Metaphor is a part of the not-knowing aspect of art, and jet I'mfirmly

convinced that it is the supreme way of searching for truth. How can this be?
CHARLES SIMIC
Max Wertheimer

Thinking consists in

envisaging, realizing structural features and structural

requirements; proceeding in accordance with, and determined
by, these requirements; thereby changing the situation in the
direction of structural improvements, which involves:

that gaps, trouble-regions, disturbances, superfcialities, etc.,

be viewed and dealt with structurally;

that inner structural relations- ftting or not ftting- be

sought among such disturbances and the given situation as a
whole and among its various parts;

that there be operations of structural grouping and

segregation, of centering, etc.;

that operations be viewed and treated in their structural

place, role, dynamic meaning, including realization of the
changes which this involves;

realizing structural transposability, structural hierarchy,

and separating structurally peripheral from fundamental
features- a special case of grouping;

looking for structural rather than piecemeal truth.

3 RlGHT
G.E. Moore

What Aesthetics tries to do, [Wittgenstein] said, is to give reasons,

e.g. for having this word rather than that in a particular place in
a poem, or for having this musical phrase rather than that in a
particular place in a piece of music. Brahms' reason for rejecting
Joachim's suggestion that his Fourth Symphony should be opened
by two chords was not that that wouldn't produce the feeling he
wanted to produce, but something more like "That isn't what
I meant". Reasons, he said, in Aesthetics, are "of the nature of
further descriptions": e.g. you can make a person see what Brahms
was driving at by showing him lots of different pieces by Brahms,
or by comparing him with a contemporaty author; and all that
Aesthetics does is "to draw your attention to a thing", to "place
things side by side". He said that if, by giving "reasons" of this sort,
you make another person "see what you see" but it still "doesn't
appeal to him", that is "an end" of the discussion; and that what
he, Wittgenstein, had "at the back of his mind" was "the idea that
aesthetic discussions were like discussions in a court oflaw", where
you try to "clear up the circumstances" of the action which is
being tried, hoping that in the end what you say will "appeal to the
judge". And he said that the same sort of"reasons" were given, not
only in Ethics, but also in Philosophy.

7 RIGHT
Louise GlUck

Art is not a service. Or, rather, it does not reliably serve all people in
a standardized way. Its service is to the spirit, from which it removes
the misery of inertia. It does this by refocusing an existing image
of the world . . . - where the flat white of the page was, a field of
energy emerges.

8 RIGHT
David Abram

. . . Levy-Bruhl used the word "participation" to characterize the

animistic logic of indigenous, oral peoples -for whom ostensibly
"inanimate" objects like stones or mountains are often thought
to be alive, for whom certain names, spoken aloud, may be felt
to influence at a distance the things or beings that they name, for
whom particular plants, particular animals, particular places and
persons and powers may all be felt to participate in one another's
existence, influencing each other and being influenced in turn.

For Levy-Bruhl participation was thus a perceived relation between

diverse phenomena; Merleau-Ponty's work, however, suggests that
participation is a defning attribute of perception itself. By asserting
that perception, phenomenologically considered, is inherently
participatory, we mean that perception always involves, at its most
intimate level, the experience of an active interplay, or coupling,
between the perceiving body and that which it perceives. Prior to
all our verbal reflections, at the level of our spontaneous, sensorial
engagement with the world around us, we are all animists.

9 RIGHT
 But doesn't non-metaphorical language tell the truth about the
world, too? Aren't eyes eyes and windows windows?-Yes, that's
one way oflooking at it.

LEFT 12
I. A. Richards

... any part of a discourse, in the last resort, does what it does
only because the other parts of the surrounding, uttered or
unuttered, discourse and its conditions are what they are. "In the
last resort" - the last resort here is mercifully a long way off and
very deep down. Short of it we are aware of certain stabilities which
hide from us this universal relativity or, better, interdependence of
meanings. Some words and sentences still more, do seem to mean
what they mean absolutely and unconditionally. This is because the
conditions governing their meanings are so constant that we can
disregard them. So the weight of a cubic centimeter of water seems
a fixed and absolute thing because of the constancy of its governing
conditions. In weighing out a pound of tea we can forget about the
mass of the earth. And with words which have constant conditions
the common sense view that they have fixed proper meanings,
which should be learned and observed, is justified. But these words
are fewer than we suppose. Most words , as they pass from context
to context, change their meanings; and in many different ways. It is
their duty and their service to us to do so....

[T]he Proper Meaning Superstition.... [is] the common belief

... that a word has a meaning of its own (ideally, only one)
independent of and controlling its use and the purpose for
which it should be uttered. This superstition is a recognition of
a certain kind of stability in the meanings of certain words. It is
only a superstition when it forgets (as it commonly does) that the
stability of the meaning of a word comes from the constancy of the
contexts that give it its meaning. Stability in a word's meaning is not
something to be assumed, but always something to be explained.

... what a word means is the missing parts of the contexts from
which it draws its delegated efficacy.

12 RIGHT
Henri Poincare

It may be surprising to see emotional sensibility invoked a propos of

mathematical demonstrations which, it would seem, can interest only the
intellect. This would be to forget the feeling of mathematical beauty, of
the harmony of numbers and forms, of geometric elegance. This is a true
esthetic feeling that all real mathematicians know, and surely it belongs to
emotional sensibility.

Now, what are the mathematic entities to which we attribute this

character of beauty and elegance, and which are capable of developing
in us a sort of esthetic emotion? They are those whose elements are
harmoniously disposed so that the mind without effort can embrace their
totality while realizing the details. This harmony is at once a satisfaction
of our esthetic needs and an aid to the mind, sustaining and guiding. And
at the same time, in putting under our eyes a well-ordered whole, it makes
us foresee a mathematical law. Now, as we have said above, the only
mathematical facts worthy of fixing our attention and capable of being
useful are those which can teach us a mathematical law. So that we reach
the following conclusion: The useful combinations are precisely the most
beautiful, I mean those best able to charm this special sensibility that
all mathematicians know. . . . and that sufficiently explains why the one
lacking it will never be a real creator.

john Conway . . . If I draw you the picture [of the geometrical

theorem] , you'll immediately see that it is true. That's
the elegance of a proof showing up . . . . suddenly you see
a simple [way] that you can explain, perhaps to an 11
year old, why [the theorem] is true.

Lister Sinclair Simple, yes. Is simple the same as elegant? Is the best
proof a simple proof?

john Conway I'd hesitate to say it's the same, but it's very closely
related, isn't it?. . . . You can look at the whole thing and
appreciate it . . . .

Lister Sinclair . . . under certain circumstances, you can hold the whole
proof in your mind at once, so to speak, and that would
be elegant.

john Conway Yes . There's a funny feeling I get sometimes . . . .

everything's as it should be .

Lister Sinclair . . .. That sense of rightness, of everything falling

beautifully into place.

john Conway . . . fitting. 37 RIGHT

 Lyric insight- thisness, the whole grasped in the particular-holds
mortality in the balance. Thus it, too, is timeless, but in a different
way. Lyric insight holds time in abeyance, but as a dike holds back
the sea: it shudders under the impact. For geometric thought, time
simply does not exist.

LEFT 70
RobertHass

And it is something like that, some feeling in the arrest of the image
that what perishes and what lasts forever have been brought into
conjunction, and accompanying that sensation is a feeling of release
from the self. Antonio Machado wrote, "Hoy es siempre todavia." Yet
today is always. And Czeslaw Milosz, "Tylka trwa wieczna chwila. "
Only the moment is eternal.

70 RIGHT
Max Wertheimer

In this respect I wish to report some characteristic remarks of

Einstein himself. Before the discovery that the crucial point, the
solution, lay in the concept of time, more particularly in that of
simultaneity, axioms played no role in the thought process- of
this Einstein is sure. (The very moment he saw the gap, and realized
the relevance of simultaneity, he knew this to be the crucial point
for the solution.) But even afterward, in the final five weeks, it was
not the axioms that came first. "No really productive man thinks
in such a paper fashion," said Einstein. "The way the two triple sets
of axioms are contrasted in the Einstein-Infeld book is not at all the
way things happened in the process of actual thinking. This was
merely a later formulation of the subject matter, just a question of
how the thing could afterwards best be written. The axioms express
essentials in a condensed form. Once one has found such things
one enjoys formulating them in that way; but in this process they
did not grow out of any manipulation of axioms."

He added, "These thoughts did not come in any verbal

formulation. I very rarely think in words at all. A thought comes,
and I may try to express it in words afterward." When I remarked
that many report that their thinking is always in words, he only
laughed. I once told Einstein of my impression that "direction" is
an important factor in thought processes. To this he said, "Such
things were very strongly present. During all those years there was
a feeling of direction, of going straight toward something concrete.
It is, of course, very hard to express that feeling in words; but it
was decidedly the case, and clearly to be distinguished from later
considerations about the rational form of the solution. Of course,
behind such a direction there is always something logical; but I have
it in a kind of survey, in a way visually."

73 RIGHT
 Things are, and are not, as they seem.

This means: at any given moment, from any given perspective, it is

possible to be insensitive (forgetful, unimaginative, inattentive) .

Things are what they seem; but it is possible for them to seem differently.

LEFT 79
Herakleitos

Nature loves to hide.

79 RIGHT
Herakleitos

One thing, the only wise thing, is unwilling and willing to be

called by the name Zeus.

81 RIGHT
Simone Weil

Simultaneous existence of incompatible things in the soul's bearing;

balance which leans both ways at once: that is saintliness, the actual
realisation of the microcosm, the imitation of the order of the world.

88 RIGHT
 To assemble reminders for a purpose: this i s to highlight aspects of
a form of life. It is to invite someone to attend in a way that can lead
to recognition.

Why not just tell them? -Understanding a proposition is not

the same thing as accepting that it is true. (Although being told
that something is true may precipitate a gestalt.) One can come
to believe a proposition without understanding it in just the
way one can come to know the Pythagorean theorem without
understanding it- without seeing that it is so.

LEFT 90
Max Wertheimer

To see, to grasp, to realize what is structurally central and what is

not, is, in most cases of thinking, of the highest importance. . . .

I n order to illustrate the issue I shall tell a story of an entirely

different kind. The events are said to have happened in a small
Moravian village in the time of the old Austrian empire. An
inspector from the Ministry of Education arrived one day to visit
the school room. It was part of his duty to make such periodic
inspections of the schools. At the end of the hour, after he had
observed the class, he stood up and said: "I am glad to see that you
children are doing well in your studies. You are a good class; I am
satisf ed with your progress. Therefore, before I go, there is one
question I would like to ask: How many hairs does a horse have?"
Very quickly one little nine-year-old boy raised his hand, to the
astonishment of the teacher and the visitor. The boy stood up, and
said: "The horse has 3,571,962 hairs." The inspector wonderingly
asked: "And how do you know that this is the right number?"
The boy replied: "If you do not believe me, you could count them
yourself." The inspector broke into loud laughter, thoroughly
enjoying the boy's remark. As the teacher escorted him along the
aisle to the door, still laughing heartily, he said: "What an amusing
story! I must tell it to my colleagues when I return to Vienna. I can
already see how they will take it; they enjoy nothing better than a
good joke." And with that he took his leave.

It is a year later, the inspector is back again at the village school for
his annual visit. As the teacher was walking along the aisle with him
to the door, he stopped and said: "By the way, Mr. Inspector, how
did your colleagues like the story of the horse and the number of his
hairs? " The inspector slapped the teacher on the back. "Oh, yes,"
he said. "You know, I was really very anxious to tell this story - and
a fine story it was -but, you see, I couldn't. When I got back to
Vienna I wasn't able for the life of me to remember the number of
hairs."

91 RIGHT
 Davidson "prefers to give reasons" not just "announce" what he
thinks, like Dewey.

This is to prefer the conveyance of knowledge to the facilitation

of understanding. Gestalts don't have reasons: they announce
themselves.

Which is not to deny that one understanding of a situation may be

less penetrating or less wise than another. Nor to deny that some
representations of it may be less perspicuous. There is, however, no
simple recipe for communicating gestalts; or, rather, there is only
the roughest and readiest: point and hope.

LEFT 92
 Wisdom has to do with the grasp o fwholes that occupy the
same space, yet are different. This life, as opposed to that.
("Oh, I see now how it is for you!")

LEFT 93
 To be wise is to be able to grasp another form of life without
abandoning one's own; to be able to translate experience into and
out of two original tongues. To resist, then, the translation that is a
form of reduction. (As in: "They believe shaking the thunder-stick
will bring rain!" - as though they believe everything we believe,
plus this odd thought. )

LEFT 94
RobertHass

[Transtromer's poem, Baltics,] enacts the qualities of a consciousness

that knows it has been outside of time and is going to die, two
thousand miles below words like socialism and intentional anarchism
and bankbook, and it knows that the discovery and enactment of
those qualities in our art are the spiritual precondition for a viable
politics.

94 RIGHT
 There is a psychological element here, as well as a talent for
seeing-as. One has to be able to see what is there, rather than what
one hopes or expects. This requires a certain sort of strength.

LEFT 95
Donald Coxeter

And in the opposite way, when a puzzle came that I was not able
to get . . . right, I would be very, very distressed and dejected.
Sometimes I would get stuck and just put that problem away
and just leave it. Then I'd come back to it a few months later and
perhaps do it better. And then sometimes I would have another
look at it and still be puzzled and then go to sleep, and then in the
middle of my sleep, I would somehow see the solution, and then I
would get out of bed and quickly write it down, lest I would forget
it and think it was just another dream. And then in the morning, I
would verify it and go on.

Henri Poincare

Then I turned my attention to the study of some arithmetical

questions apparently without much success and without a suspicion
of any connection with my preceding researches. Disgusted with
my failure, I went to spend a few days at the seaside, and thought of
something else. One morning, walking on the bluff, the idea came
to me, with just the same characteristics of brevity, suddenness
and immediate certainty, that the arithmetic transformations of
indeterminate ternary quadratic forms were identical with those of
non-Euclidean geometry.

Charles Simic

How come there are moments when one has the eye for the
similar and the significant, when for the rest of our days, poets like
everyone else stare at the world in incomprehension?

Max Wertheimer

In human terms there is at bottom the desire, the craving to face

the true issue, the structural core, the radix of the situation; to go
on from an unclear, inadequate relation to a clear, transparent,
direct confrontation - straight from the heart of the thinker to the
heart of his object, of his problem.

95 RIGHT
Max Wertheimer

Thinking is not merely to solve set problems. The goal itself, as a

part of the situation, may be structurally sensible or foolish. ]ust as
the operations within a real thinking process function as parts in
their place and role with regard to structural requirements, so does
the goal itself, as part of the broader context. Often the thinker, in
the course of trying to solve a set problem, stops, realizing that the
situation requires quite different things, requires changing the very
goal. To stick to set goals, to insist on reaching them, is often sheer
thoughtlessness.

In life such cases are often of a serious character. Sometimes men,

for instance, politicians, after trying hard to reach a certain goal
and working at it a long time, suddenly realize that the goal itself,
as set, was out of place, unrelated to the real requirements, to more
essential goals. This in itself may be a discovery of something that
was not at all realized before - namely, that the means for a sought
goal would endanger, would kill a much more important goal.
Thinking is not merely concerned with means; it concerns the ends
themselves in their structural signifcance.

97 RIGHT
 "Now wait a minute. Ifi can't see a given thing as just anything else,
how is it I can experience the resonance of the whole in it?"

To say x is Y is to claim there is a relation between them like that

between a given pitch and the octave above it. You can't actually
make a string produce the fundamental without producing the
overtone. Of course, the fifth and the fourth and the sixth and the
third also sound when the string vibrates, but to an increasingly
faint degree. To claim the Necker cube is a Dutch interior is
like claiming to be able to hear Fb when someone sounds an
A-most human ears can't do it. (There might be extraordinary
circumstances under which we would believe someone who made
this claim; but in the absence of such circumstances, we wouldn't.)
To experience the Necker cube as a this, however, would be like
suddenly, for a moment, hearing all the overtones, even the
faintest. But if one had such an astonishing experience, one
would be unlikely to express this by claiming one could hear Fb.

LEFT 99
Charles Simic

Awe (as in Dickinson) is the beginning of metaphysics. The awe

at the multiplicity of things and awe at their suspected unity.

99 RIGHT
 The difference between an image and certain sorts of symbol is
crucial here: an image, in Hass's sense, gestures to a this; many
symbols lack this dimension of reference. A this echoes with
being- the internal relations that are the resonant structure of
the world. A symbol like the Nike swoosh, the Nazi swastika, or
even the oak as a 'symbol of strength' is, on the other hand, a static
abstraction; it def ects attention away from the particular and thus
forecloses on the possibility of ontological attention.

LEFT 100
RobertHass

The extraordinary thing, one comes to see, about Basho's poems

or Vermeer's paintings is that the world is not set against any
particular loss or peril to give it intensity and importance, and so
they do not will into the world any more loss or peril than all of us
must suffer as a condition for being alive.

It is a truism of]apanese criticism that, of the three great poets

in the haiku tradition, Basho took the way of spirituality and Issa
took the way of humanity and Buson took the way of art. Which
is another way of describing what I have thought of as Buson's
polytheism. In many ways, Basho and Iss a are more moving poets
to me, but I find that there is something steadying and nourishing
about the art ofBuson, about his apparent interest in everything
that passed before his eyes and the feeling in his work of an
artist's delight in making. This does not mean that he made no
discriminations, that he thought this was as good as that; it means
that he acted as if he believed that any part of the world, completely
seen, was the world . . .

Mustard flowers,
no whale in sight,
the sea darkening

. . . . In Japanese, the poem does not even end with that stutter of
wonder, kanna(!), Nanohana ya kujira mo yorazu umi kurenu. The
tone is quite level. Bus on is not surprised by the fullness and the
emptiness of things.

100 RIGHT
 The emptiness of things - their inconsequence. We sense this most
deeply when we sense the fullness of the world's resonance in the
thing. Nothing can echo with being unless it is emptied of itself.

LEFT 101
RobertHass

Basho told a disciple that the trouble with most poems was that
they were either subjective or objective, and when the disciple said,
"You mean, too subjective or too objective?" Basho said, "No."

101 RIGHT
 Truth is the asymptotic limit of sensitive attempts to be responsible
to our actual experience of the world. We recognize some gestures
as true when we experience the resonant relation they indicate or
enact. We recognize others as true when there is a ft between them
and a form of life. Either case may, or may not, involve language.

"But if it does involve language, which depends on a 'form of

life', doesn't that mean what's true here might not be true there?
Doesn't this relativize truth, making it nothing more than culturally
sanctioned belief?" -There are not so many forms oflife that
we might not learn several or many. Translation is possible. It is
possible to become fuent in another tongue. "Sensitive attempts to
be responsible" means truth is the result of attention. (As opposed
to inspection. ) Oflooking informed by love. Of really looking.

LEFT 102
 I n what sense i s what-is ineffable? I n the sense that a poem is
untranslatable. This does not mean: what-is has the form of
language. Rather, it means: non-metaphorical language cannot
capture how what-is means, and we get a sense of how this might be
when we try to translate poems from one language to another. An
English poem cannot capture how a Japanese poem means.

And yet we can-even if we speak no Japanese- get a sense

of how the Japanese poem means: a rendering in romaji, plus a
unit-by-unit translation into English, plus an account of basic
conventions of]apanese poetry and its role in Japanese culture
can give an English-speaking reader a much clearer sense of the
poem than any polished translation of the poem on its own. Setting
a romaji 'worksheet' beside an English translation of the poem
can also help us understand what is - and what is not-lost
in translation. But given the English poem, without the romaji
worksheet, or even any warning that poetry "can't be translated",
we could easily form a mistaken impression of what a Japanese poet
had meant.

Philosophy, pursued as an unbroken series of arguments, as the

elaboration of a system, is to the world what an English translation
of a Japanese poem is to the Japanese original. The meditation, the
constellation of aphorisms-philosophy that in its form demands
of the reader the work of seeing-as- is to the world what the
romaji worksheet is to the Japanese original.

LEFT 103
Ludwig Wittgenstein

125. It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction

by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery,
but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state
of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the
contradiction is resolved.

130. Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory

studies for a future regularization oflanguage - as it were first
approximations, ignoring friction and air-resistance. The language­
games are rather set up as objects ofcomparison which are meant
to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of
similarities, but also of dissimilarities.

As one might illustrate the internal relation of a circle to an ellipse

by gradually transforming an ellipse into a circle; but not in order
to assert that a given ellipse in fact, historically, came from a circle
(hypothesis of development*) but only to sharpen our eye for a
formal connection.

* [Note by editors and tra11slators] ? or e!lo!ution

131. For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions

only by presenting the model as what it is, as an object of
comparison-as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a
preconceived idea to which reality must correspond. (The
dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.)

132. We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of

language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many
possible orders; not the order.

[13 3 .] . . . [Thus] we . . . demonstrate a method, by examples; and

the series of examples can be broken off. -Problems are solved
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.

There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed

methods, like different therapies.

104 RIGHT
 Reductionism says connectedness is sameness; the contemporary
academic version says further that sameness is revealed through
analysis. Metaphor understands connectedness as resonance,
revealed in the shift of gestalts.

LEFT 105
Charles Simic

Poetry is an utterance that no paraphrase can exhaust because

poetry is not about ideas but about the music of chance. Poetry
proclaims that there's something more real than ideas, something
that remains, as it were, always stubbornly unformulated, but
which we as readers of poetry have no trouble experiencing and
savoring in poems we love.

105 RIGHT
RobertHass
When Buson was dying in the winter of
1783, one of his friends reports, he spoke
o his night nurse about the life of poetry.
"Even being sick like this, my fondness
for the way is beyond reason, and I try to
make haiku. The high stage of my dream
hovers over the witheredfields is impossible
for me to reach. Therefore, the old poet
Basho's greatness is supremely moving to
me now." The poem he refers to is Basho's
ast, written when he was taken ill on a visit
o Osaka in the fall of 1694. Tabi ni yamite
yume wa kare-no wo kakeme guru, it goes:
Sick on a journey,
my dream hovers
over the withered fields.
. . . Kare-no, in Basho's last poem,
means "withered fields." It is one of the
conventional phrases of seasonal reference
hat almost all haiku contain. It identifies
he time as late fall. Here it also means, I
think, "the traditional phrase 'withered
felds."' His dream wanders in the world
and in the poem indistinguishably.
t would seem wild with restlessness and
grief if it were not for the frmness of the
yntax- and for something else that is a
ittle difficult to describe. The phrase yume
wa. Yume is dream or dreams, wa a particle
ndicating what's being talked about. One
often sees it translated "as for." It is such
a common feature of]apanese that to
ranslate it at all is to begin to translate the
culture rather than the language - and
I don't know very much about either
Japanese culture or the Japanese language.
I have studied these poems without
learning to speak japanese and I am afraid
of a beginner's tendency to exaggerate
differences. A literal translation might be
asfor dream it hovers or wanders. I asked
a Japanese friend if it would be closer to
translate the poem into English, "my dream
wanders . . . " or French, "La reve s'egare . . . "
He shrugged hopelessly.
"There is no French word for dream, to me,
that doesn't have the meaning of delusion.
And all the words for wandering suggest
error." He shook his head at the peculiarity
of the French. "And everything in English
has to be pinned down, your dream, my
dream, and all the verbs are physical. Yume
wa," he made large circles with both hands,
"means dream, the whole thing," more
gestures, "dream. "
Whatever the translation it is that turn of
phrase that gives the poem its deepest,
most amazing effect. It is why the poem
does not record sickness, yearning,
unsatisfied hunger. Nor is it exactly
objective or detached. It sits just in between,
not detached but not attached either.
Intense sadness and calm: non-attached,
the Buddhists would say. It was this
extraordinary act of consciousness that
Buson was remembering in his dying
master: as.for dream, it wanders the withered
fields.
106 RIGHT
 And, o f course, one's preference for a style o f explanation will
depend on one's purposes. (Just don't imagine there are purposes
in which politics play no role.)

LEFT 107
Hilary Putnam

It is important to realize that the problems of the philosophy of

mathematics are not at all sui generis. Consider for purposes of
comparison the 'problem of the indeterminacy of translation'.
The problem is (famously) that we cannot point to trajectories
of particles which are one way rather than another when A is the
correct interpretation of a certain discourse; and Quine concludes
that 'there is no fact of the matter' as to whether A is the correct
interpretation. Or consider the so-called 'realism' problem about
ethical statements, which is again that one cannot point to causal
processes or physical objects which must be one way rather than
another if something is good. The discussion that we have just
reviewed in the philosophy of mathematics is not, fundamentally, a
different discussion. The problem in all of these cases - as, indeed,
Simon Blackburn has seen,44 although I believe that he has taken
exactly the wrong view- is that we wish to impose a pattern of
what it is to be true, a pattern derived largely from the successes
of physical science, on all of our discourse . . . . In contrast, the
Wittgensteinian strategy, I believe, is to argue that while there
is such a thing as correctness in ethics, in interpretation, in
mathematics, the way to understand that is not by trying to model
it on the ways in which we get things right in physics, but by trying
to understand the life we lead with our concepts in each of these
distinct areas. The problems in the philosophy of mathematics
are not precisely the same as the problems in metaethics or the
problems about the indeterminacy of translation, because the way
the concepts work is not the same in these different areas; but what
drives the sense that there is a problem- a problem which calls for
either a 'skeptical solution' or an absurd metaphysics -can be the
very same preconceptions about what 'genuine' truth, or 'genuine'
objectivity, or 'genuine' reference must look like.

107 RIGHT
 Wittgenstein claims: "If I say 'For me the vowel e is yellow' I do not
mean: 'yellow' in a metaphorical sense, -for I could not express
what I want to say in any other way than by means of the idea
'yellow'." (Philosophical Investigations, p. 216e.)

So if a word is meant "in a metaphorical sense" this means one can

express what one wants to say in some other way? -- But this is
nonsense and here Wittgenstein repeats one standard prejudice
about metaphor: that it is a mere rhetorical embellishment, that
we could, if we chose, dispense with it. The recognition of what he
calls "the secondary sense" of 'yellow' here involves precisely the
gestalt shift that characterizes the understanding of a metaphor.
One hallmark of a good metaphor is that what it expresses cannot be
adequately captured in a paraphrase.

Wittgenstein was closer when he said that astonishment was thinking.

LEFT 108
Ludwig Wittgenstein

Given the two ideas 'fat' and 'lean', would you be rather inclined
to say that Wednesday was fat and Tuesday lean, or vice versa? (I
incline decisively towards the former.) Now have "fat" and "lean"
some different meaning here from their usual one?-They have
a different use . - So ought I really to have used different words?
Certainly not that. - I want to use these words (with their familiar
meanings) here . . . .

Asked "What do you really mean here by 'fat' and 'lean'?"- I

could only explain the meanings in the usual way. I could not point
to the examples of Tuesday and Wednesday.

Adam Zagajewski

To defend poetry means to defend a fundamental gift of human

nature, that is, our capacity . . . to experience astonishment and to
stop still in that astonishment for an extended moment or two.

108 RIGHT
Simone Wei[

how is it that man becomes a slave to his own method? the

essential problem . . .

The mind is enslaved whenever it accepts connections which it

has not itselfestablished.

109 RIGHT
RobertS. Root-Bernstein

If, as appears to be the case to so many scientists, visual or other

nonverbal forms of thought are crucial elements in problem­
raising and problem-solving ability, then exclusive educational
stress upon verbal and mathematical skills drastically limits the
types of problems that students can raise and solve. Indeed, if
the comments by Einstein and Ramon y Cajal concerning the
importance of play are valid, then exclusive reliance upon book
learning is itself misguided. Certainly Ostwald, Maxwell, and Gibbs
learned as much (if not more) about nature by exploring it through
hobbies such as painting, sculpting, inventing, and building as they
did through formal book studies. And, returning to Hindle's study
of Morse and Fulton, one sees clearly that the nonverbal skills
of the inventor-scientist may best be stimulated by active
participation in the arts. Yet in many American high schools
and universities, science majors are actively discouraged from
participating in arts programs because arts and crafts skills are
considered to have no intellectual value. In view of the information
integrated in the present essay, one can only rue this narrow­
minded, intellectual bigotry that is handicapping the minds of the
scientists of tomorrow.

110 RIGHT
 The cultivation of metaphorical insight is dangerous because
it takes us into territory where others have succumbed to the
siren song of metaphysical hypostatization. "Look to the uses
of a word in its language-games! Everything is in order as it is!"
means "Don't be seduced into metaphysical hypostatization- it
makes you think 'stuff' is there when it isn't, and then you have
no end of problems!". And this is true enough. But in his war on
hypostatization, Wittgenstein threw the baby out with the bath
water: for meaning lives in the very experiences that feed the
impulse to hypostatization. Western European philosophy will
escape (certain of) its "dead-ends" not by denying the existence of
those experiences, but by seeing that there is a way to accept their
importance without hypostatizing them.

LEFT 111
Ludwig Wittgenstein

155. Thus what I wanted to say was: when he suddenly knew how
to go on, when he understood the principle, then possibly he had
a special experience - and if he is asked: "What was it? What took
place when you suddenly grasped the principle?" perhaps he will
describe it much as we described it above -- but for us it is the
circumstances under which he had such an experience that justifY
him in saying in such a case that he understands, that he knows
how to go on.

436. Here it is easy to get into that dead-end in philosophy, where

one believes that the difficulty of the task consists in our having
to describe phenomena that are hard to get hold of, the present
experience that slips quickly by, or something of the kind. Where
we fnd ordinary language too crude, and it looks as if we were
having to do, not with the phenomena of every-day, but with
ones that "easily elude us, and, in their coming to be and passing
away, produce those others as an average effect". (Augustine:
Manifestissima et usitatissima sunt, et eadem rusus nimis latent, et
nova est inventio eorum.)

111 RIGHT
Ludwig Wittgenstein

559· You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say

something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is
not reasonable (or unreasonable).

It is there-like our life.

560. And the concept of knowing is coupled with that of the

language-game.

112 RIGHT
 "The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping
doing philosophy when I want to." (PI §133.)--Philosophy as
therapy for philosophical puzzlements involves the contextualization
of a 'problematic' notion so that its 'problematic' character vanishes,
or is seen as the construction of an overzealous prosecution of the
demand for a 'theoretical' explanation.

But what this doesn't address is the reason one is driven to demand
(overzealously or otherwise) such explanations in the f rst place. Why
we are unable to recognize this demand as inappropriate, even though
the history of philosophy is the history of failed attempts to fulfl it.

LEFT 113
Ludwig Wittgenstein

Though- one would like to say- every word has a different

character in different contexts, at the same time there is one
character it always has: a single physiognomy. It looks at us.

((Meaning is a physiognomy. ))

113 RIGHT
Konrad Lorenz

Of myself, for one, it is simply not true that my first step in

approaching any phenomenon I have observed consists in creating
a rather random hypothesis and subsequently trying to find fault
with it. Knowing about the functions of my perception as I do,
I feel inclined to suspect that the sequence of events is, at least
partly, the reverse of this. I strongly suspect that, at the time when
a set of phenomena seriously begins to fascinate me, my Gestalt
perception has already achieved its crucial function and 'suspected'
an interesting lawfulness in that particular bunch of sensory data. If
I then spend more and more time in observation of these particular
phenomena, it is already a consequence of a hypothesis which my
perception has formed, though I may still be quite unconscious of it.
The increased observation accelerates the input of sensory data until,
when sufficient redundancy is achieved, the consciously perceived
lawfulness detaches itself from the background of accidentals, an
event which is accompanied by a very characteristic experience of
relief expressed, as Karl Buhler described many years ago, in the sigh:
'Aha!'. . . . [I] f our conscious effort at cognition really had to start at
the level of miscellaneous, unprocessed sensory data . . . [i]nductive
procedure would, I think, really be impossible and it would indeed
be the best strategy of research to do one's best to disprove a
hypothesis which, in this case, would be highly unlikely to contain
any appreciable amount of truth. Gestalt perception, on the other
hand, when based on a sufficient wealth of unbiassed observation,
has a way of being right, and if one is familiar with its occasional trick
of being altogether wrong and knows when to discount its assertions,
it is an invaluable and quite indispensable guide.

114 RIGHT
 Metaphor is a way of understanding the world; it comes naturally
to nearly all language-speakers. Any account that makes it out to
be odd or queer in relation to 'the norm' is itself odd or queer. We
think we need such an account only because we have misconstrued
the nature of 'the norm'. A good account will be as much a critique
of standard Western European assumptions about meaning's
relation to language as it will be a positive discussion of metaphor.

LEFT 115
Ludwig Wittgenstein

What makes a subject difficult to understand- if it is significant,

important- is not that some special instruction about abstruse
things is necessary to understand it. Rather it is the contrast
between the understanding of the subject and what most people
want to see.

115 RIGHT
 The real discovery is not the one that will let us stop doing
philosophy when we want to. Philosophy is thinking in love with
clarity; and such thinking, in itself, is not a source of problems.
What will not let us rest is the thought that what is clear must also
be single; we are addicted to the elimination of ambiguity. If a thing
is truly the path down, we think, it cannot also truly be the path up;
at least one of these, we say, must be merely an appearance.

But this is not to think clearly. It is to fail to attend to what

experience shows. It is to stop short of wisdom, which recognizes
clarities that non-metaphorical language cannot render. Different
wholes occupy the same space.

The real discovery is the one that will let philosophy resume
thinking metaphorically when it needs to.

LEFT 116
Zhuiing Zi

Therefore understanding that rests in what it does not understand

is the finest.

116 RIGHT
THE LAST TIME

Chorus:
This may be the last time,
This may be the last time, children!
This may be the last time,
It may be the last time, I don't know.

Verse:
May be the last time we ever shout together.
It may be the last time, I don't know.
May be the last time we ever shout together.
Well, it may be the last time, I don't know.

Chorus:
This may be the last time,
This may be the last time, children!
This may be the last time,
It may be the last time, I don't know.

118 RIGHT
 NOTES
� EPIGRAPH
Charles Simic, "Notes on Poetry and
Philosophy", Wonderful Words, Silent Truth,
p. 67-
� LEFT HAND ITEMS
4 "An intellectual and emotional complex in
an instant of time", Pound's definition of
image: see Ezra Pound, "A Few Don'ts", in
"A Retrospect", Literary Essays ofEzra Pound,
P· 4·
5 "Construction cranes on the horizon want
to take the big leap": Tomas Transtri:imer,
"Outskirts", trans. Robert Ely, Selected Poems
19 54 19 86, p. 98.
"My heart is a sad device": Roo Borson, "A
Sad Device", A Sad Device, pp. 42 4 3 .
17 The Oxherding Sequence: A sequence of pic
tures illustrating the stages of Zen discipline.
D.T. Suzuki discusses different versions of the
sequence and what is known of their histories
in Manual ofZen Buddhism, pp. 12 7 144. He
offers two sets of actual pictures, including
Shubun's reproduction of the famous version
by Kuoan Sh!yuim. (This set also appears in
Lyric Philosophy, RH §§13 0 154 passim.)
20 "All that philosophy can do is destroy
idols": Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Philosophy",
trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A. E. Aue,
Philosophical Occasions, p. 171.
29 "As language gets its way of meaning . . . " :
Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Philosophy", trans.
C. G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue,
Philosophical Occasions, p. 193. (See RH 26.)
32 Etymology of'metaphor': see RH 5 1 .
35 Compassion for the self: cf. Lao Zi, Tao Te
Ching, trans.
Stephen Mitchell, Ch. 67-
39 As Mancosu suggests: Paolo Mancosu,
"Visualization in Logic and Mathematics"
in K. jorgensen, P. Mancosu, et a!., ed. ,
Visualization, Explanation and Reasoning
Styles in Mathematics.
58 "A poet's words can pierce us": Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Zettel, trans. G.E.M.
Anscombe, §155. (See RH 55.)
61 Berkeley's criticism of Locke's notion of
abstract ideas: see George Berkeley, A
Treatise Concerning the Principles ofHuman
Knowledge, Introduction §§11 21, esp. §13.
64 Simone Wei! on the experience of necessity:
in addition to the sources mentioned in
Citations, see On Science, Necessity, and the
Love ofGod, ed. and trans. Richard Rees
(London: Oxford University Press, 1968),
especially the essays ofPart 1. See also Steven
A.M. Burns, "Virtue and Necessity", Laval
theologique et philosophique, Vol. xxxn
(1976), pp. 261 275·
72 Freud on secondary process thought: see
The Interpretation ofDreams, Ch. 7, § E ; see
also "Project for a Scientifc Psychology", NOTES FOR
"The Unconscious", "Formulations on the LEFT-HAND
Two Principles of Mental Functioning", ITEMS
and "Beyond the Pleasure Principle", which
are available in The Standard Edition ofthe
Complete Psychological Works ofSigmund
Freud.
Living the other's death . . . : a paraphrase of
Kahn's translation ofHerakleitos, Fr. 62. (Cf
RH }4) .
81 "Things are and are not as they seem": see
LH 79·
91 "It's a chalice": see RH 56, top figure.
92 D avidson's preferences: see "Post Analytic
Visions: Donald Davidson", in Giovanna
Borradori, The American Philosopher, p. 49·
108 "Ifi say 'For me the vowel e is yellow' . . . ": this
passage is a continuation of the discussion
quoted on RH 108.
Astonishment is thinking: Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Last Writings on the Philosophy
ofPsychology, Vol. 1 , trans. C. G. Luckhardt
and M.A.E. Aue, §565. (See RH 1.)
109 Quotations and paraphrase from Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations,
trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, a s indicated.
110 The interlocutor here paraphrases a
central recommendation ofWittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations.
116 The real discovery . . . : cf. Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigatio11s.
trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, §133. (Se LH U). l
 1 9 ( 1 950 51), pp. 45 9 470. Roe notes (p 461)
Galton's argument for "further development
and utilization of visual imagery."
11. Galton, Inquiries (n. 10 above).
12. Robert Kargon, "Model and Analogy in
Victorian Science," Journal ofthe History ofIdeas
3 0, no. 3 (July-September 1969) , pp . 423 436;
Richard Olson, Scottish Plzilosopliy and British
Physics 1750-188o (Princeton, 197 5), pp. 3 8.
15. Arthur I. Miller (Imagery in Scientific Thought:
Creating zoth Centzay Physics [Cambridge,
Mass. , 1986]) argues that "thinking in images is
an essential ingredient of scientif c research of
the highest creativity" (p. 222). For an extended
essay on the signif cance of Einstein's nonverbal
thinking, see Gerald Holton, "On Trying to
Understand Scientific Genius," Americau
Scholar 41, no. 1 (winter 1971-72), pp. 95 110,
reprinted in Holton's Thematic Origins of
Scientiic Thought (revised edition, Cambridge,
Mass., 1988). On Einstein's difficulty in
translating thoughts into words, see [his letter
to jacques Hadamard, reprinted as Appendix
11 in the latter's The Psychology of!nventiou
in the Mathematical Field (Princeton, 1949),
pp. 142 14)].
18. Agnes Arber, The Mind and the Eye (Cambridge,
1954), p. 5; Maya Pines, "We Are Left Brained
or Right Brained," New York Times Magazine,
September 9, 197 3 , p . 3 2 .
24 Oxford English Dictionaty.
25 Simone Wei!, Gravity and Grace, trans. Emma
Craufurd, p. 109.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans.
Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, §141;
excerpt from Philosophical investigations,
trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, §66.
26 Konrad Lorenz, Behind the Mirror,
trans. Ronald Taylor, p. 7·
Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Philosophy",
trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M.A. E. Aue,
Philosophical Occasions, p. 193.
27 Tomas Transtromer, "How the Late Autumn
Night Novel Begins", trans. Robin Fulton,
New Collected Poems, p. 119.
28 Charles Wright, from "Disjecta Membra",
Black Zodiac, p.83. From Wright's notes to
the poem: "('These fragments are the disjecta
membra of an elusive, coveted, and vaguely
scented knowledge.' Guido Ceronetti, The
Science ofthe Body)".
29 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico
Philosophicus,
trans. D.F. Pears and B. F.
McGuinness, 2.18, 2.172, 4.021, 4.022.
30 Par Lagerkvist, "0 Man who stands beside
my shore", Evening Land/Afton/and, trans.
W. H. Auden and LeifSjoberg.
31 Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, trans. Emma
Craufurd, p. 96.
32 Federico Garcia Lorca, In Search ofDuende,
trans. Christopher Maurer, pp. 48 49.
33 Herakleitos, D K Fr. 50, trans. R.E. Allen.
34 Simone Wei!, Gravity and Grace, trans. Emma
Craufurd, p. 118.
Herakleitos, D K Fr. 62, trans. after T.M.
Robinson.
35 Federico Garcia Lorca, I n Search ofDuende,
trans. Christopher Maurer, pp. 53 54. NOTES FOR
RIGHT-HAND
36 Proofthat square double in size is made on
diagonal of given square. ITEMS
37 Henri Poincare, "Mathematical Creation",
Ch. l l i , Science and Method in The
Foundations ofScience, trans. George Bruce
Halsted, pp. 3 91 392.
John Conway and Lister Sinclair, "Math and
Aftermath", CBC Ideas Transcript, 13 14 May,
1997, pp. 14 15.
38 Max Wertheimer, "The Syllogism and
Productive Thinking", in Willis D. Ellis,
ed. and trans., A Source Book ofGestalt
Psychology, p. 279.
James Robert Brown, Philosophy of
Mathematics: An Introduction to the World of
Proofs and Pictures, p. 34·
39 Tristan Needham, Visual Complex Analysis,
p. vii.
James Robert Brown, Philosophy of
Mathematics: An Introduction to the World of'
Proofs and Pictures, p. 29.
40 Paolo Mancosu, "Visualization in Logic
and Mathematics" in K. Jorgensen,
P. Mancosu, et al. , ed., Visualization,
Explanation and Reasoning Styles in
Mathematics, excerpted from penultimate
paragraph. Mancosu's bibliography lists
the following papers by M. Giaquinto:
"Visualizing as a means of geometrical
discovery", Mind and Language, 7, 1992,
 pp. 382 401; and "Epistemology of visual
thinking in elementary real analysis", British
joumal for Philosophy ofSciwce, 45, 1997, pp.
789 813.
Max Wertheimer, "Einstein: The Thinking
That Led to the Theory of Relativity",
Productive Thinking, p. 227.
Paolo Mancosu, "Visualization in Logic and
Mathematics", in K. Jorgensen, P. Mancosu,
et a!., ed., Visualization, Explanation and
Reasoning Styles in Mathematics, excerpted
from final paragraph.
41 Freeman Dyson, Disturbing the Universe,
p. 62.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, trans.
G.E.M. Anscombe,
pp. 213e 214e.
42 Max Wertheimer, "The Syllogism and
Productive Thinking", in Willis D. Ellis,
OTES FOR
ed. and trans. , A Source Book ofGestalt
GHT-HAND
Psychology, p. 280.
EMS
James Robert Brown, Philosophy of
Mathematics: An Introduction to the World of
Proofs and Pictures, p. 35; pp. 35 36.
43 Simone Wei!, Gravity and Grace, trans. Emma
Craufurd, p. 109.
44 Henri Poincare, "Mathematical Creation",
Ch. III, Science and Method in The
Foundations ofScience, trans. George Bruce
Halsted, p. 386.
Herakleitos, D K Fr. 54, trans. after G.S. Kirk
&].E. Raven.
45 Max Wertheimer, "The Syllogism and
Productive Thinking", in Willis D. Ellis,
ed. and trans., A Source Book ofGestalt
Psychology, p. 280.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazer's
Golden Bough, trans. A. C. Miles, p. 9e; note
by A. C. Miles and Rush Rhees. Compare the
text of Philosophical Investigations §122:
A main source of our failure ro understand is
that we do not comma11d a clear view of the use
o f our words. Our grammar is lacking in this
sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation
produces just that understanding which consists
in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the importance of
finding and inventing illtermediate cases.
The concept of a perspicuous representation
is of fundamental signif cance for us. It earmarks
the form of account we give, the way we look at
things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'')
46 Charles Simic, in Charles Wright, "Narrative
of the Image: A Correspondence with
Charles Simic", Quarter Notes: Improvisation
and Interviews, p. 73·
47 Charles Simic, "Wonderful Words, Silent
Truth", Wonderful Words, Silent Truth, p. 95·
48 Simone Wei!, First and Last Notebooks, trans.
Richard Rees, p. 250.
49 Max Wertheimer, "Numbers and Numerical
Concepts in Primitive Peoples", in Willis D.
Ellis, ed. and trans. , A Source Book ofGestalt
Psychology, p. 272.
50 Simone Wei!, Gravity and Grace, trans. Emm
Craufurd, pp. 125 126.
51 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, trans.
G.E.M. Anscom be,
§§455 457·
Ernest Klein, A Comprehensive Etymological
Dictionary ofthe English La nguage.
52 Jane Hirshfield, "Secretive Heart", The Lives
the Heart, p. 9·
53 Tim Lilburn, "Sorrow; the River", Living In
The World As !fit Were Home, pp. 61 62.
54 Robert Hass, "Images", Twentieth CentUJy
Pleasures, pp.274 275.
55 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, trans. G.E.M.
Anscombe, §155.
56 Reversible figures: chalice/faces from Henry
Gleitman, Psychology, Fig. 6.17; duck/rabbit
from Irvin Rock, An Introduction to
Perception, p. 264; white squares/black arrow
from Gaetano Kanizsa, Organization in
Vision: Essays on Gestalt Perception, p. 28.
57 Tomas Transtromer, "The Nightingale
in Badelunda", trans. Robin Fulton, New
Collected Poems, p. 151.
58 Zbigniew Herbert, "Stool", trans. Czeslaw
Milosz and Peter Dale Scott, Selected Poems,
p. 24.
59 Charles Simic, "Wonderful Words, Silent
Truth", Wonderfitl Words, Silent Truth, p. 88.
6o Robert Hass, "A Story About the Body",
Human Wishes, p. 32.
61 Henri Poincare, " Intuition and Logic in
Mathematics", Part I , Ch. 1 , The Value of
Science in The Foundations ofScience, trans.
George Bruce Halsted, p. 210.
 Martin Gardner, "Math and Aftermath", CBC
Ideas Transcript,
13 14 May, 1997, p. 3 ·
62 Wislawa Szymborska, "Utopia", trans.
Stanislaw Barariczak and Clare Cavanagh,
View with a Grain ofSand, pp. 12 7 1 28.
63 Max Wertheimer, "On Truth", in Mary Henle,
ed., Documents ofGestalt Psychology, p. 28.
64 G.H. Hardy, "Mathematical Proof", p. 18.
6s James Robert Brown, Philosophy of
Mathematics: An Introduction to the World of
Proofs and Pictures, p. 37·
LA. Richards, The Philosophy ofRhetoric,
p. 118.
66 Proof of Pythagorean theorem.
67 Herakleitos, D K Fr. 84a, trans. T.M.
Robinson.
68 Jane Hirshfield, Nine Gates: Entering the
Mind ofPoetly, p. 111.
Robert Hass, "Images", Twentieth Century
Pleasures, p. 287-
Ludwig Wittgenstein, excerpt from
Philosophical Investigations, trans.
G.E.M. Anscombe, §144. Cf. Zettel §461.
Wittgenstein's parenthesis may allude
to a story frequently told about the
twelfth century Indian astronomer and
mathematician, Bhaskara, who is alleged to
have offered a visual proof of the Pythagorean
theorem to which was appended simply
the word "Behold!". Bhaskara did indeed
offer a visual demonstration of the theorem,
which he invites his readers to "see"; but
the presentation is both less dramatic
and less incisive than the story might lead
one to expect. See "Algebra (Vija ganita)"
§§146 147, pp. 220 223 (esp. pp. 222 223)
in Algebra, with A rithmetic and Mensuration,
from the Sanscrit ofBrahmegupta and
Bhdscara, trans. Henry Thomas Colebrooke
(London: John Murray, 1817 (1973]).
69 Simone Weil, First and Last Notebooks, trans.
Richard Rees, p. 270.
70 Robert Hass, "Images", Twentieth Century
Pleasures, p.
275.
71 Donald Coxeter, "Math and Aftermath", CBC
Ideas Transcript, 13 14 May, 1997, p.
1.
Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, trans. Emma
Craufurd, p. 135·
72 Charles Wright, "Narrative of the Image: A
Correspondence with Charles Simic", Quarter
Notes: Improvisations and Interviews, p. 59·
73 Max Wertheimer, "Einstein: The Thinking
That Led to the Theory of Relativity",
Productive Thinking, p. 228.
74 Herakleitos, D K Fr. 49a, trans. T.M.
Robinson.
75 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico
Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and
B.F. McGuinness, 5.131; Philosophical
Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe,
p. 212e; p. 214e.
76 Tim Lilburn, "How to Be Here?", Living In
The World As !fit Were Home, pp. 3 5.
77 Denise Levertov, "Invocation", Relearning the
Alphabet, p.121.
78 Max Wertheimer, "Gestalt Theory", in Willis NOTES FOR
D. Ellis, ed. and trans.,A Source Book of
RIGHT-HAND
Gestalt Psychology, p. 2.
ITEMS
79 Herakleitos, D K Fr. 123 , trans. Charles H.
Kahn.
So Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico
Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F.
McGuinness, 4.0312.
81 Herakleitos, D K Fr. ) 2 , trans. T.M. Robinson.
82 Ludwig Wittgenstein, excerpts from
Philosophical Investigations, trans.
G .E.M.
Anscombe, § 1 51.
83 Ludwig Wittgenstein, a s recorded in
Stephen Toulmin's notes from the academic
year 1946 47, in Allan Janik and Stephen
Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna, p. 207;
excerpt from Philosophical Investigations,
trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, §126; Tractatus
Logico Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and
B.F. McGuinness, 6.522.
Herakleitos, D K Fr. 124, trans. Charles H.
Kahn.
84 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe,
§129; Culture and Value, trans. Peter Winch,
p. 61e.
85 Charles Simic, "Notes on Poetry and
Philosophy", Wonderful Words, Silent Truth,
p. 64.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks o n Frazer's
 Rush Rhees, in an uncharacteristically
disparaging vein, comments: "The typed
section on Frazer begins with three (five?]
remarks which are not connected with them
in the manuscript. He had begun there
with remarks which he later marked S (=
'schlecht') and did not have typed. I think we
can see why."
Lao Zi, Lao mt, Stanza 1 [often called Ch. 1],
trans. A.C. Graham in Disputers ofthe Tao:
Philosophical A rgument in Ancient China,
p. 219.
86 Herakleitos, D K Fr. 112, trans. Charles H .
Kahn.
87 Charles Wright, "Narrative of the Image: A
Correspondence with Charles Simic", Quarter
Notes: lmprovisations and lnterviews, p. 59·
88 Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, trans. Emma
Craufurd, p. 92.
TES FOR
89 Lao Zi, Tao Te Ching, trans. Stephen Mitchell,
HT-HAND
Ch. 29.
MS
Herakleitos, D K Fr. 118, trans. T.M.
Robinson.
90 Simone Weil, First and Last Notebooks, trans.
Richard Rees, p. 40.
91 Max Wertheimer, "The School Inspector",
Appendix 3 , Productive Thinking, pp.
269 270.
92 Marcus B. Hester, "Metaphor and Aspect
Seeing" in Warren Shibles, ed., Essays on
Metaphor, p. 121. The image of nerves sining
like tombs is taken from the second line of
Emily Dickinson's "After great pain, a formal
feeling comes".
93 Max Wertheimer, "On the Problem of the
Distinction Between Aibitrary Component
and Necessary Part", Productive Th inking,
p. 264.
94 Robert Hass, "Transtromer's Baltics: Making
a Form of Time", Twelltieth Century Pleasures,
p. 86.
95 Donald Coxeter, "Math and Aftermath", CBC
Ideas Transcript,
13 14 May, 1997, p. 4 ·
Henri Poincare, "Mathematical Creation",
Ch. m, Sciwce and Method in The
Founda tions ofScience, trans. George Bruce
Halsted, p. 388.
Charles Simic, in Charles Wright, "Narrative
of the Image: A Correspondence with Charles
Simic", Quarter Notes: Improvisations and
Interviews, p. 72.
Max Wertheimer, "Dynamics and Logic of
Productive Thinking", Productive Thinking,
p. 236.
96 Denise Levertov, "Illustrious Ancestors", The
jacob's Ladder,
p. 87.
97 Max Wertheimer, "The Area of the
Parallelogram", Productive Thinking, p. 77·
98 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TJ·actatus Logico­
Philosophicus, trans.
D.F. Pears and B.F.
McGuinness, excerpt from 4.122; excerpt
from 4. 123 .
99 Charles Simic, "Wonderful Words, Silent
Truth", Wonde1jitl Words, Silent Truth, p. 88.
100 Robert Hass, "Images", Twentieth Century
Pleasures, pp. 307 308.
101 Robert Hass, " Images", Twentieth Century
Pleasures, p.
292.
102 Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, trans. Emma
Craufurd, p. 108.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Last Writings on the
Philosophy ofPsychology, Vol. II, trans. e.G.
Lucklrardt and M.A.E. Aue, pp. 14 15.
References in parentheses are to Last Writings
in the Philosophy ofPsychology, Vol. 1 .
103 Jane Hirshfield, Nine Gates: Entering the
Mind ofPoetry, pp. 71 73-
104 Ludwig Wittgenstein, excerpt fi·om
Philosophical hwestigations, trans. G.E.M.
Anscombe, §125; Philosophical Investigations,
trans. G.E.M. Anscom be, §130; Remm·ks on
Frazer's Golden Bough, trans. A.C. Miles,
p. 9e; Philosophical Investigations, trans.
G.E.M. Anscombe, §131; excerpts from §§132
and 133.
105 Charles Simic, in Charles Wright, "Narrative
of the Image: A Correspondence with Charles
Simic", Quarter Notes: Improvisations and
Interviews, pp. 72 73.
106 Robert Hass, "Images", Twentieth Century
Pleasures, pp.276 278.
107 Hilary Putnam, "On Wittgenstein's
Philosophy of Mathematics", pp. 262 264.
 Note 44 is to Simon Blackburn's Spreading 113 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
the \Vord (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Investigations, trans.
G.E.M. Anscombe,
1984). p. 181e; excerpt from §568.

08 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosoph ical 114 Konrad Lorenz, Studies i n Animal and
Investigations, trans.
G.E.M. Anscombe, Human Behaviour, trans. Robert Martin,
p. 216e. pp. xxii xxiii. (Introductory remarks on
"Gestalt perception as a source of scientific
Adam Zagajewski, Another Beauty, trans. knowledge".)
Clare Cavanagh, p. 116.
115 Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Philosophy",
09 Simone Wei!, First and Last Notebooks, trans. trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M.A.£. Aue,
Richard Rees, p. 24. Philosophical Occasions, p. 161.

110 Robert S. Root Bernstein, "Visual Thinking: 116 Zhuang Zi, Chuang Tzu, trans. Burton
The Art oflmagining Reality", pp. 63 64. Watson, p. 44·

111 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical 117 Herakleiros, D K 18, trans. after Charles H.
Investigations, trans.
G.E.M. Anscombe, §155, Kahn.
§436.
118 Traditional African American gospel song.
112 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty,
trans. Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe,
§§559 560.

FI GURES
RH 1 Necker cube (also LH So, 97, 98)
RH 36 Proofthat the square double in size is made on the diagonal of a given square
RH s6 Chalice/faces
RH 56 Duck/rabbit
R H 56 White squares/black arrows
RH 66 Pythagorean theorem
 C I TA T I O N S
Abram, David. The Spell ofthe Sensuous. New York:
Vintage Books, 1996. RH 9-
Allen, Reginald E. Greek Philosophy: Thales to
Aristotle. New York: The Free Press and
London: Collier-Macmillan, 1966. RH 3 3 ·
Arnheim, Rudolf. Visual Thinking. Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1969. RH 17.
Berkeley, George. A TJ·eatise Concerning the
Principles ofHuman Knowledge. 1710. LH 61.
Borradori, Giovanna. The American Philosopher:
Conversations with Quine, Davidson, Putnam,
Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Cavell, Macintyre, and
Kuhn . Trans. Rosanna Crocitto. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991. LH 92.
Borson, Roo. A Sad Device. Dunvegan, Ontario:
Quadrant Editions, 1981. LH 5·
Brown, James Robert. Philosophy ofMathematics:
A n Introduction to the World ofProofs and
Pictures. London and New York: Routledge,
1999· RH 3 8, 39, 42, 65.
Chuang Tzu. RH 116. See Burton Watson.
Conway, John. "Math and Aftermath". CBC Ideas
Transcript No. 9723 (13, 14 May, 1997). RH 37·
Coxeter, Donald. "Math and Aftermath". CBC
Ideas Transcript No. 9723 (13, 14 May, 1997).
RH 7 1, 95·
D avidson, Donald. LH 92. See Giovanna Borradori.
Diels, H. Rev. W. Kranz. Die Fragmente der
Vorsokratiker, 6th Edition. Zurich:
Weidmann, 1951.
Dyson, Freeman. Disturbing the Universe. New
York: Harper & Row, 1979. RH 41.
Ellis, Willis D., ed. and trans. A Source Book of
Gestalt Psychology. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1938. RH 6, 38, 42, 45, 49, 78.
The Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, ed. Paul Edwards.
New York: Macmillan, 1967 (1972). Note for
LH 117.
Ferguson, E.S. Engineering and the Mind's Eye.
Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The
MIT Press, 1992. RH 23.
Freud, Sigmund. The Standard Edition ofthe
Complete Psychological Works ofSigmund
Freud, ed. and trans. James Strachey. London:
Hogarth, 1966. L H 72.
Gardner, Martin. "Math and Aftermath". CBC
Ideas Transcript No. 9723 (13 , 14 May, 1997).
RH 61.
Gleitman, Henry. Psychology. 4th Edition. New
York: W.W. Norton, 1995· RH 56.
Gluck, Louise. "The Best American Poetry 1993:
Introduction". Proofs & Theories. New York:
The Ecco Press, 1994. RH 8, 20.
Goodman, Nelson. Languages ofArt. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1968. RH 11.
Graham, A. C. Disputers ofthe Tao: Philosophical
A rgument in A ncient China. La Salle, Illinois:
Open Court, 1989. RH 85.
Hardy, G.H. "Mathematical Proof". Mind, Vol. 38
(1929). RH 64.
Hass, Robert. "Images" and "Transtri:imer's Baltics:
Making a Form of Time". Twentieth Century
Pleasures. New York: The Ecco Press, 1984,
pp. 269-308. RH 54, 68 , 70, 94, 100, 101 , 106.
___ . Human Wishes. New York: The Ecco Press,
1989. RH 60.
Henle, Mary, ed. Documents ofGestalt Psychology.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1961. RH 63.
Herak!eitos. Fr. 1 8 RH 117; Fr. 3 2 RH 81; Fr. 49a RH
74; Fr. 50 RH 33; Fr. 51 RH 5; Fr. 54 RH 44; Fr.
6o, note for LH 116; Fr. 62 RH 34 (see also LH
72); Fr. 84a RH 67; Fr. 112 RH 86; Fr. 118 RH
89; Fr. 123 RH 79; Fr. 124 RH 83 . See Diels­
Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker for
original Greek texts. See Reginald E. Allen, CITATIONS
Charles H. Kahn, G.S. Kirk & J.E. Raven, and
T.M. Robinson for translations.
Herbert, Zbigniew. Selected Poems. Trans. Czeslaw
Milosz and Peter Dale Scott. New York: The
Ecco Press, 1968 , 1986. RH 58.
Hester, Marcus B. "Metaphor and Aspect Seeing".
Essays on Metaphor, ed. Warren Shibles.
Whitewater, Wisconsin: The Language Press,
1972, pp. 111-123. RH 92.
Hirshfield, Jane. The Lives ofthe Heart. New York:
HarperCollins, 1997. RH 52.
___ . Nine Gates: Entering the Mind ofPoetry.
New York: HarperCollins, 1997. RH 16, 68,
103.
Hume, David. A n Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977
[ 1748 , rev. 1777]. RH 21.
Janik, Allan and Stephen Toulmin. Wittgenstein's
Vienna. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973.
RH 83.
Kahn, Charles H. The art and thought ofHeraclitus.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979. Note for LH 72, RH 79, 83, 86, 117.
Kanizsa, Gaetano. Organization in Vision: Essays
on Gestalt Perception. New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1979. RH 56.
Kirk, G.S. &].E. Raven. The Presocratic
Philosophers. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1957. RH 5, 44-
Kiein, Ernest. A Comprehensive Etymological
Dictionary ofthe English Language.
Amsterdam, Oxford, New York: Else\ier,
1966-1967, 1977· RH 51.
Lagerkvist, Par. Evening La nd/Aftonland. Thms...
W.H. Auden and LeifSjiiberg. Derroit:: ..-:1f!i1lt
State University Press, 1975- KH :;o.
Lao Zi. St. 1 [Ch. 1] RH Ss; Ch. 29 KH 8<T, Ch. ,..,._
 G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell ,
1977· § 1 4 1 R H 2 5 ; § 3 3 7 R H 19; §§559 560
RH 112.
__ . Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G.E.M.
Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972
( 1953, 1958]. §23 R H 19; §66 R H 25; §122, note
for RH 45; §125 RH 104; §126 RH 83; §127 RH
2; §129 RH 84; §§130 132 RH 104; §133, note
for LH 116; §144 RH 68; §151 RH 82; §155 RH
111; §217 RH 19; §436 RH 111; §§455 457 RH
51; §568 RH 113; p. 181e RH 113 ; p. 198e LH
109; p. 204e LH 109; p. 206e LH 109; p. 212e
RH 75, pp. 2 1 3 e 2 1 4e RH 41; p. 214e RH 75;
p. 216e RH 108.
__. "Philosophy". Trans. C.G. Luckhardt
and M.A. E. Aue. Philosophical Occasions
1912 19 51. Ed. James C. Klagge and Alfred
Nordmann. Indianapolis and Cambridge:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1993. LH 20,
RH 26, LH 29, RH 115.
__. Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough. Ed.
Rush Rhees. Trans. A. C. Miles. Atlantic
Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press,
1979. P. vi RH 85 (see also note for RH 85);
p. 9e RH 45, 104.
__ . Remarks on the Foundations of
Mathematics. Revised edition. Ed. G.H.
von Wright, R. Rhees, G.E.M. Anscombe.
Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Cambridge,
Massachusetts and London: The MIT Press,
1978. Part IV §30 (p. 238) RH 13.
__. Remar!?s on the Philosophy ofPsychology,
Vol. 1. Ed. G.H. von Wright and Heikki
Nyman. Trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M.A.E.
Aue. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. §888
RH 22.
__ . Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. Trans.
D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961 (1921]. 2.172
RH 29; 2.18 RH 29; 4.021 4.022 RH 29; 4.0312
RH So; 4. 122, 4.123 RH 98; 5.131 RH 75; 6.)22
RH 8).
__. Zettel. Ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H.
von Wright. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967. §155 RH 55,
LH 58; §461, note for LH 68.
Wright, Charles. Black Zodiac. New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 1997. RH 4, 28.
__. Quarter Notes: Improvisations and
Interviews. Ann Arbor: The University of
Michigan Press, 1995. RH 72, 87. (See also
citations under Charles Simic.)
Zagajewski, Adam. Another Beauty. Trans. Clare
Cavanagh. New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 1998. RH 108. CITATIONS
Zhuang Zi. RH 116. See Burton Watson.
Zwicky, Jan. Lyric Philosophy. Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1992. Foreword, note for
L H 17, note for LH u6.
ACKNOWLED GEMENTS
My sincere gratitude to Roo Borson, Robert Bringhurst,
Steven Burns, Harvey Hix, Tim Lilburn, Paolo
Mancosu, Gary Miller, Dale Piner, Andrew Steeves,
Jamie Tappenden; and, above all, to Susan Haley, my
editor, and to Don McKay.
The publisher and author acknowledge, with thanks,
permission to reprint the following copyright material:
Short extracts from A Source Book ofGestalt Psychology,
ed. and trans. Willis D . Ellis. Reprinted by pemission
of Routledge. � Excerpt from Engineering and the
Mind's Eye by Eugene S. Ferguson, The MIT Press,
1992. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. � The
first stanza ofLao tzu, trans. A. C. Graham, in Disputers
ofthe Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China,
Open Court Publishing, 1989. Reprinted by permission
of the publishers. � "A Story About the Body" from
Human Wishes by Robert Hass. Copyright © 1989 by
Robert Hass. Reprinted by permission ofHarperCollins
Publishers Inc. � 970 words from TI.ventieth Century
Pleasures by Robert Hass. Copyright © 1984 by Robert
Hass. Reprinted by permission of HarperCollins
Publishers Inc. � "Stool" from Selected Poems of
Zbigniew Herbat, edited and translated by Czeslaw
Milosz and Peter Dale Scott. English translation
copyright © 1968 by Czeslaw Milosz and Peter Dale
Scott. Introduction copyright © 1968 by A. Alvarez.
Reprinted by permission ofHarperCollins Publishers
Inc. and Penguin Books Ltd. � "Secretive Heart" from
The Lives ofthe Heart by Jane Hirshfield. Copyright
© 1997 byJane Hirshfield. Reprinted by permission of
HarperCollins Publishers Inc. � 780 words fi·om Nine
Gates: Entering the Mind ofPoetry by Jane Hirshfield.
Copyright © 1997 by Jane Hirshfield. Reprinted by
permission of HarperCollins Publishers Inc. Michael
Katz, 173 Tamalpais Avenue, Mill Valley, California
94941. � Reprint of"O Man who stands beside my
shore" by Par Lagerkvist in E1'ening Land/Afton/and,
trans. W.H. Auden and LeifSjiiberg, with the permis
sion of Wayne State University Press. Copyright © 1953
by Albert Bonniers Fiirlag, Stockholm. English
translation copyright © 1975 by Wayne State University
Press, Detroit, Michigan 48202. � "lllustrious
Ancestors" by Denise Levertov, from Collected Earlier
Poems 1940 1 9 60, copyright © 1958, 1979 by Denise
Levertov. Used by permission of New Directions
Publishing Corporation. � "Invocation" by Denise
Levertov, f·om Relearning the Alphabet, copyright ©
1970 by Denise Levertov. Used by permission of New
Directions Publishing Corporation. � Excerpts from
Living In The World As !fit Were Home by Tim Lilburn,
Cormorant Books, 1999. Copyright © 1999 by Tim
Lilburn. Reprinted by permission of the author. �
"Play and Theory of the Duende" (411 word excerpt)
by Federico Garcia Lorca, translated by Christopher
Maurer, from In Search ofDuende, copyright © 1955,
1998 by New Directions Publishing Corporation,
copyright © Herederos de Federico Garcia Lorca, trans
lation copyright © Christopher Maurer and Herederos
de Federico Garcia Lorca. Used by permission of New
Directions Publishing Corporation. � Excerpts ti·om
"Visualization in Logic and Mathematics" by Paolo
Mancosu reprinted by permission of the author. �
Material from "Math and Aftermath", CBC Radio
One, Ideas. Producer: Sara Walch. Broadcast May
1 3 , 14, 1997. � Eighteen lines from Tao Te Ching by
Lao Tzu, A New English Version, with Foreword and
Notes by Stephen Mitchell. Translation copyright ©
1988 by Stephen Mitchell. Reprinted by permission
ofHarperCollins Publishers Inc. and Macmillan
Publishers Ltd. � Short extract from G.E. Moore's
"Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930 33 ", Mind, Vol. 64,
No. 253 (January 1955) . Reprinted by permission
of Oxford University Press. � Approximately 550
words from pp. 10 11, 35, 94, and 118 119 from
The Philosophy ofRhetoric by LA. Richards ( 1937 ).
Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press. �
Excerpts from Wonde1jitl Words, Silent Truth by Charles
Simic. Copyright © by the University of Michigan
Press 1990. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
� "Utopia" from View with a Grain ofSand, copyright
© 1993 by Wislawa Szymborska. English translation
by Stanislaw Baranczak and Clare Cavanagh, copyright
© 1995 by Harcourt, Inc. Reprinted by permission of
the publisher. � "The Nightingale in Bade lunda" from
New Selected Poems by Tomas Transtriimer, translated
by Robin Fulton, Bloodaxe Books, 1997- Reprinted
by permission of the publisher. � Shorr extracts fi·om
Gravity and Grace by Simone Wei!, ed. Gustave Thibon,
trans. Emma Craufurd. Reprinted by permission of
Routledge. � Selected excerpts totalling 1200 words
from Productive Thinking by Max Wertheimer.
Copyright © 1959 by Valentin Wertheimer. Copyright
renewed 1987 by Michael Wertheimer. Reprinted
by permission ofHarperCollins Publishers Inc. �
Excerpts from Philosophical Investigations by Ludwig
Wittgenstein, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe.
Reprinted by permission ofBlackwell Publishers.
� Excerpts ti·01n Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough
by Ludwig Wittgenstein, translated by A.C. Miles,
revised by Rush Rhees. Reprinted by permission of
The Brynmill Press Ltd. � Excerpt f·om "Meditation
on Summer and Shapelessness" and excerpt from
"Disjecta Membra" from Black Zodiac by Charles
Wright. Copyright © 1 997 by Charles Wright.
Reprinted by permission of Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
LLC. � Excerpts from Quarter Notes: Improvisations
and I llterviews by Charles Wright. Copyright © by
the University of Michigan Press 1995. Reprinted
by permission of the publisher. � The author and
Gaspereau Press apologize for any errors or omissions
in the preceding list and would be grateful to be
notified of corrections that should be incorporated in
any subsequent edition of this volume.
� THIS BOOK WAS TYPESET IN THE LAURENTIAN TYPES, DESIGNED
by one of Canada's fnest typographic designers, Rod McDonald.
Originally commissioned by Maclean's magazine (the frst such
commission ever made by a Canadian publication) , the type was
introduced as part of a redesign of the magazine in July 2002.
Based on the letterforms of the sixteenth-century French typecutter
Claude Garamond, Laurentian combines a strong vertical stroke,
sturdy serifs, a robust x-height and slightly compressed character
width with a quiet liveliness and surprisingly open counters.
Laurentian's comfortable economy and legibility, and its warm,
open quality speak to McDonald's skill, as does the fact that this
design was selected for inclusion in the prestigious New York Type
Director's Club 2003 exhibition. Laurentian was aquired by Agfa­
Monotype and released as a part of its Typeface Classics collection
in 2003, joining McDonald's Cartier Book, his widely praised
reworking of Carl Dair's Cartier typeface. This book also includes a
trial version of Laurentian Greek, which were generously provided
to Gaspereau Press by Rod McDonald. A.s.