HAZOP & Operability Study (Hazop) : Procedures

WORLEY SAFETY & RISK MANAGEMENT
HAZOP & Operability Study

(HAZOP)
Procedures
050/90510
26-Apr-2001
Services
Safety & Risk Management
Level 16, QV1
250 St Georges Terrace
Perth, Western Australia 6000
Tel: +61 8 9278 8200
Fax: +61 8 9278 8384
Web: http://www.worley.com.au
Worley Safety & Risk Management Pty Ltd
ABN 74 056 615 037
© Copyright 2001 Worley Safety & Risk Management Pty Ltd
HAZOP PROCEDURE 2001
PROCEDURES
Disclaimer
This procedure has been prepared on behalf of and for the exclusive use of Worley Safety & Risk
Management, and is subject to and issued in accordance with the agreement between Worley
Safety & Risk Management and Worley Safety & Risk Management Pty Ltd. Worley Safety &
Risk Management Pty Ltd accepts no liability or responsibility whatsoever for it in respect of any
use of or reliance upon this report by any third party.
Copying this report without the permission of Worley Safety & Risk Management or Worley Safety
& Risk Management Pty Ltd is not permitted.
PROJECT 050/90510 - HAZOP PROCEDURE 2001

REV DESCRIPTION ORIG REVIEW WORLEY DATE CLIENT DATE
APPROVAL APPROVAL
A Issued for internal review N/A 15-Nov-95 N/A

H Cooper P Sutton
0 Issued for Use 15-Nov-95

H Cooper P Sutton P Sutton
1 Issued for Use (updated) 26-Apr-01

H Cooper P Sutton P Sutton
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CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................................................1
2. THE HAZOP TECHNIQUE .......................................................................................................................2
2.1 What is a HAZOP?.......................................................................................................................................2
2.2 When to do a HAZOP .................................................................................................................................3
2.3 Benefits of HAZOP .......................................................................................................................................3
2.4 Definition of HAZOP terms ........................................................................................................................4
3. PROCEDURE FOR A HAZOP STUDY................................................................................................6
3.1 Definition of objectives and scope..........................................................................................................6
3.2 Selection of HAZOP team .........................................................................................................................7
3.3 Preparation .....................................................................................................................................................8
3.4 Conduct of HAZOP Sessions ................................................................................................................ 11
3.5 Record of results........................................................................................................................................ 16
3.6 Follow-up ...................................................................................................................................................... 17
3.7 Documentation ........................................................................................................................................... 18
4. MORE ON GUIDEWORDS.................................................................................................................... 20
5. ROLE OF THE HAZOP TE AM LEADER........................................................................................... 27
6. SUCCESS/PITFALLS .............................................................................................................................. 29
Appendices
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1. INTRODUCTION
HAZOP TECHNIQUE
The HAZard and OPerability Study (HAZOP technique) was developed over twenty years ago in
response to a need to identify hazards before they occur. Safety was typically incorporated into a
design by the use of checklists, design procedures and experience. However, checklists had the
disadvantage that new hazards which were not on the list were overlooked. This was essentially the
fly-crash-fly method of the aviation industry for improving the safety and operating performance of a
plant or plane as the case may be. The designers learnt from their mistakes (at the expense of test
pilots). Once a problem occurred it was fixed so that it didn't happen again or at least the designers
kept experimenting until a suitable solution was found.
This approach was relatively acceptable when plants were small and the consequences were small,
although the life expectancy for test pilots was low. However as plants, in particular chemical and
petrochemical plants were becoming too big and the consequences of a hazardous incident too great,
this method was no longer acceptable. There was a need for a more searching and systematic
method for to assess the safety of a plant and to supplement design procedures. Thus the HAZOP
method was developed.
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2. THE HAZOP TECHNIQUE
2.1 What is a HAZOP?

A HAZOP is a disciplined procedure carried out by a multi-disciplinary team of personnel. The
procedure aims to systematically generate questions about the design and operation of the particular
system under review and to identify deviations from normal operation which may lead to potentially
hazardous events or operating problems. The HAZOP is based on the premise that safety and/or
operational problems can only arise when there is a deviation from the design or operating intent.
The procedure is to search a design and/or procedure systematically line-by-line, vessel-by-vessel,

section-by-section and step-by-step to identify every conceivable deviation from normal. The
procedure uses a set of guidewords which are carefully chosen to promote creative thought about all
possible process abnormalities.
For each possible process deviation, the team considers whether there are realistic causes for that
deviation and whether the consequences are significant. The team then considers whether the
existing safeguards are adequate and may make recommendations for corrective action or further
study as appropriate.
The composition of the team is important. The team should comprise representatives from both the
design and operating groups for the plant and any other specialists as required. The team members
should be knowledgeable and experienced in the field they represent. Further the team is guided in
the HAZOP process by a teamleader who is experienced in the HAZOP technique and able to assist
the team in identifying deviations and the potential hazards and operating problems.
Once a system has been assessed on a line-by-line or step-by-step basis, then the team reviews the
system as a whole to check for possible interactions which have not already been identified. The
overview also follows a set of guidewords which are designed to highlight inadequacies and
inconsistencies in the whole system.
The objective of the HAZOP is to identify all the major hazards associated with a plant or process.
Although it is a comprehensive hazard identification tool, it cannot provide assurance that all hazards
(major and minor) will be identified.
Further having identified the hazards, does not mean that the best way to deal with it is obvious. A
simple risk analysis and hazard ranking exercise is recommended to highlight the level of attention
each hazard requires.
HAZOP studies can be performed on new plants, on existing plants and on proposed modifications to
existing plants. The method is not restricted to chemical and petrochemical processes; it can also be
conducted for storage, transportation, and other systems.

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2.2 When to do a HAZOP
NEW DESIGN PROJECTS
For a design project, the most appropriate and valuable time to conduct a HAZOP is when the
detailed design is complete. By detailed design, we mean that the Process Flow Diagrams, Process
and Instrumentation diagrams and Process Piping Diagrams (PFDs, P&IDs, PPDs) show all the
equipment, pipework, valving, instrumentation and the control system and that the operating
procedures are documented.
At this stage in the design process, sufficient detail is available so that the HAZOP technique can be
applied in a meaningful way and if necessary it is possible to make changes to the design without
major expense (i.e. equipment is not purchased or facilities already built) or delays to the project.
A HAZOP can also be conducted during the construction stage and before start-up, however this is
mainly used as a check on operating procedures since any design changes should have been
highlighted at the detailed design stage and would be costly to correct during construction.
MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING PLANTS
As it is often found that a seemingly inconsequential process change can have a major effect on the
safety of a plant, it is common practice to include a HAZOP process as part of the project approval
process for plant modifications. The HAZOP should be conducted when the PFDs, P&IDs and PPDs
are complete as noted for a new design project.
EXISTING PLANTS
A HAZOP can be conducted on an existing plant. The reasons for carrying out a HAZOP on an
existing plant may be because of a recommendation from a safety audit or concerns about the
operability and safety of the plant following one or a number of incidents on the plant.
The HAZOP focuses as a check on operating procedures, however, if necessary, design changes may be
recommended.
START-UP AND SHUTDOWN OF PLANTS
A HAZOP can be conducted on the start-up and shut down of existing as well as new plants. This is
primarily a check on procedures.
2.3 Benefits of HAZOP

The benefits of a thorough HAZOP are seen throughout the life of the particular plant or system.
In the design phase of a project, the HAZOP reduces the number of last minute (potentially
expensive) modifications which may be required. It also means that the designers will have a focus
on what are the key safety and operational aspects of the project i.e. what could cause the most
trouble to the o peration of the plant.

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A HAZOP can also assist in the construction and commissioning phases of a project, by being able to
foresee major problems and then allow time to adequately plan how to handle the problems. This
leads to trouble free construction and commissioning. The same applies to start-up and shutdown
phases of a project.
The major benefits are realised in the operating phase of a project with trouble free operation post
start-up and long term. The HAZOP also provides a basis for a documented safety assessment of
the plant/system.
2.4 Definition of HAZOP terms

Some particular terms are used in conducting a HAZOP study. As a reference source, these terms
are defined below.
INTENTION: The intention defines how the system is expected to operate or is designed to operate.
This defines the normal operation. Since the HAZOP technique is based on the premise that
problems only occur when there is a deviation from the normal mode of operation, then the deviations
leading to potential problems are developed as deviations from the system design/intention.
PARAMETERS: Parameters are aspects of the system operation which make up the design intention.
Examples of parameters are flow, temperature, or pressure.
GUIDEWORDS: Guidewords take on a number of different forms depending on the system under
consideration and the stage of the HAZOP. In its simplest form when considering line-by-line, step-
by-step sections of the system, the guidewords are words or phrases which are used to qualify or
quantify the des ign intention and associated parameters. These guidewords are to promote thought
on possible deviations from the design intention. The standard simple guidewords are as follows:
GUIDEWORD M EANING
No, Not, None Complete negation of intent
More, High Quantitative increase
Less, Low Quantitative decrease
As Well As Qualitative increase
Part Of Qualitative decrease
Reverse Logical opposite of the intent
Other Than Complete substitution
These words are combined with a system parameter to highlight a possible deviation e.g. no flow.
Only those guidewords which are meaningful for the selected parameter are considered e.g. only high
and low temperature are applicable when considering temperature.
For analysis of procedures step-by-step, guidewords such as How, Why, When, Where, Who, Check
and Order are also used.

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Finally for the HAZOP overview, the whole system is reviewed against a set of guidewords which aim
to identify the interactions between different sections and to catch the big picture. These guidewords
relate to consideration of emergency response, environmental controls, start-up, shutdown,
commissioning and maintenance. A full list is described in Section F.4.
DEVIATIONS: Deviations are where possible departures from the design intention have been
identified using the guidewords. It is not unusual to have more than one deviation when considering
of a single guideword.
CAUSES: For each possible deviation, the team considers where there are realistic causes or
reasons for the deviation to occur. These causes can be equipment failures, human errors, or other
reasons and often there is more than one cause for each deviation.
CONSEQUENCES: If the deviation does occur then the results of that deviation are the
consequences. The consequences of a deviation will often depend on the cause of the deviation.

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3. P R O C E D U R E F O R A H A Z O P STUDY
There are many steps involved in completing a HAZOP study, and these steps extend outside just the
set HAZOP sessions. The full procedure is outlined below and each step is then discussed in more
detail.
3.1 Definition of objectives and scope
3.2 Selection of HAZOP team
3.3 Preparation
3.4 Conduct of HAZOP sessions
3.5 Follow-up
3.6 Record of results
3.7 Documentation
3.1 Definition of objectives and scope

The first step in a HAZOP is to detail the reason for the study and its objectives and scope. The
general objectives are normally set by the person responsible for the project or for the plant. This
person may be the project manager, the project engineer or the plant manager. The study leader
may assist in defining the objectives and scope. A clear definition up front means that management
and the study team have the same understanding of the expected results of the study.
Some examples of reasons for a study are to:
• Check the safety and operability of a new design;
• Check the safety and operability of a proposed modification;
• Assess alternatives in process modifications or siting of a particular unit/piece of equipment;
• Improve the safety/operability of an existing plant.
The objective of a HAZOP study in its simplest form is to identify potential hazards and operating
problems. Extending this objective may focus the study on one or all of the following;
• Reducing the number of last minute modifications to a design project;
• Reducing/eliminating commissioning, start-up and shut down 'problems';
• Reducing/eliminating plant operating 'problems';
• Providing compliance with government regulations.
The scope of the HAZOP study also needs to be defined in terms of the following;
• the physical boundaries of the system;

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• the modes of operation to be considered;
• external events/factors to be considered;
• extent of consequences to people, property and the environment to be considered;
• any time and/or financial constraints;
• any aspects which can be taken for granted e.g. chemistry.
3.2 Selection of HAZOP team

The HAZOP technique is all about teamwork. It is the interaction of the team members which results
in a more thorough and complete review than would be accomplished by each individual working
separately on the same project. The team must be multi-disciplinary. The team should comprise
representatives from all groups involved (e.g. design/technology, project/construction and operations)
and people should be selected for their knowledge of the process (design engineer) and/or ability to
make a technical contribution (e.g. instrumentation engineer). The team should also have a
nominated leader and possibly a technical scribe or secretary. It is also important that the team
members have the necessary authority to make changes.
The team leader should not be responsible for making a major technical contribution to the study.
The leader is responsible for conducting a sound and thorough HAZOP. Apart from assisting with the
defining of objectives for the study and selecting team members, the team leader prepares for the
study, collects the necessary information, but most importantly controls the HAZOP sessions
including the recommendations and supervisors the study documentation and report generation.
Sometimes the leader will take on the responsibility of the technical scribe or secretary. Particularly
with large and complicated projects, the inclusion of a secretary allows the leader to concentrate on
the process and not the recordings.
Since the major function of the team leader is to guide the team in the HAZOP process during the
HAZOP sessions, the team leader should be experienced and well versed in the technique. If
possible the team leader should not be closely associated with the subject of the HAZOP study, as
there is a danger of developing blind spots. An independent person is able to place a more objective
viewpoint on the proceedings and outcome of the HAZOP. The role of the team leader is discussed
in more detail later.
The overall composition of the team varies according to the objectives and scope of the study. A
team typically contains 5 to 7 people. If the group is too small, there may be insufficient breadth of
knowledge to ensure completeness and interaction of ideas and disciplines. If the group is too large
then everyone may not be able to communicate their ideas effectively. An important feature of the
team and its members is that they have a positive and constructive attitude towards the study.
For the HAZOP review of a new plant design, the team may consist of the following members:
• Team Leader (plus scribe/secretary for large projects)
• Project Engineer
• Design Engineer

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• Operations/Plant Supervisor to be associated with new p roject
• plus specialists if required
• Mechanical/Maintenance/Inspection Supervisor
• Control systems/Instrumentation Engineer
For a HAZOP study for modifications to an existing plant, the team may comprise
• Team Leader (plus scribe/secretary for large projects)
• Project Engineer
• Process Engineer
• Plant Supervisor
• Possibly an operator and/or trades technician
• Plus specialists if required
• Mechanical/Maintenance/Inspection Supervisor
• Control systems/Instrumentation Engineer
The actual composition of the team depends on the particular study. The composition may also vary
from meeting to meeting within a HAZOP study as various experts, or technical specialists, are
utilised on an as needed basis.
3.3 Preparation
The amount of preparation needed for a HAZOP study depends upon the size and complexity of the
project and whether it involves continuous or batch processes. The preparative work for batch
processes is more involved than for continuous processes. Preparation for the study involves three
steps:
1) Obtain necessary information
2) Convert information to a suitable format and plan sequence of study, and
3) Arrange meetings
STEP 1. OBTAIN NECESSARY INFORMATION
The basic information needed is listed below;
• piping and instrument diagrams/process piping diagrams (P&IDs/PPDs);
• process flow diagrams (PFDs);
• plot plans;
• procedures;

PROCEDURES
• material property data.
The drawings must be fully marked up showing the proposed new plant or plant change. All changes
should be included and all basis process data (flowrates, temperatures and pressures) should be
available. The plot plans should show the area where the new plant is to be situated or the location of
the existing plant which is to be modified highlighting the proposed location of any new equipment. It
is important that neighbouring units/communities are shown on the plot plans. The procedures can
be a simple description of the proposed operation of the new plant or modified plant, however, the
more detailed the procedure the better and some of the recommendations from the HAZOP may be
specific changes or inclusions in the operating procedures.
Other information which may be required is as follows and depends on the system under review;
• isometrics;
• equipment arrangements;
• equipment data sheets;
• mechanical drawings;
• instrument sequence control charts;
• logic diagrams;
• plant manuals;
• equipment manufacturers' manuals.
The information must be inspected to ensure that it is appropriate, complete and accurate. This may
entail walking the lines to check drawings with actual installation.
Only one set of drawings is required. Any changes during the HAZOP sessions are marked on this
set and it avoids the confusion which can be generated by multiple copies.
STEP 2. CONVERT INFORMATION TO A SUITABLE FORMAT AND PLAN SEQUENCE OF STUDY
It is at this stage, that the major difference between continuous and batch processes is realised.
They are discussed separately.

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Continuous Processes
For continuous processes, the preparative work is minimal. The existing process flow, P&IDs, PPDs
and PFDs and other documentation usually contain sufficient information and are in a suitable line-by-
line format for the study. Planning the sequence of the study is straightforward and essentially follows
the flowscheme. Each major vessel within the scope of the study is identified, then starting with the
first vessel, each input line is given a number and each output line is given a number in sequence.
When all the input lines and output lines for a vessel have been numbered, that vessel is numbered.
The process begins with the primary process flowline and continues on working progressively
downstream along the primary process flowline. After the primary process flowline is numbered, side
streams and alternate/auxiliary process flows are numbered. Th e vessel and line numbering
becomes the sequence of the study.
Generally lines are assigned in a section from one vessel to another vessel (or from one vessel to
atmosphere, if appropriate). Exchangers, pumps and other equipment are included in the one
vessel/line section. The line number should be noted on the drawing at both ends of the line and the
line highlighted in a broken line drawn along its length with a highlighter pen. Different colour
highlighter pens can be used to differentiate different process systems e.g. slurry, green liquor,
steam water.
The drawings covering the complete line from one vessel to another must be provided. So that all
instruments, side streams and valves are shown. A reference to another drawing indicating where
the line goes is not sufficient. There can be no black holes/sinks.
Also when dealing with proprietary items of equipment, the flow schemes must show fully how the
piece of equipment will be integrated into the system. It cannot be just a black box with a line in and
line out somewhere.
During the course of the HAZOP, the sequence may change because of lack of information about a
particular area or perhaps because it makes more sense to the team to review one particular area
before another. Flexibility in the sequencing is available provided all lines/vessels are still covered
and one area is not just left out.
Batch Processes and Procedures
For batch processes, the preparative work is usually more extensive. Since the intention of the
system changes with time, then the operating status of the system must be described and assessed
individually for each step in the process. The information to prepare for a HAZOP of this type
includes not only the operating instructions but the logic and instrument sequence diagrams. It may
be necessary to prepare a chart indicating the status of each vessel on a time basis. Also if operators
are physically involved in the process (e.g. manually opening and closing valves), then their activities
must be included as a step in the process.
For HAZOP of procedures, the particular procedure under investigation is broken into individual steps.
A complicated procedure may be broken into a series of smaller sections with these sections shown
on a simplified diagram of the procedure. Each section will itself contain a series of steps.

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The sequence of study for both batch processes and procedures will follow the sequences and steps
identified in the preparative work. In most cases, it will start at the first step and progress logically
towards the end of the process. This means that the HAZOP study will not necessarily start at the
beginning of the plant flow scheme or follow the process flow scheme.
STEP 3. ARRANGE MEETINGS
Once the preparative work is complete (i.e. system under investigation is divided into individual
lines/vessels/steps and the sequence of study established), then the team leader can estimate the
time required for the HAZOP meetings/sessions. There are a number of ways to do this. The more
commonly used method is to allow 15 minutes for each line/vessel or step to be investigated.
Alternatively for continuous processes, 2.5 to 3 hours can be allowed for each major piece of
equipment (e.g. vessel). Note that this is an estimate for meeting time and does not include time for
preparation, documentation and follow -up which is done outside the meetings.
The HAZOP session work is intensive and the team will tend to be less effective if work is crammed
into long individual sessions. As such, it is recommended that sessions are scheduled for a
maximum of 3 to 5 hourly durations and preferably in the morning. The afternoon can be used for
documentation and follow-up work. Large projects may require that the process is broken into
separate units and each assigned to one of several teams in order to accomplish the work with one
overall coordinating leader or that maybe the work is divided between two teams with the same team
leader conducting morning and afternoon sessions.
An overall time constraint on the HAZOP is usually beneficial in keeping everyone on track and
focused; otherwise the HAZOP and the follow-up can tend to become dragged out.
3.4 Conduct of HAZOP Sessions

For each HAZOP meeting/session, the basic requirements are as follows:
• a room where the team can follow the HAZOP procedure without interruption;
• a set of guidewords and worksheets for recording HAZOP sessions or portable computer with
HAZOP recording package and overhead projection facilities;
• drawings and other information as prepared for the particular session;
• wall space where the necessary drawings can be pinned up (note that only one set of drawings
should be in the room so that all changes are marked on the one drawing);
• thumbtacks and/or tape to pin up drawings;
• highlighter to mark up finished line segments;
• red pen to mark up changes on the drawings;
• whiteboard or easel with paper and appropriate pens.
The procedure for each HAZOP meeting/session is as follows;
1. Statement of the objectives and scope of the HAZOP by the team leader.

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2. Statement by the team leader why each team member was selected and as a minimum what
specific contribution they are expected to make.
Establish Team Rules (e.g. Every idea is a good one. Be creative. Listen to what others have
to say without criticism. Be patient with the person recording)
3. Broad description by team leader or design/operations representative, of the total system under
review including the objective of the system/project, the location of system relative to other
units/communities and in particular the location of any new items of equipment.
4. Brief outline by the team leader of the plan for the HAZOP study going into the HAZOP process
in more detail if any team member is not familiar with the method.
5. Select first unit (vessel-line-vessel combination, functional unit, procedure) to be examined.

The team leader asks the team to explain the function/objective of this unit.
6. Select and mark/highlight an unstudied section (line/vessel or step of a procedure).
The team leader asks the team to explain the explicit purpose and intent of this line
/vessel/step including any associated equipment (e.g. pumps, exchangers in a line section).
The explanation should highlight the normal mode of operation, the normal operating
conditions of the line and allowable ranges for the operating conditions.
7. The team leader applies the first guideword.
The team leader asks can this deviation occur, is this deviation meaningful?
8. If the deviation is meaningful, the team leader asks the following questions and the responses
are recorded:
What could cause this deviation to occur?
What are the possible consequences of this deviation occurring (if there are no safeguards)?
What are the hazards of an incident occurring?
What means are there to detect this deviation and subsequent incident occurring?
What means are there to protect against the deviation occurring or to reduce the consequences
of this incident occurring?
How likely is this deviation to occur and how likely is it to escalate into an incident? Assign
rank.
How extensive are the consequences of the incident if it did occur? Assign rank.
Assess overall hazard rank. Is further action required?
What are the recommendations? Assign action parties.
9. Repeat step 8 for all meaningful deviations for the given guideword.
The procedure for each HAZOP meeting/session continued:

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10. Repeat step 7, 8 and 9 for all guidewords. The first section (line or step) is finished. Mark this
line or step as completed.
11. Repeat from step 6 for all lines to and from the specific vessel under consideration and for all
steps for the procedure under consideration. The whole procedure is now finished and should
be marked off as complete.
12. When all lines associated with a particular vessel have been examined, repeat steps 6 through
to 10 for the vessel, highlighting the normal mode of operation and operating conditions for the
vessel.
The vessel is now finished and should be marked off as complete.
13. Step 5 onwards can now be repeated for the next vessel-line section or the next procedure.
14. When all vessels/lines and steps for a procedure have been examined and completed, then the
overview of the whole system is assessed against a second set of guidewords.
For each guideword in turn, the team leader asks what the particular
requirements/considerations are for the system under review. Any special conditions or need
for action is noted. Again the ranking of potential problems/hazards should be considered as
part of the process of making recommendations.
15. The initial HAZOP sessions are now complete. The HAZOP process is not finished however
without the follow -up and documentation steps.
Note that if the action items/recommendations include a change in the

design/flowlines/equipment then this change must be HAZOPed following the same procedure
above reviewing the section where the change has physically occurred.
The whole HAZOP method is summarised on a flowsheet Figure 1.
NOTES ON CAUSES OF DEVIATIONS
Every incident has a root cause. There is no such thing as an accident. Somebody or something
made an incident happen. As such there are three types of root causes. They are:
• Human error
• Equipment failure
• External events
The HAZOP team needs to assess what is a realistic cause of an incident.
NOTES ON NEED FOR ACTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The basic purpose of a HAZOP study is to identify potentially hazardous scenarios from both a safety
and an operational point of view. The results of a HAZOP study are often a list of hazardous
incidents. Therefore the team should not spend any significant time trying to engineer a solution if a

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problem is uncovered. It is more important that hazards are ranked so that the level of resources
required to address a problem can be identified and allocated in a cost effective basis.
If a solution to a problem is obvious and cost effective, the team should document their recommended
solution. If a solution is not obvious, then based on the ranking of the hazard they should recommend
that someone follow-up and resolve the problem outside the HAZOP study.
Also if there is insufficient information available to decide if a potential problems exists, the team
should note it, assign someone to collect additional information and continue with the study. This
person can then report back to the HAZOP team at a subsequent meeting. The team can then
assess whether or not a potential hazard exists and whether a recommendation is needed. If a
problem is a lack of knowledge on the team's part then other specialists may be called in.
The HAZOP study may result in a large number of action items. Therefore to properly manage the
action items, this procedure recommends that the action items should be prioritised using a risk
ranking method. The risk ranking is based on a qualitative assessment of the severity of an event if it
were to occur combined with a qualitative assessment of the likelihood of the event occurring.

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FIGURE 1: FLOWSHEET OF HAZOP METHOD
Select a section
Explain the intention of the section/the vessel and its lines/procedure
Select a line/step in procedure
Explain the intention of the line/step in procedure
Apply first guide word
Develop a meaningful deviation
Examine possible causes
Examine consequences
Identify hazards/operating problems
Rank hazards/operating problems
Record results, any recommendations/action items
Repeat for all meaningful deviation for guideword
Repeat for all guidewords
Mark off line/step as examined
Repeat for each line associated with vessel/step in procedure
Repeat for vessel, if appropriate
Mark off section/vessel/procedure as examined
Repeat for all sections/vessels and lines/procedures
Mark off all sections as examined
Apply first overview guideword
Identify potential hazards/operating problems
Rank hazards/operating problems
Record results
Repeat for all overview guidewords
Mark off as overview complete

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3.5 Record of results

During each HAZOP session, the team records the minutes of their meeting on a HAZOP worksheet.
A typical worksheet is shown in Figure 2. The usual approach is that a record is only made when a
meaningful deviation has been identified. The causes and consequences of that deviation are then
noted along with any potential problem/hazard which may exist, the ranking for the hazard/problem,
any action items or recommendations and the assigned action parties. The worksheets should
represent a complete record of what the team considered during the sessions and the background
behind any action items and recommendations.
It is useful to assign a number or some form of identification to each cause (and subsequent
consequence combination) e.g. C1, C2, etc. If the consequences for a later cause or deviation are
the same, then the number of the earlier cause/consequence can be referenced instead of repeating
the written description e.g. "as for C5".
It is also useful to assign a number or other form of identification to each action item/recommendation
e.g. A1, A2, etc. The main reason for the identification is to assist in preparing action lists and follow -
up. The numbering/identification system also acts as a reference to the HAZOP minutes when
marking up changes on the flow schemes.
One person is usually assigned the task of keeping the minutes of the meeting. Depending on the
size of the project and its complexity, the person keeping the minutes may be one of the members of
the team (probably the team leader) or an extra person brought in to the team for the sole purpose of
recording the minutes (a technical secretary). The advantages of having a technical secretary is that
it permits all members of the team including the team leader to concentrate on the HAZOP process
and more will be achieved in each HAZOP session, thereby saving time overall. The secretary is also
able to assist the team leader preparing the HAZOP reports and gathering information.
At the end of each HAZOP session, the worksheets should be typed or neatly hand written. The
action items and any requests for further information should be summarised from the worksheets and
presented in a separate follow -up report. A copy of the worksheets and the follow-up reports should
be distributed to each of the HAZOP team members and nominated action parties.
Commercial computer packages are available to assist with recording HAZOP sessions and to
prepare summaries of action items and recommendations. The advantages of using a HAZOP
recording package are as follows:
• to save time, since the minutes are recorded in a presentable way at the time of the meeting i.e.
the minutes do not have to be typed out later.
• to set up the computer package with a computer data projection device so that all members of the
team can see what is being recorded as it is recorded during the session. This reduces follow-up
time and review of the minutes and more importantly also reduces the possibility of differing
opinions about what was actually discussed or understood at the meeting.
• to allow more information to be recorded during the HAZOP sessions. Many packages can be set
up beforehand so that the full set of guidewords to be considered is already entered on
worksheets. This means that all guidewords considered are documented even if the response is

PROCEDURES
"Not considered a potential hazard/problem. This means that other people who were not at the
HAZOP (such as senior management and government authorities) but may have need to review
the work, know what was considered and know that a particular item was not simply left out.
3.6 Follow-up
As part of the recording of the results of the HAZOP sessions, summary lists of the action items and
recommendations have been prepared. The follow-up to the HAZOP sessions then starts with the
action lists and concerns the points where a hazard or operating problem has been identified and
what the team proposes in terms of action or recommendations.
There are five main activities involved in follow-up to the HAZOP sessions. They are;
• Communicating any decisions concerning changes in design or operating methods to the

responsible parties;
• Obtaining any additional information required to address a problem and then to submit the
information at subsequent HAZOP sessions;
• Where necessary, developing a number of alternative action items to solve a particular problem,
deciding the most appropriate on a cost effective basis and reporting back to the team;
• Where changes to the system have been recommended, conducting extra sessions to HAZOP
these changes, and finally
• Chasing the progress of the action items and recommendations.
All cases where additional information is required should be investigated and resolved during the
course of the study and presented at follow-up sessions. If necessary the HAZOP should be deferred
until all the necessary information is available.
It is also important to ensure that any proposed changes as a result of the HAZOP are themselves
subjected to a HAZOP. The proposed changes may well introduce new hazards and problems.

PROCEDURES
FIGURE 2: TYPICAL HAZOP WORKSHEET
3.7 Documentation
Good communication of the results of the HAZOP is essential. This is not only to facilitate follow-up
of the action items but to inform the concerned parties about the inherent hazards and operating
problems of a particular plant or modification and to highlight how these hazards and problems are to
be addressed.
The HAZOP may generate a large number of worksheets, highlight a number of hazards and
problems and generate a large number of action items and recommendations. An effective way to
communicate the results of the HAZOP is to prepare a summary HAZOP report.
The summary report is prepared at the completion of the HAZOP study including any follow -up
HAZOP sessions. The report should clearly describe the objective and scope of the study, highlight
the potential hazards and operating problems along with the key means of reducing/eliminating the
problems, and highlight the recommendations and what was achieved by the HAZOP. A typical
outline for a summary report is given below. The worksheets and follow-up action lists are included
as appendices.
HAZOP SUMMARY REPORT
• Cover page
• Summary
• Objectives and scope

PROCEDURES
• Discussion highlighting potential hazards and operating problems and means of

reducing/eliminating problems
• Recommendations and major outcomes
• Appendices
- Proces s description including flow scheme and other drawings/data used as the basis for
the study;
- Description of the HAZOP technique;
- Complete list of action items highlighting unresolved items;
- Completed worksheets.
The report should be distributed to the senior management responsible for the plant/system under
consideration and to individuals/departments responsible for any action items resulting from the
study.

PROCEDURES
4. MORE ON GUIDEWORDS
There are two sets of guidewords. The first set is applied to the examination of particular design and
operating aspects of individual vessels, lines and procedural steps. The second set is applied to the
overview of the whole system under review.
For both sets, the selection of guidewords and how they are used is not fixed. The team leader
should ensure that the guidewords to be used for a particular HAZOP session are appropriate to the
system under review and the objective of the HAZOP itself.
FIRST SET OF GUIDEWORDS - EXAMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL VESSELS/LINES/STEPS
The first set of guidewords is used to promote thought on deviations from the design intention for the
vessel, line or step under examination. The set of guidewords used also depends on where a
continuous or batch type/procedural operation is being reviewed. These are discussed separately
below.
Continuous
The guidewords for a continuous operation and their meanings and comments are presented in Table
1 below.
TABLE 1: GUIDEWORDS FOR CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS
GUIDEWORD MEANING COMMENTS
No, Not, None Complete negation of the No part of the design/operating intention
design intent is achieved and nothing else happens
More, High Quantitative increase A measurable increase in a particular

design/operating intention is achieved
and this increase is outside the normal
range
Less, Low Quantitative decrease A measurable decrease in a particular

design/operating intention is achieved
and this decrease is outside the normal
range
As well as Qualitative increase All the design and operating intentions

are achieved together with some
additional activity
Part of Qualitative decrease Only some of the design and operating

intentions are achieved; some are not.

PROCEDURES
GUIDEWORD MEANING COMMENTS
Reverse Reverse of design intent The opposite of the design/operating

intention is achieved/occurs
Other than Complete substitution No part of the original intention is

achieved; something quite different
happens.
These guidewords are used opposite design and operating parameters of the system. The
parameters relate to certain aspects of the design or operation of th e system and are developed from
the design intention of the vessel, line or step under review. There are two types of aspects. There
are the specific aspects which describe the physical features of the process and there are the general
aspects which tend to describe what is going on or what is supposed to be going on.
The specific aspects can be summarised as:
• changes in quantity (the related parameter is flow);
• changes in physical condition (the related parameters are pressure, temperature, phase, static
build-up);
• changes in chemical condition (the related parameters are reaction, composition, concentration,
contaminants);
• changes inside vessels (the related parameters are level, reaction, mixing).
The general aspects can be viewed as parameters in themselves and are summarised as:
• start-up and shutdown conditions (line testing, commissioning and maintenance procedures)
• instrumentation
• control
• electrical considerations
• operability, reliability, simplicity
The simplest example of the combination of guidewords and a parameters to produce a possible
deviation is:
No + Flow = No Flow
Other deviations are developed in similar manner.
A listing of typical guideword/parameter combinations is prepared in Table A attached. The table also
includes examples of causes for a deviation.

PROCEDURES
Batch Operations and Procedures
When conducting a HAZOP of a batch operation or a procedure, where for both the study has been
broken down into a sequence of steps, the meaning of the standard guidewords is slightly different to
that of the continuous process study. The guidewords and their interpretation are presented in Table
2 following.
TABLE 2: GUIDEWORDS FOR BATCH OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES
GUIDEWORD MEANING/USAGE
No, not, none The step or operation is not performed at all
More, higher Quantitatively, more is performed than is specified or required by the step or
procedure (e.g. a vessel is supposed to be filled to the midpoint and is filled
to the high point )
Less, lower Quantitatively, less is performed than is specified or required by the step or
procedure (e.g. a line is supposed to be flushed for 30 minutes and is only
flushed for 10 minutes )
As well as Qualitatively, more is performed than is specified or required by the step or

procedure (e.g. the block valves to two vessels are opened instead of the
block valve to only one of the vessels)
Part of Qualitatively, less is performed than is specified or required by the step or

procedure (e.g. a valve is supposed to be shut off completely and is only half
closed )
Reverse The opposite of what is specified or required happens (e.g. a valve is

opened instead of being shut )
Other than Something completely different to what is specified or required happens.

(e.g. instead of isolating pump A, pump B is isolated)

PROCEDURES
An additional set of guidewords are useful when studying sequences and procedures. These are
presented in Table 3 below with their meanings.
TABLE 3: ADDITIONAL GUIDEWORDS FOR BATCH OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES
GUIDEWORD MEANING/USAGE
How How is the step to be accomplished? Is the operator physically able to perform
the step as specified? Are the necessary facilities available?
Why Why is this step included? Is there a logical reason for the step? Is the step or
operation really needed?
When Is it important when the step or operation is performed?
Where Is it important that the step or operation is performed in a particular place/spot?
Who Who is to perform this step or operation? Is it clear who is responsible?
Check/verify How is it checked/verified that this step has been properly completed?
Order/sequence Is it important that the steps are performed in the order/sequence specified?
SECOND SET OF GUIDEW ORDS - OVERVIEW OF WHOLE SYSTEM
The second set of guidewords is aimed at looking critically at how the whole system interacts. The
guidewords cover some key areas plus some of a more general nature.
The key areas are as follows:
Emergency response - in the event of failure of services/utilities
- interaction of controls and protection
- in the event of fire and explosion
- safety equipment
Environmental control - effluents
- noise
- monitoring, regulatory requirements
- toxicity (acute, chronic)
Quality control/Testing - sampling
- alarms/trip systems
- equipment

PROCEDURES
Abnormal operations - start-up
- shutdown
- commissioning
- maintenance
Design controls - materials of construction
- design codes and practices
- simplicity
A listing of typical guidewords for the overview is prepared in Table B attached.

PROCEDURES
Table A: Listing of Guidewords for continuous operations
ASPECT OF GUIDEWORD/DEVIATION POSSIBLE CAUSES

DESIGN/OPERATION
Changes in quantity No flow Pump failure, pump racing, delivery vessel pressure
lost/over pressurised, suction pressurised, scale
dislodged, leak in heat exchanger, presence of
foreign body or sediment, poor suction conditions,
cavitation, drain leaking, valve jammed, gas locking,
poor isolation, surging, back siphoning, loss of
automatic control, operator error, failure of joint, pipe,
trap, bursting disc, relief valve
High flow
Low flow
Reverse flow
Changes in physical conditions High/low temperature Boiling, cavitation, freezing, chemical breakdown,
flashing, condensation, sedimentation, scaling,
foaming, gas release, priming, exploding, imploding,
changes in viscosity/density, external fire, weather
conditions, hammer
High/low pressure
Phase change
Static build up Source of ignition, personnel shock

Changes in chemical condition Concentration/ composition Changes in proportion of mixture, in water or solvent
content
Contaminants Ingress of air, water, steam , fuel, lubricants, corrosion
products, other process materials from high pressure
systems, leakage through heat exchangers, gas
entrainment, spray, mist
Start -up and shutdown conditions Testing Vacuum, pressure testing

Commissioning Concentration of reactants, intermediates
Maintenance Purging, venting, sweetening, drying, warming,

access, spares, flushing
Changes inside vessels High/low level Flooding, pressure surges, corrosion, sludge
High/low mixing Agitator failure, vortex, layering, erosion

high/low reaction Frothing, other reactions, runaway reaction, gassing,
exothermic, endothermic, enrichment, catalyst
Instrumentation Instrumentation Location, display, operator access
Control Control Conventional/computer control configuration, logic

and behaviour, response speed, manual control loops
Electrical Electrical Motor sizing, substation
Operability/reliability/ Operability/reliability/ Manning levels
simplicity simplicity
TABLE B: LISTING OF OVERVIEW GUIDEWORDS

PROCEDURES
KEY AREAS GUIDEWORDS COMMENTS
Emergency response In event of failure of utilities Consider part and total failures and
compound failures
Consider lighting of plant and
instrument panels, power for alarms
In event of fire or explosion Procedures, training, escape,

location of neighbouring plant
units/communities
Interaction of controls and Consider 'fail safe' modes
safeguarding
Firewater system Firewater supply, deluge system, fire
detection/fighting
Safety equipment availability, location, personnel
protection, eye wash stations/
showers
Environmental controls Effluents Compatibility/reactions in drains,
sewers, collecting mains, vents,
stacks, flares
Toxicity Potential for acute/chronic exposure
Noise
Monitoring Government requirements, facilities
Quality and consistency Sampling process streams Contractual requirements,
Frequency of testing, facilities for
testing, spares/backup
Reliability
Testing alarm/trip systems
Testing equipment
Abnormal/infrequent operations Commissioning Sequencing, procedures, training,
supervision, facilities
Start-up
Shutdown
Maintenance
Design controls Materials of construction Temperature/pressure rating,
corrosion lagging, personnel
protection
Services/utilities required Electricity, water, cooling water
nitrogen, air, steam, other
Design codes/practices
Design capacity/overdesign Potential bottlenecks
Electrical safety Area classification, earthing

PROCEDURES
5. ROLE OF THE HAZOP TEAM LEADER
The chief role of the HAZOP team leader is to guide the team in the HAZOP technique ensuring a
thorough study, to control the teams discussions so that time is not wasted and to ensure that all
recommendations and proposed changes are balanced. The team leader is responsible for the
satisfactory completion of the HAZOP.
The team leader should be knowledgeable and experienced in the HAZOP technique and capable of
guiding and controlling a group of people. The team leader does not necessarily need to know the
system under review and it is preferred that the leader is not responsible for making a specific and
major technical contribution to the study.
The responsibilities of the team leader according to the different phases of the study can be described
as follows:
BEFORE THE HAZOP SESSIONS
• define objectives and scope clearly;
• gather the necessary drawings and data and check accuracy;
• prepare the study material and plan the study sequence;
• prepare the guidewords to be used for the HAZOP;
• select the team members;
• ensure that the team members and facilities for the HAZOP are available;
DURING THE HAZOP SESSIONS
• guide the team is the HAZOP technique;
• ensure that the team members understand the HAZOP method and their individual roles;
• provide technical input as needed;
• ensure that the full range of deviations is generated and that a full range of realistic causes and
consequences is developed;
• assist with ranking and prioritising hazards and problems;
• ensure that recommendations and action items are based on rational argument and balanced in
terms of eliminating the problem and managing the problem ;
• assist with assigning action parties;
• ensure that discussions are balanced by ensuring that all team members participate in the
discussions and that thos e who have the specific technical knowledge or ability are given the
opportunity to express their views, avoid one team member dominating the discussions;

PROCEDURES
• keep the discussions to the topic under review, avoid side track discussions;
• keep track of time, if discussion of a particular issue is taking too long organise that the issue is
resolved outside the meeting and designated team members report back at the next session;
• ensure the results of the meeting are accurately recorded.
AFTER THE HAZOP SESSIONS
• ensure that the minutes of the meeting and the follow-up reports are prepared and distributed;
• document status of action items;
• follow-up action items and action parties;
• prepare summary report;
• report findings to responsible parties and management.

PROCEDURES
6. S U C C E S S /PITFALLS
A successful HAZOP is a study where;
• the objectives and scope are fulfilled;
• the study is thorough and correctly executed;
• the documentation is complete and adequate, and
• the recommendations and findings have been successfully communicated to the relevant
personnel.
There are many steps involved in conducting a HAZOP and they all contribute to its success. Some
areas which commonly let a HAZOP down are:
• lack of focus on the objectives and scope of the HAZOP;
• inadequate preparation;
• inaccurate drawings and information;
• inexperienced team leader;
• inexperienced team members who do not have the necessary breadth of knowledge;
• inadequate team efforts, team members not willing to participate and not committed to study;
• excessive safeguarding installed making project not viable;
• inadequate documentation;
• inadequate follow-up of recommendations and action items.
The objectives and scope of a HAZOP must be clear from the outset and expected results of the
study must be well understood by everyone including management. The HAZOP team must have the
authority to assess the system and recommend changes without a more senior person (who was not
involved in the HAZOP) overriding the recommendations and changes at a later date

HAZOP & Operability Study (Hazop) : Procedures

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WORLEY SAFETY & RISK MANAGEMENT

HAZOP & Operability Study

PROJECT 050/90510 - HAZOP PROCEDURE 2001

A Issued for internal review N/A 15-Nov-95 N/A

0 Issued for Use 15-Nov-95

1 Issued for Use (updated) 26-Apr-01

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2. THE HAZOP TECHNIQUE .......................................................................................................................2

2.1 What is a HAZOP?.......................................................................................................................................2

2.2 When to do a HAZOP .................................................................................................................................3

2.3 Benefits of HAZOP .......................................................................................................................................3

2.4 Definition of HAZOP terms ........................................................................................................................4

3. PROCEDURE FOR A HAZOP STUDY................................................................................................6

3.1 Definition of objectives and scope..........................................................................................................6

3.2 Selection of HAZOP team .........................................................................................................................7

3.3 Preparation .....................................................................................................................................................8

3.4 Conduct of HAZOP Sessions ................................................................................................................ 11

3.5 Record of results........................................................................................................................................ 16

3.6 Follow-up ...................................................................................................................................................... 17

3.7 Documentation ........................................................................................................................................... 18

5. ROLE OF THE HAZOP TE AM LEADER........................................................................................... 27

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2. THE HAZOP TECHNIQUE

2.1 What is a HAZOP?

The procedure is to search a design and/or procedure systematically line-by-line, vessel-by-vessel,

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2.2 When to do a HAZOP

NEW DESIGN PROJECTS

MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING PLANTS

START-UP AND SHUTDOWN OF PLANTS

2.3 Benefits of HAZOP

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2.4 Definition of HAZOP terms

No, Not, None Complete negation of intent

More, High Quantitative increase

Less, Low Quantitative decrease

As Well As Qualitative increase

Part Of Qualitative decrease

Reverse Logical opposite of the intent

Other Than Complete substitution

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3.1 Definition of objectives and scope

3.2 Selection of HAZOP team

3.4 Conduct of HAZOP sessions

3.6 Record of results

3.1 Definition of objectives and scope

Some examples of reasons for a study are to:

• Check the safety and operability of a new design;

• Check the safety and operability of a proposed modification;

• Assess alternatives in process modifications or siting of a particular unit/piece of equipment;

• Improve the safety/operability of an existing plant.

• Reducing the number of last minute modifications to a design project;

• Reducing/eliminating commissioning, start-up and shut down 'problems';

• Reducing/eliminating plant operating 'problems';

• Providing compliance with government regulations.

• the physical boundaries of the system;

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• the modes of operation to be considered;

• external events/factors to be considered;

• extent of consequences to people, property and the environment to be considered;

• any time and/or financial constraints;

• any aspects which can be taken for granted e.g. chemistry.