inOrganizations'

ofAuthority
TheHierarchy
PeterM. Blau

ABSTRACT
The unexpectedfindingof a previous study of 150 governmentagencies,that superior
qualificationsof the personnelincrease the ratio of supervisors,was interpretedto imply
that many supervisorsimprove upward communication,whereas few entail centralized
managementthroughdirectivesfromthe top down. A study of 250 governmentagencies
of a different type confirmsthe inferencethat organizationsrequiringhigherqualifications
of theirpersonnelare more decentralized,and it shows that the largerproportionof super-
visors in them resultspartly from the narrowerspan of control of first-linesupervisors
and partlyfromthe largernumberof manageriallevels in the hierarchy.Other correlates
of a hierarchywith many levels are size, few major divisions,automation,and explicitpro-
motion regulationsthat give much weight to meritand littleto seniority.The implication
is that large organizationsdevelop multilevelhierarchies,which remove top management
from the operatinglevel, primarilyif conditionsin the agency, such as automation and
personnelstandards that assure minimumqualifications,make operations relativelyself-
regulatingand independentof directinterventionby management.Such conditionstrans-
form squat structuresthat are centrallygovernedinto tall hierarchieswith decentralized
authority.These conclusionsare supported by data on still another type of government
agency, which reveal essentiallythe same correlationswith multilevelhierarchy.

Advancesin the social sciencesdo not Trow, and Colemanclearlyadvances our

occurin straightlinesof uniform progress, knowledgeof uniondemocracyfarbeyond
as the recurrent rediscoveries of half-for- Michels'theoryof oligarchy whichinspired
gotten classics indicate, be it Simmel's it. The patternof scientificdevelopment
analysisof conflictor Durkheim'sof the may be describedas dialectical.Mounting
divisionoflabor,theinsightsofKarl Marx, criticisms of one approachlead to concen-
Adam Smith,or even Plato. But neither trationon anotherdesignedto overcome
does thedevelopment of sociologymovein thefirst'sshortcomings; yet thesecondap-
circlesor simplyfluctuatebetweenalterna- proachis likely,in due time,to reveallimi-
tive theoretical approaches.There is some tationsof its ownthatencouragestillother
continuity, and thereis someprogress.The lines of scientific attack; but slowlysome
analysis of pattern variables by Parsons progressis made.
and Shilssurelyis a refinement ofToennies' The study of formalorganizationsis a
conceptsof Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, case in point.Weber'stheoretical analysis,
for example,and the researchof Lipset, whichhas longdominatedthefield,was in-
' Thispaperis thesixthreportof theCompara- creasingly criticizedforpresentingan ideal-
tiveOrganization ResearchProgram, supported by ized conceptionof bureaucracy and forex-
grantGS-553fromtheNationalScienceFounda- aminingonlyits formalcharacteristics and
tion,whichis gratefullyacknowledged. I also want ignoringtheinformal modificationsthatoc-
to thankMarshallW. Meyerforhisexcellent com-
mentson an earlierdraftof thispaperas wellas cur
in actual practice.In responseto this
for his assistancein the collectionand analysis researchon organizations
criticism, concen-
of the data, and CharlesPerrowforhis helpful tratedon informalrelationsand unofficial
The staffof theNationalOpinionRe- practices,the attitudesof individualmem-
criticisms.
searchCenterdid an outstanding job in conduct- bersand theirobservablebehavior.The re-
ing a ratherunusualsurveyof organizations and
obtainingthe requireddata fromvirtuallyall sultingstudiesof theinformal organization
financedepartments selected. of work groups and theactual performance
453

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 454 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
ofdutiesin bureaucracies haveundoubtedly historicalperiods,whichwas Weber's ap-
contributed muchto our understanding of proach; or intensiveexaminationof two
these complexstructures.While comple- contrastingformsof organization,as in
mentingWeber's approach,however,the Stinchombe's studycitedbelow; or quanti-
new focusneglectedthe basic theoretical tativecomparisonsof many organizations
problemto which he addressed himself. and multivariate analysisoftheircharacter-
One question a student of organizations istics.The last procedureis adoptedhere.
mayask is howtheexistingconditions in a The assumptionmade in choosingthis
bureaucracyaffectattitudesand conduct, procedureis thattheanalysisof the inter-
for instance,why bureaucraticconditions dependencebetween organizationalattri-
stifleinitiativeand what the processesin- butes based on systematiccomparisonsof
volvedare.2 But thereis anotherquestion largenumbersof organizations promisesto
that can be asked, namely,why certain contributemost to organizationaltheory.
conditionsemergein organizationsin the If the ultimateaim o-fthis theoryis to
firstplace, for example,what determines derivegeneralprinciplesthat explain the
the development and the characteristics of emergence of structures withvariouschar-
the authoritystructure.Weber was con- acteristics,the firststep must be to ad-
cernedwith the secondproblem-explain- vance more limited generalizationsthat
ing the configurations of bureaucraticcon- specifythe conditionst-hataffectthe de-
ditions-whereasrecent researchfocused velopmentof different characteristics, and
on the first-investigating their conse- quantitativecomparisons permitsuchspec-
quencesforindividualsand groups-to the ification.The analysis of the authority
virtualexclusionof thesecond,in partbe- structureto be presentedis based on data
cause the case studymethodusually em- collectedfromseveralhundredgovernment
ployed is not suitable for answeringthe agencies.Only agenciesof a specifictype
second question. are directlycompared,to eliminatethe
A theoryof formalorganization, as dis- disturbing influenceof differences between
tinguished froma theory of group life in a types; but the resultsof one such study are
bureaucraticcontext,seeks to explainwhy confronted with those of another,to dis-
organizationsdevelop various character- cernwhetherconclusionsare confinedto a
istics,such as a multilevel hierarchy or de- singletype.The inquiryis restricted to the
centralizedauthority. To furnishtheseex- formalattributesof organizations, since it
planationsrequiresthat the characteristicswas notpossibleto collectdata on informal
of organizations are not takenas givenbut patternsand individualattitudesin hun-
the conditionsthat produce themare in- dredsof government agencies.This limita-
vestigated.Thus one may ask how the tion of the approach to organizational
qualifications of an organization'sstaffin- researchhere adopted may well give rise
fluencethe structureof authorityin it, or in the futureto different approachesnot
generallywhat conditionsaffectthe shape similarlylimitedto easily accessibledata.
of the hierarchy, whichare the two prob- But theprospectof a possiblecountertrend
lems posed this paper. In orderto an- in the futureshouldnot deterus now from
in
swer thiskind of question,it is necessary exploitingthe scientificcontributionthat
to comparedifferent organizations and not systematiccomparisonsof even relatively
merelyto study the influenceexertedon simple organizationaltraits can make at
behaviorby theconditions foundin a single thepresentstageof knowledge.
case. The method of comparisonmight The expositionis deliberatelydesigned
involveanalyzingbureaucracies in differentto call attentionto continuities in bureau-
2See Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and So- cratic theory and research, and the paper
cial Structure (2d ed.; New York: Free Press, also seeksto revealtherolethattheoretical
1957), pp. 195-206. speculationswhichgo beyondtheempirical

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 THE HIERARCHY
OF AUTHORITY
IN ORGANIZATIONS 455
evidenceplay in establishingcontinuities "The role of technicalqualificationsin
betweendifferent investigations. The re- bureaucraticorganizationsis continually
search reportedis conceived within the increasing."3 But, in addition,"each lower
framework ofWeber'stheoretical tradition; officeis underthe controland supervision
it followshis approachof studyingthe in- of a higherone."4 The assumptionthat
terrelations betweenformalconditionsin professionalexpertnessand bureaucratic
bureaucraticstructures,rather than the disciplineare simplytwo aspects of the
individualsand human relations within rational organizationof large-scaletasks
them,and it deals with two substantive not only conflictswith the prevailingim-
issues his theoryposes-the relationship pressionthat professionalwork suffersif
betweenexpertness and authority, and the subjectedto bureaucratic disciplinebutalso
significanceof the formalhierarchyof has been questionedon both systematic
offices.
Moreover,thecontinuities fromone theoretical and empiricalgrounds.
empiricalinvestigation to anotherare in- In a well-known footnote, Parsonscriti-
dicated as the tentativeinterpretations of cizes Weber for confounding, two analyti-
earlierfindings are testedand refinedin a cally distincttypesof authority.5 Profes-
subsequentstudy.I shall tryto illustrate sional authorityrests on the certified
thatadvancinghighlyspeculativegeneral- superiorcompetenceof the expert,which
izationsin interpreting empiricalfindings promptsothersvoluntarilyto followhis
serves importantscientificfunctions,for directivesbecause they considerdoing so
such inferential conjecturesare the basis to be in theirown interest.Bureaucratic
forthe cumulationof scientific knowledge, authority,in contrast,restson the legiti-
provided that they are followedup by matepowerof commandvestedin an offi-
further research.The only connectionbe- cial position,whichobligatessubordinates
tweendifferent empiricalinvestigations,and to followdirectivesunder the threatof
hence the only source of cumulation,is sanctions.Superiorknowledgeis not re-
the generalizations derivedfromeach that quired for bureaucraticauthority(expert
go beyondits limitedevidence. knowledge is notwhatauthorizesthepolice-
man to directtraffic, forexample,or what
PROFESSIONAL AND BUREAUCRATIC
inducesus to obeyhis signals),whereasit
AUTHORITY
is essential for professionalcontrol,and
The relationshipbetween the expert mandatory complianceis enforcedby coer-
qualifications of a professional
staffand the cive sanctionsin the bureaucraticbut not
bureaucratic authority vestedin a hierarchy in theprofessional case. Gouldnersimilarly
of officesposes an interesting theoretical stressesthedifference betweentheinfluence
issue.Professionalism and bureaucracy have exertedon thebasisoftechnicalcompetence
muchin common,such as impersonalde- and the compellingauthorityin a bureau-
tachment,specializedtechnicalexpertness, cratichierarchy, and he derivesfromthis
and rationaldecisionmakingbased on uni- distinctiontwo contrastingformsof bu-
versalisticstandards.There are also diver- reaucracy-"representative" and "punish-
gent elements,however,and professional ment-centered."6
principlesoftencomeintoconflict withthe 'Max Weber,The Theoryof Social and Eco-
requirementsof bureaucraticauthority. nomic Organization (New York: OxfordUniver-
Weberimpliedthattheprofessional author- sity Press, 1947), p. 335.
ity rooted in experttechnicalknowledge 4Ibid., p. 331.
and thebureaucraticauthorityrootedin a ' Talcott Parsons, "Introduction,"ibid., pp. 58-
hierarchyof officeswithlegitimateclaims 60.
to disciplinedcompliancetend to occur 'Alvin W. Gouldner,Patterns of IndustrialBu-
together, both being distinctivecharacter- reaucracy(Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954), esp. pp.
istics of complex rational organizations. 21-24.

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456 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
Researchresultsalso challengeWeber's thesefactorsmay easilycomeintoconflict
assumptionthat technicalexpertnessand withthedisciplinerequiredby bureaucratic
hierarchicallyenforceddisciplinetypically authority.Research indicatesthat a pro-
occur together.Stinchcombe'scomparison fessionalorientationtowardserviceand a
oftwoindustries suggests,forexample,that bureaucraticorientation towarddisciplined
thetechnicalskillsofconstruction workers, compliancewith proceduresare opposite
whichcontrastwith the low level of skill approachestowardwork and oftencreate
in mass production,promoterationalper- conflictin organizations.10 Besides, the
formance and therefore serveas a substitute identification of professionals with an ex-
for the bureaucratichierarchythrough ternalreference groupmaywelllessentheir
which the work in mass productionis loyaltyto theorganization.11 It is also rea-
rationallyorganized.7Thus technicalex- sonable to expect that conflictsarise as
pertnessand hierarchicalauthorityseem decisions made strictlyon the basis of
to be alternatives,not complementary.professionalstandardsare recurrently set
Udy's researchon the organization of pro- aside for the sake of administrative con-
ductionin 150 non-industrial societiesar- siderationsby bureaucraticauthorities. All
rives at parallel results.8He finds that theseconflicts referto fairlyadvancedas-
severalbureaucratic includ- pects of professionalization.
characteristics, But Weber's
ing a hierarchicalauthoritystructure, are concernwas not so muchwiththesecom-
directlycorrelatedwith one anotherbut ponentsofprofessionalism as withtechnical
not, even inversely,with several rational expertness, whichhe held to be an integral
characteristics,including specialization, part of hierarchically organizedbureauc-
whichmay be considereda primitivefore- racies. The findingsof Stinchcombeand
runnerof technicalexpertness, and so may Udy imply,however,thatevena moderate
rationalworkproceduresin general.Udy degreeof technicalexpertness conflicts with
concludes: "Bureaucracyand rationality bureaucraticauthority.
tendtobe mutuallyinconsistent in thesame Yet therecan be no questionthathier-
formal organization."9It is noteworthy archicallyorganizedbureaucraciesdo em-
thatbothof thesestudiesdo notdeal with ploy personnelwith expert trainingand
advanced levels of professionalizationbut qualifications. As a matterof fact,formal
with ratherrudimentary formsof expert organizationstypicallyrequire theirstaff
qualifications. to meet certain educationalor technical
The various componentsof profession- qualifications, and these requirements in-
alism must be distinguished in analyzing dicate that a minimumof expertnessis
its implicationsfor hierarchicalauthority indeedan integralpartof thebureaucratic
in organizations. Full-fledgedprofessional- structure. If expertnessitselfis, neverthe-
ization entails not only expertskills but less, incompatiblewith some elementsof
also a body of abstractknowledgeunder- strictbureaucraticauthority,as the find-
lyingthem,a self-governing associationof
0 See, e.g.,Roy G. Franciesand Robert C. Stone,
professionalpeers, professionalstandards
Service and Procedure in Bureaucracy (Minne-
of workmanship and ethicalconduct,and apolis: Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1956).
an orientationtoward service. Some of ' See Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and
7Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Bureaucratic and Locals," Administrative Science Quarterly, II
Craft Administrationof Production,"Administra- (1957-58), 281-306,444-80; Theodore Caplow and
tive Science Quarterly,IV (1959), 168-87. Reece J. McGee, The AcademicMarketplace (New
York: Basic Books, 1958), esp. p. 85; Everett C.
'Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "'Bureaucracy' and 'Ra- Hughes, Men and Their Work (Glencoe, Ill.: Free
tionality' in Weber's Organization Theory,"
Press, 1958), esp. p. 137; and Peter M. Blau and
AmericanSociological Review, XXIV (1959), 791-
W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations (San
95. Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), pp.
'Ibid., p. 794. 64-74.

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 OF AUTHORITY
THE HIERARCHY IN ORGANIZATIONS 457
ings cited suggest,the questionis how it of thepertinent resultssufficesto introduce
modifiesthe structureof authorityin or- the problemsinvestigatedin subsequent
ganizations.The presentpaper addresses research.The data were collectedby the
itselffirstto thisproblemofhowvariations Public PersonnelAssociationthrough ques-
in thequalifications of thepersonnelaffect tionnairesto its members.They pertainto
theauthority structurein formalorganiza- the executiveagenciesof the civil service
tions,and it thenturnsto the questionof commissions of moststate and majorlocal
ofhowotherconditionsaffectthehierarchy Americangovernments, with the bias of
of authority. selection favoring larger agencies and
A simpleworkinghypothesis forinvesti- thoseidentifiedwithmeritprinciples. These
gating the firstproblemcan be derived agencies are small bureaucracies,with a
froma few plausible considerations. En- medianstaffof not quite seventeen(even
trance requirements that assure that the aftertheninety-six witha staffof less than
agencystaff(meaningall personnel, in line five were eliminatedfromthe analysis).
as well as "staff"positions)has relatively The measureof expertnessis whetherthe
highminimumqualifications mightbe ex- operatingstaff,excludingboth managerial
pectedto lessentheneed forguidanceand and clericalpersonnel,is requiredto have
close supervision.The implicationis that a collegedegreewitha specifiedjob-related
suchexpertrequirements widenthespan of major.'4The onlyavailableinformation on
controlof managers,increasing thenumber the hierarchyof authorityis the ratio of
ofsubordinates undereach,12and therefore managersto non-supervisory officials.15
reduce the proportionof managerialper- The employment of expertswithstipu-
sonnel in the organization,because each lated educationalqualificationsdoes not
superiorcan supervisemore subordinates reducetheproportionate size of themana-
if theyare expertsthanif theirlowerskills gerialstaffin publicpersonnelagencies.On
necessitatemuch guidance and checking. thecontrary, undermostconditions, though
These inferences,which appear straight- not underall, agenciesthat requiretheir
forward and perhapsevenself-evident, sug- employeesto meet relativelyhigh qualifi-
gest as an initial hypothesisthat expert cationsare morelikelythanothersto have
requirements decreasethe ratio of mana- a highratioof managers.Expertness, more-
gerial to non-supervisory personnelin or- over, seems to prevent other conditions
ganizations, whichwidenstheaveragespan fromreducingtheproportion of managers.
of control. An in
increase the divisionof labor tendsto
decrease the managerialratio in the ab-
STUDY OF PUBLIC PERSONNEL AGENCIES sence of expertrequirements but increase
it in theirpresence.The hypothesisthat
This hypothesis was testedas part of a theexpertness of theoperatingstaffwidens
previouslypublishedstudy of 156 public the span of supervisory controland conse-
personnelagencies,'3and a briefsummary
1 The measurewasdichotomized in contingencies
'2 The assumptionthat less close supervision tableson thebasisof whether at leasthalfof the
widensthe span of controlis made explicitby operating staffhas to meetthisrequirement, but
A. Janger, amongothers:"If the managerprac- the actual distribution is bimodal,and in most
eitherall of the staffor noneof it
tices close supervision,. . . then he is decreasing organizations
thenumber ofpeoplehecansupervise. He broadens has to meetthiseducationalrequirement.
his span by grantingthem more authority" 'The criterion of was beinghead ofa
("Analyzingthe Span of Control,"Management divisionratherthanmanager a journeyman or apprentice,
Record,XXII [July-August, 1960],9). whichprobablyincludesmostsupervisory person-
' For a fulldiscussion, see PeterM. Blau,Wolf nel in thesesmallagencies,thoughsomechiefsof
V. Heydebrand,and Robert E. Stauffer, "The smallsections mayhavebeenexcluded, particularly
Structure of Small Bureaucracies," American So- in the fewlargeagencies(onlyseventeen have a
ciologicalReview,XXXI (1966), 179-91. staffof morethanone hundred).

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 458 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
quentlyis reflected in a low ratio of man- agreementwith the one reachedby both
agersis clearlynegatedby theseresults. Stinchcombeand Udy in theirempirical
In thelightof thesenegativefindings we studies,as well as withthe theoretical dis-
reconceptualized themeaningattributed to tinctionParsons makes between profes-
the managerialratio. Since it does not sionaland bureaucraticauthority. But our
appear reasonablethat better-trained per- researchspecifiesthe sourceof the incom-
sonnelofficers are morecloselysupervised patibility.What is inappropriatefor an
than those lacking similar qualifications, organizationstaffedby expertsis a hier-
the initial assumptionthat a higherratio archyin whichofficial authority is central-
of managersis indicativeof closersuper- ized in thehandsof fewmanagers.It seems
visionmustbe questioned.An alternative paradoxical that more managersare re-
interpretation of the significanceof this quired to direct employeeswith superior
measure,whichis compatiblewiththefind- qualifications than thoseless well trained.
ings,is thata low ratioof managersimplies The explanationlies in the implications of
a centralized authoritystructure,with a low ratio of managersalready adum-
managerialauthorityconcentratedin the brated and in the implicationsof expert
handsof comparatively fewofficials.
When qualifications.
administrative authorityis centralizedin Experttraining maybe expectedto make
few positions,managementpresumablyis a man not only moreindependent in the
carriedout largelyby a centralheadquar- performance of his duties but also more
tersthatissuesdirectivesto the operating aware of the broaderimplicationsof his
staff,whereasmanagementin a structure workand morecapableof detecting operat-
witha large proportion of authorityposi- ingproblemsand finding solutionsforthem
tionsprobablyentailsmorereciprocalad- than is an untrainedperson.Expertsare
justmentsas the resultof the greaterop- morelikelyto resenthavingtheirdiscretion
portunitiesfor communicationbetween limitedby managerialdirectivesthan em-
managerialand operatingpersonnel. ployeeswhoselesserskillsmake themwel-
The difference in assumptionsbetween come some guidance.In addition,experts
the originaland therevisedinterpretationscan make greatercontributions to the im-
of the managerialratio should be made provementof operatingproceduresthan
explicit.The initial formulation assumed men withoutspecialized training.Hence,
thatfewmanagersindicatea wide span of feedbackcommunication fromtheoperating
control,henceless close supervision, which staffis especiallyvaluableformanagement
permits subordinates to exercise more if this staffconsistsof experts.To take
autonomyin theirwork.The reconceptual- fulladvantageof the contributions experts
ization assumes that few managersimply can make to operations, management must
a centralizedauthoritystructure,which facilitatethe flowof upwardcommunica-
encouragesmanagementthroughone-sided tion.A low ratioof managerstendsto dis-
directives withlittlefeedbackfromoperat- courageupward communication, however,
ing levels,thus reducingthe autonomyof inasmuchas a smallcontingent ofmanagers
subordinates.The empiricaldata, though can mosteasilydirectoperations by issuing
theywere the basis for the revision,are ordersfroma centralheadquartersto the
not adequate to validate eitherset of as- staff.A high ratio of managersincreases
sumptions.However,the reconceptualiza- opportunitiesfor communication between
tion permitssome suggestiveconjectures. officials responsibleforadministrative and
Appointing employeeswithexpertquali- those responsiblefor operatingdecisions.
fications and institutinga centralized Such extensivetwo-waycommunication is
authority structure appearto be alternative of special importanceif the personnelhas
modesoforganization, whichare somewhat expert qualifications,not alone because
incompatible.This conclusionis in broad expertstendto be morealienatedby one-

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 OF AUTHORITY
THE HIERARCHY IN ORGANIZATIONS 459
sided directivesbut particularlybecause lyze this complexinstitution. Finally,the
they make greatercontributionsthrough inferencethat expertnesspromotesa de-
feedbackthan personswith poorerquali- centralizedauthoritystructureis highly
fications. speculative,since the implicationis that
In short,the interpretation suggestedis decision making is decentralized,but a
that the added significance the expertness largeproportion of managersis not neces-
of the stafflends to the freeflowof up- sarily indicative of decentralizationof
ward communication in organizationsac- decision making.One might even argue
counts for the associationbetweenexpert that,on the contrary, the smallerthepro-
requirements and a highratioof managers. portionof managers,the morelikelywill
We were able to mustera bit of indirect theybe to delegateresponsibilities to sub-
evidencein supportof this interpretationordinatesin order to lightenthe burden
in the studyof public personnelagencies. of theirduties.
An expertstaffimprovesoperating economy
in very small agencies,with a personnel STUDY OF GOVERNMENT FINANCE

ofless thantwenty, butit impedeseconomy DEPARTMENTS

in largeragenciesunless the clericalstaff A studyof 254 financedepartments of
is relativelylarge.In agenciesof sufficientstate and local governments made it pos-
size to makecommunication a seriousprob- sibleto testthehypothesis thatstaffexpert-
lem, the absence of an adequate clerical ness leads to decentralization of responsi-
apparatus to maintainchannels of com- bilities,and furtherto explorethe condi-
munication has an adverseeffect on operat- tionsthatinfluence thestructureof author-
ing economyif and only if the staffcon- ity in organizations.Originaldata were
sistsof experts.16 This finding impliesthat collectedforthe purposeof this studyby
expertqualificationsof operatingofficials N.O.R.C. interviewersfrom informants
enhancetheimportance of communication, (senior managers) in the major finance
indirectly supporting our interpretation. department of each government. The uni-
Nevertheless, the generalizations we ad- verse consistsof the departmentsin all
vanced rest on shaky grounds.They are states, all countieswith a populationof
based on data fromonlyonekindoforgani- more than 100,000,and all cities with a
zation, a specific type of government populationof more than 50,000, in the
agency.Besides,public personnelagencies UnitedStates,exceptthosewitha staffof
are verysmall,while bureaucratictheory fewerthan twentyor withno subdivision
presumablydeals withlarge organizations. of responsibilities intotwoor moreunits.17
(It should be noted, however,that the The sample comprisesthe entireuniverse,
stereotype ofthehugegovernment bureauc- and information was obtained from96.6
racy witha staffof thousandsis mislead- per cent of these organizations. Although
ing as far as particularagenciesof state responsibilities vary,nearlyall departments
and local governmentsare concerned, maintainfinancialrecordsand pre-audit
amongwhicha personnelof one hundred disbursements, and the majorityare also
is undoubtedlymuch above the average.) responsiblefor post-auditingother de-
Moreover,the only measureof the hier- partments,investmentmanagement,and
archyofauthority available,theproportion fixed-asset accounting.The mediandepart-
of managers,is clearlyinsufficient to ana- menthas a staffof sixty,six major sub-
and fourhierarchical
16Blau et al., op. cit., p. 189, Table 8. Among divisions, levels.
largeragencieswith an expertstaff,60 per cent of A numberof the questionsraisedby the
thosewitha low but only 23 per cent of thosewith conclusionsof the earlier study can be
a high clerical ratio operate at high cost; whereas
in largeragencieswithoutan expertstaff,high cost 17Dataon thesesmallerdepartments werealso
is as unlikelywith a low (24 per cent) as with a obtained,in thiscase by mail questionnaire,but
high clerical ratio (33 per cent). theyare notincludedin thepresent analysis.

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 460 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
answeredby thisresearch.Anothertypeof withcomparatively fewemployeesso quali-
government agencyhas now been investi- fied(Table 1, row1).19 The moreextensive
gated,makingit possibleto checkwhether data of the secondstudymake it possible
the previousfindingsmerelyreflectsome to stipulatethe structuralimplicationsof
special conditionsin personnelwork.The the higherratio of managersin organiza-
organizations underexamination are larger, tionswithmanyexperts.The employment
witha minimum size of twentyinsteadof ofan expertstaff seemsto giveriseto verti-
fiveand a medianof sixtyinsteadof seven- cal differentiation, increasingthe number
teen,and a largernumberof cases is avail- of manageriallevels in the organization.
able foranalysis,increasingthe reliability The numberof hierarchical levelstendsto
of findings. Of greatestimportanceis the be largerin departments requiringof its
fact that a varietyof measures of the personnelrelatively higheducationalquali-
structureof authoritywere deliberately ficationsthanin thosewithlowerrequire-
designedto permitrefinement of theearlier ments(row 2). The span ofcontroloffirst-
inferences.Informationwas obtained on line supervisorsis, on the average,some-
the proportionof managerialpersonnel, whatnarrower ifthestaffhas superiorqual-
specificallydefined as all officialswith ifications thanif it does not (row3).20 The
supervisoryduties; the numberof levels span of controlof middlemanagers(those
in thehierarchy(the mean forthe various betweenthe top executiveand first-line su-
divisions); the average span of control- pervisors)is, by contrast, widerin agencies
numberofsubordinates-offirst-line super- withwell-trained personnelthan in others
visorsand that of middlemanagers; the (row 4). But thesemiddlemanagershave
proportion of theirtimemanagersspendon manyfewersubordinates in any case, aver-
supervision;and the hierarchicallevel on aging less than two, than first-line super-
whichvariousspecifieddecisionsare made, visors,whose median is six subordinates.
furnishing directindicationsof delegation Managershave typicallybroaderresponsi-
of responsibilities and decentralization of bilitiesthanoperating officials,and veryfew
authority. The index of requirements
expert managers report to a single superior; ex-
is the proportionof the staffexpectedto pertqualifications presumably broadenthe
have a college degree,roughlyparallel to responsibilitiesof operating employees,
the index used in the otherstudy,'8and whichis reflected in a parallelreductionin
departments are dichotomized on the basis thenumberreporting to a singlesupervisor.
of whetherat least one-fifth of the total This consistent inverseassociationbetween
personnel(whichis about two-fifths of the scope of responsibilities and widthof span
non-clerical personnel)is expectedto meet of controlclearlyindicatesthat a narrow
the requirement of collegegraduation. span of controlmustnot be assumedto be
The basic findingreportedfrom the indicative of closenessofsupervision.2'
studyof publicpersonnelagenciesis con- The implicit assumption that proportion of
1

firmedby thisresearchon anothertypeof managersis inverselyassociated with span of con-

trol over the operatinglevel is stronglysupported
government agency; a highratioof mana- by the data. The proportion of departmentsin
gerialpersonnelis moreoftenfoundin fi- which first-linesupervisorsaverage six or more
nancedepartments witha largeproportion subordinatesis 72 per cent in the 151 with a man-
of college-trained experts than in those agerial ratio of less than one-quarterand 20 per
cent in the 102 with a highermanagerialratio.
''Althoughthenumberrequiredto have a col- 'A parallel result,showing complexityof task
legedegreein accounting as well, to be inverselyrelated to width of span of con-
was ascertained
whichwouldfurnish an indexexactlyparallelto trol,is presentedin Gerald D. Bell, "Determinants
thatusedin thepreviousstudy,thisnumber wasso of Span of Control," AmericanJournal of Sociol-
ofthestaff)thatthe ogy, LXXIII (1967), 100-109.
low (an averageof one-tenth
less stringentrequirement-collegedegreewhat- ' Bell has some direct evidence on closenessof
everthemajor-is considered to be thepreferable supervision,whichshows it to be unrelatedto span
indexof staffexpertness. of control (ibid.,p. 106).

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 THE HIERARCHY
OF AUTHORITY
IN ORGANIZATIONS 461
The utilizationof employeeswith su- sonnelseemto spendmoretimethanother
periorqualificationsraises the proportion managerson professional
workof theirown
of managersin an organization,apparently whichkeeps themin touchwiththe prob-
because it tendsto increasethe numberof lems encountered by the operatinglevel.22
manageriallevelsand decreasethespan of Such greaterinvolvement in actual opera-
controlof first-line
supervisors
withoutde- tionson thepart of managersof an expert
creasing that of higher managers. The staff,comparedto other managers,may
questionarises how the extra managerial well improvetheirqualificationsto discuss
manpoweris utilizedin departments with technicalproblemsof the workwiththeir
TABLE 1
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND AUTHORITY STRUCTURE

PROPORTIONOF STAFF
REQUIRED To HAvE B.A.*
PERCENTAGE OF FINANCE DEPARTMENTS YULE'S Q
(IN COLS. [11 AND [2]) IN WHICH: (GAMMA)
Low High
(1) (2) (3)

1. The proportionofmanagersexceedsone-quar-
ter of the total personnel
.................. 35 48 .27
(147) (106)
2. The numberof levels is fouror more ....... 36 51 .29
(148) (106)
3. The mean span of controlof first-line super-
visorsis six or more...................... 56 44 -.23t
(147) (106)
4. The mean span ofcontrolof middlemanagers
is 1.6 or more............................ 38 54 .32
(135) (100)
5. The average managerspends morethan two-
fifthsofhis timesupervising
................ 52 38 -.29
(145) (106)
6. Division heads make budgetingor accounting
decisions................................ 40 54 .26t
(122) (86)
7. An officialbelow the directorrecommends
promotionsand dismissals................. 30 45 .32
(147) (104)

* Since this variable is not associated with size, it is not necessary to control size.
t All relationships are significantbelow the .05 level except these two, which are significanton the .08 and .06
levels,respectively.

a highlyqualifiedstaff.The timeestimates subordinatesand thus to take fulladvan-

of informants permittentativeanswersto tage of the greateropportunities forcom-
thisquestion.If muchof thestaffis college municationthat the smaller numbersof
trained,managersare less likelyto spend subordinates per superiorcreate.
most of their time in actual supervision The questionofprimeinterest is whether
thanif it is not (Table 1, row 5, based on the hypothesisthat expertnesspromotes
themeanforall managers),and thisis the decentralization, which rested merelyon
case for first-linesupervisorsas well as 'One mightthinkthat the findingcould also
highermanagers.The findingthat superi- be interpreted toshowthatdepartmentswithmany
ors of expertsdevotecomparatively little expertshave more complexresponsibilities
and
timeto actuallysupervising themhelps to theirmanagersdevotemoretimeto planningand
werethatsuch
buttheinstructions
administration,
explainwhy theirnarrowspan of control activities and vir-
be includedundersupervision,
does notimplyclose supervision. Managers tuallythe onlyactivityexcluded,exceptfortop
in departments with highlyqualifiedper- executives, wouldbe workofone'sown,

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462 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
inferential conjecture,is confirmed by the tions in contemporary Americanagencies
directlypertinent data fromfinancedepart- promotehierarchicaldifferentiation.
ments.This is in fact the case. Responsi- A multilevel hierarchy is associatedwith
bilitiesof variouskindstendto be delegat- severalbasic characteristics of financede-
ed by management to lowerlevelsin agen- partments.(1) The numberof levels in-
cies where the staffhas relativelyhigh creases with increasingsize, that is, the
Thus budgeting
qualifications. and account- numberof employees (Pearsonian zero-
ingdecisionsare morelikelyto be madeby ordercorrelation, 5124). (2) Althoughthe
divisionheads ratherthan the department zero-ordercorrelationbetweennumberof
directorhimselfif the staffincludesmany levels and numberof major subdivisions25
college-trained men thanif it includesfew is virtuallyzero (- .05), thereis an in-
(Table 1, row 6). The likelihoodthat an verse associationbetweenthe two when
officialbelowthetopexecutiverecommends size is controlled(- .34). (3) The wider
promotionsand dismissalsis also greater theaveragespan of controlof middleman-
in agencieswithmanyexpertsthanin oth- agers,thelargeris thenumberof levelsin
ers (row 7). Parallel relationshipswithex- thehierarchy(.27). (4) Automation in the
pertness,thoughthey are somewhatless formof computers is associatedwithmulti-
pronounced,are revealedby otherindica- ple levels (.34). (5) Explicitwrittenpro-
tionsof decentralization of responsibilities,motionregulationsencouragehierarchical
such as thetop executive'spolicyto let his differentiation (.22). (6) The numberof
divisionheads make most decisions,and levels increasesthe more weightwritten
the fact that first-line supervisors,not examinationshave for promotions(.24),
higherofficials,formallyevaluate the per- and it decreasesthe moreweightseniority
formance of non-supervisory employees.In (- .22) and supervisory evaluations(
sum, managerialauthorityover decision .16) have forpromotions.26 (7) Decentrali-
makingappears indeed to be moredecen- zationof responsibility forpromotions and
tralizedin organizations withlargepropor- dismissalsis correlatedwithmultiplelevels
tionsof trainedexpertsthan in others. (.18). (8) The largertheproportion of em-
ployees requiredto have college degrees,
MULTILEVEL HIERARCHIES finally,the larger the numberof levels
The findingthat superiorqualifications (.16).
of the personnelin government agencies Sinceso manyfactorsare associatedwith
encouragedelegationof responsibilities is hierarchical levels,partialcorrelations were
not surprising. But what is unexpectedis computedbetweeneach of the eightand
that such superiorqualificationsare also numberoflevelsholdingconstanttheother
associatedwithverticaldifferentiation into seven. The resultsof this analysis,which
multilevelhierarchies.It is generallyas- providethebasis forthefurther discussion,
sumedthattheproliferation of hierarchical are presentedin Table 2. The multiplecor-
levels in organizationsis a sign of over- relationbetweenall eightfactorsand levels
bureaucratization and an impedimentto " Regressionanalysisis used here,partlybecause
rationaloperations, and theresultsofUdy's the numberof levels is a genuinecontinuousvari-
studyofprimitive production organizations able and so are most independentvariables, and
particularlybecause this proceduremakes it pos-
pointto thisconclusion,23 whereasthe op- sible to examine partial associationswhile holding
posite is implied by the association ob- all seven othercorrelatesconstant.
tainedherebetweenlevelsand trainingre- " The criterionof "major subdivision"is a divi-
quirements,since superior trainingun- sion whose head reportsdirectlyto the department
doubtedlyentails more rational decision director(or his deputy,if he has a singledeputy).
making.The questionarisesof whatcondi- " Only theweightof writtenpromotionexamina-
tionsis consideredin the subsequentanalysis,since
23Udy,loc. cit. the two otherfactorsare complementary to it.

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 THE HIERARCHY
OF AUTHORITY
IN ORGANIZATIONS 463
is .65. These characteristicsof financede- not the former divisions,wouldnowbe de-
partments explain43 per cent of the vari- finedas the "major subdivisions"by the
ance in hierarchicallevels,withmostof the criterion used.This changewouldalso help
differencebeingdue to threefactors-size, to explainwhynumberof levels and span
divisions,and automation. of controlof middlemanagers,whichin-
Some reflections on the considerations cludes assistant directors,are correlated
thatprobablyinfluence thedecisionto add withoutcontrols(.27) but are no longer
new levelsin the hierarchy can serveas a significantlyrelatedoncesize, subdivisions,
startingpointforinterpreting theseassoci- and otherconditionsare controlled(.11).
ations.As an organizationexpandsin size The assumptionshere are that the assist-
and complexity, it is likelythatadditional ant directors,
whoseestablishment increases
major divisionsare established,whichin- levels,havea particularly widespan of con-
creases the numberof officials directlyre- trol-hencethezero-order correlation-but
sponsibleto the departmentdirectorand thatthe introduction of thisnew level oc-
TABLE 2
CORRELATIONS WITH NUMBER OF LEVELS IN THE HIERARCHY

DATA ON

Zero-Order Partial Standard- Regression EALOYMENT

Correlation Correlation ized B* Error Zero-Order
Correlation

1. Number of employees ...................... .51 .50 .53 .06 .60

2. Number of major divisions ..... ............ -.05 -.32 -.30 .06 .19
3. Span of control of middle managers........ .. 27 .11 .09 .05 .31
4. Automation (computers)" ..... ............. .34 .23 .19 .05 .53
5. Explicit promotion regulations" .... ......... .22 .04 -.03 .06 .33
6. Weight of examinations in promotions .... . . .24 . 13 . 12 .06 b
7. Decentralization of promotion decisionsa ..... .18 .12 .09 .05 . 19
8. Proportion of staff required to have B.A ...... .16 .03 .02 .05 -.00

a These three factors are dichotomous and were used as dummy variables in the regressionanalysis. All others are continuous
variables except weight of examinations, which was coded in four categories.
b No correspondingvariable is available for the employment security study.

overburdens himwithsupervisory responsi- curs usuallyin large agenciesand reduces

bilities.To lightenthisadministrative load
of thetop executiveand freehimto devote
moretime to his primaryexecutivefunc-
tions,a fewassistantdirectorsmay be in-
stalledon a newlevelto whomthedivision
directorsreportand who in turnreportto
thedirector, just as thecreationof theU.S.
Secretaryof Health, Education,and Wel-
fareconstitutedan intermediate level be-
tweenthe Presidentand officials who for-
merlyreporteddirectlyto him.The intro-
ductionof sucha newlevel of assistantdi-
rectorswouldaccountforthe inverseasso-
ciationobservedbetweenlevels and major
subdivisionsbecause the few "superdivi-
sions" headed by the assistantdirectors,
the numberof major subdivisions-hence
the considerablylower correlationunder
thesecontrols.
Differentiationinto a multilevelhier-
archyhas evidentadvantagesforexpand-
ing organizations,accordingto these con-
jectures.In fact the numberof levels in
financedepartments increaseswithincreas-
ing size, as previouslynoted; so does the
number of major subdivisions,however
(the zero-ordercorrelationbetween size
and subdivisions being.43, nearlyas large
as thatbetweensize and levels,.51). Not
all largeagencieshave manylevelsand few
majordivisions.The inverseassociationbe-
tweenlevels and subdivisions whensize is

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464 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
controlled impliestheexistenceof twocon- dependentof direct intervention by top
trastingdepartmental structures,one that managementfurtherthe developmentof
is primarilydifferentiatedhorizontallyinto multilevelhierarchies.Advanced techno-
manymajordivisionsand one that is pri- logical equipment,inasmuchas it mecha-
marilydifferentiated verticallyinto many nizes operationsand makes themto some
levels.The questionis whatconditionsdis- degree self-regulating, often serves this
courage horizontaldifferentiation-whichfunction. The mechanization of facilitiesis
places an excessiveadministrative burden not theonlyconditionthataffectsthereli-
on top management-andencourageverti- abilityof performance, however.Regard-
instead.
cal differentiation less of how automatedoperationsare, top
The clue foransweringthis questionis managementmust rely on its managerial
providedby the othermajor correlateof staffto implementits objectivesand ad-
number of levels, namely, automation, minister its policies.Hereinlies the signifi-
whichrevealsa substantialassociationwith cance of promotion proceduresforthehier-
it (.34) thatpersistswhenotherconditions archy.Explicitpromotionregulationsfur-
are controlled(.23). Althoughextending nishuniform standardsthatall higheroffi-
the hierarchyhas administrativeadvan- cials musthave met. But thesestandards
tagesforthetop executiveofa largeorgan- assuretop management thathigherofficials
ization,it also removeshim increasingly will have adequate qualifications fortheir
fromtheoperatingleveland makesit diffi- responsibilities only if theystipulatethat
cult forhim directlyto controloperations promotionsbe based primarilyon exam-
and keep tightreinson them.This loss of inationsdesignedto testthesequalifications
close contactwiththe operatinglevel is a ratherthan on seniorityor the possibly
seriousdisadvantagefora directorwho re- idiosyncratic evaluationsof supervisors. A
lies largelyon directsupervisionforcon- significant correlationbetweenthe weight
trol,but it is not such a disadvantageif of writtenexaminations in promotions and
top managementhas institutedindirect numberof levels remainswhenothercon-
mechanismsof controland can exercise ditionsare controlled(.13), but the corre-
withtheiraid sufficient influenceon oper- lationbetweenthe existenceof promotion
ations by settingpoliciesand formulatingregulations and levelsdisappearswhenthe
programs.The automationof accounting weightofexaminations and otherconditions
proceduresthroughcomputersis just such are controlled(.04). The reasonprobably
an impersonalmechanismof controlin fi- is that only promotionregulationsthat
nancedepartments. It places muchcontrol- give merit examinationsmuch weight
ling influenceover operationsinto the guaranteethatall managerialofficials have
handsof thetop executives whosedecisions certain minimumqualificationsand thus
determinethe over-allsetup of the auto- reducetop management's reluctanceto lose
matedfacilitiesand thenatureof thecom- directcontactwith the operatinglevel by
puterprograms, therebyobviatingtheneed establishing intervening layersin the hier-
formuchdirectsupervision. The assembly archy.
line servessimilarfunctionsin factories.27 The more top managementtruststhe
Since automationservesas a controlmech- middlemanagerswhoconstitute its admin-
anismthatgreatlyreducesthemaindisad- istrativearm to dischargetheirresponsi-
vantage of multilevelhierarchies,it fur- bilities in accordancewith its guidelines
therstheirdevelopment.28
I It is also possiblethatthecausal directionis
The generalprinciplesuggestedis that
theoppositefromthatassumed above,whichwould
conditionsin organizationsthat make the meanthatagencieswithmultiple levelsare more
reliableperformance of dutiesrelativelyin- likelythanothersto introduceautomation, quite
possiblybecausetheybenefit
particularly
fromits
2'Blau andScott,op. cit.,pp. 176-78. functionas a control
mechanism.

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 THE HIERARCHY
OF AUTHORITY
IN ORGANIZATIONS 465
and directives, the moreinclinedit will be TWO CONTRASTINGTYPES
in all likelihoodto delegateresponsibilities In conclusion,some inferencesabout
to them.The implication is thatthedegree two contrasting typesof formalorganiza-
of confidence top executivesplace in their tion will be drawn fromthe associations
managerialassistancewill promotedecen- withmultilevelhierarchy observed.One of
tralizationof authorityas well as multi- thesetypesmay be consideredthe modern
levelhierarchies. If thissurmiseis correct, organizationgoverned by universalistic
it could explain why the zero-ordercor- standards; the other representsthe old-
relation between number of levels and fashionedbureaucracy.
decentralization (.18) is reducedto a point A fundamentalissue confrontingthe
that falls just shortof significance at .05 executivesof organizationsis whetherto
whenotherconditionsthat affectmanage- manage primarilyby means of director
ment'strustare controlled(.12). indirectcontrols.Managementthroughdi-
Entrancerequirements thatdemandcom- rectcontrolsentailskeepingin close touch
parativelyhighqualifications of employees with operationsand issuingcorrectiveor-
undoubtedly improvetheirabilitiesto per- ders whenever necessary. Management
form their duties without close super- throughindirectcontrolsinvolves devis-
vision.The interpretation advancedimplies, ing impersonalcontrol mechanismsthat
therefore, thattheproportion of theagency constrainoperationsto follow automati-
personnelexpectedto have collegedegrees cally the policies and programsspecified
and the numberof levelsin the hierarchy by top executives.The substitution of in-
are positivelyrelated.As a matterof fact, direct mechanismsof control for direct
such a positivezero-ordercorrelationhas controlrequiresthatan orientation to ab-
been observed(.16), but controlling other stractuniversalistic standardsreplace re-
conditionsreducesthis correlationto the liance on personaljudgments.The devel-
vanishingpoint (.03). The proportionof opmentof theseimpersonalcontrolmech-
employeeswith college trainingis not anisms is most likely if technicalcon-
stronglyassociatedwith any of the other siderationsand effective performance are
controlvariablesunderconsideration, but supremevalues, whereasideologicalcom-
it is somewhatcorrelatedwithfourof them mitmentsand particularisticsolidarities
(between.12 and .14), itsmostpronounced havelittlesignificance.29
zero-ordercorrelationbeing that with de- Today the prototypeof an impersonal
centralization(.14). A plausible explana- controlmechanismis the computer,which
tionof thispatternof findings can be de- dramaticallyillustrateshow technological
rivedif expertqualifications are viewedas facilitiesautomateoperationsand simul-
simplyone elementin a configuration of taneously give top management-whose
of conditionsindicativeof operationsthat decisionsgovernthe basic computersetup
are relativelyself-regulating and independ- -much controlover themwithoutrequir-
ent of directintervention by management. ing frequentdirectintervention. Not only
As partof thisconfiguration, the qualifica-
the operationsthemselves but also the re-
tionsof employeesare associatedwiththe
cruitmentof employeesand that of the
development of multilevelhierarchies. But
once the otherfactorsthatmanifestinde- managerial stafftend to becomestandard-
pendence of managerialintervention are ized in the modernorganizationin terms
controlled, includingthoseto whichexpert of universalistic principlesof effective per-
qualificationsdirectlycontribute,such as formance. Explicit personnelregulations
decentralization, the entiresignificance of stipulatemeritcriteriaforemployment and
qualificationsfor the hierarchyhas been I It isevidentthatthisorientation
is inappropri-
takenintoaccount,and theyare no longer ate forcertainkindsof organizations, suchas re-
associatedwiththenumberof levels. or ideological
ligiouscongregations politicalparties.

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466 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
for advancementto managerialpositions, insofaras promotionstandardsdo exist,
relievingtop managementof administra- theytend to give weightto seniorityand
tive tasks,lesseningthe influenceof per- personaljudgments ofsuperiorsratherthan
sonal bias and variationsin judgmentover objective merit criteria, thus implicitly
personneldecisions,and assuringminimum placing the importanceof loyalty above
Both the automationof the thatof technicalcompetence.
qualifications.
workprocessand the meritstandardsthat A finalquestionto be raisedis whether
the managerialand operatingstaffmust theseconclusionsconcerning two contrast-
meetcontribute to thereliableperformance ing typesof formalstructureapply to all
of dutiesand helpto makeoperationscom- workorganizations (thoseemploying people
parativelyself-regulating withintheframe- to performtasks), or only to government
work of the organization'sobjectivesand agencies,or perhaps only to government
management'spolicies. These conditions financedepartments.The methodological
reduce management'sneed to keep close point made in the introduction bears re-
directcontrolover operationsand, conse- peating in this connection: generalizing
quently,oftengive rise to major changes beyondthe data is necessaryforscientific
in the hierarchy. To wit,verticaldifferen-cumulationbecause such generalizing sup-
tiationcreatesa multilevelhierarchy,which plies the sole connectionbetweendifferent
usually decreases the numberof major empiricalstudies.The findingthat multi-
divisionswhoseheads reportto theagency level financedepartmentsin the United
directorand increasesthe span of control States have fewermajor divisions than
of thesedivisionheads,and responsibilitiesothersof the same size, for example,can
becomedecentralized.The strongestpres- neitherbe negated nor confirmed by re-
sure to instituteimpersonalmechanisms of searchon otherorganizations, fortheasso-
control,and thustheconditionsthatfacili- ciation between levels and divisions in
tate thesestructuralchanges,comes from another type of agency simply has no
the expandingsize of organizations. directbearingon it. Onlyiftheinvestigator
In short, the modern organizationis is willingto advance generalizations that
characterized by a tall,slimhierarchy with referto broaderconceptsthanhis empirical
decentralized authority. The oppositetype, data-all work organizationsor vertical
which may be called an old-fashioned differentiation ofanykind-is it possibleto
bureaucracy,has a squat hierarchywith replicateor refutehis conclusionsand ulti-
authoritycentralizedat the top. In this matelyto developa scientific theory.
case, which is most prevalentin smaller Hence the empiricalfindingsfromthe
organizations, the top executivemaintains study of financedepartments are deliber-
tight controlover operationsby directly ately used to suggesttentativeprinciples
supervising manydivisionheads,assigning about workorganizations in general,to be
each of themonly few subordinates,re- testedand appropriately modified in future
fraining from introducingintermediate research, just as theinferences drawnin our
levelsthatwouldincreasehis distancefrom earlierstudywere testedand refinedthis
theoperatingpersonnel, and delegatingfew one. Some indicationthat the conclusions
responsibilities.The lesser interestin im- abouthierarchical structureare at leastnot
personalmechanisms ofcontrolunderthese restrictedto financedepartmentsis pro-
circumstances is reflectedin the rare in- videdby a preliminary analysisof data on
stancesof automationand in thenatureof quite anothertypeof government agency.
the personnelpolicies.Explicitregulations The stateemployment securityagenciesin
that specifypersonnelqualificationsare this countryare large roof organizations,
infrequent;promotionsare largely left each consisting of a stateheadquarters and
underthe discretionof management;and an averageof fortylocal officesdispersed

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 THE HIERARCHY IN ORGANIZATIONS
OF AUTHORITY 467
throughoutthe state, and their median These parallelslend some credibilityto
size is morethanten timesthatof finance the claimthatthe propositions about hier-
departments.Despite these differences,archical differentiation suggestedin this
mostofthefactorsassociatedwithmultiple paper are fairlygeneralprinciplesabout
levelsin financedepartments revealsimilar workorganizations, or in any case about
zero-order correlationsin stateemployment the governmentagencies among them,
agencies,even thoughseveralof the meas- thoughfurtherresearchwill undoubtedly
ures are far fromidentical(compare the call for revisionsand refinements. The
last withthefirstcolumnin Table 2). Con- tentativeconclusion is that impersonal
trollingsize tendsto increasethesimilarity; mechanisms of control,such as automation
forinstance,numberof divisionsand num- and meritpersonnelstandards,help trans-
ber of levelsare inverselycorrelatedwhen formflat structuresin which the chief
size (after logarithmictransformation) is executiveexercisesmuch personalcontrol
controlled in employment securityagencies into multilevelhierarchieswithdecentral-
(-.37), as theyarein financedepartments ized authority.
( .34). UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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