail, the exercise
of that prerogative. The jurisdiction of the CIR in a certified case is exclusive. The parties involved in
the case may appeal to the Supreme Court from the order or orders thus issued by the CIR.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 empowers the Court of Industrial Relations to issue an order "fixing
the terms of employment." This clause is broad enough to authorize the Court to order the strikers to
return to work and the employer to readmit them
The return-to-work order cannot be considered as an impairment of the contract entered into with the
replacements. Besides, labor contracts must yield to the common good and such contracts are subject
the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and similar subjects.
2) GOLD CITY VS. NLRC
The employees of Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. (INPORT) stopped working and
gathered in a mass action to express their grievances regarding wages, 13th month pay and
hazard pay. The employees were members of the Macajalar Labor Union-Federation of Free
Workers (MLU-FFW) with whom INPORT had an existing CBA. On that same morning, the
strikers filed individual notices of strike with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment. With
the failure of conciliation conference, INPORT filed a complaint before the LA for Illegal Strike
with prayer for a restraining order/preliminary injunction. NLRC issued a TRO. Majority of the
strikers returned to work leaving respondents, who continued their protest. Counsel for
respondents filed a manifestation that INPORT required prior screening conducted by the MLU-
FFW before the remaining strikers could be accepted back to work. Counsel for MLU-FFW filed
a Motion to Drop Most of the Party Respondents From the Case. The 278 employees on whose
behalf the motion was field, claimed that they were duped or tricked into signing the individual
notices of strike. After discovering this deception and verifying that the strike was staged by a
minority of the union officers and members and without the approval of, or consultation with,
majority of the union members, they immediately withdrew their notice of strike and returned
to work. LA granted their prayer to be excluded as respondents. INPORT’s complaint was
directed against the 31 respondents who did not return to work and continued with the strike.
LA found the strike illegal for not having complied with the formal requirements in Art. 264 of
the Labor Code.
• The workers who participated in the illegal strike did not, however, lose their
employment, since there was no evidence that they participated in illegal acts.
• After noting that INPORT accepted the other striking employees back to work, LA held
that the respondents should similarly be allowed to return to work without having to
undergo the required screening.
• As regards the respondents who were union officers, they could not have possibly been
duped or tricked into signing the strike notice for they were active participants in the
conciliation meetings and were thus fully aware of what was going on.
NLRC affirmed with modification. The concerted activity was more of a protest action than a
strike. Respondents, including the 6 union officers, should also be allowed to work
unconditionally to avoid discrimination. In view of the strained relations between the parties,
separation pay was awarded in lieu of reinstatement.
Upon INPORT’s MR, NLRC modified:
Since respondents were not actually terminated from service, there was no basis
for reinstatement.
It awarded 6 months’ salary as separation pay or financial assistance in the nature
of equitable relief.
The award for backwages was deleted. In lieu of backwages, compensation
equivalent to P1,000 was given.
INPORT filed a petition for certiorari alleging that NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
awarding respondents separation pay and backwages despite the declaration that the strike
was illegal.
ISSUE: Is the strike Illegal?
HELD: YES
Respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action to press for their wages
and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of work by concerted
action resulted from a labor dispute.
The Arbiter correctly ruled that the strike was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of Art.
264 (now Art. 263) pars. (c) and (f) of the Labor Code.
The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not conform to the notice required by the law to
be filed since they were represented by a union which even had an existing CBA with INPORT. Neither
did the striking workers observe the strike vote by secret ballot, cooling-off period and reporting
requirements. The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the strike-vote report were
intended to be mandatory.
The effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Art. 265 (now Art. 264) make a distinction between
workers and union officers who participate therein. A union officer who knowingly participates in an
illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal
acts during a strike may be declared to have lost their employment status. An ordinary striking worker
cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed
illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he
knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act
during a strike.
INPORT accepted the majority of the striking workers, including union officers, back to work.
Respondents were left to continue with the strike after they refused to submit to the screening
required by the company. The question to be resolved now is what these remaining strikers,
considering the circumstances of the case, are entitled to receive under the law, if any.
The striking union members among respondents are entitled to reinstatement, there being no just
cause for their dismissal. However, considering that a decade has already lapsed from the time the
disputed strike occurred, it would be more practical and appropriate to award separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. No backwages will be awarded to private respondent-union members as a penalty for
their participation in the illegal.
3) RCPI vs. Phil. Comm, 65 SCRA 82, July 15, 1975, GR L-37662
Radio Communications of the Philippines (RCPI) failed to execute an order of
reinstatement of workers. The Industrial Court executed the return-to-work order due to the
failure of the counsel of RCPI to submit his offer of exhibits. RCPI claimed that the order shall
only be complied after review of identity and status of employees enumerated in the court
order
to be passed upon light of evidence at the hearing. Asserting that the Industrial Court
sacrificed
substance for technicality to deem that RCPI waived its right to make an offer of its evidence,
RCPI filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Did the Industrial Court commit grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take account
RCPI’s evidence due to failure to submit offer of exhibits on time?
(4) Kiok Loy vs. NLRC
In a certification election was held, the Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (Union for short), a
legitimate labor federation, won and was subsequently certified in a resolution by the Bureau
of Labor
Relations as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden
Ice Cream Plant (Company for short). The Union furnished the Company with two copies of its
proposed collective bargaining agreement. At the same time, it requested the Company for its
counter proposals. Eliciting no response to the aforesaid request, the Union again wrote the
Company reiterating its request for collective bargaining negotiations and for the Company to
furnish them with its counter proposals. Both requests were ignored and remained unacted
upon by the Company. The attempt towards an amicable settlement failed, thus, it prompted
the Bureau of Labor Relations to certify the case to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for compulsory arbitration. When Union submitted its position paper. The Company did
not submit its position paper, and instead requested for a resetting which was granted. The
case was further reset due to the withdrawal of the Company’s counsel of record. The new
lawyer formally entered his appearance as counsel for the Company only to request for another
postponement allegedly for the purpose of acquainting himself with the case. When the case
was called for hearing, the Company’s representative, Mr. Ching, who was supposed to be
examined, failed to appear. Its counsel then requested for another postponement which the
labor arbiter denied. He also ruled that the Company has waived its right to present further
evidence and, therefore, considered the case submitted for resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the Company was deprived of due process.
HELD: NO.
No. The court held that because of the urgent character and the overdue execution, the
order of reinstatement had the earmark of legality.
Despite the rule requiring labor cases to be resolved on material facts, the court stressed that
these cases must be decided on time since claimants are not in a position to engage in long drawn
proceedings as compared to the capability of employers who are not at risk of withdrawal or
convictions and financial capability.
Thus, because of the failure of RCPI to offer evidence and demonstrating lack of diligence in
implementing the return-to-work order, the Industrial Court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion.
*other discussions:
The court held an award of backwages to employees concerned in addition to the reinstatement.
Such is a consequence to RCPI’s failure to comply with the reinstatement. Employees who are
deprived of their means of livelihood in defiance of the court order has the right to be
compensated of their lost of earnings. RCPI is ordered to pay the 167 employees and workers of
petitioner enumerated in the reinstatement order.
HELD: NO
The Company’s aforesaid submittal failed to impress the Court. Considering the various
postponements granted in its behalf, the claimed denial of due process appeared totally bereft of any
legal and factual support. As herein earlier stated, petitioner had not even honored respondent Union
with any reply to the latter’s successive letters, all geared towards bringing the Company to the
bargaining table. It did not even bother to furnish or serve the Union with its counter proposal despite
persistent requests made therefor. Certainly, the moves and over-all behavior of petitioner-company
were in total derogation of the policy enshrined in the New Labor Code which is aimed towards
expediting settlement of economic disputes. Hence, this Court is not prepared to affix its imprimatur to
such an illegal scheme and dubious maneuvers.
(5) Mayor vs. Macaraig
DOCTRINE:
RA 6715, did not abolish the NLRC, or change its essential character as a supervisory and
adjudicatory body.
—
Republic Act No. 6715 did not abolish the NLRC, or change its essential character as a
supervisory and adjudicatory body. Undersaid Act, as under the former law, the NLRC
continues to act collegially, whether it performs administrative or rule-making functions or
exercises appellate jurisdiction to review decisions and final orders of the Labor Arbiters. The
provisions conferring a somewhat greater measure of autonomy; requiring that its membership
be drawn from tripartite sectors (workers, employees and the public sector); changing the
official stations of theCommission’s divisions; and even those prescribing higher or other
qualifications for the positions of Commissioner which, if atall, should operate only
prospectively, not to mention the fact that the petitioners (in G.R. No. 91547) have asserted
without dispute that they possess the new qualifications—none of these can besaid to work so
essential or radical a revision of the nature,powers and duties of the NLRC as to justify a
conclusion that theAct in truth did not merely declare vacant but actually abolished the offices
of commissioners and created others in their place.
Jovencio Mayor, a member of the Philippine Bar, was appointed Labor Arbiter in 1986 after he
had, according to him, met the prescribed qualifications and passed a “rigid screening
process.” Fearing that he would be removed from office on account of the expected
reorganization, he filed in this court the action assailing RA 6715. (This case involves 5
consolidated cases of civil actions that involve 1 common, fundamental issue: constitutionality
of RA 6715.)
RA 6715: declares vacant "all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission," and operates to remove the
incumbents upon the appointment and qualification of their successors. So basically, the
petitioners here were removed from office pursuant to RA 6715.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioners’ removal under RA 6715 is unconstitutional
(7) Pepsi vs. Galang
HELD:YES.
Security of tenure is a protected right under the Constitution. The right is secured to all employees in
privates as well as in public employment. "No officer or employee in the civil service," the Constitution
declares, "shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law."
Now, a recognized cause for several or termination of employment of a Government officer or
employee is the abolition by law of his office as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of
economy or to remove redundancy of functions, or clear and explicit constitutional mandate for such
termination of employment.
Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration that that office is vacant. While it is
undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish certain offices, it cannot be conceded the power
to simply pronounce those offices vacant and thereby effectively remove the occupants or holders
thereof from the civil service. Such an act would constitute, on its face, an infringement of the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure, and will have to be struck down on that account. It
cannot be justified by the professed "need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested
with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or
emoluments."
No express or implied abolition of the offices of petitioners, therefore, their removal is unconstitutional
It is immediately apparent that there is no express abolition in RA 6715 of the petitioners' positions.
So, justification must be sought, if at all, in an implied abolition thereof; i.e., that resulting from an
irreconcilable inconsistency between the nature, duties and functions of the petitioners' offices under
the old rules and those corresponding thereof under the new law. An examination of the relevant
provisions of RA 6715, with a view to discovering the changes thereby effected on the nature,
composition, powers, duties and functions of the Commission and the Commissioners, the Executive
Director, the Deputy Executive Director, and the labor Arbiters under the prior legislation, fails to
disclose such essential inconsistencies.
There are no irreconcilable inconsistency in the nature, duties and functions of the petitioners’ officers
under the old law and new law. – no implied abolition of the offices.
HELD: YES
Novilla Et Al were employees of Pepsi Cola Distributors Inc. were suspected of involvement in
the irregular disposal of empty Pepsi Cola bottles. Pepsi Cola thus filed a criminal complaint for
theft against them but this was later withdrawn and substituted with a criminal complaint for
falsification of private documents. After a preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal
Trial Court, the complaint was dismissed. The dismissal was affirmed by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor.
While the administrative investigation was ongoing, the Novilla Et Al were
dismissed by the Pepsi company. As a result, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before
the Labor Arbiter, and demanded reinstatement with damages. They also filed a separate civil
complaint against Pepsi for damages arising from what they claimed to be their malicious
prosecution before the RTC. Pepsi moved to dismiss the civil complaint on the ground that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the case because it involved employee-employer relations
that were exclusively cognizable by the labor arbiter. The motion was granted. However, the
respondent judge, acting on the motion for reconsideration, reinstated the complaint, saying it
was “distinct from the labor case for damages now pending before the labor courts.” Pepsi then
appealed to the Supreme Court. Article 217 of the Labor Code and a number of decisions of
this
Court to support their position that the private respondents’ civil complaint for damages falls
under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
(8) PAL vs. NLRC
The petitioners in this case seeks the nullification of the injunctive writ issued by the NLRC and
the Order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on the ground that the said Orders
were issued in excess of jurisdiction. Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner.
Both were dismissed from the service for their alleged involvement in the April 3, 1993
currency smuggling in Hong Kong.
Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction.
The NLRC issued a temporary mandatory injunction enjoining petitioner to cease and desist
from enforcing its Memorandum of dismissal. NLRC insisted that it is proper for them to issue a
writ of temporary injunction since it vested to them under the Labor Code. On the other hand,
petitioners argued that NLRC erred in divesting the labor arbiter of its original and exclusive
jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied by the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC, even without a complaint for illegal dismissal filed
before the labor arbiter, can entertain an injunction and issue such writ enjoining petitioner
PAL from enforcing its Orders of dismissal against private respondents, and ordering petitioner
to reinstate the private respondents to their previous positions.
(9) SPIC N’ SPAN Services Corporation vs. Gloria Paje et al.,
Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. It must be stressed that not every controversy
involving workers and their employers can be resolved only by the labor arbiters. This will be so
only if there is a “reasonable causal connection” between the claim asserted and employee-
employer relations to put the case under the provisions of Article 217. Absent such a link, the
complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice in the exercise of their civil and criminal
jurisdiction. Here, the complaint is for damages for malicious prosecution which was filed with the
Regional Trial Court by the employees of the defendant company. It does not appear that there
is a “reasonable causal connection” between the complaint and the relations of the parties as
employer and employees. The complaint did not arise from such relations. What the employees
are alleging is that the petitioners acted with bad faith when they filed the criminal complaint. This
is a matter which the labor arbiter has no competence to resolve as the applicable law is not the
Labor Code but the Revised Penal Code. The complaint did not arise from such relations and in
fact could have arisen independently of an employment relationship between the parties. Pepsi
acted with bad faith when they filed the criminal complaint which the Municipal Trial Court said
was intended “to harass the poor employees” and the dismissal of which was affirmed by the
Provincial Prosecutor “for’ lack of evidence to establish even a slightest probability that all the
respondents herein have committed the crime imputed against them.”
HELD: NO.
NO. The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an action for
illegal dismissal. This is clear from the allegations in the petition which prays for; reinstatement
of private respondents; award of full backwages, moral and exemplary damages; and
attorney's fees. As such, the petition should have been filed with the labor arbiter who has the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the said case.
The NLRC shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by labor
arbiters as provided in Article 217(b) [now Art. 224 (b)] of the Labor Code. In short, the
jurisdiction of the NLRC in illegal dismissal cases is appellate in nature and, therefore, it cannot
entertain the private respondents’ petition for injunction which challenges the dismissal orders
of petitioner.
The NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order granting private respondents’
petition for injunction and ordering the petitioner to reinstate private respondents.
Under the Labor Code, the ordinary and proper recourse of an illegally dismissed employee is to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter. In the case at bar, private respondents
disregarded this rule and directly went to the NLRC through a petition for injunction praying that
petitioner be enjoined from enforcing its dismissal orders. Moreover, the preliminary mandatory
injunction prayed for by the private respondents in their petition before the NLRC can also be
entertained by the labor arbiter who has the ancillary power to issue preliminary injunctions or
restraining orders as an incident in the cases pending before him in order to preserve the rights of the
parties during the pendency of the
case.
HELD: NO
In February 1998, Gloria Paje and 10 others were dismissed as promo girlsof Swift
Corporation. Paje et al were provided to Swift by Spic N’ Span Services Corporation. Paje et al,
through their non-lawyer representative, Florencio Peralta, filed a labor case for illegal
dismissal against Swift and Spic N’ Span. Paje et al won. Swift and Spic N’ Span appealed the
case to the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals likewise ruled in
favor of Paje et al. Spic N’ Span and Swift further appealed to the SC where they alleged that
there are two procedural infirmities on the part of Paje et al.
First was the fact that not all of them (Paje et al) signed the pleadings signed before the NLRC,
and second, that Paje et al were represented by a non-lawyer (Peralta); that under the law, in
labor cases, there are only two instances where a non-lawyer may appear or represent a
litigant before the labor arbiter or the NLRC, to wit: (1) If they represent themselves; or (2) If
they represent their organization or members thereof. Neither can be said of Peralta.
ISSUE: Whether or not such procedural lapse on the part of Paje et al is sufficient for the
dismissal of their complaint against Spic N’ Span and Swift.
(10) Abbott vs. NLRC, 145 SCRA 206
(11) St. Martin Funeral Homes vs NLRC
Respondent (Arcayos) was summarily dismissed by St. Martin Funeral Homes for
misappropriating funds worth Php 38,000 which was supposed to be taxes paid to the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging that the dismissal was illegal, respondent filed a case
against St. Martin Funeral Homes in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Petitioner’s (St. Martin Funeral Homes) contention is that the respondent is not an employee
due to the lack of an employer-employee contract. In addition, respondent is not listed on St.
Martin’s monthly payroll.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, confirming that indeed, there was no employer-
employee relationship between the two and hence, there could be no illegal dismissal in such a
situation. The respondent appealed to the secretary of NLRC who set aside the decision and
remanded the case to the labor arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was
denied by the NLRC. Now, petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court – alleging that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s appeal/petition for certiorari was properly filed in the
Supreme Court.
(12) U-BIX CORPORATION and EDILBERTO B. BRAVO v.
VALERIE ANNE H. HOLLERO
In the hierarchy observed in the dispensation of justice, rules of procedure can be disregarded in order
to serve the ends of justice. Certain labor rights assume preferred positions in our legal hierarchy.
Under the Constitution and the Labor Code, the State is bound to protect labor and assure the rights of
workers to security of tenure. The State is bound to “protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare,” and the workers are “entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living
wage.” Under these fundamental guidelines, Paje et al’s right to security of tenure is a preferred
constitutional right that technical infirmities in labor pleadings cannot defeat. The Supreme Court also
noted that even if not all of the complainants signed the pleadings, it is sufficient that some of them
have signed it. The lack of a verification in a pleading is only a formal defect, not a jurisdictional
defect, and is not necessarily fatal to a case. The primary reason for requiring a verification is simply to
ensure that the allegations in the pleading are done in good faith, are true and correct, and are not
mere speculations.
We should remember, too, that certain labor rights assume preferred positions in our legal hierarchy.
Under the Constitution and the Labor Code, the State is bound to protect labor and assure the rights of
workers to security of tenure.
Article 4 of the Labor Code provides that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its
provisions (including its implementing rules and regulations) shall be resolved in favor of labor. The
Constitution, on the other hand, characterizes labor as a primary social economic force. The State is
bound to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, and the workers are entitled to
security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. Under these fundamental guidelines,
respondents right to security of tenure is a preferred constitutional right that technical infirmities in
labor pleadings cannot defeat.
HELD:
HELD: NO
Historically, decisions from the NLRC were appealable to the Secretary of Labor, whose decisions are
then appealable to the Office of the President. However, the new rules do not anymore provide
provisions regarding appellate review for decisions rendered by the NLRC.
However in this case, the Supreme Court took it upon themselves to review such decisions from the
NLRC by virtue of their role under the check and balance system and the perceived intention of the
legislative body who enacted the new rules. “It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to
scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review
is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and
balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.”
The petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the appeal or certiorari should have
been filed initially to the Court of Appeals – as consistent with the principle of hierarchy of courts. As
such, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.
HELD: No.
Petitioner U-Bix Corporation (U-Bix) hired on March 6, 1996 Valerie Anne H. Hollero
(respondent) as a management trainee at its Furniture Division, with salary and allowances
totaling P10,000 monthly. On May 1, 1996, it promoted respondent tofacilities manager, with
salary and allowances totaling P20,000 monthly. U-Bix later sent respondent and three other
employees to the United States for two months of training for a newly acquired franchise, the
ServiceMaster Company. The training commenced on July 4, 1996 and ended on September 3,
1996. On February 14, 1997, U-Bix, citing respondent's supposed "pattern of tardiness,
absences, neglect of duties, and lack of interest," 2 terminated her employment for loss of
trust and confidence. U-Bix in fact filed on May 22, 1997 a complaint against respondent
before the Labor Arbiter for the reimbursement of training expenses and damages.
Subsequently or on August 25, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioner U-Bix and/or its President-petitioner Edilberto B. Bravo. The Labor Arbiter (LA)
rendered a decision declaring that the dismissal of Hollero is valid and legal and ordered her to
pay U-Bix the reimbursement of her training. It dismissed Hollero’s complaint for lack of
merit. On appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the NLRC reversed
the LA’s decision. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but subsequently denied by NLRC. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.
ISSUES: Whether or not Hollero was illegally dismissed by U-Bix.
(13) Tumaodos vs San Miguel Yamamura Packaging Corporation
U-Bix failed to discharge the burden of proof that Hollero’s dismissal is for a valid and just cause
In termination cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal is for a valid and just
cause. While an employer enjoys a wider latitude of discretion in terminating the
employment of managerial employees, managerial employees are also entitled to security of tenure
and cannot be arbitrarily dismissed at any time and without cause as reasonably established in an
appropriate investigation. In the case at bar, U-Bix failed to substantiate their allegations of Hollero’s
habitual absenteeism, habitual tardiness, neglect of duties, and lack of interest. Daily time records,
attendance
records, or other documentary evidence attesting to these grounds could have readily been presented
to support the allegations but none was.
The merits of a complaint for illegal dismissal do not depend on its prayer but on whether the employer
discharges its burden of proving that the dismissal is valid. U-Bix failed to comply with the procedural
due process of dismissing an employee. In another vein, the Court finds that U- Bix and Bravo failed to
comply with the procedural requirements for a valid dismissal. Hollero being a manager did not excuse
them from observing such procedural requirements. The notice does not inform outright the employee
that an investigation will be conducted on the charges particularized therein which, if proven, will result
to her dismissal. It does not contain a plain statement of the charges of malfeasance or
misfeasance nor categorically state the effect on her employment if the charges are proven to be true.
It does not apprise Hollero of possible dismissal should her explanation prove unsatisfactory. Besides,
the U-Bix and Bravo did not even establish that Hollero received the memorandum.
Neither did U-Bix and Bravo show that they conducted a hearing or conference during which Hollero,
with the assistance of counsel if she so desired, had opportunity to respond to the charge, present her
evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against her. The meeting with Hollero on December 23,
1996
did not satisfy the hearing requirement, for Hollero was not given the opportunity to avail herself of
counsel.
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code mandates that an employer who seeks to dismiss an employee must
―afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative if he so desires.‖ Expounding on this provision, the Court held that ―'[a]mple
opportunity’ connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable
him
to prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation. The legality of respondent's
dismissal was, however, raised not by U-Bix's complaint but in respondent's Position Paper. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is determined from the allegations made in the complaint, and cannot be made
to depend upon the defenses made by a defendant in his Answer or Motion to Dismiss. The jurisdiction
of labor arbiters, as well as of the NLRC, is limited to disputes arising from an employer- employer
relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their
collective bargaining agreement. U-Bix's complaint was one to collect sum of money based on civil laws
- on obligations and contract, not to enforce rights under the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or the
collective bargaining agreement.
HELD: No.
Petitioner employee of respondent, became member of SMC Employees & its Subsidiaries
Multi-Purpose Cooperative. Respondent implemented an Involuntary separation program,
petitioner availed, and his package was computed at P3M, he was paid but respondent
withheld P1.4M on behalf of the Cooperative due to outstanding indebtedness to the
cooperative, this was evidenced in the notation of the receipt. Petitioner avers that his
obligations to the cooperative stemming from a simple loan of P250k had already been settled,
and in fact was overpaid. Respondent filed a Complaint for Interpleader with Consignation
before the RTC, in order for Cooperative and Petitioner settle their conflicting claims.
Petitioner Then filed a case in NLRC RAB for non payment of separation pay and damages.
NLRC ruled in favor of petitioner, respondent appealed. NLRC affirmed LA ruling, hence filed
certiorari with the CA. CA ruled in favor of respondent as LA did not have jurisdiction over the
case.
Article 224 of the Labor Code provides that LA has original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases
accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, or arising from employer-employee relations.
Petitioner’s claims do not fall under these cases. “reasonable causal connection rule”, if there is
a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the ER-EE relations, then the
case is within the jurisdiction of the labor courts.
Moreover, the cooperative is not a party to the labor complaint; and respondent had consigned
the amount of P1.4M in the RTC where the interpleader case was pending.
Ruling LA and NLRC erred in ordering refund to petitioner, and it has no sufficient basis. CA
Decision affirmed.

Issue: WON CA GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LABOR COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER, AND THAT THIS CASE DOES NOT REQUIRE
APPLICATION OF ANY LABOR LAWS?