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Copy 110 Chi ef ,

1946

Ref Ko AIU/ IS/ 34 EClbw:~~~ AIR DIVI SION HJS/RF:II/ rm

HEAD<;YARrERS UNITED STATES FORCES IN AUSTRIA
Air Int errogat ion Unit (Int. Center- Aus t r ia)
APO 77 7. us AJU.!Y

329509
I NTERROGAT I OlI W l>i.U!Y 18 November 1946
•
GAF IllTELLI GEl'CZ SZRVI CE (All"EHR)

Secti on
I ntr oduc ti on and Evaluation of Sou r ce .• .. ,.... .. . . .. . .... . . ... . ... I
Or ganizati on of GAF l n t e lli gc nc~ Serv i ce (East er n Section) •.•. .. • • II
Sel ection of GAF I nt~lli ge nce Per sonnel • ..• . .. . .•. .... .. •. .. .• .. •• III
Air Int elligenc e Trai n i ng .. . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .•. . . .. . . . IV
Sources u s ed i n Obt a ining I nt el ligence I nfo r~at i o n on the
Russian Air Zor ce. ... .. . . .... .. . . . .. .. .. . . . ... .. .. .. .. ..• . . ..•• V
Relati ons b etwee n Abl"ehr ( Count er I nte ll igence ) and
Si cherhoitsdi ens t (I n t er nal Secur i t y Servic e) •.... • . • .. •. •. . .• . VI
~ evie\tf of Eesults Obtain ed . . . . •• .. .. ..• . . . •• . . . . ... .. . . . ... . .. . ..• VI I

Sect ion I

I NTRODUCTI ON AiID JVALUAT IO, OF SOURCE

1. I l~ODUCT! ON : This repo r t at t empts to give some of the general

aspects of thec)l.'ganf"zati onal setup and t he ....ork p erf or med by t be Intelli­
gence Ser vic e of the German Ai r Force bef ore and during tb~ war . I nas:1lU C'h
as the Source of this report was a s pecial i st in and a mewoer of t hat p art
of the OAF Intel l i g ence Servi ce which concer ned it self with Eastern Europ p. ,
t he f a cts n.nd op ini ons give n be l ow f! h ould be cons idered a& me r ely a par t.
of the ent i r e ' GAF int e l l i genc e sys t em . Source was a member of t he ai r
sect i on of Abwehr Abt e ilung I t whi ch w~s d i r ec t l y resp onsible f or g at ~e r i ng
i n t elli gence and c vunter inte l li gence info r mati on on the armre s , nav i e s
and a ir fo r c e s of for e i g n or enemy nat ions .

2 . BVALUATI OU OF ~OURCE: Sour ce of this r epor t 18 Dr . Bert ram

Schul ze ( see AJU I n t e rr o~at i o n rcpo r ~s P I R numbe r 75 and IS numb er 27) who
ser-.ed wi1..h the easte r n sectlo D of .·.Jwehr ! !alit , known a s OK'l·r/A.1TIt .6uslard /
.Ab,., . Abtlg . l/w.ft/ Os t (a ce !,:p':. :" i o!1 IT of this repo r t : Orgar.lza tion c f
GA3' I ntelligence) f r om HA.:'-: ~ 1939 u ntil Ap ril 194:!. . He served as he,~ d of
t h is sect ion dur ing t "'1::: last y ee r of his 'ler..i ce. Af te r thll.t time Schulze
was sent on "'..n C;l.C i :' ''e intel l i genc e mis s ton ~o Persi a , "but Illai nt e.1ned cl ose
contar.... w':' t h G-. ~ j' i nt el lige nce h ee.d.CI.u arters in "lJer Un . <:cl.!ul ze is g~ ne r.llly
cO"L..1dAr c ... a fi r st class inte l Hgence speci a..lis~ . I nt e r l o ~at o rs feel t h at

bebw as f ully lI.ut hor 1tative and r eliabl e .

, Se c tion II
DE['
h e iF ~ honeet . co operative ~er s on a nd c on~ ider the i n: or mat 1on su~m itted
~

V.iJ r
~ ~,. n
iii

3. RESPONS I 3 r .ITY: The Intelli gence Service di re ct ed against the

Sov i et. Air :;o r ce was the r cspc.nsib il1 ~ y of SUb - Se ct i on I/AiT/ "!As t of Sec ti on

" JAN 1941

~-------
 I of the "Amt Ausland ll (office for foreign countri'es) and of the intelligence
speciallst~ of the counter I ntelli gen~e aect1on~ att~cbed to the General
COInme!ld Hee.d.q\lar+.e rc .

4. ORG>JH7.ATlON OF AMT ~U$lJL!A.~\;r,jffi (l'OFIWN GOU11!RIE'l--WT1!T!'lR

INTFiliL!Gr'JC:':~-: "1::~~:;: z.,: lrP--!l!".C z," ?:~; i=.;To!!-~f!.'·1. ···t~~1~1.-i ~ 1"'[._-".." ';T <\:". 'j :/:~pen­
deM"d.i.vh i:ln . Cr-hT' of Al:t J...,ls1i'.!Hi AtN~;:r ::.i.r.t.l;I :"93: l 'I' a~ ,.t 6..':' J;'";;l. C.;.:I!l.::is .
He was under the cO!"'~'l.nd ot n,· (...!:.i~:~ Clf the 7' t~b C...)i::"'(l.,\"ld of ,he .A,..- J",e~ FC' roes ,
General Keitel , an~ "r ~:.1 a".ltxH:i'l:cd t o :h ave f.lldionCeB \t1th !:!1t!pr "'itncut
prior appoin tcent . '!~.e follu ·... l~; ctaff sectic;t~ ' ''era und.er the direct
command of ld.miral Cenari~ :

a. ':'he office of thE:! Adjutant (UaJor of the .lir Force Jenke) .

b . ~he office of the Chief of Staff responsible for the organi­

zation of the office . It ...,al:l under the comr.tanc\. of Colo nel Oste r (execut,ed
i n April 191.15 together with ) d.i!liral Canaris) and h'is co- worker Re ichligerich­
t s r at von Dohnanyi.

c. The Personnel Office for officers, army officials and civilian

empleyees was headed by Colonel von Frankenst ein.
d. rinance and 3udget Cffice. Chief : Jnt~ndrnturrat To e~pen .

e. The Legal Office (corr espondence ~ith the Reichsminister of

Justice , deci8iona Dade concerning the legal rlghtR of agents, compensation
contracts , pensions etc.).

t . The ~neral Cord Index Sect ion for ~he registration of all
agents .

g. ~he Gener~l Pegister Section for all official correspondence .

h. The Internal Counter Inte2ligence ~ection which was r esponsible

tor security within kmt Ausland/Abwehr.
- ~ .
5..~OPJ)l'iTA~E Stm-SECTIO:1S: In addition to the above mentione~ staff . .
sections . Ann. Aualand/Abwchr ''''es 'divl c.ed into the following four sections
each having a posit ion equivalent to that of a regiment :

a. The "Foreign Countries" Section. 'rask: Ori ginally c,h arged

with the procuring of political informat ion and mo.!.ntaining oineir.l con­
nections with the armi es , navies and air force s of other cmL~tr!es, Chief:
Captaln (Javy) 3uerkner .

b . The Counter Intelligenc e Section I. ~a8k: The gathering of

informati on on the cr mles , navies, air forces . t echnical i~tell1~en=e and
potential war po"rer of other count rie s . C!lief : Celonel Pleo8!ibl'o ...·( (A!'1ty
G e;le:'2~ St&ff) .

c. Counter Intellig~nce ~ection I!. ~n8k : To work on po l iti cal

and settlement pro~le~s of fo r eign countries; the fomentinf, of strixu3. and
l'iots ; the org3nization of sabotage .

d.
The Counte r Intelligence Sec tion III . Task: To combat enemY
intell1g~nce . Chief : Colonel von Benth'ep,:ni (A r my Gf'neral Stnff). ehe
Counter !lspionage sub-section of the Counter !ntell1. ,~e!',_'e !=;ection III was
known as group II ! F and headed by l:eu'tenent Colon ~~·1. ,,',:,eund .

6. ORGAlTl ZATI Ol..,f OF ':' m:: Comr:ER HiT!:LLIGEltCZ s~r~lOil I: The CIS/ I
was divided int o the followin g :,uo·,t;CC'tiuIlO;

a. Group I for AIm:!

b. Group I for ~avy -...,- •
'"
\ ,: ~ '­
•• 2 .­
• •
~
 ,
,
,

~ c. Group I for Ai r
"
d. Group I for lofartlme Economy

c. Group I for "!ar time Technical Developmente

f . Group I for Technical Intelligence Aids , i . e . counterfeiting of
passports , documents and staops, secret inks, photographic and micro-photo­
eraphic outfits.

g. G rou~ r for Air Technical ~evelopmentG .

h. These br ouPS were under the command of a group leader .... ith the
rank of a battalion commander . The groups were agDin divided into sub-sections
such es Mst or Nest .
• ..
7. THE ORG}"j,TIZATIOl:1 OF AB1f.EHR I tUFT (GROUP I FOR J IR I NI'ELL IG.ill~CE)

a. Cornrnanders: From 1939 to 1 9 ~4 Ab\'rcbr l/Luft was unde r the

com~ of the frllowing officers (successl:"e1:r):.

• (1)

(2)
Colonel

Majo r ( .
( Air Porce General Staff) Metzner
,
,
, n ) Brasser

(3) Majo r ( " • " ) :erede

(4) Lt. Col . ( , , , H ) Klelnstueber

(5) 'ihen the Abwehr ....as reorganized in the spring of 1944,

Lieutenant Colonel Ohletz became chief of 1t•.filitary .Office
en in the F.eichssicherheitshauptamt (Internal. Security
Service) . ~h i s off ice t ook charge of all Inte11ige~ce
activities against the Eas t at that time .

b. Sub-aectio~s: Abwehr J/Luft ( see par . Gc) consisted of ~

sub- secti ons:

(1) Sub- sect ion: ~gland/~merica

(2) Sub- section : Frnnce

(3) SUb-section: East

The Sub-Group East concentrated its activitie~ on the Sovi et Air Force, but
also gathered information on the Air rorcet> of the :Belt·lc States. Foland ,
the Balkan States and Turkey .

c . Commanders of Sub- section East : ~he SUb-~ection Sast of

Abw ehr r/ L'\f t wac CllCc.essively headed by the follo\"in& ofHears:

(1 ) Lt. Col. (..~ ir Force) HElU~wa.ld

(2) Lt. Col. (Air Force) Schulze ( Source of this report)

(3) Major (Air Force) GeiGpler

(4 ) Major (}ir Force) i3echtler

d. Duties of Sub- ·acction East : This Section was charged with two
functionc:

(1) To give operational suggostions and pro f essional advice to

tl""1C intelligence eroups of Genoral Comnand. Headquarters .

3
 • • ....~

• Major (Air "oree) lliegmann Pr8€Ue

Lt. Col.

Captain
(
(
"
,
,
"
)

)
Seidl

v. Krusenstern
H" ~
Cxac,1w

'''arsaw
IL Ii ~ Jlf"
Major ( , , ) stuermer Sofia
Major ( " , ) Benesch ;\gram

10.. ACTIY"ITY 05' ,} !B. l loI-rETLIGE:JC:Z: SFBCIAJrSTS ATTACHED TO G~

C0W4A.:1ID !f.f::-p'l{..~~E.!.~ : The t:iS1r of'
t hese -~~p~la~i!>-ts \:~; " to-~~'iY""Out opera­
tiO!lS, :.~e quire d t o gather intf"ll '~gence rcque :i\ted by Abwehr I/Luft. They
worked either directly with the agents . (usually ueine; a cocie name) or
'e reployed the assistc.nce of advanced units. :...; ::-e~ llit a.te such activi-ty. the
i nt el lig ence sections maintained sub-Jff~_ ces . :nes s~e centers and advanced
rep)~·t ing places. Thus . the office Koenigsberg r..ad sllb-offices at TUsH,
Inst orburg and 31bing , the ,offi ce Berlin '3. sub- section in Frankfurt an der
Ode~; Breslau: a sub-section in Gleiwitzi Pr~e a sub-section in Bruenn;
and C::aeOWtsub-sections in Radom , Rzeszow, \f~saw and· :Br ~s t Litowsk . These
sub-~ p-c ti o ns were superviaed by your.g intelligence officers , non- commissioned
of f i c c ~s or civili~~ emp loyees. Each intell i gence office or sub-section had
a mess:~.g e cent er n ear t he border ')r nea r the front line s. These mes ~ age
cer\t l.'. t's were u Bed a s ceI!t ers fo r t he h.and. ~.ing of agents who had reportsd or
w~ re t.:> be i nte r ::ogated after haYing acco!1plished thei r missions . The me ssage
cent-er 'Usue.lly cons hted of a nO :l- cam:niss::'o!led off:!.cer or a ci'filie.n em/?loyce
who pl.l sed as a cnstoms inspector . border guard or road survey man . Thi s
mLn was usua lly acc epting me s sab~s and instructjng agents f or all int e lligence
a eencieo ( Air Forc e , AJ.:Lty , lTavy etc.). rn a ir.:i. tion t o these me ::sAge ce:t1..ers .
t he ln1;sll:!.Gence offi c es often p. stab lishetl. f o r"l ~rd rece-pti.on P Of;ts which
WE"ra s ')rnetimes located behin4 enemy lines , thus ena·oling eg~mts to report with­
out havtng to cross the blJrde r ~

11. The air intelligenc e specialis t s often had no direct contact wi th

the agents , but dealt with 90 called chief lr_mf.n (!!auntvertrauensJ.eu te n ) who
in tuxn were leaders of an ~entG or ga."li:::ation having a ge:lts wor :(i~g for
them in forei gn count r ies . These men liv ~d either 1n t he f orei gn country
concern ed or i n the v ic in ~ ty of a me s sage c enter or for m T·cl. p ost . '.£Ihe
intell ige:'lce spe cioJ.i ci,; :, were thoroughly tr a ined in tho .i. r f i e l d and "'Ere
kept i nft:'l'1t:pd .)f t he CT' re nt st a ·,u :;I of develop!l10nt of t~"l Pl1.S S l _M } ~ r :c'oice.
This e ut<J~led t hem to ",zD..'nine, evalu a t e a~d p a ss on r eTl,,:-ts on t!.lP. sp ot . Thus ,
only r eli ab le inf orma t t o!), wa s f or l'&.!:d.ed to Ab:'fehr I/Luft !n :?er" i !1.

Sect10n III

SELECTION ,OF GAr IN'ZELLTG~lCE P!lRSONDiEL

12. "GAF -_ ---- - --

INTELLIGE1{CE
" - -"""")' .. - CHI~S : The office known as OKV/Amt Ausland/
Abwehl" ! /Lt''''~ \ :J.:::-' I r.t nll1.(;en,:e Section of the German Hi gb COI'l!lM1'..d ) wa s
hesul"d S\;..!t ~;;f):'.v~,l;;r l-~ CCJ1·;n9l M~ f; z':l e r, M A.j~ r P!"as;:;er, 1,:aj C'T !lr.'!o.e, and
fi::l ?_~J.:.· !, ~.lj'~t,b.1ti.:! .-:- Co l onel r:l elnst;oloe ::- . tTnt:!.l t e o sp ri ng cf 191!\, t'1(. jJ,~ men
wele ;-(> '1r"'1..i.J i. bl~ fo : ' ~1.e i~T1a l bel e cti on of ~ILi:ieJ.]i€,~'1c:1 pen'>::>fl1(' l.•

13. SZSC'rI OH OF ACT!",!; VERg; ;S RZ5Z3VE p:r:;p.rmr.r.r.L: Due to the secret

nature o f- t.~~-\,:;; . :-~:m~Y- .U l" ro:'cc C;:-C~ S . a;?p'-.~ i,-,q -'fere con:::lioC'l' pd iJP.o re
the ~'!1r e:>d only v e 1"Y ~ew r es ervo o 1fi. r:~ r s \L l' e c:t.t.:~Je cl in f ;.l1 it·.!'1h~:r ·.a.':' n­
ing . }.fte:: t he out'v reak of the war , =e:;e:ryc offirers ~!e"l' c D.l 8Cetl.'f 1,:.•~ed "

14. SELBCTION: Section heads of the sub-s ectionn Engl and/America ,

France , and ~st -Select ed suitabl e individuals from those propos~d by the
GAP personnel, office , by General Headqu arters or by ind iv idual in'~elligenc e
spec ialists . 1~8mes were then submitt cd to t he Ght Inte n, :i ge T'_c e Se rvice
Ch ief for a final decision . The r:cr Sun:lel c hi ef of GJ.f · YnJ_ f:jll i cence , a
M&jlJ r Raspe , wa.-s in charge of re Q.u e s t ing .,\nd T,lr occ sslnp; ;; elect cc. r-e rsonnel .
 15. ~ESTING: Appointees were called in f or an p.ight weeks training
c ourse for r--;:)'S:';'e off1cers, which was followed by a prcbation -P'3:>"tod ~." 'be
servE',t ""t GK£ Intel li gE'~r:e Reariq'l;arter s ,:: r onp. of its sub - J I"c~jOJ'·. A.,!,l::~P..nts
1.\' ~ .....· n e.cc<:!ptp.d f,:7' !-~c ..:, ... e ser\':~~ O!.],!" u j*,;)n cc;;::oh:tion of th.l e l~' ::"od, .:0
Pl'''I <J9,:t ::'on -;:~ ,..::'od was r eq11 i.rcd for :reSel"fe oi;',·,e ers dur5.ng " h~ .... a1' • .J.;; {;~:c y
c CI'lid 1' 0 tr .:.n~ "fe rrtlu. or .!~ 9cis sec. L-;' H , ti ::'ie .

a. A certai~ amount of interest and an understanding of aviation .

b. A thorough knowl ed~e of the enemy language concerned.

c. KtlOt11edge of the resoec tive country, as ...,ell as customs and

the mentality of it S tnW bitants >
d . !Tatural ability for the intelligence service , sincere interest
in the work, a certain a~oo~ t cf scepticism. a keen min~ and a sound unde~­
standing of psyc.hologlcal rroblel:!s ~ ~ou=ce is of the o. ~ inion that point '
IIda \'las tl1a o.ete!"rrd.ning ~fl.c<;o,: in finc'.! Mceptance 'becaus e of t he fact that
It a mfln has to be 'uorn f,r the Intelligence Serv:ce ll • Pe rson s particularly
qualified \-Tere chocen from tlla r anY.:; of e:oo~:t merchants , nembers of the
press , end fly e rs possesRing kno·...( !.edge of the sp ~<..i fi. c for eigit country.
Applicants selected from these groups "Iere usunl:l.y very successful in thei r
'W'ol'k.

17. CHA!TG:£ Hi POLICY: When in spring of 1944 the Reichssicher­

he1tshaupt",,~t-ffiTtoc"ichart!e of the GAF Intelli gence Se:-vicE'l , 11; "..as f elt
t hAt in~e:ilige n ce and ae"mts could. be trained wlthcu~; :OCGSSt"s:'::g
G peci.q,1i~ts
t h~ r~(_nil'i,;'llel1"; S cut J.inec. 1n Par 16 d .
Old experienced officers were dlt. ­
mi cs ct1, a'ld young , entirely unexpe r ienced offlcers were trai ned in spe-: i a l;sed
tr ain~ ng prograos . 'fhen Source re t urned fr oill Brit ish cap ~ hi.t YI his !'J'rtl3 r
co:" l eague s t old him tha.t as a concequence of the new policy the q\la~:I ~;r of
work !lad deterior ated rap-id ly .

Section IV
AIR U!'TE.i.I,IGZl CE TRAIi:lIFG

18 . TRAnlE~G PROCE.'OU3.J<,! Until thp. spring of 194h, tra1n!.ng "!as cer:- ied
on u :1de r 'the folloWillg-!l'i:tid:;:Qll\: '1,lh e thE:C'ret i...:E.l trfl,j !'l,:lnci c.~· Abt-lehr I/ll.l'!t
office rs began with the st.u dy of 8. cop;, of intelligence ::egull'.Lcn s cor. ­
siGting of about 100 p:i::lges and cont alni:ng th ri:! elements of bE'slc int:',elligence
training . Fer::.onal ins t ruc t,ions anJ. advi ce we,r e given oCl;:lisionc.Uy by
Afuli:-al CanllI' i s. Gene:-eJ ly speaki~p.;, the pElr;;') nal cxpel'iel~Ce of the in­
divId.ual in st:.u cting offi,,;er \0;,',3 e..!,r!la;.,lZ'lo. n,"li ,ractical p"'s,Lloles of success­
ful inta!l igeHce FI.na. Co~'.r.I';er-":,lJ.·\:'(')l.\i~'3_"',~ e opt!':"c,t '~Ci.S \<1:::"'" cO:lGistently
used . SourCE: ·Del:!.~v es that t ~i<; :'," 'i~.r_': •.;. hs.:l. ' .l.J.o:! aiva."ltag~ of bel'll; !"lore
thO:'OUi;).' beca.lfi9 f,q~ts could ",;c;- ::'t""Il..n:"O<.':o:>ed l(",Jre ea~ily . The su c c~::s of ~his
sys t",[,j e.epp.nd;)d , :Io'rever , on tha 1ns";r..c:' ors exper :'ence and pedagogic ta.lent •
.Al l e~edl,y , the r esuJ.t6 of thh tV-rtil oS. trl~:M.j ng \t..'ere favol't\-b:e .. ,The r/Luft
i ntelligence spec!ltil sts r ece:,.-ed only a. 'f',,.. bri..::f cours~s of" instroctio:"l in
techni=:a l fiel~ls, !;'-lch e.s tr.e uso I)" "er.;". t: :::11::.:;, ph'Jtogra"Phi ng 1I: tth I,ji,ui.atura
c am~r<"..s: codes , inte:-ce'Ptl(..r: of tel~'Phcv~ F.l.'1d t;~,16.~rI;'Ph l:!.ner. , i.ns · a.llt.,t·i.(.!1..
of i"te rce:o ti on tif."";' cell, et~. ~fur1 L e l C:,.na!"J.s \1e~ of' t'l1e op'ni(1n ··~.tl"~ t::e
off1{,:E:r!': o~ the Abl'i9hr I sbrv ice shou l d. '..md~l'Eta.YJ.d the princ iples of. t~-e
,.::t ov", !ll';. nti c l'.e::' te chnical Ille-:;!\ods , bu·t nep.Q. not ma st;)r them 'Le~c,ll'>e t il chnical
personne l , would always be e.vallabl o fo :" thei~ o, er -9.tion . Source do es (l:l t
app~'ove ofthl.s theJry , as he f eels that !...t rtadfl t~ .t,'bwehr ofl"icern to,)
d epnnd .... nt upon ~he lr 3.s~ist ar.t s "'ho we::" e gS:1drr..Lly i'!cxp6rie~(,dd. 1t ~'"
SO-.....·.. . f.J'i, s..."Cper1tmce that tim'3 and ~Bil'l J,:u,,'ehr 1 offl .:,ors VE'lTa \l:"?l'le ~o carry
O\lt "!tf:lir n~ej.g>lI'.lN'~S Occf'.us e of a l.ack 01 all ch b1o~lfid5p., l ~!'.e\! 'lil-:"" :-.':~ch­
s ci(':h'-heit6h:;.uptam:~ took ove'" in t}"le f' p'!'":lng: c.:t 1 ~1i.4, JLo~e t l ''''JU,!;h tr,,)'ll;i.n~
of A'!.w·J;;".r J. nc.!'vi l)c i n the empl")1IU3T.t ().~ la.crn i ca! aic'c:s wac Ol·o.,~,:, P~_

• 6
•
•
 •

• ,
19. SOURCE'S EVALUATION or TRAINING: The general technical training
of Abwebr I officer£; was cCJJ'" ;,!e t ely i 11sufficient . , Information on current
tec}'l ni cal air development s \las limite'-, to the Oercan .A~. r F:>!'':.e . The average
off ·".cer and intelli gence spR c l alist .: n this group l a cks d al!Y knowledee of
aer on~\1. t i c devel o;mel'l.ts in ot'1e r nl;..tions. :t'e r this inf orna i.i on he doper-ded
on maga. z ~ n e s and 'to·"')klets publisl'.ed in the United states, Eng lc.nd. F::-ance.
Italy or Switzerland .

Section V

SCURCES USED IN OB"1.1AINHTG UlTEL'I. I~,~~_!}~lFORlOTIO!:r o ~y THE RESSIA1I AIR FORCE

20 . P.E.ASO:.:rS FOR ::lIFFI Cr LTI3S : Ac cording to Schulze. the difficulties

involved inol)(;ainin~ intt;I'ligence in'ormation lUl the RuBSie.D Air i 'o rce

,pri or t o , apd dnr in g the l.Ilal' we re tremendous . The following reasons for
"his wer e outlined. to the interrogator by Source:

a. The close observance of border s facing the r est of I'Urope

by the 3ues ians .

b , The strict supervision of all foreigners and general traveling

l1mitat ions.

c. · The well deve l oped counter-intelligence system of the Russian

Ar med For ces and war indUstri e s .

d. The security consciousness of the Russian soldier and industrial

employoe.

e. The intentionally confusing designation of the uni te of the

Russian Air Force.

f. The decentralizat ion of Russi,an a·i rcraft and related indUstries.

,g. Transportation difficul~les encountered by agents in the

Soviet Union .

21. UTILlZATI01{ OF AGE!:iTS : Source \oIo.s part icularly int~rested in the

question of the successful employment of European agents and , for that
purpose, had made a thorough st udy of all files Available , to GAF intelligence.
He has also discussed the subject with intelligence off ice rs of the German
Air Force. Army and Navy and obtained the follo~ing information;

a . Few German. 3ritish or !rench agents succeeded in penetrating

into Russia prior to the outbreak of the war.

b. 'ilhite-Rueeian a&:ents r~ported t o have succeeded. were actually

encouraged to go on their missions into Russia by counter-espionage agents
and were apprehended by the :S . ~.T".D. (Counter Intelligence Service of the
Sovie~ Minist ry of IntGrior).

c. According to Source. agents who had offered their ~ervices

to foreign military atta.ches in Hosco\\' were Fussian "agents prpvocateurs ll
without exception. He states that ·t his was proven by tl . Il: .'" .D . files captured
by the German Army at Kaunas in the SUmmer of 1941 ( interrogation of the
r,i thu.anlan Military attacho) .

d. The G~(F did succeed in sending a few agents into ?ussia from
Poland, the Baltic states and Finland. Finnish agents limited their activi­
ties to Soviet-Karelia and did not penetrate beyond Leningrad in tbe r;outh .'
The agents of the naltic States operated only in border territorie s Inha.bited
by their Olin people. .Ago nt s working fo r the Polish General Staff manag€d to
advance to Central Russia. but were unable to communicate with Warsaw .

 Most of them f a il ed to r etur n. Generally speaking , Polish intelligence

'activity ~f,ls l1.mited to the territ o ry inhe:oited ·'JY Poles and Ukrf'l.i.c ~a:ns .

22. iCSULT OF FAIWF.E OF AGD7S : As a rcS"),H of the fa:'lu:':'03 expe rienced

in the empl:;-y:!:~ntoT~.;~t'a ag,1:~si: j; he Ru!>sit>I. A:i. r Force. ~ h~ followlr!g
channels "rere ecpl oy ec1.:

a . Utilization of intelligence information compiled , chiefly

before the war, ~ the General Staff:J of Polan'i. F:nland and the Paltic
Stat ers from the reports of t heir own agent s , Age:ots of A,:,w:? h:t' r/IJlt t
managed to lI1,;u yU this i nforr-.a"'·ion fr om office:'s of these countrie!> or e ls e
r epresented the!l:selves as rq·"hite-P.ussia.'1." agents . thus getting full coope r­
ation .
,
o. ~lh.ite Russian milit a ry o:,ganizations , ;;:articularly the l:russkiJ
Obschtsc}l.y !"10sennys Solas ll (R.O .~·,(,S.) w'1.th i"ts head~arters in Paris. n:aill­
taineo. t i:.e ir own intelligence servlce dhected a.~aln st , the Soviet tJni o'l ...
In a:iditi cn to \"lork performed on the:'r own initi ative , these organize.tl.ons
maintai ned close liai son with the Ge!'ler?,l Staffs of Finland . the Baltic
St ates, PolE'..nd, Ruma'1.ia • .Bulgaria , JUg'')'.;lavia, Turkey , C!.echoslo,·pj:ia­
and France . White Russian in'~ellige:lce agents '..rere generally con a i de:red
high caliber personnel and were u.sually speciE..li~ed gcob?:aphical e)..-pe~ta .
Tiu;y !'lever ci.iscJ.oSE'd their sources in the USSR to GAF intelligence offic~ rs ,
It is Sourcels p e rsow.l opir.ion that a certain amou.."1.t of 'ihi:'e-?..lsP; iE'_'l i:1i'luenc(
continu.ed to pr e v~.il in Sov::'et dip !on:&tic circl es in DJ.ropee.n ce.:;t1;;-,ls. Poe
beli ~ ¥cs that t he se diplomats rev~aled a great ienl uf intel:lgence ~nrn rm~t ion
eithe= because of pers onal convidions or under t ile i cl'}uence of a~,c oh CJ l.
GA~' inteJ,lie;ence officers a~: cep t ed material ::rc.n ' :!::.ite-Rusdan i n "; £;E ~ge n ce
services r athe r scepticaJ l y. These serv i cE;s had. no oute ic.,e f!na.'lc:'e.:!. suppor t
--ai.':! t he ir existep..c a d$:pended on the !'ilk'Ulcial re ~.H!M.:.!'se'il ent obt.a.1. nGd in P:lY­
meht of intelligence info rmation submitted . Certain elements did not hesitat e
t o exagger ate facts or , if ne cessary , to invent infor~ation t hat could not -
be checked upon . It Vias the p ollcy of GN' intelJ :!.6ence to pay well for
intelligen ce tills ootai!led , but to accept it as fact only if other>.,ise ' S'.lb­
st.antiated.

~ 23 . OT~~~r~CJ:SS U§..~ ~~~"':I~RUS~~.!1 S9.l!!':.~Z~ : Only two GerJr.an i!lt ­

e l 1igence UC'3n{.ie.; inA Plr:r.:'~~i.C"~. fro:" Ad:.>"!uc.l !;("::..ar is . ('!lief of the GS:"!'lnn
!n';ell! Gence S.:rvice , to Irulint a~.n. li aison wi ';h a.'ld to contact ··'!:i tc-Russ:·,c.!l
sources:

a . Ab"'ehrstelle Berlin . under the com:'I!and. .of Colonel Brnnatis

was in charge of jf'for;::18t ion n:..J/,litted by :r . O.'f,S , (1·.rhite-~sr..i81'. {>;..1.o11­
i g€nce Service) eo'; P,..r 13.

b . Ab",ehrstelle H1en , headed by Colone l Graf Me.ro~na-Redw.itz

mD.intabed liai son vlith t.!'o.e '·f,n1te Russian Genoral Turkul. '~':'l'.-c.:l '/9.3 the
h 3ati of a c omnletely indepene.ent organization . Eis key men \ie re the :fungarian
en gj :r.ee ~' lO.e t;',; (alias Kauder) and a 'W hite- ?ussiaTl off icer named Ira Land
(ali as !.cng or LO!i6inus). '
, . '.0.
-
aI:!., R-,pprc::: .FROIl.
.- - ,..--- - - --
RUSS IAlJ .:lJU.fY pj .E)- , AIR ' FORCE. DESERT:ElPS:
_._,._,. "._---,-, The principal
source of ill:')r::::.l&LYI on \'hr.. ol g ..>.!tiza:tl.o!l, arr.a..,t;nt, C'c£.:,! -;."io':!nt .z.n(1..... :;-<\ ~n:lng
of t he !hS3:lE;... Air 7~'r.ce bC+,I'IeE::n 1 915 ..u td 19'{B \'! (>.S tho: in ·~ ... r :,,· ogf:. t.i. -J:l I)l
t ::treQ Run s u:m A... r :-O:"Cd ::lffi(,pr d03pr tprs~ S..:'ll ~ .~ j s u'Hl.l·1e t,c re,!~.ll thpi r
nFl.."".63, Ov,t f\ t a.~es tb, y thCl7 :''It''.o. l)eEC~l p:Levious)y q'JOF;~.:!.".lH":ci t>;V i J):"errogat,o:rs
of" ~he Le.'" rien and Y\,lliGh Gonr.r3..... Steffe . As H r .:(;c'lt -of th". Fol'>..."J!: r.l·y:rp aign ,
G",)n::!ny wao::; .!!lec tly !'I o:·d'9l't;!cl cy R'u.sitl. . SO'!:";'':- "".;!",t.es >"r..a.'; 1 0"11 :tut: OM
h ok ui·· ;..ntf'.€~ of t~~ ge':ler.; l. confuS::'on t hnt eX ':'S1;d:l f o r a. pF. : ::,?d of ~t:ve ral
mc:r;ths d.fte~ ';he PoUsh C1lr.:.ld..ign had. bef,n (,omp 1f:;1;~~" :::le Iili €,.rs.>';':'on o~ ,Polish.
L:Lthuani<lr.. , 'rhlt03 Russian ar.d tJki.:.n:c,'l I t'fugees '"'n,....1;J.f:i~ '},~l'::lan ug~nts to
p er_et rate OGh:':..r..d Eucsi ...=1 ~ u :::."il.. 3 $\:::l.j" to u:'t:>e c.erta:'n e!E'!:l.,nt s. partj-::ularly
Jtilssian 1J.::: F c::ce 5rouu.:l1).::;-sonn~ 1 . t·o desert. 'l:he il\":'orrr.:-- t; ion tll'ls o'Qt fiinad
e!ll.',bled A~lie;hr r/LuJ:t to fO!"l!l e. ~.keletQn p ic ture 01 t{~(> o:.-ga.!', L;;'l:';lo11 cf the
Rt:.ssia~ Air F:l rc"3 <.L,cl of the locclt i on of principal a i r i ndu.3tr-i e s under Russian

3
't : _ 4 , \
• SE~
•
 ,

cont~ol. The work in connection with this was partlcularl ~Q ifficult as a

result of the inte:ctionally confusing organization of the Russian Air F'orce

and the emp!oynent of code designations w~ich wore consistently changed .

25. lliFOPMATI W 03TAINZll BY A GERl<iAll DISPLACED Pl'.,]!SONS COM};I SSlON

(UNSI:sDLUN'G5Ko: il-o!! ';;SIOH) : The act.u al purpose of this commission was t ore turn
t o German controlled territory all pe rsons of German origin residing in the
newly . acquired west zone of Russia in 1939 . This commission t;-avelled i
extensively in Bessarabia, Bukowina, Galicia. Wolhynia, Podo~ia. and the
territory of the former Baltic state8~ There were nume r ous agents of Abwehr
I/Luft appointed as members of this commission who managed successfully to
gather complete information on the Russian Air Force and potential air ·targets,
in th~ae terri.tories . . Ad:iitional '1ntell\genc€ was ga,.thered t:.rom .the detailed
interrogatio n of ' emigra.'1ts frorri the above mentib ned territories. .

26. EIT'ERROOAT!Oi! OF GERMA.:.T SFEC!ALISTS a:..

. . .'l"URl:rIN'G
·
FROM KIJSSIA: German
engineers. technicians and specialists· who either retu rned or {tore expelled

from Russia between 1931 and 1939 represented a potential reservoir of in.. .

formation on the g round organization of the Russian Air Force ·and Russian

aircraft and related industries. All these ret'unees \'lere interroga.ted by

Abwehr I/Luft immediately upon their return ~ro~ Russia . Source r ef erred

the interrogator particularly to qne Germ~ e,eronaUtical engineer (name

u:Llcnown) who had been actively engaged in the Pussian air industry, and who

was a ble to give valuable informa.til)n en actual production , prod\lctior~

capacity, rejections and the nature of production T'!.istakes.

2.1 . E}.~LOYMENT OF TRAVELLERS ,-'\lIT!) T ~UR ISTS: In 'order to have current

information on the type of all'c!'aft employed or te~ted on Russian air fields,

practically all Gercan officials, merchants and tourists vere employed for

observation of a irf ields and air industries. These agents often succeeded

in photographing such inst?~lations While passing by train or while flying

over .in airc raft . As a rewlt of these aetivities which l1ere carried out

until the outbreak ~f 'the war. Abwehr. I/Luft succeeded in learning of contem.. .

p l ated ; roduction of a ne~ type of Russian bomber ~factured by the Fill

factory near Mos~o"" .,

. . . ,
28. U!TELLIGEriCE OB!AI~J:SD :rRm~ HIGH .RUSS!AU OFFICIAI.S: Source: stated

tha t German Air Intelligence succeeded in obtalnlng illtcllige ncc information

from high Russian officials engaged in import or eJ..- port activities for the oN

Soviet Union . These officials ....bo traVelled extens :i.~·e ~ in f c r ~j gn countries

f u rnished information f(lr high financial rewards , on SCl \" j et e.ir~raft f'.nd .

related industries, geograph.ical lo cat ions thereof, prool, ~ ',; i. on capeci ':ry and

production difficulties. One of these officials . who inten&e d to leave

RI.l.ssia &.nd who t...as anxious to have 'substantia l property in Germany . handed

over .all p l e.tI.s for the futur e extension of Soviet e ir inc.ustry to the GAF

Abwehrstelle Nurnberg i n 1939 . The figures t hen submi tted' were so high

' that the German General Staf: uoubted their autnentici,tY ' and suspec ted
Soviet counter intelligence act : vlty. It was later determined that these
. .
figure.s r epresented f ::tual , facts.
. "

29. SPECIALIZED INTELLIGENCE lHSSION: In 1939. ' a specializ ed squad­

ron of the Germar. Air General Staff was employed to gather exact intelli­

gence on the airfields and air il1dustry of thJ Leningrad area. This squad­

ron managed to ph.otograph its objectives from great heig:hts "lith sp ecia l '

infra- red ~ameras. This mission was ¥Upervised by the Gcneral Staff of the

...
L...ut\,'affe and . results are
~ - nQt
- known to Source.

~.

30. .AB~JlR~LUFT1.£TIV)T n:~_AIT.!1' T_cl'l B~G1l'!I! NG OF ~BE RUSf- IAN

CAMPAIGN: The war against Bllssia com"letely dunged the meth ods emplC"ycd

and sources used in obtaining intellige nce informat,ion . /!'he fa:>t iilo....ing

front lines enabled Ab\~ ehr I/Luft E/>.st to place ~en}s l and thp. tI')ci.c:cn

parachute technique made i t possible to have agen~::::; f ,lr 'lJehir: d. e:l c,m,.y It:::tes

at pre.:iesignated objectives. H'l:1dreds of thous andl3 of rona ;fn pri&.Jr.~rs

(Tartars, Tscherkesr-.ia'1s, Georgians, As.erbeidochans. r"llrkoi'1eniar.:::., U,!'I)e:ke ns,

Tschadiks , and Kirkisians etc.) represented a great reservo~r of suitable

"
. . ... ••
 "

agents/material. Due to the success achieved during the early stages of the

war·, these peoI;>le were most cooperative in offering their services. As a

result of the rapid advance , much intelligence information was obtained at

captured airfields and from Russian Air Force prisoners . ~he radio inter­

ception service aided in obtaining further information on the Russian Air

Force and' air industries.

Section VI

RELA.TIO~SHIP B!.'rWEE!~ .A:ai'!EHR '( COtmTEB. Ul'I·ELL.IG£J~CE) AlID SICHERH!:ITSD I ENST

(INTER.:AL SZCUllI~Y SERVI CZ)

31. RIVALRY OF AG2CIES: • NO 'dir"- ct relations existed bet\oleen J..bwebr

and SD until the Rclchssicherheltshauptamt assumed control of the Abwehr in
the spring of 1944 (see par. 7& (5) aoove). This mo~e had been expected
for many years before it actually took place , and t he old Abwehr officers .
had been anticipating it as early as , 1939. They realized that tha Abwehr
would eventually be accused of embezzlement and would be liquidated . This
actually proved an east method of disposing of Abwehr officers considered
undesirable by the SD. Many capable Abwehr officers ma..'laged to transfer to
less dangerous branches in time. ~~ constant rivalry "Detween the two services
had existed . It le~ to a competition which without doubt injured the effici ­
ency of both organizations. However , the ruthlessness of this competition
led to a' mE'. d r a ce in the exp~.oitation of new information sou.rces , outbidding
of offers. Ustealing" of good agente and interference with the operation of
abl e rival agents. The SD always "fe.s in e.n advant~eous podtion because of '
its superlor political connections and its affHiati on with the Reichssi­
cherheitshauptamt . The STI often threatened Abwehr agents with Ge stapo
interference. ulnformation dealers" took advantages of this situation and
managed not only to double their prices but abo to ,sel l ~t heir information.
twice • .

a. This led to a situation , wherein both .1!.bwehr and SD submitted

p ractically the s8l'le tn:e of inf6rmation to the eveluaHon centers . Due to
the fact that the reports were usually checked , it was for a long time as~ed
that intelligence information Dnlet be correct. This resulted in general
confudon. Some SD agents who v/ere in charge of important information centers
a t tempted to keep rival agents away fr om their sources by denouncing th~m to
the SD Whi~h , in turn , eliminated or arrested them .

. b. Upon Source's return to Ge rmany at the end of January 1945 . he

was told quite c16ar l y by members of the IIMilitaerisches Amt e", which had
absorbed the Abteilungen (Sections) of Abwehr I in the :sa~'t in the spring of
1944 , tl4~t the two- track set-up of the German informa tion service had led
to D. fs,Hure of both uni'l;.5 . The SD went so far as to censor official ma.il
a.nd telep~:.one calls of Abwehr officers and actually to "steall! Abwehr ..
intell igence information and to pass it on to their own head~artera and
evaluation centers.

32. SO~lRC~15 ACT I VITIES : During Source ' s service with the . }bwehr
I/Illft. 1. e, between 1939 .and 1941 , contl·nued difficulty existed 'oet",een the
J.bwchr and SD r egarding 'a gents operat;1hg;.agE:\in·s t Russia from t~ ' lT€az: and
Far East . These agent s were (}oeeks . «:fur-ks I ' and Persians who ·, ma.1n~ell!ed
business connections in Russia . The number of these particular agents wae
naturally small e.nd. Abwehr I/Luft often had ""'Ci13agreornents wi tX ; the "$D. I n
many i nstances Source was ~~ccessful in coming to an agreement with th~ 5D~
because- the S:9 \'las then represcnt~ by an official who was senst'J le enough
~o realize that an understanding wou.lp. ai'~rooth p arties. >riG fllias "fas'
IlZur Christian" , former L(Jndesgrupenletter of the "Ausland~organisationll in
Spain . During the resettlement period _of the "Volksdeutsche ll group from
Russian occupied area~, Abwehp' I!Luft was in a ~ifficult position . ~he
settlement commandos consistefl of 58 members, practically or fully cont rolled
by the SD. Squrce , who was then head of, J..bwehr l/Luft l!lr..naged to select
men for this phase of the Abwehr service' \<I~O -'f~l'e llarticularly skilled and

?i,
abl e to ge t along with the S~ and 5S . , The r esult'of this Rituation ~8 8
successful operation even though all offici~ Abwoltr mail 1oIas ' secret l y
• ceneoT€ ,d and the informati~~tole~~~~he !ID~ 1-•• .• '

, . .,
•
 , ". l -.
•
•
,
-"

a. During S;u;~e I ss:~te in ·pe; sta . he had encounter€ ,d ' many

difficulties 1n his r elat i ons .., i th the S1) . The German envoy Ette ge.ve his

permissi on for Sourc e ' s cover a:r~ oi:'"1tment as nVice- Counsu!lI in ~'neb ;, ;I_ .'3 (':1­
thr. 'coD'l it t on t hat he mai ntain c i os ('J cOlltact \oIith the SD :n Per"ja , r;-l'-e

e nvoy hims e lf \'ISS an 55 Gruppenfueh!'er . SD of ~ ic1al s in Pe rsi a took

adva.l1!ag~ of t he s 1 tus.tion by dcoElJ.Jj nc;: c opies of . a ll of SchulzE : "> repo r t s

tc t:'\l:o .f o'N'eJ:'l.r. It wa s !'inD.l.ly 8€ : i:esd to submit onl;}' soma of his r eport s .

n e '3D managed t o obtair. the r emai rling r eports froLl age nts among t he lega ­

t 5.. on personne L

b. l'ib.e n Source was s tranded in Pe r sia i n Septembe r 1941 afte r t he

German l egatio n had been ev i c ted fr om ~' E;heran , h~ end. the SD r eprss e nt:ative

Mayr wert f orced t o cooperate until such ti 'lle a s one of them could esteolish

coc:uu nication wit ll. lIerlin . :-l~ e two p!.en r eached c..n understanding whereby

Sou rce \laS in c har Ge of r.lili tary ques tions c o n cerni~g the Abwshr whil e Mayr

was responsible for en political quesqons ccncerniru;. the SD .

c . iihen Source left for southern ~~rsi a i n J une 1942. Ha,.vr agr eed

t hat Schul z!: was t o be in charg e o f all intelli gence \.rork t he r e . ¥syr

accept ed r esponsibility f or the r ema ini ng par t of Pe rsi a . ~lliile it waG thus

possib l e t o separat e resp onsibilities i n t h",ir wor k , ·liffer ences of opinion

arose continuous ly.

33 . AT'i'EMPT!;J COOPSRAT I ON: To r e!O,edy the whol e confused situation,

Berli n decid ed in the'spring'of 19 43 t hat SD , AO\'lebr I jLuf t and .Jo:~)\"ei:r II

would hav e to wor k tog(> t he= , A system of confe r E'nc t s '''as a cc or d i ngl y i n­

troduced during whi ch all f\Cute p r oblem!> "'e r e di scus sed and i nstructions

given . Thtl SJ.) was always the d e ci d i ng agency and thi~ b s came only a r ound­

a bout 1./ay of g r adu a lly tu r ning t he: ...,hol(, Persian p::ooolef!l and the f a vor a"Jla

position ach i ev ed by Aoweh.r IjLuft over to t he SD .

a. This wa s p rovgn by the fact that i n the summe r of 1943 an

SS signal u n it consis t i ng of high rar.king o f f 1c e rs~ wa~ l anded in Pe r sia
in the p l a ce of an Abweh!' signal unit "'hich had. bee n r equestE:d . 5S Ha1J,pt ­
sturmfuehrer Kurmis who hended t he S5 unit made it cle a r tc Source that
he woul d pr efer fo r Sour ce to return to .13e:rlin~ as s ooIi as p:J"ssibl e'1 Sbu r ee
r efused and because of his firm a ttitude he managed t o hold h is p cs'i t1t'n
as l eader of t he ItGGru.an Mili tary Mission" to the Grandduk e of iT;? .:;r V>.a:1
Ghaschggai . On one occas i on under the influence of alc onol , KU1~i~ told
Source t hat h e would not hesi t a t e to poison him if ordal'ed t o do so by Rimmler .

Section VII
P.!lVIE'( OF R~sums OBTAIlTED

3Ii-. RELIAiH LITY OF nJFO?,J.L6':1 I OlT OBTp.INZD BY SOUBCY. ' S UNIT : Tho quality

and r ol1ab ility of int el ligence in~at i';r;-obtained -riy Abw~hi: I jLuft/=a.st

could be chec!{ed i :: mal!.y casas anc'l_ the• following r eful ts a r e exareplE:.s of

the d egr ee o f r e li abi lity obt ai ned :

a . Aft er the occupati on of Cz e chosl ovakia in ~~rc h 1 9~9 , the

GAF Ge ne r al Staff eXRmined the r eports submi t ted on the Cz(choslov a-~ian

Air For ces ar~ s tat : d t hat the iPJormation had be6n lOO~ corrsct. ~his

ce rt a inly added t o the pres tig 6 of: th£ org••nlozation , ane. the OAF General

Staff was suffic i e nt ly i mpr e s sed to tak(: the ini'or,unti on that ""as sub:li tted

t lle r eaf ter more , seriously. '

b. Obtaining int .:lli g enca on t ba Polish .Ur Yorce ....as more

diffi cult . This was duo to t~ e s iz e of tha country and mOTE ef f ec tive

Poli sh Connt 6r IntelligenCe sy~te!ll. jore verthalcss , the r t;;sults proved 95%

' co:-rect . Informa tion (m th(; organiz atio n , E':-quipoent . armt.Il"isnt and CO!'I::f.1 t
p C'rformanc e of the Poli sh} ir Force also r ::- ~"·Q 1. .1;(.1 rc: 1 ~c1' r,:~_i.~."u] ,~ , t.'C\/_

'::\~ cr> t:'l~ ;,:olin h ) ir' 7CTCC !!a·:\ (s: cJ.b li s hed several auxili a r ail'ij,;;Jds a

f ew weeks bofo'l'e the war . Int elligence r eports he.d f a .. ] e-::. t~ P'""'''l1.l ..: e thi s

i nfor~ntio n . Source att ri bu t ~ d ~his fai l u r Q to a tac~ of time .

11 •
 c. The occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941 showed that
9g~ of the information of t he Abwe>br r/Luf t/East r epo rts on t hese count ries
was c omplE: t ely rel1aole . Th i s Ho;-k had prc...· en more difficult t hM h'lS. b een
the C'l~e i n Cz<!chos1ovakia or Pc land as no cooperation ,,·as furni :-he_.:i 1'1:" t he
Germa:l population . I n the case of Yug oslav:'a. AO\'lehr I jruft uan~,;-d ToO 0-::'­
tal.!' the ess1ste.nce o"f a pro-(}e:.mrU:l sec"!;io::t of the Croatian p0I-ulation . The
g eographic position of G:-eece (!Dot:.ntainous terrain limited. the location of
airfields to certain 10caJ 1 t,i es) sinpli:'ied the ';;ask of gatharing intel ligence
1n the.t CO'llntry . li"hen the G~L1lcn b'<lsjness mer. and. ;:mg in eers who had conduct ed
i ntelligence o.ctivit it!s in Greece "'ere fo1.'c£d tb l (;o.ve , th(;ir work \"as given
to Gr~eks instructed and train~d by t.h;m.

d. Checking the renability of i nformation subm i tted on the Soviat

Union was possible only in terr! ~ory ocC\.cp ied . . n 19l.j1 and 194? by the Germa,.'"lS.
F.eports pertaining to unlts , stuffs, c.,:nmarr.. pns t.:: , ai.r be.tes , gaso lin e depots ,
ammu..'1 iti on cl&pots etc . ?!"o71O·d to be app...·t)xirna ~1. y 90~ reliable . Informa t:,c!l
on air and r elated I ndustries ~ as complet~ and ~~: - pct. Accord i ng to Source ,
the r ~!!ults obtained in t he Ce~\!a,:;\Lcr urea "lere equally re: :. l.ablc. . SourCE: al s o
stat es that the sea:' ch, for :'n':oi"mation at ra:/."elia. (Kare lian peninsula) in
t he district of Kand1ascka, in the tlJ.Rt:.:ici; of O':'onetz as well as in the
western part of the d i 5tr i~t of ATcl;~.f_?,c lsk 1'1'0.5 most successfu L Thi s was
v e rif ied-by a compa rison of Ablrfehr Ii"iJJ.ft information .,..ith reports fro~ the
Fi n..."'1.ieh Intcl 1.ieence SeTv ice.

e. Int el ligence information on the gr ound organization of the

Russian Air Force and on air indust ries was ccmpletely i nsuffi c ient in the
foll o\,ling territories :

(1) Tho north- easte rn sect or of EUropean ~l.Ssia (the eastern

part of the district of Archangelsk and t he district of
Wolga) .

(2) ~he Turanean sector (Kaso.chstan , Turkestan , Usbekidstan

and ~ adachik ist ~~ ) .

(3) The whole of Siberia.

f . Concerning the organization of the SOviet Air Force, Ab""ehr

l/Luft/East knn"l until the beginning of the "tar against Rllssia, e.pproxinately
wbich units were stati oned in the west- Russian and cent~al-Russian districts.
As axesult of the calliouflaged \.mit d6-signations fIJ'ld numbering system , the
r e sults of this wor k we:re never r eli able . I nfor!':1.ation on the equipment
and arma'nent of the Russian Air Force Was f a i rl~ com-plete un t o tr..e outb reak
of the ,"ar .

g . Serious. differences exiated between Abwehr l/ !JJ..it/Ea..at and

the r..e rman ar Attacn~ in Hosc ow. on one side and the Gener al Staf f of the
German Air For ce on tbe othe r, concerni:."!.g the po,.,sr of the Sovie>t Air Force
and air indus t ry between 1939 aM. 1941. Source rec&lls one insta.'lce i n
w;11ch bot h the Acwehr and the Ai r Attache r epor ted about l~. 000 Soviet tacti­
cal ai rcraft . The Gene:--o.l Staff of the GAF d'e c lared that the Soviet .Ai r
Force could have no core than 5 . 000 aircraft of thi s type and that the rep ort­
i ng agenCies were aCf!~;)'til".g naterial of the P.\!ssian SoYiet Counter ::;spionl'lge
Sys t ell) . The COl,lrse of the ""ar proved fthe "}'bwehr and the GAF e.t tache to he.ve
b een corr ect .

(~iljli: f' M"iI,)//ff<:

ROBERT B. lo1CRK .....
Captain, Air Corp s
Chief Interrogator

DISTRlBOT I Ol!:
(.::>a following. :p~e)
12

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)

DISTRIBUTION :

AC of S , G-Z . CP!G , HIS

- Copy NOe I , 2, 3 , 4
AC of S , G-2 , USF'ET - Copy ro. 5 - 19 (inel)

MIS, US~T - C~py Nos 20 , 21

AC of S, G-' . Third Ar~ - 22 , 23. 24

AC of S, G-~ . ~erlin Distr!ct 25 , 26

Ql/GUS - CO'O; Nos 'i!7 - 36 (~ncl)

AC of S , 0:--2 , USFA - CO'OY Nes 'Sl - 42 (incl)

6825 Hq Cc , ¥.lS , USFA - Copy lios 43, 44

BGS (I) , Hq BAR - Copy Nos 45 - 67 (Inel)

I nterjrn ReseArch ~ l~t Ser - Copy Nos 68, 69 , 70

lnt C:fr, Get aTI'U - CO'OY Nos 71 , ?2 . 73

US Naval F()r~s~ . Europe - Cnpy Nos , 74, 75 , 76

US 1ll'aYa.l FJ~c,;!s,
Germany - Cnpy No s ?? 78

AC of S, A -2 , USA'~ - CO'OY Nos 79 - 88 (lnc l)

AC of S. A-2 , TJ5JJ""E - Copy Nos 89 - 103 (lncl)

FIAT - Copy No 104

LHDC - Copy No 105

BIOS - Copy 110 J06
AI 12, Air IUnistry - Copy No 107
AI 3 , Air Ministry - CODY No 108
ADI , (SC) , Air r'dnis try- - Copy Nos 109 - 113 (lncl)
~ir Division , ACA (Er) - C~py Noe 114 , 115
Rots Branch , EAec D1V, He USiA - CODY l OS 116. 117
AIU, Air Division , Rq USFA - Cnpy Nos 118 - 123 (incl)
Spares and File - Copy Nos 124 ~ 143 (inc1)

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