Declaration

I ………………………………………………………….

Hereby declare:

a) That this dissertation is my own original work and that all source material used is
acknowledged herein;
b) That this has been prepared specifically for a first degree of the University of
Newcastle Upon Tyne; and
c) That it does not contain any material previously submitted to the examiners of this
or any other University.

Signed …………………………………

Date ……………………………………

1
Abstract

Through drawing on published memoirs, interviews and an extensive body of archival

research, this research proposes to critically examine Lee Kuan Yew’s constructions of the
West. To date, essentialist presumptions regarding Singapore’s development have restricted
the potential of administering a level-headed analysis of Lee’s politically ambiguous
nature. I have therefore endeavoured to produce a contextualised account, paying due
consideration to his colonial routes, and Singapore’s complex and fragmented history. At
this critical juncture with the re-imagining of the divide between Asia and the West, and in
particular when allied to the developing theory of Occidentalism, Lee’s creative and
complex narrative of the West provides an appealing case for analysis. Contrary to a
popular belief that Asian values constituted a deep-rooted, postcolonial modus operandi
(that is, a barrier to the West as a social, cultural and political entity), a more accurate
interpretation is that these ‘values’ were meticulously employed as part of a strategy
fabricated to sustain Lee’s political vitality. Through incorporating a more localised and
politically determined approach, this research hopes to further our knowledge concerning
the myriad ways the West has been shaped across Asia.

Keywords: Lee Kuan Yew, occidentalism, the West, modernity, Singapore

Word Count: 9,999

2
Contents

Declaration 1
Abstract 2
Contents 3
List of Appendices 4
List of Figures 4
Acknowledgements 5

Introduction 6

Chapter 1: Literature Review 9

1.1: Situating ‘the West’: emulation, confrontation and distortion 9
1.2: The optimism of postcolonialism 11
1.3: When Asian virtues defy Western expectations 12
1.4: Concluding remarks 14
Chapter 2: Methodology 15
2.1: Allowing Asia to speak: part I 15
2.2: Critical reflections 16
Chapter 3: Asian Values in the Mirror of the West 19
3.1: Surviving without a hinterland 19
3.2: Lee, Asian values and ‘Asianism’ 21
3.3: Asia’s pride, Singapore’s superiority 22
Chapter 4: Anti-Westernism and Democratic Dignity 25
4.1: Asian values and the culture of excess 25
4.2: Under prying eyes: power, politics and anti-Westernism 27
4.3: Mocking the socialist fantasy 29
Chapter 5: Conclusion 31

3
 5.1: Allowing Asia to speak: part II 31
5.2: Re-conceptualising occidentalism 32
5.3: The benefits of elitist perspectives 33
5.4: Limitations 34
5.5: Future study 35
References 36
Appendix 44

List of Appendices

Appendix 1: Record sheets 36

List of Figures

Fig. 1: Map of Singapore 7

4
Acknowledgements

This dissertation has been a long and arduous process and I feel obliged to thank several
key figures. Many thanks go to Alastair Bonnett for his expert mentorship, and for his
continued assistance, support and encouragement for this dissertation, also to Rachel
Woodward for her willingness to offer advice concerning methodology. Further thanks go
to Alan Chong at the National University of Singapore (NUS) for his intuitive guidance in
the initial stages of the project. I am also grateful to the School of Oriental and African
Studies at the University of London for allowing me to conduct several days of archival
research. Finally, I am indebted to my aunt and uncle for providing me with a place to stay
to conduct the latter stages of the research, and to my family for their love and
unconditional support throughout.

5
Introduction

“I have had to sing four national anthems: Britain’s God Save the Queen, Japan’s Kimigayo,
Malaysia’s Negara Ku, and finally Singapore’s Majulah Singapura; such were the political
upheavals of the last 50 years. Foreign troops have come and gone...The swirling currents of
political changes swept me along...Yet, there we were in the 1950s, a small group of English-
educated colonial bourgeoisie...Our task was to swing the people around to support what had
to be done so that Singapore could survive...”
(Lee, 2000: 685-6)

Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore and ‘Asian values’

Singapore’s tangible relationship between culture, modernity and Westernisation has

designated it a political enigma. As its founding father, Lee Kuan Yew was an influential,
outspoken and often controversial political figure. He was instrumental to Singapore’s
development, and within thirty years witnessed its transformation from a British trading
colony into a prestigious cosmopolitan metropolis. Rather notoriously, Lee accredited
Singapore’s political and economic stability to an explicitly non-Western doctrine
(Mutalib, 2000). According to Lee Singapore exhibited ‘Asian values’ of discipline,
resilience and morality that were absent in the West and vital to Singapore’s survival; after
all, it lies within a conservative Muslim region (Fig. 1). He expounded his unease
concerning the temptations of the West; should Singapore succumb to Western virtues it
would face economic doom and social collapse. Through alleging Singapore’s
indeterminate future, Lee effectively instilled a culture of caution in Singapore. This has
served as a legitimating device for Lee’s authoritarian rule, with the allegiance of the
people mobilised and moulded into a paternalistic regime.

Though Singapore masquerades as ‘a traditional and conservative Asian society’ (Chong,

2004: 101), Westernisation has been pivotal to Singapore’s prosperity, and Lee’s Western
background mobilised to augment political and economic support. Indeed, Chong (2004)
acknowledges the ambiguity of Singapore’s role in the Asian values debate; Lee often
strayed from the Asian ideal he earnestly promoted. It is therefore important to challenge
the sincerity of Lee’s condemnatory constructions of the West. Contrary to a genuine

6
belief in the ‘decadence’ of the West, I posit that Lee’s anti-Westernism was strategically
employed as a front for his political regime. The West was not merely championed as a
model for development, nor exorcised as a threat to Singaporean culture. Rather, Lee
shifted between contrasting ideas of the West at the convenience of his rule – his anti-
Westernism was mobilised as a complex and mobile political device.

Fig. 1: Singapore’s conservative neighbours (Fulbright, 2010)

Despite scholarly pursuits to clarify the theoretical credentials of occidentalism, it is yet to

materialise as a bona fide theory. Moreover, essentialist presumptions concerning
Singapore’s development have restricted the potential of administering a level-headed
analysis of Lee’s politically ambiguous nature (Chong, 2006). Despite confusion regarding
Lee’s accomplishments in successfully instilling Asian values whilst simultaneously
maintaining a robust and prosperous economy, Singapore’s modernity has evaded
prolonged scholarly attention. It has not been taken seriously by the West, satirically
described as ‘Disneyland with the death penalty’ by one observer (Gibson, 1993: online).
Through drawing on published memoirs, interviews and an extensive body of archival
research, I propose to critically examine Lee Kuan Yew’s constructions of the West.

Aims
7
Studying Asian elites like Lee will contribute toward a richer understanding of non-
Western constructions of ‘the West’. Challenging ethnocentric assertions, this paper aims
to allow Asia to speak, thus providing recognition of Singapore’s agency. Hitherto, no
occidentalism-related studies have examined the complexion of individual political leaders,
and Chong (2007: 417) declares that this is encouraging in its desire to interpret
‘modernization through specifically local perspectives’. Analysing occidentalism in more
individualised contexts is imperative to further our knowledge concerning the myriad ways
in which the West has been shaped across Asia (Bonnett, 2002). Accordingly, this paper
aims to answer the following questions:

1. In what ways have Asian values been employed by Lee to negotiate his relationship
with the West?
2. How does Lee’s political ideology reflect themes of occidentalism?

This will be fulfilled through implementing the following objectives:

 To assess how Singapore’s colonial history influenced Lee’s relationship with the
West
 To determine how Asian values mediated the negotiation of Lee’s anti-Western
identity
 To consider how Lee’s constructions of the West affect our understanding of
occidentalism

Structure

This paper comprises five principal chapters. Following this introduction, chapter one
presents an overview of the current literature, theories and debates that inform and provide
context for the main argument. The ensuing chapter addresses the general philosophies
upon which the data collection was founded and justifies the research methods chosen.
Chapters three and four form the main part of the study, articulating the research findings
and providing an interpretation of the data. The final chapter concludes on the
effectiveness of the research and relates the findings to broader theoretical debates.

1 Literature Review
8
This chapter addresses literature which examines constructions of ‘the West’, modernity,
and more particularly, literature which employs themes of occidentalism. It will then
briefly digress to highlight issues surrounding postcolonial literature, problematise
conceptual ambiguities and discuss enduring Eurocentric attitudes displayed toward former
colonies, before culminating with a discussion of Singapore, applying themes from the
previous two sections. Finally, the chapter will summarise the findings and reaffirm the
relevance of my research.

1.1 Situating ‘the West’: emulation, confrontation and distortion

The idea that Western civilisation constituted the eminent form of modernity informed
much scholarship over the past century. Recent years witnessed a realisation of the
Eurocentric bias that permeated Western social theory: that the West had modernised, and
‘the rest’ had followed (Ahiska, 2003). The theory of occidentalism proposes to challenge
the West’s ‘traditional, jealous claim on the ownership of modernity’ (Bonnett, 2005: 509)
and expound non-Western readings of this history. Contrary to regarding modernity
merely as having emanated from the West, we should acknowledge the intricacy of the
relationship between East and West, and pursue a more rigorous account of civilisation
(Coronil, 1996). Projections of the West have been generated to affirm and consolidate
non-Western national identities; occidentalism is promising in its desire to examine the
West not as an unstoppable force but as a political construct which shapes, and is shaped
through, different national and regional contexts (Bonnett, 2002; see also Ahiska, 2003).

Ambiguity surrounding ideas of the West has culminated in a theory that is politically and
intellectually complex (Spencer, 1990), and in embryonic stages of development. The East
has engaged with the West in a multifarious fashion, subsequently different scholars have
upheld different interpretations of occidentalism. Carrier (1995) postulates that it concerns
non-Western constructions of identity through mobilising contrasting ideas of the West;
trajectories of development for non-Western localities are thus grounded in an antithetic
perspective to the West envisaged. Yet Jervis (2005) concedes that, in light of the East’s
assimilation within the capitalist system, and its emulation of Western principles, this
interpretation lacks pertinence. Employing Huntington’s (1996) idea that post-Cold war
Western democratisation efforts would be met with resistance and hostility in Islam and

9
across Asia, Buruma and Margalit (2004) establish an explicit connection to the 9/11
attacks, asserting that occidentalism connoted Islam’s resentful and antagonistic response
to Western principles of scientific rationality and democracy.

Aydin (2007) resists their view, noting an unhealthy emphasis on confrontation between
Muslim and Christian worlds at the expense of a broader perspective. Delanty (2003: 15)
concurs, adding that ‘[t]he relationship between civilizations is also more porous and does
not take the form of fundamental ‘clashes’’. To essentialise this theory as anti-Western
would neglect the geographically heterogeneous nature of reactions to the West (Bonnett,
2005). Whereas Said’s (1978) orientalism defined the ‘Other’ in negative contexts,
occidentalism allows for a ‘positivity of the other – its experiences, utterances and
practices’ (Ahiska, 2003: 365). Ning (1997) agrees, noting that Chinese societies view the
West as a heaven and symbol of achievement. Complementary visions of the West have
typically been employed to guide the modernising aspirations of non-Western localities
(Bonnett, 2005; Aydin, 2007). Dualisms between Western materiality and Eastern
spirituality are no longer applicable in Asia, where various countries have industrialised in
a bid to compete with the West (Chen, 1995). This is not to infer that modernisation will
homogenise non-Western cultures; contrarily, modernisation assumes particular cultural
meaning through various national and regional contexts.

Eisenstadt’s (2000) paper on multiple modernities represents a theoretically incisive

approach to examining modernity. His foremost assertion is that ‘Western patterns of
modernity are not the only ‘authentic’ modernities, though they enjoy historical precedence
and continue to be a basic reference point for others’ (ibid: 3). Rather than conceiving
Westernisation as a prevailing global force, the West has diffused through the non-Western
world and materialised in locally reinterpreted forms (Arnason, 2006) – leading to a global
divergence of social, cultural and political institutional norms (Eisenstadt, 2000). Building
upon Eisenstadt’s work, Delanty (2003) likewise advocates a ‘post-Western’ modernity: as
the European Union engulfs Eurasia, our understandings of Europe, or ‘the West’, as an
ideological construct will be increasingly challenged. He concludes that, as modernities
within East and West become more porous, specific territorial cultural identities will be
increasingly inconceivable (ibid).
Coronil (1996) professes a growing aversion to the interchangeability of geographical
epithets, such that West is synonymous with Europe, or the United States. Though such

10
ambiguities endorse the distortion of complex cultures (Arkush, 1997), or a polarisation of
the Other (Young, 1995), they are employed within a conceptual tautology. Eisenstadt
(2000) further pronounces that these generic categories do not have the capacity to portray
the complex mosaic of identities that they claim to represent. For instance, that ‘Asia’
represents a plenitude of different nations, cultures and identities means that Asia has
become more a symbol than a geographical reality (Sun, 2000). Clarke (1997) notes that
the ideological framing of this opposition has stripped these terms of their meaning, while
Spencer (1990) exhorts us to be critical of the political context in which these terms are
employed. Notably, they ‘may lead us astray as much as guide us’ (Pieterse, 2006: 69).

1.2 The optimism of postcolonialism

“The fantasy of postcolonial theory...is that those in the Western academy...have managed to
free themselves from this hybrid commerce of colonialism, as from every other aspect of the
colonial legacy”
(Young, 1995: 182)

Discord surrounding postcolonial theory has compelled scholars to question the

implications of the term ‘postcolonial’. According to Ahmad (1992), postcolonialism is
anti-colonialism in a postmodern guise, however Yeoh (2001) conceives that this term is
increasingly confusing and vague – meaningless considering its conflation with other terms
like ‘neocolonial’ and ‘anti-colonial’. It is perilous to associate ‘postcolonial’ with
freedom from colonial influence - the actual transition concerns identity, not sovereignty
(Wong, 1999). However, analysing reconstructions of identity through a Western
framework merely reinforces imperialist conceptions of development, silencing the people
in question (Kapoor, 2004). Regarding the optimism of the term postcolonial (Jacobs,
1996), we should question its theoretical contribution.

The term postcolonial is ambiguous; as Goss (1996: 239) questions, ‘does the emphasis lie
with the post- or the colonial?’ In declaring their development ‘different’, are we not
reinforcing the self-other binary expounded by Said (1978)? Sharp and Briggs (2006)
imagine so, stating that postcolonial theorists are delusional in believing they can
overcome asymmetric power relations and tend to problems of representation. Goss (1996:
250) reinforces this point, explaining that ‘all dominating referents are self-determined’:

11
postcolonial theorists adopt subjective analyses, making biased and careless assumptions
concerning development, offering little to the global South (Sharp and Briggs, 2006).
Dirlik (1999) further finds their presumptions about identity remarkable, given their
objection to essentialism.

Chong (2007: 399) observes that Southeast Asia has been presented as a region that is
resistant to the West, or a ‘region of revolt’. This opposition supposedly derives from
being forced to modernise through the Westphalian system. This highlights the perils of
using the term ‘independent’ to describe former colonies. To ensure modernisation these
states have relied upon foreign assistance, reinforcing their colonial role in the
international division of labour. Subsequently, the term ‘postcolonial’, contrary to
superseding, implies the reproduction of colonialism (Coronil, 1996). This discussion
adopts heightened relevance for Singapore. Lee attributed Singapore’s success to ‘Asian
values’ – that is, promoting a customary Asian culture free from Western influence.
Through this method, Singapore’s economic stability and nationalistic pride were re-
established in the post-independence era (Wong and Bunnell, 2006). However, in reality
the West exerts huge influence in Singapore; contrary to independence from, Singapore
maintains a level of interdependence within the West.

1.3 When Asian virtues defy Western expectations

Singapore’s success emanated from a rejection of Western values, many of which were
inconsistent with its quest for modernisation. However, Singapore emerged as an
innovative economy, auspiciously combining economic planning and laissez faire policies
(Huff, 1995; see also Pang, 1971). Lee’s assertion of Asian values, in light of Singapore’s
Western economy, has perplexed Western analysts (Kwong, 2001). Indeed, Chong (2004)
concedes the ambiguity of ‘Asian values’, confessing that they may either be interpreted as
an exceptionalist political discourse, or conversely, an Asian interpretation of modern
capitalism. Yao (2007) too acknowledges the moral weaknesses in Singapore’s
philosophy: though Western virtues are condemned, Singapore exhibits values inherent to
many Western countries, and as a modern and prosperous state, boasts cosy relations with
financial powerhouses. Therborn (2006) affirms the hollowness of Lee’s sentiment,
coming from a politician that thoroughly embraced his colonial background.

12
Huntington (1996) attests that Singapore’s claim to have modernised in isolation from the
West is whimsical. He advocates a policy of reformism: tying traditional modernisation to
preservation of indigenous values – a policy popular with non-Western elites. Cultural
discourse concerning preservation of heritage has long been a prominent theme in official
government policy (Yeoh and Kong, 2006); the Committee on Heritage Report (1988: 6)
pronounced the vital importance of balancing ‘Asian Values and Western influences’. It
would be easy to dismiss this culture preservation as a lost cause. Yeo (cited in Tu, 1984:
180) rejected the possibility that Singapore could remain a conservative, Asian society
given its ‘headlong rush into Westernisation’. This insight proved prophetic: an obsession
with ‘material betterment’ encroached Singaporean life, evidencing a fundamental shift
from familial concern to economic welfare (Yeoh and Kong, 2006).

Despite being modelled on a Westminster parliamentary structure, Lee’s government has

been blasted for its excessive and authoritarian nature (Zhang, 2002; Yao, 2007).
Singaporean polity involves a level of control deemed unacceptable by the West
(Fukuyama, 1992). Bonnett (2006: 280) connects this to Asian values discourse; it ‘has a
certain sickly presence in the conduct of Asian statism’, demonstrating an omniscient and
omnipotent administration. Many Western observers interpret Lee’s uncompromising
regime as a dictatorship, despite Singapore’s prominence as an uncorrupted Asian state
(Transparency International, 2009). Indeed, Lee was no stranger to accusations of
malfeasance, with the West intent on exposing aspects of his regime which appeared
unsavoury and illiberal. Singapore was even chronicled as Disney with death penalty
(Gibson, 1993). Is it right to brand the Singapore system irrational? Chatterjee (1986)
believes this reflects the Eurocentric nature of Western academia in trying to ‘understand’
other cultures.

Singapore is lauded for mimicking Western trajectories of development but simultaneously

chastised when insistent upon hereditary ways of life. Lee has been branded a political
enigma because ‘his policies achieve economic prosperity while ignoring many of the
sacred cows of standard political thinking’ (Kwong, 2001: 56). Chong (2004) concurs,
attributing Singapore’s admonishment to a frustrated Western reaction that, whilst
achieving similar results, Singapore has not conformed to its liberal model of development.
In a contemporary context, the non-Western world is analysed through a Eurocentric lens

13
(Dirlik, 1999), and coerced into conforming to those ideals. It is easy to forget that
‘rationality’ in the West may epitomise ‘irrationality’ in the East (Chen, 1995). Arnason
(2006) exhorts us to realise that the world will consist of divergent and contradictory ideals
of societal structure. Though Singapore affiliated many facets of Western culture it is
intrinsically an Asian society and there are no grounds on which the West can discriminate;
Southeast Asian politics will inevitably differ from the Western parallel (Chong, 2006).
The inexorable nature of criticisms directed toward Singapore reflects a level of apathy
towards a postcolonial state which has embraced an inimitable trajectory of modernity.

1.4 Concluding remarks

Theoretical uncertainties that have beset the theory of occidentalism suggest that there will
never be a universal conception of non-Western modernity. Notwithstanding the
pessimism of this verdict, it highlights the enduring importance of localised re-conceptions
of modernity in non-Western contexts. As of yet, no related studies have spotlighted the
mindsets of individual political leaders, and Chong (2007: 417) declares that this is
encouraging in its desire to interpret ‘modernization through specifically local
perspectives’. As section 1.3 revealed, essentialist presumptions regarding Singapore’s
development have restricted the potential of administering a level-headed analysis of Lee’s
politically ambiguous nature (Chong, 2006). It is important to overcome the essentialist
and Eurocentric trends that have beset this theoretical field; analysing Asian elites and their
intimate experiences will promote a richer understanding of the multifarious nature in
which the West has been applied and administered. Focus will now shift to the methods
which were employed to conduct the research.

2 Methodology

14
This section identifies the research methods through which the data was collated, and
highlights the aspects of my research which distinguish it from contemporary scholarship
on Singapore. This will be achieved through critiquing the work of two prominent
scholars in the field: Michael D. Barr, an Australian political scientist, and Alan Chong, the
research assistant to Lee’s memoirs. It subsequently opens up discussion concerning
attitudes to cross-cultural research, positionality and the importance of overcoming our
subjectivities when administering analysis.

2.1 Allowing Asia to speak: part I

Michael D. Barr is renowned for his criticisms of Lee and the PAP. According to Barr,
Lee’s political strategy conceals an ulterior motive. For instance, Lee’s memoirs have
limited value in recounting the Singapore story; their publication merely constitutes a
strategy ‘to ensure his own unblemished place in history’ (Barr, 2000a: 271). Though Barr
is right to scrutinise Lee’s memoirs (indeed, it would be foolhardy not to), his efforts
surpass those of the standard critic. In charging Lee with bias, and with presenting a
falsified account of Singaporean society, Barr fails to demonstrate a capacity to appreciate
Lee’s complex background. In most of his work Barr is consistent in his view that the PAP
is oppressive, illiberal and excessive. Through focus on interviews with opposition
politicians (see Barr, 2003b for interview with JB Jeyaretnam) and important societal
members who clashed with Lee (see Barr, 2010 for analysis of Lee’s reaction to catholic
activism), Barr presents Lee in an unsympathetic, negative light – a leader who has
moulded Singapore in his own prejudice and whose ruthlessness has brought him personal
rewards (Barr, 2000b). Though the erratic and polemical nature of Barr’s analyses is clear
to see, it remains to be known whether Barr would favour a more empathetic and tolerant
approach if he had considered Singapore’s conservative, Islamic surroundings rather than
offering a contextless comparison to Western liberal norms.

Alan Chong adopts a more favourable approach, opting to compare Lee to other Asian
political figures (see Chong, 2006 for comparison to former PAP cabinet members
Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, Tommy Koh and Kishore Mahbubani; see Chong, 2008 for

15
comparison to Filipino and Indonesian leaders José Rizal and Sukarno) and proclaiming
the value of his contributions to democratic discourse (Chong, 2008). As a Singapore-born
scholar, it is logical that Chong would be more sympathetic to Lee’s cause. He employs
long quotes from Lee’s memoirs, speeches and interviews, essentially allowing Lee’s voice
to be heard. Regarding Lee’s memoirs, Chong states that despite suspicions of
exaggeration, his accounts of Britain must hold some element of truth (Chong, 2008). It
should be noted that Chong acted as research assistant in the production of Lee’s memoirs,
and rather disconcertingly, he seems to defend Lee regardless of the charges made
(whether his personal commitment affected his academic intuition is an important
consideration). For instance, criticism that Lee faces is unwarranted and solely because
Singapore frustrates the West in not wholly conforming to its liberal democratic image
(Chong, 2004). In addition, contrary to alleged single-party dominance, Chong
contemplates the actuality that Singaporeans have repaid their gratitude through voting for
Lee’s party (ibid); Lee has utilised his power (though somewhat excessively) to manage
political instability and create a workable non-Western model of development. Though the
irony of Singapore’s foreign policy puzzles Western observers (Chong, 2004; see also
Kwong, 2001; Yao, 2007), he insists that ‘Southeast Asia remains a political chameleon
still trying to define its essentialist identity’ (Chong, 2008: 248).

2.2 Critical reflections

In keeping with the cognitive nature of their approach, this research adopted textual
analysis as its primary methodology. This analysis covered Lee’s published memoirs, and
his journal and media interviews. To complement this method, I consulted an extensive
body of archival literature covering Lee’s policies, the inception of the PAP and
Singapore’s history pre- and post-independence. The end product was an assemblage of
sources spanning a vast time scale. Through combining analysis of primary materials with
consultation of indigenous and Western scholarship, this research was designed to present a
coherent and balanced account of Lee’s history with the West. Textual analysis offered ‘an
alternative, richer ‘truth’…not available from more conventional data sources’ (Cloke et
al., 2004: 105), and its association with geographical representation (Aitken, 2005) was
crucial to formulating an understanding of how Lee constructed Western stereotypes.

16
Critiquing the work of Barr and Chong offers a means to highlight and justify the aspects
of my research which separate it from existing scholarship. Regarding Southeast Asian
leaders, Chong (2008) exhorts us to be sensitive to their background – living in a colony,
and in Lee’s case under the Japanese occupation. When contacted regarding this research
proposal, Chong was wary of the fact that a British researcher would be researching an ex-
British colony, and advised against the reproduction of a contextless liberal critique.
Contrary to the discursive nature of Barr’s analyses, this research hopes to offer a
contextualised account, paying due consideration to Lee’s colonial routes, and Singapore’s
complex and fragmented history.

Scholars must be open and receptive, and be ‘prepared for [the text] to tell [them]
something’ (Gadamer, 1975: 238). One should be wary of ‘the ethnocentric and orientalist
premises of Western discourse’ (Faure, 1993: 6). It is unlikely that cross-cultural research
is completely void of bias and ideological prejudice. Yet, in order for the text to reveal its
truths, one must cast aside their own fore-meanings (Gadamer, 1975). It seems that the
work of Barr also has been shaped by a personal commitment to chastise Singapore for
defying Western norms, evidencing the propensity of Western discourse to indulge in
Eurocentric analysis. I hope to avoid this pitfall through assuming a neutral standpoint:
offering a rational analysis and presenting Singapore as existing through its own agency,
but simultaneously theorising as to the reasons behind Lee’s anti-Western complexion.

Young (1995) notes that a level of complacency has permeated colonial discourse – in
particular concerning neglect towards the methodology being used. He explains that the
correct theoretical questions are not being addressed, and that as a consequence our own
assumptions limit the value of our cross-cultural interpretation. Although as a Westerner,
admittedly my judgements will never completely be divorced from the analysis, it is
nonetheless important to acknowledge the tenets that inform cross-cultural research.
Chatterjee (1986: 13) believes that a level of charity is required in cognitive interpretation:
one must take their beliefs for granted, accepting their actions as existing within ‘entirely
different criteria of rationality’. This is a point with which Chong (2008) agrees, noting
that rights and responsibilities must be treated contextually. In other words, though they
may seem irrational to us, it is unlikely that everyday activities in these cultures are guided
by large-scale communal error; thus, interpretation should be guided by an ‘area of
agreement between anthropologist and the people [being studied]’ (Chatterjee, 1986: 12).

17
Taking these points into account, this paper can now proceed to discuss the findings of the
research and the interpretation of the data.

3 Asian Values in the Mirror of the West

“...an island city-state in Southeast Asia could not be ordinary if it was to survive. We had to

18
 make extraordinary efforts to become a tightly knit, rugged, and adaptable people...We had to
be different.”
(Lee, 2000: 7)

This chapter analyses the nature in which Lee employed Asian values to engage with the
West in the post-independence era. Interpreting Asian values merely within the
dichotomous context of protecting a pure and moral Asia from decadent processes of
Westernisation, constitutes a superficial analysis of an elaborate political discourse. Asian
values served a discursive function for Lee, enabling him to exploit a subtle, anti-Western
rhetoric to guide his vision of the ‘ideal Asian’. Articulating these values as exclusively
‘Asian’ has enabled Lee to emphasise the vitality of preserving a Singaporean culture that
is exceptional from, and superior to, the West. Through insinuating Singapore’s
superiority, and placing emphasis on the ‘Asian’, Lee could promote values which filtered
and cleansed the adverse and detrimental aspects of Westernisation, and which resulted in a
morally superior people.

3.1 Surviving without a hinterland

Excerpted from Lee’s second memoir, the statement at the start of the chapter evokes the
national disquiet concerning Singapore’s uncertain future in the post-independence era.
For the many recently independent colonies, postcolonial theorists had painted a bleak
picture of exploitation through the international division of labour. Converse to
subscribing to this theory and accepting this bleak fate, Lee forged a unique path for the
Singaporean people to take. He was defiant and believed survival was possible through
unprecedented levels of determination and spirit. This promotion of ‘Asian values’
appeared as a cultural dichotomy between a decadent West and a moral Asia, and as
providing ‘cultural ballast’ (Barr, 2003a) to transcendent processes of Westernisation that
had supposedly blighted Singapore. In his memoirs Lee constructed a fine line between
right and wrong, and his idea of the West traversed this line. The Singapore Story was
presented as a struggle for survival against the ‘social and economic evils’ (Lee, 1998a:
191) of the West: dependency, materialism and corruption. In reality, these ‘evils’ existed
throughout much of Asia, but through identifying them explicitly with the West, Lee
reinforced the Asian-Western dichotomy and abet Singapore’s persistence with Asian
values.

19
Particular aspects of Western politics – notably British healthcare and welfare schemes,
and American foreign policy – were manipulated and transformed into ‘failures’ of the
West. Lee declared that the implementation of the National Health Service (NHS) revealed
the unrealistic and idealistic ambitions of the Labour government. The idea that all citizens
would receive free healthcare was impractical, ‘collid[ing] against the reality of human
behavior, certainly in Singapore’ (2000: 100). Thus, abuse of free health provisions, albeit
acceptable in Western culture, was not so in Singapore. Second, Lee criticised the
inadequacies of British welfare schemes, discerning that they merely acted to undermine
the self-reliance of the British people. Akin to the manner he exposed healthcare, he
proclaimed that reliance on handouts detracted from man’s ‘primeval urge’ to provide for
his family (Lee, 1996: 47). Though Britain may stand for this sluggish behaviour, Lee
would only accept a form of man that was superior. Finally, Lee constructed a negative
imagery of U.S. foreign policy as deceptive, brash and simplistic. Contrary to a
manipulative and money-oriented administration, Lee championed a politics grounded in
honesty and purity, thus insinuating the superiority of the Singaporean government. Lee’s
reliance upon subtle, anti-Western rhetoric, and his resultant manipulation of negative
Western stereotypes, were crucial to guiding his vision of the ‘ideal Asian’.

Lee believed in a ‘need to align Singapore’s survival with the greater currents of
international political favour’ (Chong, 2006: 273) and, despite his application of the
aforementioned rhetoric, Britain and the U.S. were deemed vital to Lee’s strategy. Both
were pivotal to Singapore’s progress; Britain as an economic catalyst and the U.S. as a
military aide in the cold war – the ‘anchorman of the non-Communist world’ (Lee, 1981:
10). Lee conceded that modern day Singapore was ‘the result of Pax Britannica and Pax
America over the past 100 years’ (Lee, 2008: online), and further asserted that, were the
West’s ‘good points’ not there to guide Singapore, ‘we wouldn’t have got out of our
backwardness’ (Lee, 1994a: 125). In addition, despite making remarks about a failed
Western culture, Lee admitted that Singapore’s financial centre had liberalised and taken
inspiration from New York and London, even acknowledging the ‘creativity’ of America’s
entrepreneurial spirit (Lee, 2009). Evidently, these representations of the West as a
guardian angel and as intrinsic to Singapore’s culture, directly contradict the negative
stereotypes which were operationalised after independence.

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3.2 Lee, Asian values and ‘Asianism’

As a self-proclaimed Confucian, Lee cited the good of the people as his main concern. His
enduring promotion of Asian values acted to galvanise pride in the purity and morality of
the Singaporean people. According to Kong and Yeoh (2003), Asian values became a
major political discourse, instilled in the minds of Singapore’s citizens and translated into
political action. There was a popular belief that Singapore was too Westernised, with
English education and Western capitalism invoking an identity crisis among young
Singaporeans. Lee indeed distinguished between the vitality, commitment and discipline
of the Chinese and ‘the apathy, self-centeredness, and lack of self-confidence’
demonstrated by the English educated (2000: 149). Asian values therefore seemed to
delineate a form of postcolonial modus operandi – that is, a means of protecting
Singapore’s fragile culture from unrelenting processes of Westernisation.

However, interpreting Asian values merely in this context constitutes a superficial analysis
of a complex political discourse characterised by conflictual obligations; that of retaining
Singapore’s traditional way of life, and that of generating a modern, educated population
able to compete with the West. Hsü Cho-Yün (cited in Tu, 1984) has dubbed this neo-
Confucian ethic ‘Lee Kuan Yewism’ – a Singaporean ethic which considered Confucian
values but which also catered to the modern generation. Lee stressed that, without Asian
values, Singapore would not have grown and prospered (Lee, 1998b). This was not to
imply that Singapore underwent modernisation in isolation from the West; rather, through
conforming to these values, the balance between Asian morals and economic prosperity
was maintained. Modernity in Singapore was thus guided by a moral ethic supposedly
absent in the West.

Lee typically employed Asian values discourse as a means of mediating his relationship
with the West, either in defensive or offensive contexts. This is no more evident than in the
case of Michael Fay, an American student who was caned for committing an act of
vandalism in Singapore. In conjunction with the Asian values debate, this proved highly
controversial, provoking America’s social conscience, most of which believed that Fay
deserved leniency and thus exception from this outmoded form of punishment (Chong,
2004). In one interview, Lee defended his actions, illustrating that had Singapore

21
exemplified Fay from the law, the PAP would have lost their moral authority and thus their
‘right to govern’. Accused of taking excessive action, Lee contested: ‘We don’t deal with
criminal behavior the way Americans do. We don’t have the concept of ‘victim of society’’
(Lee, 1994b: online).

It was at times like these when Lee could retreat behind the wall of ‘Asianism’ (Yao,
2007), placing emphasis on Asian values, adopting a defensive stance and berating the
West for interfering in a supposedly Asian culture. As for Lee’s articulation of Asian
values in a more offensive context, Feulner (cited in Chong, 2004: 113) notes that he
formulated an ‘elaborate critique’ regarding the breakdown of American civil society,
which drew upon education levels, and murder and incarceration rates. For instance, Lee
drew a contrast between America, a society which had gone ‘fundamentally wrong’, and
Singapore, a society where ‘other people’s lives...have to be respected’ (Lee, 1994b:
online). This charge referred to two Japanese students that were killed in Los Angeles for
their car – they lost their lives solely due to entering this anarchic, lawless and most
significantly, Western society. Lee thus not only distorted and defaced the West as a threat
to survival, but intimated that this state of disorder would not exist in Singapore.

3.3 Asia’s pride, Singapore’s superiority

At a time when the East’s fortunes were dramatically changing, the West was offered as ‘an
individualistic, anti-social and bloated creature that could no longer ‘keep up’ with Asia’
(Bonnett, 2004: 101). Impervious in his belief that Western values were not arbitrary or
absolute, Lee frequently criticised the U.S. for attempting to impose them in Singapore, a
state positioned in a conservative Muslim region with ‘a different historical background
and different social values’ (Lee, 1998c: online). He condemned the U.S. for ‘China-
bashing’ (2000: 638): only Americans were to blame if the next generation of Chinese
became decidedly anti-American. America’s attitude towards Asia, and its attempts to
engender ‘a ‘new morality’ on these countries (Singh, 1999: 110) reflected a diabolical lack
of understanding of oriental culture. Central to all these statements is the edict that
America should refrain from meddling in Asia’s business, and resist the temptation to ‘foist
their system indiscriminately on societies in which it will not work’ (Lee, 1994a: 110).

22
Lee’s anti-Western offensive reflected a resurgence of Asian pride. He felt assured that
Singapore demonstrated all the indicators of a well-governed society: a lack of corruption,
a strong economy and above all, a law-abiding populace – as Fukuyama (1992) suggested,
Singapore appeared above criticism. It seems fitting, therefore, to offer an alternative
cognition of Asian values. Articulating these values as absolutely and exclusively ‘Asian’
has served a strategic function in emphasising the vitality of preserving Singapore’s
culture: ‘only if the cultures are good and worthy of preservation, would it follow that the
culture requires things to be done differently from the West’ (Kwong, 2001: 185). Asian
values did not merely or simply represent a negative riposte to Westernisation. Rather,
inclusion of the epithet ‘Asian’ invoked a degree of superiority over the West. As Bonnett
(2004) points out, a postcolonial era of Asian leaders (Lee included) signified a new dawn
of Asian confidence and with it an image of the West as increasingly powerless. Lee was
well-positioned to criticise the West, because Singapore was, a priori, superior. This
empowered him to modernise Singapore in a way that acted to filter out the adverse and
detrimental impacts of Westernisation – that is, modernise on his own terms.

The notion that Lee articulated Singaporean values as exclusively Asian alludes that
whatever Singapore was, or embodied, did no longer exist in the West (Yao, 2007).
Essentially, the Westernisation extant in Singapore was a form superior to, and absent in,
the West itself. However, as has been copiously made clear, Singapore has been
perpetually influenced by a Western doctrine. Upon reflecting on his relationship with
Britain, Lee stated he was grateful for ‘long years of association...[which] nurtured certain
values’ (2000: 371). He expressed heartfelt thanks for support of, and encouragement
from, many British politicians – many to whom he remained close, even at times he
publicly campaigned against them in Singapore’s struggle for independence. The PAP is to
a considerable degree, a Westernised political party. Though at the outset this was due to a
level of dependence upon British support, Lee’s government has since opted to keep the
British colonial structures in place, administering a ‘Westminster-style inspired parliament’
(Chong, 2004: 100). Moreover, the founding members of the PAP met (and several were
educated) in Cambridge, at a time when they were seeking refuge from the Japanese
occupation.

According to Zhang (2002), in light of this evidence, Lee’s political principles can
therefore be enigmatically identified as both Western and Confucian. This statement

23
resoundingly defeats the notion that Lee genuinely believed in a tangible opposition
between Asian values and Western values. Moreover, the cosmetic nature of his anti-
Westernism brings into question the constructions of the West that Lee used to govern
Singapore. Contrary to a genuine belief in the ‘decadence’ of the West, which many
scholars believe was integral to the dichotomous construction of Asian values, Lee has
exploited the ambiguous nature of ‘the West’ to construct a negative Western imagery. As
Yao (2007) states, this ambiguity compounded the West to an entity with purely abstract
qualities in Singapore. It has been easy for Lee to mould Singapore’s cognition of the West
into a negative Western stereotype, to inform the people’s adherence to Asian values and
thus Lee’s vision of modernity. The next chapter provides a critical insight into this anti-
Western rhetoric, positing that, contrary to representing a profound reaction to the West, it
has been exploited by Lee in particular contexts for different political means.

4 Anti-Westernism and Democratic Dignity

“We are becoming too Westernised. We must go back to Asian virtues.”

(Lee cited in Lu, 1983: 71)

“Indeed the West is the perfect embodiment of things that the State warns people about, yet it

24
 also offers what Singapore most anxiously wants to acquire”
(Yao, 2007: 53)

The West was not merely celebrated as a model for development, nor exorcised as a threat
to Singaporean culture. The notion that Lee urged Singapore to ‘go in whatever direction
world conditions dictate if we are to survive’ (Lee, 2007: online) is imperative to
understanding his exchanges with the West. Lee did not strictly believe in his adverse
constructions of the West, but typically deviated between Asian and Western values at the
convenience of his rule. I examine Lee’s political strategy in three contexts; first, Asian
values were mobilised within an underlying public rhetoric that the state was under threat –
Lee’s memoirs constitute an important medium through which this transpired; second,
Asian values were employed to generate political support and excuse his regime in the face
of internal and external criticisms; finally, Lee’s initial advocacy of democratic socialism
illustrated a political performance fabricated to win him public support – presenting his
acute Western shifts as inherent to Singapore’s survival acted to internally legitimate his
actions and win him favour in the long term.

4.1 Asian values and the culture of excess

This section proffers the link between Singapore’s survivalist culture and Lee’s excessive
regime as a primary context in which Lee could employ Asian values. It posits the
application of Lee’s memoirs as a medium through which Lee could mobilise Singapore’s
survivalist rhetoric, thus justifying his actions. Lee has maintained a ‘near-apocalyptic
vision of economic doom and social collapse’ (Yao, 2007: 25). Anticipating that Singapore
would capitulate into insignificance in his absence, Lee personified an over-protective
father figure, instilling in Singapore a ‘feverish imagination’ of ‘moral panic’ (Yao, 2007:
26). Inducing a level of insecurity amongst Singapore’s populace was vital as a
legitimating technique in Lee’s regime (Barr, 2003a); if Singapore was perceived as
vulnerable to external threat, then acts of self-sacrifice could be justified as being in the
nation’s interest.

Lee employed survivalist rhetoric as a major propaganda device throughout his reign. In
fact, Lee’s memoirs were utilised to restore and revive Singapore’s culture of caution,
emphasising the difficult journey that Singapore endured before and since independence.

25
Singapore’s troubled history is presented as an ever possible likelihood; were Singaporeans
to take their new life for granted, history would repeat itself. Yao (2007) observes that the
narrative in his memoirs is intended to provoke a response. For instance, through
juxtaposing a ‘generation that has not known hardship’ (Lee, 2000: 133), against historical
examples of Singapore’s struggles, Lee reminded this generation that, were they to ignore
Asian values, and the examples of hard work and thrift set by Lee, the situation could
deteriorate rapidly and Singapore would breed undesirable Western characteristics.

Moreover, the crime and unemployment that formerly typified Singapore, supposedly
symbolises the West now; expressing a reluctance to recede to ‘older’ times enabled Lee to
justify his anti-Westernism as a protection device. His promotion of Asian values, further
than culminating in a ‘superior’ mortal able to survive Singapore’s allegedly uncertain
future, has ensured that scenarios of chaos and unruliness, akin to the West, will never
materialise. Singapore’s history has thus been dramatised by Lee and mobilised to aid ‘the
imagining of the future’ (Yao, 2007: 52). Operating through an assumption that nothing
should be taken for granted, Lee generated a rugged community spirit characterised by
unification, determination, confidence and self-reliance. Lee’s memoirs present Lee as a
guardian angel who saved Singapore from a disastrous fate. In Lee, the people saw a
strong, defiant leader who led them to prosperity; his memoirs accentuate this theme
through glorifying Lee as a divine figure indispensable to Singapore.

As Singapore’s founding father, Lee took great endeavour to ensure Asian values were
explicitly and inextricably linked with him (regarding the Lee Kuan Yewism that Hsü Cho-
Yün described earlier, one would infer that he has succeeded). Recounting his rise to
power, Lee stated that ‘a competitive display of selflessness...swept a whole generation; the
more selfless you were, the more you impressed the masses’ (1998a: 254). He connected
the white suits that adorned his party to a clean and pure government. Importantly, the
relationship between Lee and the state was presented as mutually beneficial. Lee required
Singapore’s citizens to maintain its prosperity, thus ensuring that Singapore remained ‘a
place that is useful to the world. Otherwise it wouldn’t exist’ (Lee, 2009: online). Through
exhibiting hard work and thrift, Singapore’s economy would remain competitive and in
good condition for the next working generation. Lee’s utopian belief in ‘deferment of
present enjoyment for future gain’ (Lee, 1994a: 117) would be justified, his discourse of
loyalty reinforced and the people’s faith in him sustained (Chong, 2004).

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4.2 Under prying eyes: power, politics and anti-Westernism

The chapter now examines how Asian values were strategically mobilised, bestowing Lee
with popular support and rationalising his dogmatic style to internal and external
audiences. That Singapore’s political infrastructure is underpinned by a dominant party
system, has in no way escaped the West’s attention – or criticisms from the Singaporean
public. Though accusations of a dynasty (Trocki, 2006) are excessive, Lee certainly had a
‘political stronghold’ over Singapore (Yap, 2005: 47); naturally this has influenced
Singapore’s construction in his image (Zhang, 2002). That Singapore and Lee were so
cogently linked made extricating them an arduous, almost trivial process. Lee’s title as the
‘founding father’, contrary to merely designating him Singapore’s creator, afforded Lee
with the power to command a high degree of authority over its citizens.

Eurocentric notions of Lee ‘inculcating a culture of fear’ (Barr, 2003b: 300) in Singapore,
seem inaccurate and inattentive to reality. It is more appropriate to judge Lee as having
expertly manipulated his political position, so that to be against him was akin to opposing
the Singapore story itself. Dissidence was thus uncommon and unpopular in the republic.
James Gomez, a scholar born in Singapore and an illustrious critic of Lee, devoted a
substantial quantity of his work to exposing Lee’s supposedly underhanded tactics. He
observes a ‘weak state of competitive party politics’ (Gomez, 2001: 15), noting that the
political opposition have been ‘cowed into fear’ as regards speaking out against Lee (ibid:
15). His provocatively titled book, Publish and Perish, presents a collation of selected
publications by the National Solidarity Party – a prominent rival of the PAP, and whose
political magazine had been afforded restricted circulation in Singapore. Through this
‘media blackout’ (ibid: 20) there was a broad and popular belief that the political
opposition did not demonstrate the aptitude to govern.

Through a firm assurance that his actions protected and benefited Singapore in the long
term, Lee was granted a certain degree of leniency. His tough policies were accepted,
provided they met this condition. Asian values were employed in this context to generate
support for Lee; his paternalistic regime reflected a level of morality in protecting
Singapore from ‘Otherness’. Although in his memoirs Lee implies his actions were for

27
Singapore’s physical survival, it is perhaps more precise to attribute this rhetoric to a desire
to sustain his political vitality – as Kwong (2001: 199) alleges, a mechanism ‘for self-
serving politicians’. Further, through expertly exploiting the exceptionalist context of
Asian values, Lee was able to affirm his regime as non-Western and thus impervious to
Western criticism (Chong, 2004). This acted to legitimise many political conventions in
Singapore deemed unacceptable in the West, for instance pertaining to Lee’s censorship of
opposition parties, or attempts to fend off human rights charges like those concerning
Michael Fay (Trocki, 2006).

According to Yao, ‘Singapore’s anti-Western sentiments relate to a need to affirm its own
achievements and progress, a sort of comparison to other First World nations’ (Yao, 2007:
68). Seen in this light, anti-Western rhetoric was employed by Lee as a defining marker of
Singapore’s success parallel to the West. In interviews Lee commonly felt the need to
reaffirm Singapore’s progress, alleging that, had they embraced certain Western values this
would not have been possible:

‘[The U.S.] want to impose certain values on me that would make it very difficult to govern a
Singapore in the middle of a Muslim Southeast Asia...What are the indicators of a well-
governed society? Look at the humanities index in last week’s Economist, we’re right on top’
(Lee, 2005: online)

Grooming the West in this provocative manner was thus a further medium through which
Lee could acquire the moral capital required to sustain popular support and convince the
public of his cause.

4.3 Mocking the socialist fantasy

In the final section, Lee’s shifts from championing ‘democratic socialism’ (Lee, 1998a:
280) to advocating substantial levels of capitalism are proposed as a vital strategy to ensure
the longevity of his rule. In the years leading up to independence, Lee presented himself as
a radical, anti-Western figure and this afforded him widespread political support. At a
superficial level, Singapore’s battle for independence appeared to be grounded in
traditional anti-colonial contexts – inequality, exploitation and the resultant ousting of the

28
colonial power. But Lee admitted that this was merely a cosmetic political display. In
reality the terms for independence were agreed between Lee and top British officials,
behind closed doors during elaborate dinner functions. Even having acquired
independence, Lee insisted on close collaboration with the British head of state, Bill
Goode.

Whether reflecting his Western sympathies, Cambridge education or a genuine desire to

take over ‘effectively, smoothly and peacefully’ (Lee, 1998a: 315), this close connection
further evidenced the superficial nature of his anti-Westernism. Had this relationship
become public, Lee would have squandered his reputation as Singapore’s anti-colonial
warrior. Whereas in the eyes of Goode the PAP was ‘a democratic, socialist party which
had constructive ideas, and the honesty, energy and the ability to govern’ (cited in Lee,
1998a: 312), the Singaporean people championed Lee as a saviour, ridding Singapore of its
colonial ties and inspiring a promising future for all. Lee’s anti-Western performance was
thus crucial to the sustenance of his bold image, and his iconic status as Singapore’s
messiah was a key reason why he remained in power for such a prolonged time period:
where would Singapore be, or indeed go, without him?

Though his party’s early success indicated an anti-colonial and socialist electorate, Lee did
not hesitate to embrace Western principles, particularly in economic contexts. This has
been acknowledged by Chong (2004), who notes the shocking nature of Lee’s selective
non-conformity towards Western norms. When Singapore required external assistance,
Lee made use of his Western credentials to forge key economic ties – these times he
described as do or die (Singh, 1999). Albeit somewhat presented as a threat to Singapore,
these ties have been fundamental to Lee’s long and prosperous reign, and Singapore cannot
exist (or indeed claim to exist) without a Western conscience. Lee even conceded that ‘to
be modern without becoming more Western is difficult’ (Lee, 1994a: 126). His declaration
at the start of this chapter appears to be paradoxical in nature: Asian virtues have become
Westernised. Family life constitutes a complex amalgamation of Asian and Western ideals
(Kong and Yeoh, 2003), and both sets of values have subsequently become inseparable.

One may conclude that an English language speaking business class, a surge of Western
trade activity and a profound emphasis on money making have rendered culture
preservation ‘a lost cause’ (Kwong, 2001: 197). Indeed, this investment climate mocked

29
the ‘socialist fantasy’ previously envisioned by Lee and his party (Yao, 2007: 68). Lee’s
recent championing of the installation of Singapore’s first casino encapsulates his pro-
Western transformation; the casino is a symbol of the Western decadence he once fiercely
opposed. He now describes Singapore as ‘a completely Western city...in the center of
Southeast Asia’ (2000: 399). It should be noted that, the mandatory nature in which these
forms of Westernisation were portrayed acted to excuse Lee’s rapidly converting ethos, at
least in the eyes of the public; he was effecting these changes to secure Singapore’s (and
more importantly his) future. These convenient pro-Western shifts thus illustrated a
strategy formulated to safeguard Lee’s position.

The following section will synthesise the research findings with relation to key theoretical
debates. In addition, it will provide a brief reflection on the limitations of the study, and
pose questions for future research.

5 Conclusion

“Although the actions of others may not seem rational to us, they may be perfectly rational
according to entirely different criteria of rationality”
(Chatterjee, 1986: 13)

This paper aimed to explore: how Lee employed Asian values to negotiate his relationship
with the West, and; how his political ideology reflected themes of occidentalism. I have
attempted to provide a critical insight into Lee’s encounters with the West, positing that,

30
contrary to representing a profound response to the West as a social, cultural and political
entity, Lee’s anti-Western rhetoric has been meticulously employed as part of a strategy
fabricated to sustain his political vitality. Notwithstanding space constraints, which limit
the paper’s scope to offer an extensive discussion of the issues raised, it is nevertheless
important to outline the focal points of the argument and situate them within a broader
context (Arnason, 2006):

 Critical questions should be asked as to the lack of agency afforded to non-Western

localities in postcolonial theory;
 localised re-conceptualisations of occidentalism should lead to greater theoretical
clarity, and;
 this can be effectively accomplished through studying occidental projections within
elitist perspectives.

5.1 Allowing Asia to speak: part II

Typically framed within clichéd narratives of suppressed Eastern civilisation versus

domineering Western hegemon, former colonies have very rarely been afforded an agency.
As section 1.2 revealed, through presenting their reaction as a struggle against, or
resistance to, the West (Chong, 2006), postcolonial theorists merely reinforced imperialist
conceptions of development (Sharp and Briggs, 2006). Enduring representations of the
postcolonial state as inferior, subordinate or even powerless, have contributed to a
theoretical field that is increasingly irrelevant to reality. Particularly Singapore’s
modernity has been continually compared and contrasted with the West, reflecting an
enduring ideological prejudice within academia. Scholars are continuing to assert their
Western projections, making essentialist presumptions regarding the identity of these
countries. Lee has evidently fallen victim to Eurocentric analyses, treated as a political
science and analysed within Western categories, to try and understand his shifting socio-
economic loyalties toward the West (Chong, 2007). Faure (1993: 6) maintains that we
simply cannot overcome these Western projections; in truth, ‘[i]t would be an error to
believe that much has changed’.

Singapore is identified as almost Western, but not quite; it is compared to its Western

31
counterparts, and Lee criticised when not conforming to its ideals. It is imperative that
academia emerges from ‘the dark of postcolonial ideological correctness’ (Yao, 2007: 68);
to contextualise Singapore within Western liberal norms is to distort a very complex and
particular culture. I have endeavoured to reflect a more dynamic reality, presenting
Singapore as a civilisation able to assert its own agency, actively shape its own modernity
and thus engage with the West on its own terms. Arnason (2006: 86) exhorts us to
overcome and give up on Eurocentric notions that the West has ‘existed as a model
imposed on non-Western cultures by Western conquerors’. Singapore’s case is on the
contrary; Lee employed Asian values to present Singapore’s modernity as superior,
essentially reversing the polarities between ‘occidental progress [and] oriental stagnation’
(Hill and Lian, 1995: 194), ensuring that he stayed in control, maintaining Singapore’s
cultural integrity through engaging with the West in creative and complex ways.

5.2 Re-conceptualising occidentalism

This study of Lee Kuan Yew demonstrates that localised re-conceptualisations of

occidentalism will yield a theory with greater theoretical clarity and context.
Occidentalism has conventionally been characterised as a ‘reaction’, or ‘opposition’, to the
West, with different scholars sustaining different interpretations of the precise nature of
this response. Subsequently, various definitions have been proposed, including, but not
exclusive to: the development of a non-Western identity through contrasting ideas of the
West (Carrier, 1995); an aspiration to emulate or ‘positivise’ the West (Ning, 1997; Ahiska,
2003), and; an extreme and dehumanising view of the West (Buruma and Margalit, 2004).
It is vital to acknowledge that there will never be a definition of this theory which applies
universally; rather, the meaning of the West is contingent and partial, reflective of different
national and regional conditions (Bonnett, 2002). Moreover, the occidentalism that Lee
exhibits seems to encompass all of the aforementioned ideas. Anticipating this, the most
promising direction for the theory to follow would be to embrace, and align with,
Eisenstadt’s (2000) notion that modernity has manifested in a global and multifarious
fashion.

In the encounter between Asian and Western culture, the West has assumed specific
meanings in distinct regional contexts. Capitalism has not merely emanated from the West

32
towards the periphery, nor has it simply subsisted outside of a traditional and conservative
Asia (Bonnett, 2005). In Singapore’s instance, the West has been actively re-articulated
and moulded to complement its particular form of modernity. Lee’s complex and
conflicting encounters with the West render traditional epithets of ‘Asia’ and ‘West’
increasingly irrelevant (Eisenstadt, 2000); just as Delanty (1998) declares that no Western
society can be proclaimed innately Western, the meaning of ‘Asia’ in Singapore is vague
and perplexing. For instance, without making assumptions it is impossible to determine
the cultural significance of ‘Asia’ to: a state self-labelled as a Western city in the third
world (Lee, 2007); a state which, for much of its history, was governed by foreign powers;
a state which has embraced the English language; a state which actively promotes a money
making ethos.

5.3 The benefits of elitist perspectives

One way in which we can begin to answer these profound questions is through the methods
adopted in this paper: the study of indigenous political elites. Rather than attempting to
class and categorise the responses of non-Western states, academia should adopt a more
diverse approach and address how meanings of ‘the West’ are interpreted and derived from
different political actors. Evidently, Lee’s complex engagement with the West serves
further evidence of the daunting theoretical complexity of occidentalism, and according to
Delanty (2003: 20), ‘represents one of the most important challenges to the dominant
Western model’. Lee’s occidental character is not necessarily poignant or profound,
involving a deep-rooted ‘reaction’ to the West; rather, Lee has developed a culturally
specific idea of the West which has been strategically mobilised as a tool to affirm and
reaffirm the legitimacy of his political regime. Contrary to constituting a socio-cultural
response, Lee’s anti-Westernism has been employed as a strategy. Chen (1995) shrewdly
observed that occidental responses may adopt contradictory forms within the same national
context, and this is no more palpable than in the case of Singapore. This study has
highlighted the complex and contradictory ways in which the West has been employed in
Lee’s political agenda, at certain times reflecting a positive vision of prosperity and
fortune; at other times, constituting a threat to Singaporean culture. But visions of the
West as an evil ‘Other’ should not be taken at face value; to do so would neglect the
importance of Singapore’s desire to Westernise – a point reaffirmed in Yao’s (2007)

33
affidavit which commenced chapter 4.

Scholars must persist in addressing urgent concerns regarding presumptions of identity,

and through studying individual accounts this can be achieved. This observation is
reinforced by Eisenstadt (2000), who notes that different societies hold diverse and
contrasting views as to what constitutes ‘modern’. Though it may be possible to detect a
vague pattern regarding political ideology in Southeast Asia, or indeed across Asia itself,
specific political elites each enact select political visions based on ideologies grounded in
the social, cultural and political history of that locality. Albeit not necessarily typical of
national opinion, Lee’s idea of the West is exclusive to Singapore and its complex colonial
history (as evidenced by his reflections at the start of this paper). Implicitly and explicitly
tied to themes of survivalism, exceptionalism and authoritarianism, his complex
constructions of the West demonstrate that one should not generalise as to the identity of
fragmented and non-Western cultures (Eisenstadt, 2000).

5.4 Limitations

From these conclusions I am confident that the research has successfully met its aims and
objectives. Although Skeggs (1997) reminds us that the qualitative nature of this research
reflects a subjective, selective and individual viewpoint, I have tried to avoid this pitfall
through seeing the West through Lee’s eyes, as opposed to simply analysing Lee’s
‘response’ to the West and drawing contextless contrasts to Western norms. However,
drawing on Faure’s earlier point, admittedly my interpretation will never be free from
Western influence. Further, though Lee and Singapore are inferred as sharing an intrinsic
connection (Barr, 2003), Lee’s views are not representative of the Singaporean public, and
there is evidently more to postcolonial politics ‘than the Machiavellian manipulations of
elite politicians’ (Spencer, 1990: 253). However, Lee’s creative and complex narrative of
the West provides an appealing case for analysis. It should be noted that, this narrative of
the West is inherent to Lee’s history, and therefore inapplicable elsewhere in Asia. In fact,
it is not possible to determine the extent to which similar narratives have been formulated,
without undertaking related research in a different locality (see section 5.5).
Notwithstanding this point, the importance of Lee’s geopolitically particular conceptions
of the West, and the subsequent benefits to be gained from analysis within local

34
perspectives (Chong, 2006), unearth the potential of a localised and more politically
determined approach within occidentalism-based research.

5.5 Future study

In light of the items discussed above, an area of research that holds potential concerns
more locally and politically determined analysis of non-Western constructions of ‘the
West’. As Bonnett (2006) asserts, the notion that all the countries in Asia may share
similar characteristics is farcical. It is not unreasonable to assume that many countries
across this vast space have adopted socially, culturally and politically explicit narratives of
the West. In Southeast Asia, particularly Sukarno of Indonesia’s ‘Konfrontasi’, has evaded
the West’s scholarly attention, although various other examples could be cited. However,
perhaps these more historical accounts seem outdated and increasingly irrelevant with
regards to current political trends. With reference to the work of Eisenstadt (2000), and of
Delanty (2003), the more suitable question may regard the role of Western stereotypes in a
contemporary context, with research focused on a more progressive political generation.

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