1. Joseph v.

Bautista, 170 SCRA 540

Remedial Law;  Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; When there is only one delict or

wrong, there is only one cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have
been violated belonging to one person.— The argument that there are two causes of action
embodied in petitioner’s complaint, hence the judgment on the compromise agreement
under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for breach
of contract of carriage, is untenable. A cause of action is understood to be the delict or
wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of
the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the
same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and
distinct legal obligations. However, where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a
single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated
belonging to one person. The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the
delict or wrong violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted
from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises. In the case at bar, there is no
question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a
single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the different
respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed by law.

FACTS:

● Patrocinio Perez (Perez) is the owner of a cargo truck for conveying cargoes and
passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City to Manila.
● On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa
(Domingo) was on its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from Pangasinan.
● Petitioner Luis Joseph (Joseph), with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck at
Dagupan City after paying the sum of P 9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan.
● While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway proceeding towards
Manila, defendant Domingo tried to overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same
direction. At about the same time, a pick- up truck supposedly owned by Antonio
Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake
the cargo truck which was then in the process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing
the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a
result, Joseph sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs
● Petitioner Joseph filed a complaint for damages against respondent Perez, as owner
of the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and against
respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver,
respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.
● Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and never was an owner of
the pick-up truck and neither would he acquire ownership thereof in the future. Petitioner
Joseph apparently could not ascertain who the real owner of said cargo truck was.
● On September 27, 1974, respondents Siason and Lazaro thru their insurer,
Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid petitioner Joseph’s claim for
injuries sustained in the amount of P 1,300.00.
● By reason thereof, petitioner Joseph executed a release of claim releasing from liability
the following parties, viz: Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, Alberto Cardeno,
Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan
 ● They also paid respondent Patrocinio Perez' claim for damages to her cargo truck in the
amount of P 7,420.61.
● Respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate
and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs.
● Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-defs.' motion and Counter
Motion to dismiss. The so- called counter motion to dismiss was premised on the fact
that the release of claim executed by petitioner Joseph in favor of the other
respondents inured to the benefit of respondent Perez, considering that all the
respondents are solidarily liable to herein petitioner.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. CFI – Bulacan: dismissing petitioner's complaint, as well as the order, dated August
22, 1975, denying his motion for reconsideration of said dismissal

ISSUE:
Whether or not the release of claim executed by petitioner Joseph in favor of
respondents Sioson, Villanueva and Pagarigan inured to the benefit of respondent
Perez.

RULING: YES.

A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by

the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. The singleness of a cause
of action lies in the singleness of the delict or wrong violating the rights of one person.
Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of
action arises.
There was only one cause of action involved although the bases of recovery
invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were not necessarily
Identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a
recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the
other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against
double recovery for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the
fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.
The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to petitioner Joseph, the full
payment made by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release from any
and all liability to petitioner Joseph inevitably resulted in the extinguishment and release
from liability of the other solidary debtors, including herein respondent Patrocinio Perez.
The claim that there was an agreement entered into between the parties during the pre-
trial conference that, after such payment made by the other respondents, the case shall
proceed as against respondent Perez is both incredible and unsubstantiated. 

2. Bermudez, Sr. v. Herrera, 158 SCRA 168

Quasi-Delict; Actions; Damages; Injured party or his heirs has the choice between an

action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code and an action for quasidelict under Articles 2176-2194 of the Civil Code.—ln cases of
negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action
for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he
may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligence act of his employee, subject to the
employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.

Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to
file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for
quasi-delict.—In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages
based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal cases to
file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for
quasi-delict.

Same;  Same; Same;  Criminal Procedure; Even without reservation under Section 2 of

Rule ///, Rules of Court, injured party in a criminal case which resulted in the acquittal of
the accused is allowed to recover damages based on quasi-delict.—The appellant precisely
made a reservation to file an independent civil action in accordance with the provisions of
Section 2 of Rule III, Rules of Court. In fact, even without such a reservation, we have
allowed the injured party in the criminal case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused
to recover damages based on quasi-delict.

FACTS:
A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a
jeep on which Rogelio, a six-year old son of Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. and Adonita Yabut
Bermudez (Sps. Bermudez), was riding. The boy sustained injuries which caused his death. As
a result, a criminal case for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Domingo
Pontino by the Manila City Fiscal's Office. Sps. Bermudez filed in the said criminal case "A
Reservation to File Separate Civil Action." Thereafter, Sps. Bermudez appellants filed a civil
case for damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. CFI- Manila: dismissed Sps. Bermudez’s complaint, to suspend the hearing of the case
against Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case for Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence is finally terminated and, finding that the Sps. Bermudez instituted the action "on
the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of constituted a quasi-
delict," the trial court stated that Sps Bermudez had already elected to treat the accident
as a "crime" by reserving in the criminal case their right to file a separate civil action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing by Sps. Bermudez of a Reservation to File Separate Civil Action in the
criminal case precludes them from filing an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.

RULING:

In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
and an action for quasi- delict under Article 2176- 2194 of the Civil Code. If a party
chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarity liable for the negligent act of his
employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father
of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by Sps. Bermudez was an action for damages based on
quasi-delict. The fact that Sps. Bermudez reserved their right in the criminal case to file
an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for
quasi-delict.

Obligations arise from law, contract, quasi-contract, crime and quasi-delict.

It is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable, the following requisites must be
present: 
(1) that an employee has committed a crime in the discharge of his duties;
(2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability;
(3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry.

Article 2177 of the Civil Code, cited in Section 2, of Rule 111, provides that —
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. 

3. Singson v. BPI 23 SCRA 1117

Civil law; Tort; Damages; Existence of a contract between the parties is not a bar to the

commission of a, tort by the one against the other.—It has been repeatedly held: that the
existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the other and the consequent recovery 01 damages therefor (Cangco v. Manila
Railroad, 38 Phil. 768; Yamada v. Manila Railroad, 33 Phil. 8; Vasquez v. Borja, 74 Phil. 560).
Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air
France vs. Carrascoso, L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966, involving an airplane passenger who, despite
his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accomodation and compelled
to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-
carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter’s part, for, although the relation between a
passenger and a carrier is “contractual both in origin and nature the act that breaks the contract
may also be a tort.”

FACTS:

● Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment had been
rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co.,
to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff therein. Said judgment became final and executory
as only against Ville-Abrille for its failure to file an appeal.  A writ of garnishment was
subsequently served upon BPI — in which Singson had a current account — insofar as
Villa-Abrille’s credits against the Bank were concerned.
● Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading the
name of Singson in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendant, without
further reading the body and informing himself that said garnishment was merely
intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., et al, prepared a letter
informing Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that case.
● Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor of B. M.
Glass Service and another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were dishonored by the
bank.
● B. M. Glass Service then wrote to Singson that the check was not honored by BPI
because his account therein had already been garnished and that they are now
constrained to close his credit account with them.
 ● Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of Execution
and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank.  The BPI lost no time to
rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently committed.
● Thus Singson filed this action for damages against BPI.

ISSUE: WON the existence of a contract between the parties bars a plaintiff’s claim for
damages based on torts?

HELD: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a
tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefore. Indeed,
this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs.
Carrascoso, involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been
illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist
compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort
on the latter’s part, for, although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is “contractual
both in origin and nature … the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort”.
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the
circumstance, that the wrong done to Singson was remedied as soon as the President of the
bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that
an award of nominal damages — the amount of which need not be proven — in the sum of
P1,000, in addition to attorney’s fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff’s
rights.

4. Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155

Common carriers;  Contracts;  First class tickets.—A written document speaks a

uniform language; the spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve
stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the terms of a
ticket is desirable.
Same;  Damages;  Moral damages; Trial; Bad faith in breach of contract of carriage.—
Where at the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard that he
intended to prove that, while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, the respondent was ousted
.by petitioner's manager, who gave his seat to a white man, and evidence of bad faith in the
fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner, it is
therefore unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the
complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was
cured by the evidence.
Same;  Exemplary damages.—The New Civil Code gives the court ample power to
grant exemplary damages in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is that
defendant should have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner. The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits
into this legal precept.
Same;  Attorney's fees.—The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of
exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorney's fees. The least that can be
said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys’ fees be
given. We do not intend to break tradition that discretion well exercised—as it was here—
should not be disturbed.

Facts:
Rafael Carrascoso was part of a group of pilgrims leaving for Lourdes. Air France, through
PAL, issued to Carrascoso a first class round trip ticket. From Manila to Bangkok, he traveled
in first class but at Bangkok, the manager of Air France forced him to vacate his seat, because
a "white man" had a "better right" to it. He refused and even had a heated discussion with the
manager but after being pacified by fellow passengers, he reluctantly gave up the seat.
     Air France asserts that the ticket does not represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties, and that the issuance of a first class ticket did not guarantee a first
class ride (depends upon the availability of seats). CFI and CA disposed of this contention.

Issue and Holding

WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims. YES

Ratio
On CA's decision
Air France charges that CA failed to make complete findings of fact on all issues presented. SC
says that so long as CA's decision contains the facts necessary to warrant its conclusions,
there is nothing wrong in withholding any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence
for the defense.

On the seat issue

If a first-class ticket holder is not entitled to a corresponding seat, what security can a
passenger have? It's very easy to strike out the stipulations in the ticket and say that there was
a contrary verbal agreement. There was no explanation as to why he was allowed to take a first
class seat before coming to Bangkok if indeed he had no seat or if someone had a better right
to it.

On contract to transport, QD, etc.

This is different in kind and degree from any other contractual obligation because of the
relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation as they have a right to be treated by the employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy, consideration. What happened was a violation of public duty by Air France--a case of
QD, so damages are proper. A case was cited wherein it was said that although the relation of
passenger and carrier is contractual in origin and nature, the act that breaks the K may be also
a tort.

On the issue of award of damages

Air France assails CA's award of moral damages, claiming that since Carrascoso's action is
based on breach of contract, there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith in order to avail
of said award. While there was no specific mention of "bad faith," it may be drawn from the
facts and circumstances set forth. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by evidence.

Allegations in the complaint on this issue:

1. There was a K to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering the Bangkok-Teheran
leg
2. This K was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transpo at Bangkok
3. There was bad faith when the manager compelled Carrascoso to leave his seat after he
was already seated and to transfer to the tourist class, thereby making him suffer
inconvenience, embarrassment, humiliation, etc.
bad faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-
interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes

See NCC 21. Upon the provisions of NCC 2219 (10), moral damages are
recoverable. Exemplary damages are well awarded also, since NCC gives the court power to
grant such in K and QK, with the condition that the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

5. Rafael Reyes vs. People, 329 SCRA 600

Civil Law; Negligence;  Damages;  In negligence cases, the same act or omission can
create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and
civil liability quasi delicto but the offended party can not recover damages under both types
of liability.—In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action
to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and
(2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy
because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the
accused. This is the rule against double recovery. In other words, “the same act or omission
can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto,
and civil liability quasi delicto” either of which “may be enforced against the culprit, subject
to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover
damages under both types of liability.”

Same;  Same; Same;  Vicarious liability of the employee is founded in Article 2176 in

relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code and on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code;
Under Article 2176 the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate
is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee; Enforcement of the judgment against the employer does not
require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the employer with
that of the employee, the two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary. —
Private respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of
the accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. Under the law,
this vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of law.
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which
would allow an action predicated on quasi-delict to be instituted by the injured party
against the employer for an act or omission of the employee and would necessitate only a
preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here, the liability of the employer for the negligent
conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee. The enforcement of the judgment against the
employer in an action based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent
since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being
statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary. The second, predicated on Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable
for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability attaches
when the employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of his work and is found
to be insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability adjudged.

Same;  Same; Same;  Reservation of the right to file the separate civil action waives other
available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of the accused-driver. —
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, when private respondents, as complainants in the criminal action, reserved the
right to file the separate civil action, they waived other available civil actions predicated on
the same act or omission of the accused-driver. Such civil action includes the recovery of
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Same;  Same; Same;  Award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a
separate civil action against the employer.—With regard to the second issue, the award of
damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the
employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, “civil indemnity is not part of the penalty
for the crime committed.” The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal
action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery of civil liability is not
included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as
employer of the accused truckdriver.

Facts:In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by Dunca left Tuguegarao,
Cagayan bound to San Fernando, Pampanga loaded with 2,000 cases of empty beer “Grande”
bottles. Seated at the front right seat beside him was Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper. At
around 4:00 o’clock that same morning while the truck was descending at a slight downgrade
along the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged portion of the
road covering the full width of the truck’s right lane going south and about six meters in length.
These made the surface of the road uneven because the potholes were about five to six inches
deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand
Domingo, before approaching the potholes, he and Dunca saw the Nissan with its headlights on
coming from the opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged road by taking the left
lance but at that particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run over it.
This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved
to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result, Dunca’s vehicle rammed the incoming
Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder
where it finally stopped. The Nissan was severely damaged and its two passengers, namely,
Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly. On October 10, 1989, Provincial
Prosecutor Durian filed with the RTC an amended information charging Dunca with reckless
imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property. On November 29, 1989, the
offended parties filed with the RTC a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation, as employer of driver Dunca, based on quasi delict. Respondents opted to pursue
the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against
petitioner. On December 15, 1989, respondents withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil
action against the accused and manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto
in the criminal action. However, they did not withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi
delict against petitioner as employer arising from the same act or omission of the accused
driver. The RTC held that the driver was guilty. Respondents moved for amendment of the
dispositive portion of the joint decision so as to hold petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages
awarded to the private respondents in the event of insolvency of the accused, which the lower
court granted.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident may be held
subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal action against
the truck driver despite the filing of a separate civil action by the offended parties against the
employer of the truck driver; and
(2) Whether or not the Court may award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case
despite the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truck driver.

Held:(1) No. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to
enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a
separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the
choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not
recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule
against double recovery.In other words, “the same act or omission can create two kinds of
liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto”
either of which “may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover damages under both types of liability.” In
the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against
petitioner as employer of the accused, based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. Petitioner, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in
the criminal case for reckless imprudence, cannot be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing
of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and
the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted
with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article
2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

(2) No. The award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action
against the employer. The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action is
whether accused Dunca is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property. The action for recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the
separate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver. The
policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or
omission whether the action is brought against the employee or against his employer. The
injured party must choose which of the available causes of action for damages he will bring.

6. Jarco Marketing v. CA, GR 129792 (December 21, 1999)

Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Words and Phrases; “Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance,” Explained.—

One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a
character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to
prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender
years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.
The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although
its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years
as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied
invitation to such children. (Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. v. Balandan, et al., 91 Phil. 488, 490
[1952]). Same; Same; Same; “Accident,” Explained.—An accident pertains to an unforeseen
event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is “a fortuitous
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if
happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.”

Same;  Same; Same;  “Negligence,” Explained.—Negligence is the omission to do

something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is “the failure to observe, for the protection of
the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.”

Same;  Same; Same;  Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory—one cannot

exist with the other.—Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot
exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care,
which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any
means suggested by common prudence.

Same;  Same; Test in Determining Existence of Negligence.—The test in determining the

existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith, thus: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty
of negligence. Same; Same; Evidence; Hearsay Rule; Res Gestae; Witnesses; It is axiomatic
that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a
physician are generally considered declarations and admissions.—It is axiomatic that
matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are
generally considered declarations and admissions. All that is required for their
admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of
a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as
witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described, it
is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied
to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales’
testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic
death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable
the counter’s base.

Witnesses;  It is settled that when the issue concerns the credibility of witnesses, the
appellate courts will not as a general rule disturb the findings of the trial court, which is in
a better position to determine the same.—It is settled that when the issue concerns the
credibility of witnesses, the appellate courts will not as a general rule disturb the findings
of the trial court, which is in a better position to determine the same. The trial court has
the distinct advantage of actually hearing the testimony of and observing the deportment of
the witnesses. However, the rule admits of exceptions such as when its evaluation was
reached arbitrarily or it overlooked or failed to appreciate some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which could affect the result of the case. In the instant case,
petitioners failed to bring their claim within the exception.

Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Children; Presumptions; Children below nine (9) years old are

conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence. —Anent the negligence
imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below
nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In his book, former
Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated: In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is
conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt
from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability
obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown
that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict
and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under
nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and
that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a
child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule,
therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable
of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

Facts:

Jarco Marketing owns Syvel’s Department Store; Kong, Tiope, and Panelo are store managers;
Sps. Aguilar are the parents of daughter Zhieneth.

Criselda and Zhieneth Aguilar (6 years old) were at the 2nd floor of Syvel’s Department Store.
Criselda was signing her credit card slip when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud
thud. When she looked behind her, she saw her daughter pinned by the bulk of the store’s gift
wrapping counter. She asked the assistance of the people around her, and she was
immediately rushed to Makati Medical Center where she was operated. The next day, she lost
her speech. She died 14 days after the accident. The cause of her death was attributed to the
injuries sustained.

After her burial, Sps. Aguilar demanded the reimbursement of hospitalization, medical bills, and
wake and funeral expenses from the petitioners, but they refused to pay. Sps. Aguilar filed a
complaint for damages, seeking the payment of actual [157k~] and moral [300k] damages,
attorney’s fees [20k], and for loss of income and exemplary damages.

The petitioners denied any liability for Zhieneth’s injuries and death. They also said the
complaint was malicious, so they sought the dismissal of the complaint and an award of moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.

● Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to
freely roam around in a store with glassware and appliances
● Zhieneth was guilty of contributory negligence for climbing the counter, thereby triggering its
collapse
● Counter was made of sturdy wood with strong support, and it has never fell nor collapsed for
the past 15 years since its construction
● Jarco Marketing maintained that it observed due diligence of a good father of the family
● Other petitioners raised due care and diligence in the performance of its duties
 RTC found that the preponderance of evidence favored the store, et al, saying that the
proximate cause was Zhieneth’s act of clinging to the counter, and that Criselda’s negligence
contributed to the accident. The RTC found that the counter was not an attractive nuisance
[something that would attract children to approach, get on or use it], since the counter was
situated at the end or corner of the 2nd floor.

Here are the assertions of Sps. Aguilar:

● Zhieneth should be entitled to the conclusive presumption that a child below 9 is incapable of
contributory negligence.
● Even if she is capable of contributory negligence, it was physically impossible for her to have
propped herself on the counter considering her small frame, and height and weight of the
counter.
● The fact that a former employee of the store, Gonzales, accompanied Zhieneth to the hospital
belied the theory that Zhieneth climbed the counter.
● This employee Gonzales said that when Zhieneth was asked by the doctor what she did, she
said “Nothing, I did not come near the counter and the counter just fell on me.” This should be
accorded credit according to the spouses.
● Negligence could not be imputed to Criselda since it was reasonable for her to let go of
Zhieneth at that moment that she was signing the credit card slip.
● The proximate cause was petitioner’s negligence in failing to institute measures to have the
counter permanently nailed.
In response, here is what the petitioners have to say:

● Zhieneth’s death was an ACCIDENT.

● Nailing the counter to the ground was not necessary because it has been there for the
longest time without any prior accident and it’s just in a corner.
● The criminal case for homicide through simple negligence filed against them was dismissed,
and they were acquitted.
The CA reversed RTC, ruling in favor of Sps. Aguilar.

● Petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter [it’s shaped like an
inverted L; the top is wider than the base; weight of the upper portion not evenly distributed
nor supported by the narrow base]. Two former employees brought this to the attention of the
management but the latter ignored their concern. CA said the incident could have been
avoided had petitioners repaired this defective counter. The contention that it has been there
for a long time without a prior incident is immaterial.
● Zhieneth was incapable of negligence or other tort.
● Criselda was absolved of any negligence.
● Testimony of Gonzales (former employee) given credit
● Awarded actual damages, compensatory damages [denied award of funeral expenses for
lack of proof to substantiate it]
CA denied petitioners’ MfR, so they are now seeking the reversal of said decision, saying that
since the action is based on tort, any finding of negligence on the part of Sps. Aguilar would
negate their claim for damages, where said negligence was the proximate cause of the injury
sustained. They also assailed the testimony of Gonzales who was already separated from the
store (tarnished by ill-feelings and all).

Issues and Holding

WON Zhieneth’s death was accidental or attributable to negligence. ATTRIBUTABLE TO
NEGLIGENCE
WON negligence was attributable to petitioners [for maintaining a defective counter] or to Sps.
Aguilar [for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store]. FAULT OF
PETITIONERS

Ratio
Accident v. Negligence – they are intrinsically contradictory

ACCIDENT pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to

defendant (or if it happens wholly or partly through human agency, it is an event which under
the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens); there is
exercise of ordinary care here

NEGLIGENCE is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those

considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do

Alternatively, it is the failure to observe, for the protection of another person’s interest, that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury

Picart v. Smith lays down the test to determine WON negligence exists: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, he is guilty of negligence.

SC found that Zhieneth performed no act that facilitated her death. Basis is her statement to the
doctor as related by former employee Gonzales. It was made part of the res gestae since she
made the statement immediately subsequent to the startling occurrence. It is axiomatic that
matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are
generally considered declarations and admissions. Also, the court considered the fact that
Zhieneth was of a tender age (and in so much pain!), so it would be unthinkable that she would
lie.

Other findings:

Petitioners were informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter, yet they did not act on
the matter, so they failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family.

They failed to establish that the testimonies of former employees were biased.

Conclusive presumption that children below 9 are incapable of contributory negligence is

applied.

Judge Sangco [book author] says that children below 9 is conclusively presumed to have acted
without discernment, and are exempt from criminal liability. Since negligence may be a felony
and a QD, it required discernment as a condition of liability, so therefore, said children are
presumed to be incapable of negligence.

Even if contributory negligence would be attributed to Zhieneth, no injury should have occurred
if petitioners’ theory that the counter is stable and sturdy is to be believed.

Criselda is absolved from any contributory negligence, since it was reasonable for her to let go
of her child to sign a slip.
Zhieneth was just a foot away from her mother, and the counter was just four meters away from
Criselda (contrary to statements that Zhieneth was loitering at that time).

Topic: Applicability of Articles 1172-1174

Article 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of
obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances. (1103)

Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance,
that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)

Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared
by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person
shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable. (1105a)

7. Sarmiento v. Sps. Cabrido

G.R. No. 141258, April 9, 2003, 401 SCRA 122

Doctrine:

Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties.
Corollarily, those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or
delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. The
fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time
and of the place.

FACTS:

Tomasa Sarmiento’s friend, Dra. Virginia Lao, requested her to find someone to reset a pair of
diamond earrings into two gold rings. Sarmiento sent Tita Payag with the earrings to Dingding’s
Jewelry Shop, owned and managed by spouses Luis and Rose Cabrido, which accepted the job
order for P400. Respondent Marilou Sun went on to dismount the diamond from original
settings. Unsuccessful, she asked their goldsmith, Zenon Santos, to do it. He removed the
diamond by twisting the setting with a pair of pliers, breaking the gem in the process. Petitioner
required the respondents to replace the diamond with the same size and quality. When they
refused, the petitioner was forced to buy a replacement in the amount of P30,000. Rose
Cabrido, manager, denied having any transaction with Payag whom she met only after the latter
came to seek compensation for the broken piece of jewelry. Marilou, on the other hand,
admitted knowing Payag to avail their services and recalled that when Santos broke the jewelry,
Payag turned to her for reimbursement thinking she was the owner. Santos also recalled that
Payag requested him to dismount what appeared to him as sapphire and that the stone
accidentally broke. He denied being an employee of the Jewelry shop.

ISSUE:

1. WoN dismounting of the diamond from its original setting was part of the obligation

2. WoN respondents are liable for damages and moral damages.

RULING:

Yes. The contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties reveal the scope of obligation
assumed by the jewelry shop to reset the pair of earrings. Marilou expressed no reservation
regarding the dismounting of the diamonds. She could have instructed Payag to have the
diamonds dismounted first, but instead, she readily accepted the job order and charged P400.
After the new settings were completed, she called petitioner to bring the diamond earrings to be
reset. She examined one of them and went on to dismount the diamond from the original
setting. After failing to do the same, she delegated it to the goldsmith. Having acted the way she
did, she cannot deny that the dismounting was part of the shop’s obligation to reset the pair of
earrings.

Yes. Those who, in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. Santos
acted negligently in dismounting the diamond from its original setting. Instead of using a
miniature wire, which is the practice of the trade, he used a pair of pliers. Moral damages may
also be awarded in a breach of contract when there is proof that defendant acted in bad faith, or
was guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligation.

8. David Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad (1910)

TOPIC: Negligence as Proximate Cause

SYLLABUS: LlABILITY FOR DAMAGES; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.—When the

immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff's own act, which contributed
to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he can not recover damages for the
injury.

FACTS:

The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries, 15 years of age, the
son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having
considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. The defendant is a foreign corporation
engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of
Manila.

On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years
of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an
employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.

Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by
youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in
machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. The visit was made
on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving
the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they
walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company
dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty
brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and
appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means
of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the
explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive
power.

After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys
picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them
home.

After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old,
and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments
with the caps. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled
with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel
applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less
serious injuries to all three.

Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand
burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal
capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by
the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the
interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing
and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a
mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a
day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature
both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.

Defendant company, apparently relying on the rule of law which places the burden of proof of
such allegations upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence in rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff failed
in his proof.
ISSUE:
Whether defendant company is liable

RULING:
No, the company is not liable.

Under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff,
which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant,"
and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap
and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant
injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for
the injuries thus incurred.

Plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a
recovery, must establish by competent evidence:

(1) Damages to the plaintiff.

(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty.

(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left
exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping
them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had
he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and
strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked
up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he
not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.

Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite
are not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in
the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of twenty or thirty of
these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly
justifies the inference that the defendant company was either the owner of the caps in question
or had the caps under its possession and control.

plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, and the record discloses
throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion
which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not
anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less
dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and
knowingly produced the explosion.

The question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand
the character of his own acts and their consequences; he was sui juris (legally competent;
capacity to manage one’s own affairs) in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him
to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which
would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act.

9. G.R. No. L-10126

October 22, 1957

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA,
OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD
VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant- appellant.

FACTS:

● This is a suit filed by the heirs of Juan Bataclan, to recover from Mariano Medina,
the owner and operator of Medina Transportation under a certificate of public
convenience, compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees in the total amount of P87,150.
● On September 13, 1952, Juan Bataclan was among the 18 passengers of Bus of
Medina Transportation, who was traveling from Amadeo, Cavite to Pasay City.
The bus was driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon.
● Along the way, one of the front tires of the bus burst and the vehicle began to
zigzag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned
turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus, others had to be
helped or pulled out, while Bataclan, who was seated near the driver along with
3 others, could not get out of the overturned bus. Heeding the shouts of help by
Bataclan and the rest, 10 men, 1 of whom was carrying a lighted torch fueled by
petroleum, approached the overturned bus. Immediately, a fierce fire started,
burning and consuming the bus, including the 4 passengers trapped inside it.
Bataclan and the 4 passengers died. Hence, this case filed by Salud Villanueva,
Bataclan’s widow, in her name and in behalf of her 5 minor children for recover
of compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the
total amount of P87,150.
● After trial, the CFI Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as
attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by
Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The trial court
 held that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus.
● The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals, but the latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value
involved in the claim in the complaint.

ISSUE:

WON Mariano Medina can be held civilly liable for damages.- YES
WON the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus or
the fire that burned the bus, including the 4 passengers left inside.- YES

RULING:

● The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus
because when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its
back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected.
● The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for
help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and
the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the
morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did
from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available.
● In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and
was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of
its passengers and the call for outside help.
● Moreover, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to
the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and
forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the
position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have
leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus.
 ● The leaked gasoline can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and
yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or
taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the
bus.
● In addition, the case involves a breach of contract of transportation because
the Medina Transportation failed to carry Bataclan safely to his destination,
Pasay City. There was likewise negligence on the part of the defendant,
through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time
of the blow out, the bus was speeding and that the driver failed to changed
the tires into new ones as instructed by Mariano Medina.
● The driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary
precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires,
specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do,
probably, despite his speeding, the blow out would not have occurred.

Ratio:
● Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.
● Comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
PROVISIONS:

"ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in
articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7 while the extraordinary diligence for the
safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756."

"ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances."

"ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."

"ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers.

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees."

"ART. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on

account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of
a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission."

10. Fernando v CA
G.R. No. 159751
December 6, 2006
Civil Law; Negligence; Defifinition of; Under the Law, a person who by
his omission causes damage to another, there being negligence is obliged to
pay for the damage done.—Negligence has been defifined as the failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury (Corliss v. Manila Railroad
Company, L-21291, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 674, 680). Under the law, a
person who by his omission causes damage to another, there being
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done (Article 2176, New Civil
Code).

Same; Same; To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the

negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation between the
omission and the damage; Defifinition of Proximate cause.—To be entitled to
damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant
must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He must prove
under Article 2179 of the NewCivil Code that the defendant’s negligence was the
immediate and
proximate cause of his injury. Proximate cause has been defifined as that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any effificient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred (Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186).
Proof of such relation of cause and effect is not an arduous one if the
claimant did not in any way contribute to the negligence of the defendant.However,
where the resulting injury was the product of the negligence of
both parties, there exists a diffificulty to discern which acts shall be
considered the proximate cause of the accident.

FACTS
● Market master Bibiano Morta filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property
of the City Treasurer's Office to re-empty the septic tank in Agdao. Because of
this, an invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano
 Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suñer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. On
November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified and he signed the purchase order.
● However, before such date, on Nov 22, 1975, bidder Aurelio Bertulano was
found dead inside the tank with 4 others (Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso,
Alberto Fernando, and Jose Fajardo, Jr.).
o Cause of death: asphyxia caused by diminution of oxygen supply in the
body. Their lungs burst due to their intake of toxic gas produced from the
waste matter inside the tank.
o Since the tank was found almost empty, it was presumed that the victims
entered the tank to re-empty it, without knowledge and consent of the
market master.
● Petitioners (heirs of the 5 deceased) sued the Respondent (City of Davao) for
the deaths, faulting the government for failing to clean the tank for 19 years,
resulting in an accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the 5 laborers.
They also alleged that the fault is compounded by the absence of warning signs
indicating the existence of danger and because Respondent exerted no efforts
to neutralize the harm.
● Petitioners aver that it was Respondent's gross negligence which was the
proximate cause of the fatal incident that led to the deaths.
● RTC ruled in favor Respondents, dismissing the complaint. CA initially ruled in
favor of Petitioners, ordering Respondents to pay Petitioners. But on motion for
reconsideration, the CA reversed itself and ruled in favor of Respondents,
holding them not liable to the Petitioners.

ISSUE:

1. Is the respondent Davao City guilty of negligence in the case at bar?

2. If so, is such negligence the immediate and proximate cause of deaths of the
victims hereof?

1) WON there was negligence? — NO

● Negligence: failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
 ● Test: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then
he is guilty of negligence.
● What would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
always be determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case.
● If a prudent man can foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued, it
is his duty to take precautions to guard against that harm.
-Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently nrohahle to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against
its consequences

2) WON the alleged acts/omissions of Respondents is the proximate cause of the

deaths of the victims? — NO
● To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another.
a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage.
He must prove that the defendant's negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury,

+ Proximate cause: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence

unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.

Test: Where the victim contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence,
he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence.

Public respondent had been remiss in its duty to re-empty the tank annually, but such
negligence is not a continuing one. In fact, upon learning that the tank needs to be
cleaned, they immediately took steps to remedy it.
It is an undisputed fact that people have been using the toilet but have remained
unscathed. They pass over it, but since it's well-covered they are unharmed. The
absence of any accident was u to the public respondent's compliance with the
sanitary and plumbing specifications in constructing the toilet and tank.

· The toxic gas from the waste matter could not have leaked out
because the tank was air-tight. The only indication that it was full was
when water came out of it. Yet even when it was full there was no
report of any casualty of gas poisoning despite the people's continued
use of it.
-Engineer Demetrio Alindada of the city government testified as to the safety
of the tank and the toilet. An accident such as toxic gas leakage is unlikely to
happen unless the cover is removed.

· The accident which caused the victims' deaths happened because

the victims, on their own and without authority from the public
respondent, opened the tank.
· Victim Bertulano is an old hand in the service and is presumed to know
the hazards of the job (of
cleaning septic tanks). Their failure to take precautions is the proximate
cause of the accident.

Other issues: (Addtl facts if u want haha)

- As to the lack of ventilation pipe in the toilet, which Petitioners allege emphasize
the negligence of the public respondent, the court held that theirs is not an
expert witness. On the other hand, Engr Alindada testified that the sanitary plan
would not have been approved unless it is in conformance with sanitary
requirements (ventilation pipe need not be constructed separately/outside the
building, but could also be embodied in the hollow blocks).
- As to the lack of warning signs, toilets and septic tanks are not nuisance per se
which the Civil Code necessitates warning signs for.
- Court also held that there was no contractual relationship whatsoever between
the victims and the public respondent.