EN BANC Upon a motion duly seconded, Atty.
Maglana - the incumbent
B.M. No. 2713 June 10, 2014
ATTY. AILEEN R. MAGLANA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE VICENTE R. OPINION, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is the Appeal dated June 11, 20131 (with Urgent
Motion to Prohibit Protestant-Appellee to Participate in the Election
for Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
[IBP] Set on June 15, 2013) filed by Atty. Aileen R. Maglana,
President of IBP Samar Chapter, assailing the June 7, 2013 decision of
the IBP Board of Governors (BOG).2
This BOG decision granted the election protest of Atty. Jose Vicente
R. Opinion; declared Atty. Opinion as eligible to run for Governor of
IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term; annulled the
proclamation of Atty. Maglana as Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas;
and proclaimed Atty. Opinion as the duly elected Governor of IBP
Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.3
The Antecedents
On May 25, 2013, thirteen (13) delegates of the IBP Eastern Visayas
Region gathered at the Session Hall of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 24, Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Capitol Site, Maasin,
Leyte, to elect the Governor of their region for the 2013-2015 term.
Also present during the meeting were the Court’s designated observer,
Judge Bethany G. Kapili (Executive Judge of the RTC, Branch 24,
Maasin, Leyte), other lawyers of the Southern Leyte Chapter and
outgoing Governor Manuel Enage, Jr. Governor Enage presided over
the election. He then called the election to order and opened the
nominations for the position of Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas for
the 2013-2015 term.4
President of IBP Samar Chapter - was nominated for the position of
Governor. Atty. Maglana then moved that Governor Enage declare
that only IBP Samar Chapter was qualified to be voted upon for the
position of Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas, to the exclusion of all
the other eight (8) chapters. Atty. Maglana cited the rotation rule under
Bar Matter No. 491 and argued that since 1989 or the start of the
implementation of the rotation rule, only IBP Samar Chapter had not
served as Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas.5
Atty. Opinion, the candidate of the IBP Eastern Samar Chapter,
thereafter, took the floor and manifested that before he decided to run
for Governor, he sought the opinion of the IBP if he was still qualified
to run considering that he also ran for Governor and lost in the
immediately preceding term. Atty. Opinion stated that he received an
opinion dated April 2, 2013 from Governor Vicente M. Joyas,
Chairman of the IBP Executive Committee, that pertinently stated:6
This has reference to your Letter dated March 15, 2013 addressed to
former IBP President Roan I. Libarios seeking clarification on your
Chapter’s qualification to field a candidate for Governor on May 25,
2013.
Please be informed that your having lost the Governorship elections
for Eastern Visayas in 2011 does not disqualify your Chapter from
seeking an election for Governorship of Eastern Visayas Region. Thus,
under the present set up, the IBP Chapters of Eastern Samar, Samar,
and Biliran are qualified to field their respective candidate for the
scheduled Regional Elections on May 25, 2013.7
Atty. Opinion also manifested that in the 2011 Regional Elections for
IBP Eastern Visayas, the representative of IBP Samar Chapter, Judge
Amanzar, waived "the votes as he cannot pursue an election at that
time." Instead, Atty. Opinion was "asked to run."8 The Chapter
President of Samar in 2011, however, categorically denied the waiver
and said, "I did not pursue my intentions, although I had one at that
time to run for governor, because I was financially handicapped... but I
did not categorically waive our right to the governorship, because I
believe that waiver should be, - should not be implied. I categorically
say that I did not waive my right, or the right of the chapter to run for
governor."9
Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon, the delegate from Biliran, meanwhile
pointed out that Governor Joyas as Chairman of the IBP Executive
Committee had no authority to make the above-cited pronouncement;
it is only the Supreme Court that has the authority to determine the
qualified chapters in the region.10
After heated debates on the proper interpretation of the rotation rule to
the present case, Governor Enage eventually ruled that Atty. Opinion
was disqualified from running for the position of Governor of IBP
Eastern Visayas.11 Thereafter, some delegates protested the decision of
Governor Enage which prompted him to call a recess. When the
session resumed, Atty. Malig-on, Vice President of IBP Cebu Chapter,
moved that the election be suspended and the issue of Atty. Opinion’s
objection to Governor Enage’s ruling be resolved by the IBP BOG.
Governor Enage, however, denied this motion and, thereafter, ordered
the distribution of the ballots.12
The counting of the ballots revealed that only ten (10) out of the
eleven (11) ballots cast were filled up. Governor Enage counted the
votes, with six (6) votes in favor of Atty. Opinion considered as stray
votes and four (4) votes in favor of Atty. Maglana. He then proceeded
to proclaim Atty. Maglana as the duly elected Governor of IBP Eastern
Visayas in view of the disqualification of the other nominee, Atty.
Opinion.13
The Protest
On May 27, 2013, Atty. Opinion filed an election protest with the IBP
BOG.14 In support of his election protest, Atty. Opinion raised two
points.
First, he noted that since its introduction in 1990, the rotation rule had
not been followed in the elections for Governor of IBP Eastern
Visayas since Cebu Province, Cebu City, Bohol and Northern Samar
have had two elected governors each, as opposed to other chapters
which only had one governor elected. Since the rotation rule was not
followed, IBP Eastern Samar Chapter cannot be disqualified to run
since it was merely exercising its right to run for the second time in the
same manner as that of the other chapters that had elected two
governors.15
Second, he emphasized that IBP Samar Chapter had waived its turn in
the rotation when it did not field a candidate for Governor in the 2007,
2009 and 2011 elections. He notes that IBP Samar Chapter should not
be allowed to assert its turn in the rotation at anytime; otherwise, it
would disrupt the sequence considering it "follows Cebu City
sequence wise." Thus, for the 2013 regional elections, both Eastern
Samar and Samar should have been declared eligible to run for
Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas.16
In her Comment,17 Atty. Maglana argued three points.
First, IBP Samar Chapter did not waive its turn in the rotation. In fact,
the former IBP Samar Chapter President, Atty. Cesar Mabansag,
categorically denied, during the May 25,2013 regional elections, that
he had waived the right of IBP Samar Chapter to the governorship.
Even if there was a waiver during the 2011 election, IBP Samar
Chapter can reclaim its right to the governorship before the rotation is
completed, pursuant to Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP
By-Laws. Thus, for the 2013-2015 term, IBP Samar Chapter, which
remains to be the only chapter that did not have its turn in the rotation,
should be allowed to reclaim its right to the governorship.18
Second, she noted that since Bar Matter No. 586, dated May 14, 1991,
mandated the strict implementation of the rotation rule, and based on
IBP records, all chapters in the region, except IBP Samar Chapter,
have already had their turn in the rotation. Thus, she argued that in
order for the rotation cycle in the region to be completed, IBP Samar
Chapter, which had not yet had its turn in the rotation, should be
deemed the only qualified chapter to field its candidate for governor in
the May 25, 2013 regional elections.19
Third, she contended that even if the rotation cycle is reckoned from
1973, it is still IBP Samar Chapter’s turn in the rotation, pursuant to
the rotation rule under Section 39,Article VI, as amended, of the IBP
By-Laws. She notes that with the election of Governor Enage in the
2011-2013 term, the remaining chapters that have not served as
governor are Samar, Biliran and Eastern Samar Chapters. Thus,
pursuant to Section 39, IBP Samar Chapter should be able to field its
candidate for governor first, ahead of Biliran and Eastern Samar
Chapters.20
The IBP BOG Decision
In its June 7, 2013 decision, the IBP BOG granted the election protest
of Atty. Opinion and declared him the duly elected Governor of IBP
Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.
First, the IBP BOG held that IBP Samar waived its turn in the first
rotation cycle, from 1989 to 2007. It noted that under the rotation rule,
the governorship of a region shall rotate once in as many as the
number of chapters there are in the region, to give every chapter a
chance to represent the region in the IBP BOG. In the case of IBP
Eastern Visayas, the region consists of nine (9) chapters, thus the cycle
consists of nine governorship terms (from 1989 to 2007). Based on the
records, it is clear that four chapters have been represented twice; IBP
Eastern Samar was represented once while IBP Samar was never
represented at all.
Based on these considerations, the IBP BOG concluded that IBP
Samar Chapter effectively waived its turn in the rotation order when it
did not field any candidate from 1989 to 2007,as well as when it did
not invoke the rotation rule to challenge the nominations of those
candidates whose chapters had already been previously represented in
the rotation cycle.21
Second, the IBP BOG ruled that the first rotation cycle had already
terminated with the 2005 to 2007 term despite the lack of
representation from Eastern Samar as it has effectively waived its turn
in the first rotation cycle. It emphasized that the rotation rule is not
absolute and is subject to waiver, such as when the chapters, in the
order of rotation, opt not to file or nominate their own candidates for
governor during the election regularly done for that purpose. It also
held that Atty. Maglana’s contentions that IBP Eastern Samar can
reclaim the governorship at any time and that the first rotation cycle
cannot be completed unless IBP Eastern Samar has had its turn are
completely anathema to the concept of the rotation cycle; the rotation
cycle should run its course and the rotation in the region cannot be
held hostage by any one chapter.22
Third, the IBP BOG found that based on the rotation by exclusion rule
(i.e., once a member of the chapter is elected as governor, his or her
chapter would be excluded in the next turn until all have taken turns in
the rotation cycle), the six (6) remaining chapters in the region were
actually qualified to field a candidate for governor in the May 25, 2013
regional elections. It also noted that the IBP Eastern Visayas region is
actually already in its second rotation cycle with governors from Leyte
(2007-2009), Bohol (2009-2011) and Southern Leyte (2011-2013)
already having served the region. In the present case, both IBP Eastern
Samar and IBP Samar were actually qualified to field their candidates
for Governor, alongside IBP Cebu City, IBP Cebu Province, IBP
Biliran and IBP Northern Samar Chapters.23
Fourth, the IBP BOG concluded that Atty. Opinion, who was actually
a qualified candidate for Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas, should be
declared the duly elected Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas for the
2013-2015 term, considering that he garnered the majority six (6)
votes, as opposed to the minority four (4) votes garnered by Atty.
Maglana.24
The Appeal
On June 11, 2013, Atty. Maglana filed the present Appeal (With
Urgent Motion to Prohibit Protestant-Appellee to Participate in the
Election for Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Set on June 15, 2013). In support of her Appeal, Atty.
Maglana submits the following arguments:
First, IBP Samar Chapter is the only qualified chapter to field a
candidate for governor for the 2013-2015 term, to the exclusion of all
other chapters in the IBP Eastern Visayas region. She emphasizes that
based on the records, IBP Samar Chapter clearly had never served as
governor for IBP Eastern Visayas since the introduction of Bar Matter
No. 491 in 1989.25
Second, IBP Samar Chapter never waived its turn in the rotation cycle
because under the rotation by exclusion scheme, it does not know
when its turn to serve as governor would be. Even assuming that there
had been a waiver, Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-
Laws allows the chapter that waived its turn in the rotation order to
reclaim its right at any time before the rotation is completed.26
Third, the rotation cycle in the IBP Eastern Visayas region can only be
completed once a nominee from IBP Samar Chapter had served as
Governor for the 2013-2015 term. The rotation cycle cannot simply be
deemed complete by just equating the number of terms with the
number of chapters in the region. Atty. Maglana contends that the
situation of IBP Samar Chapter is the same as that of Romblon
Chapter in 2009 when the Court, in In the Matter of the Brewing
Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines,27 affirmed IBP Romblon Chapter’s right to the 2009-2011
term despite the fact that there were other chapters in the Western
Visayas region that had served more than one term.28
On July 2, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution denying Atty.
Maglana’s prayer to restrain Atty. Opinion from voting in the election
on June 15, 2013, the same having become moot and academic. In the
same Resolution, the Court also required Atty. Maglana to furnish the
Court, within five (5) days from notice, a certified true copy of the IBP
BOG decision dated June 7, 2013.29
On August 3, 2013, Atty. Maglana submitted her Compliance with the
Court’s directive in its July 2, 2013 Resolution.30
The Issues for Resolution
The core issues raised by the present Appeal are the following:
1. Whether the first rotation cycle in IBP Eastern Visayas, since the
implementation of Bar Matter No. 491, has been completed;
2. Whether IBP Samar Chapter waived its turn in the rotation order so
that it can no longer claim its right to the governorship position for the
2013-2015 term;
3. Whether IBP Samar Chapter is the only qualified chapter to field a
candidate for governor in IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term;
and
4. Whether Atty. Opinion should be declared the duly elected
Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.
Our Ruling
We affirm the IBP BOG decision dated June 7, 2013 and declare Atty.
Opinion the duly elected Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas for the
2013-2015 term.
We begin with a brief background on the organizational structure of
the IBP. The IBP is divided into nine (9) geographic regions, namely:
Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Southern Luzon, Bicolandia, Greater
Manila, Western Visayas, Eastern Visayas, Western Mindanao and
Eastern Mindanao.31
Each of these regions is subdivided into chapters and is represented by
a Governor elected by delegates from among the member-chapters of
each region.32 In the case of IBP Eastern Visayas, the region is
composed of nine (9) chapters, namely:33
1. Biliran
2. Bohol
3. Cebu Province
4. Cebu City
5. Eastern Samar
6. Leyte
7. Northern Samar
8. Samar
9. Southern Leyte
At least one (1) month before the national convention, the delegates
from each region shall elect the Governor for their region, who shall
be chosen by rotation.34
These nine (9) Governors constitute the IBP BOG which governs and
has general charge of the IBP’s affairs and activities. Aside from the
Governors, the other national officers of the IBP are: the IBP
President, the EVP, the National Secretary, the National Treasurer, and
the heads of the National Committees.35
The Rotation Rule
The logical starting point in resolving the present matter before us is
Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, as amended by Bar Matter
No. 491. This provision established the rotation rule in the IBP. The
provision states:
SEC. 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least one (1)
month before the national convention the delegates from each region
shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as
much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
In its Resolution in Bar Matter No. 586 dated May 16, 1991, the Court
decreed without amending Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws
that the rotation rule under Sections 37 and 39, Article VI of the IBP
By-Laws should be strictly implemented "so that all prior elections for
governor in the region shall be reckoned with or considered in
determining who should be the governor to be selected from the
different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors."36
Despite the call for strict implementation of the rotation rule under Bar
Matter No. 586 in 1991, the Court amended Section 39, Article VI of
the IBP By-Laws only in 2010 in In the Matter of the Brewing
Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines,37 by mandating the mandatory and strict implementation
of the rotation rule, as well as recognizing that the rotation rule is
subject to waivers by the chapters of the regions. The provision, as
further amended, now reads:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least one
(1) month before the national convention the delegates from each
region shall elect the Governor for their region, who shall be chosen
by rotation which is mandatory and shall be strictly implemented
among the Chapters in the region. When a Chapter waives its turn in
the rotation order, its place shall redound to the next Chapter in the
line. Nevertheless, the former may reclaim its right to the
Governorship at any time before the rotation is completed; otherwise,
it will have to wait for its turn in the next round, in the same place that
it had in the round completed.38
Broken down into its components, Section 39, Article VI, as amended,
of the IBP By-Laws contains the following elements:
(a) Delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region
who shall be chosen by rotation;
(b) Rotation of the governorship of each region shall be mandatory and
to be strictly implemented;
(c) A chapter may waive its turn in the rotation order which shall
redound to the next chapter in the line; and
(d) The chapter that waived its turn may reclaim its right to the
governorship at any time before the rotation is completed; otherwise, it
will have to wait for its turn in the next round, in the same place that it
had in the round completed.
Elements a, c and d are key elements that are decisive in resolving the
present controversy. As far as element (a) is concerned, the problem
relates to the element of rotation where the manner of implementation
is the disputed issue. Elements (c) and (d) also assume significance
because of the assertion of waiver on the part of IBP Samar Chapter of
its right to the governorship.
As has been interpreted and applied by the Court in the past, the Term Elected Governors Chapter
rotation rule under Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-
Laws actually consists of two underlying directives. 1989-1990 Caretaker Board N/A
First is the directive for the mandatory and strict implementation of the
rotation rule. The rule mandates that the governorship of a region shall1990-1991 Benedicto H. Alo Cebu Province
rotate once in as many terms as there may be chapters in the region.
This serves the purpose of giving every chapter a chance to represent1991-1993 Baldomero C. Estenzo Cebu City
the region in the IBP BOG.
1993-1995 Agustinus V. Gonzaga Bohol
Second is the exception from the mandatory and strict implementation
of the rotation rule. This exception would allow a chapter to waive its 1995-1997 Jose Aguila Grapilon Biliran
turn in the rotation order, subject to its right to reclaim the
governorship at any time before the rotation is completed. Thus, as the
1997-1999 Kenny A.H. Tantuico Northern Samar
Court held in In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the
Election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, "[t]he rotation rule is
1999-2001 Celestino B. Sabate Eastern Samar
not absolute but subject to waiver as when the chapters in the order of
rotation opted not to field or nominate their own candidates for
2001-2003 Emil L. Ong Northern Samar
Governor during the election regularly done for that purpose."39
The Operation of the Rotation System in IBP Eastern Visayas 2003-2005 Manuel M. Monzon Cebu Province
Pursuant to Bar Matter No. 491, the delegates for the 1989-1991 term
2005-2007 Manuel P. Legaspi Cebu City
elected Atty. Benedict H. Alo of Cebu Province as Governor of IBP
Eastern Visayas. This development ushered in the implementation of
2007-2009 Evergisto S. Escalon Leyte
the rotation system for the governorship of IBP Eastern Visayas. Thus,
the rotational cycle should be counted from the time of Bar Matter No.
491, when the Court provided for the rotation system. This term 2009-2011 Roland B. Inting Bohol
(1989-1991) constituted the first "turn" in the cycle and should be
2011-2013
considered the starting point for consideration in resolving the various Manuel L. Enage, Jr. Southern Leyte
aspects of the present controversy. Note, however, that part of this
term was under a caretaker that served as a preliminary and 2013-2015 Disputed Disputed
preparatory measure under the developments that initiated Bar Matter
a. The First rotation cycle has been completed in 2007.
No. 491.
Counting from the governorship of Atty. Benedicto H. Alo of IBP
The tabulation below shows the election developments for the position
Cebu Province Chapter, the first rotation cycle of governors,
of Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas from the 1989-1991 term up to
consisting of nine (9) governorship terms from 1989 to 2007, followed
the present, viz.:
the following pattern and succession:
1. Cebu Province - Benedicto H. Alo, 1990-1991
2. Cebu City - Baldomero C. Estenzo, 1991-1993
3. Bohol - Agustinus V. Gonzaga, 1993-1995
4. Biliran - Jose Aguila Grapilon, 1995-1997
5. Northern Samar - Kenny A.H. Tantuico, 1997-1999
6. Eastern Samar - Celestino B. Sabate, 1999-2001
7. Northern Samar - Emil L. Ong, 2001-2003
8. Cebu Province - Manuel M. Monzon, 2003-2005
9. Cebu City - Manuel P.Legaspi, 2005-2007
leaving three chapters – Samar, Leyte and Southern Leyte – with no
governor elected to represent the chapter’s slot in the rotation.
Pursuant to the rotational rule, the governorship of a region shall rotate
once in as many terms as there may be chapters in the region, to give
every chapter a chance to represent the region in the IBP BOG.
However, not every chapter was represented in the first rotational
cycle. As the IBP BOG noted, there were instances when the Governor
of IBP Eastern Visayas came from the same chapter, such as Northern
Samar (1997-1999 and 2001-2003), Cebu Province (1990-1991 and
2003-2005)and Cebu City (1991-1993 and 2005-2007).
These "aberrant" developments, strictly speaking, sidetracked the
smooth and proper implementation of the rotation rule in the first
rotational cycle that started with the 1990-1991 term of IBP Cebu
Province and which should have ended in the 2005-2007 term with all
the chapters, including Samar, Leyte and Southern Leyte, given the
chance to be governor. Stated otherwise, had the chapters strictly and
mandatorily followed the rotation rule, the first rotational cycle should
have been completed in 2007.
We cannot sustain Atty. Maglana’s arguments, that: (1) the first
rotation cycle in IBP Eastern Visayas region had not been completed
in 2007; and (2) that the rotation cycle can only be completed once a
nominee from IBP Samar Chapter had served as governor for the
2013-2015 term, for two reasons.
First, as the IBP BOG established, the primary reason why some
chapters, such as Northern Samar, Cebu Province and Cebu City, were
represented twice (in the first rotation cycle) was because Samar either
did not field any candidate from 1989 to 2007 or it failed to invoke the
rotation rule to challenge the nominations of those candidates whose
chapters had already been represented in the rotation cycle. We agree
with the IBP BOG that Samar Chapter effectively waived its turn in
the rotation order, as will be further explained below. Because of this
waiver of its turn in the first rotation cycle, we conclude that the first
rotation cycle had been completed in 2007.
Second, Atty. Maglana cannot simply reclaim IBP Samar Chapter’s
right to the governorship in the 2013-2015 term because it is contrary
to Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws. This
provision states that the chapter which has waived its turn in the
rotation cycle may reclaim its right to the governorship at any time
before the rotation is completed. Having been established that the first
rotational cycle had been completed in the 2005-2007 term, IBP Samar
Chapter can no longer belatedly reclaim its right to the governorship in
the 2013-2015 term as it should have exercised its claim on or before
the completion of the first rotation cycle in 2007. In this regard, we
quote with approval the disquisition of the IBP BOG:
Moreover, protestee’s view that the Samar chapter, by virtue of its
being the only chapter that has yet to have its turn as governor in the
rotation rule era, can reclaim the governorship at any time it opts to
and that the rotation cycle cannot be deemed completed until it does is
anathema to the very concept of the rotation rule. The region cannot be
held hostage indefinitely by one chapter. The rotation has to run its
course. Indeed the flaw of protestee’s reasoning would be even more
apparent if the issue of the election of the Executive Vice President
would come into play inasmuch as the Samar Chapter could then
invoke its perceived right to the governorship when it is the turn of
Eastern Visayas Region to have an EVP elected from its ranks, thus,
giving it an undue advantage over the other chapters in the region.40
The dissent, however, emphasizes that the preferred policy as
mandated in Section 39, Article VI, as amended of the IBP By-Laws,
is the mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation by exclusion
rule. The dissent posits that unless and until IBP Samar Chapter had
actually been given the opportunity to seat as Governor of IBP Eastern
Visayas, the first rotation cycle for the position of IBP Eastern Visayas
cannot be considered complete.41
The dissent’s reliance on the mandatory and strict implementation of
the rotation by exclusion rule, as mandated by Section 39, as amended,
Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, is inaccurate. Despite the amendment
of Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws mandating the strict
implementation of the rotation by exclusion rule, the Court cannot
ignore the reality that prior to the present amendment (i.e., from the
1989-1991 term until December 2010), the prevailing rotation rule was
not mandatory; the choice of governor should only be rotated as much
as possible among the chapters of the region.
Note that this rule even prevailed after the first rotation cycle of
governors, consisting of nine governorship terms from 1989 to 2007.
Thus, the dissent cannot simply apply Section 39, Article VI, as
amended, of the IBP By-Laws in the present case because this
amendment calling for the strict implementation of the rotation rule
cannot be interpreted retroactively, but only prospectively, so that it
would only take effect in the 2011-2013 term.
As previously emphasized, not every chapter was represented in the
first rotation cycle; there were three instances when the Governor of
IBP Eastern Visayas came from the same Chapter, such as the case of
Northern Samar, Cebu Province and Cebu City. These aberrant
developments can only be justified under the "as much as possible"
qualifier cited above. Based on these considerations and from a
practical perspective, we can reasonably conclude that the first rotation
cycle has been completed in 2007 despite the non-participation of
Samar, Leyte and Southern Leyte, after considering the following
premises:
i. Bar Matter No. 491 lays down the starting point of the IBP's rotation
system that called for the election of a governor for a region to be
rotated as much as possible among the chapters of the region;
ii. This rule on rotation prevailed until the amendment of Section 39,
Article VI of the IBP By-Laws on December 14, 2010 decreeing the
mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation rule; and
iii. The recent amendment of Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-
Laws should be interpreted prospectively so that it would only take
effect from the 2011-2013 term.
b. IBP Samar Chapter waived its turn in the first rotation cycle.
As mentioned, the rotation rule under Section 39, Article VI, as
amended, of the IBP By-Laws is not absolute as it is subject to a
waiver, as when a chapter in the order of rotation opts not to field or
nominate its candidate for governor during the election regularly
called for the purpose. The dissent, however, posits that IBP Samar
Chapter did not waive its turn in the rotation cycle because there was
no clear or unequivocal waiver on its part.42
First, the dissent notes that no express waiver was executed by the IBP
Samar Chapter to forego its turn in the rotation cycle. Second, the
second and third elements of a valid waiver were not proven. The
dissent argues only during the election for governor for 2013-2015 that
IBP Samar Chapter could have been aware of its right to be the sole
and only remaining Chapter that should vie for the position of
Governor because it is only during that time that it becomes clear that
it is the only remaining Chapter of IBP Eastern Visayas which remains
unrepresented in the IBP BOG. Lastly, the IBP By-Laws is silent on
how and when the waiver should be made and whether or not the
Chapter President or the Board of Directors is clothed with authority to
waive the turn of the Chapter in the rotation cycle on behalf of its
members. Thus, the dissent concludes that it remains unclear that there
was a clear and unequivocal intention on the part of IBP Samar
Chapter and its members to waive its right to the governorship.43
The dissent’s citation of Article 6 of the Civil Code and its application
of the elements of a valid waiver of a right under civil law is
misplaced.
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution mandates the Court’s power
of supervision over the IBP. In Garcia v. De Vera,44 the Court held that
implicit in the constitutional grant to the Supreme Court of the power
to promulgate rules affecting the IBP (under Section 5, Article VIII of
the Constitution) is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP,
including the election of its officers. In administrative matters
concerning the IBP, the Court can supervise the IBP by ensuring the
legality and correctness of the exercise of its powers as to means and
manner, and by interpreting for it the constitutional provisions, laws
and regulations affecting the means and manner of the exercise of its
powers. For this reason, the IBP By-Laws mandates that the Court has
the plenary power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws in
accordance with policies it deems, not only consistent with the
Constitution, laws and regulations, but also as may be necessary,
practicable and appropriate in light of prevailing circumstances.45
Pursuant to the Court's power of supervision over the IBP, the Court
already spoke decisively on the issue of waiver under Section 39,
Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws in In the Matter of the
Brewing Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.46 As mentioned, the Court ruled that the rotation rule
under Section 39 is not absolute, but is subject to a waiver, as when a
chapter in the order of the rotation opts not to field or nominate a
candidate for governor during the election regularly called for that
purpose. Notably, the Court in that case also established the standards
by which a chapter may be deemed to have waived its turn in the
rotation cycle under Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP
By-Laws. Thus, the dissent's reliance on the standards of waiver of
rights under civil law cannot simply prevail over the standards set by
the Court in the Brewing Controversies case.
In the Brewing Controversies case, the Court held that the six chapters
in the region that should strictly take precedence in the rotation rule
over Lanao del Sur Chapter (i.e., IBP Sarangani Chapter and the other
five chapters) waived their turn in the rotation order by not fielding a
candidate for governor and by failing to invoke the rotation rule to
challenge the nominations from the latter. In ruling that Atty.
Marohomsalic of Lanao del Sur Chapter was qualified to run for
governor in the 2009 elections, the Court noted that there were
instances when the governor of Western Mindanao Region came from
the same chapter and that the other chapters opted not to field or
nominate their own candidates, thus:
In the regular election of April 25, 2009, there is no dispute that the
voting delegates of IBP Western Mindanao Region voted into office
Atty. Marohomsalic of Lanao del Sur Chapter as Governor for the
2009-2011 term. During the said election, his only rival was Atty.
Benjamin Lanto who also belongs to the same Lanao del Sur Chapter.
A third candidate, Atty. Escobar from the Sarangani Chapter, was
nominated but he declined the nomination.
While the Committee points out that six (6) chapters in the region,
including Sarangani, are entitled to precedence over the Lanao del Sur
chapter in the order of rotation, the fact remains that not one of them
nominated or fielded a candidate from their respective ranks during the
April 25, 2009 election. Neither did any one of them challenge the
nominations of the Lanao del Sur Chapter based on the order of
rotation.
By not fielding a candidate for Governor and by declining the
nomination raised in favor of its Chapter President (Atty. Escobar), the
IBP Sarangani Chapter is deemed to have waived its turn in the
rotation order. The same can be said of the remaining
chapters.1âwphi1 They too are deemed to have waived their turn in the
rotation as they opted not to field or nominate a candidate from among
their respective members. Neither did they invoke the rotation rule to
challenge the nominations from the Lanao del Sur Chapter. On the
contrary, they fully expressed their concurrence to the cited
nominations, which may be interpreted as a waiver of their right to The same facts obtain in the present case. As the IBP BOG noted, not
take their turn to represent the region in the Board of Governors for the all the nine (9) chapters of Eastern Visayas were able to field a
2009-2011 term. governor for the first rotation cycle from 1989 to 2007 since three
chapters were represented twice. IBP Eastern Samar Chapter, to which
It need not be stressed that, as cited by the Committee itself, there
Atty. Opinion belongs, was represented once while IBP Samar
were instances when the Governor of the Western Mindanao Region
Chapter, which Atty. Maglana represents, was not represented at all.
came from the same chapter such as ZAMBASULTA (1997-1999 &
The IBP BOG also established that some chapters were represented
1999-2001) and Sultan Kudarat (2003-2005 & 2007-2009). Thus,
twice during the first rotation cycle because Samar Chapter either did
Atty. Marohomsalic could not be faulted if the other chapters opted not
not field any candidate for governor from 1989 to 2007 or it did not
to field or nominate their own candidates. Having been validly
invoke the rotation rule to challenge the nominations of those
nominated and duly proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of
candidates whose chapters had already been previously represented in
Western Mindanao, Atty. Marohomsalic therefore deserves to assume
the rotation cycle. Based on these considerations and pursuant to the
his position during the remainder of the term.
Court’s December 14, 2010 ruling, we conclude that IBP Eastern
It would have been a different story if another Chapter in the order of Samar effectively waived its turn in the first rotation cycle.
rotation fielded its own candidate or invoked the rotation rule to
To justify its position that it is the sole Chapter qualified to field a
challenge Atty. Marohomsalic’s nomination. But the record is bereft of
candidate in the 2013-2015 term, Atty. Maglana cites the December
any showing that his nomination and subsequent election was
14, 2010 Resolution of the Court in In the Matter of the Brewing
challenged on that basis. If there was any challenge at all, it merely
Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the
referred to his nomination by Atty. Macalawi which the Committee
Philippines48 where it upheld the turn of IBP Romblon Chapter which
itself has found to be in order. Thus, no compelling reason exists to
then completed the rotation cycle in IBP Western Visayas region.
disregard the electoral mandate and nullify the will of the voting
delegates as expressed through the ballot. The citation is also misplaced. In this case, the Court upheld the
election of Atty. Fortunato as Governor of IBP Western Visayas since
The "rotation rule" is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the
he obtained the highest number of votes and also because under the
chapters in the order of rotation opted not to field or nominate their
rotation rule, it was the turn of the Romblon Chapter to represent IBP
own candidates for Governor during the election regularly done for
Western Visayas Region in the IBP BOG. Contrary to Atty. Maglana’s
that purpose. If a validly nominated candidate obtains the highest
contentions, the Court in that case never made a finding that there
number of votes in the election conducted, his electoral mandate
were also chapters that had two governors in one cycle and that these
deserves to be respected unless obtained through fraud as established
second terms were considered as "aberrations." Furthermore, unlike
by evidence. Such is not the case here.
the case of IBP Samar Chapter, the Court did not make any finding
Suffice it to say, the "rotation rule" should be applied in harmony with, regarding the waiver of the right to the governorship in IBP Romblon
and not in derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate as Chapter’s case.
expressed through the ballot. Thus, Atty. Marohomsalic cannot be
c. IBP Samar Chapter is not the only qualified chapter to field a
divested and deprived of his electoral mandate and victory. The order
candidate for governor for the 2013-2015 term.
of rotation is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar its relaxation in
exceptional and compelling circumstances.47
With the end of the first rotation cycle in 2007 during the term of Atty.
Manuel P. Legaspi of IBP Cebu City Chapter, the election of Atty.
Evergisto S. Escalon of IBP Leyte Chapter in that same year
effectively ushered in a fresh second rotation cycle in the IBP Eastern
Visayas region.
Thus, the second rotation cycle for governor in the IBP Eastern
Visayas region now follows the following pattern and succession:
1. Leyte - Evergisto S.Escalon, 2007-2009
2. Bohol - Roland B. Inting, 2009-2011
3. Southern Leyte - Manuel L.Enage, Jr., 2011-2013
With the IBP Eastern Visayas region already in the second rotation
cycle and with governors from Leyte, Bohol and Southern Leyte
Chapters having served the region as starting points, Atty. Maglana’s
position that IBP Samar Chapter is the only remaining chapter
qualified to field a candidate for governor in the 2013 -2015 term
clearly fails. The rotation by exclusion rule provides that "once a
member of [a] chapter is elected as Governor, his [or her] chapter
would be excluded in the next turn until all have taken their turns in
the rotation cycle. Once a full rotation cycle ends and a fresh cycle
commences, all the chapters in the region are once again entitled to vie
but subject again to the rule on rotation by exclusion."49
Under this rule, considering that Leyte, Bohol and Southern Leyte
Chapters already served in the second rotation cycle, the six remaining
chapters are qualified to field their candidates for governor in the
2013-2015 term. Applied in the present case, it is clear that both IBP
Eastern Samar and IBP Samar, along with Cebu Province, Cebu City,
Biliran and Northern Samar Chapters, are qualified to field their
candidates in the May 25, 2013 regional elections in the IBP Eastern
Visayas region.
d. Atty. Opinion is the duly elected Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas
for the 2013-2015 term.
Based on the above considerations, we agree with the IBP BOG that
Governor Enage seriously erred in disqualifying Atty. Opinion as a
candidate and in declaring the six (6) votes he garnered as stray.
The election of Atty. Opinion is well-settled. He did not only come
from the chapter which is entitled to be elected for the position but
also got the majority of six (6) votes, as opposed to the four (4) votes
garnered by Atty. Maglana in the May 25, 2013 elections.
As the Court held in its December 14, 2010 Resolution in In the Matter
of the Brewing Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines,50 "[i]f a validly nominated candidate obtains the
highest number of votes in the election conducted, his electoral
mandate deserves to be respected unless obtained through fraud as
established by evidence."51
Similarly, such is not the case here and thus, Atty. Opinion should be
declared the duly elected Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas in the
2013-2015 term.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves that:
1. Atty. Jose Vicente R. Opinion is qualified to run for Governor of
IBP Eastern Visayas region for the 2013-2015 term;
2. The six (6) votes cast in favor of Atty. Jose Vicente R. Opinion are
valid votes and should be counted in his favor;
3. The proclamation of Atty. Aileen R. Maglana by Governor Manuel
Enage, Jr. be annulled since she failed to obtain the majority of the
votes cast in the May 25, 2013 elections; and
4. Atty. Jose Vicente R. Opinion be declared the duly elected
Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas region for the 2013-2015 term,
having garnered the highest number of votes cast in the May 25, 2013
elections.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC April 11, 2013
IN THE MATTER OF THE BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN
THE ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRA TED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 8292
ATTYS. MARCIAL M. MAGSINO, MANUEL M. MARAMBA
and NASSER MARAHOMSALIC, Complainants,
vs.
ATTYS. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, ABELARDO C. ESTRADA,
BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., EVERGISTO S. ESCALON,
and REYMUND JORGE A. MERCADO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
The Court, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), resolves this matter of the election of the
Executive Vice-President (EVP) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for the 2011-2013 term.
This administrative matter was triggered by the Petition for
Intervention filed by petitioner-intervenor IBP-Southern Luzon Region
(IBP-Southern Luzon), seeking a declaration that the post of EVP-IBP
for the 2011-2013 term be held open to all regions and that it is
qualified to field a candidate for the said position.
This matter comes at the heels of the controversies resolved by the
Court in its December 4, 2012 Resolution regarding the application of
the rotation rule in determining which chapter of the IBP-Western
Visayas region (IBP-Western Visayas) was qualified to field a
candidate for the position of governor. In the said resolution, the Court
clarified that the rotation rule was one by exclusion. Similar to this
recently resolved controversy, the present dilemma calls for the
application of the rotation system at the national level.
The Factual Antecedents
To understand the nature of the controversy and the issues presented
for resolution, an examination of the structure of the IBP and its
history is in order.
In 1973, the Philippine Bar was integrated1 to elevate the standards of
the legal profession, to improve the administration of justice and to
enable it to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.2 Governing the IBP was the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-
BOG), consisting of the governors from each of the nine (9)
geographic regions of the archipelago,3 namely: Northern Luzon,
Central Luzon, Southern Luzon, Greater Manila, Bicolandia, Eastern
Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao, and Western
Mindanao.4 The governors of the IBP-BOG are, in turn, elected by the
House of Delegates which consists of members duly apportioned
among the chapters of each region.5
At the helm of the IBP is the IBP National President (IBP-
President),6 who is automatically succeeded by the EVP. When the
Philippine Bar was first integrated, both the IBP-President and the
EVP were elected by the IBP-BOG from among themselves or from
other members of the Integrated Bar,7 with the right of automatic
succession by the EVP to the presidency for the next succeeding full
term. The presidency rotated among all the nine regions in such order
as the IBP-BOG had prescribed.8 Both the IBP-President and the EVP
held a term of one (1) year, with the presidency rotating from year to
year among the regions.9
On November 1, 1974, the IBP By-Laws took effect, providing that
the IBP-President and the EVP be chosen by the Board of Governors
from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a
rotation basis.10 It was also provided that the IBP-President and the
EVP hold office for a term of two (2) years from July 1 following their
election until June 30 of their second year in office and until their
successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.11
Later, several amendments in the IBP By-Laws were introduced, Following the rotation system just ordered, the following individuals
among which were the provisions relating to the election of its national representing the different regions of the IBP served as IBP-President:
officers. In Bar Matter No. 287, dated July 9, 1985, the Court
approved the recommendation allowing the IBP-President, the EVP 1. Eugene Tan (Capiz) Western Visayas January 28, 1990-April
and the officers of the House of Delegates to be directly elected by the 199117
House of Delegates.12
2. Numeriano Tanopo, Central Luzon April 1991-June 30,
Unfortunately, history recalls that this mode of electing the IBP
Jr. 1991
national officers was marred with unethical politicking, electioneering
(Pangasinan)
and other distasteful practices. Thus, on October 6, 1989, the Court in
Bar Matter No. 491, dated October 6, 1989, ordered: 1] the annulment
of the just concluded national elections; 2] the abolition of the system 3. Mervin Encanto Greater Manila 1993-1995
of election of national officers by direct action of the House of (Quezon City)
Delegates; 3] the restoration of the former system of having the IBP-
President and the EVP elected by the IBP-BOG from among 4. Raoul R. Angangco Southern Luzon 1995-1997
themselves, with right of succession by the EVP to the presidency and (Makati)
subject to the rule that "the position of Executive Vice President of the
IBP shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions;"13 4] the holding 5. Jose Aguila Eastern Visayas 1997-1999
of special elections for the election of the first set of IBP-President and Grapilon
EVP;14 and 5] the appointment of a caretaker board to administer the (Biliran)
affairs of the IBP pending the holding of special elections.15
6. Arthur Lim Western 1999-2001
In the same Bar Matter No. 491, the Court ordered the amendment of
(Zambasulta) Mindanao
Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-laws, to read:
SEC. 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines 7. Teofilo Pilando, Jr. Northern Luzon 2001-2003
shall have a President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by (Kalinga Apayao)
the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as
much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex 8. Jose Anselmo Cadiz Bicolandia 2003-2005
officio Vice President for their respective regions. There shall also be a (Camarines Sur)
Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Board. (As amended pursuant to On January 27, 1999, in Velez v. de Vera,18 reasoning that the rotation
Bar Matter No. 491) system applied only to the EVP, the Court considered the election of
The Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for then EVP Leonard De Vera (De Vera), representing the Eastern
the next succeeding term. The Presidency shall rotate among the nine Mindanao region, as one completing the first rotational cycle and
Regions.16 [Emphasis supplied] affirmed the election of Jose Vicente B. Salazar (Salazar) of the
Bicolandia region as EVP. The Court explained that the rotational
cycle would have been completed with the succession of EVP De hold the position of IBP Executive Vice President for the 2007-2009
Vera, representing Eastern Mindanao as IBP-President. For having term and, therefore, barred from succeeding as IBP President for the
misappropriated his clients’ funds and committing acts inimical to the 2009-2011 term;
IBP-BOG and the IBP in general, De Vera was removed as governor
4. The proposed amendments to Sections 31, 33, par. (g), 39, 42, and
of Eastern Mindanao and as EVP, and his removal was affirmed by the
43, Article VI and Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws as
Court.
contained in the Report and Recommendation of the Special
Thus, Salazar became IBP-President for the 2005-2007 term with Committee, dated July 9, 2009, are hereby approved and adopted; and
Feliciano Bautista (Bautista) of Central Luzon as EVP. The term of
5. The designation of retired SC Justice Santiago Kapunan as Officer-
Salazar was the start of the second rotational cycle. Bautista eventually
in-Charge of the IBP shall continue, unless earlier revoked by the
succeeded to the IBP presidency with Atty. Rogelio Vinluan (Vinluan)
Court, but not to extend beyond June 30, 2011.
as his EVP.
SO ORDERED.
In 2009, however, the national and regional IBP elections were again
tainted with numerous controversies, which were resolved by the Attempts to seek reconsideration of the Court’s resolution were denied
Court in its December 14, 2010 Resolution,19 in the following manner: by the Court in its Resolution, dated February 8, 2011.20
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves that: Despite Bar Matter No. 491 and Velez,21 which recognized the
operational fact that the rotation was from the position of President to
1. The elections of Attys. Manuel M. Maramba, Erwin M. Fortunato
that of the EVP, Section 47 was not immediately amended to reflect
and Nasser A. Marohomsalic as Governors for the Greater Manila
the official position of the Court. It was only amended through the
Region, Western Visayas Region and Western Mindanao Region,
December 14, 2010 Resolution.22 Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws now
respectively, for the term 2009-2011 are UPHELD;
reads:
2. A special election to elect the IBP Executive Vice President for the
Sec. 47. National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
2009-2011 term is hereby ORDERED to be held under the supervision
shall have a President, an Executive Vice President, and nine (9)
of this Court within seven (7) days from receipt of this Resolution with
regional Governors. The Executive Vice President shall be elected on
Attys. Maramba, Fortunato and Marohomsalic being allowed to
a strict rotation basis by the Board of Governors from among
represent and vote as duly-elected Governors of their respective
themselves, by the vote of at least five (5) Governors. The Governors
regions;
shall be ex officio Vice President for their respective regions. There
3. Attys. Rogelio Vinluan, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon, Jr., shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors.
Evergisto Escalon, and Raymund Mercado are all found GUILTY of
The violation of the rotation rule in any election shall be penalized by
grave professional misconduct arising from their actuations in
annulment of the election and disqualification of the offender from
connection with the controversies in the elections in the IBP last April
election or appointment to any office in the IBP.
25, 2009 and May 9, 2009 and are hereby disqualified to run as
national officers of the IBP in any subsequent election. While their In the special elections that were held thereafter, Roan I. Libarios
elections as Governors for the term 2007-2009 can no longer be (Libarios), representing IBP-Eastern Mindanao Region, was elected
annulled as this has already expired, Atty. Vinluan is declared unfit to EVP and he later on succeeded as president.
On April 27, 2011, the IBP-BOG, acting on the letter of then Gov.
Erwin M. Fortunato (Fortunato) of IBP-Western Visayas requested
that the Court provide guidance on how it would proceed with the
application of the rotational rule in the regional elections for governor
of IBP-Western Visayas.23
On December 4, 2012, the Court issued a resolution24 addressing the
issues with respect to the election of governor for IBP-Western
Visayas. In clarifying that the rotational rule was one by exclusion, the
Court explained that in the election of governor of a region, all
chapters of the region should be given the opportunity to have their
nominees elected as governor, to the exclusion of those chapters that
had already served in the rotational cycle. Once a rotational cycle
would be completed, all chapters of a region, except the chapter which
won in the immediately preceding elections, could once again have the
equal opportunity to vie for the position of governor of their region.
The chapter that won in the immediately preceding election, under the
rotational cycle just completed, could only vie for the position of
governor after the election of the first governor in the new cycle.
The Current Controversy
Earlier, on July 27, 2012, IBP-Southern Luzon filed its Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to Admit the Attached Petition In
Intervention25 and the subject Petition In Intervention,26 seeking a
declaration that the post of EVP for the 2011-2013 term be held open
to all regions and that it be qualified to nominate a candidate for the
position of EVP for the 2011-2013 term.
The Petition in Intervention was, in turn, opposed by Fortunato,27 who
insisted that IBP-Western Visayas was the only region that could vie
for the position of EVP for the 2011-2013 term.
In the December 4, 2012 Resolution, the Court deferred its action on
the intervention sought by the IBP-Southern Luzon and required the
IBP-BOG to submit its comment.28
In its Comment, dated January 2, 2013, the IBP-BOG prayed that the
"IBP-Southern Luzon be allowed to nominate a candidate for EVP for
the 2011-2013 term, without prejudice to the right of other regions
except IBP-Eastern Mindanao, to do the same."29
The opposition of Fortunato to the subject petition in intervention of
IBP-Southern Luzon was joined by his successor, Marlou B. Ubano
(Ubano), Gov. Manuel L. Enage, Jr. of IBP-Eastern Visayas,30 and the
members of the House of Delegates of IBP-Western Visayas.31 Nasser
A. Marohomsalic (Marohomsalic),32 one of the original parties in this
case, Gov. Leonor Gernoa-Romeo33 of IBP-Bicolandia, and the IBP-
BOG34 likewise filed their respective comments.
Position of IBP-Southern Luzon
In support of its bid to qualify in the election for EVP for the 2011-
2013 term, IBP-Southern Luzon takes the following positions:
● In view of the Court’s resolution to bar its representative, Vinluan,
from succeeding as IBP-President for the 2009-2011 term, the IBP-
Southern Luzon was effectively deprived of its right to the IBP
presidency.35
● With the election of Eugene A. Tan as IBP-President (January 29,
1990-April 1991), IBP-Western Visayas should no longer be allowed
to field a candidate in the forthcoming election for EVP.36
● As he was just elected on January 5, 2013, Ubano cannot be
considered qualified to seek the position of EVP cum IBP-President
due to his lack of experience.37
Position of IBP-Western Visayas
For its part, IBP-Western Visayas advances the following arguments in
support of its position that it is the only region qualified to field a
candidate for EVP for the 2011-2013 term:
● The Petition in Intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon should not be
entertained as it would be contrary to Section 2, Rule 19, it being filed
following the finality of the December 14, 2010 Resolution of the
Court.38
● With the term of current IBP-President Libarios coming to an end,
IBP-Western Visayas is the only region left qualified to field a
candidate for EVP, pursuant to the December 14, 2010 Resolution of
the Court.39
● The IBP Southern Luzon had already taken its turn in the rotation
system following the election of Vinluan as EVP (2007-2009) and
Raoul R. Angangco (Angangco) who also served as EVP during the
1995-1997 term.401âwphi1
● The election of Eugene Tan cannot be considered as part of the
current rotation as he was elected following the special elections held
as a result of the October 6, 1989 Resolution of the Court.
Synthesized, the core issues that must be addressed for the resolution
of the Court are the following:
A. Whether the motion for intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon can be
allowed and admitted.
B. Whether the first rotational cycle was completed with the election
of Atty. Leonard De Vera.
C. Whether IBP-Southern Luzon has already served in the current
rotation.
D. Whether the IBP-Western Visayas has already served in the current
rotation.
The Motion for Intervention Should be Allowed and Admitted
There is no dispute that the Constitution has empowered the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules concerning "the integrated bar."41 Pursuant
thereto, the Court wields a continuing power of supervision over the
IBP and its affairs like the elections of its officers. The current
controversy has been precipitated by the petition in intervention of
IBP-Southern Luzon, praying that the election of the EVP for the
2011-2013 term be opened to all and that it be considered as qualified
to field a candidate for the said position.
In the exercise of its continuing supervisory power, the Court is
allowing the matter to be raised as an issue because it has not yet been
squarely settled, as will be pointed out later on.1âwphi1 Moreover, it is
not only an exercise of its constitutional and statutory mandated duty,
but also of its symbolic function of providing guiding principles,
precepts and doctrines42 for the purpose of steering the members of the
bench and the bar to the proper path.
It should be noted that this is merely an administrative matter, a bar
matter to be specific, where technical rules are not strictly applied. In
fact, in administrative cases, there is no rule regarding entry of
judgment. Where there is no entry of
judgment, finality and immutability do not come into play. On several
occasions, the Court has re-opened administrative cases and modified
its decisions that had long attained finality in the interest of justice. A
recent example is Talens-Dabon v. Judge Arceo,43 where the Court
lifted the ban against the disqualification of the respondent from re-
employment in government. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for
Clemency,44 the Court granted clemency so the respondent could
transfer to a higher position. In Petition for Judicial Clemency of
Judge Irma Zita v. Masamayor,45 the respondent was given judicial
clemency for her past administrative offenses so she could apply for a
lateral transfer.
At any rate, granting that technical rules are strictly applied in
administrative matters, the Court can exercise its power and
prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their
operation if and when justice requires it. "The power to suspend or
even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling
as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared
final."46
The First Rotational Cycle Already Completed
As earlier recited, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws was amended in the
December 14, 2010 Resolution47 of the Court to read as follows:
Sec. 47. National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
shall have a President, an Executive Vice President, and nine (9)
regional Governors. The Executive Vice President shall be elected on
a strict rotation basis by the Board of Governors from among
themselves, by the vote of at least five (5) Governors. The Governors
shall be ex officio Vice President for their respective regions. There
shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors.
The violation of the rotation rule in any election shall be penalized by
annulment of the election and disqualification of the offender from
election or appointment to any office in the IBP.
From the above, it is clear that the amendment was effected to
underscore the shift of the rotation from the position of president to
that of EVP. The purpose of the system being to ensure that all the
regions will have an equal opportunity to serve as EVP and then
automatically succeed as president.
As previously mentioned, in Velez,48 the Court stated that the rotation
system applies to the election of the EVP only and considered the
service of then EVP De Vera, representing the Eastern Mindanao
region, as having completed the first rotational cycle. For said reason,
the Court affirmed the election of Salazar of Bicolandia as EVP. The
Court explained that the rotation cycle with respect to the presidency
would have been completed with the succession of EVP De Vera as
IBP-President. The specific words used in Velez49 were:
In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is
actually rotated among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with
respect to the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic succession
rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains
in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic
succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to
the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic succession rule
provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon
the election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions
had already produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It
is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Vera's
removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to
assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the
rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty.
de Vera to the IBP Presidency.
The notion that the ruling in Velez50 should not be considered at all by
the Court because it is barred by the Omnibus Motion Rule deserves
scant consideration. It may have been earlier overlooked, but the Court
is not barred from motu propio taking judicial notice of such judicial
pronouncement, pursuant to its continuing supervisory powers over the
IBP.
The Second Rotational Cycle
While there may have been no categorical pronouncement in Velez
that the second rotational cycle started with the election of Salazar as
EVP, it cannot be denied that it was so. With the Velez declaration that
the election of De Vera as EVP completed the first cycle, there can be
no other consequence except that the term of EVP Salazar commenced
a new rotational cycle. From the records, it appears that the following
had already served as EVP in the Second Rotational Cycle:
1. Jose Vicente Salazar Bicolandia 2005
2. Feliciano M. Bautista Central Luzon 2005-2007
3. Rogelio Vinluan Southern Luzon 2007-2009
4. Roan L. Libarios Eastern Mindanao 2009-2011
As there were only four (4) regions which had served as EVP, there
are still five (5) other regions which have not yet so served. These
regions are:
1. Northern Luzon
2. Greater Manila Area
3. Eastern Visayas
4. Western Visayas
5. Western Mindanao
Needless to state, Western Visayas is not the only region that can vie
for EVP for the 2011-2013 term. This answers the query of Fortunato.
51
With respect to IBP-Southern Luzon, following the ruling in Velez, it
is clear that it already had its turn to serve as EVP in the Second
Rotational Cycle.
The Special Committee failed to take into account the Velez ruling
52
In arriving at its December 14, 2010 Resolution, the Court then was
confronted with limited issues. Among those were: 1] the validity of
the election of Nasser A. Marohomsalic as governor of the IBP-
Western Mindanao Region; 2] the validity of the election of Manuel
M. Maramba as governor for the Greater Manila Region for the term
2009-2011; 3] the validity of the election of Erwin M. Fortunato as
governor for Western Visayas Region for the term 2009-2011; and 4]
the validity of the elections for EVP for the 2009-2011 term presided
by then IBP-President Bautista. The four issues were intertwined since
the validity of the elections presided by IBP-President Bautista was
questioned on the alleged lack of quorum, as it was attended by
Marohomsalic, whose own election was then also being questioned.
With those limited issues resolved, the Court directed that special
elections should be held for the election of EVP for the remaining
2009-2011 term "to heal the divisions in the IBP and promote unity by
enabling all the nine (9) governors-elect to elect the EVP in a unified
meeting called for that purpose."53 In ordering the special elections to
be conducted, the Court took into account the report of the Special
Committee as follows:
The list of national presidents furnished the Special Committee by the
IBP National Secretariat, shows that the governors of the following
regions were President of the IBP during the past nine (9) terms (1991-
2009):
Numeriano Tanopo, Jr. (Pangasinan) --- Central Luzon ------- 1991-
1993
Mervin G. Encanto (Quezon City) -------- Manila --------------- 1993-
1995
Raoul R. Angangco (Makati) ------------- Southern Luzon ----- 1995-
1997
Jose Aguila Grapilon (Biliran) ----------- Eastern Visayas ----– 1997-
1999
Arthur D. Lim (Zambasulta) ------------- Western Mindanao--1999-
2001
Teofilo S. Pilando, Jr. (Kalinga-Apayao)-Northern Luzon –--- 2001-
2003
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (Camarines Sur) –Bicolandia ---------- 2003-
2005
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (Camarines Sur) –Bicolandia -----2005-Aug
2006
Jose Vicente B. Salazar (Albay) ---------- Bicolandia ---- Aug. 2006-
2007
Feliciano M. Bautista (Pangasinan) ----- Central Luzon ------ 2007-
2009
Only the governors of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao
regions have not yet had their turn as Executive Vice President cum
next IBP President, while Central Luzon and Bicolandia have had two
(2) terms already.
Therefore, either the governor of the Western Visayas Region, or the
governor of the Eastern Mindanao Region should be elected as
Executive Vice-President for the 2009-2011 term. The one who is not
chosen for this term, shall have his turn in the next (2011-2013) term.
Afterwards, another rotation shall commence with Greater Manila in
the lead, followed by Southern Luzon, Eastern Visayas, Western
Mindanao, Northern Luzon, Bicolandia, Central Luzon, and either
Western Visayas or Eastern Mindanao at the end of the round.54
Apparently, the report of the Special Committee failed to take into
account the ruling in Velez55 that the service of then EVP Leonard De
Vera, representing the Eastern Mindanao region, completed the first
rotational cycle.
Thus, it committed two inaccuracies. First, it erroneously reported that
"only the governors of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao
regions have not yet had their turn as Executive Vice President."
Second, it erroneously considered Central Luzon and Bicolandia as
having had two terms each in the First Rotational Cycle, when their
second services were for the Second Rotational Cycle.
The unfortunate fact, however, is that the erroneous statements of the
Special Committee were used as bases for the recommendation that
"either the governor of the Western Visayas Region, or the governor of
the Eastern Mindanao Region should be elected as Executive Vice-
President for the 2009-2011 term."
Worse, they were cited by IBP-Western Visayas as bases to oppose the
Petition in Intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon, arguing that it would
be contrary to Section 2, Rule 19, it being filed following the finality
of the December 14, 2010 Resolution56 of the Court.
At any rate, the statement of the Court in its December 14, 2010
Resolution57 that "only the governors of the Western Visayas and
Eastern Mindanao regions have not yet had their turn as Executive
Vice President," did not pertain to the lis mota of the case. Thus, it did
not settle anything so as to be deemed a precedent-setting ruling.
Those statements, therefore, could not be considered as overturning,
vacating and setting aside the ruling in Velez58 that the service of then
EVP De Vera completed the first rotational cycle.
The election of Eugene Tan As IBP President
Much has been said about the election of Eugene Tan as IBP-
President. IBP-Southern Luzon argues that with his election and
service as IBP-President from January 29, 1990 to April 1991, the
IBP-Western Visayas should no longer be allowed to field a candidate
in the forthcoming elections for the EVP.59 IBP-Western
Visayas counters that his election could not be considered as part of
the current rotation as he was elected following the special elections
held as a result of the October 6, 1989 Resolution of the Court. It has
also been argued that he merely served as Interim President.
As Velez60 declared that the election of EVP De Vera completed the
first rotational cycle, it could only mean that all regions had their
respective turns in the first rotational cycle. Thus, in this second
rotational cycle, issues as to the nature of his election and service as
IBP-President during the First Rotational Cycle are inconsequential.
At any rate, Eugene Tan could not be considered as an interim
president. It was Justice Felix Antonio who was designated by the
Court as Interim Caretaker until the election of the IBP-President by
the elected IBP-BOG. The election of the new President and Executive
Vice-President was directed by the Court itself and in no way can it be
said that they served on an interim basis. Besides, at that time, under
Section 47, the rotation concerned the presidency only. Section 47 was
ordered to be amended only in the December 14, 2010
Resolution,61 despite Bar Matter No. 491 and Velez,62 which
recognized the operational fact that the rotation was from the position
of President to that of EVP.
If Eugene Tan served only up to April, 1991, it was not because he
served merely in the interim. He served up to that time only because
he resigned. As reflected in Bar Matter No. 565, dated October 15,
1991, Tan resigned as IBP-President when he was charged by several
staff members of the IBP in a letter-complaint to the Chief Justice,
with favoritism or discrimination in the hiring of officers and
employees in the IBP and with extravagant and irregular expenditure
of IBP funds. The Court found the acts of Eugene Tan as constituting
grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct in office, which
would have warranted his removal from office. Considering that he
had earlier tendered his resignation as IBP-President and his term of
office already expired on June 30, 1991, the Court imposed on him the
penalty of severe censure only.63
Moreover, in A.M. No. 491, the Court stressed that: "One who has
served as President of the IBP may not run for election as EVP-IBP in
a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among
the nine (9) regions shall have completed; whereupon the rotation shall
begin anew."
Rotation by Exclusion
As clarified in the December 4, 2012 Resolution of the Court, the
rotation should be by exclusion. In said resolution, it was stated:
Resolution of the Court
Re: IBP-Western Visayas Region
After an assiduous review of the facts, the issues and the arguments
raised by the parties involved, the Court finds wisdom in the position
of the IBP-BOG, through retired Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, that at
the start of a new rotational cycle "all chapters are deemed qualified to
vie for the governorship for the 2011-2013 term without prejudice to
the chapters entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained
sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each chapter will have its
turn in the rotation." Stated differently, the IBP-BOG recommends the
adoption of the rotation by exclusion scheme. The Court quotes with
approval the reasons given by the IBP-BOG on this score:
6. After due deliberation, the Board of Governors agreed and resolved
to recommend adherence to the principle of "rotation by exclusion"
based on the following reasons:
a) Election through "rotation by exclusion" is the more established rule
in the IBP. The rule prescribes that once a member of the chapter is
elected as Governor, his chapter would be excluded in the next turn
until all have taken their turns in the rotation cycle. Once a full rotation
cycle ends and a fresh cycle commences, all the chapters in the region
are once again entitled to vie but subject again to the rule on rotation
by exclusion.
b) Election through a "rotation by exclusion" allows for a more
democratic election process. The rule provides for freedom of choice
while upholding the equitable principle of rotation which assures that
every member-chapter has its turn in every rotation cycle.
c) On the other hand, rotation by pre-ordained sequence, or election
based on the same order as the previous cycle, tends to defeat the
purpose of an election. The element of choice – which is crucial to a
democratic process – is virtually removed. Only one chapter could vie
for election at every turn as the entire sequence, from first to last, is
already predetermined by the order in the previous rotation cycle. This
concept of rotation by pre-ordained sequence negates freedom of
choice, which is the bedrock of any democratic election process.
d) The pronouncement of the Special Committee, which the Supreme
Court may have adopted in AM No. 09-5-2-SC, involving the
application of the rotation rule in the previous election for GMR may
not be controlling, not being one of the principal issues raised in the
GMR elections.
7. Thus, applying the principle of ‘rotation by exclusion’ in Western
Visayas which starts with a new rotation cycle, all chapters (with the
exception of Romblon) are deemed qualified to vie for the
Governorship for 2011-2013 term without prejudice to the chapters
entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the
new rotation cycle provided each chapter will have its turn in the
rotation.
The Court takes notice of the predictability of the rotation by
succession scheme. Through the rotation by exclusion scheme, the
elections would be more genuine as the opportunity to serve as
Governor at any time is once again open to all chapters, unless, of
course, a chapter has already served in the new cycle. While
predictability is not altogether avoided, as in the case where only one
chapter remains in the cycle, still, as previously noted by the Court
"the rotation rule should be applied in harmony with, and not in
derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate as expressed through
the ballot."
Thus, as applied in the IBP-Western Visayas Region, initially, all the
chapters shall have the equal opportunity to vie for the position of
Governor for the next cycle except Romblon, so as no chapter shall
serve consecutively. Every winner shall then be excluded after its
term. Romblon then joins the succeeding elections after the first
winner in the cycle.64
As stated therein, it would be without prejudice to the regions entering
into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the new
rotation cycle, provided each region would have its turn in the rotation.
As noted by the Court in its December 4, 2012 Resolution, there is a
sense of predictability in the rotation by the pre-ordained scheme.
Through the rotation by exclusion scheme, the elections will be more
genuine, as the opportunity to serve at any time is once again open to
all, unless, of course, a region has already served in the new cycle.
While predictability is not altogether avoided, as in the case where
only one region remains in the cycle, still, as previously noted by the
Court "the rotation rule should be applied in harmony with, and not in
derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate as expressed through
the ballot."65
The December 14, 2010 Resolution
That the Court, in its December 14, 2010 Resolution,66 ordered the
election of the EVP-IBP for the next term based on the inaccurate
report of the Special Committee, is a fact. That cannot be erased. As a
consequence thereof, Libarios of IBP-Eastern Mindanao is now the
IBP President. He, however, is part of the second rotational
cycle because 1] in Velez67 it was categorically ruled that the service
of then EVP De Vera, representing the Eastern Mindanao
region, completed the first rotational cycle; and 2] he could not be
part of the first rotational cycle because EVP de Vera of the same
region had already been elected as such.
It is to be noted that in the December 14, 2010 Resolution,68 the Court
did not categorically overturn the ruling in Velez.69 It merely directed
the election of the next EVP, without any reference to any rotational
cycle.
To declare that the first rotational cycle as not yet completed will
cause more confusion than solution. In fact, it has spawned this current
controversy. To consider the service of current president, Libarios, as
part of the first rotational cycle would completely ignore the ruling in
Velez.70
The Best Option: Open to All Regions
How then do we treat the turns of those who had already served in the
second rotational cycle? Shall we treat them as anomalies? As aberrant
developments, as Justice Brion puts it?
A remedy is to reconcile the conflicting decisions and resolutions with
nothing in mind but the best interest of the IBP. It appears from the
pleadings, however, that the differences are irresoluble.
To avoid the endless conflicts, confusions and controversies which
have been irritably plaguing the IBP, the solution is to start another
rotational round, a new cycle, open to all regions. At any rate, all
regions, after the election of Libarios, would be considered as already
having its turn in the presidency. This is not to detract from the fact
that under Section 47, as amended, and from the pertinent rulings, the
position of EVP-IBP is the one being actually rotated, but as stated in
the December 14, 2010 Resolution,71 it will enable the IBP "to start on
a clean and correct slate, free from the politicking and the under
handed tactics that have characterized the IBP elections for so long."
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws should be further amended
Whatever the decision of the Court may be, to prevent future
wranglings and guide the IBP in their future course of action, Section
47 and Section 49 of the IBP By-laws should again be amended. Stress
should be placed on the automatic succession of the EVP to the
position of the president. Surprisingly, the automatic succession does
not appear in present Section 47, as ordered amended by the Court in
the December 14, 2010 Resolution. It should be restored. Accordingly,
Section 47 and Section 49, Article VII, are recommended to read as
follows:
Sec. 47. Election of National President Executive Vice President. –
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President, an
Executive Vice President, and nine (9) regional Governors. The
Governors shall be ex-officio Vice President for their respective
regions.
The Board of Governors shall elect the President and Executive Vice
President from among themselves each by a vote of at least five (5)
Governors. Upon expiration of the term of the President, the Executive
Vice-President shall automatically succeed as President.
Each region, as enumerated under Section 3, Rule 139-A of the Rules
of Court, shall have the opportunity to have its representative elected
as Executive Vice-President, provided that, the election for the
position of Executive Vice President shall be on a strict rotation by
exclusion basis. A region, whose representative has just been elected
as Executive Vice President, can no longer have its representative
elected for the same position in subsequent elections until after all
regions have had the opportunity to be elected as such. At the end of
the rotational cycle, all regions, except the region whose representative
has just served the immediately preceding term, may be elected for
another term as Executive Vice-President in the new rotational cycle.
The region whose representative served last in the previous rotational
cycle may be elected Executive Vice-President only after the first term
of the new rotational cycle ends, subject once more to the rule on
exclusion.
The order of rotation by exclusion shall be without prejudice to the
regions entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequence
in the new rotation cycle provided each region will have its turn in the
rotation.
A violation of the rotation rule in any election shall be penalized by
annulment of the election and disqualification of the offender from
election or appointment to any office in the IBP.
SEC. 49. Terms of office. - The President and the Executive Vice-
President shall hold office for a term of two years from July 1
following their election until June 30 of their second year in office and
until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and
duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the
event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the
Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the
unexpired portion of the term. His tenure as such shall not be
considered a new turn in the rotation.
In the event of death, resignation, removal or disability of the
Executive Vice President, the Board of Directors shall elect among the
regions qualified to be elected as Executive Vice President to serve the
unexpired portion of the term or period of disability.
In the event of the death, resignation, removal or disability of both the
President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors
shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired portion
of the term or during the period of disability. Unless otherwise
provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed
by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the
pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix.
u>Creation of a permanent Committee for IBP Affairs
To further avoid conflicting and confusing rulings in the various IBP
cases like what happened to this one, the December 14,2010
Resolution and Velez,72 it is recommended that the Court create a
committee for IBP affairs to primarily attend to the problems and
needs of a very important professional body and to make
recommendation for its improvement and strengthening.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to:
1] GRANT the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit the
Attached Petition In Intervention;
2] DECLARE that the election for the position of the EVP for the
2011-2013 term be open to all regions.
3] AMEND Section 47 and Section 49, Article VII of the IBP By-
Laws to read as recommended in the body of this disposition.
4] CREATE a permanent Committee for IBP Affairs.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
A.C. No. 6732, October 22, 2013
ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WESTERN
VISAYAS, REGIONAL OFFICE (NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN
PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant, v. ATTY. SALVADOR N.
PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN
JOSE, ANTIQUE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a
court of law is guilty of the gravest misconduct and deserves the
supreme penalty of disbarment.
The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr. (respondent) of San
Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an inexistent decision
of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong,
Antique (RTC) instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by Regional
Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC,
received a written communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a
Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a copy of
the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O.
Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of
the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose
petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.1
On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr.
Hunt, reiterating the request for a copy of the decision in Special
Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.2
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records
of Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then
discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084
wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court files
revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special Proceedings No. 084
entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not
exist,3 Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated October 12, 2004 attaching a
machine copy of the purported decision in Special Proceedings No.
084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Rey Laserna that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court
proceedings in the UK.4
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the
document attached to the October 12, 2004 letter was a falsified court
document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the
situation.5
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to
communicate on the situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the
investigation of the falsification.6
In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed
an affidavit on March 4, 2005,7 wherein he stated that it was the
respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the falsified decision in
Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration
of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The
allegations against the respondent were substantially corroborated by
Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit dated
March 20, 2005.8
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,9 but he invoked his
constitutional right to remain silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to
Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the latter appeared and gave
his sworn statement.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of
the Ombudsman for Visayas the records of the investigation, with a
recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for falsification of
public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal
Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).10 The NBI likewise
recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator that disbarment
proceedings be commenced against the respondent.11 Then Court
Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member of the Court)
officially endorsed the recommendation to the Office of the Bar
Confidant.12
Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his
counter-affidavit,13 whereby he denied any participation in the
falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion on
Shirley’s petition for the annulment of her marriage; that he had given
advice on the pertinent laws involved and the different grounds for the
annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone back
to him to present a copy of what appeared to be a court decision;14 that
Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him that he had caused the
falsification of the decision; that he had advised Dy Quioyo that the
falsified decision would not hold up in an investigation; that Dy
Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted
to people on Recto Avenue in Manila to solve his documentation
problems as an OFW; and that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles
Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao,
Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn statement before Police
Investigator Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to
the effect that her late husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible
for making the falsified document at the instance of Dy Quioyo.15
Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondent’s
counter-affidavit as his comment, and referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006,17 Atty. Lolita A.
Quisumbing, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, found the
respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations of the
Attorney’s Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year.
She concluded that the respondent had forged the purported decision
of Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special Proceedings No.
084 concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rey
Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner, when in truth and in
fact the proceedings related to the petition for declaration of
presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as
the petitioner;18 and that the respondent had received P60,000.00 from
Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision. She rationalized her conclusions
thusly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respondent’s denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends
that it was one Manuel Jalipa (deceased) who facilitated the issuance
and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn statement of the widow of
Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the first
place, if the decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an
almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision on file in Judge
Penuela’s branch except for the names and dates? Respondent failed to
explain this. Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI investigation
and merely invoked his right to remain silent. If his side of the story
were true, he should have made this known in the investigation. His
story therefore appears to have been a mere afterthought. Finally, there
is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose
Quioyo would falsely implicate him in this incident.19
In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 2007,20 the
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner by
suspending the respondent from the practice of law for six years.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-70921 denying the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-2007-063. The
IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in
accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B22 of the Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondent’s
comment/opposition as his appeal by petition for review; (2) to
consider the complainant’s reply as his comment on the petition for
review; (3) to require the respondent to file a reply to the
complainant’s comment within 10 days from notice; and (4) to direct
the IBP to transmit the original records of the case within 15 days from
notice.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the
respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for falsifying a court
decision in consideration of a sum of money.
The respondent’s main defense consisted in blanket denial of the
imputation. He insisted that he had had no hand in the falsification,
and claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of Dy
Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady
characters in Recto Avenue in Manila to resolve the problems he had
encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a history of
employing unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.
However, the respondent’s denial and his implication against Dy
Quioyo in the illicit generation of the falsified decision are not
persuasive. Dy Quioyo’s categorical declaration on the respondent’s
personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was
positive evidence, was not overcome by the respondent’s blanket
denial, which by nature was negative evidence.23 Also, the imputation
of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did
not command credence. It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent
filed his counter-affidavit only after the Court, through the en
banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him to comment.24 The
belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing more
than an afterthought.
The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by
Mrs. Jalipa that declared that her deceased husband had been
instrumental in the falsification of the forged decision. But such
reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife
was rendered unreliable due to its patently hearsay character. In
addition, the unworthiness of the sworn statement as proof of
authorship of the falsification by the husband is immediately exposed
and betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost verbatim
reproduction of the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in the
real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of
grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision
in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at
all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.” Lawyers are further
required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to
engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law.25 Specifically, the deliberate falsification of
the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high
degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery
of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the
falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal
status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a
member of the Bar.
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the
legal profession is always a privilege that the Court extends only to the
deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to
him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer’s Oath and the
canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities. He
may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for
acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his
professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly
connected with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness for the
office and his unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to
practice law confers upon him.27 Verily, no lawyer is immune from the
disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to
investigate and punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a
professional or private capacity.28 The test is whether the conduct
shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity,
and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer
unworthy to continue as an officer of the
Court.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar

that they should do nothing that may in any way or degree lessen the WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST.
confidence of the public in their professional fidelity and PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of
integrity.26 The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code
discipline on those among them who wittingly and willingly fail to of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him effective upon
meet the enduring demands of their Attorney’s Oath for them receipt of this decision.
to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST.
x x x support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood,
Roll of Attorneys.
nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give
This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated
aid nor consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or malice,
proceedings to be initiated against ASST. PROVINCIAL
and x x x conduct [themselves as lawyers] according to the best of
PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
[their] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to [their] clients x x x.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts of the country, and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion,

Peralta, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-
Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Del Castillo, J., on leave.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6052 December 11, 2003
IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE
VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS, FROM BEING
ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN
THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS
OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and
TONY VELEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA And IBP BOARD OF
GOVERNORS, respondents.
DECISION
TlNGA, J.:
This is a Petition1 filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel
Ravanera and Tony Velez, mainly seeking the disqualification of
respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera "from being elected Governor of
Eastern Mindanao" in the 16th Intergrated Bar of the Philippines
("IBP") Regional Governors’ elections. Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-
President of the Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera
and Velez are the past President and the incumbent President,
respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.
The facts as culled from the pleadings of the parties follow.
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") was
set on April 26, 2003, a month prior to the IBP National Convention
scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The election was so set in compliance
with Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By Laws, which reads:
SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least
one month before the national convention, the delegates from each
region shall elect the governor of their region, the choice of which
shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution2 No. XV-2003-
99 dated April 16, 2003, reset the elections to May 31, 2003, or after
the IBP National Convention.
Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the
Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter in Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P.
Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, sent a
letter3 dated 28 March 2003, requesting the IBP Board to reconsider its
Resolution of April 6, 2003. Their Motion was anchored on two
grounds viz. (1) adhering to the mandate of Section 39 of the IBP By
Laws to hold the election of Regional Governors at least one month
prior to the national convention of the IBP will prevent it from being
politicized since post-convention elections may otherwise lure the
candidates into engaging in unacceptable political practices, and; (2)
holding the election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the
outgoing IBP Board from resolving protests in the election for
governors not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed in Section 40 of
the IBP By Laws, to wit:
SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an
election shall, within two days after the announcement of the results of
the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a written
protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such
petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the
outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the protest, with
due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be
announced not later than the following May 31, and shall be final and
conclusive.
On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for
reconsideration in its Resolution No. XV-2003-162.4
On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been
adjourned in the afternoon of May 24, 2003, the petitioners filed
a Petition5 dated 23 May 2003 before the IBP Board seeking (1) the
postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the second or
third week of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of respondent De
Vera "from being elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao
Region."
The IBP Board denied the Petition in a Resolution issued on May 29,
2003. The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, two specific reliefs are being sought, to wit, first, the
postponement of the elections for regional governors and, second, the
disqualification of Atty. Leonard de Vera.
WHEREAS, anent the first relief sought, the Board finds no
compelling justification for the postponement of the elections
especially considering that preparations and notices had already been
completed.
WHEREAS, with respect to the disqualifications of Atty. Leonard de
Vera, this Board finds the petition to be premature considering that no
nomination has yet been made for the election of IBP regional
governor.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Board hereby resolves, as it hereby
resolves, to deny the petition.6
Probably thinking that the IBP Board had not yet acted on
their Petition, on the same date, May 29, 2003, the petitioners filed the
present Petition before this Court, seeking the same reliefs as those
sought in their Petition before the IBP.
On the following day, May 30, 2003, acting upon the petitioners’
application, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
directing the IBP Board, its agents, representatives or persons acting in
their place and stead to cease and desist from proceeding with the
election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao.7
Citing the IBP By-Laws, the petitioners expound on the mechanics for
the selection of the IBP officers from the Chapter Officers up to the
Regional Governors constituting the IBP Board which is its highest
policy-making body, as well as the underlying dynamics, to wit:
IBP Chapter Officers headed by the President are elected for a term of
two years. The IBP Chapter Presidents in turn, elect their respective
Regional Governors following the rotation rule. The IBP has nine (9)
regions, viz: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Greater Manila, Southern
Luzon, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern
Mindanao and Western Mindanao. The governors serve for a term of
two (2) years beginning on the 1st of July of the first year and ending
on the 30th of June of the second year.
From the members of the newly constituted IBP Board, an Executive
Vice President (EVP) shall be chosen, also on rotation basis. The
rationale for the rotation rule in the election of both the Regional
Governors and the Vice President is to give everybody a chance to
serve the IBP, to avoid politicking and to democratize the selection
process.
Finally, the National President is not elected. Under the By-Laws,
whoever is the incumbent EVP will automatically be the National
President for the following term.
Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern
Mindanao, have had two (2) National Presidents each. Following the
rotation rule, whoever will be elected Regional Governor for Eastern
Mindanao Region in the 16th Regional Governors elections will
automatically become the EVP for the term July 1, 2003 to June 30,
2005. For the next term in turn, i.e., from July 1, 2005 to June 20,
2007, the EVP immediately before then will automatically assume the
post of IBP National President.
Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera
had transferred his IBP membership from the Pasay, Paranaque, Las
Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter,
stressing that he indeed covets the IBP presidency.8 The transfer of
IBP membership to Agusan del Sur, the petitioners went on, is a
brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery of the
domicile rule and a great insult to lawyers from Eastern Mindanao for
it implies that there is no lawyer from the region qualified and willing
to serve the IBP.9
Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of
regional governor, executive vice-president and national president, the
petitioners submit that respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral
aptitude. According to them, respondent De Vera was sanctioned by
the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC
Justices during the deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder
law. They add that he could have been disbarred in the United States
for misappropriating his client’s funds had he not surrendered his
California license to practice law. Finally, they accuse him of having
actively campaigned for the position of Eastern Mindanao Governor
during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, a
prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws.10
After seeking leave of court, respondent De Vera filed on June 9, 2003
a Respectful Comment 11 on the Petition.
In his defense, respondent De Vera raises new issues. He argues that
this Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy, contending
that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination
of the qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is
purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and
exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP. Respondent De
Vera also assails the petitioners’ legal standing, pointing out that the
IBP By-Laws does not have a provision for the disqualification of IBP
members aspiring for the position of Regional governors, for instead
all that it provides for is only an election protest under Article IV,
Section 40, pursuant to which only a qualified nominee can validly
lodge an election protest which is to be made after, not before, the
election. He posits further that following the rotation rule, only
members from the Surigao del Norte and Agusan del Sur IBP chapters
are qualified to run for Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region for the
term 2003-2005, and the petitioners who are from Bukidnon and
Misamis Oriental are not thus qualified to be nominees.12
Meeting the petitioners’ contention head on, respondent De Vera avers
that an IBP member is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter
membership.13 He cites the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II and
Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws, thus:
Article II, Section 19. Registration. - xxx Unless he otherwise registers
his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a
member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or
area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is
located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one
Chapter.
Article IV, Section 29-2. Membership- The Chapter comprises all
members registered in its membership roll. Each member shall
maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any of the
grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers
his membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the
latter, provided that the transfer is made not less than three months
immediately preceding any Chapter election.
The right to transfer membership, respondent De Vera stresses, is also
recognized in Section 4, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court which is
exactly the same as the first of the above-quoted provisions of the IBP
By-Laws, thus:
Rule 139-A, Section 4. xxx Unless he otherwise registers his
preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a
member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or
area where his office, or, in the absence thereof, his residence is
located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one
Chapter.
Clarifying that it was upon the invitation of the officers and members
of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter that he transferred his IBP
membership, respondent De Vera submits that it is unfair and unkind
for the petitioners to state that his membership transfer was done for
convenience and as a mere subterfuge to qualify him for the Eastern
Mindanao governorship.14
On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he
exhibited disrespect to the Court or to any of its members during its
deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. As for the
administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when
he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to
surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it
cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack
of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is
as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative
charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere
preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory in
character similar to the recommendatory findings of an IBP
Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of
and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the
complainant in the California administrative case has retracted the
accusation that he misappropriated the complainant’s money, but
unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating
officer. Finally, on the alleged politicking he committed during the
IBP National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, he states that it is
baseless to assume that he was campaigning simply because he
declared that he had 10 votes to support his candidacy for
governorship in the Eastern Mindanao Region and that the petitioners
did not present any evidence to substantiate their claim that he or his
handlers had billeted the delegates from his region at the Century Park
Hotel.15
On July 7, 2003, the petitioners filed their Reply16 to the Respectful
Comment of respondent De Vera who, on July 15, 2003, filed
an Answer and Rejoinder.17
In a Resolution18 dated 5 August 2003, the Court directed the other
respondent in this case, the IBP Board, to file its comment on
the Petition. The IBP Board, through its General Counsel, filed
a Manifestation19 dated 29 August 2003, reiterating the position stated
in its Resolution dated 29 May 2003 that "it finds the petition to be
premature considering that no nomination has as yet been made for the
election of IBP Regional Governors."20
Based on the arguments of the parties, the following are the main
issues, to wit:
(1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy;
(2) whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De
Vera, the determination of which in turn requires the resolution of two
sub-issues, namely:
(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper
remedy under the IBP By-Laws; and
(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;
(3) whether the present Petition is premature;
(4) assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the
present petition is not premature, whether respondent De Vera is
qualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region;
Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera
contends that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction on the present
controversy. As noted earlier, respondent De Vera submits that the
election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the
qualification of those who want to serve the IBP, is purely an internal
matter and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the IBP.
The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution confers on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate
rules affecting the IBP, thus:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and the legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the
activities of the IBP, including the election of its officers.
The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the
1935 Constitution. Section 13, Art. VIII thereof granted the Supreme
Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law. It reads:
SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution and
the similarly worded provision in the intervening 1973
Constitution21 through all the years have been the sources of this
Court’s authority to supervise individual members of the Bar. The
term "Bar" refers to the "collectivity of all persons whose names
appear in the Roll of Attorneys."22 Pursuant to this power of
supervision, the Court initiated the integration of the Philippine Bar by
creating on October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar Integration, which
was tasked to ascertain the advisability of unifying the Philippine
Bar.23 Not long after, Republic Act No. 639724 was enacted and it
confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to effect the integration of
the Philippine Bar. Finally, on January 1, 1973, in the per
curiam Resolution of this Court captioned "In the Matter of the
Integration of the Bar to the Philippines," we ordained the Integration
of the Philippine Bar in accordance with Rule 139-A, of the Rules of
Court, which we promulgated pursuant to our rule-making power
under the 1935 Constitution.
The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in
asserting IBP independence from the Supreme Court, ironically
recognizes the full range of the power of supervision of the Supreme
Court over the IBP. For one, Section 7725 of the IBP By-Laws vests on
the Court the power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws,
either motu propio or upon recommendation of the Board of
Governors of the IBP. Also in Section 15,26 the Court is authorized to
send observers in IBP elections, whether local or national. Section
4427 empowers the Court to have the final decision on the removal of
the members of the Board of Governors.
On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme
Court looked into the irregularities which attended the 1989 elections
of the IBP National Officers. In Bar Matter No. 491 entitled "In the
Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines" the Court formed a committee to make an inquiry into
the 1989 elections. The results of the investigation showed that the
elections were marred by irregularities, with the principal candidates
for election committing acts in violation of Section 14 of the IBP By-
Laws.28 The Court invalidated the elections and directed the conduct of
special elections, as well as explicitly disqualified from running thereat
the IBP members who were found involved in the irregularities in the
elections, in order to "impress upon the participants, in that electoral
exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the
stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore
the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely
eliminate, expensive electioneering."
The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws.
First, it removed direct election by the House of Delegates of the (a)
officers of the House of Delegates; (b) IBP President; and (c)
Executive Vice-President (EVP). Second, it restored the former system
of the IBP Board choosing the IBP President and the Executive Vice
President (EVP) from among themselves on a rotation basis (Section
47 of the By-Laws, as amended) and the automatic succession by the
EVP to the position of the President upon the expiration of their
common two-year term. Third, it amended Sections 37 and 39 by
providing that the Regional Governors shall be elected by the members
of their respective House of Delegates and that the position of
Regional Governor shall be rotated among the different chapters in the
region.
The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme
Court over the IBP and establish without doubt its jurisdiction to hear
and decide the present controversy.
In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have no
cause of action against him, respondent De Vera argues that the IBP
By-Laws does not allow petitions to disqualify candidates for Regional
Governors since what it authorizes are election protests or post-
election cases under Section 40 thereof which reads:
SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an
election shall, within two days after the announcement of the results of
the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a written
protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such
petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the
outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the protest, with
due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be
announced not later than the following May 31, and shall be final and
conclusive.
Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions
the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. The remedy it
provides for questioning the elections is the election protest. But this
remedy, as will be shown later, is not available to just anybody.
Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the
disqualification of nominees for the position of regional governor. This
was carefully detailed in the former Section 39(4) of the IBP By-Laws,
to wit:
SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. - Any question
relating to the eligibility of a candidate must be raised prior to the
casting of ballots, and shall be immediately decided by the Chairman.
An appeal from such decision may be taken to the Delegates in
attendance who shall forthwith resolve the appeal by plurality vote.
Voting shall be by raising of hands. The decision of the Delegates
shall be final, and the elections shall thereafter proceed. Recourse to
the Board of Governors may be had in accordance with Section 40.
The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on
nomination and election of the Board of Governors. Before, members
of the Board were directly elected by the members of the House of
Delegates at its annual convention held every other year.29 The election
was a two-tiered process. First, the Delegates from each region chose
by secret plurality vote, not less than two nor more than five nominees
for the position of Governor for their Region. The names of all the
nominees, arranged by region and in alphabetical order, were written
on the board within the full view of the House, unless complete
mimeographed copies of the lists were distributed to all the
Delegates.30 Thereafter, each Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate
voted for only one nominee for Governor for each Region.31 The
nominee from every Region receiving the highest number of votes was
declared and certified elected by the Chairman.32
In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP
elections, this Court deemed it best to amend the nomination and
election processes for Regional Governors. The Court localized the
elections, i.e, each Regional Governor is nominated and elected by the
delegates of the concerned region, and adopted the rotation process
through the following provisions, to wit:
SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of
nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3
of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one Governor for
each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates
from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated Norte are qualified to be nominated and elected at the election for the
among the different chapters in the region. 16th Regional Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant to the
rotation rule enunciated in the aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the
SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. - At least
IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter while
one (1) month before the national convention the delegates from each
the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis
region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which
Oriental IBP Chapter. Consequently, the petitioners are not even
shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming election.
The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and
On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present
thus made it less controversial. The grounds for disqualification were
petition.
reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the pool from which the
Delegates may choose their nominees is diminished as the rotation This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature
process operates. for the petitioners to seek the disqualification of respondent De Vera
from being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern Mindanao Region.
The simplification of the process was in line with this Court’s vision of
Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for
an Integrated Bar which is non-political33 and effective in the
the post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated for
discharge of its role in elevating the standards of the legal profession,
the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the
improving the administration of justice and contributing to the growth
members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao.
and progress of the Philippine society.34
Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated,
The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove he can always opt to decline the nomination.
the provision on disqualification proceedings. Consequently, under the
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post
present IBP By-Laws, the instant petition has no firm ground to stand
because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence
on.
is in Parañaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP
Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the
Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws, petitioners are not the proper persons way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the
to bring the suit for they are not qualified to be nominated in the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP
elections of regional governor for Eastern Mindanao. He argues that membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
following the rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws as
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19
amended, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del
Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme
Norte are qualified to be nominated.
Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or
Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the choice, thus:
present petition, petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit.
Section 19. Registration. -
As provided in the aforesaid section, only nominees can file with the
President of the IBP a written protest setting forth the grounds ....
therefor. As claimed by respondent De Vera, and not disputed by
petitioners, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a
lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province,
city, political subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence
thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a
member of more than one Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)
It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is
not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter
where his place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion
to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership.
Only when he does not register his preference that he will become a
member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains his
office. The only proscription in registering one’s preference is that a
lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact,
under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as
the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:
SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all members
registered in its membership roll. Each member shall maintain his
membership until the same is terminated on any of the grounds set
forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his
membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the
latter, provided that the transfer is made not less than three months
immediately preceding any Chapter election.
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the
transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the election
of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP
membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month
thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a
letter35 addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP
PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan
del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent De Vera’s transfer and
advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective
records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification
mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that De Vera’s
transfer was made effective sometime between August 1, 2001 and
September 3, 2001. On February 27, 2003, the elections of the IBP
Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as
mandated by Section 29-12.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that
elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last
Saturday of February of every other year.36 Between September 3,
2001 and February 27, 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This
makes respondent De Vera’s transfer valid as it was done more than
three months ahead of the chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.
Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified
because he is not morally fit to occupy the position of governor of
Eastern Mindanao.
We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic
requirements provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. The
basic qualifications for one who wishes to be elected governor for a
particular region are: (1) he is a member in good standing of the
IBP;37 2) he is included in the voter’s list of his chapter or he is not
disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated
Bar, or by the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he belongs;38 (3) he
does not belong to a chapter from which a regional governor has
already been elected, unless the election is the start of a new season or
cycle;39 and (4) he is not in the government service.40
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one
must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one,
this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidates
lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of
Delegates. Indeed, based on each member’s standard of morality, he is
free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses
the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the
disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should
emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by
this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which
involves moral turpitude.
Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the
basis of the alleged sanction imposed by the Supreme Court during the
deliberation on the constitutionality of the plunder law, is apparently
referring to this Court’s Decision dated 29 July 2002 in In Re:
Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the
Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera.41 In this case,
respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and
was imposed a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) for his remarks contained in two newspaper articles
published in the Inquirer. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions
of the report, with De Vera’s statements written in italics.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers
Plunder Law
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote
in favor of a petition filed by Estrada’s lawyers to declare the plunder
law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.
De Vera said he and his group were "greatly disturbed" by the rumors
from Supreme Court insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law, with two other justices still
undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said Plunder Watch, a
coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor the
prosecution of Estrada.
"We are afraid that the Estrada camp’s effort to coerce, bribe, or
influence the justices- considering that it has a P500 million slush fund
from the aborted power grab that May-will most likely result in a pro-
Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either unconstitutional or
vague," the group said.42
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Monday, November 19, 2001
SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes
Xxx
"People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged."
said lawyer Leonard De Vera of the Equal Justice for All Movement
and a leading member of the Estrada Resign movement.
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering
the plunder law unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably
more massive than those that led to People Power II.
Xxx
De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the "jueteng" scandal that
led to People Power II if the rumor turned out to be true.
"People wouldn’t just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is
basically wrong. Sovereignty must prevail. "43
In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera
admitted to have made said statements but denied to have uttered the
same "to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to
bring it into disrepute."44 He explained that he was merely exercising
his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech.
The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the
statements were aimed at influencing and threatening the Court to
decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law.45
The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera
immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt
does not involve moral turpitude.
In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines46 cited in Villaber v. WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De
Commission on Elections,47 the Court defines moral turpitude as "an Vera to run for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties the 16th election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and on 30 May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the election for the
man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED.
morals."48 The determination of whether an act involves moral Accordingly, the IBP Board of Governors is hereby ordered to hold
turpitude is a factual issue and frequently depends on the said election with proper notice and with deliberate speed.
circumstances attending the violation of the statute.49
SO ORDERED.
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing one’s opinion
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-
on a public interest issue can be considered as an act of baseness,
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
vileness or depravity.1âwphi1 Respondent De Vera did not bring
Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced
his views on the Plunder Law.50 Consequently, there is no basis for Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.
petitioner to invoke the administrative case as evidence of respondent
De Vera’s alleged immorality.
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De
Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that
no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court
finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest
the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he
found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these
explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic
rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the
same.51 In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the
administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera’s moral fitness to
run for governor.
Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had
housed the delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park
Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again petitioners did not
present any proof to substantiate the same. It must be emphasized that
bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof under our Rules of Court.52
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015
SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA
UMAGUING, Complainants, v. ATTY. WALLEN R. DE
VERA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 for the alleged
betrayal of trust, incompetence, and gross misconduct of respondent
Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera) in his handling of the
election protest case involving the candidacy of MariecrisUmaguing
(Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing
(complainants), for the SangguniangKabataan (SK) Elections,
instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
36 (MeTC), docketed as ELEC. CASE No. 07-
1279.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Facts
As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK
Chairman in the SK Elections for the year 2007 but lost to her rival
Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote.3 Because of this, complainants
lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera.
On November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to
pay his acceptance fee of P30,000.00, plus various court appearance
fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount of
P30,000.00.4 According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more
than enough time to prepare and file the case but the former moved at
a glacial pace and only took action when the November 8, 2008
deadline was looming.5 Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of
the necessary documents and attachments for the election protest. Two
(2) of these attachments are the Affidavits6 of material witnesses Mark
Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera (Almera), which was
personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid
affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they were
unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera allegedly
instructed AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and Hendricson Fielding
(Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and
Almera and ask them to sign over the names.7 The signing over of
Lachica’s and Almera’s names were done by Christina Papin (Papin)
and Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had all the
documents notarized before one Atty. DonatoManguiat (Atty.
Manguiat).8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately
disowned the signature affixed in the affidavit and submitted his own
Affidavit,9 declaring that he did not authorize Papin to sign the
document on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the
MeTC and drew the ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge
Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were
falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a
pleading to rectify this error (i.e., an Answer to Counterclaim with
Omnibus Motion,10 seeking, among others, the withdrawal of
Lachica’s and Almera’s affidavits), it was observed that such was a
mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to
have the affidavits personally signed by the affiants but still hastily
filed the election protest with full knowledge that the affidavits at hand
were falsified.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out
that Atty. De Vera did not appear before the MeTC, although promptly
notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did not offer
any explanation as to why he was not able to
attend.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an
explanation regarding his non-appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera
explained that he was hesitant in handling the particular case because
of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De
Vera, Judge Belosillo received P60,000.00 from the defense counsel,
Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order to acquire a favorable decision for his
client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for the case if
the complainants would give him P80,000.00, which he would in turn,
give to Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for
Umaguing.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity
and competency of Atty. De Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary
relations, the complainants asked the former to withdraw as their
counsel and to reimburse them the P60,000.00 in excessive fees he
collected from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the
case.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s
disbarment.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the
accusations lodged against him by complainants. He averred that he
merely prepared the essential documents for election protest based on
the statements of his clients.17 Atty. De Vera then explained that the
signing of Lachica’s falsified Affidavit was done without his
knowledge and likewise stated that it was Christina Papin who should
be indicted and charged with the corresponding criminal offense. He
added that he actually sought to rectify his mistakes by filing the
aforementioned Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in
order to withdraw the affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As he
supposedly felt that he could no longer serve complainants with his
loyalty and devotion in view of the aforementioned signing incident,
Atty. De Vera then withdrew from the case.18 To add, he pointed out
that along with his Formal Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel,
complainants executed a document entitled “Release Waiver &
Discharge,”19 which, to him, discharges him and his law firm from all
causes of action that complainants may have against him, including the
instant administrative case.
After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline,
the matter was submitted for report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In a Report and Recommendation20 dated December 5, 2009, the IBP
Commissioner found the administrative action to be impressed with
merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De Vera be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of two (2)
months.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that
Atty. De Vera participated in the falsification of Lachica’s affidavit,
the IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely with respect to the falsification
of Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty. De Vera deliberately
omitted to comment on. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out
that the testimony of Elsa Almera-Almacen, Almera’s sister – attesting
that Lalong-Isip approached her and asked if she could sign the
affidavit, and her vivid recollection that Atty. De Vera was present
during its signing, and that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that
she was not Almera – was found to be credible as it was too
straightforward and hard to ignore.22 It was also observed that the
backdrop in which the allegations were made, i.e., that the signing of
the affidavits was done on November 7, 2007, or one day before the
deadline for the filing of the election protest, showed that Atty. De
Vera was really pressed for time and, hence, his resort to the odious
act of advising his client’s campaigners Lalong-Isip and Fielding to
look for kin and relatives of the affiants for and in their behalf in his
earnest desire to beat the deadline set for the filing of the election
protest.23 To this, the IBP Investigating Commissioner remarked that
the lawyer’s first duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice, and therefore, his conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the
profession.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of
the IBP resolved to adopt the findings of the IBP Commissioner.
Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified document in court, a two
(2) month suspension was imposed against Atty. De Vera.
On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution27 dated February 11, 2014, affirming with modification
their December 14, 2012 Resolution, decreasing the period of
suspension from two (2) months to one (1) month.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be
held administratively liable.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same
were duly substantiated by the records. However, the Court finds it apt
to increase the period of suspension to six (6) months.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the
courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity,
and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are
the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine
Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that
every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona
fide member of the Law Profession, thus:28
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients;
and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.29 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of
the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court
or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant
of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as
be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a
coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.30 In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.”
After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself in
complete agreement with the IBP Investigating Commissioner, who
was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors, in holding that Atty. De
Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit, i.e.,Almera’s
affidavit, before the court in his desire to beat the November 8, 2008
deadline for filing the election protest of Umaguing. To this, the Court
is wont to sustain the IBP Investigating Commissioner’s appreciation
of Elsa Almera-Almacen’s credibility as a witness given that nothing
appears on record to seriously belie the same, and in recognition too of
the fact that the IBP and its officers are in the best position to assess On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document
the witness’s credibility during disciplinary proceedings, as they – captioned “Release Waiver & Discharge” which Atty. De Vera, in his
similar to trial courts – are given the opportunity to first-hand observe Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged him from all causes of
their demeanor and comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera action that complainants may have against him, such as the present
authorized the falsification of Almera’s affidavit is rendered more case, would not deny the Court its power to sanction him
believable by the absence of Atty. De Vera’s comment on the same. In administratively. It was held in Ylaya v.
fact, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors’ Gacott36 that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Resolution dated December 14, 2012, no specific denial was proffered
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest
by Atty. De Vera on this score. Instead, he only asserted that he was
or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the
not the one who notarized the subject affidavits but another notary
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
public, who he does not even know or has seen in his entire life,31 and
grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the
that he had no knowledge of the falsification of the impugned
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
documents, much less of the participation in using the
disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and
same.32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court views the same to
the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve
be a mere general denial which cannot overcome Elsa Almera-
no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
Almacen’s positive testimony that he indeed participated in the
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
procurement of her signature and the signing of the affidavit, all in
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
support of the claim of falsification.
official administration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of
the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of
The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of Governors the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party,
rendered its recommendation – is that Almera’s affidavit was and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens
submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated may have in the proper administration of justice.37
retraction of the questioned affidavits, through the Answer to
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath
Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion, does not, for this Court, merit
and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
significant consideration as its submission appears to be a mere
by submitting a falsified document before a court.
afterthought, prompted only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth
be told, it is highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in
As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty.
the dark about the authenticity of the documents he himself submitted
Abellana38 (Samonte), suspended the lawyer therein from the practice
to the court when his professional duty requires him to represent his
of law for six (6) months for filing a spurious document in court. In
client with zeal and within the bounds of the law.33 Likewise, he is
view of the antecedents in this case, the Court finds it appropriate to
prohibited from handling any legal matter without adequate
impose the same here.
preparation34 or allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling
the case.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement39 for the
return of the amount of P60,000.00,40 comprised of Atty. De Vera’s
acceptance fee and other legal expenses intrinsically related to his
professional engagement,41 for he had actually admitted his receipt
thereof in his Answer before the IBP.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin,
in Samonte:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary and Perez, JJ., concur.cralawlawlibrary
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that
whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should
remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers
preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession.
Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to
cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the
trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the
privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a
member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern
disciplinary sanctions.43
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is
found GUILTY of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective
upon receipt of this Decision, with a stern warning that any repetition
of the same or similar acts will be punished more severely.

Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants

Spouses Willie and Amelia Umaguing the amount of P60,000.00
which he admittedly received from the latter as fees intrinsically linked
to his professional engagement within ninety (90) days from the
finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive
will warrant the imposition of further administrative penalties.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar

TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT
OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A
DISTRICT COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS,
SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS AND THE INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUBJECT: VOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP
IN THE BAR OF ATTY. JOSE PRINCIPE.
For the information and guidance of all concerned, quoted hereunder is
the dispositive portion of Resolution of the Court En Banc dated
September 20, 1990, in Bar Matter No. 543, Re: Voluntary
Termination of Membership in the Bar of Atty. Jose Principe, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, there being due compliance by said attorney with the
IBP By-Laws on voluntary termination of membership in the IBP, and
considering his reasons therefor, the Court Resolved to- APPROVE
the request of Atty. Jose Principe and hereby ORDERS that he be
dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. xxx"
Manila, October 16, 1990.

\
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 8103, December 03, 2014
ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL
OFFICER, BATAAN CAPITOL, BALANGA CITY,
BATAAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. RENATO C.
BAGAY, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2013 Resolution1 of
the IBP Board of Governors which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner xxx and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
and considering the Respondent guilty of negligence in the
performance of his notarial duty, Atty. Renato C. Bagay’s Notarial
Commission is hereby immediately REVOKED. Further, he is
DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2)
years.
It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the
letter,2 dated June 11, 2008, submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr.
(Atty. Angeles, Jr.), the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon.
Remigio M. Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay
(respondent), for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at the time
he was out of the country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008. The
notarized documents were as follows:
1. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato Macalinao
and Loida C. Macalinao and Trisha Katrina Macalinao,
notarized on April 3, 2008;
2. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato S. Sese and
Sandy Margaret L. Sese, notarized on March 25, 2008;
3. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina A.
Castro married to Eduardo Samson and Thelma Medina and
Gina Medina notarized on April 3, 2008;
4. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Rowena Berja, notarized on
March 17, 2008;
5. Deed of Donation executed by and between Crispulo
Rodriguez and Luisa Rodriguez Jorgensen, notarized on April
8, 2008;
6. Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights
executed by the wife and sons of Rodrigo Dy Jongco, notarized
March 19, 2008;
7. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Rolando
and Nelia Francisco and Violeta Hernandez, notarized on April
3, 2008;
8. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina
Baluyot and Carmelita Padlan, notarized on April 3, 2008;
9. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Gregorio Limcumpao and
Simeona Limcumpao, notarized on March 27, 2008;
10. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Eusebio
and Libertad Bacricio and Carlos Tamayo married to Teresa
Tamayo notarized on March 18, 2008;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad S.
Consengco and Sps. Gilvert and Johanna Gervacio, notarized
March 18, 2008;
12. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the Rural
Bank of Pilar and Mila Gatdula, notarized on April 2, 2008;
 13. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad
Cosengco and Sps. Jay and Helen Zulueta, notarized on March
18, 2008;
14. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Cipriano and Salvacion
Violago, notarized on April 1, 2008;
15. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sahara Management and
Development Corporation, notarized on March 26, 2008;
16. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Danilo
Arellano, Luzviminda Ramos and Sps. Fernando and Agnes
Silva, notarized on March 18, 2008;
17. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Vicente
Banzon married to Elizabeth Banzon and Sps. Dommel and
Crystal Lima, notarized on April 2, 2008; and
18. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Marilyn T.
Casupanan and Dominador M. Manalansan notarized on March
14, 2008.
These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the
Provincial Treasurer who had information that they were notarized
while respondent was outside the country attending the Prayer and Life
Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the affidavits of the persons
who caused the documents to be notarized which showed a common
statement that they did not see respondent sign the documents himself
and it was either the secretary who signed them or the documents came
out of the office already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of
Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed
from the country on March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008.
The copy of the Certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration was
also attached to the letter.3chanrobleslaw
The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP, Bataan Chapter,
and the latter endorsed the same to the IBP National Office for
appropriate action. The latter endorsed it to the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD).
When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal) required
Atty. Angeles, Jr. to formalize the complaint, the latter replied on
September 30, 2008 stating, among others, that his June 11, 2008
Letter was not intended to be a formal complaint but rather “a report
on, and endorsement of, public documents by Atty. Bagay while he
was out of the country,”4 and that any advice on how to consider or
treat the documents concerned would be welcome.
On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter
to the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate
action.5chanrobleslaw
This Court, in its Resolution,6 dated February 2, 2009, resolved to note
the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated September 30, 2008, and require
respondent to comment on the said letter.
In his comment,7 dated 27 March 2009, respondent claimed that he
was not aware that those were documents notarized using his name
while he was out of the country. Upon his own inquiry, he found out
that the notarizations were done by his secretary and without his
knowledge and authority. The said secretary notarized the documents
without realizing the import of the notarization act. Respondent
apologized to the Court for his lapses and averred that he had
terminated the employment of his secretary from his office.
The Court then referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report
and recommendation. When the case was called for mandatory
conference on September 16, 2009, only respondent appeared. Atty.
Angeles filed a manifestation reiterating his original position and
requesting that his attendance be excused.8 The mandatory conference
was terminated and the parties were directed to file their respective
position papers. Only respondent submitted a position paper,9 to which
he added that for 21 years that he had been practicing law, he acted as
a notary public without any blemish on record dutifully minding the
rules of the law profession and notarial practice.
10
The Report and Recommendation of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III
(Atty. Abelita III) as Investigating Commissioner found that the letter
of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated June 11, 2008, was not verified, that most
of the attachments were not authenticated photocopies and that the
comment of respondent was likewise not verified. Atty. Abelita III,
however, observed that respondent’s signature on his comment
appeared to be strikingly similar to the signatures in most of the
attached documents which he admitted were notarized in his absence
by his office secretary. He admitted the fact that there were documents
that were notarized while he was abroad and his signature was affixed
by his office secretary who was not aware of the import of the act.
Thus, by his own admission, it was established that by his negligence
in employing an office secretary who had access to his office, his
notarial seal and records especially pertaining to his notarial
documents without the proper training, respondent failed to live up to
the standard required by the Rules on Notarial Practice.
Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his
notarial duty which gave his office secretary the opportunity to abuse
his prerogative authority as notary public, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended the immediate revocation of
respondent’s commission as notary public and his disqualification to
be commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said
recommendation in its Resolution,11 dated September 28, 2013.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration12 of the said resolution
of the IBP. He contended that by admitting and owning up to what had
happened, but without any wrongful intention, he should be merited
with leniency. Moreover, he claimed that he only committed simple
negligence which did not warrant such harsh penalty.
On May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
reconsideration of respondent stating:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration,
there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the
Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere
reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and
taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-85 dated
September 28, 2013 is hereby affirmed.13
On August 1, 2014, the Director for Bar Discipline endorsed the May
4, 2014 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to the Office of the
Chief Justice for appropriate action.
The sole issue to resolve in this case is whether the notarization of
documents by the secretary of respondent while he was out of the
country constituted negligence.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Respondent admitted in his comment and motion for reconsideration
that the 18 documents were notarized under his notarial seal by his
office secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly
constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible for
the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice provides that a “Notary Public” refers to any person
commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary
public’s secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the
official acts of a notary public.
Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary’s
act which he did not authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the
secretary which he employed. He left his office open to the public
while leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his notarial seal and
register within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary
could use these items to notarize documents and copy his signature.
Such blatant negligence cannot be countenanced by this Court and it is
far from being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood
that respondent’s flimsy excuse was a mere afterthought and such
carelessness exhibited by him could be a conscious act of what his
secretary did.
Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A
person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full
responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register.14 He cannot
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to his
secretary.
As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent
claims that for the 21 years that he has been practicing law, he acted as
a notary public without any blemish and this was his first and only
infraction. His experience, however, should have placed him on guard
and could have prevented possible violations of his notarial duty. By
his sheer negligence, 18 documents were notarized by an unauthorized
person and the public was deceived. Such prejudicial act towards the
public cannot be tolerated by this Court. Thus, the penalty of
revocation of notarial commission and disqualification from
reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years is appropriate.
Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him
liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not only
damaged those directly affected by the notarized documents but also
undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the function
of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not
only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.15 Where the notary public
is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by
reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or
consent to the doing of any.16chanrobleslaw
Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not
to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due
to his negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as
notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice law. By
leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with his
secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize
documents without any restraint.
Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR,
which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into his office
while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity
being conducted therein. They expected that their documents would be
converted into public documents. Instead, they later found out that the
notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any
force and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were
notarized by an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession was eroded.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is
in order.
Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege
and a significant responsibility. It is a privilege granted only to those
who are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest. As we
have declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act
as notary public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires
that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from
imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in SO ORDERED.
general.17chanrobleslaw
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,* and Leonen, JJ.,
concur.
It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a
private document into a public document, making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus,
notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements
in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the
public in the integrity of public instruments would be
undermined.18chanrobleslaw

Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that
the Court will not take lightly complaints of unauthorized acts of
notarization, especially when the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in our legal system hang in the balance.

WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines is ADOPTED with MODIFICATION. Finding Atty.
Renato C. Bagay grossly negligent in his duty as a notary public, the
Court REVOKES his notarial commission and DISQUALIFIES him
from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2)
years. The Court also SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
three (3) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the
repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.

The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this

Decision to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall
take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to Office of the Bar Confidant

to be appended to Atty. Renato C. Bagay’s personal record; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 11113, August 09, 2016
CLEO B. DONGGA-AS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROSE BEATRIX
CRUZ-ANGELES, ATTY. WYLIE M. PALER, AND ATTY.
ANGELES GRANDEA, OF THE ANGELES, GRANDEA &
PALER LAW OFFICE, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed on February
11, 2005 by complainant Cleo B. Dongga-as (complainant), before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) – Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), against respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-
Angeles (Atty. Cruz-Angeles), Atty. Wylie M. Paler (Atty. Paler), and
Atty. Angeles Grandea (Atty. Grandea; collectively, respondents) of
the Angeles, Grandea & Paler Law Office (law firm), charging them of
various violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
for, inter alia, refusing to return the money given by complainant in
exchange for legal services which respondents failed to perform.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that sometime in May 2004, he engaged the law
firm of respondents to handle the annulment of his marriage with his
wife, Mutya Filipinas Puno-Dongga-as (Mutya). In his meeting with
Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler, complainant was told that: (a) the case
would cost him P300,000.00, with the first P100,000.00 payable
immediately and the remaining P200,000.00 payable after the final
hearing of the case; (b) respondents will start working on the case
upon receipt of PI00,000.00, which will cover the acceptance fee,
psychologist fee, and filing fees; and (c) the time-frame for the
resolution of the case will be around three (3) to four (4) months from
filing. Accordingly, complainant paid respondents P100,000.00 which
was duly received by Atty. Cruz-Angeles.2chanrobleslaw
From then on, complainant constantly followed-up his case with Attys.
Cruz-Angeles and Paler. However, despite his constant prodding,
Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler could not present any petition and
instead, offered excuses for the delay, saying that: (a) they still had to
look for a psychologist to examine Mutya; (b) they were still looking
for a "friendly" court and public prosecutor; and (c) they were still
deliberating where to file the case.3 They promised that the petition
would be filed on or before the end of June 2004, but such date passed
without any petition being filed. As an excuse, they reasoned out that
the petition could not be filed since they have yet to talk to the judge
who they insinuated will favorably resolve complainant's
petition.4chanrobleslaw
Sometime in the third week of July 2004, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and
Paler asked for an additional payment of P250,000.00 in order for
them to continue working on the case. Hoping that his petition would
soon be filed, complainant dutifully paid the said amount on July 23,
2004, which was again received by Atty. Cruz-Angeles.5 However, to
complainant's dismay, no appreciable progress took place. When
complainant inquired about the delay in the filing of the case, Atty.
Cruz-Angeles attempted to ease his worries by saying that the draft
petition was already submitted to the judge for editing and that the
petition will soon be finalized.6chanrobleslaw
In the last week of September 2004, complainant received a text
message from Atty. Cruz-Angeles informing him that the National
Statistics Office bore no record of his marriage. The latter explained
then that this development was favorable to complainant's case
because, instead of the proposed petition for annulment of marriage,
they would just need to file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. She also informed complainant that they would send
someone to verify the records of his marriage at the Local Civil
Registrar of La Trinidad, Benguet (Civil Registrar) where his marriage
was celebrated. However, upon complainant's independent verification
through his friend, he discovered that the records of his marriage in the
Civil Registrar were intact, and that the alleged absence of the records
of his marriage was a mere ruse to cover up the delay in the filing of
the petition.7chanrobleslaw
Utterly frustrated with the delay in the filing of his petition for
annulment, complainant went to respondents' law office to terminate
their engagement and to demand for a refund of the aggregate amount
of P350,000.00 he earlier paid them. However, Attys. Cruz-Angeles
and Paler refused to return the said amount, and to complainant's
surprise, sent him two (2) billing statements dated October 5,
20048 and October 10, 20049 in the amounts of P258,000.00 and
P324,000.00, respectively. Notably, the October 5, 2004 billing
statement included a fee for "consultants (prosecutors)" amounting to
P45,000.00.10 In view of the foregoing, complainant filed the instant
Complaint-Affidavit before the IBP-CBD, docketed as CBD Case No.
05-1426.
In her defense,11 Atty. Cruz-Angeles admitted to have received a total
of P350,000.00 from complainant,12 but denied that she was remiss in
her duties, explaining that the delay in the filing of the petition for
annulment of marriage was due to complainant's failure to give the
current address of Mutya and provide sufficient evidence to support
the petition.13 Further, Atty. Cruz-Angeles alleged that it was Atty.
Paler who was tasked to draft and finalize the petition.14 For his
part,15 Atty. Paler moved for the dismissal of the case for failure to
state a cause of action, arguing too that complainant filed the present
administrative complaint only to avoid payment of attorney's
fees.16chanrobleslaw
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation17 dated July 10, 2012, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner found Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that they be
meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for four (4)
months. However, Atty. Grandea was exonerated of any liability as his
participation in the charges has not been discussed, much less
proven.18chanrobleslaw
The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant indeed
engaged the services of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler in order to
annul his marriage with his wife, Mutya. Despite receiving the
aggregate amount of P350,000.00 from complainant, Attys. Cruz-
Angeles and Paler neglected the legal matter entrusted to them, as
evidenced by their failure to just even draft complainant's petition for
annulment despite being engaged for already five (5) long
months.19 Moreover, as pointed out by the Investigating
Commissioner, despite their preliminary assessment that complainant's
petition would not likely prosper, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler still
proceeded to collect an additional P250,000.00 from complainant.
Worse, they even billed him an exorbitant sum of
P324,000.00.20 Thus, the Investigating Commissioner opined that the
amounts respondents had already collected and would still want to
further collect from complainant can hardly be spent for research in
connection with the annulment case that was not filed at all. Neither
can they cover just fees for Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler who did
nothing to serve complainant's cause.21chanrobleslaw
In a Resolution22 dated September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid Report and
Recommendation, with modification increasing the recommended
penalty to two (2) years suspension from the practice of law. Atty.
Cruz-Angeles moved for reconsideration,23 which was, however,
denied in a Resolution24 dated June 7, 2015.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Attys. Cruz-Angeles
and Paler should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Court's Ruling
A judicious perusal of the records reveals that sometime in May 2004, Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property
complainant secured the services of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler for collected or received for or from the client.
the purpose of annulling his marriage with Mutya, and in connection
therewith, paid Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler the aggregate sum of Rule 16.03– A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client
P350,000.00 representing legal fees. However, despite the passage of when due or upon demand, x x x.
more than five (5) months from the engagement, Attys. Cruz-Angeles
It bears stressing that "the relationship between a lawyer and his client
and Paler failed to file the appropriate pleading to initiate the case
is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good
before the proper court; and worse, could not even show a finished
faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the
draft of such pleading. Such neglect of the legal matter entrusted to
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or
them by their client constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03,
received for or from his client. Thus, a lawyer's failure to return upon
Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case,
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act
is a gross violation of general morality, as well as of professional
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to ethics."26chanrobleslaw
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable. Furthermore, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler misrepresented to
complainant that the delay in the filing of his petition for annulment
Case law exhorts that, "once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client,
was due to the fact that they were still looking for a "friendly" court,
he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to
judge, and public prosecutor who will not be too much of a hindrance
such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he
in achieving success in the annulment case. In fact, in the two (2)
accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
billing statements dated October 5, 200427 and October 10,
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.
2004,28 Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler made it appear that they went to
Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his
various locations to look for a suitable venue in filing the said petition,
client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
and even paid various amounts to prosecutors and members of the
administratively liable,"25cralawred as in this case.
National Bureau of Investigation to act as their "consultants." Such
misrepresentations and deceits on the part of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and
In this relation, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler also violated Rules
Paler are violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, viz.:
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when they failed to return to
complainant the amount of P350,000.00 representing their legal CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
fees, viz. : the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
or deceitful conduct.
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that "[a]s officers of the court,
lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing."29 Clearly, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler fell short of such
standard when they committed the afore-described acts of
misrepresentation and deception against complainant. Their acts are
not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal
profession; they also reveal basic moral flaws that make Attys. Cruz-
Angeles and Paler unfit to practice law.30chanrobleslaw
As members of the Bar, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler should not
perform acts that would tend to undermine and/or denigrate the
integrity of the courts, such as insinuating that they can find a
"friendly" court and judge that will ensure a favorable ruling in
complainant's annulment case. It is their sworn duty as lawyers and
officers of the court to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts.
Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial
institution. Without this guarantee, the institution would be resting on
very shaky foundations.31 This is the very thrust of Canon 11 of the
CPR, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others." Hence, lawyers who are remiss in
performing such sworn duty violate the aforesaid Canon 11, and as
such, should be held administratively liable and penalized accordingly,
as in this case.[32]chanrobleslaw
Moreover, Canon 7 of the CPR commands every lawyer to "at all
times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession" for the
strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its
members. It is every lawyer's duty to maintain the high regard to the
profession by staying true to his oath and keeping his actions beyond
reproach. It must be reiterated that as an officer of the court, it is a
lawyer's sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice; as acts and/or
omissions emanating from lawyers which tend to undermine the
judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of the government and to
the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus, all lawyers should
be bound not only to safeguard the good name of the legal profession,
but also to keep inviolable the honor, prestige, and reputation of the
judiciary.33 In this case, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler compromised
the integrity not only of the judiciary, but also of the national
prosecutorial service, by insinuating that they can influence a court,
judge, and prosecutor to cooperate with them to ensure the annulment
of complainant's marriage. Indubitably, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
also violated Canon 7 of the CPR, and hence, they should be held
administratively liable therefor.
Anent the proper penalty for Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler,
jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected
their client's affairs, failed to return the latter's money and/or property
despite demand, and at the same time committed acts of
misrepresentation and deceit against their clients, the Court imposed
upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years. In Jinon v. Jiz 34 the Court suspended the
lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount
his client gave him for his legal services which he never performed.
Also, in Agot v. Rivera, 35 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period
of two (2) years for his (a) failure to handle the legal matter entrusted
to him and to return the legal fees in connection therewith; and (b)
misrepresentation that he was an immigration lawyer, when in truth, he
was not. Finally, in Spouses Lopez v. Limos, 36 the Court suspended the
erring lawyer for three (3) years for her failure to file a petition for
adoption on behalf of complainants, return the money she received as
legal fees, and for her commission of deceitful acts in misrepresenting
that she had already filed such petition when nothing was actually
filed, resulting in undue prejudice to therein complainants. In this case,
not only did Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler fail to file complainant's
petition for annulment of marriage and return what the latter paid them
as legal fees, they likewise misrepresented that they can find a court,
judge, and prosecutor who they can easily influence to ensure a
favorable resolution of such petition, to the detriment of the judiciary
and the national prosecutorial service. Under these circumstances, the
Court individually imposes upon Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
years.
Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering Attys.
Cruz-Angeles and Paler to return the amount of P350,000.00 they
received from complainant as legal fees. It is well to note that "while
the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should
only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's
administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this
rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely
civil in nature – for instance, when the claim involves moneys received
by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct and
not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement."37 Hence, since
Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler received the aforesaid amount as part of
their legal fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.
Meanwhile, the complaint as against Atty. Angeles Grandea
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance and be attached to
respondents' personal records as attorney.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Reyes, Leonen,
Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., On leave.
Mendoza, J., On official leave.

WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles and

Atty. Wylie M. Paler are found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1, Canon 7, Canon 11, Rule 18.03, Canon 18, and Rules 16.01
and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, each of them is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) years, effective upon the finality of this
Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Likewise, respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles and Atty.

Wylie M. Paler are ORDERED to return to complainant Cleo B.
Dongga-as the legal fees they received from the latter in the aggregate
amount of P350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of
this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will
warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5179, May 31, 2016
DIONNIE RICAFORT, Complainant, v. ATTY. RENE O.
MEDINA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Complainant Dionnie Ricafort filed a complaint for
disbarment1 against respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina on December
10, 1999.2chanrobleslaw
Complainant alleged that at about 7:30 a.m. on October 4, 1999, his
tricycle sideswiped respondent's car along Sarvida Street in Surigao
City.3 Respondent alighted from his car and confronted complainant.
Respondent allegedly snapped at complainant, saying: "Wa ka makaila
sa ako?" ("Do you not know me?") Respondent proceeded to slap
complainant, and then left.4chanrobleslaw
Later, Manuel Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate
number of respondent's car.5 Complainant later learned that the driver
of the car was Atty. Rene O. Medina, a provincial board member of
Surigao del Norte.6chanrobleslaw
According to complainant, he felt "hurt, embarrassed[,] and
humiliated."7 Respondent's act showed arrogance and disrespect for his
oath of office as a lawyer. Complainant alleged that this act constituted
gross misconduct.8chanrobleslaw
Attached to complainant's letter were his Affidavit,9 Manuel Cuizon's
Affidavit,10 and a letter11 dated October 27, 1999 signed by Mayor
Arlencita E. Navarro (Mayor Navarro), League of Mayors President of
Surigao del Norte Chapter. In her letter, Mayor Navarro stated that
respondent slapped complainant and caused him great
humiliation.12 Thus, respondent should be administratively penalized
for his gross misconduct and abuse of
authority:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Dear Mr. Chief Justice:
This is to bring to your attention an incident that occurred last October
4, 1999 in Surigao City, committed by Provincial Board Member Rene
O. Medina.
The said public official slapped in full public view a certain Donnie
Ricafort, a tricycle driver, causing great humiliation on the person.
We believe that such conduct is very unbecoming of an elected
official. Considering the nature and purpose of your Office, it is
respectfully submitted that appropriate action be taken on the matter as
such uncalled for abuse consists of gross misconduct and abuse of
authority.
Attached herewith is a copy of the affidavit of the victim and the
petition of the Municipal Mayors League of Surigao del Norte.
Thank you very much for your attention and more power.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
Mayor ARLENCITA E. NAVARRO
Mayor's League President
Surigao del Norte Chapter13
(Emphasis in the original)
Attached to Mayor Navarro's letter were two (2) pages containing the
signatures of 19 Mayors of different municipalities in Surigao Del
Norte.14chanrobleslaw
In his Comment,15 respondent denied slapping complainant. He
alleged that the incident happened while he was bringing his 10-year-
old son to school.16 He further alleged that complainant's reckless
driving caused complainant's tricycle to bump the fender of
respondent's car.17 When respondent alighted from his car to check the
damage, complainant approached him in an unfriendly
manner.18 Respondent pushed complainant on the chest to defend
himself.19 Sensing, however, that complainant was not making a move
against his son and himself, respondent asked complainant if his
tricycle suffered any damage and if they should wait for a traffic
officer.20 Both parties agreed that they were both too busy to wait for a
traffic officer who would prepare a sketch.21 No traffic officer was
present during the incident.22chanrobleslaw
Four or five days after the traffic incident, respondent became the
subject of attacks on radio programs by the Provincial Governor's
allies, accusing him of slapping the tricycle driver.23 He alleged that
complainant's Affidavit was caused to be prepared by the Provincial
Governor as it was prepared in the English language, which was
unknown to complainant.24chanrobleslaw
Respondent was identified with those who politically opposed the
Provincial Governor.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
According to respondent, the parties already settled whatever issue that
might have arisen out of the incident during the conciliation
proceedings before the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay
Washington, Surigao City.26 During the proceedings, respondent
explained that he pushed complainant because of fear that complainant
was carrying a weapon, as he assumed tricycle drivers did.27 On the
other hand, complainant explained that he went near respondent to
check if there was damage to respondent's car.28 As part of the
settlement, respondent agreed to no longer demand any indemnity for
the damage caused by the tricycle to his car.29chanrobleslaw
Attached to respondent's Comment was the Certification30 dated
October 27, 2006 of the Officer-in-Charge Punong Barangay stating
that the case had already been mediated by Punong Barangay Adriano
F. Laxa and was amicably settled by the parties.31chanrobleslaw
On December 5, 2006, this Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and
recommendation.32chanrobleslaw
Only respondent appeared in the Mandatory Conference set by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines on July 20, 2007.33 Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Commissioner
De La Rama) noted the Certification from Barangay Washington,
Surigao City attesting that the case between the parties had already
been settled.34 Commissioner De La Rama supposed that this
settlement "could be the reason why the complainant has not been
appearing in this case[.]"35 The Mandatory Conference was reset to
September 21, 2007.36chanrobleslaw
In the subsequent Mandatory Conference on September 21, 2007, only
respondent appeared.37 Hence, the Commission proceeded with the
case ex-parte.38chanrobleslaw
In his Report39 dated July 4, 2008, Commissioner De La Rama
recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
60 days from notice for misconduct and violation of Canon 7, Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is with deep regret to
recommend for the suspension of Atty. Rene O. Medina from the
practice of law for a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof due
to misconduct and violation of Canon 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for behaving in an scandalous manner that tends to
discredit the legal profession.40 (Emphasis in the original)
Commissioner De La Rama found that contrary to respondent's claim,
there was indeed a slapping incident.41 The slapping incident was
witnessed by one Manuel Cuizon, based on: (1) the photocopy of
Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit attached to complainant's complaint;42 and
(2) the signatures on the League of Mayors' letter dated October 29,
1999 of the Surigao Mayors who believed that respondent was guilty
of gross misconduct and abuse of authority and should be held
administratively liable.43chanrobleslaw
On August 14, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors issued the Resolution44 adopting and approving with
modification Commissioner De La Rama's recommendation,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A "; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's
misconduct and violation of Canon 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for behaving in a scandalous manner, Atty. Rene O,
Medina is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for thirty
(30) days.45 (Emphasis in the original)
Respondent moved for reconsideration46 of the Board of Governors'
August 14, 2008 Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the Board of Governors in the Resolution47 dated March 22,
2014.
We resolve whether respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina should be held
administratively liable.
There is sufficient proof to establish that respondent slapped
complainant.
Respondent's defense consists of his denial that the slapping incident
happened.48 He stresses complainant's seeming disinterest in and lack
of participation throughout the case and hints that this administrative
case is politically motivated.49chanrobleslaw
It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of
disciplinary proceedings to harass its officers with baseless allegations.
This Court will exercise its disciplinary power against its officers only
if allegations of misconduct are established.50 A lawyer is presumed to
be innocent of the charges against him or her. He or she enjoys the
presumption that his or her acts are consistent with his or her
oath.51chanrobleslaw
Thus, the burden of proof still rests upon complainant to prove his or
her claim.52chanrobleslaw
In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is
preponderance of evidence,53 or evidence that is superior, more
convincing, or of "greater weight than the other."54chanrobleslaw
In this case, complainant discharged this burden.
During the fact-finding investigation, Commissioner De La Rama—as
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors also
adopted—found that the slapping incident actually
occurred.55chanrobleslaw
The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in
his signed and notarized Affidavit;56 complainant's Affidavit was also
supported by the signed and notarized Affidavit57 of a traffic aide
present during the incident. It was even the traffic aide who informed
complainant of respondent's plate number.58chanrobleslaw
In finding that complainant was slapped by
respondent,59 Commissioner De La Rama gave weight to the letter sent
by the League of Mayors and ruled that "the people's faith in the legal
profession eroded"60 because of respondent's act of slapping
complainant.61 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors correctly affirmed and adopted this finding.

The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors,
strengthened complainant's allegations. Contrary to respondent's claim
that it shows the political motive behind this case, the letter reinforced
complainant's credibility and motive. The presence of 19 Mayors'
signatures only reinforced the appalling nature of respondent's act. It
reflects the public's reaction to respondent's display of arrogance.
The purpose of administrative proceedings is to ensure that the public
is protected from lawyers who are no longer fit for the profession. In
this instance, this Court will not tolerate the arrogance of and
harassment committed by its officers.
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
By itself, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or
her on the face hints of a character that disregards the human dignity
of another. Respondent's question to complainant, "Wa ka makaila sa
ako?" ("Do you not know me?") confirms such character and his
potential to abuse the profession as a tool for bullying, harassment, and
discrimination.
This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by
perpetuating a stereotype that is unreflective of the nobility of the
profession. As officers of the court and of the law, lawyers are granted
the privilege to serve the public, not to bully them to submission.
Good character is a continuing qualification for lawyers.62 This Court
has the power to impose disciplinary sanctions to lawyers who commit
acts of misconduct in either a public or private capacity if the acts
show them unworthy to remain officers of the court.63chanrobleslaw
This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generis.64 They are neither civil nor criminal in
nature. They are not a determination of the parties' rights. Rather, they
are pursued as a matter of public interest and as a means to determine a
lawyer's fitness to continue holding the privileges of being a court
officer. In Ylaya v. Gacott:65
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar
to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office
of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak
of a complainant or a prosecutor.66chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against
lawyers are mere witnesses. They are not indispensable to the
proceedings. It is the investigative process and the finding of
administrative liability that are important in disciplinary
proceedings.67chanrobleslaw
Hence, complainant's absence during the hearings before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not a bar against a finding of
administrative liability.
WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines are ADOPTED and APPROVED. Respondent Atty. Rene
O. Medina is found to have violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) months.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of
respondent as attorney, and be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts throughout
the country.

SO ORDERED

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del

Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., on official business.
Jardeleza, J., on official leave.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9604 : March 20, 2013
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J.
RUSTIA, Complainants, v. ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and
ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E.
Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the
Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo
(Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of
the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public
Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated
14 October 2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation
of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt
practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr.
(Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory
Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly
signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of
the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other,
the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before
the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he
represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in
person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo
declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for
Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to
sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty.
Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing
on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and
submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty.
Bancolo's affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia
filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the
signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman
provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the
counsel's signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaint's
validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate
cases for Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed
against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August
2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty.
Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1
August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty.
Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia's
case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo's instructions.
Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the
cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against
him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint
for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public
document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The
dispositive portion states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by
Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and
other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4chanroblesvirtualawlibrary office. Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment
complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed before the
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was
Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by
also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19
testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that
September 2005.
Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006.
of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty.
Thereafter, the parties were directed by the Commission on Bar
Jarder, Atty. Bancolo's law partner. The complainants alleged that they
Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May
were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of
2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date,
the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo.
complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The
Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the
conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again,
Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants
respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the conference.
attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police
Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment
Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints
complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents
signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of
were also deemed to have waived their right to participate in the
Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the
mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit
letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty.
their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received
Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus,
complainants' position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents'
complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in
position paper dated 23 October 2006.
unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in
falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent The IBP's Report and Recommendation
people.
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP,
Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Information. They alleged submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo
that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo. Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
same Code. The Investigating
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint,
respondents admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two
by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his
Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.
cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner
being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to
opined:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However,
due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that
and communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law his signature appearing in the complaint filed against complainants'
Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board
signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his of Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and
signatures appearing in the various documents released from his office Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution
were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of
and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation
violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was
of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1)
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo's
negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and
violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices sent by
Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from
undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar
the practice of law for one (1) year.
of the Philippines' Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings.
It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers. However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the
Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law
AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the
firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise
Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm.
case for lack of merit.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command
responsibility". x x x. Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty.
Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December
xxx
2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, Comment/Reply to Complainants' Motion for Reconsideration and
having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present. He Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of
Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder
Governors denied both complainants' and Atty. Bancolo's motions for
to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm,
reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse the
to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of
findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution
Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to
No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents
that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have The Court's Ruling
known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the
and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable
Professional Responsibility.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client
before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a
secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST
IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-
Tenorio,9 where we held:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that
this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be
used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by,
any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman
in the unauthorized practice of law.
10
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, we held that the
preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving
the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the
legal profession. Atty. Bancolo's authority and duty to sign a pleading
are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer.
Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel's signature serves as a
certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it;
and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing one's
signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility
to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document.
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty.
Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim of circumstances or
of manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and
confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty.
Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the
affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an
opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his
Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty.
Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint
Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if
he did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to
prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification
without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some
minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay
and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a
pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for
disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was
directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the
wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his
secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of
the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice
of law for one year is warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of
the case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T.
larder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable
for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that
a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them
to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
IRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]
JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SABINO
PADILLA, JR., Respondent.
Jose M. Castillo for complainant.
Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. — Among the
duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party
or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged. The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to
avoid all personalities between counsel.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE
UNCALLED FOR IN THE CASE AT BAR; PENALTY. — Whether
directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering
evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and
uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which
such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so
doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also
to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to
measure up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal
profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not
the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the
course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to
refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be more
circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. Respondent is hereby
reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper
decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will
be dealt with more severely.
RESOLUTION
PLANA, J.:
Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for the use of insulting language in
the course of judicial proceedings.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case
submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings of the parties.
Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time,
one of the defendants) in Criminal Case No. 13331 for forcible entry
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan. Respondent was
counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on November 19,
1981, while complainant was formally offering his evidence, he heard
respondent say "bobo." When complainant turned toward respondent,
he saw the latter looking at him (complainant) menacingly.
Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many people,
complainant was unable to proceed with his offer of evidence. The
court proceedings had to be suspended.
While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the
same at the complainant, claiming that what he said was "Ay, que
bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was trying to inject
wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the record" while
in the process of making an offer of evidence. The statement of Atty.
Castillo referred to by respondent was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the
present complaint for ejectment was because defendant Erlinda
Castillo wife of this representation called up this representation at his
house and crying over the phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino Padilla
was harassing her and immediately, this representation like any good
husband would do in the defense of his wife immediately went to the
school and confronted Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked
for a yes or no answer if he harassed the wife of this representation and
if yes, right then and there l would sock his face."cralaw virtua1aw
library
more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R. No.
09753-SP, Court of Appeals; Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of
Caloocan.)
The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondent’s
actuation was triggered by complainant’s own manifest hostility and
provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore not entirely free from
blame when respondent unleashed his irritation through the use of
improper words.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior.
He is directed to observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that
a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
SO ORDERED.

Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera Relova and Gutierrez,
respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all Jr., JJ., concur.
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged. (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b)
and (f). The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to
avoid all personalities between counsel. (Canon 17.)

Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of

offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive
and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant
which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In
so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but
also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed
to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the
legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is
not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in
the course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished
to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015
JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, v. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS
ZAIDE, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review Resolution No. XX-2011-2641 of the Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-
2069, which imposed on Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide (Atty. Zaide) the
penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of
notarial commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being
commissioned as a notary public, for violation of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice (Notarial Practice Rules).2
The Case
On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Gimeno) filed a
complaint3 with the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline, charging
Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2)
falsification; (3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language;
and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust.
In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's
admission4 to the Bar and receipt5 of his notarial commission, he had
notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on
March 29, 2002.6 She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and
irregular entries in his notarial registers.7
Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She
engaged the services of his law firm Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide
Law Offices (ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that involved her
husband and her parents-in-law.
Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still
appeared against her in the complaint for estafa and violation of RA
30198 that one Priscilla Somontan (Somontan) filed against her with
the Ombudsman. Gimeno posited that by appearing against a former
client, Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against the representation of
conflicting clients' interests.9
Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious
extortionist" in the same administrative complaint that Somontan filed
against her.10 In another civil case where she was not a party, Gimeno
observed that Atty. Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as someone
suffering from "serious mental incompetence" in one of his
pleadings.11 According to Gimeno, these statements constitute
intemperate, offensive and abusive language, which a lawyer is
proscribed from using in his dealings.
In his answer12 dated September 13, 2007, Atty. Zaide argued that he
did not notarize the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition. As it
appeared on the notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp and
falsified signature were superimposed over the typewritten name of
Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this
document.13 Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno falsified his signature to
make it appear that he notarized it before his admission to the Bar.
On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide
contended that he needed to simultaneously use several notarial
registers in his separate satellite offices in order to better cater to the
needs of his clients and accommodate their growing number.14 This
explains the irregular and non-sequential entries in his notarial
registers.
Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she
did not personally hire him as her counsel. Gimeno engaged the
services of ZMZ where he previously worked as an associate. The real
counsel of Gimeno and her relatives in their annulment of title case
was Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's partners.15 On this
basis, the respondent should not be held liable for representing
conflicting clients' interests.
Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive
language in his pleadings.16
The IBP Proceedings
On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for
mandatory conference.17 After this, both parties were required to
submit their position papers.
In his report and recommendation18 dated May 18, 2010,
Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found
Atty. Zaide administratively liable for violating the Notarial Practice
Rules, representing conflicting interests, and using abusive and
insulting language in his pleadings.
He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1 (a) and 1 (b), Rule VI of
the Notarial Practice Rules when he maintained several active notarial
registers in different offices. These provisions respectively require a
notary public to "keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful
inspection, a chronological official register of notarial acts consisting
of a permanently bound book with numbered papers" and to "keep
only one active notarial register at any given time."19
However, Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty. Zaide should not
be held administratively liable for usurping a notary public's office.
The investigating commissioner noted that the evidence presented on
this issue is not enough to prove that Atty. Zaide signed and notarized
the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition even after his
admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission.20
Commissioner Magpayo also found that the evidence presented proved
that Gimeno was indeed Atty. Zaide's former client. He disagreed with
Atty. Zaide's defense that Gimeno only hired ZMZ but did not
personally hire him to defend them in their annulment of title case.
The retainer of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of all its
lawyers.21 But despite this previous attorney-client relationship, the
investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held
liable for representing conflicting interests since the annulment of title
case is totally unrelated to the Ombudsman complaint that Somontan
filed against Gimeno through Atty. Zaide.
Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used
intemperate, offensive, and abusive language when he called Gimeno a
"notorious extortionist" in one of his pleadings.22
For violating the Notarial Practice Rules, Commissioner Magpayo
recommended that Atty. Zaide be suspended for three months, and for
another six months for employing abusive and insulting language.23
The IBP Board of Governors' Findings
In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of Governors
(Board) opined that the evidence on record fully supports the findings
of the investigating commissioner. However, the Board modified the
recommended penalty and imposed instead the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial
commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being
commissioned as a notary public.24
Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration25 of the Board's November
19, 2011 resolution but this was also denied in its subsequent June 21,
2013 resolution.26
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and
recommended penalty, and accordingly confirms them.
This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly
notarized, Atty. Zaide's details as a lawyer and as a notary public
had not yet existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on May 2,
2002; thus, he could not have obtained and used the exact figures
pertaining to his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the
expiration date of his notarial commission, prior to this date,
particularly on March 29, 2002.

For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall discuss each of the This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence
main issues that the parties identified. supporting Gimeno's claim such as a witness to the alleged fictitious
notarization, leads us to the conclusion that Atty. Zaide could not
Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules have notarized the document before his Bar admission and receipt
of his notarial commission.
a. Usurpation of a notarial office
We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only
As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any generated after his Bar admission, were stamped on the March 29,
concrete evidence to show that Atty. Zaide notarized the March 29, 2002 document. How this happened is not clear from the evidence
2002 partial extrajudicial partition prior to his admission to the Bar before us.
and receipt of his notarial commission.
b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial
It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty. offices
Elpedio Cabasan, as notary public. Atty. Zaide's signature and notarial
stamp that bears his name, roll number,, PTR number, IBP number, We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by
and the expiration date of his notarial commission, were merely maintaining different notarial registers in several offices. Because of
superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's typewritten name. this practice, the following notarized documents had been irregularly
numbered and entered:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Document27 Date Doc. No. Page Book Year
Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the
Special Power of
document are his true information. However, he denied that he 6/20/05 273 55 18 2005
Attorney
personally stamped and signed the document. In fact, this document
never appeared in his notarial register and was never included in Secretary's
10/28/05 226 46 18 2005
his notarial report for the year 2002. He contended that Gimeno Certificate
falsified his signature and used his notarial stamp to make it appear
Affidavit of
that he was the one who notarized it. 10/31/05 272 55 18 2005
Quitclaim
Affidavit of Loss 4/17/06 54 11 25 2006 interest. Thus, no other person, other than the notary public, should
perform it.
Affidavit of Two
Disinterested 4/17/06 310 61 25 2006
On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in
Persons
chronological sequence in order to address and prevent the rampant
Petition for practice of leaving blank spaces in the notarial register to allow the
Issuance of Owner's 4/17/06 72 15 25 2006 antedating of notarizations.
Duplicate copy
In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he
Affidavit of needed to maintain several active notarial registers in separate offices
4/19/06 461 93 23 2006
Parental Consent so he could accommodate the increasing number of his clients
Confirmation of requiring his notarial services.
4/21/06 283 56 25 2006
Sale
This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his
Deed of Absolute functions as his powers and duties are impressed with public
4/27/06 304 60 25 2006
Sale interest.30 A notary public's office is not merely an income-generating
Section l(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer who has been privileged to
notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful receive a notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously
inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological official perform.
notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound
book with numbered pages." The same section further provides that "a
notary public shall keep only one active notarial register at any Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his
given time."28 On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously notarial commission. His flagrant violation of Section 1, Rule VI of
keeping several active notarial registers is a blatant violation of the Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple and excusable
Section 1, Rule VI. negligence. It amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer [should]
The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
maintain only one active notarial register and ensure that the entries in respect for law and legal processes."
it are chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial register" rule
is in place to deter a notary public from assigning several notarial Representing conflicting interests
registers to different offices manned by assistants who perform
notarial services on his behalf. The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should
not be held liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.
Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary
public must also personally administer the notarial acts29 that the law
authorizes him to execute. This important duty is vested with public
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
In Aninon v. Sabitsana,31 the Court laid down the tests to determine if
a lawyer is guilty of representing conflicting interests between and
among his clients.
One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty.32
Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new
relation to use against a former client any confidential information
acquired through their connection or previous employment.33
Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide
appeared against Gimeno, his former law firm's client.
The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno
ceased when Atty. Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the case where Gimeno
engaged ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject matter and is
not in any way connected to the complaint that Somontan filed against
Gimeno with the Ombudsman.
The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide
represented her family pertained to the annulment of a land title.
Somontan was never a party to this case since this only involved
Gimeno's relatives. On the other hand, the case where Atty. Zaide
appeared against Gimeno involved Somontan's Ombudsman complaint
against Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of the funds that
Somontan entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's alleged corruption as an
examiner in the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly, the
annulment of title case and the Ombudsman case are totally
unrelated.
There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at
the time Somontan engaged his services, he had already left
ZMZ. More importantly, nothing in the record shows that Atty.
Zaide used against Gimeno any confidential information which he
acquired while he was still their counsel in the annulment of title
case.
Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for
violating the prohibition against the representation of conflicting
interests.
Use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in professional
dealings
The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive
language in a lawyer's professional dealings, whether with the courts,
his clients, or any other person, is based on the following canons and
rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts. (emphasis for using intemperate, offensive and, abusive language in violation of
supplied) Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. His notarial commission, if existing, is
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the
hereby REVOKED, and he is declared DISQUALIFIED from being
Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist."34 And in
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is
another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following
also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
demeaning and immoderate language in presenting his comment
against his opposing counsel:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY
AND HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System, and the Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ.,
Department of Justice in particular, where the taxpayers paid for her concur.
salary over her incompetence and poor performance as a
prosecutor... This is a clear manifestation that the Public prosecutor
suffers serious mental incompetence as regard her mandate as an
Assistant City Prosecutor.35 (emphasis supplied)
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and
choice of his words — a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the
court.

While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage,
such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and
illuminating but not offensive.36

On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to
abstain from any offensive personality and to refrain from any act
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a witness. In
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's
language even in his pleadings, must be dignified.37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves

to ADOPT the recommended penalty of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is
found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000
ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased) substituted by
one of her heirs, CARMEN MATILDE M.
TIONGCO Petitioner, v. HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 26, JOSE B. TIONGCO
and ANTONIO G. DORONILA, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order
dated March 17, 19941 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 26, which reinstated an earlier order cancelling the notice
of lis pendens annotated on the back of Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-92383 and T-5050, of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City
covering Lots 3244 and 3246, respectively, located in Iloilo City.
The relevant facts are summarized as follows:
On October 17, 1990, petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yaredfiled an
amended complaint[2 before the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial
Region, Branch XXVI, against private respondents Jose B. Tiongco
and Antonio Doronila, Jr. Docketed as Civil Case No. 19408, the
action was one for "annulment of affidavit of adjudication, sales,
transfer certificates of title, reconveyance and damages.
In brief, the amended complaint alleged that respondent Tiongco, on
the basis of an affidavit of adjudication dated April 17, 1974 alleging
that he is the sole surviving heir of the previous owner, Maria Luis de
Tiongco, succeeded in having the subject properties registered in his
name, to the prejudice of the other surviving heir of the previous
owner, petitioner among them. Petitioner and respondent Tiongco's
father were siblings, and both were among several heirs of Maria Luis
de Tiongco. The aforesaid affidavit of adjudication was registered with
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City on May 10, 1974.
Petitioner prayed that the properties be reconveyed to the original
registered owners, subject to partition among the lawful heirs, and that
respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay damages and costs.
To protect her interest in the properties during the pendency of the
case, petitioner caused to be annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. T-52547, T-4666 and T-52546,3 which covered Lot Nos. 3244,
3246 and 1404, respectively. TCT Nos. T-92383 and T-5050 were
derived or transferred from TCT Nos. T-52547 and T-4666
respectively and registered in the name of Tiongco.
After respondent Jose B. Tiongco filed his answer, trial ensued during
which, on three separate occasions, he filed motions seeking the
cancellation of the notices of lis pendens.4 All these motions were
denied.[5
On December 14, 1993, the respondent judge issued a
Decision[6 dismissing petitioner's complaint and private respondent's
counterclaim. The trial court found that petitioner's cause of action had
already prescribed.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal[7on December 17, 1993. As before,
respondent Tiongco filed a motion for cancellation of the notices of lis
pendens[8 dated December 21, 1993; this was denied in an Order
dated January 10, 1994.[9 He filed a "Second Motion for
Reconsideration"[10 which was also denied in an Order dated January
26, 1994.[11 Displaying remarkable tenacity, respondent Tiongco filed
a "Third Motion for Reconsideration."[12 This time, however, his
arguments proved persuasive. In an Order[13dated February 14, 1994,
the respondent judge ruled to wit:
In the light of the ruling laid down in Magdalena Homeowners
Association Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 325; 330 (1990),
cited in Vda. De Kilayko vs. Tengco, 207 SCRA 600; 614-615 (1992),
that "the continuance or removal of a notice of lis pendens is not
contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action and
ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof so that the notices of lis
pendens in the case at bar may, on proper grounds, be cancelled
notwithstanding the non-finality of the judgment of this Court brought
about by plaintiff's appeal and considering the finding of this Court 17, 1994, the respondent judge issued the order, subject of this
that plaintiff's action had already prescribed, which finding is based on petition, which is quoted hereunder:
the admitted fact that the questioned deed of adjudication was
Considering that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
registered way back of May 10, 1974 so that the possibility of this
although appeal had already been perfected, the Court, prior to the
finding being reversed is quite remote if not totally nil and,
transmittal of the records to the appellate court, may issue orders for
considering further, the circumstances obtaining in this case, among
the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not
which are: (1) that the criminal complaint for perjury filed by plaintiff
involve any matter litigated by the appeal and considering that in the
against defendant Jose B. Tiongco based on the same deed of
case at bar, lis pendens is not a matter litigated in the appeal and the
adjudication had already been dismissed with finality also on the
records have not as yet been transmitted to the appellate court so that
ground of prescription; (2) that the occupants of the property who were
this Court still has jurisdiction to issue the Order of February 14, 1994
alleged as formerly paying rentals to herein plaintiff, Estrella Tiongco
cancelling the notices of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-92383
Yared, had already recognized defendant's ownership and had long
covering Lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 and
stopped paying rentals to plaintiff without the latter intervening, much
considering further, that the said Order does not direct cancellation of
less, contesting the decision in Civil Case No. 15421 where defendant
lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-89483 covering Lot no. 1404
Jose B. Tiongco was declared with finality as the true and lawful
which contains a total area of 1,587 square meters where the area of 64
owner of Lots Nos. 3244 and 3246; and (3) that, if at all, the present
square meters claimed by plaintiff can very well be taken; as prayed
claim of plaintiff covers but a very small portion of subject lots
for by the defendant Jose B. Tiongco, the Order of March 4, 1994 is
consisting only a total of about 64 square meters hence, it would be
hereby reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February 14, 1994
unfair to the defendant who has torrens title covering the parcels of
is hereby reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February 14,
lands solely in his name to have the same subjected to the harsh effect
1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens on TCT No. T-92383
of such a encumbrance; the Court, in view of all the foregoing
covering lot 3244 andon TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 is hereby
considerations and upon further review of the records, hereby
reinstated.
reconsiders its stand on the subject matter of lis pendens and so holds
that the continued annotation of subject notices of lis pendens is On April 5, 1994, the Register of Deeds cancelled the annotation of
intended to molest the defendant, Jose B. Tiongco, and is not notices of lis pendens.[17
necessary to protect the rights of plaintiff as such rights, if any, are
now foreclosed by prescription. Feeling that a motion for reconsideration would be fruitless, petitioner
filed the instant special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:
This time, it was petitioner's turn to seek reconsideration.[14 On
March 4, 1994, the public respondent issued an Order[15 reversing THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED
himself on the ground that (1) it had already lost jurisdiction over the CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE
case due to the expiration of the last day to appeal of both parties, (2) OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF THE
the notice of appeal has been approved, and (3) the records had been NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED AT THE BACK OF
ordered elevated to the Court of Appeals. THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE THAT ARE THE SUBJECT OF
THE CIVIL CASE NO. 19408, AS THESE ARE AMONG THE
Private respondent Tiongco filed another motion for DOCUMENTS THAT ARE SOUGHT TO BE DECLARED NULL
reconsideration[16 against the Order dated March 4, 1994. On March AND VOID BY THE HEREIN PETITIONER.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy
and necessity, the purpose of which is to make known to the whole
world that properties in litigation are still within the power of the court
until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the
judgment or decree by subsequent alienation.[18 The notice
of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular
real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning that one who
acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that
he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.19
Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[20 and
Section 76 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,[21 otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree provide the statutory bases for notice
of lis pendens. From these provisions, it is clear that such a notice is
proper only in:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting title to
the land or the use or occupation thereof or the building thereon.[22
Thus, all petitioner has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title
over the subject property to put the property under the coverage of the
rule.[23 It is not necessary for her to prove ownership or interest over
the property sought to be affected by lis pendens.
Whether as a matter, of procedure[24 or substance,[25 the rule is that a
notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two (2) grounds,
namely (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title
of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to
protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.[26
The petition should be dismissed, there being a clear violation of the
doctrine of judicial hierarchy that we have taken pains to emphasize in
past jurisprudence.
Thus, we ruled in Vergara v. Suelto[27 that:
[t]he Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if its
is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by fundamental
charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its
original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should
be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should
generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the
Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are not controllable
by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ
is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional
Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the
writ's procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to
be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must
strictly observe.
We reaffirmed this policy in People v. Cuaresma,[28 thus:
xxx A last word. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of
certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may
issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is
also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the
Court of Appeals (formerly Intermediate Appellate Court), although
prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14,
1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was
restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative Notwithstanding these pronouncements, parties persisted in
of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant disregarding the judicial hierarchy. As we noted in Santiago v.
of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A Vasquez,[29
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may
("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation
disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking
of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established
jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This
policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands
practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the
upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those
precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case
crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction
which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra-
proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its
resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore,
appellate jurisdiction"-was evidently intended precisely to relieve this
reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct
Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for the
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstance
Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.
justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to primary jurisdiction.
enjoin strict adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a
This policy found further application in People v. Court of
growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their
Appeals,[30 Aleria v. Velez, [31 and Tano v. Socrates.[32 Only the
applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even
presence of exceptional and compelling reasons justified a disregard of
their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and, immediately
the rule.[33
by the highest tribunal of the land. The proceeding at bar is a case in
point. The application for the writ of certiorari sought against a City Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her
Court was brought directly to this Court although there is no failure to comply with or non-observance of the principle of judicial
discernible special and important reason for not presenting it to the hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant petition could not have
Regional Trial Court. been brought before the Court of Appeals, considering all the more
that the appeal of the main case was already before it. In Magdalena,
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration, for the
Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[34 we ruled, to wit:
information and guidance of all concerned, that it will not only
continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more strict The notice of lis pendens-i.e., that real property is involved in an
observance thereof. (emphasis supplied) action-is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court
where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action,
an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It
is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who
deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and
whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary
transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be
inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and
laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is
therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the
Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance
or removal-like the continuance or removal or removal of a
preliminary attachment of injunction-is not contingent on the existence
of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the
merits thereof.
In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the
plaintiff's appeal. It therefore had power to deal with and resolve any
incident in connection with the action subject of the appeal, even
before final judgment. The rule that no questions may be raised for the
first time on appeal have reference only to those affecting the merits of
the action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g., cancellation of
notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of
provisional remedies. [emphasis supplied]
Had petitioner brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals,
the same could, and would, have been consolidated with the appeal,
thereby bringing under the competence of the said court all matters
relative to the action, including the incidents thereof.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the disposition of the
instant case will be incomplete without a reference to the improper and
unethical language employed by respondent Jose B. Tiongco, who is
also counsel for private respondents, in his pleadings and motions filed
both before us and the court a quo. It is his belief that counsel for
petitioner, Atty. Marciana Deguma, "a rambunctious wrestler-type
female of 52 who does not wear a dress which is not red, and who
stampedes into the courtroom like a mad fury and who speaks slang
English to conceal her faulty grammar,"[35 is impelled by less than
less than noble reasons in serving as counsel for petitioner. Her ulterior
motive? "[T]o please and tenderize and sweeten towards her own self
the readily available Carmelo M. Tiongco,"[36 a retired police major
described by respondent Tiongco as Atty. Deguma's "nio
bonito,"[37 an unmarried mestizo with curly hair who lives with
plaintiff for being houseless[38 who rents a place on the subject
property sought to be recovered by petitioner. Atty. Deguma,
apparently are unmarried maiden of a certain age, is variously
described by respondent Tiongco as "a love-crazed female Apache
[who] is now ready to skin defendant alive for not being a
bastard,"[39 and a "horned spinster and man-hungry virago and female
bull of an Amazon who would stop at nothing to molest, harrass (sic)
and injure defendant - if only to please and attract police-major
Carmelo Tiongco Junior - the deeply desired object of her
unreciprocated affections - who happens not to miss every chance to
laugh at her behind her back."[40 He claims that Atty. Deguma, a
lawyer with the Public Attorney's Office, is engaged in a game of one-
upmanship with a fellow employee, in that "she happens to be
ambitious enough to secretly (that what she thought) plot to put one
over her office-mate who simply netted a corporal (if not a private) by
aiming at no lest than an IMDC major - hoping to catch him by sheer
brass and audacity.[41 In so doing, Atty. Deguma is using the PAO as
a "marriage bureau for her own benefit.[42 Respondent Tiongco
predicts that nothing good will come out of opposing counsel's scheme
since, quoting Voltaire, "outside of virtue, ther's (sic) no
happiness."[43
Respondent Tiongco has achieved a remarkable feat of character
assassination. His verbal darts, albeit entertaining in a fleeting way, are
cast with little regard for truth. However, he does nothing more than to
obscure the issues, and his reliance on the fool's gold of gossip betrays
only a shocking absence of discernment. To this end, it will be wise to
give him an object lesson in the elementary rules of courtesy by which
we expect members of the bar to comport themselves. These
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility are pertinent:
CANON 8-A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH
COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS
PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01-A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
languages which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language before the courts.
In Romero v. Valle,44 we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough
allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of the
cause he upholds, his arguments, both written or oral, should be
gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as
may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another." Otherwise,
his use of intemperate language invites the disciplinary authority of the
court.[45 We are aghast at the facility with which respondent Atty.
Jose B. Tiongco concocts accusations against the opposing party and
her counsel, although it is of public record that in Tiongco v. Deguma,
et a1.,[46 we dismissed as totally unfounded his charge of fraudulent
conspiracy and public scandal against petitioner, Major Tiongco, Atty.
Deguma and even the latter's superior at the Public Attorney's Office,
Atty. Napoleon G. Pagtanac. His lexicon of insults, though
entertaining, do not find a ready audience in us, and he should be, as
he is hereby, warned accordingly: Homines qui gestant, quiqui
auscultant crimina, si meo arbitratu liceat, omnis pendeat, gestores
linguis, auditores auribus.[47
WHEREFORE, the petition fir certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman), on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016
MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-
HENARES, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO "ARGEE" C.
GUEVARRA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for
disbarment filed by complainant Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra
(respondent) for alleged violations of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1;
Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule 8.01 of Canon 8; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Facts
Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the
Belo Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI), a corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine laws2 and engaged in the specialized field of
cosmetic surgery.3 On the other hand, respondent is the lawyer of a
certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio (Norcio), who filed criminal cases
against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her
buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection and making
her ill in 2009.4
In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a
popular online social networking site, insulting and verbally abusing
complainant. His posts include the following
excerpts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I am out to
get Puwitic Justice here! Kiss My Client's Ass, Belo. Senator Adel
Tamano, don't kiss Belo's ass. Guys and girls, nagiisip na akong
tumakbo sa Hanghalan 2010 to Kick some ass!!! I will launch a
national campaign against Plastic Politicians No guns, No goons, No
gold - IN GUTS I TRUST!
Argee Guevarra Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out for Josefina Norcio's Big
Bang on Friday - You will go down in Medical History as a
QUACK DOCTOR!!!! QUACK QUACK QUACK QUACK. CNN,
FOX NEWS, BLOOMBERG, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, L.A. TIMES
c/o my partner in the U.S., Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles :) (September 22
at 11:18pm)5
Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case filed by Vicki Belo against
me through her office receptionist in Taytay Rizal. Haaaaay, style-
bulok at style-duwag talaga. Lalakarin ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan at
Reyna ng Payola ang kaso... si Imelda Marcos nga sued me for P300
million pesos and ended up apologizing to me, si Belo pa
kaya? (September 15 at 12:08pm)6
Argee Guevarra get vicki belo as your client!!! may 'extra-legal'
budget yon. Kaya lang, histado ko na kung sino-sino ang
tumatanggap eh, pag nalaman mo, baka bumagsak pa isang ahensya
ng gobyerno dito, hahaha (August 9 at 10:31pm)7
Argee Guevarra
ATTENTION MGA BATCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NIYO
AKO KUNG MAGKANONG PANGSUHOL NI BELO PARA
MADIIN AKO HA???? I just [want] to know how much she hates me,
ok? Ang payola budget daw niya runs into tens of millions....
(September 15 at 3:57pm)8
Argee Guevarra thinks aloud how the payola machinery of vicki
belo killed the news of a picket demonstration in front of the Belo
clinic. I wonder how television, print[,] and radio programs can kill the
story when the next rallies will have the following numbers 100, 200, Facebook account that were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's
500 and 1000. Kung magkaasaran pa, 10,000 demonstrators will be medical personnel, as well as the entire medical practice of around 300
assembled in front of the Belo Medical Clinic at Tomas Morato on employees for no fair or justifiable cause,14 to
July 27, 2009. Hahahahaha! (July 17 at 7:56pm)9 wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra yup... [I'll] even throw the kitchen sink at her.
Argee Guevarra Nakakatawa nga, 10milyon pa budget... [I] didn't
Enjoy nga ito, we will paralyze the operations of all her clinic and
know that my reputation is worth that much. Aba ako kaya
seek out her patients and customers to boycott her. [So] far, good
magdemanda sa kanila :) Ikot-ikot daw ang mga P.R. ni Belo trying
response – 70% decrease in her July sales... (August 9 at 10:29pm)15
to convince editors to pin me down with something eh alam ko na
wala naman akong sex video!!! Adik talaga sa botox si
Argee Guevarra Guys, pandemonium has broken loose in [BMGI's] 6
Aling Becky at may tama na sa utak - eh kung gagastos ka lang
clinics after Ms. Josie Norio's tell-all. With only 2 surgeons of BMGI
ng 10 milyon para sa tirang-pikon laban sa akin at to protect
certified by PAPRAS, there is real-and-present danger that surgeries
your burak na reputasyon as a plastic surgeon, i-donate mo na
like liposuction, nose lift, boob jobs which have been performed by
lang yon sa biktima ni Ondoy, Pepeng at Ramil! Yung
[BMGI's] physicians, every patient runs the risk of something going
mga homeboys ko sa Pasig na nilimas [ni] Ondoy ang kukubra sa
wrong with the procedures they have undergone under [BMGI's]
yo! (October 23 at 5:31pm)10
hands:(" (July 12 at 12:21am)16
Argee Guevarra is inspired by Jose Norio's courageous act of showing
Argee Guevarra [T]hey perform plastic surgery procedures without
her face on national television to expose the Reyna ng Kaplastikan,
licensed and trained doctors, they nearly killed a client of mine,
Reyna ng Kapalpakan. Inspired by shock nevertheless by the fact that
medical malpractice, use of banned substances/fillers on patients. just
the much needed partial restoration of her behind would cost a
recently, in flawless clinic, a patient who had a simple facial landed in
staggering $500,000-$1,000,000 Stanford Medical Hospital and she
the hospital ... (August 9 at 10:04pm)17
will still remain permanently disabled for the rest of her life... (July 11
at 2:08am)11
Argee Guevarra braces for typhoon Ramil without forgetting to ask
comrades and friends in Cebu to greet Vicki Belo with a boycott once
Argee Guevarra Just got my internet connection. WILL EMAIL U
she visits there on Oct. 20. Cebu's royal set already knows that she is
THE LURID UNASSAILABLE FACTS ABOUT VICKI BELO'S
not a certified plastic surgeon: Boycott Belo, Flawless
QUACK DOCTORING. (October 27, 2009)12
Reckless, Belat Essentials!!!! (October 18 at 6:23pm)18
Argee Guevarra yeah... actually the issue is simple and you will easily
Argee Guevarra [W]ell, with all the kababuyan of the Belo clinic, its
see which side you'll be taking- just pay Ms. Josie Norcio a visit at St.
money-making machines, dapat convert them into public health
Luke's at talagang binaboy siya ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan (July 10 at
clinics!!! instead of pandering to the vanities of those who want to
12:08am)13
look like Dra. Belo. (July 11 at 2:16am)19
chanrobleslaw
The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Argee Guevarra darling kellyn, so far, i have 3 other ex-belo patients
who will tell all too!!!!! Grabe pala ang mga kapalpakan niyan. So
did u leave Belo Clinic because it has become a Frankenstein
Factory? (July 11 at 2:30am)20
Argee Guevarra BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS!
BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I'll be gone for a week to a place where
there will be no facebook so please, add Trixie Cruz-Angeles if you
want to find out more about our anti-quack doctor campaign!
(September 24 at 3:00pm)21
Argee Guevarra Anyone care to sponsor T-shirts bearing this slogan? -
BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT
ESSENTIALS! (September 23 at 12:17arn)22
Argee Guevarra Pare, eksena on Thursday I will go to the hearing
with a placard - BOYCOTT BELO!!! FLAWLESS RECKLESS!!!
BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I will vote for Adel Tamano (La Salle-
Ateneo lower batch sa akin at mabuti ang pamilya niyan)... BUT
WOULD YOU??? (September 23 at 1:50am)23
Argee Guevarra advocates a national patients' boycott of the Belo
Medical Group. To all my friends and comrades, please stay away
from Belo's clinics. I have 2 cousins and 3 friends already who have
canceled their lipo from belo. Please help me shut down the Belo
Medical Group until they perform their moral and legal obligation
to Ms. Josie Norcio... (July 17 at 2:12pm)24
chanrobleslaw
Moreover, respondent, through his Facebook account, posted remarks
that allegedly threatened complainant with criminal conviction,
without factual basis and without proof,25 as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra Mr. Jay, by next year- GMA will no longer be
president and she will be jailed for plunder; Vicky Belo will no longer
be a doctor and she will be in the middle of a criminal
prosecution. The General Surgeon of France will have a Philippine
version. By October and November, some congressmen I have spoken
with will be issuing summons to Vicky Belo for a congressional
inquiry; the subject - legislation regulating the practice of cosmetic
surgery! (September 22 at 11:31pm)26
Argee Guevarra Celso de1os Angeles can still get medical attention in
prison - from Vicky Belo after she gets convicted too for criminal
negligence and estafa (July 15 at 10:05am)27
Argee Guevarra is preparing himself for a campaign against the Belo
Medical Group for its criminal negligence which nearly killed Ms.
Josie Norcio over a botched butt augmentation procedure. He
found out that the Dr. Belo herself marketed the product to Ms.
Norcio, the operation was carried out by her doctors who were not
licensed by the Philippine Association of Plastic Reconstructive and
Aesthetic Surgeons.............. (July 9 at 8:54pm)28
chanrobleslaw
Complainant likewise averred that some of respondent's Facebook
posts were sexist, vulgar, and disrespectful of women,29 to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra but can u help me too with maricar reyes? who's the
hottest cebuana chic chick there nowadays? haven't been there for
quite some time... pa-chicks ka naman!!! I'm sure marami kang 25-
and-below naprends diyan (August 10 at 8:36pm)30
Argee Guevarra hay joseph!!! how's the gayest lawyer in cebu? our
forces will soon picket the belo clinic there, can u tell me where that
is? halato ko na sayo si hayden, promise!" (August 10 at 12:23am)31
Argee Guevarra joseph, i can't say i love u too - baka belo's team will
use all sorts of attacks na against me. to thwart them, being the gayest
gay in the philippines, can u issue a certification that i am so not like
your type? at yung preferred ko lang
ay thin, thalino and thisay? (September 23 at 12:01am)32
chanrobleslaw
Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were made
with the object to extort money from her, as apparent from the
following reply made by respondent on a comment on his Facebook
post:33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Kellyn Conde Sy utang mo! Pay up time:) (July 11 at 2:37am)
Argee Guevarra kellyn, sisingilin ko muna si belo... at saka sabi mo
naman, maibagsak ko lang ang kaplastikan ni belo, quits na tayo
...(July 11 at 2:38am)34
chanrobleslaw
Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language,
were designed to inspire public hatred, destroy her reputation, and to
close BMGI and all its clinics, as well as to extort the amount of P200
Million from her as evident from his demand letter35 dated August 26,
2009, complainant lodged the instant complaint for disbarment against
respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2551.
In defense,36 respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in
violation of his constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy,37 asserting
that the posts quoted by complainant were private remarks on his
private account on Facebook, meant to be shared only with his circle
of friends of which complainant was not a part.38 He also averred that
he wrote the posts in the exercise of his freedom of speech, and
contended that the complaint was filed to derail the criminal cases that
his client, Norcio, had filed against complainant.39 He denied that the
remarks were vulgar and obscene, and that he made them in order to
inspire public hatred against complainant.40 He likewise denied that he
attempted to extort money from her, explaining that he sent the
demand letter as a requirement prior to the filing of the criminal case
for estafa, as well as the civil case for damages against her. 41 Finally,
respondent pointed out that complainant was a public figure who is,
therefore, the subject of fair comment.42
After the mandatory conference had been terminated,43 the parties
were directed to file their respective position papers.44 Thereafter, the
IBP, through the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), set the case
for clarificatory hearing.45 Upon termination thereof, the case was
deemed submitted for report/recommendation.46
IBP's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation47 dated August 13, 2013, the IBP-
CBD recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one
(1) year from the practice of law, with a stem warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.48 It held
respondent liable for violation of Rule 7.03,49 Rule 8.01,50 and Rule
19.0151 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for having posted
the above-quoted remarks on his Facebook account, pointing out that
respondent cannot invoke the "private" nature of his posts, considering
that he had at least 2,000 "friends" who can read and react thereto.
Moreover, the IBP-CBD maintained that the criminal cases he had
filed against complainant on behalf of Norcio had been dismissed for
insufficient evidence; therefore, he can no longer campaign against
complainant whose alleged crimes against Norcio had not been
established.52
In a Resolution53 dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of
Governors resolved to adopt and approve the August 13, 2013 Report
and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,54 arguing that there was no
specific act attributed to him that would warrant his suspension from
the practice of law. He also averred that the libel cases filed against
him by an employee of BMGI had already been dismissed, without
prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction.55
In a Resolution56 dated October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors
partially granted respondent's motion, reducing the penalty from one
(1) year to six (6) months suspension.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent
should be held administratively liable based on the allegations of the
verified complaint.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court's Ruling
The Court has examined the records of this case and concurs with the
IBP's findings, except as to the penalty imposed on respondent.
At the outset, the Court notes that respondent never denied that he
posted the purportedly vulgar and obscene remarks about complainant
and BMGI on his Facebook account. In defense, however, he invokes
his right to privacy, claiming that they were "private remarks" on his
"private account"57 that can only be viewed by his circle of friends.
Thus, when complainant accessed the same, she violated his
constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.
The defense is untenable.
Facebook is currently the most popular social media site, having
surpassed one (1) billion registered accounts and with 1.71 billion
monthly active users.58 Social media are web-based platforms that
enable online interaction and facilitate users to generate and share
content. There are various classifications59 of social media platforms
and one can be classified under the "social networking sites" such as
Facebook.60
Facebook is a "voluntary social network to which members subscribe
and submit information. x x x It has a worldwide forum enabling
friends to share information such as thoughts, links, and photographs,
with one another."61 Users register at this site, create a personal profile
or an open book of who they are, add other users as friends, and
exchange messages, including automatic notifications when they
update their profile. A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on
Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone, depending on the
user's privacy settings.62
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose,
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate
the accessibility of a user's profile, as well as information uploaded by
the user. In H v. W,63 the South Gauteng High Court of Johannesburg,
Republic of South Africa recognized this ability of the users to
"customize their privacy settings," but with the cautionary advice that
although Facebook, as stated in its policies, "makes every effort to
protect a user's information, these privacy settings are however not
foolproof."64
Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or
her online social networking activity - in this case, Facebook - it is first
necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto
or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in cyberspace
through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words,
utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber
world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to informational
privacy.65
The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning
and insulting complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to
private view. However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he
utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook available to
him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few.
Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement
that the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible
only to him and his circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best,
self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.66
Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that
his posts were limited to or viewable by his "Friends" only, there is no
assurance that the same - or other digital content that he uploads or
publishes on his Facebook profile - will be safeguarded as within the
confines of privacy, in light of the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by
giving its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable
way";
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are
total strangers;
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the
hundreds; and
(4) A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag"
others who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its
being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends.67
chanrobleslaw
Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does
not guarantee absolute protection from the prying eyes of another user
who does not belong to one's circle of friends. The user's own
Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook
friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is
Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared
or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the
person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."68 Under the
circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right to
privacy is negated.
Neither can the Court accept the argument that the subject remarks
were written in the exercise of his freedom of speech and expression.
Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute.69 While
the freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are
among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution, every
person exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.70 As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression may
not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy
their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.71
A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of
disclosed that they were ostensibly made with malice tending to insult
and tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling
complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng
Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has
been bribing people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and
reveals an intention to besmirch the name and reputation of
complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal
negligence upon complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant
disfigured ("binaboy") his client Norcio, labeling BMGI a
"Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's services
all these despite the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had
already filed against complainant. He even threatened complainant
with conviction for criminal negligence and estafa which is contrary to
one's obligation "to act with justice."·
In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene
language, and his act of publicly insulting and undermining the
reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook posts are,
therefore, in complete and utter violation of the following provisions
in the Code of Professional
Responsibility:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
chanrobleslaw
By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant
and BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is
bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or
private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner
befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent.
Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words
unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an
aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and
BMGI's reputation.
That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a
public personage who is exposed to criticism72 does not justify
respondent's disrespectful language. It is the cardinal condition of all
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety.73 In this case, respondent's remarks against
complainant breached the said walls, for which reason the former must
be administratively sanctioned.
"Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their
private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of
probity or good demeanor, a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for
continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct,
the reference is not confined to one's behavior exhibited in connection
with the performance of lawyers' professional duties, but also covers
any misconduct, which—albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their
profession—would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy
of the privileges which their license and the law invest in
them."74 Accordingly, the Court finds that respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, as
originally recommended by the IBP-CBD, with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra is
found guilty of violation of Rules 7.03, 8.01, and 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt
of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and

Caguioa, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
Adm. Case No. 6290 : July 14, 2004]
ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANA LUZ B.
CRISTAL-TENORIO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May
2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of
respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged
the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office.
On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely
representing herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who
has a prior and subsisting marriage with another woman. However,
through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.,
were able to obtain a false marriage contract,1 which states that they
were married on 10 February 1980 in Manila. Certifications from the
Civil Registry of Manila2 and the National Statistics Office
(NSO)3 prove that no record of marriage exists between them. The
false date and place of marriage between the two are stated in the birth
certificates of their two children, Donnabel Tenorio4 and Felicisimo
Tenorio III.5 But in the birth certificates of their two other children,
Oliver Tenorio6 and John Cedric Tenorio,7 another date and place of
marriage are indicated, namely, 12 February 1980 in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon.
As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the
respondent caused the dissemination to the public of a libelous
affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome.
The respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to the
complainant and her co-employees the alleged immorality of
Councilor Jacome.
On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant
alleged that the respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law
by her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2)
converted her client's money to her own use and benefit, which led to
the filing of an estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the
complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with the statement
"Isang bala ka lang" to deter them from divulging respondent's illegal
activities and transactions.
In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As
to the charge of deceit, she declared that she is legally married to
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12 February 1980 as
shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the
Civil Registry of Quezon City.8 Her husband has no prior and
subsisting marriage with another woman.
As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied
that she caused the dissemination of a libelous and defamatory
affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor
Jacome who caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the
complainant and her cohorts are the rumormongers who went around
the city of Makati on the pretext of conducting a survey but did so to
besmirch respondent's good name and reputation.
The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was
likewise denied by the respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-
Tenorio Law Office is registered with the Department of Trade and
Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of
Registration of Business Name.9 Hence, she has no partners in her law
office. As to the estafa case, the same had already been dropped
pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.10 The respondent likewise
denied that she threatened the complainant with the words "Isang bala
ka lang" on 24 January 2000.
Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was
filed by the complainant to get even with her. She terminated
complainant's employment after receiving numerous complaints that
the complainant extorted money from different people with the
promise of processing their passports and marriages to foreigners, but
she reneged on her promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is
politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire the
complainant and her cohorts should they initiate this complaint, which
they did and for which they were re-hired. The respondent also
flaunted the fact that she had received numerous awards and citations
for civic works and exemplary service to the community. She then
prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.
The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny
H. Tantuico.
During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the
complainant would submit a Reply to respondent's Answer, while the
respondent would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties also
agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits would
constitute as the respective direct testimonies of the parties and the
affiants.11
In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent
cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband by submitting
(1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office 12 where the name of
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a Sagip
Communication Radio Group identification card13 signed by the
respondent as Chairperson where her husband is identified as "Atty.
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr." She added that respondent's husband even
appeared in court hearings.
In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law
partnership with her husband nor allowed her husband to appear in
court on her behalf. If there was an instance that her husband appeared
in court, he did so as a representative of her law firm. The letterhead
submitted by the complainant was a false reproduction to show that
her husband is one of her law partners. But upon cross-examination,
when confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law
Office bearing her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio,
Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A. Panghulan, who is
also not a lawyer, are named as senior partners because they have
investments in her law office.14
The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February 1980 in Quezon City, but when she later
discovered that their marriage contract was not registered she applied
for late registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence a
certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General and authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries
in the birth certificates of her children as to the place and date of her
marriage were merely an oversight.15
Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of
Evidence and Memoranda, the complainant filed a Motion to
Withdraw Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly realizing
that this disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and
misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no longer interested in pursuing
the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP
Commissioner on Bar Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the
complainant failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of the
charge of cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio
Group identification card of "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.," signed
by respondent as Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997
issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729 -
20734, wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as
counsel and even moved for the provisional dismissal of the cases for
failure of the private complainants to appear and for lack of interest to
prosecute the said cases. Thus, Commissioner San Juan recommended
that the respondent be reprimanded.
In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The
modification consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to
suspension from the practice of law for six months with a warning that
a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan
as approved and adopted with modification by the Board of Governors
of the IBP.
At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the
Motion to Withdraw Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza. In
Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos,16 we declared:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed
by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case
of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack
of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of
the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is
in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except
as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges.
Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this
disbarment case should proceed accordingly.
The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct were not substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the
complainant has the burden of proving his case by convincing
evidence.17 With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the
charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the
respondent is not yet convicted thereof. In Gerona v.
Datingaling,18 we held that when the criminal prosecution based on
the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative
disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of
the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.
We, however, affirm the IBP's finding that the respondent is guilty of
assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a
non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to
practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 - A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding
oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding one's self out as
a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like
identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of
a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the
general practice of law.19 Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of
law.
In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with
himself out as one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided more severely.
him in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-
At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal- Tenorio's record as attorney in this Court and furnished to the IBP and
Tenorio Law Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.
Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She admitted
SO ORDERED.
that the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the
letterhead of her law office as senior partners because they have Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
investments in her law office.20 That is a blatant misrepresentation. concur.
The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another
proof that the respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in
misrepresenting to the public that he is a lawyer. Notably, the
identification card stating that he is "Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr.,"
bears the signature of the respondent as Chairperson of the Group.
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that
this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be
used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by,
any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman
in the unauthorized practice of law.21
WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B.
Cristal-Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that a
EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 12415, March 05, 2019 ]
JUSTICE FERNANDA LAMPAS-PERALTA, JUSTICE STEPHEN
C. CRUZ, AND JUSTICE RAMON PAUL L. HERNANDO,
COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. MARIE FRANCES E. RAMON,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
[1]
This is a Joint Complaint-Affidavit for disbarment filed by Court of
Appeals (CA) Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas-Peralta,
Chairperson of the Sixth Division, Stephen C. Cruz, Senior Member of
the Fifth Division, and Ramon Paul L. Hernando, then Junior Member
of the Fifth Division, now a member of this Court (complainants),
against Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon (respondent), a member of the
bar, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on
Bar Discipline (Commission).
The Antecedents
On March 4, 2016, it came to the knowledge of complainants that a
certain Maria Rossan De Jesus (De Jesus) went to the Office of the
Division Clerk of Court of the CA Fifth Division to ascertain the
veracity and authenticity of a Decision[2] purportedly written by
complainants in a criminal case entitled, "People of the Philippines v.
Tirso Fajardo y Delos Trino," and docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
08005.
In the said decision, complainants allegedly ordered the acquittal of
Tirso Fajardo (Fajardo), cousin of De Jesus, for the crime of violation
of Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.[3] The said
decision was given to De Jesus by respondent, who was their counsel,
to serve as proof that Fajardo had been acquitted. Respondent is a law
practitioner, who was admitted to the bar on May 4, 2004 with Roll
No. 49050. However, respondent informed De Jesus that the
promulgation of the said decision would supposedly depend on the
payment of a large sum of money to respondent.
Complainants checked the cases assigned to them and discovered that
the said criminal case of Fajardo was still in the completion stage and
was assigned to former CA Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam,[4] who
was then a member of the CA Fourth Division.[5] This was affirmed by
the CA Clerk of Court's Certification.[6]
On March 9, 2016, complainants learned through a newspaper item
and television news program that on March 8, 2016, an entrapment
operation was conducted by the members of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) against respondent, where she was caught red-
handed receiving marked money from Carlos Aquino (Aquino), a
friend of Fajardo, for the issuance of the aforementioned fake decision.
Complainants also learned that the NBI filed a Criminal
Complaint[7] against respondent and a certain Alex Rowales before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for the crimes of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2, and falsification under Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). The complaint stated that:
Complainants alleged that on December 16, 2015[,] [respondent] was
engaged by MS. RAYMUNDA FAJARDO to appeal the decision of
the Makati RTC convicting her son TIRSO DELOS TRINO
FAJARDO for violation of R.A. [No.] 9165. From said date until
March 2, 2016[,] [respondent] allegedly repeatedly asked for money
which eventually reached the total amount of about one million pesos
purportedly for legal fees and representation expenses. On March 2,
2016[,] Complainants, who are the cousin and best friend,
respectively, of TIRSO FAJARDO, met with [respondent] and one
ALEX ROWALES whom [respondent] introduced as a Sheriff of the
Court of Appeals and who showed to them a purported DECISION of
the Court of Appeals dated February 19, 2016[,] acquitting TIRSO
FAJARDO and they asked for [P]150,000.00 to hasten the release of
the purported decision and the eventual release of TIRSO FAJARDO.
Complainants first paid half of the demanded amount and verified the
purported decision[,] which they discovered to be fake. They then
reported the matter to the NBI Anti-Fraud Division[,] which then
planned an entrapment operation.
On March 8, 2016 at about 12:15 o'clock in the afternoon, the
undersigned Agents, together with the Complainants, conducted an
entrapment operation and proceeded to Jollibee Restaurant, Kalaw
Ave., Ermita, Manila[,] where Complainants and Subjects agreed to
meet[,] where Complainants are to deliver the balance of [P]75,000.00
As instructed, complainant DE JESUS occupied a table nearest the
comer of Kalaw and Orosa by the glass walls x x x. At about 12:30
pm[,] [respondent] arrived at the table with some food and proceeded
to eat while conversing with DE JESUS. After a few minutes,
Complainant AQUINO arrived and after conversing with [respondent],
he handed the marked money contained in a brown envelope to
[respondent][,] who then received the envelope and placed it [in front
of her]. After conversing some more, Complainants and [respondent]
stood up holding the brown envelope with the marked money.
At this juncture, Subject was immediately arrested and the marked
money was recovered. x x x[8]
Thus, complainants filed the present administrative complaint alleging
that respondent should be disbarred due to the following reasons: for
representing herself as a lawyer who can influence Justices of the
Court of Appeals to secure the acquittal of an accused; for defrauding
the relatives of accused Fajardo to amass a large amount of money in
the total amount of P1,000,000.00; for utter show of disrespect to
complainants, the Court, and the Judiciary as a whole; and for
committing the crimes of estafa and falsification.
Respondent did not submit any answer in spite of receipt of the order
from the IBP Commission. She also failed to appear at the mandatory
conference despite due notice.[9] Only complainants submitted their
Joint Position Paper[10] dated July 27, 2016, to the IBP Commission.
IBP Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation[11] dated September 26, 2016, the
IBP Commission recommended that respondent be disbarred as a
lawyer for committing acts that were in violation of her sworn duties
as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), and
for unreasonably involving the Justices in the incident to their damage
and prejudice.
In its Resolution[12] dated November 28, 2017, the IBP Board of
Governors (IBP Board) adopted the findings of fact and
recommendation of the IBP Commission imposing a penalty of
disbarment against respondent.
The Court's Ruling
The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Commission and the
recommendation of the IBP Board.
Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with
honesty and integrity in all their dealings. Members of the bar took
their oath to conduct themselves according to the best of their
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to their clients and to delay no man for money or malice. These
mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients
considering the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship.[13]
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law
during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to
be heard has afforded him. Without invading any constitutional
privilege or right, and attorney's right to practice law may be resolved
by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering
him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
of an attorney.[14] However, in consideration of the gravity of the profession.
consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the bar,
Further, Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02, and 10.03 mandates every
the Court have consistently held that a lawyer enjoys the presumption
lawyer to observe candor, fairness, and good faith, viz.:
of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to
satisfactorily prove the allegations in his complaint through substantial
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
evidence.[15]
court.
The Lawyer's Oath requires every lawyer to "support the Constitution
RULE 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be
authorities therein" and to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
misled by any artifice.
of any in court."[16] To the best of his ability, every lawyer is expected
to respect and abide by the law, and to avoid any act or omission that
RULE 10.02 A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent
is contrary thereto. A lawyer's personal deference to the law not only
the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing
speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and obedience to the
counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law
law on the part of the public.[17] Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the
a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment or
Code states:
assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes. RULE 10.03 A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall
not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
RULE 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. Respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code; Grave
misconduct
RULE 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. The Court finds that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and
several canons and rules of the Code. She represented to De Jesus and
On the other hand, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 obliges every lawyer to
Aquino that she could secure the acquittal of Fajardo and even used
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, to wit:
the names of the Associate Justices to accomplish her ill motives.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Respondent also defrauded her clients by drafting a fake, spurious, and
integrated bar. sham decision regarding the purported acquittal of Fajardo. She placed
the names of complainants in the fake decision even though the
RULE 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely criminal case of Fajardo was raffled in a different division and
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or assigned to a different Associate Justice. Glaringly, she discredited and
disrespected members of the judiciary by wrongfully involving
complainants' names in her fraudulent scheme. She also maliciously
represented to her clients that she can influence Associate Justices of
the CA to ensure the acquittal of an accused.
Further, respondent exacted exorbitant fees from her clients, in the
amount of P1,000,000.00 more or less, as evidenced by receipts she
signed.[18] In her ultimate desire to extort more money from Fajardo's
relatives, she presented the fake decision of acquittal and asserted that
the promulgation of the said decision would allegedly depend on the
payment of a large sum of money to respondent.
Through the operation of the NBI, respondent was arrested in an
entrapment operation when she received the marked money from
Aquino for the purported decision of acquittal. Respondent's arrest
and modus operandi were even broadcasted in television and
published in the newspaper, causing further shame, disrepute, and
disgrace to the legal profession.
Respondent was given an opportunity to controvert the allegations
against her, however, she neither filed her answer nor attended the
mandatory conference in the IBP Commission.
Verily, the acts exhibited by respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath.
Her acts are also contrary to Canons 1, 7, and 10, and Rules 1.01, 1.02,
7.03, 10.01, 10.02, and 10.03 because respondent violated the laws,
particularly Articles 172 and 315, par. 2 of the RPC, tarnished the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and committed falsehood
and deceit against her clients and the courts.
Respondent's acts also constitute grave misconduct. The misconduct is
grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must
be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law,
or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge
of grave misconduct.[19] Corruption, as an element of grave
misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who
unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure
some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and
the rights of others.[20]
Doubtless, respondent had a clear intent to violate the law when she
fraudulently drafted a fake decision of the CA, falsely including
therein the names of complainants, and presenting it to her clients for
monetary consideration. These acts show respondent's wanton
disregard of the law and a patent propensity to trample upon the
canons of the Code. Hence, respondent should also be held
administratively guilty for grave misconduct.
Proper penalty
The Court finds that complainants have established by substantial
evidence that respondent: (1) drafted a fake decision of the CA
acquitting Fajardo; (2) falsely and shamelessly included the names of
complainants in the fake decision even though the criminal case was
raffled to another division and handled by a different Justice; (3)
maliciously represented that she can influence Associate Justices of
the CA to acquit an accused; (4) fraudulently presented this fake
decision to her clients in exchange for a hefty monetary consideration;
(5) exacted exorbitant fees from her clients in the amount of
P1,000,000.00; and (6) was caught red-handed by the NBI operatives
when she received the marked money from her client for the fake
decision of the CA. As discussed above, these acts constitute
violations of the Lawyer's Oath, and Canons 1, 7, and 10, and Rules
1.01, 1.02, 7.03, 10.01, 10.02, and 10.03 of the Code. Respondent is
guilty of grave misconduct because her transgression showed her clear
intent to violate the law and disregard the Code.
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended
from his office as an attorney, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath
and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in
the Code. For the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust,
the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and Judiciary. Instead of being an advocate of justice, she became a
who possess good moral character. The appropriate penalty for an perpetrator of injustice. The ultimate penalty of disbarment must be
errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion imposed upon respondent. Her name should be stricken off
based on the surrounding facts.[21] Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of immediately and without reservation in the Roll of Attorneys.
Court states:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon is GUILTY of
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
violating the Lawyer's Oath, Canons 1, 7, and 10, and Rules 1.01,
grounds. - A member of the bar may be removed or suspended
1.02, 7.03, 10.01, 10.02, and 10.03 of the Code of Professional
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
Responsibility, and Grave Misconduct. For reasons above stated, she
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
is DISBARRED from the practice of law and her name stricken off
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately, without prejudice to the
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
civil or criminal cases pending and/or to be filed against her.
take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
Confidant to be entered into Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon's records.
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
Copies shall likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
(emphasis supplied)
concerned.
In Taday v. Atty. Apoya, Jr.,[22] the Court disbarred a lawyer for
authoring a fake court decision, which was considered a violation of SO ORDERED.
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code. The lawyer therein even delivered
and misrepresented the fake decision to his client. The Court held that Bersamin, C. J., Carpio, Del Castillo, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, A.
the lawyer "committed unlawful, dishonest, immoral[,] and deceitful Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., and Carandang, JJ., concur.
conduct, and lessened the confidence of the public in the legal Peralta, J., No part. Spouse is a complainant.
system."[23] Perlas-Bernabe, J., on official leave.
Hernando, J., No part.
In Billanes v. Atty. Latido,[24] the Court also disbarred a lawyer for
manufacturing a fake decision in an annulment case. The lawyer
therein violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code because there existed
substantial evidence that he procured the spurious decision, which
caused great prejudice to his client.

In fine, respondent's acts should not just be deemed as unacceptable

practices that are both disgraceful and dishonorable; these reveal a
moral flaw that makes her unfit to practice law. She has tarnished the
image of the legal profession and has lessened the public faith in the
EN BANC
A.C. No. 12289, April 02, 2019
ATTY. ANASTACIO T. MUNTUERTO, JR.; ATTY. RAMON
JOSE G. DUYONGCO; ATTY. MARIO Y. CAVADA; AND
ATTY. CHAD RODOLFO M. MIEL, COMPLAINANTS, v.
ATTY. GERARDO WILFREDO L. ALBERTO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, C.J.:
A lawyer who notarizes documents without a notarial commission, and
assists and abets the unauthorized practice of law by a non-lawyer,
deliberately violates the Lawyer's Oath and transgresses the canons of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He thereby manifests a lack
of respect for the law and dishonesty, and deserves to be severely
punished.
Antecedents
We hereby consider and resolve the disbarment complaint filed by the
complainants charging the respondent with falsification of public
documents, and wilful and deliberate violations of his oath as a lawyer,
and of the mandatory rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1
The complainants aver that the respondent was the counsel of record
of Cristeto E. Dinopol, Jr., who had instituted an action for
reconveyance and recovery of possession and damages against Singfil
Hydro Builders in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 47, in
Masbate City docketed as Civil Case No. 6835; that the respondent
had attached to the complaint a supplemental agreement and an
amended joint venture agreement separately acknowledged before him
as a notary public for and in Cavite City; that he had antedated his
notarizations; that, however, the Notarial Division of the RTC in
Cavite City certified that it had "no record of any Commission/Order
appointing a certain Atty. Gerardo Wilfredo L. Alberto as Notary
Public for the City of Cavite nor of any documents notarized by him,
more specifically a document denominated as Supplemental &
Amended Joint Venture Agreement;'''2 that he had not indicated his
MCLE3 certificate of compliance number and the date of issue of such
certificate;4 that realizing that the complaint he had filed was fatally
defective, he had his client sign and file the so-called Motion for Prior
Leave of Court to Admit the Herein Attached Amended Complaint,
with the amended complaint attached; and that the respondent had
further falsified the supposed secretary's certificate to make it appear
that he had been duly appointed as the acting corporate secretary of
Singtrader JV Corporation, and that a resolution had been adopted by
said corporation authorizing Cristeto E. Dinopol, Jr. as its
representative relative to the filing of the necessary and proper
actions.5
Upon receipt of the administrative complaint against the respondent,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) directed him to file his
answer. However, he did not comply, and for that reason he was
declared in default.6
The IBP then conducted a mandatory conference on June 18, 2016, but
the respondent did not attend the same despite notice. Furthermore, he
did not file his position paper.7
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In her Report and Recommendation dated January 31, 2017, IBP
Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala found the
charges against the respondent established, and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for five years, to wit:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, we respectfully recommend that
respondent, ATTY. GERARDO WILFREDO L. ALBERTO,
be SUSPENDED for a period of FIVE (5) YEARS from receipt
hereof as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8
On November 27, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the
findings and recommendation of IBP Investigation Commissioner
Villanueva-Maala, viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, but modifying the recommended
penalty to SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW for five
(5) years.
RESOLVED FURTHER to recommend the imposition upon
respondent of a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for
disregarding the Orders of the Commission.9
The respondent did not appeal or move for reconsideration.
Issue
Did the respondent violate the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility: (a) by notarizing documents without
having been issued a notarial commission; (b) by allowing a non-
lawyer to sign a motion filed in court; and (c) by failing to indicate his
MCLE compliance number in the complaint filed in connection with a
pending case?
Ruling of the Court
We ADOPT with MODIFICATION the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
I When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of the
The respondent notarized the supplemental agreement and the
amended joint venture agreement attached to the complaint he filed in
Civil Case No. 6835.10 According to the findings by IBP Investigating
Commissioner Villanueva-Maala, he held no notarial commission
when he notarized the documents. Such lack of the notarial
commission was confirmed by the certification issued by the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the RTC in Cavite City to the effect that said
office had no record of any commission appointing the respondent a
notary public for and in the City of Cavite.11
The respondent should be subjected to strong disciplinary action for
notarizing the documents without authorization or commission to do
so.
To start with, the act of the respondent constituted a blatant violation
of the injunction of the Lawyer's Oath to obey the laws. The law
thereby violated is the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, which
expressly defines a notary public as "any person commissioned to
perform official acts under the [2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice]."12 The commission, which is the grant of authority to
perform notarial acts,13 is issued upon due application by the
Executive Judge of the province or city where the applicant is to have
a regular place of work or business after a summary hearing conducted
by the Executive Judge following the publication of the notice of
summary hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in said
province or city, and after posting of the notice of summary hearing in
a conspicuous place in the offices of the Executive Judge and of the
Clerk of Court.14 Clearly, the exercise of the authority to notarize
cannot simply be done by anyone.
The significance of the office of the notary public cannot be taken for
granted. The notarial act is invested with public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act and serve as notaries
public.15 The Court has expounded on the character of the office of the
notary public in Bernardo Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,16 stating thusly:
The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents.
document under his hand and seal he gives the document the force of
evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be
acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity
which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to
authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their
execution and delivery. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey
the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Failing
in this, he must accept the consequences of his unwarranted actions.
And, secondly, the respondent, by making it appear that he had been
duly commissioned to act as notary public, thereby vested the
documents with evidentiary value. Yet, because of the absence of a
notarial commission in his favor, he foisted a deliberate falsehood on with the concomitant right to demand the return of fees already paid to
the trial court. He became guilty of dishonesty. He also trivialized the the non-compliant lawyer.
solemnity of notarizing the documents. Such effrontery transgressed
However, the respondent did not disclose his MCLE certificate of
the prohibition against unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
compliance number and the date of issue of the certificate in the
conduct on his part as an attorney made explicit in Rule 1.01 of Canon
complaint he filed in Civil Case No. 6835 of the RTC in Masbate City.
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: "A lawyer shall
Such non-disclosure was a flagrant disobedience to the aforequoted
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."17
terms of the resolution issued in Bar Matter No. 1922.
II
It is good to mention that the respondent seemed to be a repeat violator
18
The resolution issued in Bar Matter No. 1922, as amended, required of the requirement for disclosure under the resolution issued in Bar
the respondent to disclose in all the pleadings, motions and other Matter No. 1922. He had been observed to have been guilty of the
papers he filed in court of information on his compliance with the same omission in A.C. No. 12131,19 where the Court noted his having
MCLE program of the Supreme Court. The resolution reads as defied the order for him to submit his MCLE compliance, to wit:
follows:
With regard to the case docketed as SEC-MC13-138 pending before
In the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated January 14, 2014 in the RTC Mandaluyong City, Branch 211, complainant also appeared as
above-cited administrative matter, the Court RESOLVED, upon the counsel for and signed the pleadings without a certificate of
recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board, to: compliance for MCLE IV. Also, in its order dated August 19, 2014,
the RTC directed complainant to show cause for his failure to comply
(a) AMEND the June 3, 2008 resolution by repealing the phrase
with the directives of the court for him to submit his MCLE
"Failure to disclose the required information would cause the
compliance. Up to the present, complainant has yet to comply with the
dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
order of the court.
records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required
information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and III
disciplinary action"; and
The respondent was also liable for the charge of assisting and abetting
(b) PRESCRIBE the following rules for non-disclosure of current the unauthorized practice of law by a non-lawyer because he had a
MCLE compliance/exemption number in the pleadings: non-lawyer sign and file the so-called Motion for Prior Leave of Court
to Admit the Herein Attached Amended Complaint despite him being
(i) The lawyer shall be imposed a fine of P2,000.00 for the first
the counsel of record of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 6835. He
offense, P3,000.00 for the second offense and P4,000.00 for the third
thereby patently breached both the letter and spirit of Rule 9.01, Canon
offense;
9 of the Code, which states:
(ii) In addition to the fine, counsel may be listed as a delinquent
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
member of the Bar pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of Bar Matter No.
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
850 and its implementing rules and regulations; and
member of the Bar in good standing.
(iii) The non-compliant lawyer shall be discharged from the case and
the client/s shall be allowed to secure the services of a new counsel
The preparation and signing of any pleading, motion or other paper to
be submitted in court in connection with any pending matter constitute
legal work within the context of the practice of law. Verily, pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the signature on the pleading,
motion or other paper serves as a certification that the signing attorney
"has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay." Such formal assurance cannot be undertaken and
given except by a regular member of the Philippine Bar in good
standing. It is also necessary to stress that the high responsibility for
conducting the litigation pertains only to the enrolled attorney of the
party in whose behalf the pleading, motion or other paper is submitted
in court. He may delegate the signing of the pleading, motion or other
paper to another lawyer, but not to a non-lawyer.20
In Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,21 the Court, holding that the lawyer's
duty to prevent, or, at the very least, not to assist in the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy, pointed out
that:
x x x Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that
this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit the professional services or his name to be
used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by,
any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman
in the unauthorized practice of law.22
In fine, the responsibility of signing the so-called Motion for Prior
Leave of Court to Admit the Herein Attached Amended Complaint was
personal to the respondent as the attorney of record. That he delegated
it to a non-lawyer was an abdication of the responsibility that
subjected him to sanction.
IV
We next consider the penalty with which to sanction the respondent.
The Court has held lawyers administratively liable for notarizing
documents without having been issued their notarial commissions.
In Nunga v. Viray,23 the Court suspended a lawyer for three years for
notarizing an instrument without a commission. In Zoreta v.
Simpliciano,24 the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for
two years, and permanently barred from being commissioned as a
notary public for notarizing several documents after the expiration of
his commission. In Mariano v. Echanez,25 the Court suspended the
erring lawyer from the practice of law for two years and permanently
barred him from being commissioned as a notary public for
performing notarial acts without a valid notarial commission.
The respondent's act of having the representative of his corporate
client sign the so-called Motion for Prior Leave of Court to Admit the
Herein Attached Amended Complaint submitted to the RTC could be
equated to the censurable act in Tapay v. Bancolo,26 where the lawyer
had allowed a non-lawyer to sign a pleading filed in court. The
offending lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for one year.
In addition, the respondent's failure to comply with the directives of
the IBP to do certain acts in relation to the investigation of the
administrative charge brought against him - specifically, that he did
not file his answer, and his verified position paper despite being
required to do so - exhibited defiance towards the IBP's directives.
Such defiance should not be overlooked, but ought to be treated as an
aggravating circumstance of his liability in this case. This treatment
would constantly remind him that the IBP, as the investigator
designated by the Court itself to investigate the charge brought against
him, was discharging a public duty in the Court's name and stead, and
should be respected in its discharge of the duty.
In view of all the foregoing, the Court deems it to be just and proper to
adopt the IBP Board of Governors' recommendation to suspend the
respondent from the practice of law for a period of five years effective
upon receipt of this decision, and to bar him permanently from being
commissioned as notary public in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDS respondent ATTY.
GERARDO WILFREDO L. ALBERTO from the practice of law for
five (5) years effective upon receipt of this
decision; PERMANENTLY BARS him from being commissioned as
Notary Public in the Philippines effective upon his receipt of this
decision; and STERNLY WARNS him that a stiffer penalty will be
imposed should he commit a similar offense hereafter.
Let this decision be attached to the records of ATTY. GERARDO
WILFREDO L. ALBERTO in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and be furnished to the Office of
the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, A.
Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, Carandang, and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Jardeleza, J., on official business.
J. Reyes, Jr., J., on official leave.
Hernando, J., on leave.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8335, April 10, 2019
AMALIA R. CENIZA, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. ELISEO B.
CENIZA, JR., RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The abandonment by an attorney of his legitimate family in order to
cohabit with a married woman constitutes gross immorality that wan-
ants his disbarment.1
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received the complainant's
letter-complaint denouncing the immoral conduct committed by her
husband, a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.2 She
submitted therewith her affidavit detailing the grounds for her
denunciation.3
The complainant stated that she and the respondent were married on
November 12, 1989 at the Sacred Heart Parish in Cebu City; that in
time they had two children, Marie Agnes (Agnes) and Christopher
Chuck;4 that on April 21, 2008, he told her that he would be attending
a seminar in Manila, but because she had some business to attend to in
General Santos City, he seemingly agreed to her request to forego with
his trip to Manila, and that upon her return from General Santos City
on April 26, 2008, however, he had already moved out of their home,
taking along with him his car and personal belongings.
On May 23, 2008, the complainant went to the Mandaue City Hall
where the respondent worked as a legal officer in order to inquire
about his situation. She learned from members of his staff that they
had suspected him of carrying on an extra-marital affair with one Anna
Fe Flores Binoya (Anna). On the next day, the complainant,
accompanied by her daughter and a nephew, went to the address
provided by the staff to verify the information. They were able to meet
Anna's sister who informed them that she had moved out of their
address; that Anna and her second husband, Atty. Eliseo Ceniza, Jr.,
the herein respondent, had been living together in Aldea Subdivision;
and that in the evening of said date the complainant and her daughter
proceeded to the new address where they found and confronted the
respondent, who simply denied having committed any wrongdoing.
On July 9, 2008, the respondent commenced a civil action seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with the complainant,5 alleging
her psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
On August 11, 2008, the respondent visited the complainant at work
and requested her to agree to the nullification of their marriage. She
refused and instead pleaded with him to avoid displaying his paramour
in public. Her pleas notwithstanding, he continued with the illicit
relationship.
On November 18, 2008, the complainant brought a complaint for
immorality against the respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB-V-A-10-0345-G).
On April 2, 2009, the complainant sent a letter to President
Macapagal-Arroyo alleging therein that her husband had abandoned
her and their children in order to live with another woman.
On May 18, 2009, the Presidential Action Center of the Office of the
President forwarded the complainant's letter to President Macapagal-
Arroyo to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC).6 In due course, the
OBC directed the respondent to comment on the complaint against
him.
On October 26, 2009, the respondent filed his comment,7 wherein he
denied having engaged in immoral conduct and maintained that Anna
had only been a business partner. He insisted that he had moved in
with his parents after leaving their family home; and that he had left
the complainant because her behavior had become unbearable.
 be more circumspect in his actuations to avoid the impression of
In the meantime, on August 5, 2011, the Office of the Ombudsman committing immorality.
issued its decision in OMB-V-A-10-0345-G,8 in which it found the
respondent guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct for having an Commissioner Hababag rendered the following observations, to wit:
extramarital affair with a woman in violation of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which
required that: The issue is whether or not respondent is guilty of immorality in his
relationship with Anna Fe Binoya.
.... all public officials and employees shall at all times be accountable
to the people and shall discharge their duties with utmost
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful,
responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
and justice, lead modest lives, and uphold public interest over personal
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
interest.9
To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyer's conduct must not
only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as
The Office of the Ombudsman disposed: to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. (Emma T.
rendered finding respondent ELISEO B. CENIZA guilty of
Dantes vs. Atty. Crispin Dantes A.C. No. 6486 September 22, 2004).
Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct. The said respondent is hereby
meted the penalty of SUSPENSION from the service for a period of
SIX (6) MONTHS without pay with a stern warning that subsequent
violations of similar nature will be dealt with a more severe penalty.10 Upon the other hand good moral character is a requirement not only
upon one's application for admission but it is rather a continuing
requirement even after admission for the enjoyment of the privilege to
practice. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which upheld
(Boyong vs. Oblema, 7 SCRA 859).
the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman.11
Report and Recommendation of the IBP WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
recommended that the administrative suit be dismissed but with
WARNING to the respondent to be more circumspect in his actuation
to avoid the impression of committing immorality.12
On October 7, 2010, Commissioner Salvador Hababag of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD), to which the complaint against the respondent had been
referred for investigation, submitted his findings and recommended the On February 13, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued its
dismissal of the complaint, opining that the respondent be cautioned to
Resolution No. XX-2013-148 adopting the recommendation of
Commissioner Hababag,13 to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, the case is
hereby DISMISSED. However, the Warning imposed against
respondent is hereby ordered deleted.
On February 26, 2014, the case was considered closed and terminated
for failure of the complainant to seek a reconsideration or appeal by
petition for review.14
On June 4, 2014, however, the complainant transmitted a letter of
appeal vis-à-vis the resolution of February 26, 2014, attaching thereto
her motion for reconsideration.14
Thereupon, the Court referred the case to the OBC for report and
evaluation.
Upon the recommendation of the OBC,15 the Court set aside its
resolution of February 26, 2014, and required the respondent to
comment on the complainant's motion for reconsideration. 16
On February 23, 2016, the Court promulgated a resolution referring
the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.17
On March 1, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XXII-2017-889 denying the motion for reconsideration.
Issue
Should the respondent be disciplined for the actions attributed to him
by the complainant?
Ruling of the Court
We disagree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
for the dismissal of the charge of immorality.
It appears to us that Commissioner Hababag utterly failed to
conscientiously discharge his responsibility as the factfinder; and that
he also did not properly appreciate the facts in relation to the relevant
laws and the canons of ethics. All that he accomplished was to rehash
the principles of law that he believed were applicable, but without
calibrating such principles to whatever facts were found by him to be
established. He did not even explain why the principles were relevant
to the case of the respondent. Such nonchalant discharge of the
responsibility of fact-finding was almost perfunctory, certainly
lackluster, and bereft of the requisite enthusiasm. What makes it worse
for the timid, if not lethargic, recommendation was the unquestioning
affirmance by the IBP Board of Governors, which seemingly failed to
even notice the glaring inadequacy.
For sure, the finding of insufficient evidence against the respondent
was unwarranted. He had not even put forward anything of substance
in his defense. He had been content with merely denying the imputed
wrongdoing, but his denial did not disprove the substantial evidence
adduced against him. He had been sufficiently shown to have
abandoned his legitimate spouse and family in order to live with a
married woman.
The findings made by the Office of the Ombudsman in the
administrative case brought against the respondent more than sufficed
to show his immorality, thereby showing his failure to live up to the
legal and ethical obligations of a lawyer. In this regard, we adopt and
reiterate the apt findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, to wit:
Respondent is adamant in his denial that he has a relationship with
Binoya. He insists that complainant's accusation that he was having an
affair with Binoya was purely speculative and unsupported by
evidence.
Complainant, for her part, presented affidavits not only of their
daughter, Marie Agnes ("Marie"), but also of two others, namely:
Roberto Joseph Galvan ("Galvan") and Gabriel Jadraque ("Jadraque").
Marie declared, in part, that:
9. That we found out on May 24, that he had another woman named
Anna Fe Flores Binoya, and he was currently living with her in Block
11, Lot 27, Aldea Subd., Timpolok, Lapulapu City.
10. That I was there in Umapad dump site when I met Myrna Flores,
Ann's mother, Ann and Ann's daughter. She tried to deny her
relationship with my father, but just a few minutes after, I heard her
three aunts tell us that she had a new husband. She identified the new
husband as Atty. Eliseo B. Ceniza, Jr.
Meanwhile, Galvan alleged that:
2. That I have been living at Aldea Buena Subdivision, Timpolok,
Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City since February 2005;
3. That I regularly stroll in our subdivision on board my bicycle or
motorcycle with my kids;
4. That on several occasions in the month of December 2008 and
January 2009, I saw the black Honda care (sic) with plate no. YDX
692 or sometimes the red Toyota Corolla care (sic) with plate no. GEJ
877 belonging to ATTY. ELISEO B. CENIZA, JR., parked in front of
the house located on Block 11 Lot 27 of Aldea Buena Subdivision;
5. That more particularly, I have seen these vehicles parked for long
periods of time and in some days overnight at the said place;
6. That on December 22, 2008 at around 8:00 PM, I personally saw
ATTY. ELISEO B. CENIZA, JR. taking dinner, half-naked, facing the
table in the above-mentioned house together with a woman whom I
later identified as ANN FLORES from the picture that AMALIA R.
CENIZA showed me;
7. That I saw them again inside the house on December 23, 2008 at
around nine o'clock in the morning up to past twelve o'clock noontime;
Finally, Jadraque averred that:
That sometime on the first week of January 2009, Mrs. Amalia R[.]
Ceniza approached me and sought assistance to conduct a surveillance
of her husband's activities.
That Mrs. Ceniza provided me information that her husband has a
girlfriend who is residing at blk 11, lot 27[,] ALDEA BUENA SUBD.
[,] Timpolok[,] Lapu-Lapu City Cebu, which she also believed that her
husband frequently slept there at night and most of the time uses their
car a RED TOYOTA with LTO plate GEJ-877;
That on the nineth(sic) of January Mrs. Ceniza contacted me thru my
mobile phone that the classes of her daughter will end at 6:30 in the
afternoon at Cebu Doctor's College at Mandaue City and her husband
will be the one to pick up and brought [her] home.
That at about 6:00 in the afternoon that day[,] I went ahead with a
videocam with me in Blk 11, Lot 27[,] ALDEA BUENA SUBD.[,]
Timpolok[,] Lapu-lapu City and strategically positioned myself in
order to observed(sic) the place and the activities of the people in the
surroundings;
That few minutes after I saw a RED TOYOTA with LTO plate GEJ-
877 approaching the place this time I remembered the car mentioned
by Mrs. Ceniza that [was] frequently driven by her husband, so I
immediately turn[ed] on the video cam, and while the tape is
running[,] I saw the RED TOYOTA with LTO Plate GEJ-877 parked
in front of the house #27[,] at the same time[,] I saw one lady [who]
went out from the house and proceeded to the gate and unlocked it
then she went back inside the house;
That a moment after, one man went out from the driver aside of the
RED TOYOTA with LTO Plate # GEJ-877 wearing white T-shirt and
proceeded to the house # 27, he opened the gate[,] went inside, then he
locked it and proceeded to the main door of the house where the lady
who unlocked the gate waited near the main door;
(sic) That later[,] I identify (sic) the man who went out form the RED
TOYOTA with LTO Plate GEJ-877 and proceeded to the house #27 as
ATTY. ELISEO B. CENIZA JR.
Complainant likewise proffered photographs proving her claim that
respondent frequents Binoya's house, as well as, proofs that the place
which her husband visits was indeed owned by Binoya. Complainant
also adduced evidence to the effect that facts of marriage appear in the
Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cebu City, between Binoya and a
certain Ebrahaim Angeles Yap who were married on 18 October 2002
at Al Khariah Mosque, San Nicolas, Mambaling, Cebu City. The
corresponding Certificate of Marriage was likewise submitted.
Vis-à-vis complainant's overwhelming allegations, respondent offered
only self-serving denials. It is elementary that denials are weak
especially if unsupported by evidence. Denial is an intrinsically weak
defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility.
It bears stressing that aside from his general claim that complainant
only wanted to destroy his reputation and that the instant complaint is
purely a vendetta on her part, respondent did not even attempt to
present countervailing evidence to substantiate his bare allegations.
No less than respondent's own daughter, Marie Agnes, spoke her piece
about the nature of her father's association with Binoya. His daughter
is a budding teen-ager and has already attained a certain level of
maturity to understand the dynamics of the relationship of her parents.
Moreover, the photographs and declarations of Galvan and Jadraque
negate respondent's assertion that he merely visits Binoya as a
business associate. His vehicles were seen in front of Binoya's house
for long periods of time and in some days, on overnight stays. He was
also seen in Binoya's house half-naked while having a meal. Under the
prevailing circumstances, these cannot be deemed as actuations of a
business partner or the usual business meetings as respondent insists.
It is true that complainant was unable to present photograph/s of
respondent and Binoya together. Still, from the foregoing, she has
given several pieces of evidence which yield the unmistakable
conclusion that respondent and Binoya are having an illicit affair.
Under the present scheme of things, these circumstances meet the
requirement of substantial evidence in administrative proceedings. In
the extant case, there is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion that respondent and
Binoya are engaged in an illicit relationship.
We are cognizant of the fact that cases like this usually entail a 'He
said – She said' version. However, complainant was able to build her
case against respondent. As afore-discussed, complainant presented
evidence to support her claims. There were documentary evidence and
affidavits proving, to the best of her ability, her accusations against
respondent."19
The CA upheld the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman,
observing as follows:20
Petitioner [Atty. Ceniza] maintains that the insinuations and
accusations that he is having a relationship with Anna Fe Binoya is
unfounded and baseless. Petitioner claims that he had a friendly
relationship with the family of Anna Fe, and that they are far from
being intimate. Petitioner contends that public respondent based its
findings purely on circumstantial evidence. Petitioner emphasizes that
not even a picture of him and Anna Fe was ever presented. Instead, the
circumstantial evidence relied upon by public respondent at most
would only prove that indeed the petitioner visited Anna Fe at her
residence. A grave charge of disgraceful and immoral conduct
according to petitioner requires direct and competent evidence which
is absent in the extant case.
Petitioner's protestations fail to persuade. Evidence on record is awash
of the immoral and disgraceful conduct of petitioner. We find no
reason therefore to disturb the findings of public respondent that
petitioner is guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct.
xxxx
In the face of the evidence presented by private respondent, the bare
denial and self-serving statements of petitioner crumble. The positive
and categorical assertions of private respondent and the uncontradicted
statements of the witnesses that they saw petitioner staying overnight
at Anna Fe's house on numerous occasions, have sufficiently
established the administrative liability of petitioner. They reasonably
and logically lead to the conclusion that petitioner was intimately and
scandalously involved with Anna Fe. In fact, petitioner even admitted
having visited Anna Fe's home several times but claimed that Anna Fe
is her distant relative and client. If this was so, petitioner could have
presented proof showing his business transaction with Anna Fe. Also,
petitioner's claim that Anna Fe is his distant blood relative is wanting
of any evidence. Nonetheless, if petitioner and Anna Fe are indeed
relatives, this fact would not help prove petitioner's innocence from the
charge of immoral conduct. Rather, it would only make petitioner's
actions appear more scandalous and distasteful and would only tend to
validate petitioner's inclination to thoughtless indiscretions.
Also quite untenable is petitioner's protestation that the evidence
presented would prove at most his causal visits to his friend and
relative Anna Fe. In his vain attempt for absolution, petitioner pointed
out that neither a single photograph of him and Anna Fe going out
together was ever presented nor even an allegation that they were seen
holding hands or that they had a 'friendly kiss, or beso-beso'.
It is morally reprehensible for a married man or woman to maintain
intimate relations with another person of the opposite sex other than
his or her spouse. In the context of and during such an illicit affair, acts
which are otherwise morally acceptable (such as having lunch or
dinner, working overtime or watching a movie together) become
tainted with immorality when done by a married man or woman with a
person not his or her spouse. These otherwise innocent acts (like
petitioner's casual visits to Anna Fe's house and his overnight stays)
are deemed unclean because they are done in furtherance of and in
connection with something immoral.
Moreover, immorality is not confined to sexual matters, but includes
conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or
shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of
respectable members of the community, and as an inconsiderate
attitude toward good order and public welfare.
The Court will not deviate from the findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman as fully affirmed by the CA.
The members of the legal profession must conform to the highest
standards of morality because the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandated them so, to wit:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
There is no question that a married person's abandonment of his or her
spouse in order to live and cohabit with another constitutes
immorality. The offense may even be criminal – either as concubinage
or as adultery Immoral conduct, or immorality, is that which is so
willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of
good and respectable members of the community. As a basis of
disciplinary action, such immoral conduct, or immorality must be so
corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous
or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency.21 That the illicit partner is himself or herself married
compounds the immorality.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. The Court will exercise its disciplining authority only if
the case against the respondent is established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence. Given the serious and far-reaching consequences
of disbarment, only a clearly preponderant showing can warrant the
imposition of the harsh penalty of disbarment. 22 Preponderance of
evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the other; it means
evidence that is more convincing as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.23
Herein, the complainant presented clearly preponderant evidence
showing that the respondent, while being lawfully married to her, had
maintained an illicit relationship with a married woman. It is of no
moment that she presented no direct evidence of the illicit relationship
between him and his mistress; or that her proof of his immorality was
circumstantial. Direct evidence is that evidence which proves a fact in
issue directly without any reasoning or inferences being drawn on the
part of the factfinder. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which
indirectly proves a fact in issue; the factfinder must draw an inference
or reason from circumstantial evidence.24 The lack of direct evidence
should not obstruct the adjudication of a dispute, for circumstantial
evidence may be available for the purpose. The Rules of Court has
really made no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and
evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a may be
inferred.25 Thus, for the respondent to insist that the complainant did
not discharge her burden of proof because she did not adduce direct
evidence of the immorality is utterly fallacious. As the records amply
indicated, the circumstantial evidence adduced herein compelled the
conclusion that he had abandoned the complainant and their children
in order to cohabit with his married mistress.
Time and again, the Court has pointed out that when the integrity or
morality of a member of the Bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
or she denies the charge, for he or she must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence presented on the charge. He or she must
present proof that he or she still maintains the degree of integrity and
morality expected of him or her at all times.26 The respondent failed in
this regard.
In keeping with the high standards of morality imposed upon every
lawyer, the respondent should have desisted from the illicit
relationship with his mistress, and should have avoided the impression
on the part of the public that he was defying the moral standards
required of him.27 His leaving his wife and family to cohabit with his
married mistress definitely transgressed the clearly-defined bounds of
decency and morality. His transgression inflicted on his wife and
children a lot of suffering, including depression, as borne out by one
child's attempt at suicide out of despair for what he had caused to their
family. These circumstances were more than sufficient to establish the
charge of gross immorality.
That the immoral conduct of the respondent pertained to his private
life did not diminish the gravity of his ethical violation. In Advincula v.
Advincula,28 we have exhorted all lawyers to always conduct
themselves in a manner as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that they are flouting the moral standards of the legal
profession, thusly:
.... it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must
not only be in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be
of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a
member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to
refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but also to
conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is
to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever
is enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles
but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The
requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far
as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning.
Indeed, any lawyer guilty of gross misconduct should be suspended or
disbarred even if the misconduct relates to his or her personal life for
as long as the misconduct evinces his or her lack of moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.29 Every lawyer is expected to be
honorable and reliable at all times, for a person who cannot abide by
the laws in his private life cannot be expected to do so in his
professional dealings.30
In view of the foregoing, the respondent's immoral conduct
violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
We now deal with the penalty to be imposed.
In Narag v. Narag,31 the Court disbarred the respondent attorney for
abandoning his family and living with his paramour. In Dantes v.
Dantes,32 the Court disbarred the respondent attorney for having
maintained two illicit relationships, thereby not keeping up with the
strict requirements of law for the continued practice of the noble
profession. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,33 disbarment was
also imposed on the respondent who had abandoned his wife and
maintained an illicit affair with another woman. Likewise, in Guevarra
v. Eala,34 disbarment was the penalty for a lawyer who carried on an
extra-marital affair with a married woman while he was also married.
By his scandalous and highly immoral conduct, therefore, the
respondent showed that he did not possess the requisite good moral
character needed for the continued practice of law. He deserves the
extreme penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, the
Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. ELISEO B.
CENIZA, JR. guilty of gross immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 and
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; DISBARS him
from the practice of law effective upon receipt of this decision;
and ORDERS his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to the respondent's personal
record in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Furnish a copy of this decision to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for its information and guidance; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J.

Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang, and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., see separate opinion.
Del Castillo and Jardeleza, JJ., on official leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., on leave.